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TANTRAVĀRTTIKA.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

KUMĀRILA BHATTA

TANTRAVĀRTTIKA

A COMMENTARY ON ŚABARA'S BHĀṢYA
ON THE PŪRVAMIMĀNSĀ SŪTRAS OF JAIMINI.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY

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ADHYĀYA III.

ĀśHA-LAKṢHAṆA.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARĀṆA (1).

(*Laying down the subject to be considered.*)

Sūtra (1). Now then, the Āśha-Adhyāya.

The vermillion-complexioned, elephant-headed god, the Great Gaṇapati, embraced by Siddhi and Lakṣmī, the destroyer of obstacles—in Him I take my refuge !

With this *sūtra*, the author proceeds to explain whatever remains to be explained, after all that has been said in the first two *Adhyāyas*.

We have seen that the Author of the Bhāṣya, while setting forth all that is meant by the highly suggestive first *sūtra*, has fully explained, in the first two *Adhyāyas*, the means of knowing *Dharma*, as well as its Form, all about which is merely briefly hinted at in the second *sūtra*; and then, in the remaining *Adhyāyas* he has fully dealt with all other questions connected with *Dharma* that demand consideration—such as, what are the means of accomplishing *Dharma*, that are the auxiliaries helping it in its fruition?—what are not such means and hence no auxiliaries, not according it any help?—in what actions the Agent is the principal factor, the actions bringing about results desired by him?—in which of them he is only a secondary factor, the Actions not bringing about any such results ?

Thus then, we find that the word 'Āśha-lakṣhaṇa' means the 'remaining *Adhyāyas*.' Though the *Adhyāyas* referred to are many, yet the word is in the singular number, in view of the singleness of the class 'Lakṣhaṇa' (or 'Adhyāya,' to which all *Adhyāyas* belong).

Though in the next *sūtra* we find 'Āśha' defined as *that which is auxiliary to another* (and as such the word 'Āśha-lakṣhaṇa' in the first *sūtra* should be taken as meaning the 'definition of Āśha'), yet all that it can be taken to show is that, the Author begins with the explanation of 'Auxiliary character,' which is one of the many subjects to be dealt with in the 'remaining *Adhyāyas*.'

That is to say, there being many things to be dealt with, he could begin with any one of them only, and consequently, in due course, he begins, in the second *sūtra*, with an explanation of 'Çēsha' or 'Auxiliary character,' which is based upon the fact of *its being for another's purpose* and which forms the subject of the third *Adhyāya*.

The compound 'Çēsha-lakṣhaṇam' may be expounded in two different ways, affording two distinct significations of the sentence: (1) As *Karma dhāraya*: 'Çēsham'—remaining—*lakṣhaṇam*—*Adhyāya*; (2) As *Genitive Tatpurusha*: 'Çēshasya lakṣhaṇam'—Definition of auxiliary character. Or even if we accept this latter expounding only, then, too, there is no much difference in the sense of the *sūtra*. For, in that case, the word 'Çēsha-lakṣhaṇam' meaning 'the definition of auxiliary character,' it is a parts of this definition that the other subjects are dealt with in the subsequent *Adhyāyas*.

That is to say, all the subjects dealt with in the subsequent *Adhyāya*—*viz.*, the question of the Instigator and the Instigated (iv), the six means of ascertaining the order of sequence (v), the capability or title to the performance of certain sacrifices (vi), etc., etc.—all are particular features relative to auxiliaries; and as such, even though they happen to be dealt with in other *Adhyāyas*, they are spoken of as included in the 'Definition of Çēsha or Auxiliary.'

For instance, (1) it is the Auxiliary that is the Instigator of it Primary (and hence the subject of the Fourth *Adhyāya* is dependent upon the definition of the Auxiliary).

(2) As for the Order of sequence (dealt with in the Fifth *Adhyāya*) that too is a 'Çēsha' (Auxiliary), dependent upon the *Prayogavacana* (the collective Injunction laying down the performance of the Primary along with all its Auxiliaries). That is to say, when various Primaries, each bringing about an independent result, or various subsidiaries of a single Primary leading to a single result, happen to be enjoined by a single collective Injunction, it is found impossible for all of them to be performed simultaneously; and as such the order of their sequence becomes a necessary auxiliary factor in their performance; and this order is ascertained by the six means of Direct Assertion, Implication, Sequence of the Texts, Position, Order of the Primary, and Order of Actual Performance.

(3) It is only as auxiliary to the sacrifice that the Performer has his title to the performance (considered in the sixth *Adhyāya*); as the Performer being the accomplisher of that which is to be accomplished (by means of the Action), (it is he that is the real auxiliary to Actions);—what is material to the Action? Specially so as the fact of the Performer being auxiliary to the Action is shown by the *sūtra* itself, as based upon

the fact of his being distinctly enjoined for the sake of the Action—*vide Sūtra III—i—5*.

In the same manner, the latter six *Adhyāyas* treat of the subjects of the existence of auxiliaries, the forms, and extent, etc., with regard to such Primaries as have no auxiliaries distinctly laid down.

For instance, Adh. VII having established the existence of auxiliaries for such Primaries, Adh. VIII serves to show what are the auxiliaries of which action, and from where they are obtained;—Adh. IX shows that in the Veda, the principal factor being its meaning, the form of the auxiliary depends upon the due ascertainment of the meaning of texts bearing upon it;—in Adh. X, we have the question of the Exclusion and Inclusion of auxiliaries;—Adh. XI deals with the extent of the performance, as ascertained by *Tantra* (Contraction) and *Āvāpā* (Expansion);—and Adh. XII shows that, in the matter of auxiliaries, if the auxiliaries accomplished in connection with one set of actions be accepted as helping in another action also,—then, this latter action having its purposes served by the auxiliaries of another, it will be necessary for us to assume very few auxiliaries; while, on the contrary, it would be necessary to make a vast number of assumptions.

Or, it may be that the third Adhyāya is the only '*Āśha-lakṣhaṇa*,' and it is this alone that is introduced by the *sūtra* in question. As for the other *Adhyāyas*, we find each of them prefaced by an independent *sūtra*. Consequently it is the third Adhyāya alone that treats of the Auxiliary character, together with all things related to it.

The word '*atha*' in the *sūtra* may be taken in any one, or all together, of its three senses of *sequence*, *dependence on what has been explained before*, and *introduction*. The sense of the *sūtra* thus comes to be that—'we proceed with the Definition of *Āśha*, which depends upon a due *Differentiation of Actions*, that has been dealt with in the immediately preceding *Adhyāya*.'

In answer to the question as to why we proceed with the *Āśha-lakṣhaṇa*,—we have the word '*ataḥ*' ('then'), which mentions the reason; the sense being—Inasmuch as without the knowledge of one Action being different from another, we could not understand what '*Āśha*' (or Auxiliary) means, we proceed to explain this latter, immediately after the treatment of the Difference of Actions. That is to say, the relationship of the Auxiliary and the Primary is possible only between things that are distinct from one another; for when two things are identical, neither of them could be spoken of as auxiliary to the other.

Then again, immediately after the Difference of Actions, it becomes necessary to explain the Auxiliary character; because the due consideration of all other questions—relating to the Instigator, etc.,—depends upon the ascertainment of the Auxiliary character.

In this alone lies the connection between the two Adhyāyas (II and III); and as this is mentioned fully in the *sūtra* itself, the *Bhāṣya* does not take the trouble of explaining it over again. The case of Adh. II was different; the first *sūtra* of that *Adhyāya* did not point out any connection with the preceding *Adhyāya*; consequently, in that place, we had the *Bhāṣya* explaining the connection in detail, in the sentences *Prathamā Adhyāyā*, etc., etc. As a matter of fact, we find that the *Adhyāyas* are related in the subjects that they treat of, and not in the mere verbal form of the texts; and hence the *Bhāṣya* took the trouble of explaining the connection between Adhyāyas I and II, after having shown in brief what had gone in the preceding *Adhyāya*, and what was coming in the one just then begun. In the present instance however we find that the connection between the Adhyāyas II and III has been distinctly shown by the words 'atha' and 'ataḥ' of the *sūtra* itself; and it is to that alone that the *Bhāṣya* merely refers by the sentence—*The Adhyāya dealing with Distinct Actions has been finished.*

And in this sentence, the *Bhāṣya* has spoken of 'Difference' alone, as forming the principal factor in the question dealt with in Adh. II,—and it does not make any mention of the other supplementary matters therein dealt with,—because it is the Difference of Actions alone that helps in the explanation of Auxiliary character.

The reason why at the beginning of Adh. II the *Bhāṣya* has spoken of in detail of every question dealt with in the preceding *Adhyāya*, is that due ascertainment of the Difference of Actions depends upon every one of the details dealt with in the First *Adhyāya*, which deals with the Means of knowing *Dharma*, duly divided into (1) Injunctions, (2) Valedictory Passages, (3) Mantras, (4) Smṛti-regulations, (5) Injunctions of accessories, (6) Names, (7) and (8) the Ascertainment of doubtful points by means of subsequent sentences and the character of the purpose served.

For instance, (1) in the '*Abhyāsādhikaraṇa*,' we have the assertion '*aviśeṣhādanarthakam hi syāt*' (in *Sūtra* II—ii—2), on the sole strength of the previous definition of the Veda as the means of knowing *Dharma*. As a matter of fact, we find that when there is nothing else to be enjoined the Injunctive Word cannot but be taken as laying down the form of an Action; and as such it must point out an Action different from all that may have been already laid down; and thus we find that the differentiation of Actions is wholly dependent upon the knowledge of the character of *Injunctions*.

(2) In the case of the three sentences—‘*Vishṇurupāṇṇu yashtavyaḥ, etc.*’ (dealt with in *Sūtras* II—ii—9, etc.), we find that it is only when they are recognized as valedictory passages that they are not taken as laying down three distinct sacrifices; because of the fact of Valedictory Passages having no injunctive potency (as shown in *Adh. I, Pāda ii*). That is to say, we find these sentences, occurring in the midst of the mention of the anomaly of ‘*Jāmi*’ (interruption), having the character of valedictory passages, on account of their forming part of the intermediate Injunction; and as such having no independent injunctive potency, they are not taken as laying down three distinct sacrifices with Vishṇu, etc., as their deities.

(3) Inasmuch as the *mantras* serve the purpose of indicating things relative to what has been enjoined,—the ‘*Gōdāna*’ and the ‘*Āyajña*’ are not taken as distinct actions, on the sole ground of repetition. That is to say, the *mantras* have their injunctive potency suppressed by such causes as the presence of the word ‘*yat*,’ words of address, the First Person, and so forth; and hence even though they are spoken of as the means of accomplishing *Dharma*, yet they do not serve to point out one action as being different from another, even in the case of such *mantras* as ‘*Dēvaṅṣa yābhīryajātē dadāti ca, etc.*’ where we have various verbs.

(4) It is through the due ascertainment of the bearing of the grammatical rules dealing with the significations of words, that we come to accept the difference of ‘*Homa*’ from ‘*Yāga*,’ on the ground of the former involving a further action of *throwing in*. Similarly also, the Actions are not differentiated by such names as ‘*kāṭhaka*’ and the like, simply because grammatical rules distinctly make these the names of books, for certain reasons therein mentioned. Though the fact of such names being *coined* ones has been urged by some people as an argument against the eternality of words,—yet the Author admits it so far as explaining it as based upon certain causes. That is to say, the word ‘*kāṭhaka*’ means ‘*that which is taught by Kāṭha*,’ in accordance with the rule ‘*tēna proktam*’; and hence it is a *book* that is *taught*, and not the *matter*, which latter is only *performed*; and thus, inasmuch as we have a grammatical rule distinctly laying down the nominal affix in ‘*kāṭhaka*’ as signifying *that which is taught by Kāṭha*, we must take it as the name of a *book*, as it is a book alone that can be taught and explained.

(5) Accessories with new relationships (II—ii—23), and (6) Names also serve to differentiate Actions; and hence a due knowledge of the character of the Accessory and the Name is necessary in the matter of the differentiation of Actions. *

(7) In the case of the *Prājāpatyas*, there arises a question as to their forming a single sacrifice, or so many distinct sacrifices;—and this is

decided by the help of the supplementary sentence that 'The modifications of a sacrifice are to be performed in the same manner as that sacrifice itself.'

(8) Inasmuch as the number 'seventeen' could not be accomplished, without a due knowledge of the extent of the sacrifice,—in this case, we have the doubt settled by 'Purpose' (or use).

Thus it is for these reasons that, at the beginning of Adh. II, the *Bhāṣya* has briefly recalled all that has been explained in the preceding *Adhyāya*,—with a view to show the connection of the *Adhyāya* in question. In the present case, however, the Auxiliary character depending only upon the Difference of Actions, there is no use of the other details explained in Adh. II; and hence it is this 'Difference' alone that is spoken of in the *Bhāṣya*.

But this is not the only reason for the very brief reference, in the *Bhāṣya*, to the matter of the previous *Adhyāya*; because, just as at the beginning of Adh. II, so on the present occasion also, much useful purpose would be served by such recapitulation of the conclusions previously arrived at.

For instance, (1) the Auxiliary character of Actions is to be spoken of by Jaimini (III—i—4), as based upon the fact of their being connected with Results brought about by that which is signified by verbs, as shown in the Introductory portion of Adh. II (II—i—1);—(2) in III—i—7, he will establish the restricted applications of the details of *Ājya*, *Aushadhi* etc., in accordance with the difference in the Resultant *Apūrvas*, which has been shown (II—i—5) to be based upon the Difference of Actions;—(3) in connection with the various subjects dealt with in Adh. II, we have found therein the definition of '*Rk*,' '*Yajush*' and '*Sāman*'; and these definitions will be utilized in the *Sūtra* III—iii—1 *et seq.*

Consequently we must conclude that, inasmuch as there are two ways of dealing with a subject,—one that is brief, and another a detailed one,—the *Bhāṣya* makes use of one way in one place, and of the other at another; and hence there is nothing incongruous in its adopting the briefer method on the present occasion.

Thus then, the two meanings of the word '*atha*' having been explained, we have, thereby, also shown the connection between the two *Adhyāyas* (II and III).

If, however, it be found that the Connection is already implied by other means, then, with a view to avoid the unnecessary repetition, we can take the word '*atha*' as signifying *Adhikāra* (the propriety of consideration or inquiry), (and as such referring to what is to come in the *Adhyāya*, and not to what has gone in the preceding *Adhyāyam*).

In the first *sūtra* of Adh. I, we have not taken the word '*ulla*' as

denoting *Adhikāra*; because what is mentioned in the *sūtra* is the 'desire to know *Dharma*'; and this *Desire* is not what is found to be taken up for consideration; consequently all that that *sūtra* could be taken to mean was that 'we should now proceed to point out that which should be *done immediately after* the study of the *Veda*' (and after such study what is necessary to do is to have a desire for knowing *Dharma*). Even though the *knowledge of Dharma* was also found mentioned therein, as qualifying that *Desire*, yet that *knowledge* would come by itself to the disciples, by the mere explanation of the meaning of the *Veda*; and consequently, it could not be taken as a fit object to be mentioned, either by the *sūtra* or the *Bhāṣya* or the later commentators, as befitting of consideration. Specially as that which, in the assertion of the speaker, appears as an object deserving of consideration, cannot be expressed by the expression 'desire to know' for one who hears that assertion.

In the present case, on the other hand, we find that the 'Definition of Auxiliary character' is quite capable of being explained as deserving of consideration, either in the shape of the *Adhyāya*, or in that of what is therein mentioned. The meaning of the *sūtra* thus comes to be this—'Henceforth the Definition of the Auxiliary should be regarded as the object of consideration, and it should be carefully grasped and listened to.' Inasmuch as there is no room (after what has been dealt with in Adh. II) for any other *Adhyāya*, we can very reasonably speak of the 'Definition of Auxiliary' as the *object of consideration*.

Nor can there be any doubt as to the propriety of the consideration of Auxiliary character, on this occasion, in preference to any other subject; because a due understanding of all that is said in the subsequent *Adhyāyas* depends upon a correct comprehension of the Auxiliary Character. That is to say, the latter six *Adhyāyas*, dealing, as they do, of Implications as preceded by Direct Injunction, stand in need of the completion of the former six *Adhyāyas*, which treat of Injunction. So also, the Capability of Performance (dealt with in the sixth *Adhyāya*) is ascertained as existing in the Performer, in the shape of his power to perform the Action in the way that it is enjoined; and as such, a treatment of this could not but follow after a due comprehension of all Injunctions, up to the order of sequence (of the actions to be performed) (dealt with in Adh. V); as it is only when the weight to be carried has been duly ascertained beforehand, that we could ascertain whether a certain person is capable of carrying it. Then, the order of sequence, both direct and implied, is held to be dependent upon the character of the Instigating Action (treated of in Adh. IV); and it is for this reason that the order of sequence is treated of after Adh. IV. Then again, it is the Principal Action that is the Instigator of the Auxiliaries, which are not instigated

by anything else; and hence it is only right that we should treat of the character of the Instigator after that of the Auxiliary has been fully dealt with.

Thus then, the propriety of the taking up of the Definition of Auxiliary having been fully established, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show that there are various ways in which the Auxiliary can be defined,—these ways consisting of the due treatment of the Form, the Cause, and the Relationship of the Auxiliaries, also with the comparative strength and weakness of the means whereby they are recognized.

Objection : “ It is as necessary to know the Principals as the “ Auxiliaries; because so long as any one of these is unknown, there can “ be no performance.”

Reply : It is true that both should be duly known; but it is not necessary to speak of both in the *sūtra*; because the definition of one would necessarily imply that of the other.

Then there remains the question as to whether the *sūtras* should deal directly with the Principals or with the Auxiliaries; from the fact of the treatment of both being equally difficult, and leading practically to the same result, it would seem as if the matter were altogether optional; in fact at first sight, it would appear more reasonable that the treatment should be of the Principals, because they form the chief factor; but still this is not what is done; and the reason is that if the *sūtra* began with the definition of the Principal, it would be necessary for it to mention that of the Auxiliary also; because the Principal (‘ *Āśakti* ’) is explained as that which has many Auxiliaries (*Āśhas*); and hence the character of the former could not be comprehended without a due comprehension of the latter; consequently even though the Auxiliary is the subordinate factor, yet it is of this that the *sūtra* gives the definition; specially as that of the Principal follows from that (and does not require a separate mention).

Another reason for this is that Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and the rest, all tend to ascertain the character of the Auxiliary; and it is as a necessary concomitant of this that the Principal becomes indirectly defined as that which has that Auxiliary. And the comparative strength and weakness of these—Direct Assertion, etc., when they appear conjointly,—that will be treated of later on, will be found to pertain to the Auxiliary; because there is no incompatibility amongst them with regard to the Principal.

It is for these reasons that the present *sūtra* lays down the subject to be dealt with as the Definition of the Auxiliary, together with all the various means of ascertaining that character.

The questions to be dealt with in this connection are thus enumerated in the *Bhāṣya* : (1) ‘ *What is an Auxiliary ?* ’ This means that we shall

consider the form of the Auxiliary. (2) 'Why is it an Auxiliary?' This is to say, we shall explain that character of the Auxiliary which entitles us to call it an Auxiliary. (3) 'Which is the Auxiliary of which Principal?' That is to say, we shall explain the process of performance, by which the Auxiliary is attached to one Principal and not to the other,—this conclusion either involving, or not involving, the indicative power of one or the other means of ascertaining such character; and in this connection we shall explain the form of these six means—Direct Assertion and the rest,—as also their comparative strength and weakness.

Thus then, in the *First Pāda*, we shall treat of the applicability of Auxiliaries as shown by Direct Assertion; as also of certain other matters connected with it. In the *Second Pāda*, we shall treat of the applicability shown by the Indirect Indication of words. In the *Third Pāda*, we shall bring forward the aforesaid two Means (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power), and proceed to arrive at the correct conclusion by means of reconciling these two, by considering them from beginning to end; and thus even without the explicit mention of "Syntactical Connection," we shall speak of the applicability of Auxiliaries based upon this Connection—in the *Sūtra* III—iii—2; and after this we shall explain the *sūtras* dealing with the Applicability based upon the other three authorities, of Context, Order and Name. After that will follow the *Adhikarana* dealing with the comparative strength of these six authorities. Then we shall consider the question of the contradiction and non-contradiction of Context by Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication,—this explanation extending as far as the *Sūtra* III—vi—18. After that, up to the *Sūtra* III—vii—18, we shall deal with the contradiction and non-contradiction of Order by the former four Authorities. Then with a certain amount of introductory matter, there will follow the consideration of the contradiction and non-contradiction of the former five by *Name*; and with this the *Adhyāya* will end.

It is these matters to be dealt with that are referred to in the Bhāṣya—'tat tātparjñā, etc.' The purpose served by this brief reference to what is to follow makes it more easily comprehensible. And as all these details were mentioned in a body in the first *sūtra*, it was not necessary to have a *sūtra* for every one of them.

ADHIKARAṆA (2).

[*The Definition of Auxiliary.*]

Sūtra (2): That which is done for the sake of another is called the Auxiliary; because it is for the sake of another.

Inasmuch as the definition of the Principal would follow from that of the Auxiliary, we have in the *sūtra* a definition of the latter only. And inasmuch as the 'Çēsha' has many significations—'That which exceeds,' etc., etc.,—the *sūtra* distinctly mentions a reason '*because it is for the sake of another*'; which shows that the word is here used as synonymous with such words as 'Aṅga,' 'Guṇa,' 'Dharma' and the like. And this mention of the reason also serves to set aside the theories that base the character of the Auxiliary upon Invariable Concomitance, etc.

Inasmuch as the *sūtra* lays down two distinct facts,—one directly and another by implication,—it is necessary to interpret it in such a way as to avoid a syntactical split,—just as we did in the case of *Sūtra* I—i—2. That is to say, we must take the *sūtra* as meaning that—'The Auxiliary is nothing other than that which is done for the sake of another' and 'Its character is not based upon any other cause'; and in this way the *Conclusion* and the *Premiss* (embodied in the *sūtra*) come to be taken as dovetailed together (and hence there is no syntactical split).

There are five different theories as to the character of the Auxiliary; (1) some people explain it as that which is *invariably concomitant*; (2) others as that which is *instigated*; (3) others as that which *exceeds*; (4) others as that which appears at the end of the Injunction; and (5) many people explain it as that which *helps*.

(1) The sense of the first is this: "That which does not appear without another, and which appears when that other appears, is its Auxiliary; "e.g., the sprout does not appear without moisture, and the jar without the Clay, the Rod, the Wheel, etc., and hence these are known as Auxiliaries to those two."

Against this we have the following reasons: It is not proper to regard the Auxiliary as the Invariable Concomitant; because this definition would be too wide; inasmuch as we find even such things to be so concomitant as are not Auxiliaries; as for instance, the qualities of Colour, Touch, etc., are always Concomitant in Earth; and certainly none of these is Auxiliary to any other, all of them being equally predominant. Then again, we find that there are no *Slaves* or *Houses* without the *Master*; and certainly the

Master is never known as Auxiliary to them. Then again, in certain cases (as in that of the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*, each of which is composed of three independent sacrifices), we find a number of Principals to be concomitant; and according to the above theory, they would become Auxiliary to one another. Similarly Primaries and Subsidiaries, as also a number of Subsidiaries, would become mutual Auxiliaries, if the character of the Auxiliary consisted of Invariable Concomitance only. Then again, Vedic Study, Laying of Fire, Agriculture, and Earning of Wealth, etc., would all have to be taken as Auxiliaries to Sacrifices, as no performance of sacrifices is ever possible without these.

(2) In view of these objections, the upholder of the second theory argues thus: "Irrespective of Invariable Concomitance, we must admit that to be the Auxiliary which is instigated by another. This saves us from the above objections, as neither the Master is instigated by the Slaves, nor is there any mutual instigation among Colour, etc."

But this too cannot be accepted as the correct definition of the Auxiliary; because the definition is too wide, as well as too narrow. For instance, the *Purodāçakapīla* is not instigated by the 'Removal of the Chaff,' because it is an established entity already; and yet it is accepted as its Auxiliary; and on the other hand, though the *Homas* are actually instigated by such causes as the *breaking of the vessel*, the *destruction of the Cake*, etc., yet they are not accepted as Auxiliaries to these.

(3) Then we have the third theory, as follows: "That which is found to be enjoined, in excess of something already enjoined, is the Auxiliary to this latter; and thus the character of the Auxiliary consists of being an *Excess*. For instance, in all cases we find that the Injunctions of the Subsidiaries are over and above those of the Fruitful Primary; and the Subsidiaries also are something over and above the Primaries; and in all these cases we find the character of the Auxiliary consisting in *Excess*."

Against this it may be argued that this definition also is too wide; as it applies to the Primaries also; because the Primaries are as much in excess of the Subsidiaries, as the Subsidiaries are in excess of the Primaries (and hence the definition is equally applicable to both).

(4) Then, we have the fourth theory, which is as follows: "Inasmuch as we always find the Injunctions of Auxiliaries appearing after those of the Primaries, we must conclude the Auxiliary character to consist in this fact of being enjoined at the end of the Injunction. In connection with the declaration that 'the modifications of sacrifices should be performed in the same way as their originals' we find Jaimini also (later on) speaking of the Auxiliaries as being laid down at the end of Injunctions. Consequently we must conclude that the

"character of the Auxiliary, accepted by Jaimini, consists in the fact of its being enjoined by the tail-end of an Injunction, as capable of supplying the details of procedure wanted in connection with the Primary enjoined at the beginning of that Injunction."

To this theory we make the following reply : we cannot admit this to be a correct definition of Auxiliary character ; because as a matter of fact, we actually find that character belonging to Actions laid down in the beginning, in the middle, as well as at the end of Injunctions. That is to say, if in all cases we invariably found the Injunctions of Auxiliaries appearing at the tail-end of the Sentences and the Context, then we could accept that as the universal mark of the Auxiliary ; but as a matter of fact we find them laid down in the beginning, the middle as well as the end. For instance, we find such details, as the *chopping of branches*, etc., laid down at the very beginning of the Primary *Darṣa* sacrifice ; and hence, according to your definition, they could not serve as the Auxiliaries of that sacrifice. Then, we find, in many cases, the Material and the Deity laid down along with the sacrifice itself, and these too would not be Auxiliaries, as not laid down at the end. Thus then, we conclude that we cannot accept the fact of being laid down at the tail-end of Injunctions as the sole definition of the Auxiliary ; because we find that in many cases, where the sentence or the context begins with the laying down of Subsidiaries, when we come to look for the result to be accomplished by these subsidiaries, we come across the Injunction of the Primary Sacrifice, which stands in need of the mention of its method of procedure ; and as this want of the Primary is supplied by the former Subsidiaries, these come to be taken as its Auxiliaries, even though they happen to be laid down at the beginning of the Injunction.

(5) Then there remains the fifth theory, which may be thus summed up : "That should be accepted as the Auxiliary of another which is found to help it ; in this way the *Homa* cannot be the auxiliary of the *Breaking of the Vessel*, etc. ; because the *Homa* does not help the *Breaking* ; in fact it is the latter that helps the former. In the Veda too we do not find any other cause of auxiliary character save this ; because unless one thing helped another, it could not be auxiliary to it. Hence there is nothing incongruous in the definition we have given. And in fact, later on, in certain places, the author of the *Bhāṣya* also makes such declarations as 'that which helps another is its Auxiliary,' 'the Auxiliary character is characterised by help,' and so forth. And in fact, the fact of being subordinate to another's purpose also is nothing different from *Help*. Consequently the *helping of another* must be accepted as the only mark of the Auxiliary."

But even this definition is not quite correct; because in accordance with this definition, the Auxiliary character would be hopelessly mixed up among Primaries, among Subsidiaries, and also among the Subsidiaries of Subsidiaries.

That is to say, just as the Subsidiaries help the Principals, so also do the Principals help the Subsidiaries by bringing about their performance, as also by accepting their aid (and thereby justifying their performance). Because no one would perform the Subsidiaries, unless he were instigated to it by the requirements of the Principals; and these Subsidiaries too could not afford any help unless there were something to be helped (in the shape of the Principals). And thus, on account of the help accorded by them, the Principals would also become subsidiary (to the Subsidiaries); and thus by mutual help, they would become mutual auxiliaries. Then again, in the case of sacrifices, whose performance consists of various Principals, a single Principal, without the others, could not accomplish the Result; and hence they would help each other, in the bringing about of it; and hence by mutual help, they would become mutual auxiliaries; specially as this help does not in any way differ from that accorded by the Subsidiary to the Principal. In the same way we could show the possibility of mutual help among the Subsidiaries themselves. And thus, in the performance of the modifications of a single Principal, even if a single Subsidiary should come to be performed, it would necessitate the performance of all other Subsidiaries and Principals (as its auxiliaries), and there could be no restriction in this matter.

Similarly, the Earning of Wealth, the Laying of Fire, and Vedic Study, etc., would come to be the auxiliaries of all actions; because they help all of them by their various effects; as certainly there is no action that can be accomplished without the help of these. And these being auxiliaries to sacrifices, all who would do these would become entitled to the performance of sacrifices; and as such, men of all castes would become entitled to the performance of all sacrifices that are laid down with a view to the obtaining of a certain result; as the only restriction upon the character of the performer would be that he should have a desire for that Result; specially as in the case of the sentence 'The Brahmana should lay the fire in Spring,' the meaning would be that 'if the performer happen to be a *Brāhmaṇa*, the *laying* should be done in spring-time,'—which would entitle the *Çūdra* also to the laying of fire and the performance of sacrifices.

Then again, it is only when the Definition (or Character) has become duly known that it can indicate the object to be defined. Consequently the Auxiliary character, based upon *help*, is possible only in such cases where the help accorded is visible. In the case of the Purificatory

Rites, on the other hand, all of which help imperceptibly,—such, for instance, as the *Paryagnikaraṇa* and the like; as also in the case of such subsidiaries as the *Prayāṅgas*, which help the Principal *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* indirectly through their *Apūrvas*,—the auxiliary character of which (*Rites* and *Prayāṅgas*) has not been cognized,—as we would perceive no visible help accorded by them, they could never be known as Auxiliaries. Nor can it be urged that the Auxiliary character of these would be recognized, by means of the assumption of some visible help. Because prior to the recognition of the fact of their being Subsidiaries, there would be no ground for assuming any such *helping*. As in a case where a certain thing having been recognized as auxiliary to an Action, with or without a Result, there arises the question as to the way in which it would help that Action; and then alone can we, not finding a visible help, assume some sort of an unseen help. And so long as the Auxiliary character has not been cognized, on what ground could the help be assumed? And in this way there would be a mutual interdependence. For instance, the auxiliary character would be cognized by means of the Help, and the Help again would be cognized by that of the Auxiliary character; and none of the two would be cognized independently of the other.

For the matter of that, even in the case of actions according perceptible help,—e.g. the *threshing* of the corn,—we do not find any visible help following from the Restriction that the chaff is to be removed by *threshing* alone; and hence the Auxiliary character would not be recognized as necessary. Nor does the Scripture speak of any help to be accorded by chance actions; and hence, according to you, the Auxiliary character could be cognized only when the help accorded would be cognized by *Sense-perception*, etc.; and in that case the *sūtras* could not speak of the Auxiliary character as pointed out by the six means of Direct Assertion and the rest.

Then again, even in the case of such subsidiaries as are performed only by the way, and are not brought about directly by the Principal concerned, and in fact are performed for the sake of something totally different from it,—inasmuch as they would help the other, they would become auxiliaries to that Principal also; exactly like that which instigates the performance of that Action in the midst of which that Action is performed. And this would be in direct contradiction to the *Sūtras*—‘*Prāsaṅgikaṇca notkāṛṣhēt*’ (*Sūtra* V—i—28), ‘*Prāsaṅgikē prāyaścittanna vidyatē*’ (*Sūtra* IX—iv—28), ‘*navā pātratvāt*, etc.’ (*Sūtra* IV—i—34), ‘*Api vā cēśabhāṅjām syāt*’ (*Sūtra* VI—iv—3), etc., etc.

Thus we find that even Definition No. 5th is not quite compatible with the Scriptures. And consequently we declare that ‘*the Auxiliary is that which is for the sake of another*, etc.’ And what we mean is that even

without finding any help accorded by it, if we find a certain Action to be done for the sake of another, we recognize it as its Auxiliary; and after its auxiliary character has been recognized, it would naturally help it.

Question : "Is there any difference between *helping* and *being for the sake of a thing*?"

Answer : Certainly, there is a difference; because we often find that something that hinders another is also spoken of as *being for its sake*; while that which *helps* it is not spoken of as such. That is to say, the mere fact of being *done with reference to another* is enough to make it spoken of as *being for its sake*; and this is possible equally with that which helps and that which hinders. For instance, we speak of *smoke* as being *done for the sake of mosquitoes* (though what the smoke does is to drive them away). So also, even when we find one thing helping another, if it is found to be one that has come up by mere chance, and which is not found to have been done for its sake, it is not spoken of as *being for its sake*. For instance, when a man drinks water out of a canal that has been dug out for the purpose of irrigating the fields of corn, he does not speak of it as having been dug *for his sake*. Consequently we conclude that *being for another's sake* is something wholly different from *helping* it.

Objection : "Then in that case even that which hinders would come to be an auxiliary."

Reply : It can be so in the ordinary life of the world; in the case of the Veda, however, it could not be an auxiliary, as it would not be something wanted. That is to say, whenever a certain thing would be cognized as being for the sake of the sacrifice, there would be a doubt as to whether it will help or hinder it; and then, inasmuch as the Principals do not stand in need of a *hindrance*, we would reject the possibility of the thing hindering the Action; and on the strength of the said requirement of the sacrifice, we would take it to be a *helper*.

Objection : "We can never take a thing as *being for the sake of* another, without knowing it as according some help to it. Because unless the Principal is found to be in need of a *helper*, even if something happens to be near it, it is not accepted to be its auxiliary. For instance, it is not on account of mere proximity, and independently of the help that they accord, that the *Prayājas* are taken as *being for the sake of the Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*. Consequently, the *being for another's sake* being based upon *Helping*, we must accept this latter as the sole basis of auxiliary character."

Reply : This does not quite affect our position; because it is often that we find the fact of something *being for another's sake* cognized by means of Direct Assertion, even apart from all *Helpers*; and in these cases it

is based upon the mere requirements of the Principal. For instance, in the case of such sentences as '*Daṣṭāpavitrēṣa graham sammārshṭi*,' '*Vrīhin prokshati*,' and the like, the fact of the actions therein mentioned being *for the sake of* the sacrifice is recognized beforehand, by the Direct Assertion (of the sentences); and then follows their recognition as *subsidiaries*, which leads to the assumption of the *help* to be accorded by them. Even in the case of the *Prayāñjas*, where there is no Direct Mention of their being *for the sake of the Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, though it appears as if the recognition of the Auxiliary character depended upon some Help accorded by them,—yet, in reality, there too, it is based upon the requirements of the Principal; as the Help is not accorded before the sacrifice is actually being performed. As we have already shown, that until the Auxiliary character of the *Prayāñjas* has been cognized, it is not possible either to perceive, or assume, the help accorded by them. Hence in the case of these we must admit the fact to be that—the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa* being found to stand in need of some help, and the *Prayāñjas* being found to be on the look-out for something that they could help, the latter come to be recognized by means of Context or Mutual Dependence, as being *for the sake of* the former two sacrifices, long before the help is actually accorded (during the performance of the sacrifices). And as for the *help* (it being not perceptible), it is assumed simply for the purpose of justifying the recognition of their being *for the sake of* the sacrifices. And hence even in this case we find that it is only the requirement of the sacrifices that brings about the inference of the fact of the *Prayāñjas* being *for their sake*; and either this fact, or the Auxiliary character, does not quite depend upon the help accorded by them. And thus there is no incongruity in our theory.

Such being the case, inasmuch as it is Direct Assertion and the rest alone that can establish the fact of something being *for the sake of* another, it is these alone that could lay down the performability of the Auxiliaries; and as such, for a due discrimination of these, it becomes necessary to take up the present *Ādhyāya*. And as for several Principals, and several Subsidiaries, as taken among themselves, even though there is a mixture of mutual help, yet there is no mixing up of the *being for another's sake*; and so in our case there is no hopeless confusion. Thus it is established that there is no flaw in the definition of the Auxiliary, as 'that which is for the sake of another.'

Then, as for the assertion of the Bhāṣya '*that which helps another, etc., etc.*,'—in this we must take the word 'help' as indicating its cause, the *being for another's sake*; and the sentence should not be mistaken for a definition of the Auxiliary; specially as this is made quite clear further on, in the sentence—'*those that are for the sake of another, etc., etc.*'

The opponent, however, takes the sentence of the *Bhāshya* as laying down the definition of Auxiliary as *that which helps*, and hence urges the objection : “ *But we actually find the Teacher serving the ends of the Disciple, etc., etc.*”

And the reply is that *it is quite true* that he serves them ; but inasmuch as, in this case, we perceive a sort of help wholly distinct from *being for their sake*, he is not regarded as their Auxiliary ;—the *Bhāshya* rejects the example of the Teacher, and cites one in which there is an absolute *being for another's sake*, e.g., the *Born Slave*, who, from his very birth, is known as existing *for the sake of* his Master ; and so also the *calf* which is always known as being for the sake of carrying loads ; and certainly the Master is not known as being *for the sake of* these ; this is what makes all the difference.

The opponent, however, thinks that even in the case of the Master and the Slave, the idea of being for another's sake is based upon a certain help that is accorded, and hence urges the objection : “ *The Master also supports the Slave, and as such he would become subsidiary to him.*”

The reply to this is that *in thus supporting the Slave, the Master is in reality helping himself*. That is to say, the fact of being *for another's sake* is known by that in view of which that thing is done ; and certainly the action of the Master is not with a view to help the Born Slave ; the fact being that he supports him, as this supporting is inseparably mixed up with the due fulfilment of his own ends ; and as such the Master is not known as the Auxiliary of the Slave.

Then, there arises an objection based upon the idea that the present *sūtra* is a mere repetition of what has already been said under the *Sūtra* II—i—8, the objection being this : “ *Inasmuch as the definition of the “Auxiliary is already contained in the former sūtra, it was not necessary to mention it over again, in the present Adhyāya.*”

In reply to this we have the *Bhāshya*—*Tatrāpūrvārthatā vyāvartitā*. [*In the previous sūtra we have simply shown that Accessories do not bring about Apūrvas.*]

Some people explain this reply as follows : In the previous *sūtra* we have explained the Auxiliary character of such Actions as serve perceptible ends ; while on the present occasion, we explain that character as belonging to all Substances and Actions,—those with perceptible results, as well as those with results not perceptible.

But in this manner the present *sūtra* may not be a *repetition* ; but when the auxiliary character of *all* is dealt with, on the present occasion, the mention of that character of a particular kind on the previous occasion would be a mere useless repetition.

Consequently we must explain the *Bhāshya* as follows : The question

simply being as to what has been said in the previous *sūtra*,—we proceed to explain that which has been said there. It is this: the Auxiliary character of the *threshing* is based upon the definition given in the present *sūtra*; and all that was shown in the previous *sūtra* was that, inasmuch as that action serves a visible purpose, it cannot be accepted as bringing about an *Apūrva*. That is to say, it is the universally applicable Auxiliary character defined in the present *sūtra* that has been attributed to the Action spoken of under the previous *sūtra* for the purpose of showing that it does not lead to an *Apūrva*.

Or, the sense of the question itself may be explained as follows: "On the present occasion, the Auxiliary character being explained as "something quite new (not explained before), based upon the *being for another's sake*, independently of the definition of the Primary and Subsidiary character of Actions explained in the previous *Adhyāya*,—this present definition appears to be contradictory to what has been said in the " *Sūtra II—i—8*, which has distinctly explained the Auxiliary Character "to consist in *helping*."

In that case, the sense of the Reply would be this: In that *sūtra*, we have spoken of the perception of *Help*, simply for the purpose of precluding all possibility of the assumption of distinct *Apūrvas*, and not as a definition of the Auxiliary; while in the present *sūtra*, we have the real definition of all Auxiliaries; and thus the subject-matter of the two *sūtras* being totally different, there can be no contradiction between them.

ADHIKARĀṆA (3).

[*The Enumerating of Auxiliaries.*]

Sūtra (3) : According to Bādari, the Auxiliary character belongs to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications.

We now proceed to show the objects that have the character of the Auxiliary. And on this we have Bādari's view as the

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"There are only three Auxiliaries: (1) The *substance*—whose "auxiliary character is inherent, as shown under the *sūtra*, '*dravyāṇām, etc.*' (VI—i—1). [Substances are related to actions, always in the "character of auxiliaries]; and this character is denied only when it is "found to have no use whatever in connection with the Action;—(2) The "*Property* such as 'Redness' and the like, serving to qualify the substance "that helps in the completion of the Action, is from its very nature an "auxiliary;—(3) The *Sanctification* also, like *threshing*, etc., becomes "an auxiliary, by reason of its making the corn fit for being made into "cakes that are laid down as to be offered at sacrifices, and which could "only be made of the *threshed* corn, and never out of the *unthreshed* one; "thus to this also the auxiliary character belongs by its very nature.

"To the *sacrifice*, etc., on the other hand, the auxiliary character "does not belong by nature; nor is it laid down by Vedic words as belong- "ing to them. Specially, in the case of the *sacrifice*, we find that it is "itself *performed* by all agents; and it itself never functions towards the "fulfilment of anything else.

"Nor can it be urged that we do find the Sacrifice functioning "towards the fulfilment of the Result. Because, the Result is found to "appear long after the Sacrifice has been finished.

"*Objection* : 'In *Sūtra* II—i—1, *et seq.*, it has been declared that "sacrifices are possessed of the instrumental character.'

"*Reply* : It is true that that declaration has been made; but no "reasons have been adduced in support of it. Specially as all that has "been done in that *Adhikarāṇa* (II—i—1 *et seq.*), which depends for its "own fulfilment upon the *Svargakāmadhikarāṇa* (VI—i—1-3), is that "no instrumentality belongs to Nouns. Consequently, at present (before "the *Svargakāmadhikarāṇa* has been established), we could speak of the

"instrumental character of sacrifices only tentatively (as something yet 'to be proved')."

"Then, as for the *Result*—inasmuch as it is something to be accomplished by the Sacrifice, it has the character of the Principal in reference to the Sacrifice; and in reference to the Agent, its auxiliary character has never been spoken of. In fact, being something desired, it must be accepted as the Principal; while the Agent being a substance could, at best, be regarded as an auxiliary to the Sacrifice.

"For these reasons, we conclude that the auxiliary character belongs 'only to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (4): According to Jaimini, (*the auxiliary character resides in*) Actions also, as they are performed for the sake of Results.

The meaning of this *Sūtra* is quite clear.

Sūtra (5): The Result also, as it is for the sake of the Agent.

From the very fact of the Result being mentioned along with the word 'desire,' it is clear that it is for the sake of the *Person* (in whom alone the Desire could be present). For no intelligent person ever desires the acquisition of Heaven by itself; he always desires it for the sake of his own enjoyment. Then again, the *Ātmanēpada* ending in the verbs ('*yajēta*' and the like, in the sentence '*svargakāmo yajēta*') distinctly shows that the Result (Heaven) is to be enjoyed by the Agent performing the sacrifice, and not by anybody else. And thus there can be no doubt as to the Result being auxiliary to its enjoyer.

Sūtra (6): The Agent also, because he is for the sake of the Action.

In the case of such sentences as '*svargakāmo yajēta*,' the auxiliary character of the Agent is implied by the verb '*yajēta*'; while it is directly laid down in sentences like the one that lays down the sacrificial post of the Udumbara wood to be of the same height as the sacrificer. And consequently the Agent also can be regarded as having the auxiliary character.

Certain objections have been brought forward against the *Bhāṣya* (of this *Adhikaraṇa*); they may be thus summed up :

"The *Bhāshya* on *sūtra* (3), having shown that the auxiliary character belongs to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications,—and not to Sacrifices, Results and Agents,—has gone on to deny the Principal character of the Agent ; and this is altogether irrelevant.

"Then again, we find the *Bhāshya* asserting that the fact of the Agent being auxiliary to the Action, on account of its being a substance is quite perceptible. But this is a mere repetition of something already mentioned before and rejected as untenable. Nor is it quite proper to speak of the Agent along with the Sacrifice and the Result, the possibility of whose auxiliary character has been denied ; because the functioning of the Agent is not at all similar to that of these too. Hence these assertions are most improper.

"Thirdly, towards the end of the *Adhikaraṇa* we find the *Bhāshya* saying—'The conclusion finally arrived at by the author of the *Vṛtti* is this, etc., etc.' But inasmuch as it has already been declared by the *sūtras* that the auxiliary character of Substances, Properties and Sanctifications is independent of all other things, while the Sacrifice, the Result and the Agent are Principals in reference to the Substance, etc.,—and then the *sūtras* (4) to (6) themselves have spoken of the auxiliary character of these (Sacrifice, etc.) as depending upon one another,—what the *Bhāshya* speaks of as the final conclusion arrived at by the Author of the *Vṛtti* is nothing more than a mere repetition of what has already been said before."

In order to meet these objections, we should explain the *Adhikaraṇa* as follows :

There are two interpretations of the present *Adhikaraṇa* : (1) The Auxiliary having been defined as 'that which is for another's sake,' the *Bhāshya* brings forward as the *Pūrvapakṣa*, Bādari's theory of the auxiliary character residing in Substances, Properties and Sanctifications only, which is based upon the theory of the auxiliary character consisting in *Helping* ; and then lays down the *Siddhānta*, in accordance with the theory of Jaimini. And as such it was only natural that, in the first instance, the *Bhāshya* should, while putting forward the *Pūrvapakṣa*, have taken his stand upon the theory that the Auxiliary is *that which helps*. Thus then, as for the Agent, inasmuch as he is a substance, he *helps* the fulfilment of the Action ; and as such he can always be accepted (both by Jaimini and Bādari) as an auxiliary. As for the Sacrifice and the Result, on the other hand, they are never found to help in the fulfilment of anything ; and as such they cannot (according to Bādari) be regarded as Auxiliaries. Then, as for the sentence '*ṅāgaphalapurushēṣū*,'—which speaks of all the three together,—it is not to be interpreted along with the preceding word '*Āśa*,' as that 'the auxiliary character does not belong to these

three,'—but only that 'what the *Siddhānti* holds with regard to all these three (having the auxiliary character) is not possible.' And this is most natural; because what the *Pūrvapakshi* should deny is what the *Siddhānti* asserts, and not anything at random; and as it is the auxiliary character of these three that the *Siddhānti* holds, it is only natural that the *Pūrvapakshi* should deny the auxiliary character of these, and not the mere form of that character.

(2) The position of the *Siddhānti* being that Sacrifices, Results and Agents have a dual character, inasmuch as they are Auxiliaries to certain Actions, while Principals to others,—it is this dual character of these that the *Bāhshya*, in accordance with *Bādari's* theory, denies by declaring that 'in *Sacrifices, Results and Agents*' there is no dual character, as held by the *Siddhānti*; and his reasons are that Sacrifices and Results are always Principals, while the Agent is always Auxiliary. And thus inasmuch as it is only the presence of the *dual character* that is denied, in the case of all the three, by the denial of the character of the Auxiliary (in the first two) and that of the Principal (in the last), there is nothing very wrong in speaking of all the three conjointly, as all the three have the similarity of having their dual character denied.

And the *Siddhānta Sūtras* (4—6) also should be taken as establishing the auxiliary character, including (hand in hand with) the dual character (of the three),—basing this on the definition of the Auxiliary as 'that which is for the sake of another.'

Objection: "Inasmuch as, with regard to the *Agent*, the *Pūrvapakshi* has admitted his auxiliary character on the ground of his being a substance, and has only denied his Principal character, it was necessary for the *Siddhānti* to establish his Principal character, and there was no use of establishing the fact of 'the *Agent* being an auxiliary on account of being for the sake of the Action' (because this is what has been already admitted by the opponent)."

This does not affect our position; because what the *Pūrvapakshi* has done is to deny the Principal character of the *Agent*, on the ground of the non-auxiliary character of the Sacrifice and the Result; and hence as soon as the two *Sūtras* (4 and 5) have established the auxiliary character of the Sacrifice and the Result, the *Agent* would come to be recognised as having only the character of the Principal, inasmuch as he would be Principal with reference to the Sacrifice as also to its subservient, the Result; and thereby his dual character (of the Auxiliary and the Principal) being in danger of disappearance, it was absolutely necessary to recall the fact of his having the character of the Auxiliary also; and this is all that has been done in the *sūtra* in question (the sixth).

Or, it may be that the opponent has accepted the auxiliary character

of the Agent, on the ground of his *helping* (the sacrifice) ; and taking exception to this, and holding his auxiliary character also to consist, like that of the Sacrifice and the Result, in the fact of his being *for another's sake*, the author has declared—*The Agent also is an auxiliary, because he is for the sake of the Action*, and not because he *helps* it.

With a view to explain the four *sūtras* (3—6) in accordance with the interpretation of the *Vṛtti*, the *Bhāṣhya* says—‘*Athātrabhagavān, etc.*

In this case, the theory of Bādari is not the *Pūrvapakṣa*. As all the four *sūtras* are taken as a subsequent expansion of the general definition of the Auxiliary, given in *sūtra* (2), as showing the objects possessing that character.

In the previous interpretation, the *sūtra* (3), as declaring the auxiliary character to rest in Substances, Properties and Sanctifications only, has been taken as embodying the *Pūrvapakṣa*. But now, it is as representing the *Siddhānta* that the author brings forward Bādari's theory, simply by way of corroboration, and then proceeds to show further applications of the said definition (of the Auxiliary). And as for the declaration that the auxiliary character resides in Substances, Properties and Sanctifications only, it is taken in the sense that it is these alone that have *always* the auxiliary character only, and never the character of the Principal.

And then the other three *sūtras* (4—6) are brought forward to show that the auxiliary character not being absolute, it resides in Sacrifices, Results and Agents also ; and thus what is established by these *sūtras* is only the *relative* Auxiliary and Principal character of these three. And this is just what has been shown in the *Bhāṣhya* also.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole comes to be that there are two kinds of substrates of the said auxiliary character—the *Absolute* (those that are always Auxiliaries) and the *Relative* (those that are at times Auxiliaries and at times Principals).

Objection : “ Inasmuch as we find that Substances, Properties and Sanctifications also are Principals, with reference to their subsidiaries, as well as auxiliaries with reference to Sacrifices,—the auxiliary character of these also should be accepted as only *Relative* (and not *absolute*). (1) For instance, we find that the Corn is the Principal with reference to its *Threshing*, and that this *Threshing* also is Principal in reference to the *Pestle* and other Implements (used in the *threshing*) ; and then, while being Principals with reference to the *Threshing*, the Corn is found to be auxiliary to the *Preparation of the cake*. (2) Then as for Properties,—such as *Number* and the like,—we find them to be *auxiliary* to that which they qualify ; while in reference to those properties that bring about the *Number*, it is Principal. (3) Similarly Sanctifications also,—such as the *Preparing* and the *Threshing*,—are found to be *auxiliaries* to

"the *Fire* and the *Corn* respectively ; while, with reference to their own "accessories, the fuel and the pestle, etc., they are Principals. Consequently even these three cannot rightly be spoken of as *always* having "the auxiliary character only."

Reply : In the case of Substances, Properties and Sanctifications, we find that they can never be the Principal with regard to which they are Auxiliaries ; while in the case of the Sacrifices, Results and Agent, on the other hand, we find that they have the two characters with regard to one another.

That is to say, Substances, Properties and Sanctifications always bear the auxiliary character towards the Sacrifice leading to some desirable result,—even though towards their own subsidiaries they may bear the character of the Principal ; and with regard to the Sacrifice, the Principal character of these is as good as non-existent. It is with a view to this that we have the declaration in the *Bhāṣhya*—'with regard to the Sacrifice they always bear the auxiliary character' ; and not that, 'they have always the auxiliary character only.' Then again, the *Bhāṣhya* adds—'The auxiliary character of others is relative' ('others' = Sacrifices, Results and Agents) ; and the qualifying clause '*yaḥim prati*'—'with regard to the Sacrifice'—pertains to this sentence also. That is to say, in the case of these latter, we find that each of them bears the character of the Principal and the Auxiliary to the two others. For instance, the *Sacrifice* is Principal with regard to the Agent, who, as a substance, accomplishes it ; while with regard to the *Result* it bears the auxiliary character ; and then again, that (Sacrifice) which is auxiliary to the *Result* can very well be said to be auxiliary to the Possessor of the Result, the Agent ; and that (Sacrifice) which is the Principal with regard to the Agent, can certainly be called the Principal with regard to the Result, which is subordinate to the Agent. [Thus the Sacrifice is both Auxiliary and Principal to the Agent, and to the Result.] So also the *Result*, which is Principal with regard to the *Sacrifice*, is *Principal* also with regard to the *Agent*, who is an accessory of the Sacrifice ; and while it is auxiliary to the *Agent*, it is auxiliary also to the *Sacrifice* that is performed by him. Similarly the *Agent*, being the Principal with regard to the Result, is Principal also with regard to the *Sacrifice* which brings about that Result ; and while he is auxiliary to the Sacrifice, he is auxiliary also to the Result brought about by that Sacrifice. Such mutual double relationship is not found in the case of Substances, Properties and Sanctifications. And in this lies the difference between these on the one hand, and the Sacrifice, etc., on the other.

Then the *Bhāṣhya* has spoken of the Auxiliary and the Principal characters subsisting indirectly (through intervening agencies). But this must be taken as referring to cases where these relationships are only

implied by the existing state of things (and not spoken of in any texts); and they should not be taken as mentioned for purposes of observance at the performance of sacrifices; as in that case, inasmuch as the Agent and the Result would be indirect auxiliaries to the *modifications* of original Sacrifices, they would also have to be imported into the performance of these; and this would be a flagrant contradiction of the *Siddhanta*-bearing on that subject.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the above are the only ways in which the auxiliary character—to be explained in detail below—can exist.



ADHIKARANA (4).

[The *Nirvāpana*, etc., are applicable to definite objects, according to the use of each.]

Sūtra (7): They are connected with a definite purpose.

We have explained the marks and the objects of the auxiliary character. And we now proceed to consider the way in which the Auxiliaries become applied to actual practice; and in the next three *Adhikarāṇas* we shall treat of the practical applications of Sanctifications, Substances and Properties, respectively.

Some people hold that the practical application of the Sanctification is pointed out by the suggestive Power of words; that of Substances, by Syntactical Connection; and that of Properties, by Direct Assertion.

But this view is not countenanced by our teachers. Because though we do actually come across the operation of various authorities (for practical application), yet, in the present *Pāda*, we are concerned, pre-eminently, only with such applications as are based upon Direct Assertion; while those based upon the suggestiveness of words, and the other authorities, will be dealt with in *Pāda II et seq.*, as we have already said above.

[In regard to the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*, we find the Injunction '*Darṣapūrṇamāśābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*'; and in connection with these two Sacrifices, we have various texts laying down such details as the *nirvāpana* (pouring out), the *prokṣhaṇa* (washing), *avahanana* (threshing), and so forth, as relating to vegetables, and *utpavana* (sprinkling), *vilāpana* (boiling), *grahaṇa* (holding), *āsādana* (procuring), and the like, relating to the butter; and again *Ṣakṣā-haraṇa* (fetching of the twigs), *Gavāṃprasthāpana* (fetching of the cows), *Gavāṃprasnāvana* (making the cow yield milk), and so forth, relating to the *Sānnāyya* (the mixture of Curd and Butter). And with regard to these details, there arises a question as to whether all these three classes of details are to be performed in connection with all three kind of materials—Vegetables, Butter and Curd-Butter mixture, alike, or should their performance be restricted to only those materials, in which they are found to serve some useful purpose.]

Though the fact of the Details applying to the vegetables, etc., has yet to be established in the *Adhikarāṇa*, yet, it is in accordance with the *Siddhānta* that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of them as so differentiated.

The *Siddhānti* objects to the doubt, by saying that *the details are distinctly mentioned in connection with certain definite materials.*

But the opponent thinking that the connection of the details (*Threshing* f. i.) with a definite material (the *Corn*) is indicated by Syntactical Connection (in the sentence '*Vrihinavahanti*'), while it is by Direct Assertion that the word '*avahanti*' enjoins the *Threshing* pure and simple; (and as such the general applicability of the threshing is more authoritative than its special application to the *Corn* only; and with this in view, he replies by saying— "*The Threshing and the rest, as denoted by the single word, are enjoined by Direct Assertion.*"

But this way of justifying the Doubt appears very improper. Because a word is never used without another word; and the remedy for the contradiction by Direct Assertion, we have already explained in the *Vākyādhikaraṇa*. As a matter of fact, by becoming connected with the *Corn*, the *Threshing* does not cease to be *Threshing*. And if this were the case, then alone could the Syntactical Connection be contrary to Direct Assertion, and thereby rejected. On the contrary, we find that the *Threshing* cannot be performed by itself; and as such it could not but be performed in connection with another object (such as the *Corn*). In accordance with your theory also, the *threshing* is not performed by itself; and then if you reject the object pointed out by Syntactical Connection, you take upon yourself the much greater trouble of connecting its performance with every one of the objects spoken of in the Context. If you were to base its connection with something outside the Context, the words relative to which you would supply from without,—that too would involve a deal of trouble. Then if you hold it to be connected with the Principal sacrifice, by aiding it indirectly,—that would mean a remotely involved connection. If, lastly, you do not hold it to be connected with anything, then its injunction becomes wholly purposeless. Consequently the aforesaid way of justifying the Doubt is highly objectionable.

"Then we explain it as follows:—The Doubt in the present case "is not based upon the fact of the various sentences being taken "separately, or all together; but upon the fact of the various Details appertaining to the single Final *Apūrva*, or to distinct Intermediate *Apūrvas*.

"That is to say, the reasoning of the *Pūrvopaksha* is not this: That "the *Threshing*, being denoted by the word, is enjoined independently "by itself, by Direct Assertion; while it is by Syntactical Connection "that it is connected with the *Corn*; and this connection therefore is "set aside by the former Direct Assertion; consequently, being enjoined "independently, it is only natural that there should be a doubt as to "whether all the details—*Threshing* and the like—are to be connected

"with all sorts of materials, or only with those objects in connection with whom they are found to bring about certain visible effects.' But what is meant by it is that the *Threshing* is enjoined by Direct Assertion, as connected with the *Corn*; but we cannot admit it to apply to the class '*Corn*' (i.e., *Corn* in general); as such an application would be absolutely useless.

"That is to say, if the *Threshing* were taken to be connected with the *Corn* just as it is denoted by the word "*Vrihi*" (i.e., the class '*Corn*'), then, on account of this connection, it could not apply to all the materials. As a matter of fact, we find that, in accordance with the first *Adhikaraṇa* of *Adhyāya* IX, the *Threshing* passes over the directly denoted class '*Corn*,' and becomes connected with 'that which brings about the *Apūrva*'; and there can be no doubt that this connection, being pointed out by the indication of the element of the capability of bringing about the *Apūrva* which depends upon the Context, is based upon Syntactical Connection; and it is this that is meant by the sentence—'the connection of these with the *Corn*, etc., is brought about by means of Syntactical Connection' (*Bhāṣya*).

"Then as for the particular Syntactical Connection, in the form of an indication of the capability of bringing about the *Apūrva*,—it is equally capable of pertaining to the Vegetable, the Butter and the Curd-Butter mixture, as all these are mentioned in the same Context. Similarly the 'sprinkling,' 'boiling,' etc., also could be shown by Indirect Indication to be connected with other offering materials not specially enjoined.

"Then, the question of the *Adhikaraṇa* resolves itself into the following form: '(1) Are all the details to be performed with reference to the single final *Apūrva* of the *Darṣa-Pūrnamāsa*, or with reference to various minor *Apūrvas*? (2) If the latter, then are all of them connected with every one of the minor *Apūrvas*, or with only one particular *Apūrva*? If they are all performed with reference to a single *Apūrva*, or if all are connected with every one of the minor *Apūrvas*, then there will be a commingling of the various details; while if they are performed with reference to many *Apūrvas*, and each of them is connected with only one *Apūrva*, then, there would be a restriction as to the performance of these."

In regard to this question, the author begins with propounding the *Siddhānta* theory: *They are connected with a definite purpose.*

That is to say, even though the various details are found to be mentioned independently by their own words, yet when the question arises as to where they are to be performed, the invariable conclusion is that they should be performed there where they may serve a useful

purpose. Then, as a matter of fact, we do not find a commixture of these details leading to any useful result in all cases. And even if they be taken as performed with reference to *Apūrvas*, then also, the connection could be fixed upon only in accordance with the useful purpose found to be served by them. Or, we may take the *sūtra* as meaning that the scripture itself points out that they should be performed in connection with that wherein they serve some useful purpose. Thus, f.i., the *Threshing* comes to be taken as performed with reference to that particular *Apūrvā*, the means of which is indicated by the word '*Vrihi*' ('Corn'), by reason of that *capability* (of bringing about the *Apūrvā*) which inheres in the same substrate (the individual sacrificial corn) as the *Class* ('Corn') denoted by that word ('*Vrihi*'); and it could not be taken along with the *means of any other Apūrvā*, which is not similarly indicated, and with which, therefore, the *Threshing* could have no connection.

Then we have in the *Bhāṣya*, the objection—"As a matter of fact we find it directly laid down that all the details are to be performed in connection with all. That is to say, (1) as there is a single Final *Apūrvā* to be accomplished;—(2) as, even when there are many *Apūrvas*, we do not perceive any ground for limiting the indication (of any *Apūrvā* by any particular word);—and (3), lastly, as the purpose served by them would be perceived after the Injunction,—a restriction of the application of the Details could not be based upon a perception of these purposes."

The reply is—We do not yet know whether they are directly laid down as such, or not,—it is a matter still to be considered. That is to say, we do not yet know whether all the details are to be performed with reference to a single Final *Apūrvā*, or with reference to every one of the minor *Apūrvas*; and that even without the specific mention of the particular objects (the Corn and the like, with reference to which the *Threshing*, etc., should be performed), the performance of these would be restricted, in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—iv—30.

Or, the reply may be taken to mean that—if all the details be performed with reference to a single *Apūrvā*, or with reference to every one of the minor *Apūrvas*, then they would all become mixed up; whereas if they are connected with such means of distinct *Apūrvas* as are indicated by the class '*Corn*' and the like,—then there is a restriction (or adjustment) of their performance;—but it is still to be decided which of these alternative theories is true; and hence we do not yet know that all of them are directly laid down with reference to all.

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

Sūtra (8): "They must be taken as pertaining to all; because they are non-different in their Connection, and because there is no difference of Context."

The opponent explains his position as follows: "It is the subtle 'potential state of the Result, which appears as its *Sprout*, that is 'called ' *Apūrva* ', on account of its appearing in a form that *never existed before*; this we have already explained before (in Adh. II). Consequently, inasmuch as the Result of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* is one only, there cannot be more than one *Apūrva*; and the capability of bringing about this *Apūrva* belongs equally to the Vegetables, the Butter and the Curd-Butter mixture; hence the details laid down with reference to these materials must be taken as pertaining to all of them.

"Though it is possible that there may be other minor *Apūrvās*, following from each of the various sacrifices,—*Āguṇya* and the like (of which the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* are composed),—yet inasmuch as these minor *Apūrvās* do not lead to any distinct Results (as they only help in the fruition of the one Final *Apūrva*), they are, in this, like the form of the sacrifice, and as such have no capability of having any details performed with reference to themselves; and hence it is only the final *Apūrva* that comes to be taken as that which has the details performed with reference to itself.

"Even if they were performed with reference to distinct *Apūrvās*,—inasmuch as of all the various details that are laid down simply with reference to the means of *Apūrva* mentioned in the Context, none is mentioned specifically,—for if any were so mentioned there would be a syntactical split,—their Injunction must be accepted as having a universal application. And this is another reason in favour of the view that the details pertain to all the materials.

"And in support of this universal application, we have (in the *sūtra*) two reasons: (1) '*samyogato*'—*viśeṣāt*', and (2) '*prakaraṇāviśeṣāt*'. That is to say, the characteristic of bringing about the *Apūrva* that we find in one object (Corn), as the ground of its connection with a particular detail (*Threshing*), is also found in the other object; because as for the specific characteristic of the class 'Corn' (which subsists in the Corn only), this is of use only in the indication, and is of no use in restricting the application of the *Threshing*. Then, as for the *objective* character (of the *Corn* as mentioned in the sentence '*Vrihinavahanti*'), it is found in all the other objects also; as all of them are *objects to be offered*. Therefore it must be admitted that, leaving aside all such objects as are not connected with the *Apūrva*, as are

“not objects to be offered, and as do not help in the bringing about of the particular *Apūrva* of the Context,—with reference all other objects, should all the details be performed.

“Then as for those details that are either indirectly implied, or, not being directly enjoined, are only pointed out by certain purposes served by them in matters relating to ordinary worldly affairs,—the application of these could be restricted in accordance with the purpose served by them. Or, in a case where, as in the case of the modifications of original sacrifices, the Details appear by means of certain purposes previously enjoined,—and the purpose has not got to be assumed from the details themselves,—the performance of such details would be adjusted in accordance with the purposes served. In the case in question, however, we find that the sacrifice in question is the original sacrifice (*Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*) itself; and the Injunction lays down, long before the Purposes, the Details themselves, whose purposes have got to be assumed; and hence that Injunction in question must be construed,—not as ‘where these purposes are to be served, there these details are to be performed’, but—as ‘where these details are performed, there is a visible or invisible purpose served.’

“Consequently the Details must be taken as appertaining to all objects.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

***Sūtra* (9): The absence of a useful purpose would deprive it of the character of Action.**

That is to say, by denying the visible purpose actually served, or that which is mentioned in scriptures as to be served by it,—we would set aside the performability of the Action, etc., etc. The sense of the *Bhāshya* is quite clear.

***Sūtra* (10): The Result is found to appear along with the operation; it is only when there is no visible result, that its absence could justify the Details being taken merely as expressed by the words.**

It has been urged that, “inasmuch as we shall assume certain imperceptible effects, there would not be an *absence of useful purposes*.” And to this we make the following reply:

If the ‘*prathana*’ (*Thickening*), etc., were forcibly laid down in connection with the Butter also, then alone could we be justified in assuming an imperceptible result, as the *thickening* not serving any visible purpose in regard to the Butter, without that assumption, the Injunction would be

inexplicable. That is to say, it is only on the strength of the Apparent Inconsistency of a Direct Vedic Declaration that we can rightly assume imperceptible effects. But, as a matter of fact, we find the Declaration of the 'Thickening' to be quite consistent in its visible purpose, when taken along with the *Cake*; and as such there is no Inconsistency that could justify our assuming an imperceptible effect, on the strength whereof we would connect the *Thickening* with the *Butter* also.

To explain—as a matter of fact, we find that the *Threshing* brings about its perceptible result in the *Corn*, along with its performance; while in the others (the *Butter*, etc.), we find the mere operation of *Threshing*, without any results; and so long as a useful operation is possible, no Vedic Injunction can ever urge the agent to the performance of a useless operation; and in the absence of such urging by a Vedic Injunction, there cannot be any ground for an assumption of imperceptible results. And thus there would be a mutual interdependence: the assumption of the Injunction (of *Threshing* with regard to the *Butter*) being based upon the Results (imperceptible), and the assumption of the Results being based upon the Injunction. That is to say, in regard to the *Butter*, etc., we do not find either the Injunction or the Result (of *Threshing*); while in regard to the *Corn*, we find both, independently of each other.

The same reasoning may be applied to the case of the *Boiling*, etc., as to be performed in regard to the *Butter* and the *Curd-Butter* mixture.

Then again, even when a useful result is actually found to be brought about, if it be such as is not required, either by the Sacrifice or the Agent, as according a needed help,—then, that is not to be accepted; but the result brought about (by the *Threshing* in regard to the *Corn*) is not such a one; as this result is found to be the separation of the grain from the chaff; and this is needed, as helping in the preparation of the *Cake*, by all the six factors of the sacrifice—viz., the *Corn*, the *Cake*, the *Sacrifice*, the *Apūrva*, the *Priest* and the *Sacrificer*. Because without the removal of the Chaff, the *Corn* could neither be made into the *Cake*, nor be offered at the sacrifice;—this is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya* saying '*prayojanañca tēnāti.*'

In a case, however, where there is a total absence of perceptible effects, the Details would be taken merely as expressed by the words; and hence the said absence could justify the assumption of imperceptible effects; and in that case the *Threshing* would apply to the *Butter* and the *Curd-Butter* mixture also. But when a distinctly perceptible effect is present, there can be no assumption of an imperceptible one; and hence the application of the Details becomes restricted, in accordance with the purpose served by each.

Then again, when an Injunction has once had all its requirements

fulfilled by a perceptible effect in a certain place, and thereby has destroyed the force of the Apparent Inconsistency (attaching to it, in the matter of a Result),—it cannot, even in another place, be assumed to have an imperceptible effect (an assumption whereof could only be based upon the said Apparent Inconsistency).

Or again, the Details could be enjoined with regard to all the objects concerned, only under the following conditions:—(1) If they were all performed with reference to the single Final *Apūrva*; (2) if all of them were performed with reference to all the Minor *Apūrvas*; (3) if there were no distinct *Apūrvas* following from the Actions performed with the Corn, etc; (4) if these last *Apūrvas* had not the requisite capability of having Actions performed with reference to themselves.

As a matter of fact, however, we find that for each of the Actions there is a distinct *Apūrva*—every one of these having the capability of having the particular Action performed with reference to itself.

As for the fact of each of these *Apūrvas* being distinct, we have already proved it under the *Apūrvādhikaraṇa* (II—i—1-5).

And even if these *Apūrvas* do not directly lead to any Result, yet, for the mere sake of their *Apūrva*-character, they will have to be taken as having the capability of having the details (of *Threshing*, etc.) performed with reference to themselves. As a matter of fact, however, they are not wholly useless either; because that alone is rejected as wholly devoid of that capability, on the ground of uselessness, which brings about absolutely no effect, or when, even without the effect brought about by it, the Material and the Sacrifice, etc., are all duly accomplished. The Minor *Apūrvas* in question, however,—*viz.*, those that follow from the *Āgnyu* and other subsidiary sacrifices of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*,—are actually found to be indirectly conducive to a distinct Result, through the help that they accord to the Final *Apūrva* of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*. And prior to the performance of the Details in question, these Minor *Apūrvas* are not accomplished; nor have they the extent of their means clearly known. Consequently, it is for the sake of the accomplishment of themselves that these *Apūrvas* instigate the performance of the Details in question.

And an *Apūrva* is acknowledged to be the instigator of a Detail, only when it is found that the performance of that Detail brings about that particular *Apūrva*. And in the case in question, we find that the word '*Vṛiki*', as also the rest, points to that *Apūrva* which is brought about by Actions performed with regard to the *Vṛiki*, and not to others (brought about by those performed with regard to the Butter, etc.); because it has no connection with these. Thus then, the *Threshing* comes to have its usefulness established by 'having obtained its own specific Minor *Apūrva*, and

does not stand in need, either of the Final *Apūrva*, or of other Minor *Apūrvas* brought about by other Actions.

That is to say, inasmuch as, in the sentence speaking of the *Vrihi* (Corn) along with the operation of *Threshing*, we find the Injunction having its usefulness through the particular *Apūrva* following from that operation performed with regard to the Corn,—that operation is not applied to the other substances. If there were no *Apūrva* in that case, then an imperceptible result would have had to be assumed; and in that case, we could take the operation to be performed with reference to even such helps as are not pointed out by the word '*Vrihi*.' As a matter of fact, however, we have a distinct *Apūrva*; and as such none of these contingencies are possible.

The *sūtra* may also be interpreted to the same effect, as follows: In the absence of the particular *Apūrva* brought about by the Rice (*Vrihi*), there being no useful purpose served, the connection (of threshing) with the Curd-Butter mixture, either through the remote Final *Apūrva*, or through the Minor *Apūrva* of some intermediate Action, could be taken as expressed by the words; when, however, there is a distinct *Apūrva* in close proximity (with the Rice itself), the words cannot bear the strain (of signifying the connection of the Threshing with other substances); and consequently, there is no authority for connecting the *Threshing* with the Butter or with the Curd-Butter mixture.

Objection: "But then, inasmuch as the sacrificial implements, the '*Sruk*, etc., would also be connected with the Minor *Apūrva* of the *Āgnāya* 'sacrifice (at which the *Vrihi-Rice* is offered), the operation of *Threshing* ' (which you take to be laid down with reference to that which brings 'about that particular *Apūrva*) would come to be applied to those implements also."

Reply: This does not affect our position; because the function of the implements (which are instrumental) is wholly different from that of the *Vrihi* (which is objective), and they could not be indicated by the word "*Vrihi*" (and as such the *Threshing* could not apply to it). Consequently, just as, even though the Curd-Butter mixture is similar to the *Vrihi*, in that both are objects to be offered, yet the former is not indicated by the word '*Vrihi*', on account of its bringing about an altogether distinct *Apūrva*,—so, in the same manner, even though the Implements are connected with the same *Apūrva* as the *Vrihi*, yet, inasmuch as they are devoid of the function of the objective (of offering) which is inherent in the *Vrihi*, they cannot be indicated by the word '*Vrihi*' (and hence the *Threshing* mentioned in connection with the *Vrihi* could not apply to them).

That however which would help in the bringing about of the same

NIRVAPANA, ETC., APPLY TO OBJECTS.

Apūrva, by means of the same function of the *objective*, would certainly have the *Threshing* performed with regard to it; as for instance the *Barley* (to which the *Threshing* is quite as applicable as to the *Vṛthi*).

All this will be explained in detail in Adhyāya IX.



ADHIKARAṆA (5).

[The *Sphya*, etc., have their applicability restricted in accordance with their connections.]

Sūtra (11): The substance, being connected with the originative Injunction, would be laid down for the purpose of that.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find the sentence '*Sphyāṣca kapālāni ca agnihotrahavanī ca cūrpaṇca kṛṣṇājinaṇca śamyā ca ulūkhalāṇca musalāṇca dṛshaccopalā ca, etāni vai daṣa yajñāyudhāni.*' And there arises a doubt as to whether each of these implements is to be employed in whatever they may be found capable of doing, or only in that in connection with which they are mentioned.]

Objection: "Inasmuch as the application of the various implements also would be adjusted, in accordance with their specified connections, just as in the case of the *Threshing*, etc.,—the conditions being exactly the same, what was the use of devoting another *Adhikaraṇa* to "the consideration of the Implements?"

Reply: The conditions are not identical in the two cases—(1) because in the case of the *Threshing*, etc., the Opponent has admitted the restriction of their applicability to be in accordance with their specified connections, because of the perceptible effects produced by them. In the case in question, on the other hand, there being no perceptible purpose served by the restricted employment, any such employment could not be admitted in the same way. On the contrary, when a perceptible effect is found to be produced by any of these Implements in question, then there would be no ground for restricting its employment to that Action alone in connection with which it may be mentioned, if that effect is found to be of use in another Action also.

(2) In the case of the *Threshing*, etc., we find that on account of their connection with the *Vrihi*, etc., they are performed with reference to distinct *Apūrvas*; while in the case in question we do not find any *Apūrva* in connection with the *Uddhanana* (which is the particular action in connection with which we find the *Sphya* mentioned), with reference to which that Action could be performed.

(3) In the former case we find the *Threshing* mentioned only once, in connection with the single substance of '*Vrihi*'; while in the present

case, we find the various Implements mentioned in two connections in the two sentences—‘*Sphyāṣca etc. . . . yajñāyudhāni*’, and ‘*Sphyenoddhanti, etc.*’ One of these two must be Injunctive, while the other is merely Descriptive. If the former sentence be taken as Injunctive, then, the direct connection of these Implements with the sacrifice being denied in accordance with the fourth *Adhikaraṇa* of the fourth *Adhyāya* (IV—i—7-10), they come to be connected with the subsidiaries, just like the ‘*sapta-daṣṭratni*’, as shown under *Sūtra* III—i—18; and as the subsidiary character would belong equally to all actions connected with the sacrifice, we would come to the conclusion that they are to be employed in whatever action they may be found capable of accomplishing (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*); and in that case the latter sentence would have to be taken as a partial description (or reference). If, however, the latter sentence is accepted as Injunctive, then, in accordance with foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the employment of the Implements would be restricted in accordance with the connections mentioned in these sentences (as held by the *Siddhānta*).

Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as there is no connection with distinct *Apūrvas*, and “as in all cases equally there are perceptible effects produced, we must “employ the Implements in accordance with their capabilities. In this “way, the sentence ‘*Sphyāṣca, etc.*’ would become justified as constituting “an Injunction; and as for the Plural number in ‘*ṣṭāni*,’ that could be “explained as based upon the plurality of the objects (*sphyā, etc.*), en- “joined; otherwise, as the whole forms a single sentence, there would be “a single Injunction. Consequently it must be admitted that the Imple- “ments are to be employed according to their capabilities.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: As a matter of fact, we find that the *Sphyā, etc.*, are mentioned in their originative Injunction in connection with certain specific functions, the ‘*uddhanana*’ for instance; and all that the sentence ‘*sphyāṣca, etc.*’ does is to describe (or refer to) what has been laid down in those Injunctions. Specially as in the sentence ‘*sphyāṣca . . . ṣṭāni vai, etc.*’, we find the word ‘*vai*’, which shows its purely descriptive character; nor does it contain any Injunctive word, expressive of the *Bhāvanā*, which could either lay down the uses of the implements, or enjoin the Actions (at which they could be employed).

And further, in your theory, many more sentences would become

purposeless (f.i., the sentences '*sphyenōddhanti*', '*kapālēna śrapayati*' and so forth). Nor is there any purpose served by taking these sentences as mere descriptive references, and we actually find the Implements in question *directly* mentioned, in these sentences, as to be employed in the specific Actions of *uddhanana*, etc.; while in taking the sentence '*sphyāṣa*, etc.,' as laying down their uses, you will have to have recourse to Indirect Indication; because it will be necessary for you to take the word '*yajña*' (in the compound '*yajñāyudhām*') as indicating the subsidiary of the sacrifice, and the word '*āyudha*', which directly expresses the Implements of war, as indirectly indicating the Instruments of other Actions.

Nor is the law of the '*Saptodaṣarātni*' (detailed in *Sūtra* III—i—18) applicable to the case in question; because in the case dealt with by that law—i.e., that of the sentence '*Vājapēyasya saptadaṣaratniryaṇpo bhavati*'—we find the genitive ending, in '*Vājapēyasya*', which appears after the name of the sacrifice, and signifies only the relationship with that sacrifice (while in the case in question we have no such genitive ending). In fact, however, even if that law of *Sūtra* III—i—18 were applicable to the present case, then too, inasmuch as the general Injunction contained in the sentence '*sphyāṣa . . . śtāni etc.*' would be swallowed by the special ones in the sentence '*sphyēnōddhanti*, etc.', the Implements could not be connected with any other Actions save those mentioned in these latter Injunctions. Consequently, we conclude that the sentence '*sphyāṣa . . . śtāni*, etc.' serves to describe (or refer to) that character of the 'sacrificial Implement' which we find belonging to the *sphyā* and the rest laid down in the sentences '*sphyēnōddhanti*, etc.'

Then, it has been argued that, "in the case in question we do not find distinct *Apūrvas* that could make the Actions performed with references to themselves."

To that we make the following reply: In the case of the *kapāla*, etc., there is a difference in the *Apūrvas*, due to the Cake, etc.; and as for the others, these can never become mixed up in any common action, because they are distinctly laid down as the means of the particular actions '*uddhanana*' and the rest; they could not serve any useful purpose in connection with any other action; just as, even though the *Threshing* is connected with the same *Apūrva* as the *Sruk*, etc., yet it is not performed in connection with the *Sruk*, etc., because of the function of these being different (from that of the *Vrihi* in connection with which the *Threshing* is mentioned).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Implements in question are to be employed in connection with the Actions with which they are mentioned in the Injunctive sentences.

ADHIKARANA (6).

[The properties of Redness, etc., are not mixed up.]

Sūtra (12) : Inasmuch as both the Substance and Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function ; and as such their application would be restricted.

[In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find the sentence ‘*arunayā pingākshyā ekahāyanyā somam kṛiṇāti*,’ and then the text goes on adding ‘*ajayā kṛiṇāti, vāsasā kṛiṇāti*,’ etc., where] the word ‘*Arūṇā*’ denotes the quality, while the words ‘*Pingākshi*’ and ‘*Ēkahāyani*’ denote the substance, because of their co-extensiveness (with the price to be paid for the *Soma*). And with reference to the quality of ‘Redness’ (signified by ‘*Arunā*’), there arises a question, as to whether it qualifies the substance that is mentioned in the same sentence with itself, or it qualifies all the substances mentioned in the context.

Objection : “Inasmuch as the words ‘*pingākshi*’ and ‘*ekahāyani*’ also signify qualities, there is no word in the sentence that signifies a substance (and as such there is no basis for the question raised).

“As to how these two words are denotative of qualities, we proceed to explain as follows :

“I.—The *Bahuvrīhi* compound (that is present in the two words in question) is laid down in the same sense as the affix ‘*matup*’; and this affix is laid down as to be used in places where the sense desired to be conveyed is that of *Possession* or that of *Location*, as laid down in the ‘*sūtra* ‘*tadatṛāsyāsmiṇ, etc.*’

“For instance, in such words as ‘*gōmān*’ and the like (ending in ‘*matup*’), the ‘Cow’ having been denoted by the basic noun ‘*gō*’, and the ‘possessor of the cow’ having to be signified by the ‘*matup*’ affix, it is necessary for the relationship (of the Possessor and the Possessed) to be signified before the Possessor is signified. Because one who is not related to the *Cow*, is never spoken of as ‘the possessor of the Cow’; and hence it is necessary that the qualifying relationship should be expressed beforehand.

“It has been already shown (under the *Ākrtyadhikarāṇa, Sūtras* I—iii—30-35) that the qualification is always signified beforehand ; and in

"the case in question, what is held to be the qualification is the *relationship of the Cow*, and not the *Cow* only; because the '*matup*' affix could not be added to the unrelated *Cow*. Then again, if the mere *Cow* were the qualification, then the *Cows* having been denoted by the basic noun ('*gō*'), the affix ('*matup*') would denote the qualified (*i.e.*, Possessor of the *Cows*) (which would not be very correct); when on the other hand, the *Relationship* is the qualification, then it becomes necessary to find out that by which it would be denoted.

"Now then, we find that the *Relationship* cannot be denoted by the basic noun ('*gō*'); because that word denotes only the *class* '*Cow*.' Nor could the denotation of the noun serve as a sure Indicator of the said *Relationship*; because the existence of the former is quite possible, even without the latter (and hence there is no necessary concomitance between the two whereby one could be indicated by the other); and also because the utterance of the word '*gō*' only does not produce any idea of the *Relationship*; and lastly, because even in the case of the word '*gōmān*', it is only when the affix '*matup*' is pronounced, that there arises any idea of the *Relationship*. Thus then, in accordance with the law '*tadd-gamē hi tad drshyatē*', we must conclude the *Relationship* to be denoted by the affix (1).

"(2) Then, again, as a rule, that which denotes the *Qualified Object*, should denote a qualification closely connected with it; and in the case in question, we find that the noun ('*gō*') does not denote the *Qualified Object* (the *Person* possessing the *cow*); and as such that noun could not denote the *Relationship* qualifying that *Person*. The affix, however, is found to signify the *Qualified Object*; and hence it denotes that *Relationship*. And as soon as the affix denotes the *Relationship*, the idea of this *Relationship* at once brings about its necessary concomitant, the idea of the *Related Object* (the *Person*); and thus the denotative potency of the affix (with regard to the *Related Person*) having been set aside by the prior indication of it by the previously-denoted *Relationship*, the Affix could not serve to denote the *Qualified* or *Related Object* (the *Person*). And, as a matter of fact, the idea of the *Qualified Object* is not found to bring about an idea of the *Relationship*; because until the qualifying *Relationship* has been cognised, there can be no idea of the *Qualified Object*. And when the *Qualified Character* has been duly established (and cognised), there remains no further need of any idea of the *Qualifying Relationship*; and hence if the *Qualified Object* were previously cognised, there would be an absolute non-cognition of the *Qualifying Relationship*. Consequently, it must be admitted that what should be denoted beforehand is the *Relationship*; and hence it is this that is denoted by the Affix.

"(3) For the following reason also, the Affix '*matup*' should be taken as denoting the Relationship: In all cases, it is the denotation of a word that is referred to by the Abstract Affix; and in the clause "*Dēvadattasya gomattvam*" we distinctly find the Relationship that is cognised. That is to say, as in the case of '*gōtva*' ('*go*' + the Abstract Affix '*tva*'), the *gotva* qualifying a particular cow,—the one with the variegated colour f.i.,—we conclude that the qualifying '*class*' ('*Cow*') is denoted by the Abstract Affix, as apart from the word; and hence that the word '*go*' denotes that *Class*;—so, in the same manner when we meet with the clause '*Dēvadattasya gōmattvam*', we find that there is no cognition of the *Cow*, while there is a distinct cognition of the Relationship, as apart from the *Cow*; and consequently we must admit that the word '*gōmān*' denotes that Relationship. And that which is denoted by the Abstract Affix forms also the basis of the denotation of that basic noun which signifies the Qualified Object; and in the case of all words, we find that that which forms the basis of the denotation of a word, is its primary meaning, while the Qualified Object forms only the secondary or indicated meaning. Then, it is only if the '*matup*' affix denote the Relationship, that the Abstract Affix added to the basic noun '*gomān*' could denote the Relationship; because we have a general law to the effect that 'the base and the affix conjointly express the denotation of the affix.' For this reason also the '*matup*' affix must be taken as denoting the Relationship.

"The above applies to all Verbal and Nominal Derivatives, as well as Compounds, that have their significations based upon their etymology. Because in the case of all these words, the Abstract Affix denotes the Relationship. In fact, all such words, as '*Rājapurushah*,' '*Aupagavaḥ*,' '*Pācaka*,' and the like, are called '*yaugika*,' simply because their denotation is based upon '*yoga*'—i.e., Connection or Relationship.

"Thus then, in the case of the words '*Piṅgākshi*' and '*Ēkahāyani*,' also, the signification of the *Bahuvrihi* compound being identical with that of the Possessive Affix (*matup*), the words must be taken as denoting the Relationship (and as such they cannot be spoken of as denoting a substance).

"II.—Further, the *Bahuvrihi* compound is laid down as pointing to something different from that which is denoted by the component words; and hence also, that *something different* being signified by an affix, the principal thing denoted cannot but be the Relationship. That is to say, the compound '*śkahāyani*' being expounded as '*śkam-hāyanam asyāḥ*,' the *something different* meant to be expressed by the compound is found to be pointed out by the word '*asyāḥ*' with the genitive affix; and as the denotation of the *genitive* is the denotation of an

"affix, it must be regarded as the principal factor; and hence it is for the sake of pointing out that denotation of the genitive affix, that we must take the pronoun in '*asyñh*'; as the genitive affix could not be used alone by itself, and also as there is no cognition of the denotation of the Pronoun itself. Then as for the genitive, it is a usually recognised fact that all that it can denote is some sort of a *Relationship*, such as that subsisting between the 'possessor and the possessed,' the 'whole and the part,' the 'original and the modification,' and so forth. For this reason also *Bahuvrihi* compounds must be taken as denoting the Relationship.

"III.—Then again, in the case of *Bahuvrihi* compounds, we can never take a '*class*' to be the *something different* signified by it; because, in the case of the compound '*Pīṅgākshī*' for instance, there is no relationship between the class 'Cow' and the 'brown eyes'; nor again can '*one-year-oldness*' (*ēkahāyana*) belong to the class 'Cow.' That is to say, all these properties—'brown eyes,' 'one year old,' 'possession of many-coloured cows'—belong to Individuals; and then as the number of Individuals being endless, we can never perceive any relationship with regard to them,—and as that which would pertain to one individual could not rightly pertain to another,—we can never accept the word ('*Pīṅgākshī*') to be denotative of the Individual, as we have already shown under the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—30-35). Nor could the very first application of the word '*Pīṅgākshī*' be accepted to have been made to the particular cow born to-day. Consequently we must accept a certain generic entity as the denotation of the word '*Pīṅgākshī*'; and this generic entity can be none other than the Relationship (as we have already shown that the word cannot denote the class 'Cow').

"IV.—Further, even though the word '*ēkahāyana*' could denote the age of one year,—yet that too would be only a *quality*, and not a *substance*.

"Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to be wholly devoid of a substantive, it cannot form the basis of the discussion in the present *Adhikaraṇa*.

"Nor can any other sentence that could be cited as such, form the basis; because as a matter of fact, there is no word that directly denotes a particular substance. As all *Rūḍhi* (conventional) words (like '*ghaṭa*,' etc.) denote *classes* (as held by you also); and all *Yaugika* (etymological) words (like '*Pācaka*,' etc.) have been shown to denote Relationship; then as for those words that are significant of absolutely nothing else save a particular substance,—such f.i. as the Proper names '*Dittha*,' '*Davittha*,' etc.,—these are never found to be used in the *Vēda*.

"Consequently, the declaration of the *Siddhānta* also should have

"been in the form, that—'there is a restricted application of the Class and 'the Quality, or of two Qualities' (and not as that of 'the Quality and the 'Substance'). Or, there being no Vedic sentence to serve as the basis for "the discussion in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Adhikaraṇa* itself should "never have been introduced."

To the above, we make the following reply:—In all cases, etymological words always denote a *substance*; nor is it possible for a Relationship to be denoted by them; as that would involve many complications.

That is to say, if the words '*Ēkahāyaṇī*' and '*Piṅgākṣī*' were to denote a Relationship, then we should not have cited them as instances in the present *Adhikaraṇa*. As a matter of fact, however, they do not denote a Relationship. Because such a denotation would give rise to endless complications.

For instance, we could assume such a denoted Relationship to be either Relationship in general, or some particular Relationship. If the former, then all etymological words, denoting the same Relationship in general, would become synonymous. If the latter, then, inasmuch as there could not be any peculiarity in the Relationship itself, the peculiarity will have to be admitted to be brought out by the members related (*i.e.*, the Relationship could be specified only by the members related). The member, however, could not specify the denoted Relationship if it were itself not denoted; and hence it would be necessary for the member also to be denoted by the word. Then again, inasmuch as the Relationship does not subsist in a single member,—and as a single member could not serve to distinguish the Relationship from all other Relationships,—it would be necessary for the word to denote both the members related.

Thus then, in the case of the word '*gōmān*,' one member is found to be denoted by the word '*gō*'; of the other member, we do not find a denotative word; hence it must be admitted that if the '*matup*' affix were to denote the particular Relationship, it could not do so, unless it denoted at least one of the members related; and hence it would necessarily denote that member also. And then after having denoted that, the affix would go on to denote the Relationship (as held by you); and certainly this process of denotation would be a highly complicated one.

Then again, when the Relationship is capable of being pointed out by the member related, who is there that would seek to assume a denotative potency in the word itself (whereby it could directly denote that Relationship)? That is to say, when, as a matter of fact, the previously-denoted *member* is found to indicate the Relationship (by necessary concomitance), then we cannot assume this latter to be denoted by the Affix either; and hence, in every way, the Relationship must be admitted to be indirectly implied (and not directly denoted).

It has been urged above that—"until the Relationship is cognised, there is no cognition of the Qualified Object."

To that we make the following reply :—It is quite true that without the qualification, there is no cognition of the Qualified Object. But in the case of the word '*gōmān*,' the qualification consists of the '*cows*,' and not of the Relationship. That is to say, what is meant by the word is that '*Devadatta* is qualified by the cows'; and as for the *cows*, they are found to be actually denoted by the basic noun itself.

Then, it has been argued that—"Devadatta cannot be qualified by the cows that are not related."

True, he is not so qualified; it is for that very reason that the '*cows*' indicate the necessary Relationship. In any way all that the word '*gōmān*' expresses is that 'one is qualified by cows'; and then there arises a question as to the position in which the cows qualify him; and then it is that the particular Relationship (of the *cows* with Devadatta) is indicated; and thus we find that the indication of the Relationship is done by the *Cows*, and not by the word '*gōmān*.'

For if all that is implied in the word '*gōmān*' were to form the direct denotation of the word, then, inasmuch as the *Cows* could not serve the purposes of qualification, unless they existed on the earth, the *earth* also would have to be accepted to be denoted by the word! That is to say, a word cannot be taken as denoting anything and everything, without which the one object denoted by it does not attain its true character; all that the word '*gōmān*' can be taken to denote is that without which there is no idea of the qualified object. And such an object is the cow only, without a cognition of which the idea of the person qualified by the cow could not appear; which cannot be said of the Relationship (even without which the idea of the Person is found to appear).

Then again, the seeking for the Relationship is the function of the speaker; as he cannot speak of the 'Possessor of Cows,' without a relationship with the cows. That is to say, in all cases, the order of sequence in the operation of the Hearer is the reverse of that of the Speaker. For instance, the operation of the speaker is as follows :—(1) First of all, he desires to speak of a certain Qualified Object; (2) then, inasmuch as the Qualified Object could not be spoken of without the Qualification, he desires to speak of the Qualification; (3) then he utters the word ('*gōmān*,' f.i.). While the operation of the Hearer is as follows :—(1) First of all, he hears the word uttered; (2) then he cognises the Qualification; (3) and then the Qualified Object; and after that he comes to have ideas of other accessories (as the Relationship between the Qualification and the Qualified, etc., etc.), necessary for the full accomplishment of the cognition of the Qualified Object. Thus then, though the Speaker may have per-

ceived the Relationship beforehand, yet, it is only at the end that the Hearer cognises it.

As a matter of fact, however, even the Speaker does not recognise the Relationship very much beforehand; because it cannot be cognised until the members related have been cognised; consequently, in the operation of the Speaker also, the Relationship comes to be recognised only latterly; and hence, in this case also, it does not escape from the position of being indirectly implied.

And it is in the nature of the thing, that the unrelated Cows do not qualify; and hence the indication of the Relationship is a function of the Cows, and not that of the word '*gōmān*,' which can only serve to denote the qualified object in that position in which it would be capable of being qualified (by the cows); and as it is only as related that the object comes to be qualified, the Relationship also comes to be implied indirectly (as a necessary factor).

Thus then, it is that which, being accompanied by the particular qualification (Cows), has attained the full position of the Qualified Object,—that would come to be denoted by the word '*gōmān*,' as that 'he is qualified by Cows.'

For these reasons, the Relationship cannot be taken as denoted by the word.

Further, the relationship is not recognised to be denoted by the case-ending (genitive in '*asyāh*,' as shown above by the opponent); and we have no rules laying down that it is to be spoken of in any other form. That is to say, the Relationship, that is expressed by the Genitive and the Locative case-endings, is self-sufficient, and one devoid of any Gender or Number, etc.; while that expressed by the '*matup*' affix is not so. Nor is there any rule laying down the declaration that, that which is devoid of gender, etc., when expressed by the Genitive or the Locative, becomes endowed with them when expressed by the '*matup*' affix,—as there is in the case of an entity, expressed by a Verbal Derivative, which is said to acquire the character of a substance.

Thus then, the only two alternatives that are possible are these: (1) That we should accept the word to denote a Relationship devoid of gender, etc., and (2) that the word should be taken as denoting the Object Related, as qualified by the implied relationship.

And we have no hesitation in pronouncing in favour of the second alternative. Because the second member of the relationship related having been denoted as qualified by another member previously cognised, the Relationship comes to be cognised along with the related members; and hence it is not held to be denoted separately by itself.

Then, it has been argued that—"the Qualified Object having been

established, there is no need of a subsequent cognition of the qualifying Relationship."

True, there is no need; but even without such need, it is cognised, all the same, as the necessary concomitant (of the Qualified Object); and what harm does it do if it is so cognised?

Another argument that has been urged is—"Inasmuch as the Relationship is denoted by the abstract affix, it must be accepted as the denotation of the 'matup' affix."

To that we make the following reply: In the case of the word 'gōmattva,' we are forced to admit the Relationship to be denoted by it, because there is no other quality inhering therein that could be denoted (but even though this might make the Relationship somehow denotable by the word 'gōmattva,' it could never be denoted by the word 'gōmān'). Because in the case of the word 'gōmattva,' which is the *Bhāva* (character) of 'gōmān,' that upon which the use of the word 'gōmān' (in the word 'gōmattva') is based, is what is meant by the *Bhāva* (character) of the *gōmān*; and it is this *Bhāva* that is denoted by the abstract affixes 'tva,' 'tal' and the like.

Thus then, we find that the Qualification—*Cows*—that is denoted by the basic noun 'go' is entirely different from the Person possessing the cows (*gōmān*); and hence the Cows are not denoted by the Abstract Affix. Then, as a matter of fact, the Abstract Affix denotes a quality inhering in the object; and in the word in question there is no other quality denoted, which could be spoken of as the '*Bhāva*,' on the ground of the denotation of the word being present in it. Nor is the Person ever called its '*Bhāva*.' Consequently, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—i—18, the Abstract Affix rests itself upon the *implied* Relationship. And even though there is no reason for taking the Relationship as denoted, yet, inasmuch as there is sufficient reason to believe that, in the nature of things, the Relation actually subsists in the object denoted,—that reason too is considered, for the nonce, enough to make it accepted as denoted by the Abstract Affix.

Thus then, even this argument does not afford sufficient reason for assuming all etymological words to be denotative of Relationship.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that, just as in the case of the word '*Danḍi*' it is the member related that is denoted,—so also is it in the case of all etymological words, like '*Piṅgākṣi*.' Then as for the existence of the Relationship in that member, it can be explained as shown above. Consequently we conclude that what is denoted by the *Bahuvrīhi* compound is a *Substance*, and not its *Quality*.

It has been argued above that—"In the case of the word '*ekahāyani*,' "the predominant element in the third object (denoted by the compound)

“being that (Relationship) which is expressed by the genitive ending, “the compound must be taken as denoting that Relationship.”

To this we make the following reply :—Though that which is denoted by the *Bahuvrīhi* is spoken of by ‘*asyāḥ*’ (in ‘*ekam hāyunam asyāḥ*’), yet the genitive (in ‘*asyāḥ*’) is cognised as equal to the Nominative.

If the third object—the member related—were really one expressed by a word with the genitive ending, then,—just as in the case of the word ‘*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*,’ the *Rājā*, being mentioned by a word with the genitive, becomes the qualification of the *Puruṣa*, while the *Puruṣa*, mentioned with the Nominative ending, and thus being the predominant factor qualified by it, comes to be taken as denoted by the compound (‘*rājapuruṣaḥ*’),—so also, in the case of such *Bahuvrīhi* compounds as ‘*citraguḥ*,’ ‘*śkahāyani*’ and the like, what would come to be denoted by them would be the ‘Cows as qualified by Devadatta, its possessor,’ and not ‘the possessor Devadatta as qualified by the cows’ (which would be highly objectionable). Consequently the real bearing of the *Bahuvrīhi* compound ‘*Citraguḥ*’ must be expounded as ‘*citrāṇām gavām ayam*’ (the Person as related to the cows of variegated colour). Though, as a rule, people expound the compound differently (as ‘*citrā gavō yasya*’), yet, inasmuch as the final true signification of the compound is found to be in the form in which we have explained it, the expounding also should be done in that way. And thus then, the real meaning of the compound ‘*citraguḥ*’ comes to be that ‘the man, Devadatta, is qualified by the cows as qualified by that Relationship.’

And just as in the case of the phrase ‘*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*,’ the word being used with the genitive ending, it is the Relationship, that, being the predominant element, is found to be denoted; and yet when the same phrase appears as the compound ‘*rājapuruṣaḥ*,’ and the genitive ending has accordingly disappeared,—inasmuch as the two words ‘*Rājā*’ and ‘*Puruṣa*’ do not wholly renounce their own individual significations, and the extraneous factor of the Relationship is brought about by the cognition of the qualified object brought about by the proximity of the two words,—the compound does not denote the Relationship; so in the same manner, in the case of the *Bahuvrīhi* compound also, the Relationship does not form the predominant factor in its denotation; all the more so as there is no genitive ending in this case; nor does the predominant factor consist in the two component words, either singly or conjointly; and consequently we are led to the conclusion that it is the third object, a Substance, that forms the predominant factor in the denotation of all *Bahuvrīhi* compounds.

And this third object, spoken of as related, is, in accordance with its capability, accepted to be either (1) the *Class*, or (2) the *Substance*, or (3) the *Quality*, or (4) the *Action*. For instance, (1) we speak of a *Class* as

'*citravyakti*' (consisting of various kinds of individuals); (2) of a *Substance* as '*nānāguṇa*' (having various qualities); (3) of a *Quality* as '*anekāgraya*' (having many substrates); and (4) of an *Action* as '*anekāgrayā*' (inhering in many substances). In all these cases the particular third object denoted by the *Bahuvrīhi* compound is ascertained by means of the signification of another word spoken of as coextensive with the compound (f. i. the word '*jātiḥ*' in the clause '*citravyaktiriyam jātiḥ*').

Thus then in the case of the *Bahuvrīhi* compounds in question, inasmuch as the qualification of '*ekahāyāni*' (one year old) cannot apply to the *Class* which is eternal, we admit it to denote the Individual Cow.

Objection: "It has been shown above (I—iii—30-35) that on account "of *Endlessness* and *Anomaly*, the Individual can never be accepted as forming the denotation of a word."

Reply: That does not affect our position; because even though there may be an endless number of Individuals, we could very well take a single generic character, upon which we would base the connection of the word with every individual (having that character); and in this there would be no anomaly. That is to say, when the third object is found once to be marked by the *Class* itself, inasmuch as that generic character would be found to mark all Individuals (forming that *Class*), through that generic character once cognised, every one of these Individuals, as differing from one another in time, place, etc., could very well be denoted by the word; and as the word would never be used with reference to any individual not marked by that generic character, there could be no anomaly. In a case, however, where the Individuals are marked by other Individuals, there too, the basic characteristic is the generic character of the *Class*. And, howsoever far we may proceed, so long as we keep on the proper track of the series of qualifications, we shall always find the final basic generic character to be identically the same (in the case of all individuals of the same *Class*); and thus there would be nothing incongruous in connecting the word with every one of these Individuals. And in all such cases, it is the first and the last among the Individuals thus found to be pointed out by the word, that forms its real denotation; and as for the intermediate ones, inasmuch as their cognition is brought about by indirect Indication, they are not accepted as directly denoted by the word.

Thus then, in the case in question, the classes '*Piṅgava*' and '*Akṣhitva*' (denoted by the two words forming the compound '*Piṅgākṣhi*') indicate their respective Individuals—viz., the *particular quality*, and the *portion of the eye*; and these two again indicate the *Substance* having such an eye; and this *Substance* (being the final thing pointed out) becomes the denotation of the compound ('*Piṅgākṣhi*').

Then there arises the question as to whether this denotation of the *Substance* is direct or indirect (being only indicated).

As to this question there is a difference of opinion. Some people (the grammarians) hold that, just as in the case of the Deific Nominal Affixes, the '*matup*' affix, and the like, so in the present case also, the Substance is directly denoted by the compound—(1) because it is actually cognised as the predominant factor; (2) because there is co-extensiveness; and (3) because of the grammatical rule '*anēkamanyapadārthaḥ*.'

While others (the Logicians) make the following declaration: "In the case of the Deific Nominal Affixes (in the word '*Aindra*' f.i.), we find that the additional factor admitted into the word '*Indra*' does not serve any other purpose; and hence we take that as denoting the other object (the *material* dedicated to Indra); specially as in this case that object is not capable of being indicated by the basic noun '*Indra*,' because of this giving rise to an anomaly, and also because, as a matter of fact, the basic noun '*Indra*' does not signify that other object. In the case of the *Bahuvrīhi* compound, however, we find (1) that the two words retain their own original significations; (2) that there is no additional factor admitted into the words; and (3) that the necessary idea of the Substance is afforded by the classes '*Pīngatva*' and '*Akshīva*' (by Indication based upon the necessary concomitance of these with the Substance); and hence we cannot very reasonably admit the fact of the Substance being directly denoted by the compound."

But what has been said here cannot be accepted as applying to all the compounds. For instance, it might apply to the *Kamadhāraya* compound, where there is every possibility of Indication (because the classes '*nilatva*' and '*kamalatva*' inhere in the same object, which can very well be indicated by the compound made up of the two words '*nila*' and '*kamala*'). On the other hand, in the case of such *Bahuvrīhi* compounds, as '*citrāguḥ*' and the like, inasmuch as the two component words '*citrā*' and '*gō*' by themselves, denote something wholly different from that which is meant to be expressed by the compound, they cannot, either directly (by Direct Assertion) or indirectly (by Indirect Indication), be taken as co-extensive with *Devadatta*, etc.,—the owner of the cows (that is meant to be expressed by the compound); and then, inasmuch as the compound '*citrāguḥ*' by itself brings about the cognition of something different from those denoted by the words '*citrā*' and '*gō*,' even before we add such words as '*Dēvadattaḥ*' and the like,—we can not very well assume that third object to be denoted by the sentence '*citrāguḥ-dēvadattaḥ*.' Nor are the two objects, cognised, at the time of the compounding of the two words, in any way connected with the object *Devadatta*; and as such *Devadatta* could not be denoted by the said sentence.

For these reasons it must be admitted that, on account of direct cognition, and also on account of the grammatical rules bearing on the point, it is this third object that forms the denotation of the *Bahuvrihi* compound. In this way also would the predominant character of this object be compatible (which would be hard to be reconciled with the fact of its being indirectly indicated).

Thus then, in the case of such *Bahuvrihis*, the compound having been found to be directly *denotative* of the third object,—even if in the case of certain compounds, we find indirect Indication possible, there also, inasmuch as the previously-established denotative potency of the compound would not have disappeared, we could very well take the third object to be directly *denoted* (and not *indicated*).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the words '*Pīṅākshī*' and '*Ēkahāyanī*' denote a Substance.

Then as for the argument that "the word '*Ēkahāyanī*,' denoting a certain *age*, could not apply to the Class, etc., etc.,"—it does not hold water; because the *age* is indirectly *indicated*, and not *denoted*, by the word. It is only such words as 'young,' 'old' and the like that denote *age*; as for words like '*Ēkahāyanī*,' they simply denote *Substances connected with certain periods of time*; and as such they are employed to indicate particular ages. Because as a matter of fact, the declaration '*ekam hāyanam yasyāḥ*' ('that which has one year of existence') pertains to the *Substance*, and not to the *age*; because the one year of existence belongs to *one who has been born a year ago*, and not to the *age*.

Thus then both the words '*Pīṅākshī*' and '*Ēkahāyanī*' denoting a *Substance* having the qualities expressed by parts of the same words,—it is quite natural that there should arise, in connection with the sentence in which they occur, the following question: 'Does the *Redness* (mentioned by the word '*aruṇayā*') appear as the qualification of all the *Substances* that are mentioned in the Context as those with which the *Soma* should be purchased,—or, it pertains only to the *one-year-old substance* which is mentioned, as the price of the purchase, in the same sentence as *Redness* itself?'

Like the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it might be urged against the present one also, that, "inasmuch as the *Redness* is actually found to be mentioned "in connection with only one such substance, there can be no question of "its pertaining to all the substances mentioned in the Context."

Consequently we proceed to meet this objection: The sentence is so constituted that the quality of *Redness* could be connected either with the 'purchase' or with the 'one-year-old substance'; because it is mentioned in the same sentence as both of these. Then on account of its being mentioned with the Instrumental case-ending, 'the possibility of its

connection with the *Substance* is very remote, it would be connected with the 'Purchase,' on account of the greater authority of Direct Assertion (which justifies such connection). But the Quality of Redness, having no action of itself, and being altogether immaterial, could not be connected with the 'Purchase' (as its means). Then again, if we were forced to admit its connection with the *Substance* (the one year old), then the word 'Ēkahāyanyā' would come to have two distinct forms, as with reference to the *Purchase* and to the *Redness*, in accordance with the *sūtra* 'Ēkacābhye parārthavat'; and as such we would have to admit of the presence of two distinct case-endings in the word 'Ēkahāyanyā,' which do not really exist (i.e., the sentence would have to be construed as 'arunimā Ēkahāyanyāḥ' and 'Ēkahāyanyā somam kṛṇāti'); because the connection (of the *Ēkahāyanyā*) with the action (of *purchase*) can be expressed only by the Instrumental case-ending; while that with the quality (of *Redness*) depends upon the Genitive ending. And thus the *Redness* being found to be incapable of being connected with those mentioned in the same sentence with itself, it would come to be connected with any substance mentioned in the Context; and thus it could very well be taken as pertaining to all the substances mentioned in the Context (as the price of the *Soma* to be purchased).

Objection: "Then in that case, it would be practically settled, in accordance with the reasons that you bring forward, that it pertains to all the substances; and as such there should be no question as to its being connected with the *Purchase*."

In reply to this, we have the *Bhāshya*—'An authoritative word cannot express what is absolutely impossible.' That is to say, the fact of *Redness* being mentioned in the same sentence with 'Ēkahāyanyā' gives rise to the clear idea of its being a qualification of this latter; while the presence of the Instrumental ending in 'arunayā' distinctly points to its being a qualification of the action of *Purchase*; and thus the unimpeachable verbal authority of this Instrumental Ending, on the one hand, and the actual impossibility of the connection of the immaterial and inactive Quality of *Redness* with the Action of *Purchase*, on the other, leave it extremely doubtful as to which view is reasonably possible, and which is unreasonable and impossible.

In speaking of the various phases of the question, the *Bhāshya*, first of all, introduces the alternative of the connection of *Redness* with the action of *Purchase*, on account of its commanding earliest attention, in view of its being based upon direct Verbal Authority, and hence very little extra weight being put upon the Vedio Word. Then, on the strength of the mention of this connection of *Redness* with the *Purchase*, we should try our best to find out a certain capacity in the former (whereby it could

justify the said connection); and if we should find out some sort of this capacity, we should certainly accept the connection of the *Redness* with the *Purchase*. If, however, we should absolutely fail to perceive any such capacity, then we would even accept the anomaly of '*Vākyabhēda*' and take the *Redness* as qualifying the whole Context.

(1) The '*Vākyabhēda*' here spoken of is not the ordinary syntactical split marked by the repetition of the Affix, etc.; but what it means is '*Disjunction*'; the sense of the *Bhāṣya* being that we would even accept the Disjunction of the sentence speaking of the *Purchase*. (2) Or, the word '*bhēda*' in '*Vākyabhēda*' may be explained as formed with the Passive *ghañ* affix, thus signifying that *which is disjoined*; and in this case the word '*aruṇā*' would be such a '*bhēda*' of the sentence in which it occurs (*i.e.*, it would be disjoined from the sentence speaking of *Purchase*). (3) Or again, the affix in '*bhēda*' may be taken in the *Active* sense, the meaning being that the word '*aruṇā*' taken apart would disjoin the sentence; and we would even accept this, in connecting *Redness* with the whole Context.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole comes to be this: So long as the Direct Assertion (of the Instrumental ending in '*aruṇayā*') and the syntactical connection (of '*aruṇayā*' and '*piṅgākshyā śkaḥāyanyā*') are operative, the *Redness* cannot be taken as qualifying the whole Context (and in this case it would be connected with the one-year-old substance only); but if these two (Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection) have their power annulled by their incompatibility with the nature of things, and become inoperative, then, in that case, the connection of *Redness* would be ascertained by the Context only (and hence the *Redness* would be taken as pertaining to all the various substances mentioned in the Context as the price of the *Soma* to be purchased).

And on this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

"That which is laid down would appertain to all, because there is no difference in their relationship, and because of the non-difference of the context. (Sūtra 8). That is to say, inasmuch as Direct Assertion and syntactical connection are wholly indifferent on the question, we cannot but take our stand upon the indications of the Context.

"Question: 'How could the Context take cognisance of a Quality (*Redness*), which is not of the nature of an Action?'

"Answer: What we mean is, not that the Context takes cognisance of the *Redness*, but that in the word '*aruṇayā*' that which is denoted by the basic noun '*aruṇā*' is predicated with reference to the Instruments

“denoted by the Instrumental ending,—such as the *Soma* and the rest, “which are aids to the bringing about of the *Apūrva* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* “sacrifice dealt with in the Context,—and the basic noun ‘*aruṇā*.’ Thus “then the word ‘*aruṇayā*’ comes to be taken as a sentence, the meaning “afforded by it being that that Individual, which has been laid down as “helping in the bringing about of the *Apūrva*, is to be employed in bringing about that *Apūrva*, only as qualified by ‘*Redness*.’

“Consequently, it follows that all the Instruments employed—even “the vessels, etc.—should be red; and if they do not happen to be so of “themselves, they should be painted red. And as for the sacrificer and the “other agents concerned in the sacrifice, inasmuch as these are spoken of “by other case-endings, the quality of *Redness*, even though cognised as “pertaining to all, could not qualify these.

“Against the declaration that the word ‘*aruṇā*’ being denotative of “a quality, cannot be connected with the verb ‘purchase,’—the following “argument is urged:—

“‘*The word is not denotative of a quality.* As a matter of fact, it is “only such words ‘*Rūpa*,’ ‘*Rasa*’ and the like that are denotative of “‘qualities only; as it is the case with only these words, that whenever “‘they are meant to be connected with a substance, they are never used “‘without the possessive affix *matup*. On the other hand, in the case “‘of the words ‘*aruṇā*’ and the like, we find that it is seldom that “‘they are used by themselves without abstract affixes, with a view to “‘expressing *qualities*; where too such use depends upon the proximity “‘of words with the genitive ending,—in such rare instances as *paṭasya* “‘*ṣuklaḥ*; as a rule, however, these words are always used as expressive “‘of substances with certain qualities as their subordinate elements; and “‘it is for this reason that, even without the possessive affix *matup*, they are “‘used as co-extensive with substantives; e.g., *ṣuklaḥ paṭaḥ*, *aruṇo ghaṭaḥ*, “‘etc.

“‘It might be urged that in these cases we have an elimination of the “‘Possessive Affix, as laid down in the *Vārtika* on *Pāṇini*, *Sutra* “‘I—iv—19, (and hence the co-ordination of these words also with substantives is not wholly independent of the Possessive Affix).

“‘But it is not so; because the expressed meaning of words is never “‘denoted by means of eliminations; consequently we must admit that “‘the word *ṣukla*, by itself, is capable of expressing both (the property of “‘whiteness and the white object. For instance, in the case of words with “‘the *kvip* affix (where the presence of the affix is not perceptible), as “‘also in such words as *adhunā* and the like (where the affix alone is “‘perceptible, the basic word having been eliminated),—we find that even “‘though the basic word by itself (in the former case), or the affix by

“ ‘itself (in the latter), is quite capable of expressing both the meanings,—
 “ ‘yet what the grammatical rule means by speaking of the eliminations
 “ ‘is that such double potency is present in the word ; in the same man-
 “ ‘ner, in the case of the word *aruṇā* also, the basic noun itself is capable
 “ ‘of expressing both ; and this is all that is meant by the mention of
 “ ‘elimination in the *Vārtika* quoted above.

“ ‘Nor can it be urged that the word would signify the substance by
 “ ‘means of indirect Indication. (1) Because the substance is actually
 “ ‘cognised as the direct denotation of the word ; (2) and also because there
 “ ‘are no explanatory rules, in Grammar, pertaining to Indirect Indica-
 “ ‘tions ; (3) and if there were such an indirect Indication in the case of the
 “ ‘word *aruṇā*, such an indication would be possible in the case of the word
 “ ‘*rūpa* also ; and hence this latter word could be used in connection with
 “ ‘a substantive, even without the affix *matup* ; and (4) just as we have
 “ ‘the expression *candanasya gandhaḥ*, we could also have *gōḥ aruṇaḥ* ; (5)
 “ ‘when we pronounce the word *gandhatva*, we give up all idea of the
 “ ‘sandal-wood, etc., having the *gandha*, and connect the word with the
 “ ‘particular *gandhas* (odours),—so also would be the case with the word
 “ ‘*aruṇatva*, (i.e., if the case of *gandhatva* were analogous with *aruṇatva*,
 “ ‘then in the expression *gōḥ aruṇatvam*, we could connect the *aruṇatva*
 “ ‘with the Cow) ; (6) just as the word *rūpa*, so the word *aruṇa* also
 “ ‘could not be used as co-extensive with any thing.

“ ‘Some people hold the co-ordination of the word *aruṇā* with
 “ ‘substantives to be based upon Indication ; but such co-ordination
 “ ‘would be possible in the case of the word *rūpa*, as also in that of
 “ ‘the word *aruṇatva* ; because these words also do not express anything
 “ ‘more (than mere properties).

“ ‘This also sets aside the possibility of the elimination of the *matup*
 “ ‘affix in the case of the word *aruṇatva*.

“ ‘Then again, no properties are ever connected with Gender, Num-
 “ ‘ber, etc. ; hence also, inasmuch as we find the words *ṣuklaḥ*, *aruṇā*, etc.
 “ ‘connected with particular Genders and Numbers, we must admit
 “ ‘them to be denotative of substances. Nor can it be urged that we have
 “ ‘the rule that the Genders and Numbers of *guṇavacanas* or adjectives are
 “ ‘based upon their substantive substrates ; because if it were so, then we could
 “ ‘have Genders and Numbers even in such words as *rūpa*, *ṣuklatva* and the
 “ ‘like, and also because the word *guṇavacana* in the said rule does not mean
 “ ‘the words that merely express properties, but those that having expressed a
 “ ‘property, denote a substance ; for if it were not so, the word *vacana* would
 “ ‘be wholly superfluous ; because the form of the word is nothing other
 “ ‘than its *vacana* (utterance) ; and as such the former sense could be got
 “ ‘at by means of the word *guṇa* alone ; hence it is the addition of the

“ ‘word *vacana* that serves to preclude such words as *rūpa* and the
 “ ‘like.

“ ‘The *Vārtika*, laying down the elimination of the *matup* in *guṇa*-
 “ ‘*vacanas*, is also amenable to the same explanation (as there also we have
 “ ‘the expression *guṇavacana*).

“ ‘For these reasons we conclude that the word *aruṇā* denotes a sub-
 “ ‘stance; and hence inasmuch as it can very well be spoken of as an
 “ ‘agent, it can be construed along with the sentence in which it occurs;
 “ ‘(and thus having its denotation based upon Syntactical Connection, it
 “ ‘leaves no room for the operation of the Context as held by the *Pūrva*-
 “ ‘*pakshi*); and as such the word cannot be taken as qualifying every-
 “ ‘thing mentioned in the Context.’

“ ‘The reply to the above argument is that *it is not very satisfactory*;
 “ ‘that is to say, it is not compatible with the conclusion arrived at under
 “ ‘the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—30-35).

“ ‘Then again, it is only when a certain meaning is never found to
 “ ‘abandon a word, either by agreement or difference, that that meaning is
 “ ‘acknowledged as the directly expressed denotation of that word; and in
 “ ‘the case in question we find that the word ‘*aruṇā*’ never abandons the
 “ ‘property (of Redness). And in such cases, the Property, connected in-
 “ ‘separably with a substance, having been previously denoted, as forming
 “ ‘the qualification, the substance would be implied by the mere relation-
 “ ‘ship of that qualification; and hence this substance could never be
 “ ‘accepted as forming the expressed denotation of the word; as we have
 “ ‘already shown above (under the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa*).

“ ‘Then again, on account of the irregularity of usage, a substance can-
 “ ‘not be accepted as the direct denotation of the word ‘*aruṇā*’; because
 “ ‘the word is found to be used with reference to other substances with the
 “ ‘property of Redness, and to be not used with reference to the former
 “ ‘substance, when it happens to be devoid of that property.

“ ‘It might be argued that, inasmuch as at the time of the appearance
 “ ‘of another property, the substance also becomes changed, the said
 “ ‘irregularity loses its force.

“ ‘But as a matter of fact, there is no such absolute rule as that the
 “ ‘substance becomes changed; because, as a matter of fact, it is found
 “ ‘that even while the substance remains the same, various properties are
 “ ‘found to appear and disappear.

“ ‘There are two theories on the point of the appearance of new pro-
 “ ‘perties in a substance:—The first is that of the *Pañtharas*, who hold that

"the black *pot* itself becoming cooked in the fire, takes the red colour ;
 "and in accordance with this theory, the substance remains the same.
 "Another theory is that of the *Pailukas*, who hold that the cooking is in
 "the *atoms* composing the pot ; and in this theory also, the said irregu-
 "larity would pertain to these atoms. In the way that we have explained
 "(in *Ālokāvartikā*) the nature of the substance, it cannot but be admitted
 "that what undergoes the change is the Property, and not the substance
 "itself. In a case where a particular substance, the jar, is reddened by
 "the colour of another substance, the Red-chalk,—the former is spoken
 "of as 'red' though the property (of *Redness*) inheres in the sub-
 "stance (the chalk) connected with it ; and in this case, inasmuch as a
 "single substance would come to be spoken of by many such words as
 "'Blue,' 'Yellow' and the like (if all these were to be denotative of sub-
 "stances),—this would be a distinct irregularity. And certainly, this ir-
 "regularity would be very much more patent than that relating to the *Class* ;
 "and this would be highly unsatisfactory.

"Then as for the elimination of the *matup* affix, laid down in the
 "*Vārtika*, it only serves the purpose of offering an explanation of an
 "Indication established by eternal usage.

"It has been argued above that the substance is found to form the
 "principal denotation, and as such we could not admit of its Indication.
 "To this we make the following reply :—The objection could be brought
 "forward against one who should declare the substance to be the sub-
 "ordinate element in the denotation of the word '*aruṇā*' ; and it cannot
 "be effective against the theory that makes the Indication very closely
 "approximate to the object denoted by the word. That is to say, in the
 "case of the sentence '*agnirmānavakah*,' we find the *Agni* (Fire) and the
 "*Mānavaka* (Boy) to be wholly different from one another ; and hence we
 "explain the expression as being based upon a certain singularity in their
 "characters ; and hence in this case, owing to the peculiar character of
 "the idea brought about, the word '*agniḥ*' is not accepted as being
 "directly denotative of the object (Boy) that it qualifies. In the case,
 "however, of those words, which, while expressing the *Class* or the *Property*,
 "indicate the *Substance*,—we find that there is not a very great gap
 "between that which is *denoted* and that which is *indicated* ; and it is not
 "very easy to distinguish them ; and this non-distinction (idea of identity)
 "can be removed only by very learned people, on the ground of invariable
 "concomitance and difference ; and hence ordinary people (not being
 "able to effect the said distinction) come to think of the *substance* as
 "being directly denoted by the word. But it does not follow from this
 "that when the learned would speak of the non-denotability of the *Sub-*
 "*stance* by the said word, they could be charged with transgressing

“popular usage. Because the ordinary man of the world does not take the trouble of making nice distinctions between Denotations and Indications; and hence on this question he would be wholly indifferent; and as such, he could not take exception to the distinction that the learned would make, for the purposes of ascertaining the generic and specific character of things. And thus there would be no transgression in the matter.

“Then, as for the questions—‘Why cannot you admit of the elimination of the *matup*, as based upon Indication, in the case of the word ‘*Rūpa* also?’ and—‘How can the explanatory rule pertain to Indication?’—we offer the following explanation:—

“There are three sorts of Indications: (1) one that is well established by eternal usage, just as well as Direct Denotation; (2) one that is created at the time; (3) and there is one class that cannot be admitted on account of their incapability.

“That is to say, (1) there are certain words in which the Indicative potency is as eternally established as the Denotative, —e.g., the words ‘*çukla*,’ ‘*aruṇa*’ and the like. (2) There are some which are used nowadays, in the indirect indicative sense,—e.g., the word ‘*Rathāṅganāman*’ as applied to the *Cakravāka* bird (the *Rathāṅga*—part of a chariot—being the wheel which, as expressed by the word ‘*Çakra*,’ forms a portion of the name ‘*Cakravāka*’). (3) While there are certain words which are wholly incapable of having any indicative potency; such are the words ‘*Rūpa*,’ ‘*Rasa*,’ etc.

“Then to the question—‘The relationship of the substance with *Rūpa* being exactly of the same kind as that with *Çukla*, how is it that there is no Indication in the case of the former?’—the reply is, *it is just as in the case of denotation*. That is to say, according to you also, though both the words *Rūpa* and *Çukla* are equally expressive of properties, yet it is only the latter, and not the former, that is expressive of a substance with a property as its subordinate element; and in the same manner, we admit of Indication in the case of *Çukla*, and not in that of *Rūpa*.

“Against this it might be urged that—the Denotative potency of a word belongs to it naturally; which is not the case with Indication, which depends upon such agencies as that of the Relationship, etc.

“But it would be so in the case of words newly coined (like ‘*Ḍittha*’ etc.). You, however, hold the word ‘*Çukla*’ to apply to the substance, through a property inhering in it; and as this is found to be present in the case of the word ‘*Rūpa*’ also, this latter would also become applicable to the substance. Consequently it must be admitted that in *Properties* there are different kinds of potentialities, whereby only certain words expressive of it pertain to the substance bearing that property,

“while others pertain to the Property alone as the predominant factor.
“And this would be the case with Indication also.

“Thus then, just as words have diverse potentialities with regard to
“Denotation, so, in the same manner, should the meanings also be admit-
“ted to have various potentialities appertaining to the indicated meaning.
“Though the potentiality of denoting a visible object is to be *inferred* from
“its effects,—and as such the necessity of admitting an imperceptible poten-
“cy is equally present for both of us (*i.e.*, the Denotative and the Indica-
“tive Potencies being both equally imperceptible),—and the function of
“the word having ceased with the denotation of the expressed meaning,—
“yet, when this last expressed meaning is not found to be quite fully
“established, it leads to the assumption of a peculiar potency in this
“*meaning*, and not in the *word*, which points to the indicated meaning;
“and this assumption is quite warranted by the exigencies of the circum-
“stances. And on the mere ground of having to assume imperceptible
“potentialities, both theories are equal.

“Thus then, there being no Indicative potency in the word ‘*Rūpa*,’
“it can never be applied to substances, without the *matup* affix. This
“view of the case is also supported by the *sūtra* ‘*Rasādibhyaṣca*’ (*Paṇini*
“V—ii—95), which reiterates the *matup* affix with reference to ‘*Rūpa*,’
“‘*Rasa*,’ etc., simply with a view to preclude all other affixes in connection
“with these. As a matter of fact also, we do not find that the substance is
“never signified by the cognition of ‘*Rūpa*’ etc., for we actually find that
“the ‘*Rūpa*’ points to the *substance* as its invariable concomitant, just as
“the smoke points to the fire; all that we mean is that the word ‘*Rūpa*,’
“itself not pertaining to the substance, there is no Indication in this case.

“Between the Substance and the Property, whether it is the one or
“the other that is cognized as the predominant element depends upon
“their nature; and in the case of *Rūpa* etc., we find that they are always
“denoted as the predominant factors; and hence in such cases the sub-
“stance is signified merely as a qualifying subsidiary; whereas in the case
“of the word ‘*Çukla*’ and the like, the substance is expressed as the *quali-*
“*fied* predominant factor. It is on account of this indicative signification
“having continued from the very beginning of things that it is explained
“by means of the explanatory grammatical rule laying down the elim-
“ination of the *matup* affix.

“That Indication, however, which has a more recent origin, and is
“not so well established, cannot be explained by means of special rules
“laid down in the *Çāstras*; because even without such a rule, it is found
“out through other factors connected with it. As for instance, in the
“case of the expression ‘*Madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ*, etc. (*sweet taste is soft*,
“etc.), inasmuch as the *softness*, etc., are also properties, just like the

"*taste*, they cannot qualify this latter; and as such they are taken as qualifying the *substance* characterized by *taste*.

"Thus then, inasmuch as no exception can be rightly taken to the potentialities (of words), the occasional presence and absence of the elimination of the *mutūp* affix becomes quite explicable.

"The above also serves to explain the restrictions as to the presence or absence of the Abstract Affix, and to that of Coextensiveness or Diversity. For instance, the words '*Çuklatva*' etc., signifying the property, as the predominant factor, abstracted by means of the Abstract Affix, is always related (to the *substance*) by a diversity of substrates. The only difference (between '*Çuklatva*' and '*Çukla*') is that in the case of the former it is the Property that is the qualified predominant factor, while in the latter, the property qualifies a substance; and thus being subordinate to the substance, resides in the basic noun only; and it is this property, as subordinate to the substance, that comes to be subsequently abstracted by means of the abstract affixes '*tva*' etc. It is for this reason that the word '*Çukla*' has two forms ('*Çukla*' and '*Çuklatva*') while *Gandha* etc. have only one form. And there is yet another duality of form in '*Çukla*'—viz., that at one time it denotes the Property, while at another it would indicate the Substance possessed of that property; —in the former case, the word '*Çukla*' having for its subordinate factor the substance mentioned by the word with the genitive ending; e.g., '*patasya çuklaḥ*', where from the very beginning the Property of *whiteness* is spoken of as abstracted from the substance; and in the latter case, the word '*Çukla*' having for its subservient factor the substance expressed by another word with the same case-ending as the word '*Çukla*,' e.g., '*Çuklaḥ pataḥ*', where the *Çukla* is mentioned as swallowed up by the Substance.

"And thus the presence of the Gender and Number (in the word '*arūṇayā*') could be explained, as before, through the substratum of the *redness*.

"Thus it is that Grammarians have held the Substance to be the predominating element in all words expressive of Properties; as according to them, all such words, having expressed the property, apply to the substance possessing that property. Nor do the Grammarians specify and enumerate the properties; as they base their use of the names 'Property' and 'Substance' on the actually perceived relationship of the container and the contained. Thus, as a matter of fact, it is the word '*Çukla*', and not the word '*Rūpa*', that signifies the subservient substance; and thus there can be no irregularity in the matter of Gender and Number.

"It is with a view to this argument that the *Bhāṣya* has made the

"declaration—We find even such words as are expressive of properties to have the feminine gender—e.g., the words '*Karuṇā Buddhīh*,' and the like. Though as a matter of fact these words are similar in character to the word '*gandha*', yet they have been cited only with a view to show that such words take the feminine gender. The sense of this is that even those words that express self-predominant Properties are found to take particular Genders and Numbers; what then can be said against the presence of these in the case of such words as pre-eminently signify substances?"

"For these reasons, the word '*aruṇā*' must be taken as expressive of a property; and as such it cannot be connected with the verb 'to purchase.'

"The position being thus summed up, the opponent comes forward with the following objection:—'If the word *aruṇayā* is not connected with the verb to purchase, it could very well be connected with the *ekahāyanī* (one-year-old). As it is quite possible for a word expressing a property to be connected with a substance.'

"The reply to this is that the connection of Redness with the verb is expressed by Direct Declaration, while that with the Substance is expressed by Syntactical Connection; and as such, this latter being weaker is set aside in favour of the former. With a view to this, the *Bhāṣhya* says—What the objector has said is not possible; because the word '*ARUṆA*' denotes a PROPERTY only, and not both property and substance; and the word '*ĒKAHĀYANĪ*' also denotes the substance only; under the circumstances how could these two words be taken as related to each other, in the absence of the Genitive ending that would signify such relationship? The sense of this is that there are two ways in which words are related to one another: by way of coextensiveness, and by that of diversity of substrates;—and in the case of the two words in question '*aruṇā*' and '*ekahāyanī*,' they could be related by coextensiveness, only if both of them signified both Substance and Property, and words are related by the diversity of substrates, only when the word expressive of the substance is accompanied by the Genitive ending. Thus then, inasmuch as the word '*aruṇā*' signifies the Property alone, and the word '*ekahāyanī*' the Substance alone, there can be no direct verbal coextensiveness between them; nor do we find any genitive ending; consequently on account of the authoritative character of the Instrumental ending (in '*aruṇayā*'), we cannot admit of any relationship between the Property and the Substance (in the case in question).

"The opponent,—not comprehending the fact of the above assertion being based upon the comparatively greater and less authoritative character of the various words concerned, and thinking that the relationship of the Substance and the Property is denied on account of there

“being nothing to point to it, says:—(‘*Even though there is no genitive ending, yet the coextensiveness (between *aruṇā* and *ēkahāyaṇī*) is distinctly expressed by the fact of both words having the same case-ending (the Instrumental).*’)

“The reply to this is that *what the opponent says is not possible*, etc. “That is to say, our declaration is based upon the comparative strength of “the means of cognition; for instance, the basic word ‘*aruṇā*’ is found, by “its natural capability, to be expressive of a property; while its coexten- “siveness with ‘*ēkahāyaṇī*’ is based upon its *proximity* to another word; “and certainly there is a deal of difference between the authoritative “strength of these two means of signification.

“*Objection* :—‘Though the suggestive power of the word points to the “fact of the word *aruṇayā* expressing the Property of Redness only, yet we “have to admit, on the strength of Syntactical Connection, the fact of its “indirectly indicating the substrate of that property also. (That is to “say, it being not possible for the Property to be related either to the “Action or to its accessories, in order to save the word expressing it “from being wholly meaningless, we must take it as related to the word “*ēkahāyaṇī*, which also saves us from syntactical split) [*Bhāṣya*—p. 217, “l. 6 *et seq.*].’

“In reply to this, it is pointed out that the relationship of *aruṇā* with “the Action is expressed by the Direct Signification of the Instrumental “ending (‘in *aruṇayā*’), while that with the Substance could at best be “got at by indirect Indication; and as such this latter could not but give “way to the former, which is more authoritative.

“Against this again we have yet another objection, based upon the “inevitable character of the said Indirect Indication: ‘The Property not “being capable of bearing a relationship with the Action, no significance can “be attached to the case-ending in *aruṇayā*.’

“The reply to this is,—‘That would make the Instrumental ending wholly “meaningless. That is to say, no amount of inevitable necessity can “make that cognised which is not expressed by the word. Nor can the “Instrumental ending in ‘*aruṇayā*’ be justified and explained, through “Indication, like the Accusative in ‘*saktūn*’ (in the sentence ‘*saktūn juhoti*,’ where ‘*saktūn*’ is taken as equivalent to ‘*saktubhiḥ*,’ on account “of the fact of the *saktū* not being something to be accomplished, and as “such incapable of taking the Accusative ending); because the Property “(expressed by the basic word ‘*aruṇā*’) being incorporeal, it is not capable “of the character of any sort of agency denoted by the case-endings (*i.e.*, “all case-endings are equally inapplicable to it).

“Says the opponent—“The word *aruṇayā* might be taken as laying “down the property signified by the basic word, with reference to the

“agency obtained through its substrate which is endowed with a particular Gender and Number. As there is a theory current among Grammarians that even though the words expressing properties are devoid of the character of agents, yet, inasmuch as they serve to qualify such agents, they take the various case-endings, the Accusative, etc.’ [Bhāṣya —p. 218, l. 12 *et seq.*]

“*Reply* :—There is not much in this argument. Though the word ‘*aruṇayā*’ might, somehow or other, be capable of being related to the ‘*ekahāyani*’, yet inasmuch as the ‘*ekahāyani*’ would be taken up by the Action (of ‘*Purchase*.’), and it would not be possible for it to be related to both (the Action of *Purchase* and the Property of *Redness*),—as shown under *Sūtra* I—iv—8,—its relationship with the Action, being more authoritative, sets aside that with the Property; because while we find the case-ending (the Instrumental) expressive of its relationship with the Action, we do not find the genitive case-ending that would signify its relationship to the Property. In the case of the sentence ‘*nīlamut-palam*’ that has been cited by the opponent, there being no contradiction of Direct Assertion, there is a cognition of the relationship pointed out by Syntactical Connection; and as such its case is not analogous to that of the sentence in question.

“As for the several alternatives with regard to coextensiveness, we shall explain them in the last *Adhikaraṇa* of the sixth *Adhyāya*, under ‘*Sūtra* VI—viii—35. In any case, however, the coextensiveness can only be based upon Indication; and as such it cannot but be very much less authoritative.

“Nor do words expressive of Properties take the case-endings, because they qualify other agents; but because they are themselves agents. This too we shall explain under the *Adhikaraṇa* V—i—11-16.

“The opponent brings forward another argument, whereby he seeks to remove the contradiction of Direct Assertion: ‘*It is true that when there is no mutual dependence, proximity is no ground of relationship; in all cases however, it is only after the word-meanings have been rejected that the sentence-meaning becomes possible, etc., etc.*’ That is to say, when both (the Action of *Purchase* and the Property of *Redness*) are connected with ‘*ekahāyani*’ at one and the same time, then alone is there a contradiction; when, however, the relationship of one of them is only implied by the way, (while that with the other is directly asserted), there can be no contradiction. The sense of the latter sentence (in ‘*all cases it is only after the word-meanings have been rejected, etc.*’) is that the independence of word-meanings is in every way rejected; and hence there is no incongruity in the assumption of many relationships of the same word. That is to say, the word ‘*aruṇā*’ must be connected

"with some such substance as possesses the property (of Redness). Then as for the word *ēkahāyaṇī*, the independence of this also has been set aside by the fact of its being related to the Action of Purchase. And then, if the word be connected with another word, that would entail no further contradiction of Direct Assertion,—in accordance with the maxim that when once a woman has shown her face, there is no use covering it again. (Hence when a word has been connected with one word, there is no incongruity in its being connected with another word); and hence the word *ēkahāyaṇī* can very well be connected with the word *aruṇā* also, which expresses a property.' [*Bhāṣhya*, p. 219, l. 25 et seq.]

"The reply to this is—*It is not so*, etc. (*Bhāṣhya*, p. 220, l. 16). In this reply, the *Bhāṣhya* admits, for the sake of argument, the relationship of the Property with the Substance; and then points out that, even then, there is a contradiction; inasmuch as it involves the rejection of the relationship of the Property with the Substance employed in the sacrifice; and the simultaneous attributing, to the verb '*krīṇāti*,' of the contradictory characters of the Injunction and the Descriptive Reference. In a case where all words tend to qualify the verb, there is no trouble involved in the Injunction of the qualified Action; but in a case where what is enjoined is the Action, and also a little of the Substance, if we admit a syntactical split in the shape of a repetition of the verbal (Injunctive) affix,—we have an absence of all restriction.

"That is to say, a qualification is always such as is already well known (and does not require an Injunction); consequently while the '*Purchase*' is still in the state of *being enjoined*, it cannot be said to be well known, and as such it would be connected with every one-year-old thing that may be found to be mentioned in the context (and not only with that with which the *Soma* is purchased). And whichever these other one-year-old ones may be, in the context treating of the *Jyotiṣkṛtoma*, to each of them would the Property (of Redness) be related, by means of syntactical connection. If, however, we do not find any other one-year-old thing mentioned in the context, then what else could we do than admit such a thing to form part of the sacrificial gift, or to be in the shape of the cow that is kept tethered in the sacrificial house? Or it may be that inasmuch as the word '*ēkahāyaṇyā*' does not form the predicate of the sentence, and as such no significance attaches to the particular gender and number, the word may be taken as pointing to any thing that may be a year old (male or female), and as such would refer to the animals of the *savanīya* and the *Agnīshoma*; and thus there would be no definite certainty as to which one-year-old thing is meant to be qualified by '*aruṇā*.'

"This argument applies to all similar cases; e.g. in the sentence

“‘*Daṣamushṭir mimītē*’, the number ‘*ten*’ would belong, not only to the “bundles of *soma*, but to all other *Nirvāpas* in connection therewith.

“The opponent, seizing the opportunity afforded by the aforesaid “admission of the diverse character of ‘*Ēkahāyanī*’, comes forward with “the following argument: ‘Even though the *Purchase* may be enjoined as “something quite new, yet being present in the mind, it would also, by the “way, specify the particular *Ēkahāyanī* that would be qualified by “*aruṇā*.”

“The reply to this is that *it is not so*; because whenever the “meaning of a word becomes qualified, the direct denotation of that “word suffers by each qualification; and hence, because it has been “qualified by one, there is no reason why it should be qualified by others “also, in ill-advised accordance with the maxim that one who has been “seen once need not cover herself again. Nor would the word ‘*aruṇā*’ “become useless (without such qualification); because it has its use else- “where in the context. Nor can it be urged that the Property would not be “related with the context, just as it has been shown to be not related “with *Ēkahāyanī*. Because if the Property be laid down with reference “to a Substance mentioned in another sentence, there is no undue diver- “sity in the character of anything. In accordance with your theory “also, if the *Purchase* be *enjoined* with reference to the *Soma* itself, and “be *referred* to as qualifying the Substance, then there comes to be a diver- “sity in its character. In the same manner, it is on account of the same “diversity that the *Ēkahāyanī* cannot be taken as related both to the “*Purchase* and to the Property of *Redness*.

“On a former occasion we have admitted this dual relationship, “simply for the sake of argument; and on the present occasion we refute “that idea, with a view to remove all chance of a false hope rising in “the heart of the opponent.

“The real fact is that the word ‘*aruṇayā*’ lays down the *Redness* “signified by the basic word, with reference to the means of purchase, “referred to by the Instrumental case-ending.

“There is a party of Pūrvapakshīs, who hold that no significance “attaches to the Instrumental ending in the word, which, therefore, “denotes the Property alone,—this Property, being connected with the “context, and being taken up by the Recapitulatory Injunctive sentence, “and thereby pertaining to Substances, it must be taken as belonging to “all the Substances mentioned in the Context; in accordance with the “*Sūtra* III—i—18.

“But this is not right; because the Property, not forming a part of “the Procedure of the sacrifice, cannot be taken up by the context; and “as for the law laid down in the *sūtra* referred to, it points to the relation-

“ship of the Property with that *Ēkahāyanī* which is accessory to the *Purchase*; and as such there would be no ground for the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

“Consequently it is in accordance with the reasonings we have explained above that the Property of Redness should be taken as belonging to all the Substances mentioned in the Context.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: In a case where the Substance and the Property are directly found to serve one and the same purpose, they must be taken as specifying each other, just as in the case of the vessel, etc.

The expression ‘*arthaikatvē*’ in the *sūtra* refers to a particular work done by them; and the expression *aiśakarmyāt* brings forward the same fact as an argument. Or the expression ‘*arthaikatvē*’ may be taken as meaning that *when it is possible for the two to be taken along with each other*, then, the Injunction of the one *Bhāvanā*, qualified by all the qualifications, has its purpose fully served only by having pointed to that qualified *Bhāvanā*; and thus there comes to be a due adjustment of all the various factors of the sentence among themselves. Just as in the case of the sentence ‘*Dēvadattaḥ kāśhṭhaiḥ sthālyūm odanam pacati,*’ all the factors are at once recognised as pertaining to the single action of *cooking*; so would it also be in the case in question (where all the factors would pertain to the single action of *Purchase*).

Then as for the Substance alone, or the Property alone, as none of them could be performed by itself, it is not enjoined. And as for the relationship of these with any action other than *Purchase*, it could not be pointed out by the Injunctive affix appearing along with the verb ‘to purchase.’ And lastly, as for the relationship with the Substance, the Injunctive is ever incapable of establishing any such relationship. And we shall show in the next *Adhikaraṇa* that the operation of the Injunction does not extend beyond the *Bhāvanā* and its qualifications.

Then the presence of the Instrumental ending (in ‘*aruṇāyā*’ and ‘*Ēkahāyanā*’) distinctly shows that the Property of *Redness* and the *Ēkahāyanī*, while independent of each other, stand in need of the action accomplished by means of them; and as such they both come to be related, by Syntactical Connection, to the particular action of *Purchase*. And the reasons for this are the following: (1) *Aikāraka*’ (Agent) is that which *does* something; and that which is *done* can be no other than a *deed* or Action, and hence no *kāraka* or agent can have any relationship with a Substance; (2) all *kārakas* equally are fully established entities, and as such they do not stand in need of one another; and as for Properties, inasmuch as they are

all equally subservient to others, there can be no mutual dependence among themselves; (3) the Injunction in question too does not operate towards the pointing out of a mutual relationship among the *kāraṅkas*; and inasmuch as we are guided wholly by the Injunction, we accept the relationship with the action. The Action too is never accomplished without the help of certain *kāraṅkas*; and hence also there is a mutual relationship between the action and the *kāraṅka*, on the ground of the former being accomplished by means of the latter, which is a well established entity. And just as the *Substance* is wanted as helping in the accomplishment of Actions, so also is the Property of that Substance required; and hence the Property of Redness too cannot be related to anything else except the Action. That is to say, just as, on account of the impossibility of the action of Purchase being performed without a Substance, the action takes up the *ekahāyanī* as that Substance,—so, in the same manner, inasmuch as so long as the Substance has not been specified by a particular property, it cannot accomplish the Action, the Property is also sought after as a necessary element; and consequently the Property must also be taken as an accessory of the Action.

Objection :—"When the Substance has been taken up during the performance of an Action, the Property also comes to be taken up, as the "necessary concomitant of that Substance; and thus no special effort "being required for the taking up of the Property, this latter cannot be "said to be sought after in the same way as the Substance is done. That "is to say, without taking up a Substance, there can be no performance "of an Action; and when the Substance has been taken up, the Property "naturally follows in its wake."

Reply : In that case, when the Action has been performed, there would be no further need of the Substance (which would follow naturally in the wake of that Action). Then again, if it be held that the Substance is sought after previous to the performance, then the same may be said with regard to the Property also, which is sought after previously to the employment of the Substance.

That is to say, you have argued that in the taking up of the Substance, the Property becomes taken up by itself, and as such it does not require a distinct effort. But when we have taken up an Action, that involves the taking up of some sort of a Substance, and hence the Substance also would require no distinct effort. If it be urged that before the action is taken up for performance, there is a seeking after the particular Substance to be employed at it,—then we could also urge that before the Substance is taken up, there is always a desire to know what sort of Substance—with what qualifications—is to be employed.

The only difference in the two cases is that the Substance continues

to operate even after the form of the Action has been fully recognised ; whereas, when the form of the Substance has once been duly cognised, the Property has no operation apart from that Substance ; because its function has been fully served by the pointing out of the form of the Substance ; but certainly that which operates towards the pointing out of the Substance cannot be said to be wholly inoperative ; because there are various kinds of operation. As a matter of fact also, we find a distinct operation of the Property at the time that it specifies the Substance. For instance, when the Action has come to be known as to be accomplished by means of a Substance, there is always a desire to know the property or character of the Substance that is to be employed in it.

Thus then, in such a case, if the Veda itself points out a particular Substance, that Substance is accepted as the one to be employed ; but if no such is directly pointed out by the Veda, then any Substance that happens to be implied by the text, and to be supported by other authorities, would come to be accepted ; and hence, in the case in question, the directly enjoined 'Redness' would come to be an accessory of the action (of *Purchase*).

And in all cases, when a certain fact has been directly laid down by the text, all doubt and ignorance with regard to it are held to have been removed, in accordance with the Sūtra I—iv—30. Consequently, in the case in question, when it is distinctly enjoined that the Action of Purchase is to be accomplished by means of *Redness*, there being no words supplied from without, and there being a standing rule that a thing can help only in a way that lies within its power, it is concluded that the action is to be accomplished by means of Redness, *as characterising the Substance to be employed at the performance of that Action*. Because it is always found to be the case that Properties have the function of characterising Substances ; as otherwise they would be wholly inoperative ; and because their Injunction also is justifiable only in this way. That is to say, the Injunctive pertaining to the Purchase does not, in any way, renounce the *Redness* presented to it by means of the Instrumental ending (in '*arunayā*') ; and the Redness also does not become the accessory of the Purchase by any other way save that of specifying the Substance with which the Purchase is to be effected. Nor is it necessary that the aids imparted by all accessories should be of one and the same form. Nor again is the Action, in all cases, held to be in the form of *motion* alone, inhering in the Substance ; nor do all accessories directly aid the Principal Action itself ; because the relationship of these depends upon various intermediate operations. And of such factors as *Redness* and the like, the only operation that they are found capable of is

the specifying of the Substance; and though nominatives to this operation of specification, they become Instrumental to the other operations (hence the Instrumental ending).

Thus then it is from the word '*aruṇayā*' itself that it is concluded that the Purchase in question is to be accomplished by means of the Property of *Redness* as specifying a certain Substance.

In the same manner the one-year-old animal also stands in need of a property that would specify it; as without such specification it could not be employed in the action. Consequently, we find that the Property begins to look for a Substance to specify, which would also serve as its own substrate; and in the same manner the Substance also begins to look for a specifying property; and the relationship based upon such mutual requirements is established very soon. And in the sentence in question, we find that it is not possible for any other Substance or Property to be sought after; hence even without the genitive affix, we accept these two (*Redness* and the one-year-old animal) to be related to each other, on the sole ground of mutual requirements; just as two men, one of whom had his cart burnt, and another had his horse dead, having joined together in making up a joint cart, proceeded on their way. Specially as there is no ground for rejecting what is found near at hand, we conclude that the two cannot but be related between themselves.

Then again, the Purchase, which is admitted to be the principal action in question, has its substance and its property fully cognised; and as such not standing in need of any property, not mentioned in the sentence itself, it directly serves to restrict the Property to the Substance (and *vice versa*). That is to say, any unmentioned substance, that would be brought forward by the apparent inconsistency of the mentioned Property, is, as a matter of fact, not found to be sought after by the *Purchase*, which has its necessary substance distinctly mentioned in the shape of the one-year-old animal; similarly any unmentioned Property, that would be brought forward by the *one-year-old animal*, is not wanted by the Purchase, which has its necessary property distinctly laid down in the shape of *Redness*.

If the Purchase had its Substance and Property not definitely mentioned, then, in that case, it could admit of extraneous factors. If, however, the action of Purchase were forcibly connected with such Substances and Properties as it does not stand in need of, then it would not be performed in the way that it is enjoined; as it is enjoined as qualified by the definite Substance of the one-year-old Animal and the definite property of *Redness*. Secondly, it would involve an unwarranted repetition of the Principal Action. And lastly, if the various substances, etc., were taken as optional alternatives, the particular Injunction of the qualified action

would be contracted. And further, because the Purchase is the principal action, therefore it precludes the implication of other extraneous substances and Properties by the mentioned Substance and Property. Any such irregularity would be rejected by the action, even if it were a subordinate action; just as even though the Pupil is subordinate to the Tutor, yet if it becomes necessary for the former to eat out of a vessel of the *Kāśya* metal, it behoves the latter also to eat of the same, when the Pupil has (as a *vratā*) to eat of what is left by his Tutor. And it is all the more so, when the Action is the principal one.

Nor, in the case in question, do we find anything incompatible or incongruous, in the absence of an assumption of something not mentioned in the sentence; because all that is necessary is supplied by the mentioned Substance and Property as related to each other; and in this way also becomes established the fact of the two being coextensive.

Nor is there any contradiction of Direct Assertion, in this case,—as will be shown by the *Bhāṣya* later on, in the sentence—*na ca gr̥hīṭṛ cākṣārthō nēti* &c.

For instance, the relationship that we seek to establish is one that is required by the *Purchase*; and in this even the much weaker Implications of words are found to be quite compatible and not contradicted—to say nothing of the fully authoritative Direct Assertion. That is to say, when the Purchase takes up the Substance, it seeks after the Property that would specify that Substance; and when it takes the Property, it seeks for the Substance that would be the substrate of that Property. Thus then, inasmuch as the two are found to be quite compatible with one another, through the action of *Purchase*, they become related to each other by the relationship of mutual subserviency.

Some people hold that, inasmuch as the Property serves to specify the Substance, it is subservient to this latter. But to them we reply that the Substance also becomes subservient to the Property, inasmuch as on account of its incapability of otherwise aiding in the accomplishment of the Purchase, it becomes the substrate of that Property. Hence it must be admitted that both of them are subservient to the Purchase; and that between them there is always present a mutual help; consequently they must be regarded as subservient to each other.

One who holds that the Property of Redness pertains to the whole context, should explain by what that Property is enjoined. He does not admit the fact of its bearing any relationship to the Injunction of Purchase. Then as for the Recapitulatory Injunctive sentence, that could not but neglect the Property, which, not being an action, could not be taken up by that sentence. The word '*arunayā*' itself has no injunctive potency. Though the character of the agent *Kāraka* present

in the words ('*ajāyā* &c.') points to distinct substances, yet such words cannot serve as Injunctions. Then as for the Injunctions of actions '*krīṇāti*' in '*ajāyā krīṇāti*' appearing in connection with these other substances, these also having become spent up (in the injunction of the three factors of the *Bhāvanā*) are no longer capable of enjoining anything else, even though they are duly comprehended. Nor can they ever operate towards the properties of substances. And hence the property in question cannot in any way pertain to the whole context.

The opponent, taking his stand upon the law that 'those that serve the same purpose are to be taken as optional alternatives' (*Sūtra* XII—iii—10), and not perceiving the difference in the intermediate purposes served, comes forward with the objection: "If they serve the same purpose why cannot they be taken as optional alternatives?"

The *Siddhānti* offers two replies to this: (1) This assertion of yours does not establish the fact of the Property pertaining to the whole context, which is the theory that is opposed to ours; nor does it serve to preclude the relationship of that Property with Purchase; and hence inasmuch you have shifted your ground, to the denial of facts not connected with the question in hand, you have tacitly accepted defeat on the main point at issue. (2) Another reply is that *there is actually no possibility of their being optional alternatives; because they have distinct functions*—that is to say, they differ in the intermediate operations.

The opponent however takes this latter sentence to be an admission of a difference in the Principal Function served by them; and hence comes forward with the following: "(1) *You have just declared that they serve only one function; and (2) then what you say now also contradicts a previous declaration of yours, that the Property, being incorporeal, can have no function.*

"It might be argued that this latter declaration has been made by 'the *Purvapakṣi*, and as such it is not proper to taunt the *Siddhānti* with its contradiction.

"But then the question to be dealt with is always expounded from "a common standpoint,—and it was in course of the expounding of the "question that the *incorporeality* (and the consequent inoperativeness) "of the Property was declared; and the contradiction of this would certainly "vitiating the *Siddhānti* also. Or, again, the *Purvapakṣi* has urged "the fact of the said incorporeality as a reason; and a reason is always "one that is acceptable to both parties; consequently if it was not acceptable to the *Siddhānti* he should have taken exception to it on that "occasion; and as he did not do this, he tacitly accepted it as true; and "as such, if, on the present occasion, he coolly declares the fact of both

“(the Property and the Substance) serving the same purpose, and thereby “speaks of the Property as operative, he certainly becomes open to the “charge of self-contradiction.”

Reply: There is no self-contradiction; nor is there any possibility of the two being taken as optional alternatives; because there is a difference in their intermediate operations, due to the difference in their capabilities. That is to say, the Substance aids the action directly, while the Property merely serves the purpose of specifying that Substance.

From the above, the opponent jumps to the conclusion that the Property is subservient to the Substance, in accordance with the law ‘*taditarat tadartham*’,—and hence urges—“Then the Property does not help in the accomplishment of the Action.”

The reply is that *it is not so*; that is to say, what we mean is that the Substance is the channel through which the Property helps the Action.

Thus then, the two anomalies—of ‘self-contradiction,’ and ‘optional alternatives’—having been set aside, the opponent finds himself unable to perceive anything in the nature of the one-year-old animal, whereby it could serve as the said channel; and consequently having concluded the said relationship to be pointed out by syntactical connection alone, brings forward the objection that in that case the *one-year-old animal* would have the double character (of the Subject and the Predicate, as urged before). This objection is expressed in the sentence ‘*evantarhi* &c.’

In reply to this, the *Bhāṣya* says—*na brūmō vāyam* &c.,—the sense of which is that the relationship of the Property to the *one-year-old animal* is due to the natural capacity of things.

Then the opponent proceeds to deny the Restricted Relationship: “Thus too there would be a syntactical split; that is to say, even though “there may be a relationship with *Purchase*, yet as there would be a “distinct action with each agent or *kāraku*, there would certainly be a “syntactical split due to this difference among the actions. Such a split “is met with both in Vedic sentences, and in those of ordinary parlance; “for instance, (1) ‘*yasya pitā pitāmahaḥ somam na pibēt* &c.’ and (2) “*Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Vishṇumitrā bhojyantām*’; in the latter sentence “the *feeding* pertains to every one of the three persons, and in the “former the *non-soma-drinking* of the Father, and also that of the “Grandfather, are spoken of as a reason for the performance of the “*Vrātyapaṇṣayāga*; and this would be possible only if each of them “(Father &c.) were taken separately; and thus the relationship of each “of these with ‘*na pibēt*,’ as also with the *Vrātyapaṇṣayāga*, is taken “distinctly; and hence both of these are instances in point.”

The reply to this is that this does not affect our main position; and

hence it is as irrelevant as the theory that the two are to be taken as optional alternatives.

The opponent again urges: "*It is true that what we have urged does not contaminate your position; but in this manner the Purchase could be effected even by an one-year-old animal that is not red, as also by a red animal that is not one-year old.*"

The reply to this is that when the action of Purchase is the principal factor, the sentence has its end in the aggregating of all the various qualifications mentioned in the sentence (i.e. all of them pertain to the same action of Purchase); just as in the case of the sentences '*Gargāḥ ṣaṭam dandīyantām,*' '*abhishṭya huteṣu bhakṣayanti*' (where, in the former sentence, the *fine* of a hundred pieces of gold pertains to all the Gargas collectively; and in the latter the *Eating* is done after both the other actions have been performed).

Objection: "Inasmuch as the Fine serves to purify the person fined, it must be repeated with reference to each person in the Garga community, just as the feeding pertains to each of the persons mentioned."

Reply: This does not touch our position; because it is only in the case of corporeal punishment that it pertains to each individual; whereas the punishment of a fine of gold-pieces applies to the whole community; because the sentence in question lays down the fine as a source of income to the King, qualified by the number 'hundred,' as received from the criminal, on account of a certain crime committed.

That is to say, just as the sacrificial gift given to the Priests is in exchange of the services rendered by them in the performance of the sacrifice; so is the fine a conditional income provided for the King, in exchange of the protection; and as distinct fines are *laid down* for distinct crimes, the number 'hundred' forming the Predicate of the sentence, we cannot but attach due significance to the singular number in '*ṣaṭam*'; and as for the crime committed by '*Gargāḥ*,' whether it be committed by an individual Garga, or by the whole community, it becomes an occasion of the income of a hundred pieces of gold to the King; and at that time the criminals appearing in the position of the source from which the income proceeds, the sentence comes to mean that the King should receive a hundred pieces of gold from the whole Garga community; and then if he were to receive a hundred from each individual, the crime having been fully expiated by the payment of a single hundred, the acceptance of the other hundreds would be an unwarranted forcible taking away of the belongings of Brāhmaṇas; and the number also would far exceed the enjoined 'one hundred.'

Consequently the sentence must be taken as ending in the whole aggregate.

Though distinct reasons have been given, yet the opponent brings forward another doubt, aroused by the aforesaid instances: "*There being two instances, how is it ascertained that the Sentence ends in the aggregate, and not in each constituent part?*"

Reply: The *Purchase* being the Principal action,—because of its serving the purpose of acquiring the *some* that would accomplish the sacrifice; and because of the fact of that which is established being mentioned for the sake of that which has to be accomplished,—and the Substance and the Property, for opposite reasons, having the contrary (subordinate) character,—the former (action) comes to be taken along both of these latter.

Objection: "For fear of having to assume that which is not mentioned, we would have a restricted adjustment of even that Substance and that Property which are laid down in a separate sentence; and as such, there is no special purpose served by taking them as forming the "same sentence."

Reply: When there is a syntactical split, there is no cognition of the *Purchase* as qualified by both (*Redness* and the one-year old animal); and then if the *Purchase* comes to be related to each of them separately, the Property would take up any substance at random; and the Substance also would take up any Property at random:—specially as, at that time, their proximity to each other is not capable of precluding the implication by them of other things. Nor, in that case, could the single action of *Purchase* take up both the Substance and the Property; and then why could not the *Purchase*, qualified by the Property of *Redness*, not having any particular Substance specially defined, take up any and every Substance that would be brought forward by the said Property? And similarly, why could not the *Purchase*, effected by the one-year-old animal, not take up any and every property?

Even though the Property could only bring forward such other substances as are spoken of in the context as those to be utilized in the *Purchase*,—yet it would pertain to all the ten substances—*Uloth*, &c.; and thus the vagueness and indefiniteness would remain there all the same. Consequently for the sake of a single specified *Purchase*, it is absolutely necessary to speak of all the three as syntactically connected in a single sentence. And hence it must be admitted that there is a restriction as to the application of the Property of *Redness*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7).

[The washing should be done to all the vessels : non-significance of number.]

Sūtra (13): It is qualified by singleness; because singleness is distinctly mentioned.

The application of the various accessories has been duly explained; and now we proceed to consider the details of the employment of these accessories.

[In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we have the sentence '*Daçāpavitṛēṇa graham sammārshī*']; and there arises a question as to whether the washing is to be of only *one* vessel, or of all the vessels mentioned in the context. Just as in this sentence we have a question as to the significance of the singular number, so also in others, we have it as to that of the Dual and the Plural; e.g. '*Yasya puroḍāṣau kshāyataḥ*' and '*Havīnshī abhigḥārayati*.' In all these cases, an action is enjoined with reference to a particular thing; and hence there naturally arises the question as to whether any significance is to be attached to the Number of the word signifying this thing or not.

At the very outset, however, the following objection is raised: "The discussion herein started is not quite proper with regard to Vedic sentences. Because, with the exception of the due comprehension of meaning, there is no other '*vivakshā*' (Intention of the speaker to express); and the Vedic sentences being eternal (independent of a speaker), that which is found to be mentioned in them cannot but be taken as significant (or meant to be expressive).

"That is to say, the sentences that are composed by men, are dependent, for their meaning, upon the wish or the intention of the speaker; and hence they are liable to mistake, capable of having been composed with a different import, and having its subject amenable to other means of knowledge; and hence even though a certain meaning of such sentences may be duly comprehended, yet it may be one that is not intended by the speaker to be conveyed; and hence in such cases such meanings come to be rejected as 'not-intended'; and this is possible in two ways: (1) The speaker himself might say 'this is not what I mean, by the sentence,' or that 'I made a mistake, what I meant was only this &c., &c.' (2) The subject spoken having been cognized by other means of

“knowledge, as being wholly different to what is described in the sentence, “the persons hearing the sentence conclude, independently of the speaker, “that what is meant is something different, or that a mistake has been “made. But in the case of Vedic sentences, it is not possible that there “should be any other meaning intended, or that there should be a mistake. “Nor is there a speaker, in this case, who could declare any other meaning to be the one that was intended; because all the men in the world “are only hearers of the Veda, and not speakers, as has been shown under “*Sūtra* I—i—29. Nor is the subject treated of in the Veda amenable to “other means of knowledge, on the strength of which the hearers themselves could take the sentence to have some other meaning. Then, “again, a certain meaning being ‘intended’ or ‘not-intended’ is “nothing more than two particular *ideas*, or two particular phases of *wish* “or *intention*; and hence neither of these two is possible in the case of “Vedic sentences, where there is no speaker. Hence in all such cases, the “acceptance or rejection is of that alone which is directly asserted or not “asserted [respectively]; and there is no other ground for such acceptance “or rejection. In fact, even in the case of human assertions, until the “meaning desired to be conveyed has been ascertained, by other means of “knowledge, to be something quite different, the meaning comprehended “in the first instance is not rejected.”

To the above we make the following reply :

I. In the case in question there is no difference of opinion as to the *comprehension* (of singleness, which all of us admit to be comprehended); the question, however, is as to whether the *singleness* that is comprehended is meant to be enjoined (predicated) or not.

There can be no doubt as to *singleness* being mentioned in the sentence in question; nor is there any doubt as to its being related to the *Graha* (Vessel). But in the case of all things, there are three ways in which they are spoken of by Direct Assertion: (1) There is an assertion that simply speaks of them; (2) another lays down their uses; (3) another enjoins them; and it is on this latter that all performance is based. For instance (1), in the case of the original word and the affix, they simply denote their respective objects; (2) the case-affixes express its uses; and (3) the Injunctive, the Imperative and the *Let* endings have the power of enjoining.

At the time of the performance of Actions, the man depends solely upon the Injunction; and when the injunction urges him to a certain course of action,—whether that course be expressed or not expressed, having its use mentioned or not mentioned,—he at once takes up that course; and similarly, if the Injunction does not urge him to it, he does not ke it up,—even if it is distinctly expressed and laid down as useful; and

he is never urged to action either by Direct Declaration or by the mention of uses; because all that these latter can do is to point out respectively that 'this exists here' and 'this belongs to that'; and none of these say anything as to the necessity or advisability of performance. Consequently even if something happens to be distinctly expressed, or have its uses mentioned, when it comes to the consideration of its Injunction and actual performance, there always arises a question as to its being actually *intended* or not, as to be enjoined or not enjoined, and as to be performed or not performed.

Objection: "But this also is not possible without some sort of a wish (on the part of some person)."

Reply: By 'intention', we do not mean actual *wish*; we take the two words 'Intention' and 'Non-intention' ('*Viraksha*' and '*Avirakshā*') as indirectly indicating their respective effects in the shape of *Acceptance* and *Rejection*. That is to say, just as the sentence '*kālam pipatishati*' (the river-bank wishes to fall down) is pronounced only by a figurative attributing of the *wish*, based upon the extreme proximity of the *falling*,—so, in the same manner, in the case of such sentences as do not originate from any person, the *acceptance* and *rejection* (of what is laid down) are always known to be the effects of what is known as 'Intention' and 'Non-intention' (in the case of ordinary assertions); and it is on this Acceptance and Rejection that the present discussion is based.

Objection: "How could there be a rejection of that which is directly asserted"?

Reply: This question does not affect the question; because we have already said that *acceptance* depends upon *Injunction* (and not upon mere Assertion). And just as in the case of human assertions, it is the Person speaking that is the impeller or director, even in the case of something that is directly asserted,—so in the case of Vedic sentences, the impelling would be done by the Injunctive potency of the word. Because in the Veda it is the Injunctive word that takes the place of the Director; and the potency of the Injunctive that of the wish of that Director. Consequently it is admitted that that alone which is touched by the Injunction is to be performed, and nothing else; and hence it becomes necessary, in all cases, to ascertain the extent of the Injunctive operation.

Objection: "But how is it that when certain things are comprehended as equally spoken of by means of the various part of the sentence, "there are only some of them that are taken up by the Injunction, and "others are not"?"

Reply: When certain things have been presented by an expressive word, the Injunctive operates towards the Injunction, of one or all of them, always in accordance with the limit of its own peculiar potency; and

consequently it could not take up all things, simply because we wish it so. That is to say, if the Injunctive operated always in accordance with our wishes, or with that which is expressed or mentioned as useful, by the words,—then we could have the Injunction of all that is spoken of in the sentence; as a matter of fact, however, the operation of the Injunctive is always limited by its own potency; and as this potency is limited in its scope, we have the Injunction of only a few, and not all, of all that is expressed by the sentence.

Then again, the Injunctive potency is Direct or Implied, according as it is based upon the *Bhāvanā* or upon the *Agencies* (Kāraṅgas); and apart from these two, there is no Injunctive potency, either Direct or Implied. For instance, the *Bhāvanā* is enjoined *directly* by means of the injunctive affix; and it is for the sake of the accomplishment of this *Bhāvanā*, that other agencies are enjoined indirectly. And even if a certain thing is found to be directly expressed, yet, if it is not found to be a substratum of the *Bhāvanā* or of the Agencies, it is not accepted as enjoined; and as such it forms no part of the performance in question.

Thus then, with regard to the performance of the *Washing of the vessels* (as laid down by the sentence '*graham sammārṣhī*'), it is only natural that there should arise the question as to whether the *Singleness of the vessel* is also to be brought about or not. And if this *singleness*, being an agency, be a qualification of the *Bhāvanā*, then, being taken up by the Injunction, it could not but be accepted as *Intended* (significant); while if it be a mere qualification of the *Substance*, then it could not be taken as *Intended*.

Thus then, we conclude that the authors of the *Bhāṣya* and its commentaries have used the words 'Intention' and 'Non-intention' simply with reference to the *Acceptance* and *Rejection* based upon the potency of the Injunctive, which are the effects of the said *Intention* and *Non-intention*, and as such indirectly indicated by these words; and this round-about method has been employed with the sole motive of speaking, in the manner of ordinary human assertions, of the Vedic sentences, which, by themselves, transcend by far the limits of human conception, and as such, could not be grasped by students of inferior intelligences, unless they were explained in the familiar terminology applied to ordinary assertions. The same may be said about all such explanations of the Veda.

II. There is another explanation also of the propriety of the use of the words "Intention" and "Non-intention." The question raised in the *Adhikaraṇa* is with reference to those Mīmāṃsakas and Sacrificers, who seek to explain the Veda, in accordance either with reasonings or with traditional lore. They always interpret a sentence, in accordance with the potencies of words; and hence they seek to explain those things that are

found amenable to these potencies ; while those that are abandoned by these potencies, are not taken up for explanation. Consequently by '*Vivakshita*' is meant 'that which is *intended* or *wished* by the *Mīmāṃsakas* to be explained'; and that which, being untouched by the said potency, is not so *intended*, is spoken of as '*Avivakshita*'; and this *intention* and *non-intention* pertains to those Teachers of the Veda who have gone before. Consequently, inasmuch as the mention of 'Intention' and 'Non-intention' is with reference to the Teachers, there is nothing objectionable in the words being introduced in connection with the Veda.

III. Or again, the "Intention" and "Non-intention" spoken of might refer to the Intelligences ensouling the various Vedic collections, *Rgveda* and the rest (the Body in this case being one made up of words). Just as in the material bodies we have intelligent souls, who *intend* certain things, and *do not intend* others, and this *intention*, though existing only in the inner soul, is yet known, exactly as if it appeared in the external world, by people pondering over the sentence, by means of the potency of the words composing the sentence uttered by them (so in the same manner could we become cognisant of the Intention or otherwise of the Intelligence ensouling the Veda).

Then as for the possibility of such a Body (as that attributed to the Vedas), we find that there are various kinds of Bodies, brought about by the peculiar actions of the souls inhabiting them,—all these diverse kinds depending upon the modifications of Primordial Matter. For instance—(1) In this world of ours we find four kinds of Bodies, made up mostly of the earth-element, aided by those of water and the rest,—these bodies being the *Womb-born*, the *Egg-born*, the *Ground-born*, and the *Sweat-born*;—(2) bodies built up of water with the help of the other elements, clean and transparent, are known to exist in the regions of *Varuṇa*;—(3) there are many beings who wander about in the sky, with their subtile bodies made up of Air mixed with Earth and the rest;—(4) in the Heavenly Regions, there are bodies of Light, effulgent and glorious, which become added to by-and-by by the rays emitted from the sun; as has been declared in the Veda also, at the close of the sentences dealing with the *Nakshatrāṣṭi*: '*yē hi janāḥ puṇyākṛtaḥ...tēśāmetāni jyotīṃśhi ṇannakshatrāṇi*',—and Manu also speaks of people proceeding to Heaven in a body of light;—(5) the Veda also speaks of the soul inhabiting a body of *Ākāśa*, when it declares '*ījyātē vāriṇā nityam yaḥ kham Brahma*.'

Then again, Colour, Touch and the other properties that belong to the elements, are, each of them, bodies for the experiences of the soul. And the Veda also, which is spoken as the '*Ābda-Brahma*', is ensouled by a single Great Soul; and hence the *Rgveda* &c., which are spoken of separately, all belong to the soul, and are endowed with conscious intelligence.

Consequently, when we proceed to explain the meanings of the sentences of these Vedas, which contain within themselves particular intentions, whether they are intended to be significant or not is ascertained by means of the potencies of the words; and the upshot comes to be that that which is taken up by the Injunctive potency is what is 'intended'; while that which is abandoned by it, is to be explained as 'not intended' to be significant.

In this manner, it is quite possible to attribute, on the strength of the potency of the Injunctive, the said "Intention" and "Non-intention" to the soul of the Ābda-Brahma, which pervades all the Vedas; and there is nothing incongruous in speaking of "Intention" and "Non-intention", even in the direct sense of these words, with reference to the Veda, which is beginningless and endless.

Thus then, the question comes to be whether the Veda really intended the *singleness* of the vessel, or not; and in course of the present *Adhikaraṇa*, our Author will come to a definite conclusion, by a course of well-connected reasoning.

And on this we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

"That action which is mentioned as connected with *singleness*, and "that Injunction of the substance which is also mentioned along with "*singleness*, should always be performed and understood (respectively) "as pertaining to *one thing only*.

"In all cases, the Veda consisting of Injunctions and Prohibitions, "whatever we come across in the course of the Veda should always be "taken as connected with an Injunction or a Prohibition; and we should "always try our very best to construe every such thing in such a manner "as to make it connected with an Injunction or a Prohibition.

"And for doing this, there are two ways: (1) even though the "object in question be the qualification of a substance,—yet, just as in the "case of the Injunction of a *Bhāvanā* qualified by a certain substance, etc., "the Injunction is taken as indirectly pertaining to the qualifying substance also, as otherwise the qualified *Bhāvanā* could not be enjoined,—so, "in the same manner, in the case in question also, inasmuch as the Injunction of the *washing qualified by the Vessel, which is qualified by singleness*, could not be otherwise explained, we cannot but admit, on the "strength of Apparent Inconsistency, the *singleness* also to be an object "of Injunction; similarly too, in a case where we have a series of qualifications, there is a cognition of the Injunction of every one of these, based "upon the fact of each of them being connected with that which precedes

“it; and it is only when the accessories are not related to one another
 “that the Injunction of any one of them does not involve that of another,
 “—as we have shown above. (2) When, on the other hand, the Injunc-
 “tion does not extend up to the qualification of the substance, then, in
 “that case, everything spoken of in the sentence would have to be admit-
 “ted, on the strength of a single Apparent Inconsistency, to be the object
 “of Injunction; and hence, just as the ‘*Daṣṭāpavitra*’ (Cloth), the
 “‘*Singleness*’, the ‘*Vessel*’ and the ‘*Washing*’ are the qualifications of the
 “*Bhāvanā*, so would the ‘*singleness of the Vessel*’ also be.

“*Objection*: ‘It is by the Direct Denotation of the same word
 “(*graham*) that the *singleness* in question is pointed out to be the qualifi-
 “cation of the *Vessel*; and as such it is scarcely right to reject it in
 “favour of the view that it is a qualification of the *Bhāvanā*, which can
 “only be pointed out by means of Syntactical Connection.’

“*Reply*: This argument does not quite affect our position: (1)
 “Because there is no actual difference between the indication of the *Word*
 “and that of Syntactical Connection, the *singleness* may be taken as quali-
 “fying the *Bhāvanā*, without being totally separated from the *Vessel*. (2)
 “Because as the two treat of two wholly distinct subjects, there can be no
 “contradiction of the one by the other. That is to say, if, in both cases,
 “the relationship were either that of *Tādārthya* (useful accessory) alone,
 “or that of that particular form of the Qualifying Relationship which
 “appears in the form of the Container and the Contained, then the two
 “could be taken as dealing with the same subject. As a matter of fact,
 “however, we do not find any one of these relations to be present in both
 “(the *Vessel* and the *Bhāvanā*); because to the former, the *singleness* is relat-
 “ed by the Qualifying Relationship of the *Container and the Contained*; while
 “to the *Bhāvanā* it is related as its accessory; consequently the Syntactical
 “Connection may be taken as implying that ‘one should accomplish the
 “*Bhāvanā* of the *Washing* by means of the *singleness* contained in the
 “*Vessel*’; and on the other hand, if the Relationship of the *singleness* with
 “the *Bhāvanā* be that of *Tādārthya*, then, in that case, its relationship with
 “the *Vessel* being one of *Qualification*, would appear subsequently in accord-
 “ance with the law laid down in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; and it is this
 “that is pointed out by the *Word (graham)*. (3) When it is ascertained
 “that the *Vessel* is incapable of affording refuge to the *singleness*, then, in
 “that case, there would be nothing to prevent this latter from going over
 “to the *Bhāvanā*, even though it be only on the strength of a Syntactical
 “Connection; the *Vessel* itself impels it towards the *Bhāvanā*, with the
 “view that, being related to the *Bhāvanā*, the *singleness* would be taken
 “up by the Injunction, and thereby becoming limited in its scope, would
 “qualify the *Vessel* also; otherwise being abandoned by the *Vessel*, it

"would be wholly neglected by the Injunction. and as such, could not belong either to the *Vessel* or to the *Bhāvanā*. (4) Or, even granting that the *singleness* belongs to the *Vessel*; it becomes necessary to show in what manner it belongs to it. Thus then, if the *Vessel*, alone by itself, were to enter into the *Bhāvanā*, then, inasmuch as the *singleness* would be appearing *after* this entrance, it would not be taken up by the *Bhāvanā*, and as such could not belong to this latter; and it would be restricted to the form of the *Vessel* only; consequently, it is only when the *Vessel* moves along with, or is co-extensive with, the *singleness*, that it attains its true character,—just as in the case of the qualification of *Redness* mentioned by a distinct word (as shown in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*). And the reason for this is that the Injunction as a whole always appears in a qualified form; and as the Qualified could not serve the function of qualifying until it had its own qualification duly defined, it is always along with its own qualification that the Qualified Injunction enters into its function.

"Thus then, in the case in question, the *Bhāvanā*, taking up the distinctly mentioned vessel as qualified by singleness, does not take up the qualified Vessel without taking up, along with it, the qualifying singleness also. And when the singleness would thus enter into the *Bhāvanā*, it would be taken up by the Injunction also; and then there being a mutual restriction between the Substance and the Property, it comes to belong to the Vessel.

"(5) Or again, the objector has based his argument upon the superior authority of Direct Assertion, on the strength of which he has declared the singleness to be related to the Substance (Vessel). But as a matter of fact, the case is quite the contrary. Because the Substance (Vessel), mentioned by the basic noun '*grāha*', would be the nearest to the singleness mentioned by a part of the same word; but we find that this singleness is very much more nearly related to the particular Agency that is signified by the same case-ending (the Accusative) as itself, and as such it is much sooner recognized as qualifying this Agency. And we have already shown that the Agency, expressed by the case-ending, is a constituent part of the *Bhāvanā*, which is made up of various factors, appearing one after the other. And then, inasmuch as the Agency is found to be signified by the affix, it would be cognized as the principal factor; and it is a general rule that every thing (i.e. all qualifications) appertain to the principal factor; and hence both the Singleness and the Vessel become Agencies, and as such are thrown into the *Bhāvanā*, by means of the direct action of the case-ending; and as such come to be the objects of Injunction; and this is due to the fact of the Injunction being a qualified one; as will be explained later on, under the *Sūtra* IV—i—15.

"Thus then, just as that which is mentioned as to be done by means of the *Cloth* is not done by anything else,—as instead of the mentioned *washing* the *threshing* is not performed,—as instead of the *washing* of the *vessel* one does not perform the *washing* of something else,—so, in the same manner, that which is mentioned as to be done to a *single* vessel, could not be done to many. All these conclusions are dependent upon one another, in accordance with the law of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

"For these reasons, it must be admitted that the number of the *uddeṣya* also is to be taken as intended to be significant, just like that of the enjoined *vidhēya*.

"The *Bhāṣya* lays stress upon due significance being attached to the *masculinity* of the object (animal) also; but this is only by the way, and not with a view to show that the significance of the gender also is amenable to the reasonings of the present *Adhikaraṇa*; as that would mean a mere repetition of what is dealt with under the *Sūtras VI—i—6* et seq."

SIDDHĀNTA.

***Sūtra* (14): All Individuals are indicated, because the generic character belongs equally to all.**

It is a well-established fact that whenever an action is laid down, in a subordinate form, with reference to a number of individuals, all of which are indicated by the generic *Class*, etc., that Action pertains to every one of them.

For instance, in the case in question, we at once recognize the *vessel* to be the principal factor,—because it is spoken of in the Accusative case (vide *Sūtra* II—i—10), and also because it is the useful factor,—and the *washing* to be the subordinate factor. Then, inasmuch as the *class* "vessel" (which is denoted by the word '*graha*') is, by itself, incapable of being *washed*, it is the *individual* vessels that are indicated as the objects to be purified by the washing; but since the individual vessels are not capable of being denoted by the word '*graha*,' we accept the *class* "vessel" as indicative of them. Consequently, the meaning of the Injunctive sentence in question comes to be that *the action to be performed with the vessels would be perfect only by the previous washing of the vessels*; and if any vessel should be left unwashed, the action performed with it would remain imperfect; hence it is necessary that *all the vessels* should be washed.

If, however, the *vessel* were laid down as subsidiary to the *washing*,—just as the *animal* is to the *sacrifice*,—then the necessary action of *washing* having been accomplished by the washing of a single vessel, no other vessel would be required to be washed; for in that case the non-washing of the other vessels would not cause any imperfection in the action in question;

as the requirements of the Injunction will have been fulfilled (by the *washing* of a single vessel). When, on the other hand, the *vessel* is the principal factor, inasmuch as the Injunction would apply to each of the principal factors, if a single vessel were left unpurified (by *washing*), there would be an infringement of the particular Injunction in connection with that. Even if there were no distinct Injunction for each of the vessels, and each of them were to be washed only in accordance with the spirit of the single Injunction,—then, too, the non-washing of a vessel would be contrary to that spirit. If without this rejection, one were to omit the washing of certain vessels, then that would be a great sin, consequent upon the neglect of that which is enjoined.

For these reasons, we must conclude that the word '*graham*' indicates all the vessels; because all of them are equally related to the generic class 'vessel,' and because all are equally connected with the context.

Not perceiving any ground for taking the Singular number (in '*graham*') to be non-significant, the objector (in the *Bhāṣya*) comes forward with the argument that—"we find the Singular number actually mentioned."

The reply to this is that all that may happen to be mentioned is not necessarily something to be performed (or brought into action); because in the matter of actual performance, it is necessary to find out an Injunction, or the Mention of Uses,—either directly mentioned or indirectly implied. Because that which is *enjoined*, or has its uses mentioned, is accepted as to be brought into action, even if it be not actually expressed in so many words; while even if something is actually so expressed, if it happens to be abandoned by them (i.e., by the Injunction and the Mention of Uses), it is not taken up for performance. Thus then, in the case of a sentence, there being many things expressed by the several words and the affixes, etc., it becomes necessary to find out which of these are taken up by the Injunction and which have their uses and applications mentioned. Specially as by manipulating the construction of the sentence in different ways, every one of the things may be made to appear as enjoined or mentioned as useful,—it becomes necessary to find which are actually enjoined and which not. As a matter of fact, the expounders of *Mīmāṃsā*, when discussing the meanings of sentences, very often throw dust into people's eyes, by a skilful manipulation of the syntactical construction.

Thus then, in the case in question, what we have to consider is what is actually enjoined by the word '*Sammārshṭi*,' which has the form of the Present Tense, but, really is in the *Lṛt* form, which is laid down as having the sense of the Injunctive.

It is not possible for the *Bhāvanā* alone, by itself, to be enjoined; because it is not possible for it to be brought into action, by itself alone.

Then there arises the question as to whether the *Bhāvanā* that is enjoined is qualified by the *denotation of the Verbal Root*, the *washing*, only, which is well known in the world as something to be performed,—or by the substance *Vessel*,—or by the *singleness of the vessel*.

As for the word ‘*Daṣṭāpavitrēṇa*,’ it is equally significant in all cases; and serving the same purpose in all cases, it is not necessary to consider its various significations, as is done with the other words.

With reference to the word ‘*graham*’ and the rest, however, it becomes necessary to consider what is actually enjoined. And in this connection, we are faced by the following alternatives:—Firstly: as regards the “washing” and the “Vessel,”—do these qualify the *Bhāvanā*, alternatively or conjointly? or is it their relationship or their aggregation that qualifies it? or is it that one of these two while qualifying the other, qualifies the *Bhāvanā* also, and through that, comes to be enjoined? Secondly, as regards the “washing” and the “Singleness,” also we have the same eight-fold questions to consider. Thirdly, as regards the “*grahatva*” and the “*Ēkatva*” also, we have the same questions. That is to say among the three—the ‘washing,’ the ‘Vessel’ and the ‘Singleness,’—we can take any two of which one would qualify the other, and then proceed to consider the question of the relation of these with the third.

Along with these questions, there arises the further question, as to whether these (the Vessel, the Singleness and the *Bhāvanā*) form the *Object of Injunction* (i.e. Predicate) or of mere Assertion (i.e. the Subject), with reference to the “washing”; and that too whether singly or conjointly.

When the Action is the principal factor, then, there is a conjunction of the Substance and the Number; and hence all the requirements are fulfilled by a single performance of that Action. When, on the other hand, the Action is laid down as with reference to the *Vessel and Singleness* (and thereby becomes the subordinate factor), then, in that case, the Action and the Injunctive sentence, are taken as complete in each of the Vessels.

But here also, we are faced by the following questions: Is the *washing* enjoined for the *Vessel* only, or for the *Singleness* only, or for both of them alternately, or for both conjointly, or for their relationship and aggregation, or for the *Vessel* as qualified by the *Singleness*, or for the *Number* (one) as qualified by the *Vessel*? Or, with reference to the action of *washing*, is it the *Vessel* that is enjoined, or the *Singleness*, or both alternately, or both conjointly, or the relationship and the aggregation of these, or the *Vessel* as qualified by *Singleness*, or the *Number* as qualified by the *Vessel*?

A manipulation of the construction of the sentence in question having given rise to so many doubts and questions, the opponent is led to believe that, inasmuch as the number forms the predicate of the sentence, it is

this that is enjoined; and hence he takes pains to bring forward all the reasons that he finds capable of favouring the view that the *Number* is predicated in regard to the *Vessel*, and is enjoined with reference to the *washing*; and he concludes that just as Time and Place, though really the subjects, are often taken as objects of Injunction, through the Action,—so, also would the ‘*Vessel*’ and the ‘*Singleness*’ be.

On the other hand, all the syntactical constructions that he would attribute to the sentence, with a view to make the *singleness* an object of Injunction, will be rejected by the *Siddhānti* as involving a syntactical split.

As a matter of fact, also, the *Vessel* can never be the predicate of the sentence in question; and it becomes all the more impossible for the ‘*singleness*’ to be so; because it is subservient to the *Vessel*. Thus then, the sentence being taken as enjoining the *washing* for the *Vessel*, its Injunctive potency is wholly spent upon that, and as such, it could not enjoin the *singleness*. Nor could the sentence be taken as enjoining *singleness* for the *Vessel*, because there is no repetition of the Injunctive word and the word ‘*Graham*’; as it would be necessary, in that case, to have two Injunctive words and two ‘*grahas*.’ And in case the relationship of the *Vessel* and *Singleness* were positively enjoined,—if it were found desirable to have an Injunction of something over and above the connection of the *Vessel* and the *washing*,—then, also, it would be necessary, for the sake of the accomplishment of the two relationships (of the *Vessel*) to have a repetition of the word ‘*graham*’; and in this case also, the Injunctive word would have to be repeated; as a single Injunctive cannot enjoin two relationships.

For, if the Injunctive affix were to enjoin two relationships, either simultaneously, or one after the other, how could it do so, unless it were pronounced twice? so also if the ‘*Vessel*’ were to attain the relationship of the *Singleness* and the *washing*, it could not do so without its being repeated twice. Then again, the first utterance of the Injunctive having its potency wholly spent up in the enjoining of the *washing* for the *Vessel*, it would be absolutely necessary to utter it over again, for the enjoining of the *Singleness* of that *Vessel*. And this second utterance could not but be something wholly outside the Vedic Text; and thus originating from a human speaker, it could not have any authoritative character.

Thus then, however much we may rack our brains over the various constructions of the sentence in question, we cannot find any proper way whereby we could have an injunction of *Singleness*; and as such this latter cannot be taken as something to be brought into action. If in any way we could have an Injunction of this *Singleness*, it would be like the *Vessel*, etc.; and how could anyone neglect it, during the performance?

But this would be possible, only if the Action were the principal factor. As in that case, on the strength of the fact of the Injunction being that of the qualified *Vessel*, we could have an indirectly implied Injunction of the qualifying *Singleness* also. Consequently, if the opponent can establish the fact of the Action being the principal factor, then, through that, he could establish the fact of all things mentioned in the sentence being intended to be duly significant.

For these reasons, we conclude that the mere fact of something being mentioned in a sentence is not sufficient reason for taking it as *enjoined*, and hence the qualification in question—‘Singleness’—is not similar in character to such other qualifications as ‘white’ and the like.

Further, we ask:—Would this ‘singleness’ be a qualification of the Substance (*Vessel*) or of the Action (*washing*), on account of which fact it could be absorbed by the *Vessel*, the *washing*, and the *Bhāvanā*?

First of all, we proceed to show that it could not be a qualification of the *Substance*. As a matter of fact, it could be its qualification, either as forming an integral part of the Substance, or as serving to preclude, from it, all other *Numbers*. The former is quite compatible with the fact of the *washing* being performed with regard to all the *Vessels*; for if one washes *many* vessels, he certainly washes *one*; and in that case, the *washing of all the Vessels* being known, by reason of the generic character of the “Vessel” belonging to all of them, as to be performed,—and not being found to be prohibited by (i.e. incompatible with) the singular number (in ‘*graham*’),—what reason can one have for leaving off the *washing* of the second and the following *Vessels*?

The following argument might here be brought forward by the opponent: “The basic noun ‘*graha*’ itself being sufficient to denote the fact “of one and all of the *vessels* being *washed*, the affixed singular ending “could not be taken as a subsidiary *Arthavāda*; and as such it would be “taken as serving the purposes of *preclusion* (of the washing of more than “one *Vessel*).”

Reply: It is not so; it is only in a case where a general proposition having been laid down, it is repeated again with a certain specification, that we admit of *Preclusion*; in the case in question, however, we do not find any repetition; because a repetition would be possible only if there were many sentences; while what you have asserted is that the same sentence serves both to enjoin and to preclude; and certainly that is extremely incongruous. In fact, what you have asserted is that the two opposite functions are served, not by the same sentence, but by the same word (‘*graham*’); and this certainly shows an insight transcending all possibilities! That is to say, you have declared that the basic noun in that word enjoins the connection of the washing of all *Vessels*, and the case-end-

ing in it precludes that connection; this is what passes our understanding! Then again, just as when a sentence is found to serve the purposes of *enjoining* and *precluding*, it is construed in two different ways,—so would the word also have to be construed in two different ways! It is really strange how you can make such a self-contradictory assertion that at one and the same time, the same word serves to *enjoin* as well as to *preclude*.

Then again, Preclusion (*Parisankhyā*) is possible only when there is a likelihood of the universal application of a certain thing being countenanced by an assumed text, while its particular application is directly mentioned in a vedic text; because in such a case the Preclusive Injunction is free from all objections. Specially in this case, as the text supporting the universality has got to be assumed, while that supporting the particular application is already existent,—the Preclusion is accepted in view of the desirable result that it is found to accomplish.

In the case in question, however, your Preclusive Injunction serves to reject the cognition of the *washing*, as applying to all Vessels,—this cognition being brought about by the basic noun which forms part of the same sentence and word as the case-ending, which, though depending for its existence on that basic noun, is yet held to bring about the said Preclusion! And such a preclusive Injunction is open to all the three faults (that of rejecting the enjoined, renouncing of its own meaning, and acceptance of another meaning).

On the occasion of showing a case of faultless Preclusive Injunction, the *Bhāṣya* has declared, (in connection with the sentence '*ināmāgrbhāṇ...ityaṣvābhīdhānimādattē*') that the desirable interpretation is that the latter clause of the sentence ('*ityaṣvābhīdhānimādattē*') enjoins the 'Horse's reins', and not the 'Holding'; and the reason that he gives is that the *mantra* in question ('*inūgrbhāṇ*') is already known (from the words of the *mantra* itself) as to be employed in *Holding*, (and the only thing that remains doubtful is the object to be *held*, and this is mentioned in the latter clause).

But this is scarcely right; because, as a matter of fact, the Injunction is quite possible from the verb '*ādattē*'; while as for the connection between the *Holding* and the 'Horse's reins', there is no Injunction; because the word '*agrbrhāṇ*' in the *mantra* is capable of indicating the *Mantra* to be as applicable to the 'Horse's reins' as to the 'Ass's reins'; because of the word '*raṣanā*' (string, which is equally applicable to the reins of both). Nor is the 'horse's rein' any further remote from the '*raṣanā*' than the 'ass's reins'; because the word '*raṣanā*' being equally applicable to both, both would be expressed and cognized at one and the same time. Then again, in any Injunctive sentence, there is always a difference

between Direct Assertion and Implication by Syntactical Connection; because there is a distinct difference in the degree of the relationship of that which is expressed by the verbal root, and that of that which is expressed by a noun. That is to say, the noun can have no connection in the sentence unless there are three words (e.g. 'iti', 'aṣṭvābhīdhānīm' and 'ādattē'), while, that of the verbal root is accomplished by means of two words only ('iti' and 'ādattē'). Then again, the Injunctive affix in question also does not so well and quickly lay down the application of the *Mantra* to the denotation of the noun ('aṣṭvābhīdhānī', the Horse's reins)—which is not mentioned by the same word as that in which the affix appears,—as it does that to the denotation of the verbal root (the Holding) which appears in the same word ('ādattē'); and the *Mantra* also becomes connected with the *Reins* more quickly by means of the Direct Assertion (in 'ityaṣṭvābhīdhanīmā-dattē'), than it could do by that of the indicative power of the word 'aṣṭvābhīdhānī' in the *Mantra*. Nor does the *Mantra* stand in need of any other ground for being applicable to the Horse's Reins; because the generic word 'raṣṇā' (in the *mantra*) serves to point out that application just as well as any specification of it. Then again, in all cases, it is necessary to have recourse to indirect Indication, at least for the indication of the fact of the *Reins*, etc., leading to certain *Apūrvus*; and hence inasmuch as the mention of the 'Horse's Reins' would be got at by the Indication (of the word 'raṣṇā'), another direct Injunction of the same (in the sentence 'ityaṣṭvā, etc.') would be wholly useless. As the word 'Horse's-Reins' would take exactly the same time in indicating (its Injunction), as the word 'raṣṇā' would in indicating the *Horse's Reins*.

For these reasons, we cannot take the clause 'ityādattē' as merely referring to the application of the *Mantra* which is pointed out by its own words; nor can we take the latter sentence to be injunctive of the *Horse's Reins*; as what the sentence does is to enjoin the *Bhāvanā* which is simultaneously qualified by all the three—the *Horse's Reins*, the *Mantra* and the *Holding* denoted by the verbal root.

Then again, in no way does the form of the *Mantra* itself point to its connection with the *Holding*; because the *Mantra* does not enjoin any such connection, without bringing about the assumption of a vedic text to the effect; but long before the form and the context of the *Mantra* bring about the assumption of the necessary vedic text, the required Injunction (of the connection of the *Mantra*) is accomplished by means of the already existing text ('ityaṣṭvā, etc.').

Consequently, the latter sentence must be taken as enjoining the connection of the *Mantra*, which has not been laid down before. It is spoken of as a 'Preclusive Injunction' simply because it is found to lead to the separation of the *Mantra* from the *Holding of the Ass's Reins*,—and

not because of a repetition of the specification. When we proceed to seek for the special purpose served by this Injunction, we find that it does not serve any other purpose than the preclusion of the *Mantra* from the *Ass's Reins*. But this preclusion of something else does not form the meaning of the sentence, like a specialization; because the preclusion of the *Ass* is accomplished by the very fact of its not having any connection with the *Mantra*; and it is only that which is likely to come in that is precluded by means of a sentence. Specially as we find that the *Mantra* can not pertain to the *Reins* of the *Ass* until it has brought about the assumption of a vedic text to that effect; and hence it cannot be held that the Repetition, in the latter sentence, of the 'Horse's Reins', is to be taken as precluding that *Mantra* from being applied to the *Reins* of the *Ass*; because the mention of the "Horse's Reins" could be called a "Repetition" only if it had been laid down before by the quicker action of another text; and the previous mention of the "*Reins of the Ass*" cannot make the subsequent mention of the "*Horse's Reins*" a repetition. Because the application of the *Mantra* is found to have been previously laid down by the quicker operation of the Direct mention of the "Horse"; and thus the Veda, as well as the subject in question, having all its requirements fulfilled, there can be no assumption of another text, on the sole authority either of the indicative power (of the words of the *Mantra*) or of the Context. And when no such text is assumed, there is no application of the *Mantra* to the *Reins* of the *Ass*. It is on this that we have the well-known proverb — 'How can the *Ass* overtake that which has been taken away by the *Horse*?'

We can, however, enquire from the Direct Assertion (of the *Horse*) what special purpose it serves; and on this point, we could address her in the following manner: 'Is it by sheer force that you have obstructed the assumption of the indicated text? When the *Mantra* could be applied to the *Horse's Reins*, even by means of the assumed text, why should you have been in a hurry to enjoin it? It is quite true that no texts could be assumed for that which you enjoin; but what do you gain by obstructing that assumption?'

(And we have the following reply :) If the assumed text could lay down the applicability of the *Mantra* to the *Horse's Reins* only, in the same manner as is done by the Direct Injunction,—then alone could this latter be useless. As a matter of fact, however, the text assumed on the strength of the words of the *Mantra* would indicate the applicability of the *Mantra* to the *Reins* of the *Horse*, as also to that of the *Ass*; and hence it is for the purpose of averting this dual application that the Direct Injunction hastens to mention the "*Horse's Reins*." And we have this latter Injunction, because the assumed text could not point out the application of the

Mantra to the Reins of the Horse only, as is done by the Direct Injunction. Thus then, not being a mere repetition, this Injunction comes to be recognized as serving a useful purpose; and inasmuch as all requirements are fulfilled by it, the *Mantra* cannot bring about the assumption of any other text.

If the Injunction in question had only repeated the fact of the previously mentioned applicability of the *Mantra*,—then, in that case, the Preclusion would be open to all the three objections. When, however, the text being restricted, there is nothing to lay down the common applicability (of the *Mantra* to the Reins of the Horse, as also to that of the Ass), then the Preclusion is totally free from the three objections. This is what we have already explained under the *Sūtra* I—ii—42; and it is only in the way explained there that the Preclusion can be shown to be free from all objections.

For these reasons, we conclude that we should not attach any importance to the expression in question that the Author of the *Bhāṣya* has inadvertently used.

Nor is it possible for the sentence in question to be an Injunction of the connection of 'singleness'; because its injunctive potency is wholly taken up by the injunction of the connection between the 'washing' and the 'Vessel.' Just as in the case of the sentence ('Protect this food from animals—the dog, and the cat'), which enjoins the *protecting of the food*, even though the particular animals 'dog' and 'cat' are mentioned, yet they are not accepted as in any way restricting the Injunction;—and the reason for this is that in this sentence the 'dog' and the 'cat' are not mentioned as the objects to be protected (i.e. objects of the enjoined protection) from the *eating of the food*; and consequently (inasmuch as the *protection* of the food is what is enjoined), the man directed protects it from other animals also—such as the crow and the like—which too are as much spoilers of the food as the dog and the cat. In this connection we have the following saying: 'Even a child, when told to protect the food from crows, does not omit to protect it from the dog and other animals, because he knows that the chief factor in the direction was the *protection*.'

Though the above example of the 'protection of the food' has been cited by the *Bhāṣya*, yet it does not quite fit in with the case in question. Because in the sentence cited what is not intended to be significant is the 'crow,' which is a definite object expressed by a word in the sentence; whereas in the case in question, what is held to be non-significant is only the *number* (singleness) of the vessel (and this *number* is expressed by the case-ending); and that makes a great difference between the two

sentences. This sentence would be fitly cited in connection with the next *Adhikaraṇa*, where it is considered if the 'washing' is applicable to the *Ladle*, etc., also, just like the *washing* of the altar. As for an example like the one cited, there is one in the Veda itself, in connection with the 'Animal' sacrifice, where we read '*Yadī caturavattī yajumānoḥ pañcāvattaiva vapā kāryā*,' where the object of the Injunction is that 'that which is cut into pieces is to be five in number,' and hence the mention of the '*vapā*' is not intended to be significant; as otherwise there would be a syntactical split. All this we shall explain under Adh. X; and it would have been fitting to cite, in that connection, the sentence that the *Bhāṣya* has cited here. In the case in question, on the other hand, it should have cited some such sentence of ordinary parlance, in which the *Number* alone is intended to be non-significant; for instance, the sentence '*Vṛshalaḥ na pravēṣṭavyam*,' where the Plural in '*Vṛshalaḥ*' is not intended to be significant, because the sentence is taken as prohibitive of the entry of the *vṛshala*, singly, as well as collectively in large numbers.

Objection: "The word '*sammāṛskti*' might be taken as enjoining the "connection of the *Vessel* and the *Singleness*."

Reply: This could not be; as that would be contradictory to what is directly mentioned (by means of the same word). Specially as a single Injunctive word is not capable of laying down the *Bhāvanā* of the *washing*, as well as the *connection of the Vessel and the Singleness*; and thus there being a contradiction between these two objects of the Injunction, it is the former that is accepted as its object, on the strength of its proximity to the Injunctive affix being closest; and hence there being no other Injunction, there can be no comprehension of *Singleness*.

It has been argued above that in the case of a qualified Injunction, the qualification of the qualification also forms an object of Injunction.

But that is not possible; because if the *Vessel* itself does not present the *Singleness* to the *Action*, which is qualified by the *Vessel* purely by itself, —then the *Action* cannot be said to be qualified by the qualified (vessel).

That is to say, if the vessel throws itself as qualified by *singleness*, into the *Bhāvanā*, then, in that case, it would be necessary to throw in the qualifying *singleness* beforehand; as otherwise the *Bhāvanā* could not be qualified by that qualification; and in this case, the *Bhāvanā* also, taking in the *Vessel* as qualified by *Singleness*, could not take in the *Vessel* thus qualified, unless it took in also the qualifying *Singleness*. For instance, as the word denotes a substance as qualified by a certain *genus* or *class*, it does not apply to the substance, until it has denoted the qualifying *Class*; and hence in that case it would be absolutely necessary to accept the *singleness* to be a qualification of the *Bhāvanā*. As a matter of fact, this also we shall

refute below. And in a case where a substance itself is the qualification of the *Bhāvanā*, as in the case in question, the *Bhāvanā* too is connected with the *Vessel* only, and not with its *Number*; and the *Number* also is related to the *Vessel* only, and not to the *Bhāvanā*. And thus the qualified Injunction, having its end in the pointing out of the qualification of the *Bhāvanā*, does not imply anything else; specially as *Singleness* does not necessarily qualify the *Vessel*, at the time that it is actually qualifying the *Bhāvanā*; because the *Bhāvanā* does not take up the *Vessel* as qualified by *Singleness*: as it does not notice the *Number*, which is hidden under the form of the vessel itself. Nor can the *Singleness* be taken as qualifying the *Vessel* qualified by the *Bhāvanā*; because that would be tantamount to taking it as qualifying the *Bhāvanā* itself (which we shall refute below). As a matter of fact too, the *Bhāvanā* cannot qualify the qualified *Vessel*. Consequently there can be no implication (by the Injunction) of a qualification of the substance (*Vessel*): because no such qualification is wanted by the principal Injunction in question.

Then again, if it be insisted upon that there is an Injunction of the qualification, such injunction could not be possible without a repetition of the Injunctive affix; and that would involve a syntactical split. Even if we admit of this split, at the time of the actual *washing*, no attention could be paid to the *Singleness*; as what the Injunction lays down is the connection of the *Singleness* with the *Vessel* independently by itself; specially as it is not possible for an action, that is still in the position of being *enjoined*, to qualify a substance related to a qualification,—as we have already explained in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

For these reasons, the 'Singleness' cannot be comprehended as a qualification of the substance ('Vessel').

If it be urged that the 'Singleness' is laid down as qualifying the *Bhāvanā* of the '*washing*,'—then, we reply, that it could not be its qualification, either as a subordinate factor (in the shape of the means of accomplishing the washing), or as a predominant one (in the shape of something to be purified by the washing).

In the first place the '*Singleness*' could not be the predominant factor, because being incorporeal (or immaterial) it is not possible for it to be purified. Nor can it be said to be purified by the purification of the substance ('Vessel'); because it is something wholly different from it, and because the purification that is laid down for the *Vessel* is not through this *Singleness*; as it being laid down for the vessel independently by itself, it would be wholly useless to lay it down again; specially as, even at the time of the actual performance of the purificatory *Rinsing*, this latter is recognized as pertaining to the *Vessel* directly, and not as due to the *Singleness*.

In the same manner it can be shown that 'Singleness' could not be laid down as the subordinate factor.

Question : "How is it that it has not the subordinate character?"

Answer : A quality is accepted to be subsidiary, only when it is found to qualify a subsidiary substance; in the case in question, however, the 'Vessel' is not held to be subsidiary to the 'washing,' which does not bring about any visible results; and as such the quality, 'Singleness', of the Vessel, which is not a subsidiary, could not have the subordinate or subsidiary character.

Objection : "Even when the Vessel is the principal factor, it is found to accomplish the washing. That is to say, in the first place, the capability of accomplishing the washing belongs to the Vessel; and hence it would be through this, that the Singleness would aid in the washing; and even though the Vessel is the principal factor, yet it would become the Property of a Subsidiary Substance, by becoming qualified by a property (Singleness) that is subordinate to the Action. It is not necessary that an Accessory should always rest upon an Accessory; all that is necessary is that it should rest upon something that helps the Action, and thereby helps in its fulfilment; as we shall prove later on to be the universal rule. And as to whether a certain thing is an Accessory or not, this would be ascertained by Direct Assertion, Indirect Implication, etc."

In reply to this, the *Siddhānti* declares that even though it be possible for the thing in question ('Singleness') to be subordinate to (for the sake of) more than one thing (i.e. to the washing, as also to the Vessel), yet, inasmuch as the Injunctive word is not capable of enjoining any such thing, that would be either very remote (from the Injunction), or not a subsidiary; and as such it could not but be rejected.

Objection : "The above arguments are not enough to prove that 'Singleness' is not intended to be significant. Because it would be truly non-significant, if it were a qualification of the Substance. But it has not been shown that it cannot be related to the washing, either in the subordinate or in the principal position.

"It has been argued above that inasmuch as the Singleness is incorporeal, it could not be purified. But that would be the case with the denotation of the basic noun '*graha*' also, which is the class '*grahatva*,' and which, as a class, is incorporeal, and as such incapable of being purified. If it be held that there could be a purification of the Class, through the constituent Individual, then, that could be said of the Number ('one') also. If the purification done to the Individual be held to have been done to the Class, then the same would be the case with 'Singleness' also; as 'Singleness' serves to indicate the Individual

“just as well as the *Class* does. If, again, the *Class* be held to be corporeal, and non-different from the Individual, and as such directly capable of the purification, —then, also, the same may be said with regard to ‘Singleness’ also.

“It has been argued above that what is done to the *Substance* cannot be taken as done to the *Number*. But this argument applies, in your case also, to the *Class* as well. If you meet the argument by declaring the word to denote the Individual, then that would be a direct contradiction of the conclusion arrived at under the *Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—3 *et seq.*). Nor is it possible for us to have any idea of the relationship of all the individual vessels used at the innumerable performances of the *Iyotishtoma*, extending over the past, the present and the future; and farther (if the application of the word rested upon a cognition of all the Individuals), then the word could not be applied for the first time to the Vessels seen to-day. Consequently it is necessary to admit of a certain generic character (inhering in all the Individuals). No such generic character is possible except the *Class* ‘*grahatva*’; and being the generic character, it is the *Class* that comes, before all, to be denoted by the word. Nor can the word ‘*graha*’ be taken as denoting a certain *shape*; because each individual Vessel differs from the other, on account of there being a diversity in the arrangement of the constituent parts of each of them (and as such, the *shapes* of all not being identical, they could not all be spoken of as ‘*graha*’). Nor is there any other generic character, save the *Class* ‘*grahatva*,’ which inheres in all vessels, and excludes all other things. Consequently it is the *Class* that must be taken as denoted by the word.

“It has been argued above that if the *washing* were done to the Vessel, it would be cognized as belonging to it; and as such it could never be known as pertaining to ‘*Singleness*’; and consequently there would not be much use in the repetition (of the Injunction).

“To this argument, we offer the following reply: Even when connected with *Singleness*, if the Action were of the same extent (as when not connected with it), then alone could it be rejected as useless; as a matter of fact, however, we find that the connection of *Singleness* makes a great difference in the Action;—such difference lying in the fact that the Action (of washing) is done to *one* Vessel only; otherwise (if it were not connected with *Singleness*) every one of the Vessels would have had to be washed. Thus then, there being a mutual restriction between the *Substance* (Vessel) and the *Property* (Singleness), there is a distinct useful purpose served by the connection of *Singleness*,—just as by the word ‘*aruṇā*’ (in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*); and as such it is quite possible for this *Singleness* to be an object of purification. Then as for

“the fact of its being an Accessory, it has been spoken of by the author of the *Bhāṣya* himself, to be like the Property of the *Pranītā*.

“Nor is there much reason for holding that it is only when the Accessory rests upon an Accessory that it helps the Action, because, as a matter of fact, the Accessories help to accomplish the Action, even if they are incapable of being directly related with it, when they rest in something that is related to the Action, and are not connected with anything that has no connection with that Action. Inasmuch as the Accessories performed in that which is wholly unconnected with the Action would not pertain to (or qualify) that Action; they always rest upon something that is connected with it. Then, inasmuch as it does not make any difference whether they have the character of the Primary or the Subsidiary, no attention is paid to these characters. Just as the means of accomplishing the Action stands in need of the mention of its number, so also does it stand in need of the knowledge of the number of the Primary action that would be helped by it; and it is on this fact alone that the relationship of the two is based.

“Then again, when the Action takes to itself that Property which helps its own Accessory, it would certainly take it up when it is found to exist in that which is purified by that Action. As a rule, it is the Primary factor that is helped even by the Property of the Action; and the Property does not become subsidiary to the Action so well, when it rests in the Accessory, as it does when resting in the Primary. It is always in need of something that would help it in bringing about the Primary action; and it is a great help to it to have the extent of the Primary action (of washing) limited (to one Vessel) only. Then as for the purificatory rites pertaining to the sacrificer, we shall show (in *Adh. VI*) that they also are subsidiary to the sacrifice,—even when existing apart from their nominative character, which actually forms part of the sacrifice, they fall into his character of the enjoyer of its results, by making him capable of enjoying those results. And as the same rule would apply to the case in question, there can be no incongruity in the fact of the character of the Accessory belonging to those resting in the Primary Action.

“Such being the case, the fact of the Injunctive word being incapable (of enjoining the number), that has been urged by you, would apply equally to the number of those that are *predicated*,—such, for instance, as in the word ‘*paṇunā*’ (in the sentence ‘*paṇunā Rudram yajeta*’). Because in this case also, we find the sentence laying down the *Bhāvanā* qualified by the substance (*Paṇu*), the Deity (*Rudra*) and the Sacrifice; and then, if there were to be another injunction of the connection of the gender and number, either with the Action or with the Substance,

"there would be a split of the sentence. If the split be avoided by taking the original Injunction to be a qualified one,—then, that could be done in the case of *washing* also.

"And the only difference in the two cases is that in the case in question the 'Vessel' is the *uddeçya* (that with reference to which something is predicated), while the '*Paçu*' is an *upādēya* (that which is predicated).

"But this alone does not prove anything; for if the mere fact of there being a difference between the two were sufficient cause for accepting the number in one as significant, and rejecting that in the other as non-significant,—then the mere fact of the number being in the one related to the 'Vessel' and in the other to the '*Paçu*,' would be sufficient for establishing their non-significance and significance.

"And further, in the very sentence in question, though it is the *washing* that is enjoined (or predicated) with reference to the *Vessel*, yet due significance is attached to the washing *Cloth* and its singleness, without incurring a syntactical split; and it could be the same in the case of the *Singleness of the Vessel* also. If you were to declare that the two cases are not quite similar, because the cloth, etc., are mentioned in a different word from the *washing*, while the Singleness is mentioned by the same word as the *Vessel*.—then, for you, there could be no citing of examples of Singularity; as there would always be some sort of a difference between any two cases; specially as there are no two cases that are precisely amenable to the same laws and conditions. Then again, when one accepts, as significant, the property that is mentioned by another word,—then, how could he reject, as non-significant, that which is mentioned by the same word?

"For these reasons, the *Singleness of the Vessel* must be regarded as significant.

"As a matter of fact too, we find that even that with reference to which something is predicated is touched by Injunctions. For, if it were not so, then, in the case in question, the Injunction would have been duly carried out, even if the *washing* were performed *apart from the Vessel*.

"It might be argued that the sentence could not be taken as enjoining the *Vessel*, because it has already been laid down elsewhere. But that would not be correct; as the *Vessel* has never before been laid down in connection with *washing*. Then, it might be urged that it could not be enjoined, because of its having been already laid down in connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*. But in that case, there could not be an Injunction of the *Animal*, etc., because these are already found in the ordinary world. Then, as for the *animal* not having been laid down in

connection with the *sacrifice*.—the same might be said of the *Vessel* also (which has not been laid down in connection with *washing*). Then, it might be urged that inasmuch as the *washing* is not outside the pale of the *Jyotishṭoma*, the fact of the *Vessel* having been laid down in connection with this latter would make it incapable of being enjoined by the sentence in question. But then, inasmuch as the Animal-sacrifice is not outside the limits of the world, the fact of the Animal being found in the world would make it incapable of being enjoined!

“Then again, as for the argument that the *Vessel* cannot be enjoined, because it is that with reference to which something else (the *washing*) is laid down, it is wholly unsound; because *Reference* (*Anuvāda*) and *Injunction* (*Vidhi*) are respectively totally different from *that with reference to which something is predicated* (*Viddēya*) and *that which is predicated* (*upādēya*). Because we find that that which is the *Viddēya* (that with reference to which something is laid down)—e.g. space, time, &c.—is often found to be enjoined; while that which is the *Upādēya* (that which is predicated)—e.g. the *killing*—is not enjoined (in the sentence ‘*pacuṇā*, &c.’), because it has been laid down elsewhere.

“Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence in question implies the Injunction of the *qualified washing*, the *Singleness* is as much touched by the Injunction as the *Vessel* itself; and as for the fact of the former being the subordinate and the latter the predominant factor,—that is due to the fact of the latter serving a useful purpose, which is not done by the former.

“Then again, it is scarcely proper that there should be simultaneous Injunction and Non-injunction by the same word; nor would it be correct to take the basic noun ‘*graha*’ and the Accusative Affix as two distinct words.

“That is to say, when the single word (‘*graham*’) is pronounced, it would be highly improper to take it as enjoining the ‘*Vessel*’ (denoted by the basic noun), and not the ‘*Singleness*’ (expressed by the Affix). Nor can the affix be taken as a distinct word; because it is never used independently by itself, and it always appears at the end of words, and not indiscriminately, sometimes before and sometimes after them (as is the case with *words*; for instance, we have ‘*ghatam āvaya*’ as well as ‘*āvaya ghatam*’ when both ‘*āvaya*’ and ‘*ghatam*’ are two distinct words). Nor can it be urged that the Affix is a word, because it expresses, or brings about the cognition of, a certain meaning. Because in that case the *smoke* would also be a word, inasmuch as it denotes the existence of *fire*. And then, inasmuch as a single verbal affix is found to denote more than one meaning, we would have to take the same affix as a distinct word, with each meaning denoted. And again, the word ‘word’

“is one that is in common use in the world; and as such it cannot be
 “precluded from that sense in which it is used, and which is pointed out
 “by the grammatical rules relating to it. The latter distinctly lay down
 “that ‘a word is that which ends in declensional or conjugational affixes’;
 “and the word is commonly used in the same sense; consequently it is the
 “*base* and the *ending* taken together, and not each by itself, that is a
 “word.

“Even if we admit the fact of the Affix being a word, then too, when
 “you admit the *objective character*—which is denoted by the Affix—to be
 “significant, you cannot reasonably reject the significance of the *number*,
 “which also is denoted by the same affix.

“And further, in all cases of non-significance, the word is taken to
 “be as good as not uttered (i.e., not present in the sentence); and conse-
 “quently until the uttered (present) word has been assumed to be not-
 “uttered (absent),—who can set aside its denotation from the meaning
 “of the sentence in which it occurs? Then again, if you would reject the
 “signification of the number, you would have to set aside the Accusative
 “Affix (denoting it); and when this affix would be set aside, the objective
 “character would also disappear with it (as there would be nothing to
 “denote it); and hence the ‘*Vessel*’ would cease to be cognised as *some-*
 “*thing to be purified* (by the ‘washing’). Nor could it be held to be the
 “object of purification, on the ground of its serving a useful purpose in
 “connection with the action; because in the absence of the Affix, there
 “would be nothing that would connect it with the Action. That is to
 “say, the mere basic noun ‘*graha*,’ without the Affix, could not be taken
 “as bearing any relationship to the verb ‘*Sammarśhī*.’ Consequently
 “it is absolutely necessary to accept the objective character to be duly
 “significant; and thus due significance being attached to the Affix (for
 “the sake of this objective character), inasmuch as there would be
 “nothing to justify the rejection of another part of it (which pertains to
 “the singular *number*), this number too could not but be regarded as
 “significant; and as such there could not be a *washing* of *all* the
 “vessels.

“Because if there were a *washing* of all the *vessels*, on account of the
 “*singleness* not being significant,—then, in that case, there would be no
 “washing of any Vessel, because of the non-significance of the *objective*
 “character of the Vessel. Because in the same word (‘*graham*’) as con-
 “sisting of a basic noun and an affix, it is not right to take one part (the
 “base) as uttered and the other (the Affix) as *not-uttered*; because these
 “two are as contradictory as *Presence* and *Absence*, and as such could not
 “belong to the same word. Then again, from among a number of things,
 “denoted by their respective denotative words, we cannot, at one and the

"same time, accept some and reject the rest, because that would be as impossible as cooking only one half of the bird (and leaving the other half uncooked)!"

To the above arguments, we make the following reply:—

The purificatory rite (washing) is distinctly recognised as pertaining to every one of the Primary factors (vessels), which latter are not accepted to be significant, in their subordinate character; as that would be incompatible with the sense of the Accusative (which always signifies the Predominant factor).

If the *washing* were laid down both for the *Vessel*, and also for the *Singleness*, then, inasmuch as there would be no relationship between these latter—because they would both be *uddēṣyas* (that with reference to which the washing is laid down) (and as such both being predominant factors, they could not pertain to the same *Bhāvanā*, see *Sutrā* III--i--12),—the Injunction would be taken as separately complete with each of these two; and that would entail a syntactical split. On the other hand, when we have many things predicated (with reference to a single thing), the Action in question is cognised as one only, having its end in a single *Bhāvanā* qualified by all the various qualifications; and hence the syntactical connection remains wholly intact. It is only in this latter case, that all the qualifications being under the sway of a single principal *Bhāvanā*, they come to restrict one another (as shown in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*). Whereas when these appear as distinct *uddēṣyas* (i.e., when something is held to be laid down with reference to them), then they are not taken up by the *Bhāvanā*; and hence, each being capable of taking to it the Action in question, it is this Action that comes under the sway of these; and hence being taken up by each of them, it comes to be taken as to be performed in connection with each of those qualifications; and in that case the *Vessel* would come to be purified (by *washing*) independently of the *singleness*, and the *singleness* would have to be purified independently of the *Vessel*.

Thus then, if it were the *Singleness* inhering in the *Vessel* that were purified, then, in that case, it would be dependent upon this latter; and that would do away with the predominant character of both, as previously recognised, on the sole ground of their being independent of one another. If, on the other hand, the *Singleness* purified were one inhering in another substance, then it would not be known what that substance is. Because in the Context we do not find any other *Single* substance mentioned, in the way that the *Vessel* is mentioned; and even that which is *one* may be *many*, in reference to something else; and there is no cause for its being specifically defined; and as such it could not be recognised as *one*, independently of everything else.

Objection: "That would be recognised as *one* which is spoken of, in "the originative Injunction, by a word in the singular number."

Reply: That could not be; as there being many such things, it would be impossible to ascertain which one it is.

Question: "Why could not all of these be taken as such?"

Answer: Not so; because that would involve the acceptance of that which is not enjoined (according to you) and the rejection of that which is enjoined. For instance, if one were to stop with the purification of any one of these, then the purification of the others would have been omitted without any reason.

That is to say, in the case of *Singleness* being the subordinate factor, when the Action (of washing) would be performed by means of the *vessel connected with singleness*, then the action would not stand in need of anything else; and hence the Injunction would be duly fulfilled by taking up any one of the vessels. If again, the *Singleness* also were a predominant factor (as held by you), then, even if a single *object with singleness* were left *unwashed*, that would mean the infringement of the Injunction, in that particular respect. If, on the other hand, this latter were also *washed*, then the aggregation of many *Singles* would bring about a different number; and that would mean the abandoning of the directly mentioned '*singleness*'; and hence the *washing* of many would involve a rejection of the *enjoined*, and the acceptance of that which is not enjoined; and lastly, it would be necessary to construe the verb '*Sammārshī*' many times over, as pertaining to every one of the single things.

If, on the other hand, the Purificatory Rinsing were laid down with reference to the *Class*, or with reference to such other properties as *Whiteness*, etc., then, even if the action were performed with any other individual, that would not involve any other *Class* or *Property*. For instance, if the *washing* be performed to the one or the other *Vessel*, that does not bring in any other *Class* (save the '*Vessel*'),—as it does in the case of *number* (where a distinct number is brought up); and hence in such cases, there would be nothing incongruous in the repetition of the same action (with reference to each of the individuals of the same *Class*).

Objection: "Even when all are purified, at the time of the purification of each, it is only *one* that is purified; and as such there would be "no incompatibility (with the mentioned '*Singleness*,' even in accordance "with our theory)."

Reply: In that sense, the *Singleness* of the *Vessel* might be quite significant; and even when all the *Vessels* are purified (as held by us), the *Vessel* would be only *one* at the time of the actual purification. For nobody ever washes all the *Vessels* at one and the same time. Consequently as, even if the *Singleness* were non-significant (and as such the

washing were done to *all the Vessels*), the Vessels would be washed *one by one*, there is not much use in attaching a special significance to the 'Singleness.'

Objection: "The use of its significance would lie in the preclusion (or prohibition) of the simultaneous washing of all the Vessels."

Reply: It is not so; because, inasmuch as they would be taken up one by one, they could not but be *washed* one by one; and as such there would be no possibility of *simultaneous washing* (that could be precluded).

This reply we have given, by taking for granted what the opponent says. As a matter of fact, there is no idea of the *Singleness* independently by itself (without the substratum in which it inheres); and hence the sentence in question giving no idea of any relationship of the fact, or of mere *Singleness*, the Injunction is distinctly recognized as pertaining to the *Vessel* only; and hence even though the *Singleness* might be intended to be significant with reference to other substances,—yet with reference to the *Vessel*, it cannot but be regarded as non-significant. And hence it is established that *all the Vessels* are to be washed.

Thus then, we must bear in mind the general rule, applicable in all analogous cases,—that a *Purificatory Rite is never enjoined with reference to the Number*.

Further, if the *Singleness* be held to be enjoined as a subordinate factor,—then that would be in direct contradiction to the rule, arrived at under the *Saktvadhikāraṇa* (II-i-12), that the Accusative never denotes the subordinate factor. And if the Accusative were taken as not signifying the *objective*, and as indicating mere agency,—then in the first place, that would mean the abandoning of its original signification; and secondly, the *Vessel* too would have to be taken as the subordinate factor (because that also is mentioned by the word with the Accusative ending).

If then the *Vessel* be taken as the *primary*, and the *Singleness* as the *subordinate* factor,—then, that would involve a syntactical split; inasmuch as the single word '*graham*,' uttered but once, would have to be taken as serving the diverse functions of directly *denoting* the *primary* factor, and at the same time indirectly *indicating* the *subordinate* factor.

Objection: "For the sake of the uniformity of the Accusative, the *Vessel* also, like the *Singleness*, might be taken as the subordinate factor; but the fact of its serving a useful purpose will impart to the *Vessel* the predominant character; and this implied predominance would not disturb the uniformity of the word (i.e. the expressive Accusative Affix)."

To this we make the following reply: When the subordinate character does not really exist in the *Vessel*, how could it be intended to be directly

signified? And why should the predominance actually inhering in it be held to be implied indirectly?

That is to say, as a rule, in all cases of the functioning of words, a remoter functioning is admitted only when the more proximate is found to be incompatible, and not merely by our wish. Hence, in the case in question, if we once, on the strength of the direct mention of the Accusative, admit the *predominance* of the Vessel, then that would be its only character. If we should, somehow or other, find this character to be incompatible, and consequently have recourse to Indirect Indication (of the subordinate character), then, there being a contradiction between actual possibility on the one hand, and this latter assumption on the other,—even though it serves a distinctly useful purpose,—yet the text would point it out as the subordinate factor; and thus the simultaneous acceptance of the possibility and impossibility of its predominant and subordinate character would throw into complete disorder the expressiveness of the word with regard to the predominance; and that would be putting a heavy burden upon the word. For instance, first of all, the predominance of the Vessel is cognized through the direct expressiveness of the Accusative;—then that is abandoned;—and in the middle, we take it to be the subordinate factor;—and then, finding this latter to be incompatible, we again, in the end, conclude it to be the predominant factor;—and certainly all this means a lot of disorder and irregularity. For even though the *predominance* would appear subsequently, yet it would have to be based upon the word itself; as the mere *signification* of a word is not a means of right knowledge by itself; all that it does is to afford a ground for assuming a potency in the word. And thus your theory would entail a syntactical split, caused by the aforesaid assumptions (of the diverse significations of the Accusative).

Further, when a word has got hold of something that is enjoined, or definitely known by some other means, and which is sure to come about,—then, that word does not appertain to anything else. That is to say, even though the *predominance* of the Vessel is established by the fact of its serving a useful purpose,—yet, when the Accusative comes to express (or bring about) that predominance, even if it gets at a mere reference to it, it does not indicate anything else. For instance, in the sentence ‘*dadh-nēndriyakāmasya juhuyāt*,’ what the verbal root in ‘*juhuyāt*’ refers to is only the *Homa*,—even though this is already pointed out by the Context,—and it does not, for the sake of having something to enjoin, indicate any other root-meaning, such as *Going* and the like. Thus then, what the word ‘*graham*’ would do would be to refer to the *predominance of the Vessel*, and to enjoin the subordinate character of *Singleness*; and this would lead to another *Syntactical Split*. And the *predominance of the*

Vessel having been positively pointed out by the Direct Denotation of the word, who would be such a fool as to assume it to be implied indirectly?

In certain cases, *Singleness* also serves the useful purpose of qualifying a substance; and hence on account of *Singleness* the Accusative cannot be said to renounce its sense of *predominance*. Consequently on account of the peculiar potency of the expressive Accusative, both (*Singleness* and *Vessel*) must be regarded as predominant.

The *Bhāṣya* also must be explained as pointing to the above-mentioned syntactical splits (consequent upon the theory of the *Purvapākṣa*).

Objection: "What you have said might apply to the case of the sentence '*graham sammārṣṭi*'; but in the case of the sentence '*agnēḥ tṛṇāni*,' inasmuch as there is no Accusative in the word '*agnēḥ*,' there would be no chance of any of the syntactical splits referred to above, and as such its *singleness* would have to be admitted to be significant."

Reply: Your argument does not affect our position; though the Genitive ending in the word shows the '*Agni*' to be the qualifying, and hence the subordinate, factor, yet inasmuch as there is no other relationship possible (between the '*Agni*' and '*Tṛṇa*'), the two are cognized as related to one another by the relationship of the *whole and the part*. Then too, because the *Agni* (Fire) serves a useful purpose, while the removal of *grass* (*tṛṇa*) does not,—therefore *Agni* is cognized as the *master* of the *grass*; just as in the expression '*rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*' (the king's man), the *Rājā* is known as the *master* of the *puruṣa* (Man). And if the case-ending in '*agnēḥ*' be taken to be the *Ablative*, then too, inasmuch as there would be no useful purpose served by the *Removal* of the grass from the Fire, the *Ablative* would not be regarded as intended to signify the subordinate character; and hence it would come to be taken, through the exigencies of circumstances, as indirectly indicating the *predominance* of the *offered material*; just as is the case with the sentence '*madhyāt purvārdhācāvalyati*'; and thus *Agni* would come to be recognized as the *predominant*, and the *Singleness* as the *subordinate* factor; and so forth, exactly as in the case of the other sentence ('*graham, &c.*').

Then as for the word '*tṛṇāni*' (in the same sentence), there is no significance attaching to the Plural number.

So also in the case of such sentences as '*bhinne juhōti*' (pours the libation when there is a breakage), if the Locative ending (in '*bhinne*') be taken as denoting the fact of both the *Breakage* and the *Singleness* being the cause of their alternation and collation, &c., then, inasmuch as the syntactical connection would be complete with each of them, there would be no connection between the two. If, however, *Singleness* were taken as the *predicated*, and the *Breakage* as the *non-predicated* (i.e. that

with reference to which the former is predicated),—then, in that case, though there would be no contradictory predominance and subservience subsisting in the same substrate, yet there would be, as before, the anomaly of the same word '*bhinna*' denoting both predominance (of the '*Breakage*') and subservience (of the '*Singleness*'); and then, if they be all taken as syntactically connected, there would be diverse '*Breakages*,' and no significance could attach to '*Singleness*.'

As a rule, it is only when there is an actual want of a certain thing, in a sentence, that it is regarded as significant; and as a matter of fact, the want that is felt is that of something that is *predicated*, and of that with reference to which it is predicated. And in the case of this latter, inasmuch as all that it stands in need of is a certain relationship with that which is denoted by the basic noun, there is no want felt, of its *number*; as the *number* is known by other means. Consequently in the case in question, we conclude that the *washing* is to be done to such number of *Vessels* as have been pointed out by other means (the Injunctions relating to the various vessels, f.i.).

As for the various characteristics (or qualifications) of a thing, inasmuch as the only purpose that they serve is the bringing about of an idea of the thing, they cannot be taken as integral parts of the performance of the action in question. For instance, in the case of the sentence 'Bring in the man who is with the white dress,' the *cloth*; &c., do not form integral parts of the *Bringing*; because that alone can be taken as the *predicated*, without which the performance of the action would be impossible; and hence in the case in question, it is the *Vessel* alone that can be accepted as the *predicated*.

Here an objection is raised in the *Bhāṣya*: viz: "*It is only when MANY are intended that we have the plural number*; and the sense of this is that even if a thing were not *intended*, it could not be spoken of (by words) if it did not actually exist (and that if the *Singleness* did not exist, it should not have been spoken of by the word)."

The sense of the reply given in the *Bhāṣya* is that, inasmuch as the Veda is eternal, all that we can do, in its case, is to find out what it means as it stands; and we cannot rightly reproach it, like an ordinary speaker, for having used certain words. Therefore the singular Accusative Affix in '*graham*' must be taken as merely helping to make the use of the basic noun ('*graha*') possible for denoting the particular object (as the basic noun could not be used without a certain affix); or it may be taken as actually expressing only the particular agency (of the *objective*), and denoting the *number* (*Singleness*) as its necessary accompaniment. Just as though the fire is lighted for the purpose of giving light, yet it burns up the fuel also, so in the case in question, the singular Accusative only

serves to denote *objectivity*, in accordance with the law that 'the denotation of a word must be restricted to that which is the first to be expressed by it.'

In the case of the sentence '*yasya puroḍāṇau skannau &c.*,' all that the dual number does is to point out the applicability of the enjoined expiatory rite,—just like the duality of the offering material. Otherwise, the '*puroḍāṇa*' meant might be taken as only that which is dedicated to *Agni* (and in that case the expiatory rite would apply to the destruction of that one *Cake* only), in accordance with the law that 'the denotation of a word is to be restricted to that which is the most predominant' (as the '*Āgnēya*' cake is the most predominant of all the cakes concerned).

And further, *it is the Vessel that is signified by the basic noun*. That is to say, when, as a matter of fact, however much we may look for it, the *Singleness* is not found to have any direct relationship with the action in question, it cannot, in any case, be regarded as significant; and hence it is far more reasonable to take it as qualifying the *Vessel*. And consequently, even without the *Singleness*, there can be no deficiency in the *Washing*. Or lastly, the *Singleness* may be taken as pertaining to the *Class 'Vessel'*; and as such subsisting in every one of the *Vessels* washed.

Sūtra (15): That which is enjoined (or predicated) is subordinate to something else; and as such it should be taken exactly as mentioned in the text.

In the case of the sentence '*paçumālabhet*,' inasmuch as the *Animal* does not serve a useful purpose, and the Accusative ending in '*paçum*' is not found to be significant of the *objective*,—just as in the sentence '*saktūn juhoti*,'—it is taken as indirectly indicating '*agency*' in general; and then there arising a question as to the particular *agency* meant, the *animal* comes to be recognized as *Instrumental* (in the sacrifice),—in accordance with the law that 'that which is an accomplished entity helps that which has to be accomplished,' as also the law relating to the relationship of Substances and Actions,—and hence subordinate to it; and then inasmuch as the *Class*, the *Substance*, the *Number* and the *Gender* are always predicated with reference to the *Bhāvanā*,—and as the sentence in question enjoins that *Bhāvanā* alone as qualified (by those),—and as the apparent Inconsistency of all this would give rise to an Injunction of these qualifications,—there would be nothing incongruous in the syntactical connection of the various factors of the sentence.

ADHIKARANA (8).

[The Washing is not done to the Ladle, &c.]

Sūtra (16): "Because the Washing is a purificatory action, it could not be restricted in its applicability to the several accessories."

There are two ways in which the *Pūrvapaksha* is put forward: (1) "In the case of the sentence '*graham sammārshī*,' just like '*Single-ness*,' the class '*Vessel*' also is not intended to be significant (of the 'vessel only'), but as simply pointing out the nature of the object to be washed; and hence the *Washing* should be done to the *Ladles* also."

And (2) "inasmuch as there is nothing to justify the taking of the word as explained, and as the sentence distinctly lays down the connection (of the *Vessel*),—the Injunction should be separated from the '*Vessel*, being taken as laying down the *Washing* alone by itself (and as 'such applicable to the *Ladle* as well as to the *Vessel*).'"

This *Pūrvapaksha* is amenable to the same objections that have been urged against the *Adhikarāṇa* dealing with the *Avaghāta*; and these objections are also amenable to replies similar to those given in that connection.

Objection: "In that case, the present *Adhikarāṇa* will have been included in that *Adhikarāṇa*; and there should be no necessity of 'taking it upon the present occasion.'"

Reply: Certainly it should not have been taken up, if the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* had not given rise to the idea of the deficiencies of one's intention with regard to the significance of words. As it is, however, being frightened away by the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, from attaching any significance to '*Singleness*,' the *Pūrvapakshi* takes everything to be non-significant.

And there is yet another point of difference between the present *Adhikarāṇa*, and that dealing with the *Avaghāta*: viz.—in the case of the latter, there being a difference among the various *Apurvās* of the *Āgnēya*, and the rest, due to the difference among the objects themselves, it is only right that there should be a restriction in the applicability of the *Avaghāta*, &c.; whereas in the case in question, the action being one only,

—that of the *Jyotishtoma*,—it will be a single *Apūrva* that would be helped by the *Vessel* as well as the *Ladle*; and as such there is every possibility of the details of these two becoming mixed up.

The expression 'because it is a purificatory action' is meant to show that as the action of *Washing* is performed for the sake of bringing about an *Apūrva*, it has to be repeated with every one of the principal things.

SIDDHĀNTĀ.

Sūtra (17): There would be a restriction, because the particular object is directly mentioned; specially as such things are based upon the sole authority of the scriptures.

The reply that is first given to the above *Pūrvapaksha* is just as rough as the *Pūrvapaksha* itself. It is this: If the *Washing* be not related to the *Vessel*, then, there could be no injunction of the *Washing*; consequently it would be absolutely necessary to have another member of the Relationship; as there could be no injunction of the *Washing* alone, by itself.

Or the *Washing* might be restricted to the *Vessel*, because of the particular *Apūrva* that is indicated by the latter.

Objection: "But both (the *Vessel* and the *Ladle*) are related to the 'same *Apūrva*'; that is to say, there is a single *Apūrva* in the case in "question."

Reply: Even though the Action is one only, there is no difference in its *Apūrva*,—yet, because the action of *Washing* could not be done to the *Vessel* and the *Ladle*, at one and the same time, therefore, in reality, the two do not appear together, either in a single Action or in a single *Apūrva*; and hence we must admit the existence of distinct intermediate *Apūrvas* in connection with each repetition of the action of *Washing*. And as the form of the sacrifice would be completed, even without the repetition of *Washing*, such Repetition could only lead to transcendental results.

Thus then, there being no reason for passing over that intermediate *Apūrva* which is pointed out by the word '*graha*,' and as such is the most proximate (to the mention of *Washing*),—the *Washing* would come to be restricted to the *graha* (*Vessel*) only,—just like the *Avaghāta* &c.,—in accordance with the rule laid down under the *Sūtra* III—i—10.

And further, the significance of the '*Vessel*' does not give rise to any syntactical split &c., as has been shown to exist in the case of the significance of *Singleness*; and hence in the case in question, we should not be led away by the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARANA (9).

[The measure of seventeen cubits appertains to the sacrificial post.]

Sūtra (18): Being of no use in the Primary, it would appertain to its Subsidiaries.

In the sentence '*Saptadaçāratnir-vājapēyasya yūpaḥ*,' it is doubtful what is to be 'seventeen cubits' in length; because (1) if the word '*saptadaçāratniḥ*' be taken with '*vājapēyasya*',—the Injunction being construed as '*saptadaçāratnir-vājapēyasya*',—and the word '*yūpa*' be taken, somehow or other, as a mere *unuvāda* (merely descriptive),—then the measure would apply to the *shodaçi* vessels of the *Vājapēya* sacrifice; (2) if the Injunction be construed as '*yō vājapēyasya sambandhī sa saptadaçāratniḥ*,' then also, the measure would apply to the same vessels; and lastly, (3) if it be construed as '*yō yūpaḥ sa saptadaçāratniḥ*,' and the word '*vājapēya*' be taken as a qualifying adjunct, or as a mere reference to the particular sacrifice mentioned in the context,—then the measure would apply to the *yūpa* (sacrificial post) used at the '*Paçu* sacrifice' which is one of the subsidiaries of the *Vājapēya*.

On this point we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

"The measure is related directly to the *Vājapēya*, and not to the "*Paçu* sacrifice; (1) because the word '*vājapēyasya*' is immediately proximate to the word '*saptadaçāratniḥ*,' (2) because the *Vājapēya* is the "principal sacrifice, (3) because the context is that of the *Vājapēya*, and " (4) because of the direct denotation (of the genitive in '*vājapēyasya*,' "which distinctly points to the *Vājapēya* as related to the 'seventeen "cubits').

"Then, inasmuch as the measure of 'seventeen cubits' could not "apply directly to the *performance* of the sacrifice, it is taken as applying "to the substance forming a part of it. And of such substance too, we "should take that which is directly connected with the sacrifice. Though "the *Paçu* sacrifice also is mentioned in the Context of the *Vājapēya*, and "as such the Context would not be infringed by taking the measure with "the *Paçu* sacrifice, because by being connected [with the latter, the

"measure would be connected, indirectly, with the *Vājapēya* also,—
 "yet, inasmuch as there is a difference in the procedure of the Primary and
 "that of its subsidiaries, the process of the *Paçu* would not be taken in
 "by that of the *Vājapēya*; and as such there would certainly be an
 "infringement of the *Vājapēya* context (by taking the measure with the
 "*Paçu*). Then, the genitive affix in '*vājapēyasya*' also *directly denotes*
 "the direct connection of the *Vājapēya* with the measure mentioned;
 "while for you the connection of the measure with the *Paçu* would be
 "denoted by *Syntactical Connection*, based upon the co-extensiveness of
 "the '*yūpa*' with that sacrifice (and certainly the direct denotation of the
 "genitive is more authoritative than the indication of *Syntactical*
 "*Connection*). Nor is there any incompatibility in the word '*Vāja-*
 "*pēyasya*' (being taken along with the measure), which would justify
 "your taking that word as indirectly indicating (the *Paçu* sacrifice);
 "specially as, in accordance with the law that 'undue assumptions can be
 "made only with regard to subordinate elements,' it would be far more
 "reasonable to take the word '*yūpa*' as indirectly indicating a *high vessel*;
 "and consequently the measure should be taken as applying to the *high*
 "*vessel* employed at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice."

SIDDHĀNTĀ.

To the above we make the following reply: There are only two cases in which a recourse to indirect Indication could be justifiable: viz.: (1) When there is no other way in which the word could be taken, or (2) when there is a certain degree of co-existence. In the case in question however, we do not find the word '*yūpaḥ*' in any way connected with the *High Vessel*.

One who wishes to take his stand upon the Context alone, and is anxious to admit of a relationship between words in closest proximity to one another,—for him the word '*yūpaḥ*' would be wholly meaningless. It could not be taken as indicating the *High Vessel*; because there can be no Indication when there is no co-extensiveness between the Indicator and the Indicated, and when the word is capable of being otherwise taken (in its direct sense).

In the case of our theory, no word has to be taken in its indirect sense; because, as for the genitive ending in '*vājapēyasya*,' inasmuch as all that it denotes is mere '*relationship*,' there would be nothing incongruous in its pertaining to the relationship of the *Yūpa* also; for even though this latter is not a direct accessory to the *Vājapēya*, yet, inasmuch as all that the genitive requires is that there should be some sort of help accorded, and it does not denote the only relationship of the *whole* and the

part (accessory),—it helps in the *Vājapēya* by helping in the performance of its subsidiary, the *Paçu* sacrifice.

It has been argued that, on account of the extreme proximity (of the word '*saptadaçāratniḥ*' to the word '*vājapēyasya*') the genitive ending directly applies the *measure* to the *Vājapēya*. But this would be the case equally with the *yūpa* also (because the word '*yūpaḥ*' is next to the word '*vājapēyasya*'; and so this latter word could be as reasonably taken with the word preceding it as with that which follows it).

Thus then, the sentence being taken as an Injunction of the measure of 'seventeen cubits,' the *Vājapēya* would be taken as merely *referred* to (or recalled) by the word '*vājapēyasya*'; and we would take that '*yūpa*' to be related to the measure, which we would find to be connected with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice; and the only such *yūpa* is that which is employed at the *Paçu* sacrifice.

In fact, there would be a doubt as to which *yūpa* should be taken, if there were a *yūpa* at the *Vājapēya* itself; but as there is none at this sacrifice, we have taken it to be one that is used at the *Paçu*.

Then again, the *measure* cannot be taken as related to the *Vājapēya* in any of the following three ways: (1) either directly, (2) or indirectly, through something directly connected with it, (3) or through the *yūpa* of the *Vājapēya*.

For instance, (1) we have already shown that it could not be directly related to the *Vājapēya* itself. (2) Then, as for anything connected with it, there is no such thing mentioned; as any such thing is not denoted by the word '*vājapēyasya*'; as for the denotation of the word '*yūpaḥ*,' it is very far from the *Vājapēya*, and there is no *yūpa* directly connected with that sacrifice. Therefore all that the word '*vājapēyasya*' could do would be to recall the fact of this sacrifice being a qualification, which is pointed out by the Context being one of that sacrifice.

It will be fully explained under *Sūtras* III—vii—3, 4, how, through the peculiarities of the Context, the details are enjoined in connection with that which helps in the sacrifice that forms the subject-matter of that Context, and not directly in connection with those alone that are direct subsidiaries to that sacrifice. And as such our theory is not contrary to any authoritative means of knowledge.

ADHIKARAṆA (10).

[The *Abhikramaṇa* is subsidiary to the *Prayājas* alone.]

Sūtra (19): "In the case of the performer's qualifications, inas-
"much as an action cannot inhere in another action, the
"sentence must be broken up."

Purificatory Actions, Substances and Accessories have been duly discussed; and we now proceed to consider those cases in which an Action, being mentioned as related to another action, comes to be taken as a purificatory action.

For instance, in the case of the sentence '*abhikrāman juhoti*,' we find in the word '*abhikrāman*' the repetitive affix '*ṇamul*'; and hence, there arising the question as to what is done by one 'walking round and round' we meet with another word '*juhoti*,' which points to the *Prayāja*, in whose context we find the sentence in question. And then there is a doubt as to whether the 'walking round' is connected with that *Prayāja* alone, or to every one of the *Homas* that are mentioned in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*.

The raising of this question, when the connection is distinctly mentioned by the sentence in question, is open to the same objections that were raised against the raising of the question of the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*; and in the present case also the objections are to be set aside in the same manner as in that connection.

In the present case also, the Action is incorporeal, and its relationship is mentioned (just as in the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*); and yet the present discussion is started, because the points in which the two discussions differ are as follows: (a) in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it was the Substance that was found to be mentioned as co-extensive, and hence it was the relationship of that Action which is accomplished by its means, that was found to be the means of restricting the application of that Substance; while in the present case, it is that Relationship itself that has got to be established; (b) in the former it was the Property, the method of whose connection with the action was known, that was wanted as the distinctive feature; while in the present case, even the Action is not known (with which there would be a connection); and (c) in the former case there were many other substances pertaining to other actions,

while in the present case, in regard to all the various *Homas*, there is the same Priest that is the performer. Consequently the present *Adhikaraṇa* cannot be said to be a mere repetition of the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*.

On the point in question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The ‘walking round’ pertains to all the *Homas*. Because the ‘Action, being incorporeal, is never cognized as one to be accomplished by means of another action; and hence the ‘walking round’ (which is an ‘action’) must be taken as enjoined (as a qualification of the performance), without any connection with the verb ‘*juhoti*’ (which denotes ‘an Action).

“That is to say, we cannot say that the ‘Homa is performed by the ‘walking round’; and hence the ‘walking round’ cannot be connected with the *Prayājas*. For in that case there would be the same syntactical split that has been shown under the *Pūrvapaksha* of the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*.

“The *Bhāṣya* raises an objection: ‘For the same reason the walking round could not pertain to the other *Homas* (because these latter also are ‘actions).’

“This objection is exactly similar to that which was brought forward in connection with the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*; and it is to be met in the following manner: Inasmuch as in the verb the Nominative is the subordinate element,—(if the connection of the *walking round* were controlled by the verb ‘*juhoti*’), it would connect it with the action of ‘*Homa* (and not with the performer); while as a matter of fact, the ‘walking round’ is connected with the performer (of the *Prayāja*, etc.), not as pointed out by the verb ‘*juhoti*,’ but as pointed out by the Context, in which latter case *he* is the principal element; and inasmuch as the performer pointed out by the Context would be that of all the *Homas*, there would be no incongruity in the ‘walking round’ becoming connected with such a performer, and as such pertaining to all the *Homas*, and not to the *Prayājas* only.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (20): Inasmuch as it is in need of another relative, it must be taken along with the next word; specially as the connection of the word is not completed by what precedes it.

In any case the word ‘*abhihrāman*’ (walking round) does not have all its wants (of connections) supplied, unless it is taken along with some

other verb. Because it does not, in any way, express the relationship of a substance. Consequently, inasmuch as it appears in the same sentence with the verb 'juhōti,' which refers to the *Prayājas*, it is cognized as pertaining to these latter; and it is capable of helping them by bringing them into proximity with their performing agent; specially as they stand in need of the proximity of the officiating priest to the sacrificial Fire. Or, it may be that the 'walking round' has its connection with a substance implied; and as such there is nothing incongruous even in the fact of the performing agent being the subordinate factor.

Thus then we find that it is quite possible for one action to help in the accomplishment of another action; and as such one could very well be spoken of as the 'Sādhya' of the other.

It is possible for the *Pūrvapakṣa* to be put forward, not as above,—because in that form it is much too palpably absurd, being based upon a forced disjunction of the word 'abhihrāman' from the sentence,—but in the following form;—"Inasmuch as the 'walking round' is laid down with reference to all the *Homas* of the Context, that are referred to by the word 'juhōti,'—and as there is no intermediate Context (that could take in the *Prayājas* only),—the connection of the 'walking round' cannot but be controlled by the single great Context (which takes in all the *Homas*); and in this case the sense of the preceding (*Pūrvapakṣa*) *sūtra* would be this: *In the property of the agent*—i.e., in 'walking round'—*there being no inherence of the action of Prayāja*, which could be brought about only by an intermediate Context, *there would be a split of the sentence*, only in so far as the 'walking round' would not be syntactically connected with that intermediate Context."

In that case, the present (*Siddhānta*) *sūtra* should be interpreted as follows: '*Sākāṅkṣham*' would refer to the intermediate Context; and the sense of the *Siddhānta* would be that the 'walking round' is syntactically connected with that intermediate Context, through its connection with the want of the procedure, which is aroused by the injunction of the *Prayājas* (i.e. the 'walking round' is to be taken as forming part of the procedure of the *Prayājas*). And in this case, the concluding clause '*asamāptam hi pūrvēṇa*' would not mean the incompleteness of the sentence, but that the Intermediate Context is not completed by what precedes—i.e., by the mere injunction of the form and the accessories of the *Prayājas*.

And further, inasmuch as, even after the mention of 'abhihrāman,' certain accessory details of the *Prayājas* are laid down, we must admit of the existence of the intermediate Context of the *Prayājas* (as otherwise the details subsequently laid down could not apply to them).

ADHIKARANA (11).

[The *Upavita* is subsidiary to the entire *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* and not to the *Sāmidhēni* only.]

Sūtra (21): In all doubtful cases, there being an interruption there would be a split of the sentence.

The fact of Actions subsisting in one another having been established, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether such application of Action is controlled by the Intermediate, or by the Prime Context.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* the *Sāmidhēni* Mantras are laid down as the seventh and eighth *Anuvākas*, the *Nivids* are laid down as the ninth; and the *Kāmyās*, identical with the *Sāmidhēnis*, as the tenth; and then in the eleventh we have the mention of the *sacrificial thread* as to be worn on the left shoulder, passing under the right arm-pit. And then there arises the question as to whether the thread is to be so worn at the time that the person is reciting the *Sāmidhēnis*, or during all the time that he is performing all that is laid down in the Context.] In this, the *Sāmidhēni* has been mentioned separately, simply with a view to discriminate between the existence and non-existence of an intermediate context of the *Sāmidhēni*.

Objection: "The Context is one of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* only; that is to say, inasmuch as all things mentioned are taken up by the Prime Context there is no appearance of any intermediate contexts. Or again, inasmuch as the *Sāmidhēnis* indicate the *Kindling* of the Fire, they are distinctly recognized as serving the purpose of a visible preparatory rite; and as such there can be no context of these (as they do not stand in need of anything else, wherewith they could form a Context)."

Reply: It is not so, because in all cases, there are as many processes as there are verbs; and there is no obstacle in the way of the Process, put by the Prime Context, etc.; and as a matter of fact, neither the contingency of another Context, nor the Preparatory Rite, can ever set aside the Process.

Just as the passages laying down the subsidiary sacrifices, though having all their requirements fulfilled within themselves, yet, come to be connected with the passage laying down the primary *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, and yet they do not, by that connection, lose their own character,—so, in

the same manner, the subsidiary *Bhāvanās*, though complete within themselves, become connected with the final *Bhāvanā* (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇa-māsa*); and they do not, by this subservience to it, lose their own peculiar characteristics.

The Preparatory Rite also, serving the purpose of bringing about an *Apūrva*, always stands in need of some means for its accomplishment, and thereby becomes related to the Context. In fact, even in the case of such preparatory rites as bring about visible results, there is a certain transcendentalism attaching to the restriction or specialization of the particular method of bringing about the visible result; and thus there being a need of the mention of this method or process, there is an actual interdependence of the Context. And even in the case of a visible result, the want of the mention of the method or process does not cease; and that want is not supplied by any perceptible means. Consequently, it must be admitted that even such subsidiaries as those in question are amenable to particular intermediate or subsidiary contexts.

Thus then, though the want of a visible element is supplied only by a visible factor,—and hence in the case in question the *Bhāvanā* having been put forward in the form that ‘one should accomplish the indication of the kindling of fire,’ the question arises as to ‘by what’ it is to be accomplished; and in answer we have ‘by the recitation of the *Sāmidhēni Mantras*’; and then, to the question as to ‘how it is accomplished by this means,’ we have the answer ‘by making the recitation helped by preparing the Ear, to be capable of cognizing the letters, by means of a series of actions, such as the desire to speak, the effort and the striking with the tongue (of the various parts of the mouth)’;—yet there still remains the want to know how there is to be accomplished the peculiar transcendental result pertaining to the *specialization* (of the particular *Mantras* to be recited); and this want can be supplied only by the scriptural injunction of a means that brings about only transcendental results. For these reasons it must be admitted that there is a subsidiary context which connects the ‘wearing of the thread’ with the *Recitation of the Sāmidhēni*.

Objection: “In that case, the subsidiary context being more proximate (to the ‘*Upavīta*’), and hence more authoritative, it would distinctly point to the *Upavīta* as connected with the *Sāmidhēni*; and hence why should there be any question as to its applicability being controlled by the Prime Context?”

Reply: True, it would be so, if there were no likelihood of the connection of the *Upavīta* with the *Sāmidhēni* being taken as to be broken up (or interrupted) by the intervention of the word ‘*Nivid*.’

Objection: “If the connection be broken up, then there would be nothing to set aside the indication of the Prime Context.”

Reply: It is not so; because, inasmuch as the text subsequently speaks of the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni*, there is some doubt as to the connection of the *Sāmidhēni* being broken up; and hence the course of the Prime Context is not quite clear.

Thus then, on the question under consideration, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as we have the mention of the '*Sāmidhēni*' both before and after that of the '*upavīta*,' the Context of the *Sāmidhēni* must be admitted to continue all along; and as for the '*Nivids*,' they must be taken as mentioned, either as something wholly extraneous to the matter of the Context, or as subsidiary to it.

"That is to say, as a matter of fact we find, that in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, the mantras mentioned as to be recited to *Pūshan*, etc., do not break the original Context, even though they have no connection with it, and in the same manner the words relating to the '*nivid*' also would not break up the context of the *Sāmidhēni*. Or, it may be that, through the Subsidiary Context, the *Nivids* also would be taken as accessories to the *Sāmidhēni*-recitation; and in that case there being no intervention of an unconnected word, there would be nothing to alter the *Upavīta* also from being taken as an accessory to the *Sāmidhēni*-recitation."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following *reply*: Inasmuch as the context of the *Sāmidhēni* is broken by the *Nivids*, it could not be linked up by the subsequent mention of the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni*-Recitation.

As a rule, the Context extends only to that extent up till where it perceives something capable of being used or applied in connection with it; and then too, it is only that which is connected with something else, that is applied by means of the Context. In the case in question, however, we find that the words of the '*Nivid*,' through the indicative power of the words themselves,—for instance, the words '*dēvēddhaḥ*,' '*manviddhaḥ*' etc.,—distinctly appear as equal, in importance, to the *Sāmidhēni*, and are equally, with these latter, applied to the *kindling of fire*. Under the circumstances, if the *Fire* were subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēni*, then, in that case, through the *Fire*, the *Nivids* also would be subsidiary to them. If, even in the absence of real subsidiary character, such character were to be gratuitously assumed, then some people might, as reasonably, assume the *Sāmidhēni* to be subsidiary to the *Nivids*. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Context of the *Sāmidhēni* does not extend to the *Nivids*. Then, as for the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni*-Recitations, they

are, from the very words of the text, recognized as serving a desirable end for the performing agent; and as such these could not be taken up by the former *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*. If, again, the *nivids* could be subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēnis*, then,—in accordance with the law of the ‘*godohana*,’ the container also being taken along with the contained,—the Context of the *Sāmidhēnis* could extend to the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni-Recitation*. And if the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni-Recitation* were subsidiary (to the former *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*, then, in that case,—as in the case of the *mantras* recited to *Pūshan*, etc., so here also,—we could take the original Context of the *Sāmidhēni* to be uninterrupted by the mention of the ‘*Nivids*,’—these latter also being, somehow or other, taken along with it. As a matter of fact, however, neither the *Nivids* nor the *Kāmya Sāmidhēni-Recitation* are subsidiary to the original *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*. Thus, there being no subsidiary context (of the *Sāmidhēni*), the *Upavīta* must be taken, on the strength of the Prime Context, as connected with all the *Mantras*.

Objection: “If the *Kāmya* Recitation be taken to be mentioned after the Context has been stopped short (by the mention of the *Nivids*), then, in the case of the (*Kāmya*) Injunction—‘one should accomplish fame by means of the *twenty-one*’—the want of the particular substratum of the number ‘*twenty-one*’ would remain unsupplied, if we do not admit this substratum (in the shape of the *Sāmidhēni*) to be pointed out by the Context; and as such the Injunction would remain incomplete. If the required substratum were pointed out by *Syntactical Connection*, then, inasmuch as the sentence would be pointing out two relationships in connection with the enjoined action (of Recitation), there would be a syntactical split. Then, if this split we accepted as inevitable, and it be explained away somehow or other, then in the case of the *Rēvatī*, the *Vāravantī* and the *Saubhara* also, the required substratum would be pointed out by the Syntactical Connection, which would be in direct contradiction to the *Siddhānta* conclusions arrived at in connection with these *Sāmas*. Then if, for the sake of obtaining the required substratum, the Context were extended to the *Kāmya* Recitation, then the *Upavīta* also becomes taken up by that Context; and thus there are two horns of the dilemma from which you can ill extricate yourself.”

Reply: In the case in question it is not proper to take the desired result (fame) as following from a qualifying detail, which has its substratum disjoined by a ruptured Context; and there cannot be an injunction of many things, unless there is an altogether new action involved.

That is to say, the result mentioned does not follow from the qualifying detail ‘*twenty-one*’; in fact, just like the sentences speaking of the ‘*Rēvatī*,’ etc., the sentence—‘one should accomplish fame by means of

twenty-one'—lays down an independent qualified Action; and hence, in accordance with the *Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa*, the result must be taken as following from the *Root-meaning* (i.e. Recitation); thus then, the sense of the injunction in question would come to be that 'one should bring about ~~same~~, etc., by means of *Recitation qualified by twenty-one*'; and then, as to 'how' it is to be brought about by this means, we come to understand that it is through the *Recitation of the Sāmidhēni* that it is brought about; because the word '*anubrūyāt*' is common to both (the '*Sāmidhēni*' and the '*Ākavimpati*'), and because the numbers of these two are nearly the same (i.e. 'seventeen' and 'twenty-one' respectively). And thus, for the independent '*Recitation of the twenty-one*,' the *verses* qualified by the number, as also the other details, come to be supplied by the previously laid down '*Sāmidhēni Recitation*.'

Though as a matter of fact, in the present case, there is no special purpose served by the two being taken, or not taken, as different actions, yet all that we mean by the above explanation is that the sentence lends itself to such construction and interpretation.

Objection: "In that case, these other Recitations (of the 'twenty-one'), not being taken up by the *Darṣa-Pūṇamāsa*, would come to be "done apart from the performance of these sacrifices."

Reply: In the first place, this argument does not set aside our theory; because even if it be as you urge, the *Upaviṭa* comes to be connected with all the Recitations in question (which is all that the *Siddhānta* clings to).

As a matter of fact, however, there could not be an independent performance of the Recitations (of the 'twenty-one'); because that, in connection with which we find the word '*anu*' used, becomes part of the *Sacrifice* in question; and this could not be if the *Recitations* (which are enjoined as '*anu-brūyāt*') were performed independently. For instance, that Recitation, which is performed before that of the *Sāmidhēni*, is not subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēni*, just like the *Nivids*; and again, the injunction '*anubrūyāt*' could be explicable, only if the Recitations were meant to be performed *after* (the *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*), (in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūṇamāsa*), and not independently by themselves. Then again, if they could be performed separately, though they would be recognized as subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*, yet they would lose their character of '*anuvacanatva*' (being recited *subsequently* to something), if there were nothing else to be recited.

And further, the character of the *Sāmidhēni* also, which is based upon the fact of their indicating the *kindling of fire*, could not belong to the Recitations (of the 'twenty-one'), if performed independently by themselves; because that which does not appear in the course of the perfor-

mance of a Sacrifice (at which alone Fire is used) could not help in the *kindling of fire*.

That is to say, it is absolutely necessary that the numbers, 'twenty-one' and the rest, should pertain to the *Sāmidhēnis*; and it is a known fact that these latter are so called, simply because they indicate the *kindling of fire*; and this fire too that is pointed out by them, could only be one that is used at some other action (than the Recitation itself). And thus, in accordance with the *Sūtra* IV-i-26, entering into the Recitation, just like the conditions of the Primary, the original function of the *Sāmidhēnis*, in connection with the Primary sacrifice, in the shape of the *indication of the kindling of fire*, comes to be applied to the Recitation of the 'Twenty-one' also; which latter, therefore, comes to be dependent upon such *Sāmidhēnis* as are recited in course of the performance of the sacrifice.

Objection: "Then, in that case, the *Upavīta* would be connected, either with all the *Kāmya-Recitations*, or only with the last of these."

Reply: Not so; because, the want of the process of the *Kāmya-Recitation* being supplied by the process of the former *Sāmidhēni-Recitation*, laid down in the same *Context*, the *Upavīta* could be taken as subsidiary to the *Kāmya-Recitation*, only on the strength of the *Proximity* (position of its mention); and it is a known fact that this latter is much weaker in its authority than the *Context* (which points out the *Kāmya* to be done in the same manner as the original recitation of the *Sāmidhēni*).

That is to say, in the case of all secondary modifications of sacrifices, that which is not found to have been mentioned along with the accessories of their originals, is not recognized as serving any useful purpose with regard to themselves; and as such, the *Context* having all its requirements supplied, if such an accessory were to appear subsequently, it could be amenable only to the authority of *Proximity*. And it is a known fact that *Proximity* can authoritatively point to the fact of a certain accessory being used, only when such an accessory is not found incompatible (with the indications of the other means of cognition, f.i. of the *Context*, in the case in question); consequently whenever there is an incompatibility of such an accessory with the indications of the *Context*, it has to be rejected, just like the *Vidēvana*.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Upavīta* is connected as subsidiary to the whole of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*.

ADHIKARANA (12).

[The vessels of the *Vāraṇa*, *Vāikāṅkata*, etc., belong to all sacrifices.]

Sūtra (22): Inasmuch as all accessory details are equally subservient to the purposes of something else, they can have no relationship among themselves.

This *Adhikarāṇa* is an exception to Adhi. 9.

In connection with the *Kindling of fire*, we find laid down certain vessels of the *Vāraṇa* and the *Vaikāṅkata* wood, as employed at the performance of the sacrifice,—some of which are used at the *Homa*, while others are not so used. And inasmuch as these vessels have nothing to do with the actual *Kindling of fire*, they are, as a matter of course, taken apart from the Context; and then there arises a question as to the particular sacrifice at the performance of which they should be used.

And on this question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“In accordance with rule laid down in *Sūtra* III—i—18, we must conclude that the vessels in question are used for holding the offering materials at the *Pavamānēṣṭi* (as this *Ishti*, being laid down in connection with *Kindling of fire*, is directly subsidiary to it).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To this we make the following reply :—Inasmuch as the *Pavamānēṣṭi* offerings are shown, by syntactical connection, to be as primary in their character as the *Kindling of fire*,—the said offerings cannot be taken as subsidiary to the said *Kindling*; and hence the vessels must be taken as belonging to all sacrifices.

That is to say, that the said offerings are subsidiary to the *Kindling of fire* is shown only by the Context, while that they are subsidiary to the fire is shown by the Syntactical Connection of the sentence ‘*yadāhavanīyē juhoti*’ (and under the circumstances there can be no doubt as to the latter being the more authoritative of the two).

Against this way of putting forward the *Siddhānta*, the following objections are raised: “If the sentence ‘*yadāhavanīyē juhoti*’ be taken as making the fire something to be purified or prepared by the *Pavamāna* offerings, then the fire would be recognized as to be purified by means of the *Agnihotra* etc., also; which latter are equally mentioned in the

"same sentence. It might be argued that inasmuch as the *Agnihotra*, etc., bring about distinct results, the sacrificial fire is a *part* of them. But in that case, of the *Pavamāna offerings* also, it would be a part; because one and the same sentence could not speak of the same sacrificial fire, as a subsidiary part of the actions leading to definite results, and as the primary factor of those not leading to any results; as Simultaneous Injunction and Reference, Subject and Predicate, and Primary and Subsidiary are irreconcilable combinations. And your theory involves a further incongruity: viz. that in one case the Locative (in '*Āhavanīyē*') is taken as indicating the *objective*, while in another it is taken in its own original sense (of location). And further, in accordance with your argument, the *Viśvajit*, etc., which have no results mentioned as following from them, would all become subsidiaries. And all this is most undesirable and improper. Specially as the sentence lays down the 'sacrificial fire' as a well-established entity (and not as something to be prepared or purified); and in view of such actions as do not bring about definite results, the name '*āhavanīya*' is to be taken in its prospective sense."

In view of these objections, some people offer the following explanations: We must admit of there being two such sentences as '*yadāhvanīyē juhōti*',—one in connection with the *Pavamāna offerings*, and another independently by itself (not in connection with any particular action). The former of these speaks of the fire as something to be prepared, and as such standing in need of the preparatory rites; and consequently it can be taken as laying down the *Pavamāna offerings*, etc., which have no results of their own, as the required preparatory rites. And the latter may be taken as laying down the fire as a well-established entity, calculated to serve as that into which the libations of all sacrifices are to be offered. And in this way there can be none of the incongruities urged above.

The explanation that we have to offer is as follows: There is no use in taking all this trouble of assuming a sentence (in the shape of the second '*yadāhvanīyē*, etc.') which does not exist; specially as the incongruity is capable of another explanation: even if the *Pavamāna offerings* were subsidiary to the *kindling of Fire*, the *vessels* in question could not belong to those. Because in the case of the sentence '*Vājapeyasya yūpaḥ*', inasmuch as the *Yūpa* is distinctly mentioned, it has been taken (in *Sūtra* III—i—18) as belonging to the subsidiary Paṇu sacrifice; specially as even in this case the Genitive was found to be quite compatible. In the case in question, on the other hand, there is no such ground for taking the *vessels* as belonging to the subsidiaries. Then again, the expression '*Yajñāvacara*' must be taken independently by itself, as laying down the *vessels* for *all sacrifices*; because there is no previously-mentioned sacrifice to which it could refer specifically.

But inasmuch as this end could be got at by means of the law arrived at in connection with the *Recitation of mantras to Pūshan etc.*,—there can be no use of the present *Adhikaraṇa* for that purpose. Consequently the present *sūtra* is to be taken as supplementary to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, added in answer to a supposed argument emanating from the opponent. That is to say, there arising the argument—"inasmuch as the *Nivids* are subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēnis*, a mention of those cannot interrupt or disjoin the Context,"—the *sūtra* makes the following declaration in answer: *The accessory details being, etc., etc.*, which has already been explained. The sense of the declaration is that inasmuch as the *Nivids* also, like the *Sāmidhēnis*, speak of the *kindling of fire*, they are equally *subservient to the purposes of the Fire*; and as such the one (the *Nivid*) could not be taken as subsidiary to the other (the *Sāmidhēni*).

ADHIKARANA (13).

[The *Vārtraghnī* Recitation, etc., belong to the *Ājyabhāgas*.]

Sūtra (23): There is no connection of the meanings of the two verses (with the Primary).

We now proceed to consider those cases in which the *mantras* are employed in accordance with the order in which they happen to be mentioned.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find the injunctions : *Vārtraghnī paurṇamāsyām, anūcyētē, vṛdhanvatī amāvāsyāyām* ; and with regard to this, there arises a doubt as to whether the duality of the *mantras* belongs to the Primary sacrifice, or to the *Ājyabhāgas*.]

At the very outset a question is raised as to why there should be such a doubt.

And the reply to this is that the doubt is due to the fact of the order of connection, as mentioned in the sentence, being found capable of being taken in two different ways. For instance, when the connection is mentioned along with the '*Paurṇamāsi*' it remains doubtful as to whether it is to be taken along with the *time* (*Paurṇamāsi*) or with the *actions* (the *Ājyabhāga*, etc., performed at the time) ; because if the order mentioned were meant to refer to the *Actions*, then the taking of it with reference to the *Time* would involve an infringement of the Injunction. And as a matter of fact, it is only when two relationships are equally authoritative that they are capable of being considered as mutually contradictory,—and not when they differ on the point of authoritativeness ; and hence there would be equality (of the Relationship of the *mantras* with the Primary sacrifices and with the *Ājyabhāgas*), only when the sentence would be taken as connecting the *mantras* with the *Actions*, and not when it is taken as connecting them with the *Time*.

Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The *mantras* to be recited are always connected with *sacrifices*, and
"never with the two points of *Time* (the *Paurṇamāsi* and the *Amāvāsyā*) ;
"and hence the order mentioned must be taken as fully taken up as
"belonging to the Primary sacrifices. Then again, on account of the argu-
"ment urged in the preceeding *sūtra*, the four *mantras* in question (the two
"*Vārtraghnīs* and the two *Vṛdhanvatīs*) can never be connected with

"the *Ājyabhāgas* (because these latter are as much accessory to the Primary sacrifices as the *mantras* themselves). And for these reasons, the order (of the Recitation) must be taken as pertaining to the Primary sacrifices, as pointed out by *Syntactical connection*, and not with the *Ājyabhāgas*, as pointed out by the *order of sequence* (which latter is weaker in its authority than *Syntactical connection*)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply : As a rule, the connection of the Primary with the Subsidiary is not desirable, when the meaning is not found to be so connected ; and in the case in question, we find that the meaning of the four *mantras* has no connection with the Primary sacrifices. Because if they were so connected, there could not be two *mantras* to be recited, when the Primary Action is one only ; and further, because the Deities indicated in the *mantras* do not belong to the two Primary sacrifices.

That is to say, the *Saumi-mantra* (which forms part of the *Vṛdhavati*) can not find its connection with the *Amāvāsya* sacrifice ; because in this sacrifice, *Soma* is not the principal Deity ; and then, as for the *Paurṇamāsī* also, even though *Soma* does appear as its Deity, yet it is so only as accompanied by *Agni* ; and as such the mention of *Soma alone* could not be taken as connected with that sacrifice, as we have shown under the *Māhēndrādhikaraṇa* (II—i—13 *et seq.*) ; and none of the two *mantras* in question is found to be applied to *Agnishoma* (which is the joint Deity of the *Paurṇamāsī*) ; because in the sentence '*Puronuṣṭhikyāmanvāha*' (found in connection with the *Paurṇamāsī*), the singular number in '*Puronuṣṭhikyām*' is significant ; and as such only one *mantra* could be recited to *Agnishoma*. If the sentence in question ('*Vārtraghnī*, etc') be taken as laying down the *duality*, never before laid down,—then there would be a syntactical split,—the sentence being taken as laying down the particular *mantra*, and also its *duality*.

On the other hand, in the case of the *mantras* in question being connected with the two *Ājyabhāgas*, it would be easy to take the mention of the times (*Paurṇamāsī* and *Amāvāsya*) as restricting the application (of the *mantras* to particular *Ājyabhāgas*), as we have already explained before. For these reasons, on account of the relationship of the Primary and the Subsidiary (between the *Durṇa-Pūrṇamāsa* and the *Ājyabhāgas*), it is only reasonable to take the sentence in question as pointing out the *Time* : specially as it is the *Time* that is first of all found to be denoted by the sentence, and 'it is extremely difficult to outstrip Time' (as a well-known saying has it).

ADHIKARAṆA (14).

[The *Muṣṭīkaraṇa*, etc., belong to the whole of that which is dealt with in the Context.]

Sūtra (24) : Immediate sequence is not authoritatively expressive.

We have just dealt with the employment of *mantras* in accordance with the order in which they are mentioned ; and now we proceed to deal with the exceptions to that rule.

[In connection with the *Jyotishtoma* we find the sentence—‘ *Muṣṭim karoti. vācam yucchati, dīkshitamāvēdayati* ’ ; and then again, ‘ *hastāu avanē-niktā, ulaparājīnstrṇāti* ’ ; and in connection with this, there arises a doubt as to whether the ‘ *muṣṭīkaraṇa* ’ (Closing of the Fist) and ‘ *vagya-mah* ’ (Silence) simply serve the purpose of ‘ *āvēdana* ’ (Addressing the initiated Sacrificer) or they enter into the whole of the Context ? and similarly too, as to whether the ‘ *hastāvēnējana* ’ (washing of the hand) is for the sole purpose of ‘ *ulaparajistarana* ’ (spreading of the bundle of grass), or it pertains to all the actions performed ?]

At the very outset of the discussion, an *objection* is raised :—“ The ‘ *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence* are the actions of the *Sacrificer*, while ‘ the *Addressing* belongs to the *Priest* ; how then can there be any doubt “ as to the former two being subsidiary to the latter ? ”

Reply : This does not affect the question ; because of the actions of the *Priest* also the *Sacrificer* is the directing agent ; or, it may be that the former two are taken as subsidiary to the action of *being addressed* (which of course belongs to the *Sacrificer*).

On this question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“ [On account of immediate sequence, we must take the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence* to be for the sake of the *Addressing*, and the *washing of the hand* to be for the purpose of the *spreading of grass*.]

“ *Objection* : ‘ How is it that the immediate sequence operating both ways, it is the preceding (*Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence*) that are “ taken as subsidiary to the following (*Addressing*), and not *vice versa* ? ’

“ To this some people make the reply that it is with a view to show “ the doubtful character of the situation, that what is mentioned first is “ taken up as the subsidiary, simply because it happens to be mentioned first. “ But the fact is that in the case of all *Bhāvanās*, at the very outset, there “ always arises a desire to know what would be accomplished by that “ *Bhāvanā*; and in all cases that which is found to be mentioned first, is, “ owing to its place in the text, always taken as answering the said desire. “ Consequently, as soon as there arises a desire to know what is to be done by “ means of the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence*,—we are met by the next “ sentence ‘ *dikṣhitumārcdayati* ’; and we have no ground for not accepting “ this ‘ *ārvādana* ’ (addressing) as that which is to be done by the former “ two; specially as this *Addressing* too can, subsequently, be assumed to “ be capable of serving a distinctly useful purpose. Consequently we “ must take the former two to be for the sole purpose of this *Addressing*.

“ In the same manner, the *Washing of the Hand* is for the purpose of “ the *spreading of the bundle of grass*,—the word ‘ *uluparājistarāṇa* ’ meaning “ the *spreading of long grasses in the middle of the long altar*.

“ As a rule, *Capability*, *Subsidiary Context*, and *Syntactical Connection* “ are more authoritative, in the matter of application of the accessory “ details, than the *Prime Context*. Consequently in all cases, that which “ is mentioned first must be taken as serving the purposes of that which “ is mentioned next after it.

“ Then as for the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence*, the former is not “ taken as being for the sake of the latter, or *vice versa*, because they are “ not *capable* of being taken as subsidiary to each other; specially as both “ serving the purpose of bringing about the *attentiveness* of the sacrificer, “ they do not stand in need of each other. Consequently we cannot neglect “ this inherent incapability, and proceed with further assumptions.”

SIDDHANTA.

To the above, we make the following reply : (1) We do not find any syntactical connection between the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence* on the one hand, and the *Addressing* on the other; (2) as for *Capability*, it applies equally both ways; and (3) as for the desire of any intermediate process, we do not find any appearing, at the time.

That is to say, (1) the two verbs could not be syntactically connected, until there were some word denoting such connection; and so there is no syntactical connection in the case in question that could set aside the significations of the *Prime Context*. (2) As for *capability*, it is as applicable to the *Closing of the Fist* being taken as belonging to all the actions, as to its being taken as belonging to the *Addressing* alone; in fact, it is

more reasonably applicable to the former ; because the need of *attentiveness* (which is brought about by the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence*) is more urgent, when there are many actions to be performed, than when there is only one such action as *Addressing*, which could be done somehow or other (even if no special steps were taken by the sacrificer to secure attention). (3) As a matter of fact, in the case in question, there is no intermediate context (that could set aside the indications of the Prime Context). For when there is a deficiency in the process of the former action, then the latter becomes its subsidiary ; as a matter of fact, however, this is not possible ; because the object to be accomplished by the *Bhāvanā* is yet only incompletely known (and as long as the object is not fully recognized, there can be no desire to find out the *process* of its accomplishment. Nor could the want, even if it had arisen, be supplied by the latterly-mentioned action, because the use of this latter has still to be ascertained ; and so this latter also would stand in need of another action ; and so on and on, till we get to the Primary Action itself.

Objection : " If it be so, then, whenever we would have, in the " middle of a context, some sentence laying down the connection of a " certain accessory detail with a definite desirable result, then, all that " would follow after that would have to be taken as auxiliary to that " accessory detail, and could not reach the Primary Action ; because in such " a case the intermediate context will have been an accomplished fact."

Reply : If the two accessories mentioned in the sentence (*viz.*, the *Closing of the Fist* and the *Silence*) were known as belonging to the *Addressing*, then there could have been an intermediate context between those two and the *Addressing*. While as for the Process of the Primary Action, it operates on all sides ; and leaving only that which happens to be connected with something else, goes on to the very end (of the context),—as we have already shown under the *Amuṣaṅgādādhikarāṇa* (II—i—48).

Objection : " In that case, there is a total annihilation of all Inter- " mediate or Subsidiary Contexts."

Reply : In a case where the subsidiaries of actions, mentioned in the text of another Action, have been known by means of Direct Assertion, or by that of the Indicative power of words, or by Syntactical Connection,—it is by these alone that an Intermediate Context is admitted by the law of *Sandamāṇa*.

That is to say, in the case of the *Prayājus*, we find that a few of their accessories are laid down in one place, and then after some break are taken up again ; and hence in this case we admit of an intermediate context extending from the former mention of the details to the latter (just in the manner of a *clip* which connects a number of separated things). Otherwise there would be a great uncertainty as to the details,—all the auxiliaries being

capable of being taken as auxiliaries to one another. In a case, however, where there is no such subsequent mention of details, all that is mentioned must be taken as pertaining to the Primary Action. Then, as to whether they would pertain to the Primary, by itself, or as together with all its subsidiaries, that question will be dealt with under *Sūtras* III—vii—1 *et seq.*

Thus then, in the case in question, the *Closing of the Fist*, etc., must through their capability be taken as belonging to the Primary Action together with all its subsidiaries.

If we had such words as 'āveḍitum' and 'staritum', then, in that case, the *Closing of the Fist*, etc., and the *Washing of the Hand* could be taken as syntactically connected with these words, in accordance with the *sūtra* 'tumunṇvulan kriyāyām kriyārthāyām' (*Pāṇini*, III—iii—10); and then alone could the *Closing of the Fist*, etc., and the *Washing of the Hand* be taken as belonging to the *Addressing* and the *Spreading of the grass* respectively. As, however, we have no such words as 'āveḍitum,' etc., the actions in question must be taken as belonging to all the actions in question.

***Sūtra* (25): Also because the sentences are complete in themselves.**

That is to say, there is a further reason for rejecting the signification of immediate sequence: *viz.*, that each of the sentences under consideration has all the marks of a complete sentence, when taken singly, and not when taken collectively; hence also, the actions in question cannot be taken as subsidiary to one another.

ADHIKARĀṆA (15).

[The Quartering belongs to the *Āgnēya Cake only*.]

Sūtra (26): “The auxiliary, connected with the Accessory
“Detail, should be taken as common to [all; specially as
“there is no mutual relationship among them.”

We have spoken of the application of accessory details, in accordance with the order in which they are mentioned; and we now proceed to consider whether that application is possible to a part also, or only to the whole.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūṛṇamāsa*, we find the sentence,— ‘*āgnēyam caturdhā karoti*’]; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the ‘*caturdhākarṇa*’ (Quartering) is to be done to the *Āgnēya* cake only, or to the *Agnishomīya* and *Aindrāgna* cakes also.

On this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The Quartering applies to the *Agnishomīya* and *Aindrāgna* cakes
“also. Because the mention of a single Deity (*Agni* in ‘*Āgnēya*’) is
“capable of indicating the two Deities (*Agni* and *Soma*, and *Indra* and
“*Agni*); just as in the *Manotā*, the ‘*Āgni*’ indicates the connection of
“both *Agni* and *Soma*.

“Though *Agni* is not the proper Deity of the *Agnishomīya*, yet it is not
“wholly unconnected with it; and it is the presence of the Deity, and not
“the actual fact of its being the Deity, that is the basis of indicativeness;
“nor in the case in question, is *Agni* inseparably connected with the
“action of Quartering; and as such much significance cannot be attached
“to the specification of ‘*Āgnēya*’; and all that this can be taken as doing
“is to indicate (the presence of *Agni*); nor are the indicative factors to
“be taken exactly as they are mentioned; for instance, the ‘two cakes’
“are taken as indicative of the time intervening between the *Upamṣuyāgas*;
“and again in the case of the mention of the ‘*Pāṇivata*,’ no significance is
“attached to the specification of *Tvaṣṭṛ*; and lastly, even in ordinary
“parlance we find that the mother of *Dittha* and *Davittha* is spoken of
“as the ‘mother of *Dittha*’ (similarly the cake dedicated to *Agni* and
“*Soma* can be spoken of as ‘*Āgnēya*’).

“ Thus then, there being no necessary connection between Indication and Actual functioning, the name ‘*Āgnēya*’ becomes equally applicable to the *Agnēya*, the *Agnishomīya* and the *Aindrāgna* cakes.

“ It is with a view to this that the Bhāṣya has construed the *sūtra* as that, ‘inasmuch as there is no mutual relationship among these, there would be no injunction.’ In fact we often find such things to be spoken of as applying commonly to many; as for instance, in the case of the “*Prāpitru*.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (27): There should be a restriction; as the actual signification is connected with the word; because the indicative power is connected with such meaning; and as for the subsidiary text, it serves the purposes of indication.

Just as in a previous *Adhikaraṇa*, we have found that the *Ladles* are not indicated by the mention of ‘*graha*’; so in the same manner, in the case in question, ‘*Āgnēya*’ cannot indicate the cakes dedicated to two Deities (the *Agnishomīya* or the *Aindrāgna*).

It has been shown above that that with reference to which something is laid down must be regarded as significant. And as a matter of fact, that the character of being the ‘*Āgnēya*’ does not belong to the *Agnishomīya* and the *Aindrāgna* cakes is shown by the fact that the word ‘*Āgnēya*’ does not signify the mere presence of Agni; what it does signify is the Deific character mentioned by the nominal affix, and the mention of ‘*Agni*’ is merely by way of qualifying that deific character. That to which certain offerings are made is the *Deity*; and as a matter of fact, the cake that is dedicated to two Deities (Agni and Soma) is not offered to *Agni* alone; as that which has been known as pervading over two, cannot be spoken of by means of *one* only; hence either the *Agnishomīya* or the *Aindrāgna* could not be spoken of as the ‘*Āgnēya*.’

Then again, in the word ‘*Āgnēya*,’ the indicative power belongs to the signification of the Nominal Affix; and according to Pāṇini’s rule (IV-i-82) nominal affixes are applicable to only such words as are capable (of direct denotation); and for this reason the nominal affix cannot be taken as appertaining to the word ‘*Agni*’ as forming a compound with ‘*Soma*,’ and as such not being (by itself) ‘*capable*.’

That is to say, that alone is spoken of as ‘*Āgnēya*,’ which belongs to *Agni* alone, independently of all other Deities; and certainly that which is dedicated to two Deities is not one that is *dedicated to Agni alone*. It is for this reason that the deific nominal affix is not applied to the word ‘*Agni*’ when it occurs in such compounds as ‘*Agnishoma*’ and the like:

and as such the nominal affix in the word 'Āgnēya' does not signify the deific character of *Agnishoma*; while that whereof Agni alone is the Deity is always spoken of as 'Āgnēya.'

Then as for the corroborative instance of the *Prācitra* that the *Pūrvapakṣa* has brought forward,—in that case the subsidiary mention of the 'Āgnēya' is meant to be indicative of a particular place. That is to say, the general sentence having pointed out the performability of the *Prācitrāvadana* (cutting of the *Prācitra* cake) in all places, what the subsequent sentence 'Āgnēyasya mustakam virujya, etc.,' does is to lay down the particular breaking up of the head of the cake; and thus there is no similarity between this and the case in question.

Some people take exception to the *Adhikaraṇa* presented as above. They argue as follows: "Kātyāyana has distinctly laid down the rule "aviṣṣhādubhan vā" (which makes the name 'Āgnēya' applicable to "both (Agni and Soma) also. And the rule has been laid down by him "in accordance with a passage that he met with in the *Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa*—viz., 'tancaturdhā kṛtvā puroḍācam varhishadam karoti' (which "speaks of 'puroḍācam' in general as quartered)."

To this we make the following reply: It is quite true that we have the above text speaking of the *Quartering* as applying to all cakes in general; but it is restricted to particular cakes by means of passages found in other Rescensional Texts.

It might be argued that—"in the case of the *Prācitra* also we could take the subsequent sentence as restricting the former general Injunction." But this is not possible; as the sentence speaking of that is meant to lay down an accessory detail; i.e., the expression 'having broken the head' distinctly lays down such a detail with regard to the head; and as such it is incapable of restricting the preceding general Injunction; in the case in question on the other hand, the sentence 'Āgnēyam, etc.,' makes the repetition without mentioning any accessory detail; and as such it is quite capable of restricting to itself the general Injunction (of *Quartering*).

It might be argued that—"inasmuch as the texts (in different Rescensions) are far remote from each other, there could be no such restriction." But this cannot hold; because of the general law that 'that which is connected with something else, through its meaning, is to be taken along with it'; and hence the general rule always goes forward to meet the special; and as soon as it has met this latter, it becomes restricted to that particular case.

Or, the *Çatapatha* text quoted above may be taken as merely referring

to the previously mentioned particular cake by the general word '*puṛo-
dāṣam*,' for the purpose of enjoining the '*varhishadatra*' (the laying on
the grass). And if this *laying on the grass* also be found to have been
laid down previously, then the text may be taken merely as laying down
the order of the performance (i.e., the *laying on the grass* should be per-
formed after the *Quartering* has been done).

Thus then, it is established that the *Quartering* is to be done to the
Āgnēya cake only.

The sentence in the *Bhāṣya*—'*If there were no cake dedicated to Agni
alone, then for the sake of saving the word from meaninglessness, we could
have taken it to signify that which is dedicated to two Deities*'—is an
explanation of the *sūtra* clause—'*lakṣaṇārthā gṇacruṭiḥ*'; the sense of
this is that if there were no cake dedicated to Agni alone, then, as in the
case of the *Manotā*, so here also, the word '*Agni*' could be taken as indi-
cating both Agni and Soma; and the mention of the accessory '*Agni*'
would, in that case, serve the purpose of this indication of both. As a
matter of fact, however, there is a cake dedicated to *Agni alone*; and hence
it is to this cake alone that the *Quartering* is to be done.

Though it is true that the indicative factor is not connected with the
action (of *Quartering*), yet until the thing in question is indicated by it,
it cannot be comprehended; and consequently we accept that cake which
is dedicated to Agni alone.

Thus ends the First Pāda of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARĀNA (1).

[The *Mantras* expressive of *Chopping* apply to the Primary.]

***Sūtra* (1) : Inasmuch as the auxiliary character of the Mantra would be based upon the meaning expressed by it, the connection of the Mantra should be with the primary meaning; as it is with this that it has eternal connection.**

We now proceed to deal with the application of *Mantras* in accordance with their own 'Linga.' By 'Linga' is meant the capability of the *Mantra* to signify something; and as a matter of fact, this capability is sometimes found to pertain to the direct primary, and sometimes to the indirect secondary, meaning. And hence in the case of *Mantras*, it is doubtful whether they are to be used in their primary sense, or in the secondary one.

Some people, labouring under the impression that there is no secondary meaning of *Mantras*, have put the question: "What is the Primary, and what the Secondary?"

In the *Sūtras* I -iv--23 *et seq.* we have taken for granted the existence of the secondary signification as an established fact, and then considered the various bases of such signification, which have been shown to be incapable of abandoning the Primary signification; and hence the discussion that we are taking up now (wherein we are going to establish the existence of the Secondary signification) must be taken as really preceding the *Sūtra* I—iv—23.

The answer to the above question, given by the *Bhāṣya*, is as follows: The direct denotation of the words of the *Mantra* is the 'Primary' or "*Mukhya*," because, like the face, '*mukha*' of the human foetus, it is the first to appear; and the 'Secondary' or "*Gauṇa*" is that which is implied by that denotation; it is called "*Gauṇa*" because it is due to the presence of a certain property or 'Gūṇa.' The above interpretation of the word

'*Mukhya*' is also supported by its etymology—the word being formed as '*Mukha—ya*,' in accordance with the *Sūtra* (*Pāṇini* V—iii—103), the affix denoting *similarity* (hence '*Mukhya*' is that *which is similar to the mukha or face*).

Against these definitions, the opponent raises the following objections :—

"Inasmuch as the word is denoted by the word '*śabda*,' it would 'apply equally to all meanings of words. That is to say, it is absolutely 'impossible for the property of one thing to appear in another; and 'hence the '*gaṇa*' or 'secondary' cannot be explained as *due to the appearance of a property*. Thus then, whenever a word is uttered, if a 'certain meaning is found to be expressed by it,—either directly or indirectly—it inevitably leads to the assumption of a corresponding expressive potency in the word; and whether the meaning be the direct or the 'indirect one, it is, in either case, uninterrupted by any other meaning; 'and as such, being the first to be comprehended, it must be called "'*mukhya*' or 'Primary' (and thus all meanings are equally *mukhya*). 'Having disposed of the definition given in the *Bhāṣya*, we proceed to 'consider the other definitions.

"Some people explain the terms as follows:—'That is the *Mukhya* 'which is denoted by the word independently of all supernumerary 'additions. That is to say, in all cases, a definition is that which serves 'to differentiate a thing from others; and there is no doubt that the "'*gaṇa* or *secondary* meaning is that which depends upon something 'else. For instance, the word '*Agni*' by itself denotes *Fire*; but it does 'not, in the same way, denote the *Boy* (in the sentence *Agnirmānavakaḥ* '—*Boy is fire*); and the only reason for this is that in the denoting of 'the *Boy*, the word *Agni* depends upon its proximity to the other word "'*mānavaka*. Even in a case where no second word is found, the operation of the word found is always aided, in its indirect signification, by 'some other word, which, though not expressly mentioned, is implied by 'the context, etc., and thus such cases are also included in the aforesaid 'definition; because in both cases, there is the common basis of the "'signification of the word, in the shape of a certain property or *guṇa*.'

"But it is not so; because even in the case of secondary signification 'that you have cited, all that the proximity of the second word does is to 'bring to light the meaning of the first word; and thus the second word 'being only an illuminative factor, the definition of '*Mukhya*' is not inapplicable to that case.

"That is to say, though the eye stands in need of light, yet *colour* is 'universally acknowledged to be its object; and though the Primary meaning stands in need of a due perception of the letters composing the

"word, their order of sequence, their accompanying vowels, and a due remembrance of the various relationships of the word,—yet it is acknowledged to be the Primary meaning; and in the same manner, the second word cannot be required as a necessary element in the signification of the meaning, unless it has the requisite potency; and even if it were required, it would be required only as an illuminative agent; and thus, taking the place of the *method* (of signification), it could not deprive the meaning of its Primary character. Thus then, even without the second word, the meaning of the first continues intact; but for some reason or other, it is not duly manifested (to be comprehensible); just as the word 'gṛ' is not quite directly comprehended as denoting the 'Earth.'

"If you deny the illuminative character of the second word, and take both words to be equally expressive of the meaning in question, on the ground that the expression '*agnirmāṇavakah*' is always found to be expressive of that meaning; then in that case, the meaning in question would have to be accepted as expressed by the two words taken collectively,—and as such the expression would be similar to the compound word *aṣṭakārṇa* (denoting a *plant*); and on that account, each of the component words (both '*agni*' and '*māṇavaka*') would have to be accepted as herein used in their secondary meanings!

"As a matter of fact, however, the meaning in question could not be taken as expressed by the two words collectively; because, from concomitance as well as non-concomitance in usage, we find the two words having two distinct meanings. Two words are known as one compound word only in a case where the meaning of the component parts is completely set aside, and the parts themselves are cognised as inseparable. In the case of the expression '*Agnirmāṇavakah*,' however, we find that while the word '*Agni*' expresses something yellowish and bright, the word '*Māṇavaka*' denotes a wholly different thing, a certain aggregate of physical matter; and as such both words, expressing something distinct, are found to be used in their primary meaning.

"Some people, however, with a view to show, by means of the denotation of each component part, that the two words form a composite word, offer the following explanation: 'That the *Māṇavaka* is bright, is the meaning of the sentence (*agnirmāṇavakah*), in which the elements of the denotations of both component words are perceptible; just as in the case of the expression *blue lotus*; and as such that meaning is found to be expressed by means of the meanings of the component words; and hence with reference to the words themselves, it cannot but be regarded as *secondary* (*gaṇṇa*).'

"But we reject this view also, for the following reasons: The meaning

"in question could be taken as that of the sentence, if the *Agnitva* and "*Mānavakatva* had inhered in a single substance, as in the case of the "expression *blue lotus*, the *blueness* and the character of *lotus* both in- "here in the individual lotus before us. As a matter of fact, however, "we find that the word '*agniḥ*' cannot be taken in its primary sense of "*agnitva* (as this does not inhere in the Boy); nor can you hold it to be "directly significant of *bright yellowishness*; because that would bring "you over to our side; hence the meaning in question cannot be "regarded as that of a sentence.

"Consequently it must be admitted that the functioning of the word "*Agni*' is exactly of the same character, with reference to *fire*, as also "with reference to the *brightness* of the Boy; and hence both these "meanings should be regarded as equally Primary.

"In the *Bhāṣya* we have the sentence—'*agniḥ* abdo *mānavakasya* abhi- "*dhātā*'; and the genitive in '*mānavakasya*' denotes the connection of "the Boy with *Brightness*, and not that with the denoting word ('*agni*'). "Because, in the first place, the form of the Boy is not cognized from "the word '*agni*,' and *second'y*, because if the two words were wholly "synonymous, the two could never have been used at the same "time.

"The following reasoning might be brought forward: '*That which "is well known as the denotation of a word is its Primary meaning, etc., etc.* "That is to say, not taking into consideration the operation of the "second word, we shall admit, as the basis for declaring the Primary and "Secondary character of meanings, the fact of their being well or "not well known (respectively), on which fact is based the use of the "companion word (in such sentences as *agnimānavakaḥ*).'

"To this argument, we make the following reply: The *prasiddhi* "of a meaning consists only in its being comprehended, and nothing more "or less; and hence the differentiation of the Primary and the Secondary "cannot very well be said to be based upon that.

"Our opponent next proceeds to show that the required differentia- "tion would be made on the ground of the greater or less extent of the "use made by the speaker, in consideration of the greater or less know- "ledge of the person spoken to; and to this effect he makes the follow- "ing declaration: '*That which is most used etc., etc.*'

"And to this we make the following reply: If a certain denotative "potency of a word has been once recognized, it cannot be rejected, "even if be found to be used very little; and hence there cannot be any "difference between the greater used and the less used. In this connec- "tion also we can cite the example of the word '*go*,' which is accepted "as equally primarily expressive of the Cow and the Earth, though it is

“very much more used in the former sense than in the latter. To this effect, we have a proverb: ‘We appease our hunger mostly by means of bread, and only seldom by means of sweetmeats; but that does not make the bread the primary and the sweetmeats the secondary (means of appeasing hunger).’”

We now proceed to show the difference between the Primary and the Secondary meanings: Though there is a coextensiveness of the meaning of the word ‘*agni*’ with the *mānavaka*, yet, in accordance with the rule arrived at in connection with the word ‘*arund*,’ as we find that there is a denotation (by the word ‘*Agni*’) if there is some similarity (between that and the Boy), and none when there is no such similarity,—and also that the word (‘*Agni*’) is used also in connection with things other than the Boy, when such things are found to have some sort of a similarity with it, and not in connection with those that have no such similarity,—it is this *similarity* (to, *Agni*) that is the necessary qualification; and as such it is this similarity that is the first to be denoted by the word ‘*Agni*’; then inasmuch as the similarity to *Agni* cannot be cognized until the *Agni* or Fire itself is cognized, the Fire comes to be expressed even before the *Similarity*; and all the rest (in the sentence ‘*agnirmānavakah*’), being indicated by the relationship of that *Similarity* (which indicates the Boy as qualified by it), does not come to be spoken of as directly expressed, being, in this matter, just like the *Individual* (which is held to be indicated as the correlative of the *Class* which is denoted by the word). And we have already explained that there are various common properties—such as *brightness* etc.—belonging to the Fire and to the Boy.

Thus then, there being an actual difference between the Primary and the Secondary, it becomes necessary to proceed with the question started in the present *Adhikaraṇa*.

Thus then, together with the three alternatives of the secondary character spoken of under *Sūtra* I—iv—23, there are nine such alternatives as follows: (1) Indicating something after wholly renouncing its own meaning, (2) a mixture of both, (3) assumption, (4) operating with the help of a companion word, (5) the two words taken together as one composite whole, (6) the whole taken as a sentence, (7) the lesser extent of its knowledge, (8) the lesser extent of usage; having shown the impossibility of admitting any of these eight alternatives, we have established (above) the ninth definition of the secondary character.

On the question started, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the word is always subservient to something else, both the Primary and the Secondary meanings are equal; because

“ nothing more is gained by the direct denotation of a word. The advantage gained by this view is that, when we find, in the context of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, certain *mantras* with the word ‘*Pūshan*,’ we do not find it necessary to remove these *mantras* to another sacrifice, even though there is no such deity as *Pūshan* in the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; because the word ‘*Pūshan*’ indirectly indicates *Agni*, which is a Deity at that sacrifice; while if any preference were to be shown to the direct denotation of the word ‘*Pūshan*,’ then it would be necessary to remove the *mantras* from the context in which they are actually mentioned in the Veda. In the same manner, inasmuch as the word ‘*Agni*’ would indicate the ‘*Sūrya*,’ the Injunction (that ‘the ectype is to be performed in the same way as the archetype’) would be duly followed, even without changing the words of the *mantra* (i.e. the *Saurya caru* is a modification or ectype of the *Āgnēya caru*, and the *mantra* laid down for the latter being ‘*agnayē tvā* etc.’, when one comes to offer the *Saurya caru*, he employs the same *mantra*; but as the Deity is not *Agni*, but *Sūrya*, in this case he changes ‘*Agnayē tvā*’ into ‘*Suryāya tvā*’; and this change would not be necessary according to the *Pūrva-pakṣa*, as the word ‘*Agni*’ would be as significant of *Sūrya* as of *Agni*). ”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply : *Mantras* become auxiliaries to sacrifices, only on account of their capability of expressing certain meanings; and when they have this purpose served by their direct Primary meanings, the acceptance of their secondary meaning would involve the necessity of assuming another text.

That is to say, in accordance with the law laid down under the *Sūtra* II—i--31, the *Mantras*, even in their direct significations, lead to the assumption of texts, pertaining to their application. And hence if we were to accept them in their secondary signification, which totally abandons the primary, then in both cases it would be necessary to assume Vedic texts. And even while the *mantra* indicates the secondary meaning, if it denote, beforehand, its primary meaning also,—then, inasmuch as there would be no reason for passing over this primary meaning, when the text pertaining to that meaning has been once assumed, all the requirements of the *mantra*, of the *sacrifice* in question, as also of the Injunctions regarding the study of the Veda, will have been fulfilled by that text; and hence there would be no ground for assuming any other text; and the *mantra* could not be applied in its secondary sense.

Further, the recitation of the *mantra* having its purposes fulfilled (by its primary meaning), there would be nothing with its indicative

power unsuppressed, which could point to its secondary meaning; and hence the secondary meaning is rejected.

Then again, in a case where it is the secondary meaning that is desired to be conveyed, why should the primary meaning be also signified? It cannot be urged that this latter is signified, as without this the secondary would not be possible; because this latter could be got at by means of due pondering, etc.

If the two meanings were taken as optional alternatives, then, there being no permanence attaching to any one of them, in one case, the *mantra* would be wholly meaningless; and if the primary meaning were never lost sight of, then that would be a tacit admission of our view of the question.

And further, when the primary meaning of the *mantra* has been duly cognized, it is not right to make it expressive of any other meaning; specially as the laying down of the *mantra* has its purposes served by its primary meaning.

Thus then, the *sūtra* should be interpreted as follows: Inasmuch as the auxiliary character of the *mantras* is based upon their capability of expressing a meaning, they could be connected only with their original (primary) meanings; because that is the meaning with which they are eternally and inseparably connected.

***Sūtra* (2):** The *Mantra*, being a sanctificatory agent, could not apply to that which is not enjoined.

That the *mantras* of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* do not apply to *Pūshan*, etc., which are not enjoined as its Deities, is only reasonable; because all *sanctifications* appertain to that which has to be *sanctified*; and hence the indicative power of the *mantra*, which is more authoritative than the context, would make it applicable to *Pūshan* etc. and not to the Deities of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*.

Question: "When these *mantras* have been removed from the place in which they are mentioned in the *Veda*, how could they be connected with any Vedic actions? How too could the Indicative Power of the *mantras* pertain to the *Deity* only, in the absence of an indication of their general applicability as subsidiaries to sacrifices?"

Answer: The *mantras* in question are spoken of as '*Yāgāmuntraṇa*'; and this name would serve to connect them with sacrifices; and on account of the indicative power of the words of the *Mantras*, they come to be employed in those sacrifices alone, at which *Pūshān* etc. are the Deities concerned.

That is to say, unless the *mantras* were related to a certain sacrifice,

they could not be called 'Yāgāmunantraṇa'; and hence it is this name that points, in a general way, to the *mantras* being subsidiary to a sacrifice. And when we come to consider the question as to the particular sacrifice to which they should belong, inasmuch as they could not belong to those to whom they are incapable of belonging, the indicative power of the words of the *mantras* themselves come forward to point out their applicability to such sacrifices as are connected with the Deities directly denoted by the words of the *mantra* ('Pūshan' and the like).

ADHIKARAṆA (2).

[The *Aindri* mantras apply to the *Gārhapatyā*.]

Sūtra (3): The Mantra could not be applied in its direct literal sense,—because of the subsequent direction.

We now proceed to deal with an exception to the general rule arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

The sentence cited in connection with this *Adhikaraṇa* is—‘*nivṛṇaṇaṇ saṅgamano vasūnāmīti aindryā gārhapatyā mupatishṭhātē*’; and though this *mantra* is as applicable to the sacrificial fire (*Gārhapatyā*) as to Indra, yet, the special mention of ‘*aindryā*’ shows that it is to be taken in its direct sense, applying to Indra. Some people, however, take the present *Adhikaraṇa* as based upon the sentence ‘*kadā ca nastarirasi . . . Indra, etc.*’

In both these sentences, however, the question is the same, viz.—Is the *mantra* to be taken in its direct literal meaning; and as such recited as descriptive of Indra? or is it to be taken in its indirect meaning, and thereby applied to the sacrificial fire, on the strength of the subsequent direction?

Even though we find the subsequent direction distinctly connecting the *Mantra* with the *sacrificial Fire*, yet the Doubt is quite justifiable; because, as in the case of the word ‘*aruṇā*’ (vide *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*), so here also, the *sacrificial Fire* is not capable of being connected with a *mantra* speaking of Indra. Then again, in the case of the word ‘*aruṇā*,’ it was found that it was capable of being connected with the *Purchase*, through its qualification of the *substance*; in the present case, on the other hand, inasmuch as the relationship of a word with its meaning belongs to it naturally, and is not produced by any scriptural Injunction, the ‘*gārhapatyā*’ could not, in any way, be connected with the *Mantra* in question (the words whereof are found to be expressive of Indra). Because the word ‘Indra’ (in ‘*Aindryā*’) can never denote the sacrificial Fire.

The sentence in question should be taken as an injunction of the *Description*; because of the *Ātmanṣpāda* ending in ‘*upatishṭhātē*’; as, in accordance with Pāṇini’s *Sātra* I—iii—25, the root *upa-sthā* with the *Ātmanṣpāda* affix expresses an action in which the *mantra* is an instrument; and apart from *Description*, there is no other Action in which a *Mantra* can be the instrument. Thus then, if we take the word ‘*Aindryā*’ with

'*upatishṭhatē*,' the Injunction should be recognized as one of the Description of Indra; while if the word '*upatishṭhatē*' be taken with '*gārhapatyam*,' then the accusative ending in the latter word should make the sacrificial Fire the object of description (by the *Mantra*). And which of these two constructions is correct, and which incorrect, is extremely doubtful. Specially as the *sacrificial Fire* is not known as another means of the Description of *Indra*.

On the above question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

"In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing '*Adhikaraṇa*, the *Mantra* must be taken as applying to the Description of '*Indra*. Then, as for the accusative ending in '*gārhapatyam*,' it could be taken as indicating other agencies, such as the Locative or the Ablative etc.; just as in the case of the sentence '*saktūn juhōti*,' the accusative in '*saktūn*' is taken as indicating the Instrumental;—similarly in the case in question, inasmuch as the *objectivity* (expressed by the Accusative) is found to be incompatible, we can not attach any direct significance to it, and must take it as indicating mere *agency* in general. Consequently, in accordance with the *Sūtra* VI—i—1, the '*sacrificial Fire* (*Gārhapatya*) becomes subsidiary to the Description (of '*Indra*).

"Says the *Bhāṣya*—'*yadvā upasthanaviṣeṣaṇam sambandhād gārhapatyaḥ*.' Some people explain this sentence as meaning that the word '*gārhapatya*' indicates *Indra*. Thus then, the word '*gārhapatyam*' becomes capable of being taken in two different ways: (1) the Accusative ending may be taken in its indirect and the basic noun in its direct sense; or (2) the basic noun may be taken as indicating *Indra*, through the fact of both (the Fire and *Indra*) being accessories of the sacrifice, and the Accusative ending may be taken in its direct sense of *objectivity*.

"The sentence of the *Bhāṣya* in question however could be taken as meaning that the *sacrificial Fire* is a qualification of the *Description*, —i.e., of the root-meaning apart from the denotation of the affix (in '*upatishṭhatē*'). That is to say, what is incompatible is the fact of the *Fire* and the *Mantra* both pertaining to the same Action; i.e., the *Fire* can not be the objective of that of which the *Mantra* is the instrument; and the *Mantra* cannot be the instrument of that of which the *Fire* is the objective. Then in the word '*upatishṭhatē*,' which is made up of a Verbal Root and an Affix, there are two functions mentioned: the Root denoting the *standing*, and the Affix expressing *Description*. And we have al-

"ready explained the agency of the *Fire* with reference to the Description ;
 "and what is mentioned is the fact of the *Fire* being the direct objective
 "of that which is expressed by the affix. Thus then, the meaning of the
 "Injunction, contained in the sentence in question, comes to be that, '*one*
 "*should describe Indra while standing by the sacrificial Fire.*' Though,
 "on account of the denotation of the Affix being the predominant factor,
 "it would be proper for the *Fire* to be spoken of as the objective of that,
 "yet, on account of its inherent incapability of being such an objective,
 "it is separated from that and taken as the objective of that action which
 "is denoted by the verbal Root.

"For these reasons, the *Mantra* in question cannot be applied in its
 "direct primary signification."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply : On account of the subsequent direction, the *Mantra* cannot be taken in its primary meaning. Because when it becomes necessary to take one of the two—the *Brāhmaṇa* or the *Mantra*,—in its indirect secondary meaning, it is always the *Mantra* that is so taken ; because this latter is merely descriptive in its character.

For instance, in the case in question, it is directly denoted by the Accusative ending in '*gārhapatyam*,' that this *Fire* is the objective of the principal action expressed by the affix (in '*upatishṭhātē*'); and hence the *Aindrī* mantra in question must be taken as to be employed in the description of that *Fire*. And then, if in consideration of the subsequent direction ('*aindryā gārhapatyam upatishṭhātē*'), the *Mantra* comes to lose its primary signification, it must be accepted as an inevitable fact. Because it is absolutely necessary to take either the *Brāhmaṇa* ('*aindrya gārhapatyam* etc.') or the *mantra* ('*nivēṣanaḥ*, etc.') in the indirect secondary sense. But, as for the *Brāhmaṇa*, inasmuch as it embodies the Injunction of something not mentioned elsewhere, it is the first to function ; and hence in a matter which is not amenable to the authority of any other means of knowledge save the Vedic Injunction, such a *Brāhmaṇa* sentence cannot be taken in the secondary sense. As for the *Mantra*, on the other hand, it is found to be descriptive of things laid down in the *Brāhmaṇa* sentence, and hence it depends, for its functioning, upon that sentence ; consequently it must be taken in its indirect secondary signification, as apart from its primary meaning, which is incompatible with the *Brāhmaṇa* sentence.

In this way we are saved from the contingency of taking the Accusative as indicating agency in general, whereby the *Fire* could be connected as a qualification (as urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa*). Nor could the word '*gārhapatya*' in any way be etymologically explained as denoting *Indra* ;

consequently the word cannot but be taken in its universally recognized primary meaning of *Fire*.

Sūtra (4): Even though the relationship of the word to its meaning is not created by scriptural injunctions, yet the Description in question would pertain to the Fire, in view of certain common properties.

Objection: "As a matter of fact we find the *mantra* wholly incapable of being applied to the Fire. Because, in the first place, it involves much trouble to take the word 'Indra' (in the *mantra*) in its secondary signification; and then too, inasmuch as there is not the least similarity (between *Indra* and *Fire*), the word could not, even indirectly, indicate the Fire. Even a hundred directions could not make the word 'Indra' capable of denoting the *Fire*. Nor is 'Indra' a technical name for the Fire, like the technical name of 'guṇa' given to 'at' and 'ēh'; because the relationship of the word to its signification is not known to be based upon scriptural injunctions."

Reply: It is quite possible for fire to be indirectly spoken of as 'Indra,'—(1) because of the connection (of both with the sacrifice), (2) because the word 'Indra' is made up of the root 'indi' (which signifies *supreme lordship*), and the Fire also is the 'supreme lord' over its own actions (and as such it is quite capable of being called 'Indra').

Thus then, there being no other correct way of taking the *mantra*, we cannot but take it in its secondary sense.

ADHIKARAṆA (3).

[The *mantras* speaking of *calling* are to be employed in *Calling*.]

Sūtra (5): "The same may be said to be the case with *Calling*."

We have dealt with the general rule that *Mantras* are to be taken in their primary sense, and also with an exception to this rule. We now proceed to consider which cases are subject to the general rule and which to the exception.

There is a *mantra*—'*Havishkṛt ēhi etc.*'—which speaks of the calling of the sacrificer's wife, who prepares the offering material; and with regard to this *mantra*, we have the following question: Is it to be applied to that *Calling*, the mention of 'threshing,' in the direction accompanying the *mantra* ('*iti triravaghnān āhvayati*'), being explained as pointing out the time for the 'calling'? Or, on the strength of the direction, the *mantra* is to be applied to the 'threshing,' which is the first to be mentioned in the Direction, and not to the 'calling,' to which it literally pertains? If the direction be construed as '*havishkṛt ēhi iti avaghnān, āhvayati*' (*while threshing with the mantra havishkṛt etc., he should call*'), then the *mantra* becomes subsidiary to the Threshing. While if it be construed as '*avaghnān ētēnāhvayati etc.*' (*while threshing, he calls with the mantra*'), the *mantra* becomes, from its very words, connected with the 'Calling'; and then the Direction would be taken as laying down the number 'three' with reference to the *mantra* to be recited at the time of the *Calling*; in this case the word '*avaghnān*' being taken as indicating the *time* (of the *threshing*); and thus the Direction does not abandon its true signification; and the *mantra* also is applied according to its direct signification.

On this question, then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"On account of the direct mention of the 'Threshing,' and of the 'fact of the 'Calling' being mentioned by the word of the *Mantra* itself, "and lastly of the capability of the *Threshing* being taken, somehow or "other, as the 'maker of the offering material' (*Havishkṛt*),—the *mantra* "cannot be taken in its literal sense; specially as, the property of "making the offering material' belonging to the *Threshing* also, the latter "could be indicated by the word '*havishkṛt*' in the *mantra*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (6): Not so; as it is the Injunction of time; because it is actually known as such.

Inasmuch as the subsequent Direction distinctly pertains to the *three-fold repetition*, it cannot be taken as laying down the *Mantra*; specially as the affix 'ṣatr' (in 'avaghnān') denotes a qualifying characteristic; and it is this characteristic that is referred to (in the Direction).

That is to say, the word 'avaghnān' distinctly denotes the Agent as subservient to the Root-meaning, being connected with the qualifying characteristic (of *Threshing*, which forms that meaning); because such is the force of the peculiar Present Participle Affix 'ṣatr'—vide *Pāṇini* III—ii—126. And thus our view of the case does not militate against the direct meaning of any word. Consequently we must take the Direction as enjoining the 'three-foldness,' with reference to all that has been said before (viz. the calling, the reciting of the mantra, the Agent, etc., etc.): and nothing else; as all else would bring about a split of the sentence.

Then as for the *Time*, inasmuch as its existence is implied by its own inherent capability, it cannot be taken as enjoined by the Direction in question; and what the *sūtra* means by 'Injunction,' is only mere 'mention' or 'Declaration.' Specially because the '*Threshing*' itself has been enjoined in the original Injunction '*vrihinavahanti*'; but still it comes to be pronounced thrice, by being repeated three times; consequently the Direction in question must be taken as enjoining this *Repetition*; and under the circumstances, it could not but be taken as enjoining the *Time*. As we have already explained, in connection with the direction '*yāvujjiviko-bhyāṣaḥ*,' that the *Time* and the *Repetition* are the cause of each other's Injunction.

It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, that "the *Threshing* could be taken as the '*Haviṣkṛt*,' (maker of the offering material)." And to this, we make the following reply:—

Sūtra (7): Because of the non-existence of property.

In denying the application of the *Mantra* to the *Threshing*, on account of the non-existence, in it, of the property of '*Haviṣkṛt*,'—what we mean is that it is not capable of being called (or addressed), which '*calling*' is distinctly mentioned by the words of the *mantra*.

Or, the *sūtra* may be taken to be an answer to an objection from outside,—this objection being—"Inasmuch as the Direction pertains to the *three-fold repetition*, it cannot be taken as enjoining the *Mantra*, which latter can be taken as pertaining to the '*Threshing*,' through the "direct denotation of the words of the *Mantra* itself."

In this case, the sense of the reply, embodied in the *sūtra*, would be as follows:—Though you could, in some way or other, assume the *Threshing* to be the ‘maker of the offering material,’ yet the subsequent word ‘*āhṛayati*’ (Calls) would be absolutely meaningless, in regard to the inanimate *Threshing*. And further, we find the Vocative case-ending (in ‘*Harishkṛt*’), and then an order or request (to come) contained in the word ‘*hi*,’ which is in the Second Person Singular; all this would be absolutely meaningless if the *Mantra* were applied to the *Threshing*. On the other hand, when the *Mantra* is applied to the *sacrificer’s wife*, who is an animate and intelligent being, all that has been indicated becomes applicable and useful; consequently the words of the *Mantra* cannot be accepted as applying it to the *Threshing*.

○ ***Sūtra* (8):** Also, on account of the implications.

Close upon the sentence under consideration, we find the sentence ‘*Vāgevaḥ havishkṛt*,’ where we find the ‘maker of the offering material’ enlogised distinctly as a feminine character; and this would be applicable only to the sacrificer’s wife; as otherwise (if it were taken as applying to the *Threshing*), inasmuch as the *action* (of *Threshing*) has not its gender restricted to the feminine,—being, as a matter of fact, of an imperceptible gender,—the enlogy in question could be applied to it, only indirectly, by applying the word ‘*Kriyā*’ (which is in the Feminine gender).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *mantra* is subsidiary to the *Calling*.

***Sūtra* (9):** There would be an incompatibility of the Injunction, if the *mantra* in question were taken as applying to *Threshing*.

Inasmuch as there are other *mantras* distinctly laid down in connection with the *Threshing*, these would be incompatible with the *Pūrvapaksha* theory; while as the *mantra* in question is the only one that is laid down in connection with the *Calling*, there would be no incongruity in its being applied to the *Calling*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4).

[The *mantras* speaking of *Agniviharana* are applicable to itself.]

Sūtra (10): So also with 'rising' and 'giving vent.'

[In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*, we find the sentences, '*uttisṭan anvāha agnīdagnīn vihara*,' and '*vratam kṛṇuta iti vācam viśṛjati*'; and in regard to these, there arises a question as to whether the two *mantras* '*agnīdagnīn, etc.*' and '*vratam kṛṇuta, etc.*' are enjoined as applying to the 'rising' and the 'giving vent to speech'; or these two latter are mentioned simply with the purpose of pointing out the time of the recitation of the two *mantras*.]

The present *sūtra* is an *Atidēṣa-sūtra*, and as such all that has been said under the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* is to be construed along with this also. The only difference between the two cases is that in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it was the word ('*avaghnan*') in the subsequent direction that was taken as pointing out the time, whereas the word taken as such in the present instance occurs in the Injunctive sentence itself.

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The basis of the present *Pūrvapaksha* lies in the fact that in the "case of the Directive sentence considered in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, "we found that it could not be taken as enjoining the *Mantra*, because "it was taken up by the injunction of the *three-fold repetition*; and the "case with the sentences in question is not so.

"Says the *Bhāṣya*—'*utthānēna agniridhyatē*' (the fire is brightened "up by rising); and the sense of this is that the *Rising* is spoken of in "the *mantra*, which thus would become subsidiary to the *Rising*; and "then the *mantra* would cease to be directive (in its signification); and "hence there being no second person to be addressed by the *mantra* (which "has to be simply recited by the sacrificer when rising), the Imperative "affix in '*vihara*' will be taken in the sense of *time present*, and the "*agniviharana* (walking round the fire) will be done by the priest; and "as such it would be quite possible for the Priest's *Rising* to be mentioned "by the *mantra* in question, which is distinctly found to speak of other "actions of the same person.

"In the same manner, the sentence '*vratam kṛṇuta*' may be taken as

"speaking of 'vāk' (speech), just like the sentence 'vāk tṛpyatu'; because the speech being located in the mouth, the capability of the mouth to observe the penance (*vrata*) could very well be attributed to the speech; the sense of the sentence would thus be that 'it is time to observe the penance of speech.' As for the Plural number in 'kṛṇata,' it could be explained as based upon the plurality of speech due to the diversity of its location, in the Palate, the Throat, etc., etc."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Because of the non-existence of property (Sūtra 7)—that is to say, inasmuch as the *rising* and the *giving vent* do not possess the qualifications mentioned in the *mantras*,—this latter could not be applied to them. This is what is meant by the answer given in the *Bhāṣya*—that if the *mantras* were to be recited in connection with the *rising* and the *giving vent*, it would be so, only with a view to an imperceptible end. And further, we shall explain later on that the Second Person is not possible unless there is a certain direction.

Then as for the '*Viṅga*' (Indicative word, spoken of in *Sūtra* 8), one could be easily found, on looking closely into the Vedic texts.

Lastly, there would also be an *incomputability* (of the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory) with a *distinct Injunction* (*Sūtra* 9); that is to say, we find a *distinct mantra*—'*yāh paçūnāmṛshabhaḥ, etc.*'—enjoined in connection with the *giving vent to speech*; and there would be an infringement of this Injunction, if the *mantra* '*vrataṁ, etc.*' were applied to the same Action.

ADHIKARANA (5).

[The *Sūktavāka* is subsidiary to the Offering of the grass-bundle.]

Sūtra (11): "In the *Sūktavāka* we have the injunction of time, because it is subservient to the purpose of something else."

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the sentence '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*'; and there arises the question as to whether this sentence lays down the *Sūktavāka* as subsidiary to the Offering of the grass-bundle, or it only indicates the Time. And on this question we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The *Sūktavāka* (i.e., the mantra '*Idam dyāvopṛithivī*, etc.') serves the purpose of pointing out the Deity, and the *Prastara* (the Bundle of grass) serves as the place for the keeping of the *Sruk*; and hence both of these, having their purposes served independently of each other, do not stand in need of being related to each other by the relationship of the Primary and the Subsidiary;—and hence the sentence must be taken as pointing out the Time. The Instrumental ending in '*sūktavākēna*' may be explained as indicating the qualification (*Pāṇini* II—iii—21).

"The *Bhāṣya* speaks of the *Bundle of grass having its purpose fulfilled*; and the sense of this is that inasmuch as the *Bundle of grass* is the objective of the *Pratipattikarma* (offering of Disposal), it has a certain predominance attaching to it; and as such it could not be taken as subsidiary, either to the *Sūktavāka*, or to the Deity mentioned in the *Sūktavāka*. In the same manner the *Sūktavāka* also, together with the Deity (therein mentioned), is not capable of being taken as subsidiary to the *Bundle of grass*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (12): The sentence contains an Injunction (of the mantra with reference to the Offering of the Grass-Bundle); as otherwise the name '*Yājyā*' could not be applied to it, without reason.

In the sentence '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*' we find that the *Sūktavāka* is distinctly mentioned as connected with the action (of *Praharana*, offering); and the Instrumentality thus distinctly mentioned

cannot be set aside; specially because of the great authority attaching to the signification of the case-ending (in 'sūktavākēna'). Thus then, the word 'sūktavāka' would, in its direct meaning, be connected with the Action; otherwise what would be connected with the action would be the time indirectly indicated by the *Sūktavāka*. And it is only the *Sūktavāka* that is taken as subsidiary to the Action; and being thereby similar in character to the other subsidiaries of sacrifices, it becomes capable of having the name 'yājyā' applied to it;—as is done in the declaration 'sūktavāka evā yājyāṇḍabdah.'

In connection with this last declaration, a side-question is raised as to whether the *Sūktavāka* is a real *Yājyā*, or the name is applied to it only figuratively. The difference made by these two is very great; for instance, if it be a real *Yājyā*, all the accessory details laid down in connection with *Yājyās* would apply to the *Sūktavāka* also,—such details as are mentioned in the sentences, 'āsinō yajati,' 'anavānam yajati,' 'yājyāyā adhi vashaṣkaroti,' 'purāṇuvākyāṇāṁ prathamam prayuñktē'; while if the name were applied to it only by way of Praise, then none of the said details would have to be observed.

On this side-question, we have the following *Pārvapakṣa*: "All the said details should be observed; because a 'Yājyā' is *that whereby a sacrifice is performed*; and as a sacrifice is performed by means of the '*Sūktavāka*, there is no doubt as to this latter being a real *Yājyā*."

"Against this, the following argument might be urged: 'The feminine affix (in 'Yājyā') would not be compatible with the *Sūktavāka*, which, not being a *Rk*, is devoid of the feminine character.'

"But this does not affect our position; because we find the name 'Yājyā' applied to the *samid yājyā*, etc., which are not *Rks*."

"Then, it might be urged that—'in the case of the sacrificial accessories, mentioned in the *Yajurveda*, we find that even though they are accessories in the performance of sacrifices, they are not called 'yājyās'; and hence the mere fact of being accessory in the performance of sacrifices cannot be sufficient ground for the application of the name 'Yājyā'; hence that alone should be accepted as *Yājyā*, which is actually spoken of as 'Yājyā.'

"But, in that case, inasmuch as we have the declaration 'sūktavāka evā yājyā' the said accessory details would certainly apply to the *Sūktavāka*. Nor can this declaration be taken as applying the name only figuratively; because we find the two quite proximate to each other—which is the principal basis of direct relationship."

"Then again, the word 'yājyā' is a generic term; and as such could not be taken as applying to certain definite things only, unless we had a definition distinctly laid down (as governing its application); and such

"a definition would be something like this: 'That which, mentioned in the section on *Homa*, is found to be an auxiliary in the performance of sacrifices, is *Yājyā*'; and this definition would be quite applicable to the *Sūktavāka*. Consequently, it must be admitted that the *Sūktavāka* is a real *Yājyā*, and this name is directly applicable to it."

In reply to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* arguments. That *mantra*, by which the sacrificing priest offers the sacrifice to the Deity connected with that sacrifice, is the *Yājyā*; because such is the universally recognized fact. And, as a matter of fact, the *Sūktavāka* is not such a *mantra*.

As a rule, in all Primary sacrifices, everything connected with it is recognized as appearing in some such form as serves some useful purpose in the action. And as for the character of the '*Yājyā*,' it is found to consist in the fact of a *mantra* being laid down as serving the purpose of pointing to the Deity of the offered material. As for the *Sūktavāka*, it has not been mentioned, in the originaive Injunction, as serving the purpose of pointing to the Deity of the grass-bundle; as all that it does, is to mention the Deities to whom offerings have been made.

It might be urged that the indicative power of the words of the *Sūktavāka* would be set aside by the superior authority of the Direct Declaration ('*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*').

But this is not possible; because we shall show in the next *sūtra*, that the Direct Declaration of a text is incapable of restricting the application of the *mantra* unless it is supported by the indications of the words of the *mantra* itself,—this incapability being as pronounced as that of the declaration '*agninā siñcati*.'

Thus, then, we cannot admit the *Sūktavāka* to be a real *yājyā*. Nor is there any such *Yājyā*, as in which being contained, the *Sūktavāka* could take to itself the details laid down for the *Yājyā*.

It is a well-known fact that when an action has been previously recognized as a 'sacrifice,' if a certain accessory of it happens to be mentioned subsequently, that Accessory becomes known as '*Yājyā*.' And in the case in question, we find that the offering of the grass-bundle has never been cognized as a 'sacrifice,' before it came to be connected with the *Sūktavāka* (in the sentence '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*'); and thus there would be a mutual interdependence: the said offering being a sacrifice because of its connection with the *Yājyā* in the shape of the *Sūktavāka*, and this latter being a *Yājyā* because of its connection with the sacrifice in the shape of the offering of the grass-bundle.

This argument might be met in the following manner: "Even without being named '*Yājyā*,' the *Sūktavāka*, merely as such, could very well be applied to the sacrifice, and then, it would become the *Yājyā*."

"by reason of its connection with the *Offering* (*Praharāṇa*) in which the "predominant element is the *sacrificial character*, which is pointed out by "its connection with the Deity mentioned in the *Yājyā mantra* (and thus "there would be no mutual interdependence)."

To this we make the following reply: That which has not been known as '*Yājyā*,' either in the originative Injunction, or in its application,—how could it ever, subsequently, be known as having that character?

That is to say, it is only such a word as is wholly unknown,—the word '*yūpa*' f.i.,—that can be taken in a sense indicated by the use to which it is subsequently found to be put. The word '*Yājyā*,' however, is one that has its meaning well known, both at the time of the originative Injunction, and at that of its application; and as such it does not stand in need of any subsequently appearing character. As for the accessory details laid down in connection with the *Yājyā*, inasmuch as these are found to have acquired an existence, in connection with the previously known sacrifices, they could not stand in need of the *Yājyā*-character, which would be acquired with great difficulty. If the *Sūktavāka* were a modification of the *Yājyā*, then its '*yājyā*'-character would be ascertained by its functions, just as the *yūpa*-character of the *Paridhi* and the *Khalāvālī*. As a matter of fact, however, it is a *Primary* in itself; and hence the knowledge of its qualifications (or accessory details) could not depend upon its functions; and consequently the qualifications of the *Yājyā* could not apply to it.

Thus then, in the declaration—'*sūktavāka ēva yājyā*'—the word '*eva*' implies the fact of the name being applied to the *Sūktavāka* figuratively; because the use of that word would have been possible only in case the name '*Yājyā*' were applied to something that is not *Yājyā*, and not when it was applied to a real *Yājyā*. For instance, in the next sentence—'*Prastara āhutiḥ*'—the *Bhāṣya* does not use the word '*ēva*'; for the simple reason that the *Āhuti* is real. That is to say, the word '*Praharāṇa*' does not apply to all sacrifices; but it is distinctly a *Homa*; because it consists of the actual *throwing in* of the offering also (and not a mere offering). Just as the *Āghāra* etc. acquire the character of *Homa*, because of their consisting in the action of *Pouring*, so, in the same manner, the '*Praharāṇa*' has that character, on account of its consisting in the action of *throwing in*.

Then again, the name '*Yājyā*' is never meant to be directly applicable to the accessories of *Homa*; and the name is specially precluded from the *Sūktavāka*, by the fact of this latter being a *Nigada* (Prose), which is recognized on account of its being repeated in the manner of Prose. And the applicability of the name '*Yājyā*' to all *nigadas* has been distinctly

prohibited, in the declaration—‘*ayñjyā eva nigadāh*,’ as it is with the help of *Rk* mantras alone that sacrifices are performed.

Though the name is thus precluded, yet the *Bhāṣya* applies it, by way of eulogizing the *Sūktavāka*, as by being connected with the *Yajya* the *Sūktavāka* becomes highly praised. Nor can the declaration be taken as meant to be a glorification of both,—as in that case the glorification would be wholly groundless (because the basis of glorification lies in the fact of one of them being far superior to the other).

Sūtra (13): It serves the purpose of indicating the Deities, because of its connection with them.

It has been argued above, in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, that “inasmuch as the *Sūktavāka* has its purpose duly fulfilled by the indication of the Deity, it cannot be employed over again (in connection with the *offering of the grass-bundle*).”

To this we make the following reply: If the Direct Injunction and the Indication of the *mantra* words pointed to two distinct subsidiary characters for the *Sūktavāka*, then alone could there be a contradiction (and consequent rejection) of the latter by the former. As a matter of fact, however, both point to the same character; and as such there can be no contradiction.

That is to say, though it is quite true that the words of the *Sūktavāka* itself point to the fact of its serving the purpose of indicating the Deity, yet this indicative capability does not disappear from it, when it is employed in connection with the *offering of the grass-bundle*; because in this latter it is not employed in any other way (than the one justified by the indications of the words). The fact is that the capability of the *Sūktavāka* to indicate the Deity stands in need of a reconciliation with the Direct Declaration ‘*sūktavākṣṇa prastaram praharati*’; and this latter Declaration also, finding the *Sūktavāka* itself making no mention of the said *offering*,—and finding itself incapable, in the absence of such indicativeness (of the offering), of applying it to the said *offering*,—and yet not taking upon itself the responsibility of creating a fresh indicative potency,—keeps looking out for some such way in which the *Sūktavāka* could be employed in the work mentioned by it, and yet not stepping beyond what is signified by the words of the *mantra* itself. Now then, as a rule, a *Mantra* becomes subsidiary to a sacrifice, only when it speaks of either the Action itself, or certain accessories thereof. And the very first way in which it becomes related as a subsidiary is that the *mantra* should speak of the well-known form of the Primary Action itself; but when it is not found capable of speaking of any of the well-known details of the

sacrifice, then it is taken the other way:—that is to say, we are led to the conclusion that 'what is mentioned by this *mantra* is certainly present in this Action'; as otherwise it could not be subsidiary to it, as is distinctly declared to be the case.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Direct Declaration—'*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*'—addresses the *mantra* thus: 'While expressing what you already do, please help in the accomplishment of the *Offering of the grass-bundle*'; and the *mantra* replies in the following strain: 'I will do all that I can do, while indicating the desired Deity.' And if the Deities 'desired' were only those connected with previous sacrifices, then the *mantra* could not accord any help to the *offering* (of the grass-bundle); if, however, these very Deities were connected with this *offering* also, then, by indicating these, the *Sūktavāka* would be according a distinct help to the accomplishment of the offering of the grass-bundle. These Deities too are not known as to be employed in any other capacity, save that of serving as Deities; and hence the Deities spoken of in the *Sūktavāka*, could not be anything other than Deities, in the said *offering* also. Thus then, the substance 'grass-bundle' being spoken of as an *offering material*, and Agni and the rest (spoken of in the *Sūktavāka*) being Deities, the *offering* comes to be known as a *sacrifice*; and it further comes to be recognized as the particular kind of sacrifice known as '*Roma*,' because it consists of the further action of *Throwing in*.

And thus there is no contradiction between the Direct Declaration and the Indications of the *mantra*.

Thus then, the meaning of the *sūtra* comes to be this: In the case of the *Offering* also, the *Sūktavāka* serves the purpose of indicating the Deity; because the *Offering* is connected with the same Deities.

And as for the pointing out of the time, this also would be done by the *Sūktavāka*, by the way; because in the order that is laid down for the reciting of the *mantras*, the *Sūktavāka* is known as appearing at a definite time.

Says the *Bhāṣya*: '*yadyagniridam havirajushata ityēvamādyēva śrūyēta, etc., etc.*' The sense of this is that even before the declaration '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*,' it is found that a portion of the *Sūktavāka-mantra* itself is capable of connecting it with the *Offering* in question. Though the capability of the *Mantra* is equally applicable to all offering materials, yet, on the strength of the Direct Declaration in question, the sentence '*yadanēna havishā, etc.*' must be taken as referring to the *Bundle of grass*. Or it may be that from the very beginning, the word '*idam*' (this) refers to the *grass-bundle*; for the simple reason that the other materials—*Puroḍāca* and the like—are not present at the time.

Now can it be urged that, in that case, the word '*ajushata*' would be

meaningless. Because all that it does is to eulogize it, as already known to have been respected and followed (accepted).

Consequently there can be nothing incongruous in the *Sūktavāka* being subsidiary to the *Offering of the grass-bundle*.

Sūtra (14): If it be urged that "the Action is a *Pratipatti* (an offering of Disposal)."

This *sūtra* may be taken either as recapitulating an objection, or as actually bringing forward the objection. The sense of the objection is this: "How could the *Sūktavāka*, or the Deities Agni etc., be subsidiary "to the *Offering of the grass-bundle*, which is a secondary action?"

In reply to this we have the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra (14A): Like the *Svishtakṛt*, it could be both (*Yāga* and *Pratipatti*).

We have broken up *Sūtra* (14) of the *Bhāṣya* into two *sūtras* as this splitting has been indicated (as desirable) by all old teachers.

Just as the *Svishtakṛt*-offering is both an *independent sacrifice*, and a *Disposal-offering*,—so, in the same manner, the *Offering* in question also would be both. And the *mantras* would be subsidiary to this latter, exactly in the same way as they are to the former.

And certainly the character of the *Disposal-offering* is not incompatible with that of a *sacrifice*. As what the *sacrifice* consists of is the bringing about of a certain relationship between the Deity and the Offering material. And when a certain action has been thus recognized as a *sacrifice*, then follows the consideration of the question as to whether it is a *Disposal-offering* or an *Independent sacrifice*; and it comes to be taken as the former, if it is found to fulfil the conditions laid down under *Sūtra* IV—ii—19. Certainly there can be no incongruity in this.

Thus it is the *Independent sacrifice* and the *Disposal-offering* that are meant by the word '*ubhayaśaṁskāra*' (in the *sūtra*).

Or, the *sūtra* may be taken as follows: Just as the *Svishtakṛt* offering is only meant to be a purification (*śaṁskāra*) of the substance, because the *Svishtakṛt*, having had its purposes fulfilled, is auxiliary to Agni; and yet this *offering* does not lose its sacrificial character,—so, in the same manner, even though the two—the *Sūktavāka* and the *grass-bundle*—may have their purposes already fulfilled, yet they would be purificatory of each other; and as bringing about a transcendental result by means of their mutual restriction, the *offering* of that *grass-bundle* with that *mantra* would have the character of the *sacrifice* also.

Or, again, the sense of the *sūtra* may be this: In the *Svishtakṛt*

also, we find the *mantra*—‘*ayādaṅhi*, etc.,’ which speaks of Deities; and hence this forms an instance of the mutual *purification* spoken of above.

Nor is it necessary that the *mantra* cannot be subsidiary to a *Disposal-offering*. Because such an offering is distinctly seen to serve a useful purpose; and for the sake of the bringing about of the transcendental result, proceeding from the Restriction laid down, it would certainly stand in need of certain Vedic accessories (in the shape of the *mantra*, etc.).

And thus there can be nothing incongruous in applying the *Sūktavāka* to the *Offering of the grass-bundle*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6).

[The *Sūktavākas* are to be applied in accordance with their significations.]

Sūtra (15): "The whole is to be recited on both occasions; because it is enjoined as one complete whole."

Reverting to the original subject of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we proceed to consider the question as to whether the whole of the *Sūktavāka* is to be recited at the *Darṣa* as well as at the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, or portions of it are to be extracted in the case of each of these, in consideration of the Deities (connected with the sacrifices and spoken of by the *Mantras*).

And on this question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The whole of it is to be recited at each of the two sacrifices. Because it is the *mantra*, as it appears in the text, that is called the '*Sūktavāka*'; and if extracts were made from it, it would cease to be '*Sūktavāka*'; and hence in this latter case, the *Offering of the grass-bundle* would be made with a *mantra* that is not *Sūktavāka* (and that would be 'an infringement of the Injunction '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*')."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (16): It is to be employed in accordance with what it signifies; because it is the purification of an Auxiliary.

That there are always extracts made out of such *Mantras* has been explained under the *Stuṭaṣastrādhikaraṇa* (*Sūtras* II—i-13-29) and the *Pūshādyanumantraṇādhikaraṇa* (*Sūtras* XII—iii-29). If the Deities mentioned in the *Sūktavāka mantras* were such as belonged to the *offering of the grass-bundle only*, and were wholly different from those belonging to the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,—then in that case, the whole of it could have been recited at each of the two sacrifices. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the *mantras* speak of the same *Agni etc.* that are the deities of the sacrifices; and as such there is no ground for making a difference (between the Deities of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, and those spoken of in the *mantras*); we must admit that what the *mantras* do is simply to indicate the Deities to whom the sacrifices have been offered, and that the *offering of the grass-bundle* is not the sole motive cause of the

recitation of the *Sūktavāka*. For the simple reason that it is based upon the Deities that have been employed at the Primary sacrifices (of the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*), it is concluded that the *Sūktavāka*, as well as the offering of the grass-bundle, is subservient to those Primary sacrifices. And as for these Primary sacrifices, they are performed in connection with their respective Deities, and not equally with all the Deities (of the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*). Consequently, of the *Sūktavāka* also, it is necessary to make extracts (fitting in with the sacrifice at which it is to be recited).

Sūtra (17): Objection: "On account of the name (there could be no extracts)."

"That is to say, how could you explain the name '*Sūktavāka*' (which certainly could not apply to mere extracts from it)?"

Sūtra (18): Reply: The word 'complete whole' would apply to the parts (of the mantra, recited on two different occasions); because both would appear in the same Context (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*).

There are two performances of the *grass-bundle offering*; because it has to be performed at two different times—one on the occasion of the *Darṣa* and another on that of the *Pūrṇamāsa*. Consequently the whole name of '*Sūktavāka*' would apply to these two recitations on the two occasions (taken jointly). Because the whole of the *Sūktavāka* is known as an auxiliary to both (the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*); specially as both of these appear in the same context. When, however, we consider the case of the *grass-bundle offering* alone, then the *Sūktavāka* comes to be recognized as connected with each of the constituent sacrifices,—just like the *Prāyaṇīya*, the *Udayanīya*, the *Ēkādaṇī* and the *Oṭturvidhādhāna*. And thus there is no incompatibility among the Direct Declaration ('*sūktavākṣṇa prastaram praharati*'), the Indications by the mantra-words (of the sacrificial Deities), and the Context (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*).

The above is the exposition of the *Siddhānta*, as contained in the *sūtra*. But the *Bhāṣya* takes exception to that exposition, on the following grounds:

"What has been said above is not possible, because those that are dependent upon something else cannot be connected with the method of procedure. That is to say, if the Injunction (of the *Sūktavāka*) were with reference to the method of the Primary sacrifices (of the *Darṣa*-

"*Pūrṇamāsa*), then, the whole of the *Sūktavāka* would be recited in connection with both (the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*).

"That is to say, the Primary sacrifices are laid down with reference to a certain result, and not with reference to the *method*; consequently it is only with regard to the Result,—and not with regard to the Method,—that they could be meant to be taken in combination (with one another). Because it is the *method* that is laid down with reference to the Primary sacrifices; as otherwise, if it were not so laid down, it could not form an auxiliary to these sacrifices; and then, if the *method* be taken as enjoined, then, inasmuch as it would be wholly impossible for this method and the Primary sacrifices to be enjoined with reference to each other,—as that would leave them wholly unconnected,—the *Method* could not but be taken as enjoined with reference to the Primary sacrifice. And inasmuch as these Primary sacrifices are *uddēśyas* (i.e., those with reference to whom something is enjoined), no significance can be attached to their *combination*, which is denoted by the *Dvandva* compound ('*Darṣa-Pūrṇamāśābhyām*'). Consequently, the sentence laying down the method being taken as complete with each one of those sacrifices, each of the Primary sacrifices must be accepted to be connected with the whole of the method; and the performance also coming to be done accordingly, inasmuch as each of the six Primary sacrifices constituting the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*, performed at different points of time, would be complete in itself, the Recitation of the *Sūktavāka* would be done but once, and would apply to all the rest. Thus then, though the *Sūktavāka* may not be repeated with each of the six Primary sacrifices—the *Agnēya* and the rest,—like the *Prayāja*, yet the whole of it will have to be repeated once on the occasion of the *Darṣa*, as well as once on that of the *Pūrṇamāsa*. As otherwise, the *Prayāja* etc. also would have to be performed in parts, for which there would be no authority at all. Consequently, on account of the superior authority of Direct Declaration ('*sūktavākena* etc.'), we should set aside the Indications of the *mantra*-words; and take the *Sūktavāka* (as applied to the *grass-bundle offering*) either in an indirect secondary sense, or as leading to certain imperceptible results, or as indicating, for the *offering*, other Deities (than those related to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*).

"*Question*: 'When, as a matter of fact, the combination (of the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*) is laid down as the means of attaining the result (Heaven), why should the *method* be connected with the constituent parts of these sacrifices, which parts are not the enjoined means to the Result?'

"*Answer*: Inasmuch as each of the inherent parts of the sacrifice is

"connected with the Result, how do you make out that it is the *Combination* that brings about the Result ?

"That is to say, the character of *sacrifice* inheres in each of the "constituent sacrifices; and the root expressive of that (*sacrifice*) "distinctly points to the fact of the potency of bringing about the Result "belonging to the sacrifices (forming the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*) as depending "upon one another.

"*Objection* : 'Inasmuch as the means to the Result is specified by a "compound name expressive of the *Combination*, the Root ('*yaji*') also "would be taken as denoting the combined sacrifices.'

"*Reply* : Not so; because it is the Name, that, depending upon the "Root, applies to each of the sacrifices (and the Root is not dependent "upon the Name),—as we have already shown under the *Paurṇamāsyā-dhikaraṇa*. Consequently, even when the Root ('*yaji*') occurs together "with a Name, all that is meant is that the constituents are companions, "and not that it is only a combination of them that can bring about the "Result.

"*Objection* : 'Thus then, just as the potency of bringing about the "result belongs to the constituent parts as associated with one another, "so, in the same manner, the method also, as helping the accomplishment "of that Result, would pertain to them as thus combined.'

"*Reply* : Not so; because, inasmuch as the Combination appears to "be spoken of in connection with a thing with reference to which some- "thing else is enjoined,—it cannot be accepted as significant, with "reference to the Method; because it is a very common occurrence that "the same thing is regarded as significant in one place, and not in all "places.

"*Question* : 'How is it possible that one and the same thing should, "at one and the same time, be the *Predicated*, and also that with refer- "ence to which something else is predicated ?'

"*Answer* : We have already explained that such contingencies are "quite possible, according as the thing in question is taken along with "one thing or the other.

"*Objection* : 'Such a diversity would lead to a syntactical split.'

"*Reply* : Certainly; who is there that does not admit the sentence, "—which lays down the method with reference to the Primary sacrifice, "and which is inferred from the texts appearing in the Context,—to be "distinct (syntactically) from that which is directly mentioned (viz. the "sentence '*Darṣa-Pūrṇamāśābhyām saṃśakāmo yajēta*').

"*Objection* : 'The mutual combination (of the constituent sacrifices), "though meant for the accomplishment of the Result, would certainly

"force itself to attention at the time of the connection of the *Method*; and
 "there would be nothing to set it aside."

"*Reply*: It is true that it could not be set aside from mere cognition
 "but it could very well be set aside from the Injunction. Because, in this
 "case, certain intervening Injunctions being assumed as appearing after
 "the Injunction of the qualified *Bhāvanā*, the Agent, while becoming
 "engaged in that element of the Action which brings about the Result,
 "comes to take up also the association (or combination) of actions; just
 "as (in the case of the Injunction '*Paṇḍa yajeta*') he takes up the
 "singleness of the animal; but as regards the method-element of the
 "Primary sacrifices, inasmuch as he does not take up these Primary
 "sacrifices, he does not take up the combination of these either; though
 "he is engaged in the subsidiary sacrifices combined together. For these
 "reasons, no significance can be attached to the *Combination* with reference
 "to the Method; just as none is attached to the singleness of the *Vessel*
 "(in the sentence '*graham sammārṣti*'). And further, a single word,
 "expressive of the Primary sacrifice, while referring to the Primary
 "sacrifice (*Darṣa*) for the sake of the (injunction of) the subsidiary
 "sacrifices, could not lay down the said combination; as that would
 "involve a duplicity of syntactical connection."

"Thus then, it must be admitted that the method applies to each of
 "the Primary sacrifices; and the following reasons are given for this:
 "(1) Because every one of them is equally nearly related (to the method);
 "(2) because every one of them is equally mentioned as the means to
 "the desired end; (3) because not one of them has any other method
 "laid down for itself; (4) because the Context, in the shape of the want
 "of the Procedure, is equally applicable to every one of them; and
 "hence the whole Context must be taken as belonging to every one of
 "them."

"Thus then, the position taken up in *Sūtra* 17 remains untouched."

Having, in the above manner, demolished the position taken up by
 the *Siddhānta sūtra* (18), the author of the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to lay down
 his own exposition of the *Siddhānta*, in the words—'*It is not so, etc.*'

That is to say, the *Sūktavāka* cannot be taken, either as applying
 indirectly (to the Offering in question), or as leading to an imperceptible
 Result, or as indicating other Deities; because all these contingencies
 have been shown to be impossible.

Consequently, we conclude that when extracts are made out of the
Sūktavāka, in accordance with the significations of its various parts, each
 of these extracts becomes a *Sūktavāka*; because there are many *Sūktavākas*;

specially as we find that the various *mantras* '*Agniridam etc.*' (constituting the *Sūktavāka*),—which are capable of indicating several Deities connected with different sacrifices, serving distinct purposes independently of one another,—do not form a single sentence by being syntactically connected. Hence it must be admitted that there are many *Sūktavākas* (contained in the '*Sūktavāka*')—each of which is supplied with elliptical portions from that which precedes as also from that which follows it. For instance,—(1) there is one *Sūktavāka*, beginning with the *mantra* '*Idam dyāvāprthivī, etc.*' and ending with '*agniridam, etc.*'; (2) while there is another beginning with '*Idam dyāvāprthivī, etc.*' and ending with '*soma idam, etc.*'

Thus then, we find that among these *Sūktavākas*, which differ with each different Deity, and which are amenable to the same procedure of recitation,—there are some that are recited as common to many. And hence whichever of these may be recited at the *Offering of the grass-bundle*, the offering will have been done with the *Sūktavāka* (as declared in the injunction, '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*'). Because, just as a single class inheres in many individuals, so, in the same manner, the character of the *Sūktavāka*, which consists in being a '*well-said saying*,' would inhere in every one of those recited. And the word '*sūktavāka*' being thus found to be applicable to each of them, if those *mantras*, or words of *mantras*, that are found to be indicative of Deities not connected with the Action in course of performance, are not recited,—that does not constitute an infringement of any Direct Declaration; what is infringed and rejected is the *Context*; but as this rejection is done on the superior strength of the Indicative Power of words and Syntactical Connection, there is nothing objectionable in it.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that we should make use of extracts from the *Sūktavāka*.

As a matter of fact, however, even this exposition of the *Siddhānta* is not quite right. Because it is a clearly perceptible fact that the whole forms a single sentence, as is shown by there being certain words that are to be used as common to all the *mantras* concerned; just as in the case of the sentence speaking of the *Vaiṣvānara*. Then again, (for a number of sentences to be taken as syntactically connected) it is not necessary that every one of the words of one sentence should stand in need of the connection with those of the other sentence; as even if a single word happens to connect a number of sentences, they are taken together as one sentence. For instance, in the case of the sentence '*arunayā piṅgākṣhyā ekāhānyā, etc.*' we find that, even though these words are

not connected with one another, yet all of them being connected with the single word '*krīṇāti*,' are taken as syntactically connected. In the same manner, in the case in question all the *mantras* are found to be connected with the words '*yadanēna havishā ṇṣāṣtē*, etc. ;' and as such they must be taken as syntactically connected and forming a single sentence. And then again, all of them are found to serve the same purpose of indicating the sacrificial Deities ; and there are certain words that are common to many,—which fact makes them dependent upon portions of one another.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that though every one of the sentences is complete within itself, as regards its meaning,—yet, inasmuch as they are all enjoined with reference to the *Offering* (of the grass-bundle), all of them combined should be taken as forming a single sentence.

If each of them were a distinct sentence by itself, then we would have the following anomalies : (1) each of them would have to be recited separately, because at the time of the performance the Deity is the principal factor ; just as in the case of the *mantras* of the *Upasad*, *Dakṣiṇā*, etc., and (2) inasmuch as the singular number (in '*sūktavākēna*') would be significant with reference to the *offering of the grass-bundle*, its requirements would be fulfilled by the recitation of any one of the sentences.

Thus then, it must be admitted that the whole of the *Sūktavāka* forms a single sentence ; and it becomes necessary for us to explain why the whole of it is not to be recited (in the *Darṣa* as well as in the *Pūrṇamāsa*).

We offer the following explanation : We find that the word 'water' is applicable to a *drop* as well as to a *combination of drops* ; for the simple reason that *water* is a substance made up of many constituent parts. The same may be said to be the case with the word '*sūktavāka*.'

That is to say, from its capabilities, as well as from the purposes served by it, the *Sūktavāka* is recognized as having the following character : It is a sentence, which contains words expressive of Deities connected with the performance, which abounds with common words applying on all sides, and which serves the purpose of pointing out the sacrificial Deities. And thus (while reciting the *Sūktavāka*), as soon as one has uttered the word expressing one Deity, those expressive of the many Deities pertaining to the Primary and Subsidiary sacrifices also become expressed as implied by the use of the words that are commonly applicable to all ; and the whole of the *Sūktavāka* becomes recited (by the utterance of that single word). Specially as the actual utterance of the words expressive of Deities not connected with the sacrifice in hand would be an '*ill-said saying*' ('*Duruktavāka*'—and not a '*Sūktavāka*, well-said saying').

Thus then, we conclude that in the *Darṣa*, as well as in the *Pūrṇamāsa*, sacrifices, the *Sūktavāka* to be recited is only that much which contains the words pointing out the Deities of each sacrifice,—such recitation being quite in keeping with law and reason; just like the recitation of the *mantras* in which certain elliptical portions are supplied from out of other *mantras*; and hence, it is the recitation of the whole *Sūktavāka* that would constitute an infringement of the Direct Declaration ('*sūktavākēna* etc.); as the utterance of words denoting things not connected with the sacrifice in hand would be an 'ill-said,' and not a 'well-said,' 'saying' (*vāka*).

In the same manner, the *grass-bundle offering* also, when done with the *Sūktavāka* as it happens to exist at the time (i.e. as it appears at the time of the *Darṣa* or at that of the *Pūrṇamāsa*), becomes, by this, performed, as it were, by the whole *Sūktavāka*; and there is no incongruity in this.

Thus then, the *Sūktavāka* must be taken as having three forms: (1) one that appears in the actual text of the Veda; (2) that which it has, at the time of the actual performance of sacrifices, on the occasion of the Primary sacrifices; and (3) that which it has, at the time of the performance of the Subsidiary sacrifices. (1) As it appears in the text, it is held to pertain to all the Deities of the Primary sacrifices; because during the repetition of the text, if one were to recite it in any other form, he would destroy the text altogether. (2) When recited along with the Primary ones of the Combined sacrifices, we use them as pertaining to certain Deities chosen out of the rest. (3) And in connection with the Subsidiary modifications of sacrifices, it has its words (such as 'Agni,' etc.) changed into '*Sūrya*' and the like (in accordance with the character of the particular Subsidiary in hand). In all these cases, however, we have the *Sūktavāka*, appearing of course in the forms above ascertained. And it loses the character of the '*Sūktavāka*' (*Well-said saying*) only when it speaks of things unconnected with the Action in hand.

The *Bhāṣya* also must be taken as accepting the multiplicity of the single *Sūktavāka*, as is shown by its assertion that there can be as many *Sūktavākas* as there are Deities.

The *Sūtra* also may be taken thus: 'In connection with both, the word 'whole-*sūktavāka*' is applicable, in only so much as it mentions the Deities connected with each; because the Context is the same.'

And thus, in reality, the *Siddhānta* exposition given by us does not differ from that contained in the *Sūtra*, or from that given in the *Bhāṣya*.

ADHIKARANA (7).

[The sections dealing with the Kāmyayājyānuvākya belong to the *Kāmyas only*.]

Sūtra (19): On account of the Indicative Power, the Order of sequence and the Name, the mention (of the Yājyāpuronuvākya) would be in connection with the kāmya sacrifices.

We find the *kāmya* sacrifices (i.e. those performed with a view to certain desirable results)—*Aindrāgna* and the rest—laid down in a definite order of sequence; and we also find laid down, in the same order, certain *Yājyāpuronuvākya Couplets*, associated with the name '*kāmya*,' and pertaining to the same deities (Indra, Agni etc.) as those of the *kāmya* sacrifices.

And in regard to these, there arises the question as to whether these Couplets, from their indicative power, are to be employed, irrespective of the order in which they are mentioned, in all the sacrifices that happen to be connected with those Deities,—or they are to be employed only in the aforesaid *kāmya* sacrifices, in the same order in which these latter are mentioned.

The *Bhāshya* has cited many examples, only with a view to show the various instances to which the several specifications in the *Sūtra* apply.

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

On the above question, the *Pūrvapaksha* is that—"The couplets, through their Indicative power, are to be employed in all the sacrifices that have those Deities."

SIDDHĀNTA.

As against the above *Pūrvapaksha*, we have the following arguments: Unless a certain *mantra* is connected with a sacrifice, its Indicative Power alone cannot apply it to any sacrifice; and in the case in question we find that that which connects the couplets in question with sacrifices, also distinctly shows that they belong to the said *kāmya* sacrifices.

That is to say, all that the Indicative Power of the *Mantra* could do would be to connect it with a certain Deity. But no useful purpose is served by the *mantra* used for the sole purpose of pointing out the form of the Deity. The fact of the *Mantra* being connected with a sacrifice, or

with the Deity connected with the sacrifice, cannot be expressed by Indicative Power alone, independently of Syntactical Connection, Context, etc. Nor can it be known, from Indicative Power alone, in which part of the sacrifice the *Mantra* is to be employed. For these reasons, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the agency of *Name*; as by means of the *Name* is shown the connection of the *mantra* with the sacrifice, as well as the particular function of the *Mantra*. For instance, in the case in question, the name of the couplets is 'Yāgyā,' which, denoting *that whereby a sacrifice is performed*, distinctly connects the couplet with a *Sacrifice*; and it also establishes the further fact of the Couplet serving the purpose of accomplishing the offering of the material. This being done by the *Name*, the further question, as to the particular sacrifice with which the couplets are connected, is settled by the Indicative Power of the Couplets, which shows that they are connected with those sacrifices that are connected with the Deities indicated by the couplets.

Objection: "This does not quite prove what is desired (by the 'Siddhānti')."

Reply: How is it not proved, when the *Name*, 'Kāmyam yāgyāṅkāṇḍam,' distinctly restricts the application of the couplets in question to the *kāmya* sacrifices?

And further, even if the *Name* merely pointed out the connection of the couplets with *sacrifice in general*, such universal application (authorized by *Name*) would be set aside by the stronger authority of the *Order* (of sequence). Consequently it must be admitted that the couplets are mentioned as connected with the *kāmya* sacrifices.

The *Bhāṣya* raises the question—"Why should the *Sūtra* have mentioned both? That is to say, the fact of the couplets being connected with the *kāmya* sacrifices is established by the *Indicative Power* of the couplets as helped by the *Order* of their sequence; or the very *Name* alone (of the couplets) proves all that is desired by the *Siddhānta*; and under the circumstances, why should the *sūtra* have mentioned both 'Indicative Power' (*liṅga*) and 'Order of sequence' (*krama*)?"

The reply to this is as follows: It is true that the *Indicative Power* and the *Order* of the couplets would establish their applicability to the *Aindīāgna* and other sacrifices, because the verses in question, being *Yāgyānuvākya*s, could not be used in any other sacrifice; but there are certain other sacrifices,—the *Āgnēya*, for instance,—laid down by such sentences 'Agnaye vratapataye, etc.'; and in these sacrifices there are two places for the *Rk* verses—one in connection with the mention of *Agni*, where they appear in the character of the *Sāmidhēni* (literally 'that with which fuel is supplied to the Fire'), and another, where they appear as the *Yāgyānuvākya*; and as for the *Sāmidhēni* verses, they stand in need of two

verses, in order to make up the 'seventeen' which is the number enjoined in connection with them; and in regard to these latter sacrifices (the *Āgnēya* etc.), if we do not admit the *Name* to be the means of controlling the application of the verses, then, inasmuch as the Indicative Power and the Order of sequence would apply to the *Sāmidhēni* verses also,—and as there would be no ground for rejecting that which is the first to present itself,—the couplets in question would all be applied to the operating of the *Sāmidhēni* (i.e. the mention of Fire). This application, however, is set aside by the *Name* ('*Yājyānuvākya*').

Objection : "In that case, the *Sūtra* should mention *Name* only : what "is the use of mentioning the two, *Indicative Power* and *Order of Sequence*?"

Reply : What you say would have been quite right, if the couplets speaking of the Deities of the sacrifices laid down were exactly of the same number as the sacrifices themselves; as a matter of fact, however, we find that, in the order of the Action, which has a Deity other than Agni, and which is filled up with a *Yājyānuvākya* in keeping with its form,—there are mentioned certain verses pertaining to Agni; and if these were to be applied in accordance with their *Name* only, then they would be applied to the operation of the *Yājyā* (in connection with other Deities than Agni). As a matter of fact, however, such application of the verses is not possible; (1) because there is a diversity of the Indicative Power (of the verse with the Deities other than Agni); and (2) because the application of the verses pertaining to Agni is set aside by the other verses that are indicative of the same other Deities. Consequently there would be no application of the verses pertaining to Agni (if the application depended upon the *Name* alone). When, however, we accept the *Indicative Power*, as also the *Order of Sequence* (as controlling the application of *mantras*), then, when the *Name* will have ceased functioning (after having pointed out the fact of the verses being connected with a sacrifice), the application of the verse would be defined by means of their Indicative Power and the Order of their sequence; and thus the verses pertaining to Agni would become applied to the *Sāmidhēni*.

The *Bhāṣya* shows a case where what is said above actually happens. The *Yājyāpuroṇuvākya* couplets of the *Āgnivāruṇī* sacrifice having been mentioned,—before the couplets of the *Somaraudrī* sacrifices have been mentioned,—we find mentioned the *Manu*-verses; and these latter verses become the *Dharyā* verses of the *Sāmidhēni*. The same is the case with the *Prthupājavatī* verses; as in the case of these also, we find that the former is recognized as pertaining to the latter sacrifice, because, as against the order of the *Sāmidhēni*, it is mentioned after the *Yājyāpuroṇuvākya* verses.

If we did not have recourse to the *Order of Sequence*, then, through

Indicative Power and *Name* alone, the first verse pertaining to Indra and Agni would become applied to the second *Aindrāgna* sacrifice, and the second verse would be applied to the first sacrifice. When, however, the *Order of Sequence* steps in, inasmuch as it connects the verses with the sacrifice, long before the *Name* comes in, it controls the *Indicative Power* in the assumption of the corroborative text,—and hence is avoided any such application as is not in keeping with the *Order of Sequence*.

Thus then, there is nothing incongruous or objectionable in the composition of the *sūtra*.

ADHIKARANA (8).

[The mantras of the Context are applicable to the *Agnidhropasthāna*.]

Sūtra (20): "The injunction of mantras in a certain connection, would pertain to those also that do not appear in the context ; because all are equally laid down (as auxiliaries to sacrifices)."

In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* we find that there are certain mantras—such as '*Agnā āyāhi* etc.'—specially laid down as making up certain Songs and Hymns ; and then again, we find such general injunctions as '*Āgnēyyā agnidhramupatishṭatē*.'

And in connection with this latter Injunction, there arises the question as to (1) whether the *Āgnēyī* verses to be employed in the *Agnidhropasthāna* are those wholly apart from the former mantras ('*Agnā āyāhi*, etc. '); (2) or, this *upasthāna* may be done either with those very mantras, or with others ; (3) or, lastly, it is to be done with those very mantras only. That there are these three alternative views on the question is shown by the text.

As a matter of fact, however, there is no basis for the first of these views—that the verses to be employed are those alone that are not mentioned in the Context. Because, all that the *Pūrvapakshi* can, with great effort, establish is that we should apply both those that are found in the Context as well as those that are not so found ; and there is nothing to prove that the latter *alone* are to be employed. Specially as the only reason that could be brought forward in support of the employment of the verses not in the Context would lie in the fact of the name '*Āgnēyī*' applying to these also ; but this reason would equally apply to the verses appearing in the Context also, and there is no reason by which these latter could be excluded. Nor has the *Bhāṣya* mentioned the three alternative theories ; as the only theory that it speaks of, by means of the word '*aprakṛta*' without the qualifying '*api*,' is that the *upasthāna* is to be done with the verses appearing in the context, as well as those not appearing in it. And it is the absence of the qualifying '*api*' ('also') that has led people to believe that it speaks of the application of *only* those that do not appear in the context. But the argument that could be brought forward in favour of this theory would also establish the theory that both kinds of *Āgnēyī* verses are to be employed ; and this will be

explained below, by the Bhashya also, in the words—‘*aprakṛtāpi pratyayo bhavati, prakṛtamapyupādīran.*’

If, however, it be considered absolutely necessary to have the third alternative theory, then the following would be the arguments in its favour, which would be acceptable to the ultra-orthodox Ācārya :

PŪRVAPAKSHA (A).

(1) “The verses appearing in the Context having been utilized elsewhere, they will have become too stale to be used in the said *upasthāna*. (2) The Injunction ‘*Āgnēyyā agīdhramupatishṭhatē*’ is a general one, while the Injunctions of the special *Āgnēyi* verses (‘*Āgna āyāhi etc.*’) are particular ones; and as a rule a general rule can operate only by laying aside the particular rules. If these latter were not taken as particular Injunctions, then the two Injunctions would be equal; and as such could not serve as the basis for the present *Adhikāraṇa*. Consequently, then, we should employ, in the *upasthāna*, only those verses that are not in the Context.”

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B).

“The words ‘*Āgnēyi*’ and the rest being common to all *Āgnēyi* verses, the word ‘*Āgnēyyā*’ (in ‘*Āgnēyyā agīdhram etc.*’) denotes all the verses (those mentioned in the context as well as those not mentioned in it); nor do we find any peculiarity mentioned which could point, specially, to those alone that appear in the Context; because, as for the Context, all that it can do is to lead to the inclusion of the verses; and it cannot serve the purposes of specification; and as for the *Proximity*,—which constitutes what, in ordinary parlance, is known as Context,—it is set aside by the idea brought about by the Direct Mention of the word ‘*Āgnēyi*’ which literally applies equally to all the verses in question; and hence the injunction must be taken as laying down all *Āgnēyi* verses (those in the Context as well as those not in it). ”

“Says the *Bhāṣya* : *Upadiṣṭopadēṣo hi na nyāyyaḥ śvanjātīyakasya*. ‘The word ‘*upadiṣṭopadēṣaḥ*’ must be taken as = ‘*upadiṣṭasyaiva upadēṣaḥ*,’ and ‘*śvanjātīyakasya*’ as = *viśeṣanarahitasya*; the sense being that when such verses without qualifications have been laid down once, it is not right for them to be laid down again.

“*Question* : ‘*Kathanjātīyakasya ?*’ This question emanates from the *Siddhānti*, and what it means is this : ‘Even in the absence of specifications, there is a ground for particularization, in the shape of the Context.’

“The *Siddhānti*’s opponent says—*Why do you put this question, when you have the Indicative Power of the verses themselves as regulating their*

"*application?* In this the opponent brings forward an argument which, "really supporting his own position, is said in a way as if it were meant "by the *Siddhānti* as one in favour of specialization. The word 'Indica-
"tive Power' ('*Liṅga*') that is used in this sentence is not in the sense of
"the Power of indicating the Deity, which will be spoken of later on,—
"but in the sense of the Power of the Verbal affix, or the Power of being
"enjoined by that affix; because the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the absence of
"Injunction when the potency of that Affix has been spent up.

"Then says the *Bhāṣya*: *Nāsau sāmānyēnu liṅgēna anyatropadēṣa-*
"*marhati*. That is to say, the distinctive feature of the word '*Agni*'
"being common to all the verses, there is an idea of all these; and as
"there is no distinct specifying feature, we can have no idea of any
"particular *Mantra*. If a specifying feature be admitted, then, in
"accordance with the Law relating to the *Nirvāpālambha* of the *Darṣa-*
"*Pūrṇamāsa*, the specification must be done by the Indicative potency
"(of the Verbal Affix), which speaks of the performability of the action.
"This Indicative Potency is precluded from the *Dāṣataya* verses; and as
"such could be admitted as specifying the particular *Āgnēyī* verses to be
"employed. This specification is shown by the *Bhāṣya*, in the sentence
" '*yēna anēnaivamliṅgēna ētatkaroti*,' which means that the *Agnidhropas-*
"*thāna* is to be done by such *Āgnēyī* verses as are singled out as being
"enjoined by means of the verbal affix, which directs that 'it is to be done
"by such mantras as are indicative of Agni or Indra.' But in this case,
"the Injunctive word being taken up by the said specification, there
"would be no *Injunction* of any thing at all. If, on the other hand, the
"sentence be taken as *enjoining* the *upasthāna* to be done by the *Āgnēyī*
"etc., then there would be no specification; and hence we could take up
"any *Āgnēyī* verse at random. Thus then, what the *Siddhānta* would
"have is the *Injunction* of the specified *Āgnēyī* which has already
"been once enjoined; and this would be wholly unwarranted, and most
"objectionable.

"Thus then, through the power of the verse, to indicate the Deities,
"Agni etc., apart from any mention of *performability*, the *Dāṣataya* verses
"(speaking of Agni) also would come to be employed (in the *upasthāna*
"in question).

"*Question*, emanating from the standpoint of the *Siddhānti*: 'On
"the strength of the Context, we could certainly admit those only that
"appear in the context.'

"*Answer*: *Indicative Power (Liṅga) is more authoritative than the*
"*Context*. By the word '*Liṅga*' ('Indicative Power') in this sentence is
"meant the *Direct Declaration* which is literally connected with the dis-
"tinguishing feature of the Deity,—and not mere *Power*. Henceforth,

"the word '*Liṅga*,' appearing in many places, is to be taken in this sense.

"*Objection*: '*Virodhā sati*, etc. That is to say, then there would be "a contradiction (of the *Liṅga* with the *Prakaraṇa*) if we were to admit "such a verse, out of those appearing in the context, as is not related to "*Agni*; when, however, the verse that we admit is one that is related to "*Agni*, we follow both the *Liṅga* and the *Prakaraṇa*. It is in this way "that we have explained the compatibility of Direct Declaration with "Syntactical Connection,—under the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (I—i—25).'

"*Reply*: It is not so. That is to say, when the *Dāṣataya* verses also "appear as optional alternatives (for the said *Āgnēyī* verses), it is not "right to reject them, in consideration of the Context. Consequently it is "not right to follow both (the *Liṅga* and the *Prakaraṇa*).

"Then the *Siddhānti* (in the *Bhāṣhya*) adds—'*Talliṅgavattā anēnā-mūgrahitavyā*: The sense of this is that, the generic character inhering, "in its entirety, in each of the individuals, the admission of all *Āgnēyī* "verses in general would pertain also to the particular *Āgnēyī* verse that "appears in the Context; and as such there would be no contradiction in "the case at all; consequently, inasmuch as the sentence with the Indica- "tive Potency pertains to the generic character (of the *Āgnēyī*), and as the "Context only brings forward the much-wanted particular verse possess- "ing that generic character, there is no incompatibility in the co-inherence "of these two; and as such, there can be no rejection (of any thing, on "the strength of the Context).'

"[The reply given to the above (in the *Bhāṣhya*) is that *though the* "admission of the *Āgnēyī* mantra in the context would not cause an infringe- "ment of the Context, and would also be in keeping with the Indicative "Power,—yet there is no doubt that some other idea given rise to by the same "Indicative Power (i.e., the idea of the admission of the *Dāṣataya* verses) "will have to be rejected as false.] The sense of this reply is that inas- "much as the word '*Āgnēyī*' denotes all the individual *Āgnēyī* verses, the "word '*Āgnēyyā*' points to the admissibility of the *Dāṣataya* verses also; "consequently if, on the strength of the Context, those *Āgnēyī* verses "alone that are mentioned in the Context should be admitted, then the "*Dāṣataya* verses would be set aside,—and this would lead to contradiction "between the Context and the Indicative Power.

"The *Siddhānti* objects—'*But the Individual is never denoted by the* "word *Āgnēyī* (and hence the word *Āgnēyyā* would not denote the indivi- "dual *Āgnēyī* verses).' This objection is meant to strike at the very basis "of the reply just given.

"The reply to this, however, is that *we do not yet quite know if what* "pertains to the case in question is the generic character of having the

"*Indicative Power in question.* That is to say, if in the present case, the denotation of the individual *Āgnēyī* verses were as improbable as that of the individual cows, then, inasmuch as the Injunction (in '*Āgnēyyā* *agnīdhramupatishṭhatē*') would be one of the *Āgnēyī* in general, there would be nothing incongruous in the admission of those *Āgnēyī* verses that appear in the context,—even though such admission would involve the acceptance of certain particular individual verses not directly mentioned in the Injunction (according to you). If, on the other hand, the word '*Āgnēyyā*' be taken as denoting the individual verse characterized by a mention of the deity Agni,—then, if we were to restrict ourselves to those *Āgnēyī* verses alone that appear in the Context, we would be rejecting one portion of the idea arising from the Direct Denotation of the word (i.e. the admissibility of the *Āgnēyī* verses not mentioned in the Context, such as the *Dāṇṭaya*). This would be all the more objectionable, because, as a matter of fact, in the case in question (i.e. in the *upasthāna* of the *Agnīdhru*), it is the *Individual Āgnēyī*—and not any generic entity—that is the means to its accomplishment.

"*Question* : 'Does the author of the *Bhāṣya* now mean to reject the denotability of the generic entity, established in the *Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa* ?

"*Answer* : Certainly not; because all that the *Bhāṣya* means to prove here is that the generic entity cannot be an auxiliary (to the sacrifice). This is the explanation given by some people. But this explanation is scarcely right. Because in that case (the denotability of the generic entity being admitted), inasmuch as the Individual verses would not be mentioned by the sentence in question, there would be nothing incongruous in the rejection of every one of the individual verses. Consequently we must take the *Bhāṣya* to mean that it denies the denotability of the generic entity, as with particular reference to the verses appearing in the Context.

"As a matter of fact, the word '*Āgnēyī*' is denotative of the Individual, because of its signification being based upon its etymology; and as such it can never be denotative of the generic entity. In fact, in the case in question, no generic entity is cognized, because the word '*Āgnēyī*' applies to many verses, of various different metres, on the basis of the fact of the Deity spoken of in them being one and the same. For instance, in the two verses '*Āgna āyāhi vīṭayē*, etc.' and '*Āgnim hotāram*, etc.' (known as *Āgnēyī*), we do not find any common element; and we find that what is invariably concomitant with the name '*Āgnēyī*' is the relationship of the Deity *Agni*, and nothing else; not even the generic character of *being a verse*; as the name is applicable to Actions and Substances also (f. i. we have '*Āgnēya puroḍāṣa*' and '*Āgnēyī āhuti*'). In view of this the *Bhāṣya* has said that *the only*

"common element is the Deity. As for this relationship (of the Deity), though that too is a common element, yet the Bhāṣhya has not mentioned it, because it is not directly expressed by the word, being only implied by it." And inasmuch as that Deity would be common to all *Āgnēyī* verses, there would be no *endlessness* or *incongruity* (as has been found to be the case with the denotability of Individuals).

"And the reason for this is that, though, in the word '*Āgnēyī*,' the *qualifying* (Agni) is the first to be denoted (by the basic noun '*Agni*'). yet, inasmuch as the denotative potency of the base is distinct from that of the *affix*, there would be nothing incongruous in the denotation, by the affix, of the *qualified* (verse). In a case, however, where the same word ('gō' f. i.) is used to denote both (the *qualifying* Class as well as the *qualified* Individual), there can be no denotation of the *qualified*. In the case of the word '*Āgnēyī*,' on the other hand, we find that the word '*Agni*,' which denotes the *qualifying* (Deity), is never used in the sense of the *qualified* (verse); nor is the word '*Āgnēyī*,' which denotes the *qualified*, ever used in the sense of the *qualifying* Deity; and hence the same word could not be extended to the *qualified*. If the word denoted the *qualifying* Deity alone, then, inasmuch as that would fulfil all the requirements of the case, there would be no reason for admitting the *qualified*.

"For these reasons, it must be admitted that the word in question denotes the *Individuals*; as we have explained above, in connection with the words '*Pīṅgākṣī*' and '*Ēkahāyanī*.' And hence, in certain cases, we could admit the verses mentioned in the Context also.

"*Objection*—with reference to an assertion made in course of *Pūrva-pakṣa* (A):—'*It has been asserted above that, inasmuch as the verses appearing in the Context have been laid down for another purpose, they could not be meant to be laid down in connection with the upasthāna in question. That is to say, the Pūrvapakṣī himself has declared that no stale verses could be admitted.*'

"The reply given to this is from the standpoint of *Pūrvapakṣa* (B): 'What we meant to say was that if the verses mentioned in the Context alone were taken as laid down, then there would be an incongruity in the shape of the same *affix* (in '*Āgnēyī*') simultaneously serving the two purposes, of *enjoining* and *indicating* (the verses as those mentioned in the Context); whereas in accordance with our view, those are not the only *Āgnēyī* verses to be employed in the *upasthāna* in question, but others also, as the word makes no specification; and hence there would not be the said incongruity.

"*Objection*—emanating from one who cannot brook an infringement, without reason, of the Context: '*Your theory is open to the great objection,*

"that it is not in keeping with both, the Indicative Power and the Context."

"The reply to this is that the Direct Declaration connected with the Indicateness of the Deity is much stronger in its authority (than the Context).

"Says the Bhāṣhya—And further, it is not necessary to follow the Indicative Power, in the shape of the literal Declaration, as well as the Context. This is meant as a general rebuff to the extremely objectionable popular idea that both are to be respected. As a matter of fact, in the case of all authoritative means of knowledge, the Persons concerned take up the objects of cognition, not with a view to help or respect those means, but for the sole purpose of helping themselves (in their knowledge of the things concerned).

"Question: 'What do you mean by this?'

"Answer: What we mean is this: When the same means of cognition is found to be applied to a number of things, if it happens to be respected with regard to any one of these, it is taken as having its requirements fulfilled; and the other things, even if of use in accomplishing certain ends of the man, would not be admitted (if the mere respecting of the means of Cognition were the sole motive); and further, when a man would have performed a certain action calculated to bring about a certain desirable result (the text laying down that Action will have been duly respected in this single performance, and) he would not perform the Action again, even if he desired a further supply of the same desirable result. Hence, it must be admitted that we should reject the necessity of respecting the means of knowledge, and confine ourselves to the helping of ourselves by the actions (cognized by those means). And thus the word 'Āgnēyi' must be admitted to be not indicative of any particular Āgnēyī verses.

"Says the Bhāṣhya: The Context is not to be followed, because it is contradictory to the idea produced by the Liṅga. And in this sentence, the word 'Liṅga' must be taken as used in the sense of the Indicative power pertaining to no particular verses. And the sūtra also, when speaking of the admissibility of verses other than those in the Context, must not be taken as restricting the admissibility to those alone; it mentions those only, because there is no difference of opinion as to the admissibility of those that are in the Context (and which therefore needs no reiteration)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (21): Only those mentioned in the Context (are meant to be admitted), because of the Context and reasons.

The word '*tadākhyā*' means 'that which is spoken of (in the Context) as admissible'; or 'that which is spoken of as belonging to the sacrifice under treatment (i.e. the *Jyotishtoma*). It is such a verse that is to be admitted; because what the sentence ('*Āgnēyyā etc.*') lays down is a particular function that the *mantra* is to serve in connection with a sacrifice; and as a rule the Injunction of the particular is always based upon that of the general.

That is to say, in the sentence in question, the *upasthāna* is not laid down as due to the form of the *Agnīdhra* himself; nor is it an independent action, leading to a certain desirable result; because no such result is mentioned in connection with it; hence it must be admitted that the *upasthāna* is performed with a view to help in the accomplishment of the *Āpūrva* resulting from the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice. And consequently the sentence in question comes to be taken as laying down a particular action in connection with the *Jyotishtoma*. The injunction of this particular action could be possible only when there was a general Action already enjoined; and then if the same sentence ('*āgnēyyā etc.*') were to lay down the connection of the *Āgnēyi* verses with the general as well as the particular action, then there would be a syntactical split.

Objection: "The sentence in question ('*Āgnēyyā etc.*') lays down the "connection of the verses with the particular Action, while that with "the Action in general would be established by the Context."

Reply: True, it would be established by the Context; but not without having assumed a Vedic text (in support of the indication of the Context) (some such text as 'By this *Verse* we must do something connected with the *Jyotishtoma*'); but no such text can be assumed, when there already exists a text (viz. '*Āgneyyā etc.*,' which establishes the connection of the verse with the *Agnīdhra* who forms an integral factor of the *Jyotishtoma*).

Objection: "The sentence in question having laid down the particular "relationship, the general would be implied by that itself."

Reply: Not so; because Implication is equal to the Context (in the point of authority). And again, if the general connection with the *Jyotishtoma* were an invariable concomitant following on the wake of the establishment of the connection of the verse with the *Agnīdhra*,—in the same way as satisfaction follows on the wake of a hearty meal,—then, in that case, there would be no necessity of calling upon a scriptural text (pointing to that connection). As a matter of fact, however, we find that

the general connection with the *Jyotishtoma* appears long before that with the *Agnidhra*; because this latter being a mere substance, no results are to follow from a connection of the verse with this. And hence, inasmuch as that general connection would not be possible without a scriptural text, the trouble of having to assume a non-existing text would remain as before. Then again, inasmuch as the connection spoken of in the sentence in question is capable of being met with in the matter of ordinary worldly actions also, it could not necessarily connect the verse with the sacrifice (*Jyotishtoma*). Thus too, it would be necessary to assume a Vedic text, on the strength of the Context.

It is in such cases as the above that the authority of "Apparent Inconsistency" comes in; and this "Apparent Inconsistency" is admitted only when there is no other way of explaining the inconsistency. Hence, in the case in question, "Apparent Inconsistency" could justify the assumption of a Vedic text, only if, without such a text, the declaration of the particular connection (in the sentence '*Āgnēyyā etc.*') were found to be inconsistent. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Declaration in question is quite consistent, as asserting what it directly does, something in regard to the verses, that have their general connection (with the sacrifice in hand) already established (by the direct enumeration of the verses in connection with that sacrifice—the *Jyotishtoma*); and having its requirements fulfilled by that, it does not have recourse to the cumbrous method of assuming a text that does not exist.

This is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya* when it says—*The sentence in question cannot be taken as pointing out the functioning of the verses in connection with the Jyotishtoma, as that has been already laid down elsewhere.* For instance, just as when the *Kindling of Fire* has already been laid down in such sentences as '*Vasantē Brāhmaṇo 'gninādadhīta,*' the subsequent texts laying down sacrifices leading to definite results (f. i. '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*') are taken, not as implying an injunction of the said *Kindling of Fire*, but as merely laying down those sacrifices for those who have duly performed the said *Kindling*;—so, in the same manner, what the sentence in question means is that in the *upāsthāna* in question, only those *Āgnēyī* verses are to be employed, that have been connected with the *Jyotishtoma*.

Otherwise, if it were held to lay down the employment of only those that are not mentioned in the Context (as held by *Purvapakṣa A*), then, inasmuch as in the face of other possible solutions, the connection of such verses could not be accepted by the Vedic texts, the burden, quite gratuitously and groundlessly assumed, would be too heavy to be safely carried.

If (in accordance with *Purvapakṣa B*), it be taken as laying down the employment of those in the Context, as well as those not in it,—then, it would be necessary, in one case (that pertaining to the verses mentioned in the Context), to take the sentence as specializing their connection that had been already generally mentioned; while in the other (that pertaining to the verses not in the Context), it will have to be taken as laying down both the general and the special connection. And this diversity would lead to a syntactical split.

And if we admit only those that are mentioned in the Context, then we are saved from all the said undesirable contingencies. And in this, there is a further advantage,—viz. that on account of the proximity (of the Injunctive affix with the verses mentioned in the same Context), it does not become necessary to carry that affix very far from its context.

Objection: “In the Context also there is no such general connection mentioned, as is wanted; and even if it were there, inasmuch as it would point to the verses being employed in other purposes, the utilizing of it in the *Upasthāna* in question would be most incompatible.”

Reply: This does not affect our position; because we do actually make use (in the *Upasthāna*) of such verses as have been utilized elsewhere.

Objection: “In that case, the assertion of the general connection would become incompatible with what you say.”

Reply: Why should it be incompatible, when, as a matter of fact, the general is involved in all particulars? Consequently what we would do (in the case in question) would be to leave off the specialities of the general connection (as laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), which could be of no use in the case of other particulars,—and to accept only the general feature of that connection, which has been established, through those specialities; and there would be no incongruity in this.

The *Bhāṣya* has declared that—*if independently of the Context, the Dāṣataya verses were laid down by the sentence in question, then there would be a syntactical split; as in that case the sentence could only be construed as—‘Upasthānam kuryāt, tacca evamlingēna.’* But such ‘syntactical splits’ would be inevitable in all qualified Injunctions; f. i. even the sentence ‘*Somēna yajēta*’ could be construed only as—‘*Yāgam kuryāt, tacca somēna.*’ Nor is the qualified Injunction in question known as a whit less important than the other qualified Injunctions,—as, equally with the rest, it lays down something quite new. Specially as, in accordance with the *Siddhānta* also, inasmuch as no other indicative power (save that pertaining to the Deity) is admitted, the addition of ‘*tacca evamlingēna*’ is as necessary as in accordance with the *Purvapakṣa*; as even

the verse mentioned in the Context could not apply to the *Upasthāna*, if it had not that Indicative Power.

Consequently the "Syntactical split," involved in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, should be explained as shown before. And in that case, in the *Bhāṣya* passage just quoted, the first portion—'*Upasthānam kuryāt*'—is to be taken as pointing out a particular action in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and the second portion—'*tacca evamlingēna*'—as pointing, independently of the Context, to the connection (of that Action) with the *Mantra* characterized by the Power of Indicating that Deity whose connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has already been laid down.

If, in order to avoid the Syntactical Split shown against him, the opponent should take the sentence as merely laying down the connection of the verse with the directly-mentioned *Agnīdhropasthāna*,—then, to that explanation we offer the following reply :

Sūtra (22): The Injunction, in that case, would be wholly useless ; because of its non-connection with a fruitful action ; as the *Upasthāna* is not fruitful.

Objection : "The sentence in question would, from the Context, help the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*,—that is to say, the general connection of the verse being "obtained from elsewhere."

In reply to this, the *Bhāṣya* shows that the general connection would not be possible, unless it were distinctly enjoined. If the sentence meant a direct declaration of the *Upasthāna* with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, then it could have been taken along with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. When, however, the sentence is taken as laying down, by a qualified Injunction, the connection of the verse with reference to the *Upasthāna*,—without laying down the connection of this latter with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—then, what the injunction comes to is that the verse is to be employed in an ordinary worldly *Upasthāna* (not in connection with any Vedic sacrifice) not leading to any desirable results,—such an injunction being got at by the rejection of the Context which has had no corroborative text assumed in its support, and which, for this reason, is unable to give any idea of a particular connection (of the verse with a particular *Upasthāna* connected with the Vedic sacrifice of *Jyotiṣṭoma*). In accordance with our view, on the other hand, inasmuch as the verses will have been already taken up beforehand by the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, they could not apply to any other action (outside the pale of that sacrifice); and thus the Injunction would lay down something useful (the *Upasthāna* performed with the mantras, along with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, serving the useful purpose of helping in the

accomplishment of the Result of that sacrifice); and further, this way of interpreting the sentence is very much simpler. Or, there may be shown another simplicity in our view of the case: according to us what is laid down is the connection of the auxiliaries of the Jyotishtoma, in the shape of the *Agnīdhra* etc. with the instrumental accessories, in the shape of the Verses; and this Injunction would be with reference to the *Upasthāna*.

Sūtra (23): And further, all mantras are already enjoined.

It has been argued above that the *Āgneyī* verses mentioned in the Context of the *Jyotishtoma* will have been already used in connection with that sacrifice, and hence being stale, could not rightly be employed in connection with the *Upasthāna* in question.

But this is not correct; (1) because the text itself lays down a *stale* verse; and (2) because the subordinate position of the mantra makes it capable of being repeated (with general actions),—there would be no incongruity in the application of the said verses to both (the *Jyotishtoma* proper and the *Upasthāna* connected with it). For this reason, we cannot accept the sentence to admit of the construction ‘*Yēnaivamlingēna kuryāt*’ (as shown in the *Pūrvapakṣa*). Also because all mantras are such as have been already enjoined, in connection with some action or other; (and hence all mantras would be equally *stale*).

Then, it has been urged above that the verse would be particularized by the Injunctive affix (in ‘*Upatishthēt*’). But inasmuch as the necessary particularization is got at by other means, such an assertion can only shine as an irrelevant assumption. For even if we could specify the verses by means of the Injunctive affix, we could not avoid the admissibility of all the verses in question; because every one of them is *enjoined* (and as such specified by the Injunctive affix), either as forming part of the Vedic text to be studied, or as occurring in the *Brahmayajñas*, or as forming a part of the *Vācastobha* and the *Ācvināvasthā*. Consequently it cannot be rightly asserted that the specification would be done by the (Injunctive) verb; as even after such a specification, there would be nothing to set aside the idea of the admissibility of all the verses in question.

Thus then, for the very simple reason of there being no “Apparent Inconsistency” (to justify the Indicative Power in leading to the assumption of a Vedic text), it must be admitted that, in the *Upasthāna* of the *Agnīdhra*, we are to employ only those *Āgneyī* verses that are found to be mentioned in the Context.

ADHIKARAṆA (9).

[The *Bhaksha Mantras* are to be employed in the *Holding* etc., in accordance with their Indicative Power.]

Sūtra (24): "On account of its Indicative Power and Name, the *Anuvāka* must be taken as applying to the *Bhaksha*."

[We find the *Bhaksha mantra* laid down as follows: '*Bhakshē hi mā viçā.... , ēhi vaso purovaso.....bāhubhyām saghyāsam, nçakshantva dēvaatakyēsham, hinva mē.....mā me' vāninābhimatigāh, mandrābhībhutik kētuḥ.. ...trpyatu,.....gayatracchandasaḥ Indrapītasya.....bhakshayāmi.*] The *Bhāṣya* has quoted the whole *mantra*, with a view to show which word in it is capable of what use, as will be discussed in the next four *Adhikarāṇas*. As a matter of fact, just as in the case of the *Sūktavāka*, the words '*Prātassavānaḥ* etc.,' as also the '*Vasumadgāna* etc.,' that are eulogised as qualified by them,—so in the *mantra* under consideration also, the '*gāyatracchandasaḥ* etc.,' and also '*Indrapīta* etc.,' are to be used, separately, according to their several significations.

Though such is the fact, yet, in connection with the *Mantra*, there naturally arises the question as to whether the whole *Anuvāka* is to be used in the '*Eating*,' or different parts of it are to be used in connection with '*Holding*,' '*Seeing*' and '*Proper Digestion*,' as may be found to be indicated by the words of the several sentences.

On this question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as it is the *Eating* alone that is enjoined,—as the word "*bhakshayāmi*" in the *Anuvāka* itself distinctly indicates that *Eating*,—as the whole of the *Anuvāka*, being held between the two words "*bhakshē*" and "*bhakshayāmi*," cannot possibly pertain to anything else, —and, lastly, as, in accordance with the *Sūtra* IX—i—37, the *Holding* "etc. also being mere concomitants of the principal action of *Eating*, the whole *Anuvāka* is capable of being taken as a single sentence syntactically connected,—the *Anuvāka* must be taken as to be used, in its "complete form, in connection with the *Eating*.

"The following objection is here raised: '(a) The first sentence of "the *Anuvāka*—*Bhakshēhi* etc.—is quite applicable to the *Eating*; but

"(b) the next sentence—from *vaso etc.* down to *saghyāsam*—clearly "pertains to the *Holding*; though the root *saghi* (in *saghyāsam*) being "laid down in the sense of *killing*, the word *saghyāsam* is not clearly "expressive of *Holding*; yet, inasmuch as the instruments mentioned in "connection with the action are the *Arms* (*bāhubyām*), the word *saghyā-* "sum, like the word *nirvapati*, indicates the *Holding*; and it is a well-known "fact that a single root has many significations; or lastly, it may be that "the *killing* meant is that which is done by *holding*; (c) then again, the "sentence beginning with *nṛcakshasam* is found to be applicable to *seeing* "or *looking into*; though the root *cakshīn* is laid down in the sense of "making an audible sound, yet in usage, it is found to be expressive of "mere *illumination*; hence the word *nṛcakshasā* comes to mean *one who* "is well known among men; and in the word '*avakhyēsham*' also has its "origin in the root *cakshīn*; and though the change that this root "undergoes is into the form *khyān*, yet it is changed into *khyēn* (as a "Vedic form); consequently the sentence must be taken as pertain- "ing to *seeing*; (d) in the same manner, the sentence '*hinva mē etc.*' "must be taken as pertaining to the *proper digestion of the Soma*, as "it is only when properly digested that it can make the body healthy, "and not pass off below the navel. And thus the whole cannot be taken "as a single sentence (pertaining to *Eating* alone); as that would be "incompatible with the indications of the sentences as shown above."

"To this we make the following reply: All these—*Holding etc.*— "coming as they all do, before and after the *Eating*, must be taken as "qualifying concomitants of this latter; and hence if the whole *Anuvāka* "were taken as indicative of the *Eating* as qualified by them, these "qualifications also would be indicated by implication; and thus there "would be no incongruity in the whole being used in connection with "the single action of *Eating*. Though it is a fact that the *Holding etc.* "do not abandon their predominance, and are directly expressed by the "words of the *mantras*,—and as such the *mantras* should be taken as "pointing to these,—yet, inasmuch as no useful purpose would be served "by pointing to that which has not been enjoined, it is more reasonable to "take them as concomitant auxiliaries to that which is enjoined (i.e. the "*Eating*); as we have explained in connection with the *Nirvōpa Mantra*. "For these reasons it must be admitted that our view is not incompatible "with the indications of the *Mantras*.

"There is yet another argument in favour of our view—viz. that it "is in keeping with the name '*Bhakshānūvāka*' that is given to the "whole.

"Objection: 'The Name that controls the applicability of *mantras* is "that which is found mentioned in the Veda; and as for the name

“ ‘*Bhakshānuvāka*,’ it is not found mentioned in the Veda; and as such ‘it can not be rightly taken as controlling the applicability of the ‘*Anuvāka*.’

“ *Reply* : A means of knowledge, whether it be Vedic or pertaining ‘to the ordinary world, is accepted as authoritative, with reference to the ‘subject it deals with, only if it is found to be free from discrepancies; ‘and as a matter of fact, there are no discrepancies in the *Name* in ‘question (as controlling the applicability of the *Mantra*).

“ That is to say, just as the authoritativeness of the Veda rests upon ‘the fact of its being free from all discrepancies attaching to the speaker, ‘so too would be the authoritative character of a *Name* found in the ‘ordinary world; as this latter is as eternal in its application as the Veda. ‘Nor can the ordinary usage of the *Name* be relegated to the realms of ‘the ‘Blind following the Blind,’ because the *Name* (‘*Bhakshānuvāka*’) as ‘well as the named (the *Anuvāka*) is clearly perceptible; for certainly ‘no imperceptibility attaches to the *Anuvāka*, as it does to the fact ‘of the *Agnihotra* being the means to the attainment of Heaven. Con- ‘sequently the mere fact of the *Anuvāka* being recognized as called by ‘the name ‘*Bhakshānuvāka*’ must be accepted as sufficient authority for ‘the correctness of the name; it is for this reason that whenever we ‘come across this particular *Anuvāka*, the name ‘*Bhakshānuvāka*’ always ‘comes up to our mind; and the compound ‘*Bhakshānuvāka*’ being ex- ‘pounded as ‘*bhakshasya anuvākaḥ*,’ distinctly points to the fact of the ‘*Anuvāka* being connected with *Eating*. And thus whenever these two ‘(the *Anuvāka* and the *Eating*) present themselves to our mind, it ‘becomes at once apparent that they bear some sort of a mutual relation- ‘ship; and it is this general relationship that becomes *specified* by their ‘mutual requirements. That is to say, the *Eating* stands in need of ‘something that would recall it to the mind of the sacrificial performer, ‘and the *Anuvāka* stands in need of something that it should indicate; ‘and both of these being thus circumstanced, inasmuch as they are found ‘to be capable of supplying each other’s need, the Indicator and the ‘Indicated become connected with each other; and this connection is ‘enjoined by the sentence laying down the performance of the Primary ‘Action with all its details. And thus too the whole of the *Anuvāka* in ‘question comes to be recognized as to be employed in the *Eating*.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (25) : The rest is to be taken apart, because of the action (Holding etc.) being enjoined, by means of the peculiar form of the Mantras, and also by the injunction (of *Eating* itself).

The disjunction of the *mantras* is to be explained in the manner indicated in the first objection against the *Pūrvapakṣa*; that is to say, on the ground of the direct significations of the *mantras* themselves; specially as the fact of the whole *Anuvāka* being syntactically connected is set aside by the 'peculiar form of the *mantras*'—i.e. by their Indicative Power and Context, which distinctly point to *Holding* etc.

Objection: "The fact of the whole being syntactically connected with *Eating* is also based upon the Indicative Power of the *Mantras*."

Reply: True; yet that Indicative Power is very much weaker, in its authority, on account of its being much farther removed from Direct Declaration. That is to say, the Indicative Power pertaining to the *Holding* etc. directly leads to the assumption of the corroborative Vedic text, and thereby quickly points to the applicability of the *mantra*; while in the other case, in the first instance, it would be necessary to assume the fact of the whole being syntactically connected,—then, through Indication, to assume the existence of the power in the whole to indicate the single action of *Eating*,—and then the corroborative text; and thus in this case the Vedic text is very much farther removed than in the former case. Consequently, the *Eating* being found to be directly connected with the first sentence of the *Anuvāka*, which happens to be most proximate to it, and the other sentences being found to be capable of applying to the other actions (*Holding* etc.), these latter are taken apart from the sentence pertaining to the *Eating*.

Objection: "There is not much useful purpose served by a *mantra* pointing to those that are already implied by something else."

Reply: How can such *pointing out* be said to be useless, when we find that, unless the actions are so pointed out, they cannot be performed. It is only such an implied action as is not pointed out, which requires no further effort for its performance than what is made in connection with the Action that implies it. In the case in question, however, we find that each of the actions of *Holding* etc. requires an independent effort for its performance; and as such until each is recalled to the mind (at the time of the sacrificial performance), it cannot be performed; and consequently it becomes necessary for these to be recalled (and this *recalling* can be done only by means of *mantras*).

Then again, we find that the injunction that we have of the *Eating*,—viz. the sentence '*abhiśhutyā hutvā* etc., etc.,'—is incapable of bringing about a due performance of its own object, unless it also lays down the other actions of *Holding* etc.; and hence it lays down these also.

Thus then, on account of the peculiar form of the *Mantras* themselves, —and of the fact of the injunction of these actions just pointed out,—the Actions themselves are laid down (as connected with the *Mantras*);—the

Proper Digestion and the *mantra* connected with it being separated from the rest through a distinct Injunction (shown below) ; and hence even though the direct Injunction of such connection, being not perceived, cannot be distinctly pointed out,—yet that does not much affect the position. As for the *Proper Digestion*, it must be taken as directly enjoined, on account of certain expiatory rites laid down as consequent upon *Vomitting* or *Purging* (which follow only when there is no *Proper Digestion*).

ADHIKARANA (10).

[The portion of the *Bhaskshānuvāka*, beginning with 'mandrābhibhūtiḥ' and ending with 'bhakshayāmi' forms a single *Hymn*].

Sūtra (26): The portion beginning with 'mandra' is to be taken as a single mantra, because it speaks of a subsidiary detail; specially as the two sentences therein contained jointly express a single fact.

[In the above *Bhaskshānuvāka*, we find the sentence 'mandrābhibhūtiḥbhakshayāmi'; and in connection with this, there arises the question as to whether the sentence, from the beginning down to 'trpyatu,' forms one *mantra*, and that beginning with 'vusumat' down to the end forms another, or the two together form a single *mantra*.]

On this we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as, like *Holding* etc. in the previous *Adhikarāṇa*, the 'single fact of *satisfaction* is denoted by the sentence ending with 'trpyatu,' this must be taken as a distinct *mantra*."

SIDDHANTA.

To this we make the following reply: That Action alone can form the object of *Indication* by *mantras*, which requires a distinct effort for its accomplishment,—and not those that merely follow on the wake of other actions.

That is to say, in the case of the *Holding* etc. we find that unless one performs these other actions, he cannot accomplish the *Eating*; and hence it was only right for the person, as well as for the Scripture, to make a distinct effort (towards its performance and *Indication* respectively). In the case in question, however, we find that for the *satisfaction* (of Hunger) there is no other effort possible than what is involved in *Eating*; and as such no useful purpose could be served by its indication (by the mantra). Consequently, we can explain the Imperative (in 'trpyatu') either as denoting a *request*, or as having the force of the *Present*; and thereby the two sentences would be connected syntactically,—indicating, jointly, the single act of *Eating* as qualified by *satisfaction*,—thus forming a single *mantra*.

ADHIKARĀṆA (11).

[The *māntras* beginning with 'Indrapitasya' etc. are applicable to all *Eatings*, with the necessary modifications.]

[An *Hypothetical Adhikarāṇa*.]

Sūtra (27): Inasmuch as the mantra indicates the particular 'Eating,' out of a number of those that are all enjoined by the same Injunction,—the 'Eating' of the Soma other than that dedicated to Indra is to be done without any mantra.

[In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*, there are several cups of Soma dedicated to a number of Deities, Indra and the rest. The remnants of these offerings are to be *eaten*, and the *mantra* laid down in connection with this eating is the *Bhukshānuvāka* under consideration. And there now arises the question as to whether the *mantra* is to be repeated with the eating of every one of the remnants, or of that alone which has been dedicated to Indra, and those of others are to be done without any *mantras*.]

Inasmuch as the word '*Indrapitasya*' (in the *mantra*) is co-extensive with the *Soma* (that is offered to Indra),—as there are no words in the *mantra* indicative of those not dedicated to Indra,—and lastly, as there can be no modifications in *mantras* connected with the Primary Actions, (and every one of the *eatings* is a distinct Primary by itself),—it would appear that the *eating* of the *Soma* dedicated to other Deities is to be done without *mantras*.

As against the above, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

Sūtra (28): "The mantra will have to be applied in accordance with the Deity (to whom the offering has been made); because the offerings to the other Deities are shown to have their archetype in the offering made to Indra."

"In connection with the *eating* of the Soma dedicated to other Deities than Indra, the *mantra* is to be repeated with the necessary modifications; because the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the offering to Indra. Though all the offerings are similar actions, yet inasmuch as they are distinct actions, some would be mere offshoots of the other. And here we find that the offering of the *Dhruvasoma* to Indra forms the archetype of the other offerings.

"Question : 'How do you know this ?'

"Answer : We know this from the fact of the *mantra* relating to the 'Holding pointing to the *Soma* as forming the object of offering to Indra ; as there is always a restriction of the object to be accomplished by its Instrument ; as for instance, the *Agnihotra* etc. are restricted by the 'Āhavanīya Fire etc. As a matter of fact, too, all the accessory details of the *Soma* are present only where the *Soma* is present ; and hence it is only the offerings (of *Soma*) to Indra that are accompanied by the accessory details ; and the other offerings, not being directly connected with those details, would take them only by transference (from the former). And thus it is established that the same *Mantras*, with necessary modifications, are applicable to the other offerings also.

"It is only thus that we have the Injunction, with reference to the previously mentioned 'namati' (= *viparinamati*, modifies), specified to the *Anushtup* metre (that is to say, this injunction distinctly points to the fact of the modifications of *mantras* being quite in keeping with the Scriptures). This injunction is in connection with the *Jyotishtoma* ; and it is because the various parts of the *Jyotishtoma* are not yet recognized as its offshoots that the change in the *mantra* has to depend upon the said Injunction ; as if they were recognized as its offshoots, then the changes would have been made in accordance with the general law that the ectypes are to be done in the manner of the archetype ; and hence in that case the Injunction brought forward could not have shown what it is meant to show.

"Objection : 'The parts of the *Jyotishtoma* are its mere ectypes ; and hence the mention of the change does not indicate what you mean.'

"Reply : Not so ; because all the offerings ending with the *Agnishtoma* being contained in the same Injunction, even though the Parts (*samsthās*) were mere ectypes, the *mantra* applied to these would be in its unchanged form—in accordance with general law that 'the ectype is to be done in the same way as the archetype' ; and in that case there should not have been any mention of 'Change' (in the word 'namati').

"When the offering to Indra forms the archetype of the other offerings, the *mantra* does undergo changes, in connection with the *Agnishtoma* etc., occurring in the *Third Savana* ; and hence the mention of 'Change' becomes quite compatible with this. By the word 'namati' what is meant is the inserting of a particular word, and not that of the word 'anushtup.'

"Consequently certain modifications are to be made in the *mantras*, in accordance with the Deities, to whom the particular offerings are made."

ADHIKARANA (12).

[There should be a mention of Indra in connection with the *Punarabhyunnita Soma*.]

Sūtra (29): In connection with the *Punarabhyunnita*, there should be a mention of all Deities, because it contains the remnants of both.

While the foregoing *Adhikarana* still rests in the *Purvapaksha*, and the *Siddhānta* is not finally stated and established, till the end of the *Pāda*, we take for granted, for the time being, the propriety of having modifications, and then proceed to consider under what circumstances the modifications, if allowable, would be possible.

When the *soma* contained in certain vessels has been offered and poured out, even while there may be some remnants left in them, more *soma* is poured into the same vessels (for other offerings); and the *soma* thus poured in is called the '*Punarabhyunnita Soma*.' How this character belongs to that *soma*, and how it forms the object of the discussion relating to *modifications*, is thus shown:—There are ten vessels; four of these belong to the *Brahmā*, etc., who make the middle offerings; and each of these four is used twice in the offerings of *Vashaṭkāra* and the *Anuvashatkāra* of the *Hotṛ* priest; while the *Hautraka* vessels (that is the vessels belonging to the *Hotṛ*) are used only once in the offering of the *Vashaṭkāra*;—in all these, the Deity is *Indra*;—and while these vessels still contain remnants of the previously offered *soma*, more *soma* is poured into them and offered to other Deities;—all this is shown by the Directions,—in connection with the offerings to many Deities that are made by the Priests in connection with the *Second Homa*,—implied in the *yājyā mantras* connected with those offerings;—such, for instance, as '*maitrāvaruṇo mītrāvaruṇau mītram vāyam havāmahē, etc., etc.*';—and when, after all these offerings have been made, the vessels are brought out for the purpose of the post-sacrificial *eating*, then they are found to contain two remnants,—the former, the remnant of the first offering to *Indra*, and the latter, that of the offering to *Mitrāvaruṇa*. And then, when the time comes for the mention of the Deities (in course of the *mantras* to be recited in connection with the *eating* of these remnants) there arises a doubt as to whether there should be a mention of *Indra*, whose connection with the vessel as its Deity has been passed over, as also

ADHIKARAṆA (13).

[At the eating of the *Pātnīvata*, Indra, etc., should not be mentioned.]

Sūtra (32): “In the *Pātnīvata*, it would be as before.”

We proceed to consider exceptions to the general rule arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

As a matter of fact, we find that the remnants of the offerings to the pair of Deities are thrown into the *Adityasthālī*, and from that they are again transferred to the *Āgrayana* vessel; and, subsequent to this, we have the declaration of the *Holding of the Pātnīvata*—in the sentence ‘*Upāñcupātrēṇa Pātnīvatamāgrayaṇāt grhṇāti.*’

And when the eating of the remnant of this *Pātnīvata* offering comes to be done, there arises the question as to whether the Deities other than *Patnīvat* should be mentioned in the *mantra* recited, or not. And on this we have the

PŪRVAPAKSHA

that they should be mentioned—the *mantra* being read as *Indravāyupatnīvatpītasya, etc.*

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (33): Inasmuch as the remnant is taken up (by the subsequent Deity), the connection of the previous Deity should be set aside.

The present case is by no means similar to that dealt with in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. Because, at the time of the Holding of the offering to *Patnīvat*, the proximity of the other Deity is set aside; as the offering to *Patnīvat* is laid down as to be conveyed together with the remnants of the previous offerings.

That is to say, the conveying of the gift to *Patnīvat* is laid down, as to be done when the remnants of the offerings to the pair of Deities have been transferred to the *Āgrayana* vessel. And under the circumstances, even if the gift were conveyed to another Deity, the implication of its connection with *Patnīvat* would be unobstructed; and when *Patnīvat* itself is declared as one to whom the gift is to be conveyed, its connection with the remnants becomes all the more potent. For instance, the *soma* that issues from the *Āgrayana* vessel is meant to belong to *Patnīvat*; and as a matter of fact, the remnants of the other offerings are actually found to

issue from the *Āgrayana* vessels; hence these remnants also are conveyed as gifts to *Patnivat*.

If we had the declaration in the form '*Āgrayanam pātnivatam karoti*,' then, even though the Remnant would have been proximately connected with *Patnivat*, yet, inasmuch as it would not be the '*Āgrayana*,' it would on the strength of the text be removed from the conveyance of the gift. But we find the direction in the form, '*Āgrayanāt pātnivatam grhṇāti*,'—and not as '*Āgrayanasya*' or '*Āgrayanam*.' And in such cases—e.g. in the sentence '*vrkshāt parṇam patati*'—we understand the *parṇa* falling to be, not only the leaves of the tree, but also the feathers of the birds inhabiting the tree; because the *Tree* is spoken of only as the *place from which the parṇa falls* (and not as that to which the *parṇa* belongs). In the same manner, in the case in question, all that is laid down as the ground for the connection of the Remnant with *Pātnivat* is the fact of its *issuing from the Āgrayana vessel*, and not that of its being the *Āgrayana* itself. And from between the *Sampāta* and the *Āgrayana*, which occupy the same place, *that which issues forth* can be spoken of as '*Āgrayanāt apētaḥ*'; and that is the sole ground for the connection with *Patnivat*.

As for the fact of the Remnant being mixed up with offerings other than the *Āgrayana*, it issues (or flows) from the *Non-Āgrayana* also, this fact is of no use either in the prohibition or the injunction (of the *Pātnivata*); because we have no such declaration as that '*that which flows from the Non-Āgrayana is not Pātnivata*.' If such were the sense of the scriptures, then that *Āgrayana* offering, which actually flows from the *Āgrayana*, would be flowing from both the *Āgrayana* and the *Anāgrayana*, and would thus cease to be '*Pātnivata*.' Consequently, inasmuch as there would be nothing to warrant the restriction that the Remnant must (in order to be connected with *Patnivat*) flow from the *Āgrayana only*, we must admit it simply as that *it should flow from the Āgrayana*. And as this would be applicable to the *Sampāta* also, it becomes quite possible for the Remnant to be connected with the *Patnivat* Deity. And as until the ownership of the previous Deity has not been set aside, it could not belong to the previous Deity,—there can be no mention of the previous Deity (at the *eating* of the Remnant of the *Pātnivata*); just as when the teacher gives the remnant of his food to his head-pupil, and this latter, having had his full out of it, gives it to the subordinate pupil, this latter eats it as the remnant of the food of the head-pupil, and not as that of the teacher.

Objection: "*The Remnant in question is only a part of that which belonged to the previous Deity,—that is to say, before it was offered to "Patnivat."*"

The author of the *Bhāṣya*, thinking of making the objector admit his own view of the case, replies jointly: *Certainly, we do not find any part of that which has been poured into the fire as an offering.* That is to say, all that belongs to the previous Deity is that which was actually poured for it into the fire, and that which was thus offered was destroyed by the fire.

The opponent, not comprehending the drift of the answer, urges—*“Even in the original offering, we do not find any portion of that which has been poured as libation.”*

The answer to this is that, in the original offering the Deity was duly named at the time of the utterance of the words conveying the gift to the Deity.

Says the opponent: “The same was the case in the case in question also.”

The *Siddhānti* replies: *In this lies the difference from the original offering.* That is to say, in the case of the original offering, there was no mention made of the Deity that had been set aside; while in the present case, the fact of its having been set aside is distinctly stated.

Thus, then, it is established that *Patnīvat* alone should be mentioned—(the mantra being read as ‘*Patnīvatpītasya*, etc.’).

ADHIKARANA (14).

[At the eating of the Remnant of the *Pātnīvata* offering there should be no mention of *Tvashtṛ*.]

Sūtra (34): “*Tvashtṛ* should be mentioned, because of the Drinking.”

[In connection with the *Pātnīvata* offering, we have the *Mantra*, ‘*Agnāi patnīvan, sajūrdēvēna Tvashtṛā somam piva*’; and with regard to this, there arises the question as to whether *Tvashtṛ* should be mentioned at the eating or not.]

On this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as in connection with the *Pātnīvata* offering, *Tvashtṛ* is “spoken of as ‘*drinking the Soma*’ in the company of *Patnīvat*, he also “must be regarded as the Deity of that offering, as indicated by the “words of the *Mantra*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (35): Such should not be the case, because of inequality.

Tvashtṛ should not be mentioned; because between *Mantra* and the *Direct Injunction*, there is a vast difference of authoritative strength (this is one ‘inequality’); and then again, there is a difference in the characters of *Tvashtṛ* and *Patnīvat* as nominatives to the action of *Drinking*; as what the *Mantra* denotes is the mere companionship (of *Tvashtṛ*) (this is another ‘inequality’).

That is to say, in the *Injunction* of the *Pātnīvata* offering—‘*Pātnīvatam grhṇāti*’—we have *Patnīvat* alone mentioned as the Deity, and that too by means of a nominal affix (in the word ‘*Pātnīvatam*’); and the nominal affix could not denote this, if the deific character depended upon something else (the association of another Deity for instance); and for this reason also, the *Indication* by the words of the *Mantra* (of the deific character of *Tvashtṛ*) is extremely weak in its authority (as against the direct denotation of the Nominal Affix). Then again, as a matter of fact, it is not found to be impossible for the *Mantra* to be an auxiliary to the Action in question, unless the deific character of *Tvashtṛ* is admitted; as the connection of the *Mantra* with the Action is accomplished by its deno-

tation of *Patnīvāt* only. Nor is the mention of *Tvashṭṛ* in the *Mantra* otherwise inexplicable; as its mention could be taken to be in praise of *Patnivat*. Thus then, the meaning of the *Mantra* would come to be this: 'You, and *Patnīvān*, who are associated with *Tvashṭṛ*, drink the soma!'

On the other hand, how could the mention of *Tvashṭṛ* being the 'drinker of soma' (even if the *Mantra* could be made to give this meaning) make Him the Deity of that offering? Because the sole function of the Deity of a sacrifice lies in his serving as the agent with reference to whom the offerings are made (and not in his actually eating or drinking the materials offered). The deific character of *Tvashṭṛ*, however, becomes all the more unacceptable, when all that the *Mantra* speaks of is his *companionship* (with *Patnīvāt*) (and not even the fact of his being a 'drinker'); and this too, it does only figuratively; and it does not mean that he actually accompanies *Patnīvāt* in the 'drinking'; as we often find the word '*saha*' used in cases where that which is spoken of as 'accompanying' does not join in the Action; for instance, in the common saying, '*sahaita duṣabhiḥ putraiḥ bhāram vahati gardabhī*,' we find that all that it means is that—'even while the ass has ten offsprings, it is she that is made to carry the burden.'

Thus it must be admitted that the *Mantra* does not indicate the fact of *Tvashṭṛ* being the Deity (of the *Patnīvata* offering); and as such there should be no mention of him (at the eating of the Remnant of that offering).

ADHIKARANA (15).

[At the eating of the Remnant of the *Pātnivata* offering, there should be no mention of the Thirty and Three.]

Sūtra (36): So also the Thirty, as the Mantra serves another purpose.

This Adhikaraṇa simply deals with the applicability of the conclusion of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* to another case.

[In connection with the same *Pātnivata*, we find another *Mantra*: 'Aibhih agnē saratham yahyarvōk nānārutham vā, vibhavo hyāvāh, patnīvata-trimṇatastrimṇca dēvānanushvadhāmāvaha mādāyasva'; and there arises the question as to whether at the eating of the Remnant of the *Pātnivata* offering, there should be a mention of the 'Thirty and three' Deities spoken of in this *Mantra*, or not.]

And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as there are several points in which the present case differs from that dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the conclusion thereof is, for this reason, not applicable to the present case. These points of difference are the following:—

"(1) The same *mantra* that indicates *Agni* to be the Deity, also indicates the fact of *Agni* being the *Distributor* of the Drink to the 'Thirty and Three gods, who are spoken of as the partakers of that Drink; and hence the fact of these latter also being the principal Deities is shown by the *Mantra* itself, which presents *Agni* in quite a secondary position (of that of Distributer or Attendant at meals).

"(2) In the case of the *mantra* treated of in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, we found that it denoted mere *companionship*, and hence *Tvashtṛ* not being found to be mentioned on terms of equality, was rejected from the deific position. The case is reversed in the *mantra* now under consideration; as in this it is *Agni* that is spoken of as subordinate; and hence the former law cannot apply to the present case.

"(3) All that the Injunction contained in the word with the nominal affix ('*Pātnivatam*') denotes is that the deific character in connection with the Action in question consists in the fact of a certain Deity being '*Patnīvān*' (having a wife); and this qualification is found

“to be as concomitant with *Agni*—in the *mantra* ‘*Agnāi Patnivan*’—as with the thirty and three gods, who are also spoken of in the same *Mantra* as ‘having wives’ in the sentence ‘*Patnīvatastrimṣatastrimṣca dēvān.*’ Nor does the original Injunction (‘*Pātnīvatam grhṇīyat*’) preclude the connection of other Deities,—which preclusion would have vetoed the indications by the *mantra*. Nor is there any infringement of the Injunction involved in the acceptance of the other Deities (the ‘thirty and three’) along with the one formerly enjoined. And inasmuch as the connection of these other deities is cognized by altogether different means (i.e. the indications of the *mantra*), it cannot be said to have anything to do with the nominal affix (in ‘*Pātnīvatam*’), which therefore cannot be said to be dependent upon the mention of these (and as such impossible). That is to say, if the nominal affix had enjoined the Deity ‘*Patnīvat*,’ as depending upon the ‘Thirty and three,’ then alone could it be open to the charge of standing in need of an extraneous factor. And as for the *mantra*, there is nothing incongruous in its indicating the Deity, as depending upon the previous Injunction (as such dependence is declared to be incompatible only with the nature of the Nominal Affix). Then too, inasmuch as we accept both—*Agni* as well as the Thirty and Three gods—to be the Deities, there can be no contradiction between the original Injunction and the latter *mantra*’s Indication.

“*Question*: ‘When both the Deities serve the same purpose, how can they be both accepted? [as in such cases, it is necessary to take the two as optional alternatives].’

“*Answer*: Both could not be taken together, if the *mantra* did not speak of both. As a matter of fact, however, we find that, while not abandoning the mention of *Agni*,—who has been enjoined in the previous Injunction,—as having the character of the Deity in the shape of the *Distributor*, the *mantra* indicates the fact of the *Thirty and three* gods being the Deities.

“Thus then, both being taken together, it becomes necessary to make a mention of all of them (at the eating of the *Pātnīvata* Remnant). And that this is authorized by the *mantra* itself, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show by appending an explanation of the *mantra* as follows:

“In reciting the *Yājñā* the *Agnidhra* Priest thus respectfully prefers a request to *Agni*, in the words—*Ayāhi*, Come—though the ‘*ā*’ appears at the very beginning of the *mantra* and ‘*yāhi*’ after three words, yet such usage is in accordance with the rule ‘*Ohandasi vyavahitāṣca*’—*ebhih*—i.e. along with the Thirty and Three gods mentioned later on, either on the same chariot, or on different chariots, as you are exception-

“ally rich in horses; but having come before them, present to the Thirty
“and Three gods and their wives the *Śvādā* food, *Soma*, and satisfy
“them fully.’ By this it is clearly shown that these Deities are meant
“to be the enjoyers of the Drink.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: There should be no mention of the Thirty and Three gods at the eating of the *Pātnivata* Remnant. Because in all cases the functioning of the *mantra* is controlled by what is directly enjoined; consequently, as in the case of *Tvaṣṭṛ*, so in the present case also, the mention of the Thirty and Three gods (in the *mantra*) must be taken as contributing to the praise of Agni. That is to say, inasmuch as the sole business of the *mantra* lies in recalling to mind what has been previously enjoined (in the Injunction ‘*Pātnivataṃ gṛhṇāti*’), it could not, in any case, serve the purpose of indicating either the fact of Agni being the *Distributor*, or that of the Thirty and Three gods being the partakers, of the Drink,—both of these facts not having been previously enjoined.

Thus then, the *mantra* being found to serve a distinct purpose, it cannot be endowed with the power of independently indicating the deific character of the Thirty and Three gods, thereby stepping beyond the original Injunction. And when even this indicative potency is not possible, it is all the more improbable for the *mantra* to have the injunctive potency.

Nor could the *mantra* be taken as recalling the deific character of these thirty and three gods only; because these gods have been mentioned simply for the purpose of indicating the greatness of *Agni*, enjoined by the previous Injunction. And the reason why we take it this way is that, inasmuch as the *mantra* describes, as the *giver*, one (*Agni*) whose lordship over the *Soma* is unknown, such description cannot be taken in its direct sense; and hence it is taken as implying the said lordship of Agni.

That is to say, as a matter of fact, the *Soma* has not been offered to Agni at the time that the *mantra* is being recited; and then before he has himself received the *Soma*, if he were really asked to give it to others, it would mean a pure deception. If, however, the request to ‘give’ be construed as implying the praise of his greatness that ‘Thou art the true giver and the master of this *Soma*,’ then the sentence would become quite intelligible; as in that case it would resemble such ordinary complimentary talk as we come across even in ordinary parlance; as for instance, in specially complimenting one of the persons invited, one says ‘when you

have been invited, you have become the master, and it is you who should invite the others.' And in this case the sentence comes to serve a distinctly useful purpose, in keeping with the previous Injunction. And the word '*mādayasva*' (satisfy them) also, not being found to be compatible in its direct signification, is to be taken as implying the request 'come with these.' Then also the mention of Agni as *the giver* could not serve any perceptible purpose; and as such it must be taken as indicating the fact of Agni being the actual *Receiver* of the offering. And thus, that which is clearly expressed by the nominal affix (in '*Pātnīvatam*') would not have to be rejected, in view of the *Mantra* (as the two would in this case be quite compatible).

Question: "The injunction mentioning merely the word '*Pātnīvatam*' "how do you make it out to be an injunction of *Agni* alone as the Deity, "and not the Thirty and Three?"

Answer: In the injunction in question, what is taken as the *Patnīvat* (having a wife) is *Agni*, and not the Thirty and Three gods; because in the *mantra* '*Agnāi patnīvān*' we find the epithet '*Patnīvān*' applied to *Agni*.

Objection: "But we find the same epithet applied to the Thirty and "Three gods also,—in the *mantra* '*patnīvatastrimṇataḥ, etc.*'"

Reply: True; the epithet is applied to them; but in spite of that, we take *Agni* alone to be the *Patnīvān* that is meant by the previous Injunction. Because as a rule, when something is mentioned by means of a nominal affix as in ('*Pātnīvatam*'), there is no manifestation of the *number* of that which is denoted by the basic noun; and inasmuch as the denotation of the basic noun could not be inserted in any other way, in an explanation of the word ('*Pātnīvata*'), it is spoken of in the singular number,—as '*Patnīvān dēvatā asya.*' As for '*Thirty*' however it is always in the plural number, and as such could never find a place in the explanation of the word ('*Pātnīvatam*'); consequently no such nominal affix (as is found in the Injunction) could ever appear in connection with them; and hence they could never be taken as the Deities connected with the Action laid down in that Injunction.

ADHIKARAṆA (16).

[At the eating, there should be no mention of the *Anuvashaṭkāra*.]

Sūtra (37): The *Vashaṭkāra* also, like the Agent, (should not be mentioned).

[There is an *Anuvashaṭkāra* mentioned in the sentence—‘*Somasyūgrā vihityanuvash-ṭkaroti*,’ and in connection with this there arises the question as to whether this *Anuvashaṭkāra* should be mentioned or not, at the time of the *Eating*.]

On this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as there is no doubt as to the deific character of the “*Anuvashaṭkāra*” being expressed by the said Injunction, as well as by “the words of the *mantra*,—there must be a mention of this.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: Just as the Drinker appearing subsequently could not make a mention of the previous Drinker, who is not connected with the Primary Sacrifice,—so, in the same manner, there could be no mention of the *Vashaṭkāra* in question. Because this latter is not mentioned in the Primary Sacrifice; and even when it does appear, it does not appear as doing anything for that sacrifice. Consequently there should be no mention of this.

ADHIKARAṆA (17).

[The Remnants of offerings other than the one to Indra should be eaten without *Mantras*.]

Sūtra (38): *As the Soma belongs equally to all the Deities, ((there can be no relationship of the Archetype and Ectype among the various offerings); (and as for the declaration of the change into the Anushtub metre) it is a mere prohibition of the use of the preceding metre.*

We now proceed to offer our reply to the opponent's arguments contained in *Sūtra* (28).

There should not be any modifications in the *mantras*, in accordance with the Deity, the remnant of whose offering is to be eaten; the remnants of the offerings to other deities than Indra should be eaten without *mantras*. Because the whole action of the *Jyotishtoma* forms a single context; and as such an action could not be its own *archetype* (*Prakṛti*) and *ectype* (*Vikṛti*).

That is to say, if each of the several repetitions of the same action of offering to the various Deities (which repetitions constitute the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice) were a distinct action by itself, then each would have been related as the *archetypes* and *ectypes* of one another. As a matter of fact, however, they are not so many distinct actions; for neither the *Soma* nor any accessory details are laid down with reference to these individual offerings; as the way in which one of these takes up the *Soma*, etc. is exactly the same in which they are taken up by the rest. We shall explain this in detail under *Sūtra* III—vi—30. Nor can the *mantra* ('*Indrapītārya*, etc.') make the *Soma* entirely connected with *Indra*; as we have a direct declaration ('*Somēna yajēta*') to the effect that the *Soma* belongs to all the Deities. We find in the case of the declaration '*Āhavanīyē juhōti*,' that, not appearing in the context of any particular sacrifice, it points to the fact of the *Āhavanīya* pertaining to all Homas; and hence inasmuch as there are no actions without the fire, what the sentence is taken to denote is the fact of such persons as have not laid the fire not being entitled to the performance of any sacrifices. But the fact of the *Soma* belonging to all the Deities is not indicated by the *mantra* in the same manner, in the case in question; as in this case, the *Mantra* being found in the context (of the particular sacrifice *Jyotishtoma*), could

very well, by its indicative power, indicate the fact of the *Soma* belonging to Indra;—and that the *Soma* belonging to the other Deities would be *held* and *measured* (by handfuls), without being indicated by the *Mantra*.

Or, it may be that there being no discrimination among the several *Somas*, all of them being *held* up, they would be distinguished by the words conveying the offerings to the several Deities.

Or, as in the case of the *Subrahmanya*, the *mantra* could be taken as indicating *Indra* as the chief among the rest, the sense being 'Indra and the rest.'

Or, lastly, inasmuch as the word '*Vasumat*' is not found in the original Injunction of the sacrifice, the mention of that in the *mantra* would be otherwise useless; and hence the word '*Vasumatvāna*' may be taken as denoting '*Indra* as accompanied by the other Deities.'

Thus then, the *Soma* is equally connected, by Injunction, with all the Deities; and thus none of the offerings could be taken as a mere ectype of the other.

It has been argued above (under *Sūtra* 28) that, inasmuch as we have an injunction as to changing the metre of the original into the *Anuṣṭup*, the offering, in connection with which this change is laid down, is an ectype of the former. But the injunction of the change could very well be applicable, even when the *Soma* is equally applicable to all Deities; as in that case it could be explained as a qualified Injunction of a particular metre in the place of the *Jagati* metre which would have been used, on account of the offering falling in the Third *Savana*. Or, it may be that, inasmuch as the several *Samsthās* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are mere ectypes, it is only natural that there should be modifications in connection with these; but that does not serve the purpose of "showing" that the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the offerings to *Indra* (as held by *Sūtra* 28).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Bhukshamantra* is to be employed only in connection with the eating of the Remnant of the offering to *Indra*; and like the *Holding* and the *Measuring*, the *Mantra* could not restrict the *eating*; and hence the Remnants of the offerings to other Deities are to be eaten without *Mantras*.

ADHIKARĀṆA (18).

[The eating of the Aindrāgna Remnant is to be done without *mantras*.]

Sūtra (39): "In the case of the Aindrāgna offering, the *mantras* "should be used, because of the presence in the mantra of an "indication of that Deity."

Now then, there arises the question as to whether the *mantra* 'Indra-*pītasya, etc.*' is applicable to those cases where the Deity is Indra accompanied by another Deity. And on this point we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The Mantra is quite applicable to such cases. Because the declaration of Indra being the Deity does not depend upon the fact of the *Soma* "being *drunk* by him; and hence there can be no similarity between the "present cases and the case of the *Quartering of the Āgnēya Cake* (dealt "with under *Sūtra* II—i—27) for the simple reason of the incapability of "the word.

"That is to say, in the case of the sentence 'Āgnēyam caturdhā "karoti,' we find that, in the word 'Āgnēyam,' what is expressed as the "distinguishing property is the fact of the sacrificer having conveyed "the gift of that particular cake to *Agni*; and inasmuch as this fact is men- "tioned by means of the nominal affix (in 'Āgnēyam'), as pertaining "to *Agni* alone, independently of all other Deities,—it is not taken as "denoting the fact of its depending upon other Deities. In the case in "question, on the other hand, in the word '*Indrapītasya*,' the distinguish- "ing property spoken of is the fact of being the *Receiver of the gift*; and this "property belongs partially to each of the two Deities (Indra and *Agni*) to "whom the gifts have been conveyed by words; and in so far as the action " (of being the Receiver of *Soma*) belongs to each of the two, each is spoken "of as the 'Drinker.' Consequently in the case of the Aindrāgna offering, "inasmuch as both Indra and *Agni* would drink the *Soma* offered, we "could very well assert that half of it had been drunk by Indra, and "half by *Agni*. And as the character of '*being drunk by Indra*' does "not exactly exist in the Remnant that is before us (at the time of "*Eating*), we must take the word '*Indrapītasya*' (in the *Mantra*) as "applying to it, through that portion of it which has been poured in

“ libation; and there is no such limit to this as that it is only when so much has been drunk of it that it can be called by the name.

“ Thus then, inasmuch as the distinguishing property expressed in the word ‘ *Indrapitasya* ’ is found to exist in the *Aindrāgna* offering, the remnant of this latter also is to be eaten with the mantra ‘ *Indrapitasya*, etc.’.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (40) : The Mantra should apply to that of which there is a single Deity (*Indra*); because (*Aindrāgna* is) a distinct Deity (*from Indra*); just as in the case of the Quartering (*of the Cake*).

The *Aindrāgna* offering would certainly have been included in the word ‘ *Indrapita*,’ if the distinguishing feature, expressed by the word, had consisted in the functioning of the Deities towards actual *drinking* (of the *Soma*). But, as a matter of fact, our Deities do not drink; as all that they do, in the case of an offering being made to them, is that they serve as the Recipients of the conveyance of the gift. And at the time that the gift is conveyed to a joint Deity, there cannot be a mention of any one of them singly; as like the nominal affix (in ‘ *Āgnēyam* ’) the compound also (in ‘ *Aindrāgna* ’) would not be possible in case the factors compounded depended upon something else. Consequently, just as in the case of the *Quartering of the Āgnēya Cake*, so in the case in question also, inasmuch as the word ‘ *Indrapitasya* ’ denotes the fact of *Indra* alone being the Deity, it could not apply to the offering that is made to both (*Indra* and *Agni*) conjointly; and as such the *Mantra* in question cannot be applied to this latter offering.

The point, however, wherein the present case differs from that of the said *Quartering*, and which saves it from being taken as a mere repetition of the same discussion,—is as follows: In the present case what the *Pūrvapakṣi* holds is that the distinguishing character expressed by the word ‘ *Indrapitasya* ’ is not the *Deific character*, but the character of being the *Drinker* subsisting in the Receiver of the gift,—and that this exists in each of the two Deities (*Indra* and *Agni*); and the *Siddhānti* replies by showing that the actual character of ‘ *Drinker* ’ being inapplicable to the Deities, what the word ‘ *Indrapitasya* ’ indicates is the fact of *Indra being the Deity*. [And the two positions are very differently argued in the case of the said *Quartering*.]

As a matter of fact, however, even if the actual character of *Drinker* had belonged to the Deities, it would not have been possible to speak of the Remnant as ‘ *drunk by Indra*.’ Because it is not the *Soma* that was poured as offering to *Indra* that is spoken of by the words ‘ *Indrapitasya*

etc.; as that which was actually poured has been all *drunk* by Indra (and as such could not have remained in the vessel, to be *eaten* and addressed as '*Indrapīṭasya*'),—while that which has not been poured as an offering could not have been drunk by Indra (and as such this too could not be spoken of as '*Indrapīṭasya*').

That is to say, it is the Remnant of the Soma in the vessel that is spoken of as '*Indrapīṭa*'; but as a matter of fact, this has not been 'drunk by Indra,' because the word could apply only to that which was actually poured as an offering (and not to that left behind in the vessel). Consequently, inasmuch as the word '*Indrapīṭa*' denotes a property of that which exists in the vessel, it must be taken as denoting 'that which has been conveyed, by words, as an offering to Indra'; and this would simply mean that the word expresses the fact of *Indra being the Deity* as the distinguishing feature of '*Indrapīṭa*.' Nor is it possible for the character of *being drunk*, really subsisting in the Soma poured as offering, to be attributed to the Remnant in the vessel; because the word '*Indrapīṭa*' is quite applicable to the Remnant, through its own real property—that of having Indra for its Deity.

As a matter of fact, when a certain part of a substance is actually poured as offering, it is the whole of that substance, being given away (in words) to the Deity, that accomplishes the sacrifice; and hence in the word '*Indrapīṭa*,' the root '*pā*' (to drink) must be taken in the sense of '*sacrifice*,'—just as is done with the verb '*nirvāpēt*' (in the sentence '*sauryancarun-nirvāpēt*,' which literally means *deposits*, but is taken in the sense of *sacrifices*). And consequently inasmuch as the word '*Indrapīṭa*' would denote the means of the accomplishment of the *sacrifice to Indra*, it could not express that of the *sacrifice to Indra-Agni*; and hence the *mantra* in question could not apply to the offering to Indra-Agni.

ADHIKARANA (19).

[The *Mantras* beginning with the word 'gāyatrachandasah' are applicable to the offerings in connection with which several metres are used.]

Sūtra (41): "The metre is like the Deity."

The present *Adhikarāṇa* deals with an exception to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*.

[We find, in the *Bhākṣhānuvāka*, certain *mantras* beginning with the word 'gāyatrachandasah'; and there arises the question as to whether these *mantras* are applicable to that Soma-offering alone wherein the *Gāyatri* is the only metre used, or also to those in which many metres are used.]

On this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"As shown in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, inasmuch as the compound 'gāyatrachandasah' would be impossible if the *Gāyatri* metre depended upon any other metre, the word 'gāyatrachandasah' could not apply to that offering wherein the *Gāyatri* metre used would depend upon other metres; and hence the *mantras* in question should be employed in connection with that Soma-offering wherein the *Gāyatri* is the only metre used."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply :

Sūtra (42): It should apply to all offerings; because there is no offering in which a single metre is employed.

It is only when the distinguishing character mentioned can exist independently by itself, that we do not accept it as depending upon others, —and not when it has no independent existence.

We have shown in connection with the *Quartering* also, that if there were, in the context, no such cake as belonged to Agni alone, then we could have accepted those belonging to it in conjunction with other Deities also (as the objects of *Quartering*);—so also in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, it was simply because there was an offering made to Indra alone, that we denied the applicability of the epithet '*Indrapīta*' to that which was made to Indra conjointly with Agni. But it is a well-known

fact that there is no offering in which the *Gāyatrī* is the only metre used; as in the sacrifices mentioned in all the three Vedas, other metres are sure to come in. Consequently, the name '*gāyatrachandasah*' must be taken as applying to those in which there are many metres used; just as the name '*Rathantarasāmā*' is applied to offerings wherein there are many other *sāmas* also.

And the rule that 'what is dependent upon something else is incapable of being compounded' does not apply to those cases in which the factor concerned is never without dependence upon something else.

Thus then, it must be admitted that the *mantra* in question is applicable to those offerings, in connection with which there are many metres used (besides the *Gāyatrī*).

-:O:-

[The *Final Siddhānta* conclusion derived from the Discussions contained in the last nine *Adhikaraṇas*, *Sūtras* 27-42.]

Sūtra (43): One and the same mantra belongs to (*the eating of*) all (*the offerings*) as held by Aitiṣāyana; because the word '*Indrapita*' indicates the *savana*; as otherwise, the '*Drinking*' (*as pertaining to the Remnant*) will have to be taken in its secondary figurative sense.

This *sūtra* supplies the final reply to all that has been said in *Sūtras* 27-42. None of the *eatings* is to be done without a *mantra*; even in the *eating* of the remnants of those offerings that are not made to Indra, the *mantra* is to be used just as it stands, without any modifications. Because the word '*Indrapita*' meaning '*that savana in which the soma is drunk by Indra*,' even those offerings of *soma* that are not made to Indra come to be called '*Indrapita*,' as occurring in that *savana*.

That is to say, the word '*Indrapitasya*' is to be taken, not as qualifying '*somasya*' but as qualifying the '*Prātaḥsavana*' (Morning libation), and as such applying to every one of the offerings connected with that *savana*. Nor is the word '*Prātaḥsavana*' coextensive with '*Soma*'; as it is the name of a certain part of the sacrifice (*Jyotishtoma*). If then, the word meant the '*Soma* connected with the *Prātaḥsavana*,' then we should have had the word '*Prātaḥsavaniyasya*' (and not '*Prātaḥsavanasya*'). Thus then, the word '*Prātaḥsavanasya*' being taken as coextensive with '*Indrapitasya*', the genitive in these two words is due to their differentiation from all connection with *Soma*; and that in '*somasya*,' being non-coextensive, is based upon the non-differentiation (from the *Soma*).

Thus then, on account of the indication of another word ('*savanasya*'),

and on account of the fact of all the offerings having the same connections and occurring in the same context, the *Mantra* should be used in connection with every one of them.

Question: "How do you make out all this?"

Answer: We conclude thus, for the simple reason that, otherwise, the '*Soma-remnant*' (if connected with '*Indrapīṭa*') would have to be taken in its secondary figurative meaning. That is to say, the whole quantity of *soma*, conveyed, by means of words, as gift to Indra, would be the direct or principal '*Indrapīṭa*'; and the portion of it left behind in the vessel after the offering has been actually poured into the fire, would be spoken of as '*Indrapīṭa*' only figuratively. And certainly this would be highly objectionable.

Consequently, inasmuch as all the *soma-offerings* are connected with the *Indrapīṭasavana*, it is established that the eating of the Remnant of every one of them should be done with the *mantra* '*Indrapīṭasya, etc.*'

Thus ends the *Second Pāda* of ADHYĀYA III.



ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARĀṆA (1).

[The Loudness, etc., are properties of the Veda.]

Sūtra (1): "Because of the Direct Declaration, the properties would pertain to the community."

Having dealt with the applicability of *mantras* based on their Indicative Power, we now proceed to take that based upon syntactical connection.

The sentences taken up for consideration are '*uccairṛcā kṛyatē*' (the Rik is recited loudly), etc., and also '*Tadyadi ṛkta ulvanamkriyatē Gārhapatyam parētya bhūḥ svāhēti juhuyāt*' (if we should make a mistake in the *Ṛk* he should offer a libation into the *Gārhapatya* Fire with the mantra '*bhūḥ svāhā*'), and so forth.

The question now is this: In the former sentence, which lays down the qualifications of *loudness* etc. with reference to the *Ṛk*, etc., as also in the latter sentence which lays down the Homa into the three Fires with the three *Vyāhrtis*,—should we, on the strength of the fact of its being directly mentioned as independent of anything else, take the word '*Ṛk*' in the sense of *Verse* as explained in *Sūtra* II—i—35? or should we take it as denoting the whole of the *Ṛgveda* consisting of the entire set of *mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*?

Question: "Why should there be any such doubt as to the signification of the word?"

Answer: The reason for the doubt lies in the fact of there being a disagreement between the declaration in the beginning, and that in the end, of what forms a single sentence syntactically connected. That is to say, in the beginning we have the mention of the *Vedas*, while in the end we find the *Ṛk*, *Sāma* and *Yajush* mentioned. Under the circumstances the word '*Veda*', found in the beginning of the sentence, may be taken as indirectly indicating the *Ṛk*, etc., and, on the other hand, the words '*Ṛk*' etc. occurring in the end may be taken as indicating the *Vedas*; and thus

there arises a doubt as to which of these two interpretations is the more reasonable and correct of the two. The Doubt, is open to the same objections, and capable of the same justifications, as those in connection with the sentence '*aktāḥ carkarāḥ, etc.*' (*Sūtra* I—iv—29).

Objection: "In that case the present question may be taken as having "been effectively dealt with by that same *sūtra*; and as such there is no "need of its being taken up for consideration again."

Reply: This reproach is scarcely justifiable; as what has been established in that *sūtra* is the authoritative character of the sequence of a sentence, in cases where the bearing of the Injunction is doubtful; while in the case in question, there is no *doubt* as to the bearing of the Injunction, as there is no doubt as to the *Rk, Sāma, etc.* being denoted by the words occurring in the Injunction. Consequently it becomes absolutely necessary to definitely ascertain the correctness of one of the two alternatives, by finding out which word is to be taken in its secondary figurative sense.

On this question, then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"In accordance with the arguments advanced under the *Pūrvapaksha* "of *Sūtra* I—iv—29, it must be admitted, on the strength of the direct "Declaration of the object of Injunction, that the properties pertain to "the communities of the '*Rk,*' etc. (i.e. to the Verse, etc., and not to the "*Rgveda, etc.*).

"And further, just as the Generic Substance or Action is not "incompatible with special forms appearing in the sequential sentences "—so, in the same manner, the *Rk, etc.* are not incompatible with the "*Vedas.* Nor are the words '*Rk,*' etc. ever capable of being used with "reference to the *Brāhmaṇa*-portion (of the *Vedas*); while the word " '*Veda*' can be used with reference to any part of the *Veda* (be it even a "single Verse); as words expressive of a collection are always found "to be applicable to single components of that collection; as, for in- "stance, we speak of the 'whole *village* having come' (when the word " '*village*' is used with reference to the *men in the village*). Thus too, "people who are reading the *Veda*, speak of 'reading the *Veda,*' and of "the '*Veda* remaining to be finished,' etc. etc. only when they are study- "ing the *Rk*-portion of it, and not when they are reading the *Brāhmaṇa*- "portion.

"Then again, there is a definite line differentiating the *Rk, the* " *Sāma* and the *Yajush* from one another; and as such their properties of "loudness could be duly ascertained and delegated to each of them. The

"Vedas on the other hand are mixed up with one another; and as such that would always be a hopeless admixture of the properties in question. That is to say, there are certain *Rk*-verses that are found in all the three Vedas; and so also are certain *Yajush* sentences. And hence if the character of the Vedas were the sole criterion for the application of the properties, then, in the case of such verses it could not be ascertained whether they should be recited loudly or slowly (because as occurring in the *Rgveda* they should be recited loudly, while as occurring in the *Yajurveda* they should be repeated quietly); or we would have to take the properties as optional alternatives, because the applicability to them of the name of one *Veda* would be as correct and justifiable as that of the other; and there are no grounds for such option. If, however, we take the words '*Rk*,' etc. in the sentence in question as expressing the classes of *Rk* etc., then we are saved from these anomalies; because a single collection of letters does not belong to any two classes ('*Rk*' and '*Sāma*' f.i.).

"The latter theory has the further advantage of being in keeping with the indications of the fact of the sentences in question occurring in the context of the *Jyotishtoma*. Otherwise if the words were taken as referring to the particular Vedas, then, inasmuch as the *Veda* treats equally of all *Grain-Sacrifices*, *Animal-Sacrifices*, *One-day sacrifice*, etc., the properties laid down in the sentence in question would pertain to all these sacrifices; and would thus overstep the bounds of the context in which it occurs.

"*Objection*: 'Even in accordance with your theory, inasmuch as the class *Rk* also would be found in several contexts, the contingency you have just shown would be equally possible in your case also. If you seek to restrict the injunction to the *Rk* in the context, on the ground of there being no reason for overstepping the bounds of the Context,—then the same may be said in our case also; because we could restrict the injunction to that much of the *Veda* as occurs in the Context.'

"*Reply*: The two cases are not equally open to the objection; because for us, inasmuch as the genus '*Rk*' inheres completely in each collection of letters (known as such), we have it in the Context, in its complete form; for you, on the other hand, the *Veda* being a very large collection, it cannot exist, in its complete form, in the Context. If the class '*Rk*' had pervaded, as a single whole, over the collection of all *Rks*, then it could not exist, in its complete form, in the Context; and in that case, it would be exactly like the *Veda*. For the character of '*Vēdatva*' inheres only in the collection of all *Mantras*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Deductions*—known as the '*Kāṭhaka*' and the like—which treat of many sacrifices. For us, on the other hand, the generic character of the *Rk*, or *Sāma*

"or *Yajush* inheres, in its complete form, in each of the endless collections of such feet of verses, words and parts, as are found to form a single syntactical whole. And just as such corporate (collective) substances as the *Forest* are related to the community of '*Vanatva*,' so it is this community of the collections of *Rk* that is spoken of as '*jāta*' (in the *sūtra*). Though the *Bhāshya*, and the commentators on it, have explained the word '*jāta*' as synonymous with '*jāti*,'—yet this explanation is not correct; because there can be no '*jāti*' ('genus' or class) in the *Rk*, etc. Because we have shown (in the *Tarkapāda*) that there is no such class as '*goṣabdatva*' inhering in the word '*go*' (which is made up of the two letters *g* and *o*); and then how could there be any such classes as the '*Rk*,' '*Sāma*' and '*Yajush*,' all of which would be as impossible as the class '*Vākyatva*'?

"That is to say, we have already shown, under the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa*, that we cannot, like the class '*Brāmanatva*,' assume any such class as '*Vākyatva*' as inhering either in the last letter of the sentence or in the whole aggregate of letters arranged in a certain order, each of which is manifestable by means of distinct efforts, organs and positions of speech; because of the fact of these letters being separated from one another by the intervention of the desire to recognize the relationship of the denotations of words with parts differing from one another. And in the same manner, we could not assume any such class as '*Rktva*,' '*Yajushṭva*' or '*Sāmatva*,' all of which depend upon certain letters and intonations arranged in a definite order.

"For these reasons, what we must take the word '*jāta*' to mean is the aggregate community—called '*Rk*,' or '*Yajush*,' or '*Sāma*'—which inheres in every one of such collections of words as form a single syntactical whole; and there is no class known by any of those names. Just as among certain words, whose significations are based upon their etymological composition, we admit of a community other than the *Class*,—so the community of aggregates, spoken of as '*jāta*,' is something wholly different from what is known as '*Class*' or '*Jāti*.' In ordinary parlance too, the words '*jāta*' and '*jāti*' are taken just as we have explained; and hence we must interpret the *sūtra* accordingly."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (2): (*It pertains to the Veda*) because of the fact of the words occurring in a context dealing mostly with the *Veda*.

Question: "What do you mean by '*Prāyadarṣana*' here? Certainly it is not similar to the *Prāyadarṣanas*' mentioned in other places;—that is why we put you the question. The *sūtra* '*Prāyēvacanācca*' (II—ii—12)

“has been explained as *because of the mention being in a context where all the rest are Primaries*—‘*Prāyē*’ being taken as ‘*Pradhānaprāyē*’; so also in the ‘*sūtra* ‘*Viçayē prāyadarçanāt*’ (II—iii—16), the word ‘*prāya*’ has been explained as ‘*sanskāraprāya*,’ the meaning of the *sūtra* being—*because we find it in a context where all the rest are subsidiary purificatory rites, such as the milking of the cow, etc.* In the case in question, however, we cannot take the *sūtra* to bring forward the reason that the *Rk*, etc., are seen where all the rest are *Vedas*; because there are no *Vedas* apart from these *Rk*, etc. themselves; and hence the latter could not be spoken of as appearing in the midst of the former. Consequently there can be no ‘*prāyadarçana*’ in the case in question.”

Reply: What we mean is that these words—‘*Rk*,’ etc.—are found in ‘*Vedaprāya*’—i.e. in a Context that begins with speaking of the *Veda*; and as such are presented to the mind which is pervaded by the idea of the *Veda*. The *Bhāṣya* quotes the sentence wherein there is a mention of the *Veda*, and in continuation of which we have the sentence under consideration.—‘*Prajupatirva idamēka āsit tasmāt trayo dēva ajāyanta tēbhyaḥ trayo vēdā asṛjyanta agnerṛgyōdo, vāyorya-jurvēdaḥ adityāt sāmavedaḥ.*’

Then, it has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣi* that “on account of the strength of the direct declaration of the object of Injunction (in the sentence under consideration), we should take the word ‘*Veda*,’ occurring in the *Ārthavāda* passage (just quoted), as indicating the parts of the *Veda*, the *Rk*, etc.”

To this we make the following reply: The comparative authoritative strength or weakness as based upon the relationship of the Injunction and the *Ārthavāda* is wholly different from that based upon the fact of the cognition appearing in the beginning of a sentence or in a latter part of it.

That is to say, those *Ārthavādas* that are found in the *Veda* after the object of the Injunction has been mentioned, may be weaker in their authority (than the Injunction); but those that appear before them are certainly stronger, because of their *appearing first* (*mukhya*, lit.). As a matter of fact, in the case of every word the only reason that can make it give up its direct denotation is the incompatibility of that denotation (with something else expressed on a stronger authority); and this incompatibility is cognized only when this *something else*, its counter-entity, has been perceived. And in the case in question we find that, at the time that we meet with the sentence ‘*trayo vēdā asṛjyanta*, etc.,’ we have no mention of the words ‘*Rk*,’ etc. which you hold to be denotative of the community, (as these words appear after some time, lower down in the text); and as such there is nothing perceived at the time, with which the

direct denotation of the word '*Vedāḥ*' (in the former sentence) could be found to be incompatible, and the word taken as indirectly indicating the component *Rk*, etc. Thus then, while the mind is fully pervaded with the idea of the Veda directly denoted by the word '*Vedāḥ*,' we come across, in a subsequent sentence, the words '*Rk*,' etc. (in the sentence under consideration); and finding that in their direct denotations, these latter words are not construable with the rest of the sentence, we take them, on the strength of this incompatibility, in their indirect sense (i.e. as indicating the source of the *Rk*, etc., the several *Vedas*). And thus even though these words appear in the Injunction they are much weaker in authority than the preceding Arthavāda, which is much stronger in its authority,—in accordance with the *sūtra* '*Mukhyam vā pūrvacodanāt lokavat*' (XII—ii—23)."

Objection: "In accordance with the *Sūtra* VI—v—54,—that 'when "one comes before the other, the former is weaker than the latter"—it "must be admitted that the idea of the Veda, brought about by the "*Arthavāda* ('*tēbhyo vedāḥ aśrjyanta*,' etc.) appearing in the beginning, "would be set aside by the idea brought about by the subsequent *Injunction*, which latter must, therefore, be accepted as the more authoritative."

Reply: Not so; the comparative strength of sentences based upon precedence and sequence is admitted only in cases where the ideas brought about by the sentences are independent of one another. That is to say, when we find certain contradictory things spoken of, independently of one another, in distinct sentences, then alone do we find that, while the sentence occurring first appears in its full form without having to set aside anything else, the sentence appearing subsequently is not capable of having an existence without setting aside its contradictory precedent; and hence in such cases alone we apply the rule of the stronger authority of that which follows over that which goes before. In a case, however, where the things are spoken of as dependent upon one another, that rule is not applicable; because in such cases the two sentences are syntactically connected, on the sole ground of their mutual requirements; and under the circumstances, it is that which has been already cognized by means of the preceding sentence, that requires what is subsequently mentioned, to be in keeping with itself, or to add something over and above itself; consequently that which is not found to be over and above this, or to be in keeping with it, is not taken as syntactically connected with the previous sentence, for the simple reason that it is not required by it. And at the time that the preceding sentence expresses its meaning, the subsequent sentence does not exist, and as such could not set it aside; consequently it is the preceding sentence that possesses stronger authority.

Thus then, in the case in question, inasmuch as the *Injunction* and the *Arthavāda* treat of the same object, at the time that the Vedas are described in the *Arthavāda*, it is concluded that there is something to be laid down for these Vedas; and what is wanted to be known is the particular thing to be laid down for them, and that for which it should be laid down. Consequently from the sentence appearing subsequently we single out only that which is wanted; and as it is only the object to be laid down—and not that for which it is to be laid down—that is wanted, we take only the *loudness* etc. as connected with previous sentence, and not the *Rk*, etc.; and thus, inasmuch as no significance is attached to these latter, they cannot be spoken of as forming part of the object of the *Injunction*, and as such they cannot set aside the *Arthavāda* (in the preceding sentence). In fact it is the Veda as mentioned in the *Arthavāda* that is recognized as that with reference to which we have the subsequent *Injunction*. And hence the words '*Rk*,' etc. in this latter must be taken as indicating the *Vedas* (*Rgveda*, etc.).

As for the *Veda*, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is far more extensive (than the *Rk*, etc.), there can be no reason by which it could be taken as indicating its part, the *Rk-Verses*, etc.; while the *Rk-Verses*, etc. being contained in the *Veda*, could very well be taken as indicating this latter (as a collection of themselves). And just as, in other cases, there is nothing incongruous in the *Arthavādas* being taken in their indirect indicated sense, because of their being mere descriptive eulogies,—so, in the same manner, in the case in question, where the *Injunction* has the same object that has been already mentioned in the preceding *Arthavāda*, the words '*Rk*,' etc. are merely descriptive references (to the *Veda* therein mentioned), and as such there can be nothing incongruous in these being taken as indirectly indicating the *Vedas*.

Consequently the whole sentence under consideration should be construed in the following way: 'Inasmuch as these Vedas came out (of Agni, etc.), they should be recited loudly, etc.'; and it is with reference to this well-established fact that we have the subsequent words '*Rk*,' etc. (in the sentence '*uccaiḥ ṛcā*,' etc.). Otherwise these words would be wholly irrelevant, because of the diversity in the objects of the *Injunction* and the *Arthavāda*.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the properties spoken of pertain to the *Vedas*.

Sūtra (3): Because of indicative texts.

It is that indirect indication which has been met with before that presents itself to the mind much sooner than any other. And we have often found the words '*Rk*,' etc. indicating the *Vedas*—i.e. in the sen-

tence '*Rgbhiḥ prātardivi deva iyate, yajurvēdēna tishṭhati madhye-hnaḥ, sāmavēdēnāstamayē mahīyate, Vēdairagūnyaistibhirēti Sūryaḥ*,'—we find that the three last feet, all, speak of the *Vedas*, and hence we are led to take the word '*Rk*' (in '*Rgbhiḥ*') as indicating the *Rgveda*; specially as the last feet speaks of '*Vedaiḥ*' in the Plural (which could not be if only two *Vedas*, the *Sāma* and the *Yajush*, were meant), which distinctly shows that the word '*Rk*' indicates the whole of the *Rgveda*—*Mantras* as well as *Brāhmaṇas*.

Then, it has been urged that the students of *Veda* use the word '*Veda*' for the *Mantra*. It is true that they use it in that way; but in the case of all such usages, we must take the word '*Veda*' as used in its secondary meaning. But in spite of this usage, in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—iii—9, we must admit that the *Indication* (that of the *Veda* by the words '*Rk*,' etc.) is more authoritative than the other (that of the *mantras* by the word '*Veda*') [as the former is based upon a Vedic *Arthavāda*, while the latter is based upon mere usage].

[The *fourth sūtra* is taken by the *Vārtika*, after the *eighth*, at the end of the *Adhikaraṇa*.]

***Sūtra* (5): One who knows the three *Vedas* is spoken of as '*Trayīvidya*.'**

Even if the discussion is to be carried on, in accordance with ordinary usage, we have the usage of the words '*Rk*,' etc. in the sense of the *Vedas*.

“How?”

You know very well that the *Rk*, *Sāma* and *Yajush* are known as '*Trayī*'; and the word '*Trayīvidya*' is capable of being explained only as '*Trayī Vidyā asya*.' This word is found to be applied, in usage, to one who has read the *three Vedas*, and not to one who has only read the *Rk verse*, the *Sāma-song* and the *Yajush*; because the name is never applied to the *Sāmavēdis*, even though, in knowing the *Sāmavēdu* he knows the three—viz.: the *Rk-verses*, *Sāmas*, as well as certain *Yajush*. Consequently, it follows that in the word '*Trayīvidya*,' the word '*trayī*' is used in the sense of the *Three Vedas*; and hence it must be admitted that the words '*Rk*,' '*Sāma*' and '*Yajush*,' which are spoken of in lexicons as co-extensive with the word '*trayī*,' denote the *Vedas* themselves; and thus too we find that the words '*Rk*,' etc. are applied to the *Vedas*.

Sūtra (6): Obj: "In a case where there is transference, the Injunction will have to be taken in its direct signification."

This is a reference to a previous objection (the sense whereof is this):
 "In a case where a *Rk*-verse will be found in the *Yajurveda*, it will have to
 "be sung slowly, as occurring in the *Yajurveda*, according to the *Siddhānta*;
 "this however is not the case; while according to us, being a *Rk*-verse, in
 "whichever *Veda* it might appear, it will be quite reasonably sung
 "loudly; in keeping with the direct signification of the Injunction."

Sūtra (7): Reply: No; because the qualification belongs to the whole.

The mere fact of being found in the text of a *Veda* does not make a sentence liable to be called by the name of that *Veda*. The fact is that that which is enjoined by one *Veda*, is always done in accordance with that *Veda*; consequently a *mantra* would be called by the name of that *Veda* in which it may be enjoined. If it should be found to have been enjoined in both *Vedas* (the *Yajush* and the *Rk*), then, inasmuch as the law laid down in the *Sūtra* III—iii—10 would not apply to the case, we could not but take the two (qualifications of *loudness* and *slowness*) as optional alternatives for that *Mantra*.

Sūtra (8): Because of being connected (syntactically) with 'Veda,' the indication (by the words '*Rk*,' etc. of the *Rgveda*, etc.) could be set aside by the context.

[That is to say, Syntactical Connection being more authoritative than Context, there would be nothing objectionable in the indications of the Context being rejected in favour of Syntactical Connection.]

Some people read '*bādhēta*' instead of '*bādhyaēta*.'

Sūtra (4): Because of the injunction of qualification, it could have no connection with the substance.

If the injunctions were taken as laying down the qualifications of the *Rk*-verse, etc, then, inasmuch as the sentence '*Riccyadhyūḍham Sāma gāyati*' points to the fact of the *Sāma* never being separate from the *Rk*, the qualification of the former would be included in that of the latter; and as such the further injunction '*Uccaiḥ Sāmā*' would be wholly redundant. Because it is not possible for one to sing the *Sāma* based upon a *Rk* in any other way, while he is reciting the *Rk* itself loudly.

If however we take the qualifications as laid down for the *Vedas*, both

injunctions become quite justified, inasmuch as what is enjoined by the *Sāmaveda* is wholly different from that which is enjoined by the *Rgveda*.

Objection: "The injunction *uccaiḥ sāmā* would have its use in the "case of such *Sāmas* as are not based on a *Rk*,—such, for instance, as the "*Sāma* of the *Prajāpatihrdaya*."

Reply: Not so; because that *Sāma* does not form an auxiliary to the *Jyotishṭoma*; and the Injunctions of 'loudness,' appearing in the context of the *Jyotishṭoma*, could pertain to those *Sāmas* of the *Hymns* occurring in that sacrifice; and as a matter of fact we find that in that sacrifice no *Sāma* is sung which is not based upon a *Rk*.

And further, there being very few *Sāmas* not based on *Rks*, your explanation removes the taint of redundancy (in the Injunction '*Uccaiḥ Sāmā*') to an extremely small extent.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the qualifications pertain to the *Vedas*.

ADHIKARĀṆA (2).

[In the *Ādhāna* the singing is to be done *slowly*.]

sūtra (9): When the Primary and the Accessory belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the Accessory is determined by the Primary; as the Accessory is subservient to the purposes of the Primary.

We now proceed to consider a case where the Primary laid down in one Veda (the *Ādhāna* in the *Yajurveda*, f.i.) has an accessory laid down in another Veda (f. i. the singing of the *Sāmas*, *Vāravantīya*, etc. laid down in the *Sāmaveda*). In such cases the question arises as to whether the Accessory (singing) is to be done in a way in keeping with the Veda in which its Primary happens to be laid down (f. i. *quietly*, on account of the *Ādhāna* being laid down in the *Yajurveda*), or it is to be done in a way in keeping with the Veda in which it is itself laid down (f.i. *loudly*, on account of the *Sāma-singing* being laid down in the *Sāmaveda*).

On this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the qualifications based upon names pertain to each unit, the way in which a certain thing is to be done is that in keeping with the character of the Veda in which it happens to be mentioned."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: In a case where there is one qualification pertaining to the Accessory by itself, and another pertaining to it, through the Primary,—the former qualification is always to be taken as set aside by the latter.

That is to say, the two qualifications being wholly incompatible with each other, and hence it being necessary to set aside one of them, it is always that pertaining to the Accessory by itself that is to be set aside; as it is only thus that the Primary would be performed as it should be, without its being deprived of its own accompaniments; and certainly the proper fulfilment of the Primary is a business of the Accessory also; as this latter also operates solely for the sake of the former. Consequently, if, in consideration of its own qualification, it were to deprive the Primary of its natural accompaniment, then there would be a disruption

of that action (the Primary) for the sake of which it was meant to operate. Though in such a case the proper fulfilment of the Primary with all its accompaniments would mean the deprival of the Accessory of its own natural accompaniment,—yet, as the fact of the Accessory being equipped with all its accompaniments is not so very necessary (as that of the Primary), there would be nothing incongruous in the said deprival.

Consequently, inasmuch as the *Ādhāna* belongs to the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmas* that are accessory to it should be sung quietly.

Objection: “As a matter of fact, we recognize the rule to be “that only that much of the *Ādhāna* is to be done *quietly*, which “is enjoined in the *Yajurveda*; and as such the *quietness* could not “pertain to the *singing of the Sāma*. It is only the Primary action “(the *Ādhāna*) itself and its other Accessories that belong to the “*Yajurveda*; and hence it is these alone that should be done *quietly*.”

Reply: It is not so; because it is distinctly shown in *Sūtra* XI—ii—7 that the Accessories are enjoined as along with the Primary, because of the injunction; and also in *Sūtra* XI—i—16 that on account of the whole Injunction (of the Primary with its Accessories) forming a single declaration etc. (all the accessories are to be performed in accordance with the Primary). Consequently when we find certain Accessories mentioned in the comprehensive Injunction of the performance of the Primary with all its accessories,—even if these Accessories be found to have their origin elsewhere (in another *Veda* f.i.),—their Injunction will have to be taken as belonging to that *Veda* wherein we have the Primary. Consequently the *Ādhāna* together with all its accessories belonging to the *Yajurveda*, every one of them should be done *quietly*.

Objection: “In that case, the *quietness* would belong to the accessories, on the simple ground of their belonging to the *Yajurveda*; and “as such it would not be a fit basis for the present *Adhikaraṇa*, in “which you seek to establish the fact of the qualification of the Accessory “being rejected in favour of that of the Primary, with which latter “the former is incompatible (while as you have just explained, the “Accessory in question would have the same qualification as the Primary, “and as such there would be no incompatibility between the two). And “further the *Quietness* of the *Sāma*, as pertaining to it as an Accessory, is “equal to its *Loudness*; and the *Quietness* inhering in the Accessory (*singing*) “cannot be spoken of as belonging to the Primary (*Ādhāna*); and “hence the rejection of the *Quietness* (inhering in the Accessory) would “mean a rejection of the qualification of the Primary; and such a rejection “would not deprive the performance of the Primary of its natural *Quietness*. “If, however, in some way or other, the qualification of the Accessory “be spoken of as the ‘Qualification of the Primary,’ then, in that case,

"*Loudness* also (which is a qualification of the *Sāma* that is an accessory of the *Ādhāna*) could be spoken of as such a qualification (of the "Primary *Ādhāna*"); and thus both the *Loudness* and *Quietness* (of the "accessory *Sāma*) would be equally authoritative."

Reply : It is in view of the fact of the *Sāmas* having their originative Injunction in the *Sāmaveda* that those appearing in connection with the Yajurvedic action of *Ādhāna* are spoken of as 'belonging to a different Veda'; and it is only in consequence of the Primary (*Ādhāna*) being laid down as connected with all its Accessories, that we come to conclude that the *Sāma*-singing—one of these Accessories—is to be done *quietly*. That is to say, if the *Sāmas* in question had their origin in the *Yajurveda*, then alone could the *Quietness* have belonged to it as its natural qualification; as it is, however, they have their origin in the *Sāmaveda*; and as such it is *Loudness* that belongs to them by their nature; and it is only by reason of their being connected (in the present instance) with a *Primary* (belonging to the *Yajurveda*) that they come to be sung *quietly*; and as such this *quietness* could very well be spoken of as the 'Qualification of the Primary.'

Objection : "Inasmuch as the Injunction of the *Ādhāna* is that it "should be done, along with all its Accessories, by the *Yajurveda*, the "*Quietness* comes to be recognized as belonging to it *with all its accessories*; "and as such the *Quietness* comes to be quite natural to the Accessory "*Sāma*."

Reply : Not so; because the very fact of the *Ādhāna* being mentioned as laid down *with all its Accessories*, shows that the Accessory is not the principal factor. Because it is only when the Primary has certain Accessories subservient to it that it is spoken of as '*sāṅga*.' Consequently it is the Primary (*Ādhāna*) alone that directly pertains to the *Yajurveda*; and as such *Quietness* belongs naturally to that alone; and it is as belonging to this Primary that it is spoken of as extending to the Accessories; and these latter are not enjoined as themselves connected with *Quietness*.

Thus then, (if the *Sāma*-singing in connection with the *Ādhāna* were not done *quietly*), it would be the Qualification of the Primary, as pertaining to the Accessory, that would be rejected; because the Primary throws its Qualification into the Accessories; and hence in whichever accessory that Qualification would be rejected, that would mean a deficiency in the Primary itself.

As for *Loudness*, it is not recognized as a qualification of the Primary (*Ādhāna*); because the Qualification of the Accessories are never transferred to the Primary.

Objection : "We find that the natural qualification of the Accessory "*Sāma* (*Loudness*) belongs to it directly, while that of the *Primary* (i.e.

"*Quietness*) could belong to that Accessory, only indirectly, through the "Primary; and thus the comparative authoritativeness of the two would "be quite contrary to what you hold it to be (i.e. the former would be more "authoritative than the latter).

Reply: True; the natural qualification of the Accessory pertaining to it directly, is very much more quickly perceived as belonging to it; but still, the Qualification of the Primary, being found to belong to it, subsequently, after the comprehension (of the comprehensive Direction of the performance of the Primary with its Accessories), sets aside the former qualification, in accordance with the law laid down under *Sūtra* VI—v—54.

Objection: "This law would lead to the application of *Quietness* to "those *Stotras* and *Çastras* (Hymns of the *Sāmaveda*) also, which are "non-*Yajurvedic* accessories to the *Jyotishṭoma*."

Reply: True; it does become applicable to these also. But in regard to all these, different accents are used, in consequence of distinct directions to that effect. That is to say, in connection with the *Darçapūrṇamāsa*, there are Accessories enjoined in two *Vedas*; and it would appear as if various Vedic accents were to be employed in connection with these; but in accordance with the law laid down in the *sūtra* under discussion, they would all become amenable to the single tone of *Quietness* which belongs to the *Yajurvedic* Primary (the *Darçapūrṇamāsa*). But then finally, we come across certain Vedic Directions laying down definite Tones for them,—i.e. the directions.—The part of the sacrifice down to the *Ājyabhāga*-offering is to be done in *quiet* tones; the rest in *medium* tones, and that beginning with the *Anuyāja* with the *highest* (loudest) tones. Similarly there are certain *Vikri* sacrifices, modifications of the *Darçapūrṇamāsa* offerings,—such as the *Iskṭi*, the *Paçubandha*, etc.,—which would appear to be subject to the three tones just mentioned in connection with their Original (the *Darçapūrṇamāsa*); but, on account of the fact of their being directly enjoined as subsidiary to a sacrifice belonging to a particular Veda (the *Yajurveda*), they come to be taken as done with the tone peculiar to this Veda (i.e. *quietly*); but then, it is found that, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—vii—51, the comprehensive Injunction of the performance (of the Primary with all its subsidiaries) (on which Injunction rest the subsidiaries in question) is much weaker in its authority, on account of its being dependent upon a direct Injunction; and hence it is finally concluded that the tones to be employed are all the three as laid down in the above-quoted Direction. Exactly in the same manner, in the case of the *Dikshayāñi*, etc., subsidiaries of the *Jyotishṭoma*, they would, at first sight, appear to be amenable to the three tones laid down in connection with their original (the *Jyotishṭoma*); but this amena-

bility is set aside by the fact of their injunctions being contained in a particular Veda (which fact would justify the use of a single tone); but it is again brought forward by the distinct Injunction (that 'the ectypes are to be performed in the same way as their archetypes'); but then it is found that the *Jyotishṭoma* belongs to the *Yajurveda*, and that it does not take up the apparently useful qualifications of any Original (for the simple reason that it is not the ectype of any other sacrifice); and hence in accordance with the *sūtra* under discussion, the subsidiaries in question would come to be taken as amenable to the *Quiet* tone of the *Jyotishṭoma*; but the application of the present *sūtra* to this case is set aside by the distinct Injunction that 'one should recite the *Dikṣaṇīyā* in whatever tones he may desire,' which distinctly lays down all the three tones—High, Medium and Low—for the *Dikṣaṇīyā* together with all its subsidiary Hymns, etc. In the same manner, inasmuch as the *Jyotishṭoma* is found to be amenable to the three tones—the Low, the Medium and the High—laid down in connection with each of its distinctly mentioned three *Savanas*, all its subsidiaries also come, through the Primary, to be connected with the same three tones. And then, we meet with another Vedic direction to the effect that 'all that precedes the *Agnishomīya* offering should be done quietly'; and this points out the *Dikṣaṇīyā*, etc. with all their accessories, as to be done quietly (because it precedes the *Agnishomīya* offering); but then we have certain other particular tones specified as belonging only to the *Dikṣaṇīyā*, etc.; and these belong to themselves, and not to their Accessories; because these tones are laid down with reference to the *Dikṣaṇīyā*, etc. alone by themselves, in the following Direction: 'The *Dikṣaṇīyā* should be sung as *loudly* as one may wish, the *Prāyaṇīya* is to be done in a low tone, the *Atithya* in still lower tones, and *very quietly* in the *Upasat*.' But inasmuch as the last, *Quietness*, is found to have been already laid down in the previous extensive Injunction, its mention in this Direction must be taken as a mere passing reference, by way of eulogizing the tones laid down in connection with the *Dikṣaṇīyā*, etc. In the *Agnishomīya* offering, however, there is a return of the tones of its original sacrifice, laid down, in connection with the division of that original (*Jyotishṭoma*), into the three *Savanas*,—in the sentence 'in low tones, to the end of the *Āyābhagā*, etc.' Or we could divide the performance with all accessories into three parts, just like those of the *Savana*, and then employ the three tones—the Low, the Medium and the High—in accordance with that division.

The same case holds respecting the tones to be employed in connection with the *Anubandhya*, the *Avabhṛtha*, and the *Udayaniya*.

The *Savaniya*, etc. performed at the time of the extracting of the

Soma-juice would also appear to be amenable to the same three tones as those just mentioned; but on account of their being included within the *Prātaḥsavana*, etc. the tones of those are regulated in accordance with particular *Savana* in which they occur.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the words of the *Savana* are expressive of the parts of the Soma sacrifice, they could not have the tones of the *Savana*,—just as the subsidiaries of the *Dikṣhaṇīyā* do not have the tones of the *Dikṣhaṇīyā*."

Reply: Not so; because the Locative ending in '*Savanē*' distinctly shows that the tones belong to all the *mantras* that are used at the time of the *Savana*; and hence even though the words be expressive of the parts of the Soma sacrifice, yet they would be amenable to the tones of the *Savana*. For if we had the genitive ending with '*Savana*,' then the Injunction of the tones—low, etc.—would apply to those *mantras* alone that are accessories to the *Savana*; as it is, however, we have the Locative; and hence whichever *mantra* happens to be employed in the *Savana*, it becomes connected with the three tones—the Low, etc.

Some people make the following declaration: "If all that the Locative means is that the *Savanas* are the container of the *mantras*, then these latter do not become amenable to the tones—low, etc.; because *mantras* are never spoken of as the contained; and the tones would come to apply only to the *Savaniya*, etc., which are spoken of as distinctly contained in the *Savana*; while as for such auxiliaries of the *Savana* as the *Stotra*, the *Ḥastra*, the *Anuvākya*, etc.—the tones, low, etc.—could not belong to them, on account of the absence of the genitive ending (with '*Savana*')."

To the above we offer the following reply: The above objection is scarcely tenable; because even without the genitive ending, we can have the sense of the genitive conveyed by the fact of the *Savana* being the container. For instance, the bird is held to exist in the tree, just as well as the flower exists in it; and hence the character of the contained in both (though we speak of '*vṛkṣe pushpam*,' yet it can also mean '*Vṛkṣasya pushpam*') (and hence the *Mantras*, the *Stotra*, etc. would be as well contained in the *Savana* as the *Savaniya*).

Or, we may take the whole of the *Stotra* etc. as accessory to the *Sutyā* (extracting of the Soma juice); and in that case, the *Savanas* would contain them just as well as they do the other accessories. Consequently, though the *Stotra*, etc., from the very beginning, had appeared to be amenable to the tones of various *Vedas*, yet all that is set aside by the Quietness, that is pointed out as belonging to them, by the fact of their being subsidiary to a Primary (that belongs to the *Yajurveda*). And it is for this reason that we recite the *Stotra* etc. in connection

with the *juice-extracting*, in the low, or the medium, or the high tone, in accordance with the *Savana* in which they happen to occur; as such is the distinct Injunction on the point.

What has been explained just now applies to all the ectypes of the *Jyotishitoma*.

Question: "Where then would there be room for the use of the 'accentuations peculiar to the several Vedas?'"

Answer: In accordance with the *Sūtra* III—vii—51, in a case where in connection with a *Vikṛti* sacrifice, which is connected with accessories having the accentuation of the original sacrifice, there happens to be laid down an altogether new accessory belonging to another Veda (this accessory would have the tone peculiar to this other Veda, and thus this *Vikṛti* sacrifice would have the tones of the two Vedas, that to which the original belongs, and that connected with which the new Accessory is laid down):

Objection: "Even in such a case, in accordance with the *sūtra* under discussion, the subsequently-enjoined Accessory would have the same tone as its Primary, the *Vikṛti* sacrifice in question.

Question: 'Then, in that case, we could have the tone of two Vedas in a case, where, the *Vikṛti* belonging to a Veda other than to which its Original belongs, and the remaining accessories of that *Vikṛti* having the tone of the original, another new accessory happens to be enjoined in the same Veda as the *Vikṛti*.

"But that too could not be; as in this case also the tone is got at through the Primary itself.

Question: 'In that case, that Primary sacrifice itself would have the tones of the two Vedas.'

"Not so; because that too has the same tone as its Original.

"Then a case,—where the new Accessory does not come in through the Primary,—would be one of the presence of the tone of two Vedas.'

"That would not be possible; because there also we have the same qualification that belongs to the Primary.

"Then again, when the sacrifices have been divided into three parts (the three *Savanas*), and the Tone remains the qualification of these parts of the sacrifices, even though something new in the Accessory might come in, it would fall into one of these parts; and hence it could not but be equipped with the properties of the Original sacrifice; specially as the case would not be similar to the *Yupāvutastaraṇavarhi*. And for this reason also, there can not be any case where we have the tones of many Vedas. *

"And further, the mention (of 'Loudness,' etc.) in the context (of

“ the *Jyotishṭoma*) would be wholly useless (as there would be no case “ where all the three tones could be employed). ”

To the above, we make the following reply :

It would not be useless ; as the injunction ‘ what is done through the *Yajush* is to be done *quietly* ’ would apply to all the *Darvihomas* (as these employ only *Yajush mantras*). Then as for the *R̥gveda* and the *Sāmaveda*, the injunction of *Loudness* with regard to these would have its use in connection with accessories other than the necessary ones (that is with those that are laid down with a view to a particular desirable result, and that which is laid down as to be performed only when certain specified conditions present themselves). The injunctions, such as ‘ The morning *savana* is to be done in low tones, ’ are necessary ones ; and as such they belong only to the necessary accessories, not being connected with the *kāmya* (that which is done with a view to a certain desirable result) and the *Naimittika* (the conditional, to be performed only when certain conditions present themselves) accessories. Consequently any accessories of the latter two kinds, that are enjoined by the *R̥gveda* or the ‘ *Sāmaveda*, ’ are to be done *loudly* ;—as for instance, ‘ *Bhinnamabhimriṣedyatritē, cidabhiṣṛishah, etc., etc.* ’ In the same way we could cite instances of the *Yajurvedic* Quietness of tone ; so also, those accessories (of the *Jyotishṭoma*) that appear after the *Sutyā*, not being taken up by the *Savanas* (and hence not being connected with *Savanna* tones), come to have the same tone as that belonging to the Veda in which each of them occurs ; and hence it becomes established that the *Sāma*-singing of the *Avabhr̥tha* also is to be done *loudly*. Otherwise they would be performed just as one might wish. In the *Sāmas* about the *Dikshap̥yā*, however, we will have the *Quiet tone* (of the *Yajurveda*) ; because of the specific direction that ‘ all that precedes the *Agnishoma* is to be done *quietly* ; while again for the *Pravarjya Sāmas*, we would have *Loudness*, according to the Direction ‘ *Uccaiḥ pravaryjēna.* ’

As for the *Sāmas* connected with the *Ādhāna*, however, we would have them done *quietly*, because of their being laid down by Injunctions in connection with a Primary sacrifice belonging to the *Yajurveda* ; for the sentences ‘ *ya evam vidvān Vāmadevyam gāyati,* ’ etc. belong to the *Yajurveda*. Consequently, the case of the *Sāmas* should not have been cited as an example of the *sūtra* ; because in this case, as just shown, the *Sāma* is sung quietly, not because of the incompatibility between the qualification of the Primary and the Accessory as mentioned in the *sūtra*, but on account of their injunctions being contained in the *Yajurveda*.

To this argument, some people reply as follows : “ It is the “ *Sāmaveda* that brings forth the forms of the *Sāmas* ; but it does not speak “ of them by way of laying down their applications or uses (which is done

“by the *Yajurveda*; and hence they are amenable to the peculiarities of “both the *Vedas*).”

But this reasoning is scarcely correct; for in that case the discussion would have turned upon a consideration of the comparative strength and weakness of Originative and Applicatory Injunctions,—and not of the contradiction between the properties of the Primary and the Accessory (as is done in the *sūtra*); and in that case, the *Siddhānta* conclusion would have been in the form that ‘inasmuch as the performance is dependent upon the Applicatory Injunctions, greater authoritativeness should be attached to this latter (and the *Sāmas* would be sung *quietly* in the *Jyotiṣhoma* for this reason, and not for the reason of the *Sāma* being an Accessory and hence not taking its own character of *Loudness* which is contradictory to the character of the Primary *Jyotiṣhoma*, as declared in the *sūtra*).

In view of this, there is yet another explanation offered by some people; it is this: “In certain texts of the *Sāmaveda* itself, there are “applicatory Injunctions of the *Sāmas* (that are laid down in the “*Yajurveda* also). (And thus there would be a contradiction between “these two Injunctions, on which the *sūtra* is based).”

But (if there were such an applicatory Injunction of the *Sāma* in the *Sāmaveda* itself), the mere repetition of the same Injunction in the *Yajurveda* would have very little use. If the two Injunctions were treated in the same manner as the several Injunctions (of the same thing) met with in various texts of the same Veda,—then, in that case, the *Pūrvaṇvaka* would have been in the form that, “the two tones of *Loudness* and *Quietness* should be treated as optional alternatives” (as such is the conclusion in the case of two injunctions being found in two different texts,—*Vide* II—iv—8—32). And this too, only if such an Injunction alleged to exist in the *Sāmaveda* were actually quoted from it. If, however, no such actual Injunction be forthcoming, the explanation offered could not be admissible.

ADHIKARĀṆA (B).

For these reasons, then, we must take the words ‘*guṇa*’ (Accessory) and ‘*mukhya*’ (Primary) in the *sūtra* to have been used in the sense of the Originative and the Applicatory Injunctions respectively. And accordingly we should expound the *Adhikarāṇa* in the following manner:

Question to be dealt with: In a case where a thing, having its origin in one *Veda*, has its application or use laid down in another *Veda*, should

that thing be equipped with the properties peculiar to the former Veda, or with those of the latter ?

Purvapaksha : "Inasmuch as the origination of a thing always precedes its application, the properties employed should be those of the Veda in which it has its origin."

Siddhānta : The properties should be those of that Veda which lays down its application—(1) because the origination of a thing is only for the sake of the uses to which it may be applied ; (2) because it is only when the thing in question—the *Sāma*-singing—is applied to use that it stands in need of some *tone* to be applied to it ; and hence the *tones* enjoined (in the Injunction '*Uccaiḥ ṛcā*, etc.') are those that are perceived at the time of usage, and not at the time of the origination ; as there is no injunction of its being brought into action at that time.

ADHIKARANA (C).

Or, we could take the word '*vyatikrama*' in the *sūtra*, not as signifying either *Rejection* or *Contradiction*, but as denoting *non-concomitance*,—i.e. existence in different places. Thus then, we would have the *Adhikarāṇa* as follows :—

Question : In a case where the *Origination* and the *Application* of a certain thing are non-concomitant,—i.e. the *origination* is in one Veda and the *application* in another,—with the properties of which Veda should the *Sāma* be equipped ?

Purvapaksha : "It must be equipped with the properties of the *Originative Veda*, or with those of one or the other, optionally."

Siddhānta : It should be equipped with those of the *Applicative Veda* ; as *application* is the more important factor.

ADHIKARANA (D).

We might have the *Adhikarāṇa* as follows :—

Question : In a case where the *Primary* is in one Veda, and the *Accessory* in another, after the name of which Veda should the *Accessory* be called ?

The *Siddhānta* conclusion would be that it should be called after the Veda in which the *Primary* happens to be mentioned.

In this case (D) however, it would be necessary to reject the conclusion arrived at in the *Sūtra* III—vii—51, and to accept the performer to be the same, in the Original sacrifice, as in its modifications,—the one that is mentioned in connection with the Primary. If then, on the strength of the Injunction, that Performer should be accepted who is mentioned in the same Veda with the Accessory,—then the *tone* to be employed would also be the same that belongs to the *Accessory*; and it would not be proper to employ the tone of the *Primary*.

For this reason, it is best to take the *Adhikaraṇa* as based upon the consideration of the comparative authoritativeness of the *Originative* and the *Applicatory* Injunctions. As it is only thus that the citing of the example of *Ādhāna* appears justifiable. Specially as if the *Adhikaraṇa* be explained as pertaining to the incompatibility of the Primary and the Secondary, or to the contradiction between the Primary and the Subsidiary,—then, it would be necessary to explain how this would not be a mere repetition of what is said under *Sūtra* XII—ii—25.

ADHIKARANA (3).

[The *Jyotishṭoma* belongs to the *Yajurveda*].

Sūtra (10): The Action mentioned in two Vedas is to be taken as belonging to that in which most of its constituent details are found.

We now proceed to consider the question after which Veda a certain Primary action is to be called, when it is found to be mentioned in more than one Veda. (As for instance, we find the *Jyotishṭoma* mentioned in the *Yajurveda* as well as in the *Sāmaveda*, and the question is whether we should call it a 'Yajurvedic' or a 'Sāmavedic' sacrifice).

The *Siddhānta* conclusion is that it is to be called after that Veda in which we find it laid down originatively, and not as a mere subsidiary.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is put forth in the following manner: "Just as "in the various texts of the same *Veda*, so in different Vedas also, we "have the action laid down *originatively*; and hence the matter of the "property attaching to it would be a matter of mere option; or it may be "that, inasmuch as both Vedas would be found to lay down the form as "well as the accessories of the action, sometimes one, and sometimes the "other Veda might be taken as originative of it."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply:—

There can be no option in the matter of different *Vedas*, as there is in the case of different *texts* of the same Veda; consequently one Veda must be taken as enjoining the sacrifice, and the other as mentioning it simply for the purpose of laying down certain accessories for it.

Then there arises the question—"In the case of the *Jyotishṭoma* for instance, which of the two Vedas (*Sāma* or *Yajush*) is to be accepted as *enjoining* it?"

The reply to this is that that Veda which appears to mention the greatest number of the accessory details, making up the procedure of the sacrifice, should, for that very reason, be accepted as enjoining the performance of that sacrifice. For instance, in the case of the *Jyotishṭoma*, it is in the *Yajurveda* that the largest number of details of procedure—in the shape of the *Dikṣaṇiya*, etc.—are found mentioned. Consequently it is in the *Yajurveda* that that sacrifice has its origin; and hence it is spoken

of as 'YajurvĒdēna kriyats,' which means that being pointed out by that Veda, it is created by it; or that being performed in accordance with that, it is spoken of as 'being done by it.'

But this explanation of the word '*bhūyastva*' (in the *sūtra*) is not quite correct. Because when a certain thing has been recognized, from its nature, to be indicative of something else, a little or more of it does not make any difference in its cognition. For instance, when smoke is recognized to be indicative of the Fire, whether it be much or little, it must indicate the fire. In the same manner, in the case in question, it is the presence of the details of procedure that has been recognized as indicative of the Origin of the injunction of the sacrifice; and even in a case where very little of these details is mentioned, even this little would be inexplicable unless it indicated the performability of the sacrifice; and hence even this little of it would certainly indicate its performability (and as such the presence of its originative Injunction). Then again, in the case in question, it is not the *largeness* of subsidiaries that is meant to be the details of procedure; but what people call the *subsidiary*, that itself is what is meant by the Details of Procedure. Then it might be held that "where we find only a little of the details of procedure mentioned, we must take it as laid down with reference to the Primary sacrifice enjoined in another Veda." But the same may be said of a case where a large number of these details are mentioned (i.e. these may be taken as laid down with reference to the sacrifice enjoined in another Veda).

The following argument might here be brought forward: "That which is only a little can be more easily taken as pertaining to some thing enjoined in another Veda, than a large number of it could ever be."

But it is not so; because even in the case of a large number of details, it is possible for the large number of sentences to be taken as pertaining to some Injunction in another Veda.

Consequently we must expound the *Siddhānta* as follows: In the case of the *JyotishŢoma*, we find the form of the sacrifice consisting of the Substance, the Deity and the Action; and it is in the *Yajurveda* that all these three are laid down; while what the other Veda (the *Sāmaveda*) does is to merely mention the Action by name with a view to laying down certain Hymns, etc. in connection with it; and hence inasmuch as this latter stands in need of the mention of the Substance and the Deity, it cannot be taken as independently by itself, laying down the Action in question. This we have explained under the *Çākhānturādīkaraṇa* (II—iv—8 et

seq.). And even though the complete form of the Sacrifice is given in the *Yajurveda*, yet it is quite possible to establish the relationship of this sacrifice to the Hymns, etc. mentioned in the other Veda; as even though these latter serve only transcendental (imperceptible) ends, yet they are taken as connected with the sacrifice, on the strength of the directions laid down in connection with them.

Thus then, the meaning of the *sūtra* comes to be this: That action which is mentioned in two Vedas, should have its name ascertained by the mention of a larger number—i.e. the whole—of its constituent details, which may be capable of supplying all its requirements. The *sūtra* speaks of only “two Vedas,” because the *R̥k* and the *Sāma* Vedas have the same character of *Loudness*, and as there is no difference consequent upon this, a mention of these would be useless. (Hence all the difference that is possible is as between the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Yajurveda* and the *R̥gveda*.)

ADHIKARANA (4).

[The Context is a means of pointing out the application of *Mantras*.]

Sūtra (11): That which is disconnected (by Direct Declaration, Indicative Power or Syntactical Connection) is connected by means of the Context; because it stands in need of the details of procedure.

We have explained above, with examples, the application (of *mantras*) by means of Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—dealing with such principal cases as are amenable to them, individually or collectively. But out of these three, no mention has been made in the Sūtras of Syntactical Connection, because it is almost included in Direct Declaration—in the shape of the expression of the application by means of a Direct Injunction,—and also in Indicative Power,—which consists in the power of the *mantra-words* themselves to indicate its uses; specially as in the case of *sentence* (or Syntactical Connection) there is no single word that is used, and it is absolutely necessary to have the proximity of another word. Or, it may be that, Syntactical Connection is not included in the former two, but that it has been spoken of (as the means of the application of *mantras*) in the Sūtra III—iii—2, which from beginning to end has been shown as pointing to the fact of that Connection being a property of the Veda.

As an example of application by Syntactical Connection, the *Bhāṣya* has cited the sentence '*arunayā*, etc.'; but in this case it could be very well said that, as in the case of '*Aindryā*, etc.', so here also, the application is *directly declared* by the Instrumental ending (in '*arunayā*'). If the idea in the mind of the author of the *Bhāṣya* be that though the Instrumental ending points out its relationship with Action in general, yet it is the Syntactical Connection that points out the particular relationship,—then, the same may be said of the sentence '*Aindryā*, etc.' (which too would become an example of application through Syntactical Connection); because in the case of this latter sentence also, the word '*Aindryā*' only requires *something that is to be addressed*, and the word '*gārhapatyam*' stands in need of only the means or Instrument; and hence the particular relationship (between the two particulars) is brought about by Syntactical Connection alone. And hence in both these cases, the Syntactical Connection may be shown to be included in Direct Declaration; consequently both

the sentences must be taken as instances of both (Direct Declaration and Syntactical Connection).

As now the consideration of the comparative authoritativeness (of Direct Declaration, etc.) is drawing near (to be done in Sūtra 14), the *sūtra* proceeds to point out the forms of the three other means of pointing out the application,—as also the way in which they are capable of pointing this out.

But on this point, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA

—which proceeds to show that “by means of Context, there can be no cognition of the application of Accessories, or that there can be a doubtful cognition, or that the cognition would be a mistaken one: Because so long as there does not appear some other means of such cognition, there is no cognition at all; or even, if there be such other means, if it be, somehow or other, not pointed out, the cognition would be a doubtful one; or inasmuch as there is no other operation of words, except the hearing of the letters, the following of the expressive potency of those letters, and the proximity of other capable words required for the comprehension,—the Context, Order of sequence or Name cannot be the correct means of obtaining any idea of the application of accessories.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: So long as the continuity of the details of procedure relating to the Primary Action has not been broken, whatever action, without any particular result, happens to be mentioned in the text, is taken to be an accessory of that Primary,—and this only by means of the Context (*Prakaraṇa*).

For instance, the Injunction ‘*Darçapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*’ having given the idea that ‘one should obtain Heaven by means of the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,’ there arises a question as to ‘how’ this is to be done; and while this ‘how’ is being expounded in the Veda, we find mentioned certain Actions (the *Prayājas*) apparently useless (having no use stated in the context), in such sentences as ‘*Samidho yajati*,’ ‘*Tanūnapātum yajati*,’ etc., etc. Now then, we are led to believe that some help must arrive for the *Darça* or *Pūrṇamāsa* (in the shape of certain details of its procedure), and also that these latter *Prayājās* must have some end or purpose to serve. And then, we find that for the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is no aid,—mentioned either in the same word, in the same sentence, in the same context or in any other context,—which we

could perceive by any of the five means of cognition (Sense-perception and the rest), or by any words cognizable by these means of cognition. Similarly too with the *Prayājas* (we do not perceive their end or purpose). And yet it is necessary that both of these must exist (as otherwise the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* could not be performed, and the mention of the *Prayājas* in the Veda would be wholly useless). And we could conclude that these do not exist at all, only if we failed to obtain them by all the resources at our command. As a matter of fact, however, we have, at our command, a means, in the shape of Context, of obtaining an idea of those much-needed factors. Nor is extreme proximity the only ground of relationship between two things; and as a matter of fact, the Vedic potency continues to move on to the more remote factor, when it does not find a fit object among the more proximate ones. And in the case in question, it is this fact that will be the ground for admitting the mutual help (accorded between the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* and the *Prayājas*). The fact that, on not obtaining a fit object among those in close proximity, a remote one is admitted, is established by the mutual requirements (of the Primary Sacrifice and the *Prayājas*),—the infallible conclusion being that the aid that the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* stand in need of is supplied by the *Prayājas*, and the use or purpose to be served, which the *Prayājas* are in want of, lies in the help that they accord to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*. And as a matter of fact, neither of these has got anything more proximate to itself, supplying the said needs. Though we could assume this help to be accorded by some other Action,—yet, inasmuch as this other Action will have had its relationships all supplied through other Primary sacrifices, it would not stand in need of being connected with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*. For the same reason, the *Prayājas* cannot be taken as leading to Heaven (the common result assumed in connection with the *Viśvajit*, etc.). Nor again could they be taken as bringing about, independently by themselves, the Result that is declared as following from the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; because this one-sided supplying of requirement (by the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* to the *Prayājas*) could be admitted, only if there were no relationship between them based upon mutual requirement; and not while such a relationship is possible. Consequently, it must be admitted that these two supply each other's needs, just in the same way as the person whose cart-horse has died is helped by one whose cart has been burnt, and *vice versa*.

Question: "What special purpose is served by the mention, in the *sūtra*, of '*asamyūktam*'?"

Answer: The purpose served by it is the preclusion of the application of the Context to cases that are connected by Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—such, f.i., as the Injunction of

the *Pratīpat*, with duality and plurality, and the words '*Pūshā*,' etc. and their auxiliaries.

Or '*asamyuktam*' may be taken as '*that* which is *not* connected with something contrary to the Context.'—Those that are connected with its non-contradictories,—such, f.i., as in the case of the sentences '*Vrihiṁ prokshati*,' '*Varhirdēvasadanandāmi*,' '*Aruṇayā krināti*,' etc. being connected with the *Vrihi*, *Varhi* and *Kraya* mentioned in their Contexts,—there is every admissibility of the agency of the Context'; but as this is proved by the very capability of things, it has not been mentioned in the *sūtra*.

ADHIKARANA (5).

[The *Order of sequence* points out the *application*.]

Sūtra (12): The Order of sequence also (*serves to point out the application of accessories*), on the ground of the sameness of position.

The *Pūrvapaksha*, with regard to this *sūtra* and the next—dealing with the agency of *Order of sequence* and *Name*—is much in the same strain as that with regard to that of *Context*, in the foregoing *sūtra*.

SIDDHANTA.

The Order of sequence, consisting of the commonality of position, is of two kinds, as based upon the text and upon actual performance; and it is a means of pointing out the application of Accessories.

Even when the two are not performed at the same place, if it be found that the *mantra* appears in the same place in the *mantra-section* of the Veda, as the Injunction of the Primary sacrifice does in the *Brāhmaṇa-section*;—then, when we proceed to seek for the relatives of both, the one brings the other to the mind, by reason of their sameness of position,—in accordance with the Law of Sequence. That is to say, when we proceed to look for the *mantra* to be employed in connection with the Primary, that is the first to be enjoined (in the *Brāhmaṇa-section*), we begin from the very beginning of the *Mantra* section; and as soon as the first *mantra* comes to our mind, if we do not find any reasons for passing it over, we accept that as the *Mantra* sought after. In the same manner, when we proceed to look for an Action, to which the *mantra* occurring in the beginning of the *Mantra-section* would be an auxiliary, we begin from the very first Action enjoined in the *Brāhmaṇa-section*; and not finding any reasons for passing over that Action, we accept that as the one in connection with which the *Mantra* should be employed. And in the same manner, the second would be connected with the second, and so forth.

In the case of such *mantras* as the *Āgneyānumantra*, their application is found to be pointed out by the indications of such words as '*Āgneya*' and the like. Consequently, the *Bhāṣya* has cited, in the present connection, the *mantra* '*Dabdhirnāmāsīt, etc.*,' whose connection is not pointed out by the indicative power of its words and which is found mentioned in the same order of sequence as the *Upāmṣuyāja*.

Objection: "The *mantra* cited is found to be pointed out by Context, "as pertaining to all the actions (therein mentioned); and as the context "is more authoritative than the Order of Sequence, the *mantra* must be "taken as to be employed in other actions also."

To this, some people make the following reply: By connecting the *mantra* with the *Upāṃṣuyāṇja*, we follow both (the Context as well as the Order of Sequence); and that is why we take it in that way.

But against this explanation it might be urged that it is not proper to follow the Order, when we find it contradictory to the Context: because when the Auxiliary belongs to all the actions (as is shown by the Context), it has got to be repeated with every Primary action, which would not be the case if it were taken with only one action (the *Upāṃṣuyāṇja*, as shown by the Order); and hence the following of the Order would mean a rejection of the Context, which cannot be allowed.

Consequently, to the above *objection*, we offer the following reply: The other primary Actions, the *Āgnēya* and the rest, are taken up by other *mantras* that are connected with them by *Indicative Power*, as well as by *Context* and *Order*; and as such they do not stand in need of the *mantra* in question. Nor could this *mantra* be taken as an optional alternative, because its indication with reference to the other sacrifices is not at all distinct.

It might be urged that—"inasmuch as the *mantras* serve only imperceptible results, they could all be used in connection with a single Action." But that could not be; because by pointing out to the Primary sacrifice of the Context, they serve a visible purpose. And even if they served only imperceptible purposes, inasmuch as they are independent of one another, they can never be employed conjointly, so long as there is any other way of utilizing them; and only in such a contingency could the *mantra* in question be employed in connection with the *Āgnēya* etc., which having their needs supplied by other *mantras*, have once rejected it. But inasmuch as there is a way of utilizing the *mantra*—viz.: in connection with the *Upāṃṣuyāṇja*—(it cannot be connected with the other sacrifices).

And further, the *mantras*, whose indicative power is unknown, cannot have their application pointed out by Context; and in the case of the *mantra* in question we find that the word '*asi*' has its indicative power taken up in its closest vicinity. That is to say, the indicativeness of the *mantra* is not very distinct; and as such the Context could not point out its application; while for us, inasmuch as the word '*asi*' (pertains to the second person 'Thou') it points to something near and before it, and none other; and we find that it is the *Upāṃṣuyāṇja* that is near and before the *Mantra*; and hence the indicative potency of the *Mantra* is recognized through the Order of Sequence, as pertaining to the *Upāṃṣuyāṇja*; and it

is only right that this *Indicative Power* should set aside what is pointed out by the Context.

The Order of sequence, as pertaining to the *Kāmayājyākaṇḍa*, has been explained. And as for the Order of sequence relating to the position of performance, that will be explained in connection with the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the fact of the qualifications of the Animal pertaining to the *Agnishomiya* (animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*).

ADHIKARANA (6).

[The *Name* points out the Application of *Mantras*.]

Sūtra (13): The Name also does so; because it is for that purpose.

The Name, that is applied to *Actions* in its literal sense, is a sure pointer of their relationship; and that relationship is shown to be one that the Auxiliary bears to the Primary.

As the names '*Ādhvaryava*' and the like are used in the Veda alone, we do not show here the objections that were brought forward, on a previous occasion, in regard to the names occurring in ordinary parlance.

As a matter of fact we find that the *Adhvaryu* (Priest) stands in need of a function for himself—something to be done by him; and if no particular function present itself, then he would take up anything. Similarly the action, called '*Ādhvaryava*,' stands in need of an auxiliary in the shape of a Person that might perform it. And at the very outset, the idea afforded by the two words ('*Ādhvaryava*' and '*Adhvaryu*') is that the action that is done by the *Adhvaryu* is called '*Ādhvaryava*,' and that he who is the performer of the *Ādhvaryava* action is one who is called '*Adhvaryu*'; the signification of the basic noun '*Adhvaryu*' (in the word '*Ādhvaryava*') indicating that of the derivative ('*Ādhvaryava*'), or *vice versa*. Though the derivative is a distinct word,—and hence the two words ('*Adhvaryu*' and '*Ādhvaryava*') are independent of each other, and have independent eternal relation with their respective significations,—yet inasmuch as it is only the eternal functioning of a word that depends upon an eternal relationship, we have given the above explanation with regard to all such names as are applied to things in their literal sense; and we have already shown before (under the *Avēṣṭyadhikarāṇa*) that the functioning of the word '*Rājya*' has had no beginning in time. As for the causal relationship between the word and its meaning, there is nothing incongruous in it, even if they be eternal.

Some people assert as follows: "Before the application is pointed out by the Name, there is no connection between the *Ādhvaryava* and the *Adhvaryu*; the mere name cannot bring about the cognition of its literal application. If the connection were established before the functioning of the Name, then the Name would not be the means of pointing out the necessary application. Consequently, we must take the pointing out of the application of the *Ādhvaryava* as based upon the two words

“(‘*Adhvaryu*’ and ‘*Ādhvaryava*’); they are similar in form, though they “are taken in the ordinary conventional signification (and not literally), “and are independent of each other.”

But this is scarcely correct. Because the words that have no literal signification have not the capacity to point to one another in matters relating to the qualifications, even though they may be similar in form; for instance, the qualifications of the *Rathantara-sāma* do not belong to the *Kaprarathantara-sāma*—as will be shown later on; it is all the more so in the case in question, where the relationship meant is one of the Action (*Ādhvaryava*) and its Performer (*Adhvaryu*); as otherwise the citing of such instances as ‘*pāvaka*’ etc. would be wholly irrelevant (if no importance were attached to the *name* applying in its literal sense). Consequently, we must admit the word under consideration to be taken as applying literally.

It has been argued above that prior to the performance, there is no ground (for admitting the word in its literal signification). Though it is true that there is no such perceptible ground, yet, it could be inferred from the Name itself. In matters relating to the Veda, the relationship of the Action and its Performer is established from time immemorial; and it is while this relationship is existent that the Name is applied. We, however, not comprehending that relationship by any other means, come to comprehend it only by means of the *Name*; and from this we are led to believe that the Name precedes the relationship. In reality however it is the Relationship that precedes it; and though not comprehended, it is that Relationship which leads, by its mere existence, to the application of the Name. If this Name had a beginning, then it would be necessary for the Performer to have a prior knowledge of its relationship; and inasmuch as this is not possible, we might be liable to reproach on that account. As a matter of fact, however, we admit the relationship to be eternal; and as such there certainly exists some sort of a relationship with the eternally functioning Name; and this having been duly established, it would be on the ground of the apparent inconsistency of this relationship, that we would subsequently come to accept the relationship of the Auxiliary and the Primary.

Hence it must be admitted that the application is pointed out by a Name applied literally.

ADHIKARAṆA (7).

[Among *Direct Declaration* and the rest, that which precedes is more authoritative than that which follows.]

Sūtra (14): When there is a coalition of **Direct Declaration, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position, and Name**, that which follows is always weaker than the one preceding it; because it is more remote from the purpose in view.

We now proceed to consider the comparative strength and weakness of the six agencies of *Direct Assertion* and the rest, in the matter of the employment of *Mantras*, etc. And as no comparison could be made when each of them treated of different subjects, we take them up as referring to one and the same subject; and that is why the *sūtra* speaks of their '*samavāya*,' 'coalition,' by which is meant the fact of their bearing upon a single subject.

As against the wording of the *sūtra*, some people make the following declaration: "The *sūtra* should have laid down 'conflict' as a 'condition; because in the case of the sentence '*aruṇayā kṛiṇāti*' we have found that though both *Direct Assertion* and the rest point to the 'same object, yet, inasmuch as they are not found to be conflicting each other, we do not stop to consider which of them has the stronger authority. That is to say, we find that in any case, the *Redness* alone is the accessory concerned; and by *Direct Assertion*, this *Redness* is pointed out as connected with *Action in general*; by *Syntactical Connection* it is pointed out as connected with the *particular action* of 'purchase'; and by the *Context* it is shown to be connected with that *Purchase* which pertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; and though thus we find all these three bearing upon the same object of *Redness*, yet, inasmuch as each of them is found to assist, and not contradict, the other, we do not stop to consider which of them is possessed of the greater authoritative strength. Specially as no good would come out of the reference being made indefinitely to *Action in general*, and as it would be absolutely useless to refer the *Redness* to the mere form of the *Purchase*,—we find that the *Direct Assertion* and the *Syntactical Connection* stand in need of the assistance of the *Syntactical Connection* and the *Context* respectively. For these reasons, it is necessary that the *sūtra* should have spoken of

“‘conflict’ (and not mere ‘coalition’) among Direct Assertion and the ‘rest.’”

Reply: It would not be right to make any mention of ‘Conflict.’ Because it is the fact of bearing upon one and the same object that is spoken of as ‘*Samavāya*’; and when the means of cognition (Direct Assertion etc.) are found to bear upon the same object, then alone is such *Samavāya* cognized as belonging to the Accessories concerned. That is to say, in the case of such accessories as the said *Redness* etc., we do not find a coalition (*Samavāya*) of the means of cognition; as ‘*Samavāya*’ does not consist in the possibility of the application of all of them to a single subject, but in the fact of all them actually bearing upon one and the same subject. In the case of *Redness*, we find that its *connection with Action* is pointed out by Direct Assertion; then when this relationship of the Action and its Agent, pointed out by Direct Assertion, comes to be in need of the specialization of the Action, we have the action of *Purchase* (pointed out by Syntactical Connection); but all requirements not being fulfilled by this, there arises a need of further specification; and this is supplied by the pointing out (by the Context) of that *Purchase which is connected with the Jyotishṭoma*, and as such is related to an *Apūrva*. Thus we find that each of the three means of cognition has a distinct object of its own; and as such there is nothing incompatible in the acceptance of all of them as laying down the employment of accessories. Then again, in the case of *Redness*, we find that the acceptance of the remote factor does not involve the rejection of the proximate one; because by accepting ‘Purchase’ we do not reject the relationship of ‘Redness’ with ‘Action’; nor by performing the ‘Purchase’ in connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*, do we set aside its connection with ‘Purchase.’ As a matter of fact, we have a *Samavāya* (‘coalition’) of two means of cognition, only in a case where the Accessory in question is one only;—and this is pointed out to be subservient to a Primary other than that shown by the other Means; the former Means being contrary to its relationship with this latter Primary; while the latter means, not finding it compatible not to reject the relationship pointed out by the other Means, points out the accessory as subservient to a distinct Primary;—and where the Accessory, having its requirements fulfilled by being connected with one Primary, does not stand in need of being employed again. And it is in such cases alone that the ‘*Samavāya*’ of the Means is such as consists in the fact of both of them bearing upon the same object, and being mutually contradictory. Then again, we have a *Samavāya* in the shape of having to take up the same object exclusively, in a case where, though there are different Accessories, yet the Primary is one only, which is equally assisted by all the accessories; and it is found that one Means of

knowledge points out one Accessory as the active auxiliary, while the other points to another; and as a matter of fact, the Primary is so constituted that, having received assistance from one source, it does not stand in need of any other assistance. Such a *Samavāya* involves a contradiction; (and hence it was not necessary to mention the word 'conflict' over again).

On the other hand, (1) in a case where there are distinct accessories concerned—as in the case of the sentence '*samidho yajati, etc.*'; (2) where additional qualifications of the same Accessory are spoken of, as in the case of the '*Redness*' spoken of above; (3) where different Primaries are concerned,—as in the case of the *Agnēya Ashtākapāla, etc.*; (4) where additional qualifications of the same Primary are mentioned,—as in the case of different aids imparted by the accessories of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; —in all these cases, the subject-matter of the various means of cognition being distinct, we have no '*Samavāya*' of these. Whether an accessory has its use laid down by Direct Assertion, or implied by its Name, it is all the same; and in a case where all the Accessories combine to render a single assistance to the Primary,—these accessories are not laid down separately; and the means pointing them out, as well as the Accessory character concerned, is one only; and as such there being only distinct functionings of the same means, there can be no '*Samavāya*.' Similarly, in a case where the same Accessory is laid down in connection with the same Primary, by the Proximate as well as the Remote Means,—there too it is only one of these latter that is accepted as the operative means, the other being taken as serving some other purpose; and in this case too, there is no '*Samavāya*.' For these reasons, it must be admitted that the mention of '*Samavāya*' implies the element of *Conflict* also.

Though it was necessary to have shown the comparative strength of all the six in reference to a single instance, yet, inasmuch as declarations are made in a certain order of sequence, and it is impossible for them to appear all simultaneously, we proceed to take them up one by one; and we take up the other means, only because unless there is something else against which the comparison is made, there can be no mention of the comparative strength of that one which has been taken up for consideration. It is for this reason that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of '*Dvayor dvayōḥ*.'

The sentence in the *Bhāṣyā*—'*śkārtihavartitvādvācaḥ*'—is capable of another explanation: The present enquiry into the comparative strength of Direct Assertion etc. appertains to each of these singly, and not to all of them collectively; as it is these, and not the comparative strength, that have their purpose served by the employment of the

Accessory in question. Consequently, inasmuch as the declaration of comparative strength will have to be repeated with each Primary, it becomes necessary to take them up one by one; and as such the mention of the second is made simply because unless something else is shown to set off the strength or weakness of the other, we cannot form any idea of such strength or weakness; and it is for this reason that the Bhāṣhya speaks of 'dvayordvayohsampradhāraṇam.'

Then again, though as in due form it should have been necessary to compare one out of these six with the other five, yet we compare each of them with one only out of the rest, because that which is suppressed by one thing is naturally taken as suppressed by that which suppresses this latter thing, its suppressor. For instance, those—Context, etc.—that are suppressed by Indicative Power, are certainly suppressed by Direct Assertion, which suppresses the said Indicative Power; and as such those former are not brought into direct comparison with Direct Assertion.

Thus then, as Direct Assertion and Indicative Power are the first two among the six, we proceed to take up these two for comparison.

Question: "What particular example have you got for this purpose?"

"The sense of the question is that inasmuch as it is impossible for mere words to be used by themselves, in all cases these must occur in a certain sentence; and as such we can have no instance where there would be an exclusive functioning of Direct Assertion and Indicative Power only (apart from Syntactical Connection)."

With a view to the differentiation of Direct Assertion etc., from Syntactical Connection, to be explained later on, the Bhāṣhya puts forward the question to be dealt with in the following form: 'In the case of the sentence *Aindryā gārhapatyamupatishṭhatē*, should the *upasthāna* (greeting) be of *Indra* alone, or of *Indra* or *Gārhapatya* optionally, or of *Gārhapatya* and *Indra* conjointly, or of *Gārhapatya* alone?' That is to say, (1) if Indicative Power has an authority superior to Direct Assertion, then the Greeting should be done to *Indra* alone; (2) if both are equally strong, and mutually contradictory, then it should be done to *Indra* or to *Gārhapatya* optionally; (3) if they be equally strong, and not contradictory to one another, then it should be done to both conjointly; and lastly, (4) if Direct Assertion have the superior authority, then, it should be done to *Gārhapatya* alone.

Though on a previous occasion, in the *Sūtra* III—ii—3, it has been declared as a well-established fact that the *Aindri* verse is meant to be addressed to *Gārhapatya*,—yet this was done in view of the superior strength of Direct Assertion, which is to be established in the present *Adhikaraṇa*,

In view of the fact of all the six—Direct Assertion etc.—appearing in the form of a sentence, the opponent takes all of them to be identical with Syntactical Connection, and then puts the question: “*In this case what is the Direct Assertion, and what the Indicative Power?*”

The reply is—*The Direct Assertion consists in the distinct mention of the Gārhapatya, and the Indicative Power in the indications of the Mantra.*

Says the opponent: “If such collections of words were to be called ‘Direct Assertion’ and ‘Indicative Power,’—well, then, there is nothing ‘that can be called a ‘Sentence’; so will you please explain what a ‘sentence’ is?”

Still with a view to the capability of all the rest being duly differentiated from ‘Sentence,’ the Bhāshya replies: *A ‘Sentence’ consists of a number of words which collectively express a certain idea.* Though there is no such single object denotable by all the words collectively, yet what is meant is that which is implied or indicated by them. Or, it may mean that a number of words go to form a ‘sentence,’ when they denote their objects, after having been thrown together, to form a corporate whole, by means of the one single idea that is sought to be indicated by such a whole.

Objection: “In that case, inasmuch as both the *mantra* and the “*Brahmaṇa*—passage that have been quoted in the present connection “(‘*kāda ca nastarīraṣi* etc.’ and ‘*Aindryā gārhyopatyaṃ* etc.’) would “fulfil the conditions necessary for the ‘sentence,’ the present discussion “would be one about the comparative strength of two *Sentences* (and not “of a Direct Assertion and an Indicative Power). If then, it be absolutely necessary to establish the fact of the sentences in question “involving a conflict of Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, then “it becomes necessary to define and point out the differences among “Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.”

Reply: The expressive potency of a word is what is called ‘Indicative Power’ (‘*Linga*’); and ‘Direct Assertion’ is of three kinds: (1) The Injunctive, (2) the Declaratory, and (3) the Applicative; and the ‘sentence’ we have already defined before.

Objection: “Inasmuch as Declaration, Injunction and Application “are all necessarily preceded by a certain Potency, in the case of the “sentence ‘*Aindryā gārhyopatyaṃ* etc.’ also we have an instance of *Indicative Power* (and not of *Direct Assertion* exclusively); and similarly “too, in the case of the *Mantra* ‘*kāda ca* etc.’ we have the *Declaration* of “*Indra*; and as such in this case there can be no differentiation between “Direct Assertion and Indicative Power. Because neither an Injunction, “nor a Declaration, nor an Application, is possible, without certain potencies “attaching to the words; nor, on the other hand, is it possible for the

‘word ‘Indra’ to have an Indicative potency, apart from a Direct Assertion in the form of Declaration.’

Reply: True; in the sentences in question we have a mixture of both (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power). But, (1) the fact of the *Gārhapatya* belonging to the *Aindri* is not cognizable by means of Indicative Power; (2) nor is the idea of Indra being the accessory deity obtainable by means of the Direct Denotation of words.

That is to say, (1) all that the potencies of the words ‘*Aindryā gārhapatyam*’ imply is that each of these words is used in ordinary parlance in its various meanings, and not that the *Aindri mantra* is an accessory of the *Gārhapatya*; because the potency that has gone away in one quarter, cannot serve any purpose in another quarter; when, however, the words of the *Brāhmaṇa* passage (‘*Aindryā etc.*’) function by means of their own denotativeness, independently of all Indicative potency or otherwise, then they distinctly point to the *Mantra* as pertaining to the *Gārhapatya*. And in this case, we do not, in the first instance, have recourse to the assumption of the Denotative potency; as this potency is implied by the apparent inconsistency of the Denotation or expression which is an established fact; and it is only after this latter has pointed out the use, that we assume the necessary potency; and the potency is not the cause of the use. Though in reality it exists beforehand, yet it is only latterly that it comes to be cognized, on other grounds (of apparent inconsistency); and hence even though it is fully endowed with the capability of the agent, yet, not being *indicative*, it is spoken of as having no causal efficiency: If the sentence in question had emanated from a human agent, then, in that case, the Denotative Potency of the speaker would have preceded the declaration of the use. As a matter of fact, however, the assertion in question is not human; inasmuch as the *Veda* is independent of all human agency. Consequently all men being mere listeners, it is only subsequently that the cognition of potency appears; and hence it must be admitted that the idea of the *mantra* being accessory to the *Gārhapatya* is obtained directly from the hearing of the words (‘*Aindryā etc.*’).

(2) In the *mantra* ‘*kadā ca etc.*’ though Indra is denoted by the word ‘*Indra*,’ yet, inasmuch as no *use* is expressed by the word, we find no operation of Direct Assertion (in the pointing out of the use); because there is no word in the *mantra*, on hearing which the listener obtains any idea either of Indra being the Primary or of the *Mantra* being the Accessory;—as we have in the case of the sentence ‘*Aindryā etc.*,’ where the accusative ending (in ‘*garhapatyām*’) distinctly points to the fact of *Gārhapatya* being the Primary factor, and the *Aindri* being the *Instrumental* accessory. Though the *mantra* (‘*kadā ca etc.*’) by its own expressive power is capable

of pointing out its own use, yet its use cannot be taken as declared or laid down by that alone; nor by that alone is the use enjoined; because the *Mantra* has no injunctive potency; in the *Brāhmaṇa*-passage, on the other hand, we can have both the Declaration and the Injunction (of use).

Objection: "For the *Mantra* also, the Indicative Power is assumed on 'the ground of the direct denotation of its words.'"

Reply: True; it is so; but there is no mention or declaration of the use to which the *mantra* is to be put; as all that the words denote is the mere form of the objects denoted by them. The denotative potency of a word, which precedes all other potencies, is something wholly different from the potency of laying down applications or uses,—this latter being based upon the former potency. Because that which is cognized as *capable of denoting* something, is also recognized as capable of being applied; as the incapable could never be applied. Consequently the application of the *Mantra* would be based upon this second potency, and not upon the first (denotative potency); as what the word 'Indra' does, by its pristine denotative potency, is merely to denote the deity '*Indra*.'

For these reasons the discrimination among the six (Direct Assertion and the rest) should be made in the following manner:—

(1) In the case of one (i.e. in '*Aindryā* etc.'), it is in the absence of any Indicative Power that the *Mantra* is directly *declared* to be an accessory (to *Gārhapatya*); (2) while in the other (in '*kadā* ca etc.'), what is cognized is the Indicative Power, without any direct declaration of the accessory character. That is to say, in the former case, from the direct declaration of the use to which the *Aindrī* verse is to be put, we infer the existence of a potency in the verse itself of indicating the *Gārhapatya*; and its application has been already determined (by the Direct Declaration contained in the sentence '*Aindryā* etc.'). In the case of the *mantra* '*kadā* ca etc.,' however, we actually perceive a potency of indicating *Indra*; and from that we have to proceed to assume that the application of the *Mantra* is declared or enjoined (by the word). (3) Then again, in the case of syntactical Connection, we find that it neither has the indicative potency, nor does it directly declare the accessory character; what is found in it is only a conglomeration of a number of words, bearing some sort of a relation to one another. As for (4) Context, (5) Order, and (6) Name,—which respectively take the forms of Procedure, Commonality of Place, and Literal signification, respectively,—the difference among these is easily perceptible; and hence the opponent has not put any question with regard to these, nor has the Bhāṣhya thought it fit to supply the answer.

We find all these six present either collectively or singly, in all sen-

tences. That is to say, there is no sentence which is wholly devoid, either of indicative potency, or of direct declaration or of the proximity of other words. A differentiation among these we have already explained; and from among these it is sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, that is the first to be cognized. This we now proceed to show: In the case in question, we find that the sentence '*kādā ca etc.*' does not declare the application (of the *Mantra*); nor is the application implied by the proximity of any other words; what we find is that the verse contains the word '*Indra*' capable of denoting the deity Indra; and the rest of the words in the *Mantra* being syntactically connected with that word, it follows that the whole *Mantra* is capable of denoting Indra; and then this Indra too forming an integral part of the action (sacrifice), is quite a fit object for being denoted; and as such we are led to admit the fact of its being denoted (by the *Mantra*). As regards the *Gārhapatya*, we find that, without any indicative power of the *Mantra* (with reference to the *gārhapatya*) the application of the *Mantra* to that is distinctly declared by the *Brāhmaṇa*-passage ('*Aindryā etc.*'). And thus it is only natural that we should proceed to consider which of these two has the stronger authority.

Some people make the following observations: "Under the circumstances, the passage of the *Bhāshya* that we have been considering should have been taken before the sentence '*Lingavākyaḥ etc.*' or as preceding the sentence '*nātraikavākyatvāt etc.*' (*Bhāshya*, p. 286, line 18). Because if we once admit of the indicative power (of the *mantra*) towards connecting it with the greeting of Indra,—then how can we, again, admit both to have the character of the sentence? Consequently the sentence under consideration should have been placed in a place where it has been asserted that there are two sentences. Or again, it might be taken along with the sentence—'*through Syntactical Connection, the greeting cannot be said to be subservient either to Indra or to Gārhapatya*'; because in both cases we assume the existence of the operation of rejecting the Syntactical Connection. Otherwise as the fact of the *Mantra* being applied in accordance with the Indicative Power is admitted by the *Pūrvapakshi*, the raising of the question that '*the mantra is applied to the greeting of Indra on the basis of Syntactical Connection,*' and its subsequent refutation, would be wholly irrelevant. For these reasons, we must take the passage of the *Bhāshya* as misplaced by mistake, and should explain it by removing it to its proper place."

We need not attach much importance to the above observations; because it is a common thing to find that when there are many objections to be dealt with, the objection that has gone before is refuted at the time of the refutation of that which comes after it. Then again, even after the

declaration '*nātraikavākyatvāt etc.*' has been made, the mention of 'Syntactical Connection' in the sentence '*Lingavākyē etc.*' would be wholly irrelevant.

Consequently we must take the *Bhāṣhya* just as it stands,—explaining in the following manner: It is only by way of admitting for the sake of argument, that the *Purvapakṣi* has spoken of "Indicative Power" in one place; and hence it is with a view to remove even the slightest remnant of a longing that he may have for bringing in syntactical connection, that the *Bhāṣhya* has declared—'*nātraikavākyatvāt etc.*' Or it may be that with a view to declare the ineffectiveness of the Syntactical Connection in the *Brāhmaṇa*-passage, the *Bhāṣhya* has, by way of illustration, spoken of the same with regard to the *mantra* also.

Objection: "'*Aindryā etc.*' is a sentence. That is to say, the Instrumental ending in '*aindryā*' only denotes the fact of the *Aindri* verse "being an accessory, without indicating the particular Primary to which "it is an accessory,—and similarly, the Accusative in '*gārhapatyam*' only "denotes the fact of the *Gārhapatya* being a Primary factor; and "certainly none of these is incompatible with the Indicative Power (of "the *mantra* '*kādā ca etc.*')"; as so long as there is no relationship with "another word, the instrumentality of the *Aindri* would be quite real; "and the *Gārhapatya* also could be the Primary for some one of the "Āgnēyi verses. But it is the proximity of the two words ('*aindryā*' and "'*gārhapatyam*') that precludes the application of 'the *Mantra* to the "greeting of *Indra*; and this proximity constitutes what is known as "'Syntactical Connection' (consequently the case under consideration "would be one of the rejection of Indicative Power by Syntactical "Connection, and not by Direct Assertion)."

Reply: It is not so; in the reply the *Bhāṣhya* brings forward the Direct Assertion of the *Gārhapatya*. Mutual proximity also could not be taken, without contradiction, unless it opposed the said Direct Assertion. If the word '*gārhapatya*' were construed as '*Gr̥hapatērayam*,' thereby denoting *Indra*,—or if it were to indicate *Indra* as an accessory of the sacrifice,—or, if it were to denote *proximity to the sacrificial fire*,—then, the said proximity (of the words '*aindryā*' and '*gārhapatyam*') could be explicable, compatibly with the Indicative Power. Inasmuch as, however, as a matter of fact, the word '*gārhapatyam*' distinctly sticks to the denotation (of fire) belonging to it as a whole (and not taken etymologically),—there is a distinct contradiction of the Indication by the Direct Assertion (in the shape of the Direct Denotation of the word '*gārhapatyam*') (and not by *Syntactical Connection*, with which it has been shown to be compatible).

Says the *Bhāṣhya*: *Atha vā nātraikavākyatvāt etc.* This brings

forward the contradiction of the Direct Denotation of the (accusative) ending. That is to say, if the Accusative ending (in '*gārhapatyam*') had the sense of the Locative or of the Instrumental, then there might not be a contradiction. As a matter of fact, however, it signifies the *objective*; and this is certainly contradicted. The contradiction of Indicative Power has been already pointed out above; and it has been brought up again simply with a view to reject the possibility of the operation of Syntactical Connection affecting the case in question.

Question: "Inasmuch as, as shown above, contradiction is possible "in both ways, how is it that the *Bhāṣhya* takes up the contradiction of "Direct Assertion by Indicative Power, and not that of the Indicative "Power by Syntactical Connection?"

Reply: Just as by reason of its quicker operativeness, Direct Assertion sets aside Indicative Power and the rest; so in the pointing out of the application of the *mantra* also, it is the first to become operative. That is to say, it is the one that is quickest in pointing out the application, that is cognized as contradicted by its counter-agent.

Objection: "It has been declared above that Direct Assertion is not "the only one that is contradicted."

Reply: Why cannot it be contradicted,—when the limits of the relationship of Direct Assertion with Syntactical Connection have been strictly defined,—one being in the form of the Primary and the Accessory, and another in that of the Qualification and the Qualified? What Direct Assertion distinctly avers is that to the relationship of the Qualification and the Qualified, which is expressed by Syntactical Connection, belongs such and such a relationship of the Primary and the Accessory (and there is no contradiction involved in this). The Indicative Power, on the other hand, contradicts the very relationship of the Primary and the Accessory (expressed by Direct Assertion), and not that of the Qualification and the Qualified, which is expressed by Syntactical Connection. Consequently when the relationship of the Qualification and the Qualified has been established by Syntactical Connection unopposed, then what remains to be considered is the contradiction by Indicative Power of the Direct Assertion.

Or, it may be that as soon as the word '*Aindryā*' has been pronounced, it becomes evident, from the law laid down under *Sūtra* I—ii—31, that he that is to be greeted by the *mantra* is someone *other than Indra*,—and certainly this is contradictory to the Indicative Power which points to Indra as one to be greeted by it.

Thus then, it is clear that the texts under consideration involve a conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power; and as such there is nothing wrong in the discussion propounded by the *Bhāṣhyā*.

On the above question, then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"It must be admitted that all means of right knowledge are equally authoritative.

(A) "Because, as a matter of fact, when one of these has, on its own strength, once been accepted as authoritative, that strength does not disappear, when it is compared with another means.

"In the case of all means of right knowledge, Sense-perception and the rest, there are only two possible contingencies:—they are either true or false; there is no intermediate course: and that which is once a true means of knowledge can never be false; and conversely that which is false can never be true; and in all cases it is only the false means of knowledge that is rejected, and never the true one; nor is the false one ever recognized as a true means of knowledge; for the simple reason that the very character of the true means of knowledge consists in non-rejectibility. Now then, with regard to the six means of knowledge, Direct Assertion and the rest, it has been shown (in the preceding *Adhikaraṇas*) that each of them is a true means within its own limits; and none of them ever steps beyond those limits, where it could be suspected of weakness. And when an idea has once been brought about by one of these, it is not possible for it to be made non-existent. And inasmuch as every one of these ideas is only self-destructible, it could not be set aside by any other idea. Nor is it possible for the *sanskāra* (impression) of that idea to be removed,—as there can be no destruction of the *sanskāra* that is the source of memory. Nor, lastly, is it possible to separate it from its legitimate effect in the shape of due action; as the idea of action is strongly-rooted. Consequently, all the six being equally strong in authority, whenever they are found to contradict one another, they must be treated as pointing to optional alternatives.

"(B) If it be absolutely necessary to admit the rejection of one by the other, then the rejection will take a course quite contrary to that held by the *Siddhānti*, as it is a matter of common experience that that which follows can never come about unless it has rejected that which has gone before it. That is to say, among Direct Assertion etc. it is found that that which precedes is quicker in its operation than that which follows; and as such the latter could have an existence only after it had set aside the former; consequently the rejection of these by one another would be in a way quite different from that held by you.

"And further, even Direct Assertion could never lay down the application of that which would not have the power (necessary for that

.. application); and there could be no such *power*, unless there were a .. Syntactical Connection (among the factors concerned).

"That is to say, (1) that which, at the time of its appearance, has .. had its capabilities ascertained as being suited for one thing, could .. never, at the time of its actual application, be turned away from that .. thing; and it is only right to hold that the use to which a thing is put .. depends upon its capabilities (and thus Indicative Power is stronger .. than Direct Assertion).

"(2) Similarly that which is not found to be related, by Syntactical .. Connection, with another thing, could never be believed to have any .. capabilities with regard to that thing. And when there is such a .. relationship; then the apparent inconsistency of this very relationship .. establishes the said capability; and thus Syntactical Connection would .. appear to be by far the stronger in authority (than Indicative Power, .. and hence than Direct Assertion).

"(3) So also, in all cases Syntactical Connection is dependent upon .. *mutual requirement* (Context); hence it is that it is only when such .. a mutual requirement is perceptible that we recognize the presence of .. Syntactical Connection; and never otherwise; and thus being the .. necessary precursor of that Connection, Mutual Requirement, in the .. form of Context, cannot but be admitted to be the superior. Specially .. as all notions of Syntactical Connection, that go against mutual require- .. ment, are found to be totally mistaken.

"(4) In the same manner, all Requirements are based upon those .. that proximate to one another; because factors that are remote from .. one another cannot be *required* by, or related to, one another; conse- .. quently all that has gone before is possible only when there is Proxi- .. mity, which, therefore, in the form of Order, must be regarded as .. superior to all the four that have gone before.

"(5) As for *Name*, it denotes the relationship directly (and as such .. is the strongest of all).

"Thus we find that the order of superiority is wholly reversed.

"(C) Or again, all this discussion could have been relevant only if .. there were a contradiction among the six means of knowledge. As a .. matter of fact, however, there is no such Contradiction; as it is quite .. compatible for the *Mantra* (or any other accessory in question) to be used .. in ways denoted by both (means of knowledge). Consequently, even when .. the various means of knowledge coalesce or conflict, due authority must .. belong to every one of them."

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: Among these six, that which follows is rejected by that which precedes it, as they are more and

more remote from the sense of Direct Assertion. Because in the case of all of these it is universally considered necessary to admit of the corroboration of a Direct Assertion laying down the necessary application; and the cognition brought about by this corroborative Direct Assertion varies in its proximity to each of the six means of cognition in question.

If, like Direct Assertion, the authority of Indicative Power and the rest also were self-sufficient and independent, then, in that case, what you say would have been quite true. As it is, however, the authority of these, like that of the *Smṛitis*, depends upon their capability of pointing to a corroborative Direct Assertion;—which latter alone is the sole authority (in matters relating to *Dharma*). And this Direct Assertion is held to be of six kinds, in accordance with the six means of its being cognized (viz.: Sense-perception, Inference, etc., etc.).

Objection: “How is it that Indicative Power and the rest have no “independent authority of their own?”

Reply: We have proved above that *Dharma* is that which has Vedic Injunction for its sole authority (I—i—2), and then again that that which is not supported by direct verbal testimony is of no use in matters relating to *Dharma* (I—iii—1). And when the words that are directly heard are found to lay down the application, we call that a case of *Ḥṛuti*, Direct Assertion, because it inheres directly in the *Ear* (*Ḥrotra*). In a case however where the words are not found to directly lay down the application, after we have cognized the words by direct Sense-perception, the agency pointing out the application is inferred by apparent Inconsistency; and it is in such cases, that we have Indicative Power and the other five; and certainly in such cases there is a certain remoteness between the means of knowledge and the final object of cognition (Application).

For instance, in the matter of the use to which the *Aindri* verse is to be put, when both Direct Assertion and Indicative Power proceed to point it out, at the time that we come across the words of the former directly laying down the use, we find those of the Indicative Power to be capable of only reminding us of those words; and consequently while we are yet taking steps to infer the existence of such words from the apparent inconsistency of the appearance of the verse in the Context,—the necessary use is long before laid down by means of the direct words of Direct Assertion; and this use having been duly cognized, the subject-matter of the Context—i.e. the sacrifice—has its requirements fulfilled in connection with the *Mantra*, and the *Mantra* also has its own needs in connection with the sacrifice duly supplied. And thus the appearance of the *mantra* in the particular context having been otherwise explained, there is no longer any Apparent Inconsistency capable of leading us to the inference of a Direct Assertion of Indra (as the person to be greeted with the

Mantra); and in the absence of such a Direct Assertion, there can be no such application for the *Mantra*.

In fact we have explained it more than once that only that much is to be regarded as *Vedic* which has to be assumed in fulfilment of certain needs of the *Veda*.

For these reasons it must be admitted that Direct Assertion is superior in authority (to Indicative Power, which is one step further removed from its objective). Because Direct Assertion does not need the help of anything else, in the way that it is itself needed by Indicative Power.

To this effect we have the following declaration: 'That which does not stand in need of something else is the stronger of the two; while that which has its functioning dependent upon something else—how could that ever set aside this latter?'

Thus then, among Direct Assertion and the rest, we find that that which precedes operates independently of that which follows, and is, therefore, stronger than that; while that which follows, having its authority dependent upon that which precedes it, can never set aside this latter. We have already shown that we cannot admit of the authority of Indicative Power and the rest unless they are capable of leading to the inference of a corroborative Direct Assertion.

Objection: "It has also been declared that that which is itself 'devoid of Power can never be applied to any use (even by a hundred 'Direct Assertions)."

Reply: True; this has been declared; but it was a most improper declaration; because, as a matter of fact, the capability of Direct Assertion to lay down the use of an accessory does depend upon Indicative Power; it is after the use has been cognized (by means of Direct Assertion), that, upon the strength of that cognition, we come to infer its capability of being used in that way. That is to say, after Direct Assertion has pointed out the use to which the accessory is to be put, there arises the question as to the manner in which it would serve that purpose; and the conclusion arrived at is that it would serve it in the way in which it would be capable of doing so; and though there may be nothing in the accessory itself that points to its capability for such use (as f.i. there is nothing in the *Aindri mantra* itself that points to its being used in the greeting of *Gārhapatya*), yet such capability is inferred from the Direct declaration of the use (as in the Injunction '*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatishṭhāt*'). It is on this account that we have the declaration contained in the *Sūtra* III—ii—3.

Objection: "There can be no use to which an accessory is put, until 'it already possesses the requisite capability; and consequently the 'existence of such capability must be presumed before everything else;

“and thus Direct Assertion would certainly become weaker than the “directly perceptible Indicative Power.”

Reply: True; such would be the natural conclusion if the inference of the capability preceded the operation of Direct Assertion. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so; because until the *Aindri* verse has been declared to be used in a certain way, there is no reason for seeking for any capability, in it, of denoting the *Gārhapatya*; in fact, when the use has been laid down, and is found to be otherwise inexplicable, the said capability, even though existing from before, comes to be inferred only subsequently.

Objection: “Even then the remoteness from the final objective is “exactly the same in both cases. For instance, the remoteness from the “pointing out of the use, in the case of the Indicative Power, that leads “to the inference of a Direct Assertion, is exactly the same that there is “in the case of Direct Assertion, which leads to the inference of the “necessary Power. In any case the remoteness is due to the necessity “of the inference of something not visible; and this is exactly the same “in the case of both.”

Reply: True; so far it is the same in both cases; but this is of no use in the matter of the strength or weakness of the two. Because it is only when the idea of the *use* is remote that there is a notion of weakness; and this would apply only to a case where the non-existent factor has got to be assumed, or inferred, before there is an idea of the *use*.

That is to say, in the case of Indicative Power, there is no pointing out of the use, until there is a prior inference of the Direct Assertion (laying down that use); and hence in this case there is a certain degree of remoteness, which is not present in the case of Direct Assertion, wherein the declaration of the use having been duly cognized, it is the presence of this use that leads to the inference of the necessary capability; and this inference, appearing subsequently, does not remove, to any remote point, the previously-obtained idea of the use. In all cases where the two means of knowledge proceed towards a common objective, that which is found to take more time in reaching it is taken as remote from it, and as weaker in its authority than the other; and when the use has been once duly cognized, even if there were a thousand inferences to appear, they would in no way remove the means of knowledge away from its objective.

What has been said above holds good respecting all the remaining pairs—such as Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, Syntactical Connection and Context, Context and Order, and Order and Name. As in the case of all these, there can be no idea of the use obtained from anyone

until it has led to the inference of the preceding ones ; whereas when the use has been pointed out by the preceding one, the existence of the following one is merely accepted as an invariable concomitant.

Objection : " Inasmuch as Direct Assertion is directly perceptible " (which none of the other is), it is right that it should be stronger than " Indicative Power ; but in the case of the others, inasmuch as all of them " equally stand in need of the inference of corroborative Direct Assertion, " on what ground could we admit any one of them to be stronger or " weaker than the other ? "

Reply : Indicative Power and the rest are removed from the final objective of Direct Assertion, by one, two, three, four and five steps respectively ; and this makes a great difference in their respective strength and weakness. That is to say, the operation of Indicative Power is removed by the single step of the inference of a corroborative Direct Assertion, while that of Syntactical Connection is removed by two steps, in the shape of the inference of Indicative Power and Direct Assertion, and so on. For instance (in the case of the sentence '*Kudā ca nastarīraṣi* etc. ') all the other words, that are not denotative of Indra, being found to be syntactically connected with the word denotative of that Deity,—we come to assume the existence in those words of the power of denoting that deity ; and this power leads us on to the Direct Assertion (which points out the use to which the *mantra* is to be put).

As a matter of fact, in all *Mantras* it is only a certain word that denotes something directly connected with the action to be performed ; e.g. in the sentence '*Agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi*,' the words '*nirvapāmi*' and '*Agni*' ; the other words, denoting things not directly connected with the action, appear to be incapable of being of any use in its performance ; and yet the apparent inconsistency of these being syntactically connected leads to the inference of the existence in them of the capability of denoting things connected with the action ; and consequently they suppress their own original denotations, and then coming to indicate things connected with the action, become capable of being utilized in its performance ; and then it is that having led to the inference of a Corroborative Direct Assertion, they come to be actually utilized in connection with that action. All this is quite admissible in a case where there is no incompatibility (between Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power and Direct Assertion).

When however we find two *mantras* so constituted that though syntactically connected, each of them indicates a distinct object connected with actions—[e.g. in the sentence '*syonantē sadanam kṛṇomitasmin sīda*,' we find that the former part is employed in the spreading of the grass, while the latter in the laying down upon it of the

Cake]—, in such a case, the two stand in need of two distinct Indicative Powers,—and these Powers also standing in need of two distinct objects to be indicated, when the Syntactical Connection proceeds to point out the application of the sentence in question, as soon as it is found that the indicative power of a certain portion of it points to a certain use for it, it comes to be quickly taken up by that use, and Syntactical Connection is utterly incapable of employing it to any other purpose; nor does it allow any others to serve that purpose. And the sole reason for this is that, while Syntactical Connection is still on its way to the inference of Indicative Power, the already existing Indicative Power hastens to bring about the inference of the corroborative Direct Assertion, and thereby restrict the use to which the sentence is to be put.

That is to say, when the whole is applied to a certain use, it can be so applied without taking along with it all its parts; and in the sentence in question we find that all that is directly perceptible is the fact of the two parts of the sentence ('*syonam etc.*' and '*tasmin etc.*') being syntactically connected,—and not the fact of their indicating the same thing; on the other hand, the fact of their indicating two different things is proved by the cognition of their meanings. Thus then, in the matter of the application of the whole sentence and its parts, when Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power proceed to point out their uses,—inasmuch as that which is devoid of power cannot be applied to any use, while Syntactical Connection is still on the way to the inference of the fact of the latter portion of the sentence being subservient to the purpose of the former, or *vice versa*, the Indicative Powers belonging to each of these two portions themselves distinctly brings about the inference of a Direct Assertion pointing out the fact of each of the two portions being applied to a distinct purpose of its own. Consequently, while Syntactical Connection is still exerting itself towards the inference of the necessary Direct Assertion, Indicative Power has fully established the uses to which the two parts are to be applied; and thereby the mention of the *mantra* on the Context having all its requirements fulfilled, there remains no cause for the inference of any further Direct Assertion; and thus, the use, which an inferred Direct Assertion might have pointed out, falls to the ground, having no basis to go upon. As for the *Mantra* also, that which is the first to appear is more quickly applied to the use that is the first to present itself, to which the former *Mantra* could be applied only very slowly. Similarly that which appears latterly becomes more quickly applied to the use, which is the last to appear. And the *Mantra* that is quick to be applied does not pay any regard to the slow use to which it might be put. In the same manner, the meaning also, being taken up by the *Mantra* cognized first, does not take up any other; and so long as it is possible for it to be

taken in its primary sense, it cannot be relegated to a secondary position.

Thus then, Indicative Power being stronger than Syntactical Connection, the Mantras are to be applied by breaking up the sentence into two distinct parts.

Objection: "Such being the case (in the sentence '*Dēvasya tvā savituḥ.....nirvāpāmi*') the word '*nirvāpāmi*' having its indicative power duly ascertained, and appearing much more quickly, takes up the purpose in question; and precludes the application of the remote words '*dēvasya tvā etc.*' which, for this reason, can not be applied to the same use. Then inasmuch as these words have distinct purposes to serve, they cannot be taken collectively. Consequently, there being no Syntactical Connection, it becomes necessary for these words ('*dēvasya etc.*') to indicate, in some way or other, the *nirvāpa* itself,—and nothing else, as this something else could not belong to the action to be performed. For these reasons, all the words coming to have the same objective, there comes about coalescence (of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection), and there must be a rejection of the application of those words that are pointed out by Syntactical Connection alone."

Reply: In a case where other words denote things connected with the Action, there alone can we have distinct uses for them; while for those words that do not denote any such thing, their use must unavoidably be accepted as indicated by Syntactical Connection. That is to say, those words that do not denote things connected with actions,—if these be taken independently by themselves, they become wholly useless. Consequently, even though the object (*nirvāpa*) has had all its requirements fulfilled by previously ascertained relationships, yet it becomes denotable by the other words, in case these latter are found to be in need of some such object. Just as even though the details of an action are all fully supplied, yet in consequence of the order of sequence, the same details are again brought in; and again, just as though certain accessory details may have their requirements fulfilled in connection with the Primary sacrifice, yet they are employed again in connection with the subsequent modifications of those sacrifices; as we have explained in connection with the *Kṛptis*. Consequently even such words as are not denotative of things connected with the action come to be so connected and used (in accordance with Syntactical Connection).

Those words, on the other hand, that are found to denote things connected with actions, have their use, even if they do not happen to be connected with things not denoted by them; and they do not obtain a place on the mere ground of their uselessness. As all the six, Direct Assertion and the rest,—if they happen to be tainted by uselessness,—are

held to be capable of being set aside even by those that are weaker than themselves. For instance, though Direct Assertion (in the sentence '*Vrihīn prokshati* ') points to the fact of the *Prokshana* being an accessory attendant upon the form of the corn, yet we lose no time in rejecting this and taking it to be attendant upon the capability of the corn to bring about certain transcendental results,—as shown by the Context.

Thus then it becomes fully established that Indicative Power is superior in authority to Syntactical Connection; as has been shown above in connection with *Bhukshānuvāka* (III—ii—24 *et seq.*).

Between Syntactical Connection and Context it is the latter that is the weaker, because of its being further remote from its object.

We find that the connection or relationship (between the Accessory and its Primary) is distinctly perceptible in a case of Syntactical Connection; while in that of Context it is not so perceptible, but has got to be inferred from mutual requirement; and this constitutes a remoteness.

That is to say, in the case of Context all that we perceive is the mere mutual requirement of the helper and the helped, subsisting between the Primary and the Accessory sentences, both of which are fully equipped with their complements; whereas in the case of Syntactical Connection, it is the direct connection between the Primary and the Accessory that is perceptible; consequently, when these two start upon their way to connect the Accessory in question with a particular Primary, while Context is still on the way to the assumption of a Syntactical Connection (between the two), Syntactical Connection will have succeeded in assuming a Power in the words of the sentence (to indicate the required relationship); and while, in the former case, the assumed Syntactical Connection would assume the necessary Indicative Power, the assumed Power, in the latter case, will assume the corroborative Direct Declaration; and lastly, while in the former case, the assumed Power would bring about the assumption of the corroborative Declaration, the assumed Declaration, in the latter case, would have fully established the necessary application of the accessory; and thus the Requirement (upon which Context is based) having been set aside, there would remain no basis for its assumption of the necessary Corroborative Declaration; and hence the Indicative Power, even though assumed, would disappear before it reaches the stage at which it could definitely point out the necessary application. It is for this reason that we hold Syntactical Connection to be the stronger of the two.

In the same manner, between Context and Order (or Position), it is the latter that is the further remote from its objective.

Because while one (i.e. the Context), on its way to the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declaration, begins with *Mutual Requirement* (upon which the Context is directly based), the other (i.e. Order) has got to obtain this (Requirement) also from another source, and then, through that, reach the corroborative Declaration.

That is to say, Order or Position consists merely in the fact of the two (the Accessory and the Primary) being mentioned or performed *in the same place*; and in a case where the two things thus occurring in the same place, happen to be in mutual need, we have an instance of Context. As instances in point we have those modificatory sacrifices that happen to be mentioned in an extensive Context. From among these, that which has not been originally laid down as falling in the midst of the accessories of the Original sacrifice, is found to be mentioned either before or after this latter; and thereby becomes subject to the operations of Order. In the case of Context, on the other hand, all requirements having been fully fulfilled by the accessories mentioned along with the Original sacrifice which have had their uses distinctly defined,—if there is an accessory which happens to be mentioned near something that has all its needs supplied, as also near another thing that stands in some need, and thereby comes to be simultaneously taken up by both of these,—then, while it would be still giving rise to the necessary assumption of a requirement of that which is in proximity to it and hence connectible to it by Order, it would become syntactically connected with that which already has such a requirement, and as such, is connectible with it by Context. And while in the former case, we reach the assumption of Syntactical Connection, there already appears, in the latter case, the assumption of the Power, in the Accessory, to help that with which it is related by Context. And while, in the former case, there is an assumption of the said Power, we have, in the latter, the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declaration. And lastly, while, in the former case, we shall be assuming the Corroborative Declaration, the already assumed Declaration, in the latter case, would have distinctly established the application of the accessory in question; and all the rest would thereby become wholly inoperative.

Similarly too, between Order and Name, we find that in the case of the former, the mutual relationship of the Primary and the Accessory, assumed on the ground of their occurring in the same place, is still based upon the Veda itself; and in all cases the relationship of two things is

always based upon some sort of an identity; whereas in the case of Name, there is no such identity of place pointed out by the Veda as would establish the possibility of a direct relationship.

Objection: "The Name directly denotes relationship itself; and "operating thereby, it would come to be equal to Direct Assertion, in "authority."

Reply: It is not so; because the relationship that is established by the Name is something wholly different from that of the Primary and Accessory, pointed out by Direct Assertion. That is to say, the Name operates towards the establishing of a relationship among certain things that have not, in any way, been recognized as being related; and it does not establish the relationship of the Primary and the Accessory; specially because this latter is capable of being based upon any sort of a relationship. In reality the Name is incapable of denoting any relationship; as we have shown (under the *Arunādhikaraṇa*) that Names applying literally do not denote any relationship. And every relationship is in the form that the two objects (related) have something in common between themselves.

Thus then, it becomes established that Name is inferior to Order. Because in the case of the latter, the common element has not got to be inferred, as the fact of their place being common is distinctly perceptible; while in the case of the former, there being no word expressive of any common element directly perceptible, it has got to be inferred; and this constitutes a remoteness from the real objective.

For instance, while Name is still assuming the existence of the said common element between the two factors, Order has ascertained the fact of the two being in need of each other, because of their occurring in the same place, and thereby has established the Context; while the former common element is assuming the presence of a mutual requirement, the latter Context has established a Syntactical Connection; while the former case assumes a Syntactical Connection, the latter has established the Power of helping; while the former is assuming the Power of helping, the latter has established the Corroborative Direct Assertion; and lastly, while the former is assuming the Corroborative Direct Assertion, the latter has established the use to which the accessory is to be put. And thereby the mention in the Context having had all its requirements fulfilled, all that follows it, even though pointed out by the right means of knowledge, becomes like the unripe seed plucked from the tree, and as such incapable of bringing forth any proper fruit.

Thus then, it is fully established that on the ground of remoteness from the chief objective, each one of the six—Direct Assertion and the rest—is inferior to, and is set aside by, that which precedes it.

In support of this we have the following declaration :—

When there is a single fruit that is reached by a flight of stairs, and which is acquired by mere approach, and for reaching it two men contending for its possession start up, both equally fast and free from obstacles,—but one of them starts from the ground, while the other starts from one step of the stairs already gained,—then, there is no doubt that the latter one will reach the fruit first; and the fruit having been taken away by that man, the other would get down without having obtained anything. And in this case we find that though each of the men had power enough for obtaining the fruit at another time, yet when put together, the younger man—the one that is a step behind—is always vanquished.

And as a matter of fact, we find that it is in one way that operations are carried on even by weak agencies, when there is no force to contend with; while the character of the operation becomes wholly different when there is an inroad of more powerful agencies, which destroys all the strength of the weaker ones. For these reasons, it is by no means reasonable to hold that simply because the latter means of knowledge (Indicative Power and the rest) are held to be authoritative in one place, they must be so also when they are opposed by stronger and more authoritative means of knowledge (Direct Assertion f.i.).

It has been argued above that—"it is only a false semblance of "authoritative means of knowledge that can be set aside, and not what is "a real means of knowledge."

And in reply to this we say that in the cases under consideration what are set aside are really mere semblances of authoritative means. Because in these cases (i.e. where there is a more authoritative means to the contrary), those that are set aside have never had any authority. There was only a semblance of authority assumed from the fact of their having been perceived to have an authority in other cases.

That is to say, no authority attaches to these other means of knowledge, in a case where they are set aside; the fact is that having, in another place, been found to have proper authority, wherein they appear by themselves,—they are inferred, from that, to have an authority, even in the cases under consideration. But inasmuch as they are ejected by other superior means of knowledge, they fail in their purpose, and are therefore concluded to be wrong and mistaken.

Though it begins its operations with the same functions that belonged to it previously, yet, inasmuch as its objective has been wrested by another means very much quicker in its operations, and thereby, having its very root cut off from under itself, it does not reach its end; consequently, what else could we do, but set aside its authority, rejecting it as a mirage?

In all such cases, the idea of accessory character is rejected, before it has come into existence, as there has been no Direct Assertion yet assumed pointing to such character,—such rejection being done by the assumption of the falsity of all intervening cognitions (brought about by the former) ; and thus there can be no similarity in strength between the two, on the ground of the similarity of their appearance. For this reason, the rejection in question should not be mistaken for one in the form of the setting aside of a mixture of the two cognitions. The rejection of that which has come into existence, is in the form of the setting aside of its consequences, and will be treated of later on (in *Adhyāya* X).

Thus then we have explained what happens in the case of conflict between any two of the six means of knowledge. Inasmuch as the case of the conflict of one by two or more, is similar to what has been explained, the *Bhāṣya* has not treated of it separately. But it is necessary for the Commentators to explain those cases also in detail; and this is to be done in the following manner:

(1) When there is a conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection,—e.g. in the case of the sentence '*aruṇayā piṅgākslyā, etc.*' the Redness, etc. are shown, by the indicative power of Syntactical Connection and by co-extensiveness, to belong to the *one-year-old cow* ; while the Instrumental ending directly declares it to belong to the *Purchase*,—we find that while Syntactical Connection is still on the ground, Direct Assertion is already two steps nearer the goal ; and hence while the former is still on its way to the assumption of Indicative Power, the Direct Assertion will have established the use to which the accessory is to be put ; and this constitutes a great difference between the operations of the two.

(2) When there is conflict between Direct Assertion and Context,—as when the 'twenty-one recitations' are shown by the Context to belong to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, while the Direct Assertion (contained in '*Pratiṣṭhākāmasyaikavimīṣatīranubruyāt*') makes them accessory to a certain end desired by the Agent,—it is the Context that is always set aside. The 'recitations' too having the nature of actions, and thus forming part of the 'Procedure,' are subject to the specific authority of the Context ; and as such they have been cited here as examples.

Some people put forward the following as an example of the conflict between Direct Assertion and Order or Position: "We have the declaration that 'there are three *upāsads* for the *Sāhna*, while there are twelve for the *Ahīna*' ; and herein inasmuch as the number 'twelve' has not the character of an Action, and as such does not form part of the

Procedure, it cannot be subject to the authority of Context, which is based upon the Procedure; and it is only by means of Proximity that it comes to be accepted, through the assumed agency of the Context; consequently, this must be regarded as an instance of conflict of Direct Assertion and Position or Order."

But this is scarcely admissible; because if the number (Twelve) in question had belonged to the substance (used at the sacrifice), or had been an independent factor by itself, then alone it could not be taken as part of the Procedure, being entirely devoid of the form of an action. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as we have the injunction of 'twelve' with distinct reference to the *action* of *upasad*, which latter distinctly forms part of the Procedure,—the said number cannot but be contained in the Procedure. And in this case while the *upasad* contained in the Procedure would be assuming the Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power of the number, the Direct Declaration by the genitive ending (in '*ahinasya*') will have established the fact of its belonging to the *Ahina*; and this *Ahina* is nothing other than the *Ahargana*. (Consequently this would be a case of the setting aside of the Context by Direct Assertion.)

(3) *Question*: "What, then, is the example of conflict between Direct Assertion and Order?"

Answer: The qualifications of the Rope (used for tying round the sacrificial Post)—e.g. the *being made of grass* and the like—would be shown by Order to belong to the *Agnishomiyu* animal; while by Direct Assertion they are shown to belong to the Post. As it is clearly perceptible, by Direct Assertion, that the Rope is accessory to the *Tying* of the Post; and hence together with its qualifications, it cannot belong to the Animal. Because while the Order or Position would be assuming the corroborative Context and the rest,—thus separated from its objective by four intervening steps,—it will have been defeated by the said Direct Assertion. And while the Order would be engaged in assuming the existence of mutual Requirement alone (which would be the basis of the Context), its objective, the Rope, before it was reached by the said Order, would be taken up by Direct Assertion.

(4) As an instance of the conflict between Direct Assertion and Name, we have the following: We find the *mantra* '*ikhē tvā etc.*' mentioned in the chapter on *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* called by the name of '*Pauradāçiku*' chapter (chapter devoted to the '*Purodāça*-offerings), and occurring in a Context common to all the other sacrificial materials (the *Sānnāyya* etc.), not having its application pointed out by any clear Indicative Power; and at first sight, the name of the chapter would show it to belong to the *Purodāça* only; while the Direct Assertion contained in the *Brāhmaṇa*-sentence '*ikhē tvēti cākhān chinatti*' distinctly

points it out as pertaining to the cutting of the *twig* required for the making of the *Sāmnāyyā*. And while the Name would be still engaged in assuming a common element, the Direct Assertion will have established the use to which the *Mantra* is to be put, long before the former has had time to assume the intermediate corroborations of the Context, Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power and Direct Assertion; and as such it is set aside by the aforesaid Direct Assertion.

In the same manner are to be explained the conflicts between Indicative Power and Context and the rest.

(1) As an instance of the conflict between Indicative Power and Context, we have the *mantras* to be addressed to Pūshan (called the '*Pushānumantraṇa mantras*'); with regard to these, while the Context in which they occur (viz. that of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*) is still on its way to the assumption of Syntactical Connection, their Indicative Power will have established, through the assumption of the corroborative Direct Assertion, their applicability to the addressing of Pūshan; and so also while the former will assume the Power of indicating the *Agni* etc. mentioned in the Context, the latter will have established their use as lying in the addressing of Pūshan.

(2) The conflict between Indicative Power and Order has been shown in the *Stutaṣaṣṭrādhikaraṇa*, under *Sūtra* II—i—14. The example that is given in the *Bhāṣya* also is the case of the *Abhyānujñāpana* and the *Abhyānujñā* along which are mentioned, in the same order in which the two are mentioned, the two *mantras* '*upahūta, etc.*' and '*upahvayasva, etc.*'; and from their Position or Order, it would seem that the *mantra* '*upahūta, etc.*' applies to the *Abhyānujñāpana* and '*Upahvayasva, etc.*' to the *Abhyānujñā*. But the Indicative Power of the words of the *Mantras* themselves point to the contrary procedure. Consequently, while the said Position or Order would assume the Context and the necessary Syntactical Connection, the Indicative Power would have assumed its corroborative Direct Assertion and definitely established the applicability of the *mantras*; and thus we have the rejection of Order long before it has had time to assume the Corroborative Indicative Power and Direct Assertion.

We have another instance (of conflict between Indicative Power and Order) in regard to the *mantras* '*Parivirasi, etc.*' and '*yuvā suvāṣā, etc.*' which are respectively descriptive of the *karana* and the *kriyamāṇa* of the *Parivyāṇa* (winding). The Position or Order of these *mantras* would show that they belong to the *Parivyāṇa* of the *Agnishomīya*, while their Indicative Power shows that they pertain to the second *Parivyāṇa* of the *Savanīya*.

Question: "In that case, why is it that the *Manotā* is not taken as 'belonging to the sacrifice of the *Savanīya* animal,—as shown by the

"Indicative Power, which would be capable of rejecting the *Order* that "connects it with that of the *Agnishomīya* ? "

Answer: It is not so, for the simple reason that, like the case shown under the *Sūtra* III—ii—3, the *mantra* is applied to the *Agnishomīya* by reason of the implication (of *Agni* by the word 'manotā') based upon the applicability pointed out by Direct Assertion, which is more authoritative than the Indicative Power (connecting it with the *Savanīya*). It is with a view to this that we have the Direct declaration—'even if the animal be dedicated to another Deity, the *Manotā* should be the one dedicated to *Agni*.' And this Direct Assertion stands in the way of any Indicative Power applying the *Manotā* to any other animal;—the sense of the Assertion being that 'even when the animal is dedicated to two deities, the *Manotā* to be employed should be that pertaining to the single Deity of *Agni*, and it should not, on the mere ground of its pertaining to that single Deity, be disjoined from the *animal* (*Agnishomīya*) dedicated to the two deities (of *Agni* and *Soma*). Or again, we can take the word 'ēva' differently, and explain the Assertion to mean that the *Manotā* should be applied in the same *order* in which it occurs.

(3) As an example of conflict between Indicative Power and Name, we have the *Bhakshānuvāka*, which contains sentences expressive of *holding*, etc.; these sentences begin to be used as auxiliaries to the *eating*, on account of the Name ('*Bhakshānuvāka*') pointing to the fact of their bearing a common relationship (to the whole *anuvāka*); but before they come to be thus used, the words of the *mantra* indicate the applicability of its various parts to the actions of *holding*, *looking* and *proper digesting*, to which use, therefore, they come to be put. In the same manner, the *Manu-verses*, as well as the *Prthupājavatī verses*, come, by their Indicative Power, to be applied as *Sāmidhenis*, rejecting, thereby, the indications of the name '*yājyā*.'

(4) As an instance of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Order, we have the case of the words other than '*Parivīta*' and '*Parivīrasi*' which are descriptive of the *winding*—viz. the words *yuvā suvāsā āgāt sa u çrēyān*, etc.—, which, being syntactically connected with the words '*Parivīrasi*' and '*Parivīta*' that are used in accordance with their Indicative Power, come to be used in the *winding* of the *Savanīya*.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Name, we have an example in the aforesaid *Bhakshānuvāka*; i.e., the words '*Saghyāsam*, etc.' having been used in connection with *Eating*, etc. it becomes necessary to repeat, with each action, those other words of the *mantra* that are syntactically connected with the aforesaid words. (And this on account of the indications of the name '*Bhakshānuvāka*' being superseded by those of Syntactical Connection); similarly, the Name '*Ādhvaryava*' indicates

the fact of all the primary sacrifices of the *Jyotishṭoma*, etc. belonging to the *Adhvaryu* alone; these sacrifices being *syntactically connected* with the 'Desire for Heaven,' they come to belong to all persons desiring any result.

Objection: "This that you have explained would be an instance of "the superiority of Direct Assertion (and not of Syntactical Connection)."

Reply: The indication in question is not due to any particular word (of the *mantra*), as the Injunctive affix does not denote the agent; it is got at by means of a co-ordination based upon the indications due to the *proximity of two words* (which constitutes Syntactical Connection); and hence it is a case of the supersession of Name by Syntactical Connection.

As an instance of Conflict between Context and Name, we have the case of the *Prayājas*, that are mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇa* named the '*Purodāçika*,' which (though, by the name, belonging to the *Purodāça-sacrifice*) are applied to the *Sānnāyyā Upāmṣu-sacrifice*, as shown by the Context.

We have explained the examples of conflict involved in the application of a single Accessory to several Primaries. And it now becomes necessary to explain the instances of those involved in the application of several Accessories to a single Primary.

(1) As an instance of conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, we have the case of the *Aindrī* Verse: the sentence '*aindryā gārhapatyamupatishṭhātē*' being found (by reason of the *Ātmāne-pada*-ending in '*Upatishṭhātē*') to be injunctive of a certain action the instrumentality whereof belongs to a *mantra* (vide *Pāṇini—Sūtra* I—iii—25),—and the Indicative Power (of the word '*gārhapatyam*') pointing to the applicability of any *mantra* pertaining to Agni, the Direct Declaration (by the Instrumental in '*aindryā*') lays down the application of the *Aindrī* Verse; and when the place has been once filled by that verse, there is no room for any other verse.

(2) As an instance of conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection, we have the case of the *Yājñāyājñīya Pragātha*, in which Syntactical Connection points to the use of the word '*gīrā*,' while what is actually used is the word '*irā*,' as shown by the Direct Assertion ('*airankṛtā udgāyēt*'). In the same manner, for the *Viçvā-Dēvas*, the substance mentioned by Direct Assertion is the *Āmikshā*, while Syntactical Connection shows it to be the *Vājina*; and this latter, being possessed of an authority inferior to that of Direct Assertion, being rejected, the *Vājina* is not admitted as a substance for the *Viçvā-dēvas*.

(3) As an example of conflict between Direct Assertion and Context, we have the case of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* performed with a desire to obtain *fame*,—in regard to which the Context pointing to the use of *fifteen* Sāmidhēni-recitations, the Direct Assertion (contained in the sentence '*Pratiśṭhānkāmasyaikavimṣatiranubrūyāt*') shows the number of the recitations to be *twenty-one*; and hence there is a rejection of the number '*fifteen*' which pertains to that performance of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, which is done without desire for any particular result.

(4) Of the contradiction of Direct Assertion and Order, we have the case of the sacrifice performed with the desire for cattle, for which, Order points to the *Gaṃasa* as the Vessel (for the fetching of water); while Direct Assertion (in the sentence '*godohēna paçukāmasya*') declares that vessel to be the *milking vessel*; and here the indications of the former are set aside.

(5) Similarly as an example of the contradiction of Direct Assertion and Name, we have the case of the *Vājapēya*, which, from its Name, appears as to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*, while the Direct Assertion ('*Vājapeyēna svārājyākāmaḥ, etc.*') points to it as to be performed by one who desires the '*Kingdom of Heaven*'; and hence there is a rejection of the *Adhvaryu* as the performer of that sacrifice. Another example of the same we have in '*yajamānasya yājyā*.' In connection with the *Pitryājas*, the name '*Hautru*' points to the fact of the *yājyā* belonging to the *Hotr* priest; while the fact of its being performed by the *Yajamāna* is shown by the Direct Declaration of the genitive (in '*yajamānasya*'), which denotes the relationship of the agent.

As an example of conflict between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, we have the *mantra* '*Syonantē etc.*,' wherein by Syntactical Connection the whole *mantra*—from the very beginning—is shown to pertain to the action of *seating* or *depositing* (the *Purodāça*); while Indicative Power points only to the part '*tasmin sīda*' as the *mantra* pertaining to that action. In the same manner, Syntactical Connection connects the portion '*tasmin sīda*' with the action of *Abhigḥāraṇa* (Pouring of *ghee* over the grass-bedding), while Indicative Power points to '*Syonantē.....kalpayāmi*' only as belonging to that action; and the former is accordingly set aside. These *mantras* have been cited, on a previous occasion, as affording an instance of a single accessory belonging to several Primaries, while on the present occasion they are cited as one of several Accessories belonging to a single Primary. That is to say, on the previous occasion we had Syntactical Connection pointing to the fact of the *mantra* '*syonantē etc.*' belonging to the *Depositing* together with the *Abhigḥāraṇa*, while Indicative Power connected it with the *Depositing* alone; and while the former indicated the *mantra* '*tasmin sīda*' as

belonging to the *Abhigrahana*, Indicative Power showed it to belong to the *Depositing*, in connection with which it is actually used ;—on the present occasion, on the other hand, we have Syntactical Connection indicating the fact of the two *mantras* pertaining to each of the two actions (*Depositing* and *Abhigrahana*), while Indicative Power connects only one *mantra* with each action.

The *Bhāṣya* has spoken of four examples mixed up in a single explanation ; and it is necessary to differentiate these.

As an instance of conflict between Indicative Power and (1) Context, (2) Order and (3) Name, we have, (1) the case of the *Nirvāpa*, etc., for which the *mantra* '*Dēvasya tvā*, etc.' is pointed out by Indicative Power, which sets aside the applicability of any other *mantra* indicated by the Context ; (2) the *Aindrāgna* is performed with a view to a certain desirable result, wherein the couple of *Yājñanuvākyās* proceeding from the *Sāmidheni*, indicated by the Order, is set aside by Indicative Power ; and (3) in the *Somāraudriya*, wherein the application of the *Manu-Verses* pointed out by *Name* as the *Yājñanuvākyās* is set aside by those *Yājñanuvākyās* that contain words indicative of *Soma* and *Rudra*.

As an example of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context, we have the sentence '*Pūrvēdyuramārsyāyām vēdīṅkaroti*.' The Context shows that we should have recourse to that process of making the *Vēdī* (altar) which is laid down as following after the *adhivāsana* of the sacrificial material ; while the Syntactical Connection with '*amāvāsyā*' shows that it should be done on the 'previous day.' This is not a case of Direct Assertion ; as the Locative Ending (in '*amāvāsyāyām*') does not denote the relationship of the Primary and the Accessory ; though it denotes *location*, yet the character of *location* could not possibly belong to the *action* ; consequently the connection shown must be admitted to have been pointed out by the proximity of the words to one another (which constitutes Syntactical Connection), and which operates more quickly than the Context.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Order we have an example in those *Pratipatkalpas* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that are performed with a view to certain results, or on account of a certain occasion having presented itself ; we have the Direct Assertion specifying only one foot of each *Mantra*, as the one to be employed ; and then the second and subsequent feet that are to be used are shown, by Order or Position, to be those of the verses appearing in the same order in connection with those *Kalpas* whose performance is absolutely binding ; for instance, in connection with the Declaration '*Vṛkha pavasva dhārayēti rājanyāya pratipadan kuryāt*,' the second and third feet to be employed are shown, by Order, to be '*pavamānāyēndavē abhidēvam iṣakṣatē*' ; but we have

Syntactical Connection indicating,—‘*marutvatē camatsaruḥ viṣvā dadhāna ojaṣā*’—as the feet to be added (and it is this latter that is accepted as the correct form).

Objection: “The example cited would be a case of conflict of Indicative Power, because of the difference in the case-endings.”

Reply: That does not affect the situation; because all the *mantras* in question are indicative of *Soma*; and what the difference in the case-endings is incompatible with is the Syntactical Connection (and hence it is a case of the contradiction of Syntactical Connection, and not of Indicative Power, as all are equally *indicative* of the *Soma*). Consequently while the Order in question would be engaged in assuming a mutual requirement and the consequent Syntactical Connection, the Syntactical Connection will have established the application, by means of a prior assumption of Power, etc. based upon of immediate Proximity and the sameness of case-endings. Consequently this latter is possessed of the greater authority.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Name we have the following example: In the chapter called ‘*Hautra*’ we have a mention of the *addressing of the Directions*, in the sentence—‘*Tasmān maitravarunaḥ prēshyati cānucāha*’; and when we look out for the person who is to do this *Addressing*, the aforesaid Name points to the *Holy* priest as the person; while the Syntactical Connection of the sentence quoted points to *Maitrāvaruṇa*. Then as a matter of fact when the required agent has been pointed out by some one means, there is no need of the mention of any other; consequently *Maitrāvaruṇa* having been pointed out by the more-quickly-operating Syntactical Connection, the indication of the Name is set aside, long before it has had time to reach the assumption of a corroborative Context.

Nor can this be said to be a case of conflict of Direct Assertion; because the *Verb* does not denote the Nominative Agent; specially as there is no operative (*kāraka*) ending with the word “*Maitrāvaruṇaḥ*” (the Nominative not being a *kāraka* ending).

As an example of conflict between Context and Order, we have the use of the word ‘*girā*’ and ‘*irā*’ in regard to the Hymn. In the *Agni-h-toma Sāma*, the word to be used is indicated by Order to be ‘*girā*’; while Context points it out to be ‘*irā*’; and certainly this latter is stronger in its authority. On the former occasion we had cited the case of the words with regard to the *Sāma* (while the present is with reference to the *Stotra*), consequently the two cannot be said to be mixed up.

As an example of conflict between Context and Name, we have the case of the sentence ‘*tasmān maitravarunaḥ prēshyati cānucāhēti*’ as with reference to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. The *addressing* spoken of in this devolves

upon the *Hotr* priest, as indicated by the Name ('*Hautra*,' of the section in which the sentence occurs); while the Context distinctly points to *Māitrāvaruṇa* as one who does it. This same example had been cited above; but that was with reference to the form of the *Addressing of the Directions* itself.

Lastly, as an example of conflict between Order and Name, we have the case of the couple of *Aindrāgna mantras* occurring in the chapter of *Kāmyayājyās*; the Name of these *mantras* points to the fact of their being used as alternatives in both the offerings (to Indra and Agni); while the stronger authority of Order indicates the use of the first couple with the first, and of the second with the second. As for the Indicative Power of the *Mantras* themselves, it lends its support to both alternatives; consequently, the case is one of conflict between Name and Order.

We have considered the cases of the collision or conflict of Direct Assertion and the rest, when the Accessory, as also the Primary, is one only. And we have now to show that just as these six differ in authority from each other, so does each of them from another of its own kind,—the ground of difference being the same as that in the former case.

(1) On the point of the application of an accessory, we have the conflict of two Direct Declarations—one of them being more specific in its bearing than the other; e.g. we have the general statement—'*Purodāṣancaturdhā karoti*'—according to which the *Quartering* comes to apply to the *Agnishomiya*, etc., also; but when we meet with the specific Declaration '*Āgnīyancaturdhā karoti*,' we come to the conclusion that the *Quartering* applies to only that *Purodāṣa* which is dedicated to Agni. Similarly with the conflict of two Declarations in regard to two Primaries, we have the Declaration '*yadāhavanīyē juhoti*,' wherein the Locative ending in '*Āhavanīyē*' shows that the *Avabhṛtha offerings* also are to be poured into the *Āhavanīya* fire; but this is set aside by the specification contained in the Declaration '*apsavabhṛthēna*' (the *Avabhṛtha* offering is to be made *in water*). The comparative strength or weakness in these cases is based upon the doubtful character or otherwise of the declarations made.

Similarly we can cite instances of conflicts between two Direct Assertions, in regard to precedence, to subsidiaries and accessories, etc., etc. For instance, the word *paṣunā* (in '*paṣunā yajēta*') directly asserts the fact of the *Singularity* being an Accessory of the animal; while the stronger agency of the common case-ending declares it to belong to the Action. The word having declared the objective of the *Bhāvanā* to be the denotation of the Verbal Root, the stronger agency of

the Injunctive affix makes out the end desired by man to be the required objective.

(2) As an instance of conflict between two Indicative Powers, we have the case of the *mantra* '*syonantē sadanam kṛṇomi*.' In this we have two Indicative Powers—one in the shape of the capability of the two portions of the *mantra* to be syntactically connected with each other, and another in the shape of expressing its meaning. Of these two, it is this latter that is more approximate than the former, to its corroborative Direct Declaration; specially as the former is much weaker even than Syntactical Connection, as has been explained in the *Bhāṣya*.

(3) As an example of conflict between two Syntactical Connections, we have the sentence '*Pancadaṣa Sāmidhēnīranubrūyāt*,' '*saptadaṣa Vaiṣyaśya*'; in both of these the Syntactical Connection having been established through co-ordination, when we come to consider the actual application of the *Sāmidhēnis*, it is the number *seventeen* that comes to be accepted as the more authoritative of the two, being more definitely specified of the two (in the case of the sacrificer being a *Vaiṣya*).

Of conflict between two Contexts, we have an example in '*abhikrāman juhōti*'; the one vast Context shows this *abhikrāmanu* to belong to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; while the sub-context connects it with the *Prayājas*; and this latter is the more authoritative of the two, because of its being more nearly related to the subject in question; specially as long before the subject is affected by the vast Context, the sub-context establishes the necessary relationship in the shape of Syntactical Connection.

As an example of conflict between two Orders or Positions, we have the case of the two couples of *mantras*, the *Aindra* and the *Āgnēya*, which are found in the section on the *Kāmya-yājyāns*; the order of precedence of Proximity points to the fact of both of these couples being used, without restrictions, with any of the two sacrifices; but the Order of mention, consisting of proximity in the shape of the commonality of the place, restricts their application to definite sacrifices.

A conflict between two Names, we find in cases where one of them is more generic in its indications than the other; and the rejection of the one by the other we shall treat of under the *Sūtra* III—vii—41.

The examples of the conflict of these in the matter of Accessories and Primaries should be carefully distinguished and explained.

We have explained the above conflicts in cases where we had the Direct Assertion directly perceptible. The same would be the case when those conflicting with others of the same or of different kinds, would be such as are cognized by means of Inference, etc. The comparative strength of these, when the *perceptible* is pitted against the *inferred*, and when the *inferred* is pitted against the *inferred*,—whether they belong to

the same or different kinds,—would be found out in the same manner as has been shown above. As for instance, the Direct Assertion pertaining to the modificatory sacrifices, through Implication, are rejected by those applying to them, perceptibly or directly.

In these cases however, the order of strength is sometimes the other way,—f.i. the *inferred* Direct Assertion is set aside by the *directly perceptible* Indicative Power; as in the case of the *kr̥ṣṇala* (rice made of gold) the *threshing* (pointed out by the Direct Assertion 'Vṛhīnavahanti,' which has a real existence, but is applied to the *kr̥ṣṇala* only by implication) is set aside by the Capability of the golden Rice (of not being threshed). By 'Linga' or Power, in this connection, is meant the Power pertaining to all things, and not only that which belongs to the *Mantras*; as we shall find the declaration in the *Bhāṣya* further on that—'kā punarasya lingasya prāptiranyathāśumbhavaḥ'—which means that the character of *Linga* belongs even to such agencies as the fact of being found to serve the purposes of something else, and also that of having no other way of being utilized, and so forth.

In a case where the Direct Assertion is purely an inferential one (and has no real existence), while the contrary Indicative Power is directly perceptible,—as in the case of the *Smṛti* in contradistinction to the Vedic Indicative Power,—inasmuch as it is quite possible for the *Smṛti* to be based upon something (f.i. misconceptions, etc.) other than Direct Vedic Assertion, while Vedic Indicative Power can have no other basis than such a corroborative Vedic Declaration, it is the latter that should be accepted as the more authoritative of the two.

In all cases however, if the rejection of even the less authoritative makes some assertion or other (in the *Veda*) meaningless, then the rejection is to be accepted the other way; as has been declared, contrary to what is pointed out by Direct Assertion, that in the case of the sentence 'Vṛhīn prokshati,' the *Prokṣaṇa* is meant to be the means of bringing about a transcendental result (*Apūrva*).

Similarly too, when the weaker means of knowledge has a very strong support, then too the effect of rejection is reversed, as has been explained under the *Sūtras* I—iii—5 *et seq.* That is to say, of all means of knowledge, the contradiction lies in their objects, and not in their forms. Consequently, in a case where the means of knowledge is contrary to the object as it really exists, and its properties,—even though the comparative strength of the *Means* be the other way, yet in consideration of the nature of the object of knowledge, even that means, which, by itself, is weaker in its authority, would set aside the naturally stronger one; as has been declared on a former occasion—'ācamanādayaḥ padārthāḥ, padārthānānca guṇaḥ kramāḥ.' To the same effect we have the following say-

ing: 'Even though the people of the town are very strong in their combination, yet they are successfully repressed by a handful of men, who have the support of the king's authority.'

Thus far we have explained the *sūtra*, as also the *Bhāshya*, up to the place where it establishes the existence of the conflicts under consideration.

We now proceed with the explanation of the remaining portion of the *Bhāshya*.

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B).

"*Tulyabalē etē kāraṇē, idamapi kāraṇam idamapi, śrutirapi līṅgamapi, etc.*

"This assertion of the equality of strength is based upon the conviction that every portion of the Veda is equally self-sufficient in its authority; specially as both (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power) are found to have equal authority in cases where each appears by itself. That is to say, whenever we come across a *mantra*, we at once obtain an idea, even without assumption of any Direct Assertion, of the use to which it should be put; and hence the Indicative Power of the *mantra* should be regarded to be as authoritative as any Direct Assertion.

"Says the *Bhāshya*—*Na hi vijnānasya vijnānasya viśeṣa upalabhyatē.* That is to say, at the time that the *mantra* ('*kādā ca, etc.*') is mentioned in the Veda, it is at once recognized as pertaining to *Indra*; while, on the utterance of the Direct Assertion ('*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatishthatē*') it is cognized as pertaining to the *Gārhapatya*; and we do not perceive any difference in the authoritative character of these two, when they have once been accomplished. As a matter of fact, even Direct Assertion cannot point out the use to which a *mantra* is to be put, until the form of the *mantra* has been fully recognized; consequently it is always necessary to ascertain, beforehand, the form of the *mantra*; and at the time that the *mantra* in question is ascertained, there at once arises the idea that it is to be employed in the hymning of *Indra*; and this idea can never be set aside.

"Objection: '*nanu līṅgasya bhaṅgurasyaiva rūpam savicikitsaḥ.*' That is to say, while we perceive the Direct Assertion (*aindryā, etc.*) there is no possibility of the inference of another (in corroboration of Indicative Power), and this is what constitutes the transient character of Indicative Power; and what is meant by its being *savicikitsa* is the fact of its being delayed in its operations. For these two reasons (of transience and delay in operations), no self-sufficient authority can belong to Indicative Power.'

"The reply to this objection is based upon the fact of the bringing

“about of conviction being equally present (in the case of Indicative Power), as also upon the notion that by ‘*śavīkīṭsa*’ the objector means the presence of Doubt, mistake or uncertainty. *The reply is—*It is not as you say; as a matter of fact, we do not compare Direct Assertion with that Indicative Power which is doubtful in its effects.* That is to say, if it is doubtful whether the *mantra* in question is *Aindri* or not, the Power indicating this fact is no authority, even without the contradiction of a Direct Declaration; and hence our enquiry of comparative strength and weakness does not concern such *doubtful* Indicative Powers. That Indicative Power, however, which brings about a *certain* conviction, that the *mantra belongs to such and such a Deity*, is equal to Direct Declaration in its authority,—and as such must be taken as laying down an optional alternative.

“Objection: ‘*nann naiva kadācit, etc.*’ That is to say, as shown before, the Indicative Power is never without delay in its operations.

“The reply, based upon the idea that the objector has admitted the fact of Indicative Power being *śavīkīṭsa* (taking this in the sense of *doubtful*), is that *in that case* (if it were never free from doubt) *there could be no such authoritative means of knowledge as Indicative Power.*

“The *Siddhānti* retorts: ‘If the mere fact of being *delayed in its operations* were to so much disturb the nature of Indicative Power as to make it relinquish all authority, then, *let it be devoid of all authority, as there certainly is a doubt in connection with objects pointed out by Indicative Power.*’

“Now, how is it that you have given up the declaring of Indicative Power being *delayed in its operations*, and yet come to speak of it as *doubtful*? How, too, is it that at the same time, you speak of the object *being cognized by Indicative Power*, as an established fact?

“‘This does not affect our position,’ says the *Siddhānti*; as the declaration of the fact of the object *being cognized by Indicative Power* is with reference to the case wherein there is no contradiction (of the more authoritative means of knowledge); whereas the declaration of its doubtful character refers to that case wherein there is such a contradiction. That is to say, the Power of indicating the use of a *mantra* that is perceived in a case of non-contradiction, does not remain intact in all cases; and in many cases, it remains doubtful. In one place, the use thus pointed out is accepted, in the absence of contradiction; and the question is whether it continues the same, in a case of contradiction, or it is set aside by some cause? Or is it that *Indicative Power is wholly devoid of all authority*? The *doubt* remains only so long as we do not come across a Direct Declaration; as soon as we have got one, there remains no cause for the assumption of any other Direct Declaration

“(in corroboration of the Indicative Power), and so the Indicative Power
 “(to the contrary) loses all its significance. In Indicative Power, all that
 “is perceptible is mere *capability*; but this is not enough to point out
 “the use of the *mantra*; and that which is not clearly expressed can have
 “no authority in the matter of Actions,—e.g. even though they have the
 “power, yet the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kshattriya* do not perform the *Vaiçya-*
 “*stoma* sacrifice. For these reasons, you must admit that Indicative
 “Power is not a means of pointing out the use of *mantras*.’

“The reply given to the above is in neglect of the fact of the declara-
 “tion of the *Siddhānti* with regard to the non-authoritative character of
 “Indicative Power being in reference to the case of contradiction,—and
 “in fear of the declaration being one of its universal absolute non-authori-
 “tative character; and hence it is shown in what way the authoritative
 “character of Indicative Power can be established; *when a certain fact is*
 “*mentioned in proximity to a certain thing in the context, the former is*
 “*believed to be instrumental in the accomplishment of the latter; and then*
 “*there arises the question as to how it helps in its fulfilment; and the*
 “*answer to this question is settled by the capability of that thing.* This is
 “what has been explained under the *Sūtras* II—i—31 and I—ii—40.

“Or, the sense of the aforesaid declaration of the *Siddhānti* may be
 “this: ‘In the case of contradiction, the non-authoritativeness of Indica-
 “tive Power would be easily established;—consequently at the outset we
 “have shown the non-authoritative character of Indicative Power, in-
 “dependently by itself. This being done, we shall make our opponent
 “himself establish the fact of its authoritative character being based
 “upon the inference of a corroborative Direct Assertion. And this done,
 “he would be easily vanquished by us.’

“And in reply to this it has been declared that there is distinct
 “authoritativeness, and hence the two are equal in authority;—and no
 “attention has been paid to the declaration of the condition of the
 “presence of contradiction.

“Even granting, for the sake of argument, that there is difference in
 “the authoritativeness of Indicative Power and Direct Assertion, there
 “can be no setting aside of the one by the other, simply because there is no
 “contradiction between the two. For instance, the help accorded by the
 “*Prayñjas* being, both by Direct Declaration and Indirect Implication,
 “pointed out as helping both the Primary sacrifice and its modifications,
 “—there is no contradiction—specially as it is only desirable that, even
 “when that which is mentioned once is performed over and over again,
 “there should be a repetition of the subsidiaries, in accordance with the
 “Primary.

“Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the word *Indra* can apply to the

"*Gārhapatya* only indirectly, and the literal signification of the word "*Indra* applies directly to *Indra*, there is a contradiction of the signification of the word as a whole (if the word *Indra* is taken as signifying 'the *Gārhapatya* fire).'

"*Reply*: Not so; because the seeming contradiction can be very easily explained away, with reference to different uses (of the *mantra* in question). It is only if the *mantra* were pointed out as to be used in two different ways, at one and the same time,—that there would have been a contradiction, because of the impossibility and possibility of usage being in that case simultaneous. When, however, the uses are different, at the time that the word '*Indra*' would be taken as denoting the *Gārhapatya* fire, its denotation could be taken as based either upon the property (of fire) of being an auxiliary of the sacrifice, or upon the presence (in the fire) of the *glory*, which is denoted by the root '*inda*' (in the word '*Indra*'); while at the time of the same word being taken as denoting the deity *Indra*, it would be used in its own direct signification. And certainly, there can be no contradiction involved in this.

"For these reasons, it must be admitted that there can be no rejection (of Indicative Power by Direct Assertion)."

SIDDHĀNTA (B).

Direct Declaration is stronger than Indicative Power; because that the *mantra* (*Aindri*) belongs to the *Gārhapatya* is mentioned directly by the word (in '*Aindryā gārhapatyamupatishṭhaṭs*') ; whereas the fact of its belonging to *Indra* is only inferred from the Power (of the word '*Indra*' in the *mantra*), and is not mentioned directly by any words.

That is to say, the fact of the *mantra* belonging to *Indra*, that has been held to be inferred from Power or from Context, is untouched by any direct functioning of the word; and as such it can have no authority bearing upon such cases (as the performance of sacrifices and other matters of a transcendental character; vide *Sūtra* I—iii—1).

The opponent thinks that the *Siddhānti* has declared the universal or absolute non-authoritativeness of Indicative Power, and thence its rejection is due, not to contradiction, but to its inherent non-authoritativeness; and with this in view he argues as follows: "If what you say is correct, then even in a case where there is no contradictory Direct Declaration, there can be no cognition of anything obtained from Indicative Power, and hence this latter would have no authority even in such cases of non-contradiction."

In reply to this, the *Siddhānti* proceeds to establish the authoritative-ness of Indicative Power in the way that it has been done by the oppon-

ent himself, in course of the above *Pūrvapakṣa*. That is to say, this much is clear from the Context, that the *mantra* should help in the sacrifice in the way in which it is *capable* of doing so; and as a matter of fact, apart from the denotation of its meaning, there is no other way in which it could be able to help; and hence the said *capability* comes to point to the use to which the *mantra* is to be put.

The opponent thinks that the *Siddhānti* has admitted his own standpoint, and as such he could not escape from its necessary consequence, in the shape of an admission of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; encouraged by this prospect, he retorts: "*If the Capability is based upon Direct Declaration, then, in that case, it could not be rejected by another Declaration.* That is "to say, it must be admitted that if what is pointed out by Indicative Power is not supported by the authority of the words (of the Veda) "then it can have no authority; but if it has the authority of the words, "then it is equal in authority to any Direct Declaration."

Both of these contingencies are met by the *Siddhānti*, by the words: *nāpi* etc. That is to say, the Direct Declaration inferred by the Indicative Power can have an existence only in case the Indicative Power is not contradicted by Direct Declaration already in existence; and it can never appear when there is such a contradiction; consequently in a case where the use of a *mantra* is not laid down by a Direct Declaration,—all that may be assumed or inferred for the pointing out of its use is sealed with the authority of the apparent Inconsistency of something mentioned in the Veda, and as such, is as *Vedic* as anything else. On the other hand, in a case where the use of a *mantra* is distinctly laid down by a Direct Declaration,—e.g. in the case in question where the *Aindri mantra* is clearly laid down as to be used in the hymning of the *Gārhapatyā*,—the purpose of the mention of the *mantra*, as well as its result in the shape of the help accorded to the performance of the Action, having been already duly cognized, the Veda cannot bear the assumption of anything else—in the shape of the assertion that the *Mantra should be used, in the hymning of Indra*. It is for this reason that Indicative Power is weaker than Direct Declaration.

Then again, it has already been shown above that all *option* is unwarrantable; specially as the optional existence and non-existence of the same thing in the same place is scarcely tenable. Thus then, in the case in question, the Direct Declaration independently lays down the fact of the *mantra* being employed in the *hymning of the Gārhapatyā*; while the Indicative Power, by itself, lays down that of its being used in the *hymning of Indra*. And the acceptance of any one of these would mean the neglecting of that which is laid down by the other; and in view of the latter Injunction this acceptance would mean the doing of something

not enjoined; specially as the neglect of the latter too is nowhere laid down; and all this would involve the *rejection of the enjoined* and the *assumption of the non-enjoined*; and both of these would be equally undesirable. Then again, there would be the rejection of a fact that is well known. That is to say, it is a well-known fact that that which is enjoined should be carried into action, and that which is not enjoined should not be so carried; and the above procedure would be directly contradictory to both of these. For these reasons, we cannot admit of an *option*.

With a view to set aside the seeming contradiction, it has been suggested that both should be followed *conjointly*. But in reply to this we declare that there actually *is* a contradiction; because Direct Declaration, in the case in question, has fulfilled all the requirements of the *Mantra* and the *Context*; and as for the Indicative Power, its object is distinctly deficient in certain elements; and it is certainly contradicted (by the aforesaid Direct Declaration, which does not leave any deficiency in the object in question).

That is to say, in the case in question, there is a single *Mantra* and a single *Context*; and that which is mentioned once can be of one form only. And at the time that its use is pointed out by Direct Declaration, only two contingencies are possible—that the *mantra* and the subject-matter of the *Context* should have all their needs fully supplied, or not. If then, their needs are not supplied, then the use pointed out remains unaccomplished; because it is not proper that that which is actually brought into use should have any needs unsupplied. If, on the other hand, they have their needs supplied, then there can be no chance for the use pointed out by Indicative Power; and such use depends upon the presence of certain otherwise unfulfilled requirements. Lastly, if we were to admit both simultaneously, then that would involve a self-contradiction, in that there would be, and at the same time not be, certain requirements unfulfilled.

If, even in the face of all this, both Means were equally authoritative, then, inasmuch as there would be no difference in them, it could not be ascertained which one of them is foremost in supplying the requirements in question; and consequently these requirements being fulfilled by both simultaneously, the *mantra* would come to be taken as serving both purposes. As a matter of fact, however, there is a vast difference in the character of the two *Means of knowledge* in question,—in that Direct Declaration is very much quicker in its operation. Consequently when once the *mantra* has had its use pointed out by Direct Declaration, there is no room for the functioning of Indicative Power. And thus the superior authority of Direct Declaration becomes established.

Though the *sūtra* has spoken of the '*weakness of the following*,' yet

the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the "strength of the preceding," which is implied in what the *sūtra* has said; and by this the *Bhāṣya* has shown that much significance cannot be attached to the actual words of the *sūtra*.

Of the conflict between Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power we have yet another example in the following: In connection with the *Jyotiṣmoma*, we have certain 'Directions,' mentioned in the *Hautra* section; and these are enjoined as belonging to (to be addressed by) the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, by Syntactical Connection, in the sentence '*Tasmān maitrāvaruṇaḥ prēshyati cānucāhēti*.' But among these 'Directions' we meet with one, in the form '*Praçāstaryaja*'; and the Indicative Power of this sentence distinctly points to the fact of *Maitrāvaruṇa* being the priest to whom this 'Direction' is addressed. Now then, if Syntactical Connection had the greater authority, then, in the case of the latter 'Direction' also, *Maitrāvaruṇa* would be the priest who would address it; and as the addressing of a Direction to one's own self would be impossible, the 'sacrificing' (spoken of in '*Praçāstaryaja*') would have to be done by the *Hotr* priest. Whereas if Indicative Power were possessed of the superior authority, then, the 'Direction' in question would have to be used in directing the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest; and as he could not be directed by himself, it would have to be done by another person; and this Director is known in the manner shown under the *Sūtra* '*Tēshām yato viçeshah syāt*': By the common Name (of '*Hautra*') it is, in the first instance, indicated that the *mantra* in question belonged to the *Hotr* priest; but this is set aside by Syntactical Connection; and when this Syntactical Connection is, in its turn, set aside by the said Indicative Power, then it is the aforesaid *Name* itself that reverts to its work and points to the *Hotr* priest as the person who should address the Direction in question; and as for the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest, he is recognized as the person carrying out the Direction addressed.

Though the sentence '*Tasmān maitrāvaruṇaḥ*, etc.' occurs in the *Brāhmaṇa* (and as such is capable of the authority of Direct Declaration), yet, inasmuch as it merely consists of a conglomeration of words, it has not the character of Direct Declaration; and as such, it is set aside by the Indicative Power, which has its corroborative Direct Declaration in close proximity to it. If the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest were to address the Direction, then, in that case, the word '*Praçastah*' (in '*Praçastaryaja*') would be wholly meaningless with regard to the *Hotr* priest.

Objection: "In case the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest were the person directed, the words '*Hotā yakshat* etc.' would become devoid of any meaning. "Nor can it be held that these words would have their secondary significations. Because such could be the case with the word '*Praçastah*' also. "And further, in fact, it would be far more reasonable to take this latter

"word in its secondary signification, on account of the fact of its being the last to come, and as such most susceptible of the effects of contradiction, (by the word '*hotr*' that has gone before it). This could not be said of the word '*Hotr*,' which is the first to be uttered, and as such, not susceptible to the contradiction (of the word '*praçāstaḥ*' which has not yet appeared on the scene). Consequently the instance that you have cited is one of conflict between two Indicative Powers, and not between Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power."

To the above we make the following reply: It is necessary to take one of the two words in question in its secondary signification; because of the one being contradictory to the other. But the application of the word '*Praçāstaḥ*' to the *Hotr* priest would be absolutely without foundation; while that of the word '*Hotr*' to the *Maitrāvurūṇa* priest would be based upon the fact of this latter priest performing the duties of the *Hotr* priest; specially as all words expressive of the principal priest (the '*Hotr*' f.i.) are often found to be applied to his subordinates (the *Maitrāvurūṇa* f.i.); while the reverse is never found to be the case. Consequently on account of the words of the *mantra* ('*Praçāstaryaja*') having the Power of indicating the *Maitrāvurūṇa* priest, it would be addressed in directing him. Nor does the sentence ('*Tasman maitrāvurūṇaḥ, etc.*') become wholly meaningless; as it would have its use in regard to the other 'Directions'; and hence this sentence would certainly be rejected in reference to the one 'Direction' in question ('*Praçāstaryaja*').

Against the example '*Syonantē sadanam kṛṇomi*' the following objection is urged: "Inasmuch as the two sentences ('*syonantē.....kalpayāmi*' and '*tasmin sīda*') have been shown, before, to be distinct, the two together could not be pointed out by Syntactical Connection as to be used conjointly. That is to say, even though the two conjointly fulfil one condition of being syntactically connected (i.e. forming a single sentence)—namely, that when separated, each of them remains wanting in an integral factor,—yet, on account of each of them serving a distinct purpose (and thus not fulfilling the first condition of Syntactical Connection—viz: *arthaiikatva*, singleness of purpose), they are two distinct sentences, as has been shown before; consequently, there can be no question as to the two conjointly, as a whole, being used in connection either with the *abhighāraṇa* of *sadana*, or with the *Depositing* of the *Cake*, either singly or conjointly."

To the above, some people make the following reply: The discussion is not with regard to the complete sentence as one composite whole, but with regard to each of its parts.

Or, it may be said in reply that two sentences are generally taken as forming a single sentence, only when each of them is found to be wanting

in some integral factor. And it has been already shown, on account of the well-established fact of Indicative Power being stronger (than Syntactical Connection), that the two sentences in question are wholly distinct.

That is to say, it was the fact of the sentence '*tasmin sīda*' being wanting in an integral factor, that was made the basis of the declaration of the two as forming a single sentence; and certainly this is the principal basis (of connecting two sentences syntactically); as on that ground, we can assume, whenever we like, the relationship of the Qualification and the Qualified; and thereby assuming the two to have a single purpose, they can be taken as syntactically connected. For instance, in the case in question, taking the former part with the latter, we have them conjointly denoting—'The comfortable seat that I am preparing for thee by means of the flowing of butter,—on the seat prepared by this process thou shouldst sit down,'—thus the two together having the single purpose of *depositing the cake by a certain process*; or they may mean—'I am performing the preparation of the seat by means of the butter-flow, for the purpose of your sitting'—the two together, in this case, having the single purpose of *indicating the preparing of the seat with a particular result*; in this way, the two together could be taken as syntactically connected, and forming a single sentence.

The aforesaid declaration,—that, on account of the difference in their purpose, they are distinct sentences,—was based upon the fact of the Indicative Power (of the two sentences) being more authoritative (than Syntactical Connection),—a fact that has been established on the present occasion. In case Indicative Power is the stronger of the two, we reject the possibility of the two forming a single sentence on the chance of the one qualifying the other; and we accept each of them to be self-sufficient, as shown by Indicative Power; and thus giving up all idea of the one serving as the qualification of the other, we find that each of them has a distinct purpose of its own; and as such they cannot be taken as distinct sentences. Thus then, the present discussion refers to the fact of the two sentences being endowed with syntactical character, through their applications, and also to the strength or weakness of Indicative Power (as compared to Syntactical Connection). Then again, the sentence having attained to its position, through our cognition of it as such,—there follows the consideration of the presence or absence of cognitions to the contrary.

On the question thus stated, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA (C).

"Both (Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection) are equally authoritative. In that case, the action would be performed in such a

"way that at one time the two *mantras* would be used separately, while
 "at times the two would be used conjointly in connection with any one
 "of the two actions, and lastly, at times, with both of them.

"*Question*: 'How could the sense of the scripture be so very uncertain?'
 "certain?"

"*Answer*: When such an uncertainty happens to be distinctly pointed out by a correct means of knowledge, what harm does it do us to admit such an uncertainty? And there can be no doubt that the existence of such uncertainty is quite admissible in view of the equally authoritative character of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.

"When however, like Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection is cognized as setting aside Indicative Power, on the ground of its being a distinct means of knowledge,—then in that case, the two sentences are *always* used conjointly."

SIDDHĀNTA (C).

As a matter of fact, we find that the *mantra* beginning from '*syonam*' and ending with '*kulpayāmi*,' is, by its inherent *capability*, quite capable of being used, with all its requirements fulfilled, with reference to its own independent purpose; and the appearance of its being deficient in some points is due to the other sentence ('*tasmin sīda*'); (and not to anything in the sentence itself).

The whole *mantra*, from the very beginning, is 'on the look-out for some use to which it should be put. And as a matter of fact, we find that the *mantra* ending with '*kulpayāmi*' does not stand in need of anything outside itself; consequently we conclude that that *mantra* ends then and there; and finding its purpose duly served by that, we conclude that it is to be used in connection with the *Pouring of Butter over the bedding*; and hence it can, in no way, be extended so far as the action of the *Depositing of the Oake*. Nor do we find any inconsistency or uselessness in the latter *mantra* ('*tasmin sīda*'), without the companionship of the former (*mantra* ending with '*kulpayāmi*'),—to avoid which inconsistency, the two should have been taken together, because that *mantra* also has its use in connection with the *Depositing of the Oake*. Though the word '*tat*' (in '*tasmin*') stands in need of a certain antecedent, yet it could be taken as referring to the previously-established meaning of the preceding sentence; and there would be no incongruity in such a distinct use of the pronoun '*tat*.' For instance, we have the sentence '*taptē payasi dadhyānayati*,' which ends with the laying down of the *préparation* of the substance, and then, we have the sentence '*sā vaiṣṇadēvyāmikshā*,' which is taken distinctly by itself, as laying down, independently by itself, the relationship of that substance with the deity (*Vīṣṇudeva*).

Thus then, we find that the separate use of the two *mantras* has

its corroborative Direct Declaration not very far from it; and consequently there can be no overlapping of the operations of the one by those of the other.

Says the *Bhāshya*—Thus then we find that the mantra ‘*tasmīn sīda*’ has no capability of being connected with the preparing of the Bedding. Though this has been already said before, yet it is repeated over and over again, with a view to strengthen the conviction. And we can explain the repetition as serving the purpose of recapitulating the properties of the sentence in question, after the imposition of other foreign properties has been set aside. The first time that the declaration in question was made was with reference to the existence and non-existence of authoritative means of cognition; the second time it was with reference to its capability and incapability; and the last time it is with reference to its serving and not serving visible purposes.

For these reasons, then, it must be admitted that Indicative Power is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection.

Question: “In the phrase ‘conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context,’ what do you mean by ‘Context’? So far you have made use of the term ‘Context’ as a well-known entity; though what it is has not yet been explained. Consequently it is necessary for you to explain what it is; specially as it is only when its form and character are known that we could learn whether it is strong or weak in its authority.

“In reality, however, there seems to be no difference between Context and Syntactical Connection or Order. *Firstly*, it is only the proximity of certain words that stand in need of one another, that is called ‘Syntactical Connection’; and this same proximity is found in Context also. Nor is there any authorized limit to the number of words in a Syntactical Connection; as all that constitutes Syntactical Connection is the fact of the words, when separated from one another, being wanting in certain elements, coupled with the fact of their combining towards the fulfilment of a single purpose. Consequently that which contains a few words so constituted is Syntactical Connection; while that which contains a large number of words thus related is Context,—all the smaller sentences in the Context being pervaded over by intermediate purposes, and thereby capable of forming a large combination with the chief purpose of the main Context. This is what will be spoken of later on, in the *Bhāshya*, in the sentence—‘*vākyam hi ekam Darṣa-Pūrṇamāśa-bhyam sahadharmāṇām.*’ *Secondly*, Order is said to consist of proximity; and this proximity is a necessary factor in Context also; consequently Context is the same as Order.”

The *Bhāṣhya* replies to the above by showing—(I) the true form ; (II) the signification of the component parts (of the word 'Context') ; and (III) the synonyms (of the word).

(I) To explain the real form of *Context*—*Context* is the (a) declaration of (b) *what is to be accomplished*, this latter standing in need of (c) the Process (of accomplishment). (*Kartavyasyētikartavyatāṅkāṅkshasya vacanam prakaraṇam*).

(b) By '*kūrtarya*' (*what is to be accomplished*) is meant either the resultant *Apūrva*, or the *Bhāva* (or *Bhāvānā*) which is signified by the affix, as having the character of that which is to be *enjoined* and to be *performed*.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the desirable results, Heaven and the like, are included in the Resultant factor, it must be these results that are called '*Kartavya*.'"

Reply: Not so ; because, inasmuch as such results appear at a different time altogether, they do not form an integral part of the Performance ; and hence it is the *Apūrva* that leads to the subsequent accomplishment of those results, that should be regarded as the '*Kartavya*.' Consequently the results could be accomplished only after the *Apūrva* had been brought about ; this fact of the *Apūrva* being the motive of the action will be explained later on, under the *sūtra*, '*yajñakarma pradhānam tuddhi codanābhūtam*' (IX—i—1) ; while the possibility of the Result and the Deity being the motive will be brought forward in the *sūtra* '*Phaladēvatuyopca*' (IX—i—4-5), simply to be immediately refuted.

(c) By '*ākāṅkshā*' is meant the *longing* or *need* for the means of help—as to *how* the result is to be brought about. [The word '*ākāṅkshā*' = *ā* + *kāṅksh* + *ghaṇ*]. Or the word '*itikartavyataṅkāṅkshā*' may be explained as *that which needs the Procedure*, i.e. the *Bhāvānā* or the *Apūrva* ; and the '*vacana*' is of such a *Bhāvānā* or *Apūrva*—the two words with the genitive ending being taken as co-extensive.

(a) By '*vacana*'—Declaration—is meant the bringing about of a conviction by means of words.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole definition comes to be this : Even though the *Need* may be existent, in the nature of things, yet ~~that~~ alone does not constitute the "Context" ; but it is only when it is duly *cognized* that it comes to be so called ; and that too only when it is cognized as subservient to that which is to be accomplished, and not independently by itself. Therefore it is the *Need*, when clearly expressed, that constitutes 'Context' ; or the *Bhāvānā* along with the *Need* may be taken as constituting it.

(II) What has just been said is again reiterated by the *Bhāṣhya*, by explaining the significations of the component parts of the word

(*Prakarāṇa*). The word '*pra*' means *beginning*, and '*karāṇa*' means *action*; hence '*Prakarāṇa*' means *Prakriyā*, the *beginning of action*. The *Bhāṣya* next explains the particular *action* the beginning of which is meant: *Of the action of Declaration*—i.e. of the action of direct denotation. That is to say, it is the *beginning of the action of expressing the Bhāvanā*—which means the beginning of the operation of the sentence laying down the performance of the action. The factors of the Result and the Instrumental are always expressed by two words; while the denotation of the *Procedure* can be done only by means of several sentences. Consequently, by looking into all things, we conclude that it is the *Procedure* that constitutes the '*Context*'—by which is meant the *beginning of the actions of Denotation and Injunction*.

Though the word '*karāṇa*' is expressive of mere *action*, yet, when used in connection with a scripture, it is used to denote the action of *denotation*.

(III) The *Bhāṣya* next speaks of the synonyms of '*Context*': It is the '*Beginning of the Injunction*' (*Vidhyādiḥ*). As both the words "beginning" and "end" are relative terms, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show with respect to what it is the '*beginning*':—*It is with reference to the end of the Injunction*. By '*the end of Injunction*' here is meant *the cognition of the Procedure in the shape of the method of action*. The *Injunction*, which has, in its middle, the perception of the various subsidiaries, their uses and results, has for its beginning the *Procedure*; and hence the Teachers speak of it as '*Vidhyādi*' (*Beginning of Injunction*).

In this *Context*, we have recourse to connecting, over again, for the sake of another purpose, sentences that have had their purpose served by means of the words contained in them; and this is what distinguishes it from Syntactical Connection. As Syntactical Connection does not operate, for the slightest purpose, in disjoined parts, the purpose is served only by connecting them together in a definite relationship.

As for the difference of *Context* from *Order*, we shall explain it presently.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that *Context* is a distinct means of knowledge.

Question: "What is the example of this? Whatever example you will bring forward, I shall show it to fall under Syntactical Connection."

The *Siddhānti* cites the case of the *Sūktavāka*,—being fully conscious of the fact that the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Mantra*, serving the distinct functions of *enjoining* and *recalling* (something connected with the performance) respectively, can never be *syntactically connected*.

In regard to this *Sūktavāka*, there arises this question: The

Indicative Power having extracted the words expressive of the Deities (from the sentences dealing with the *Darṣa*, and connected it with the *Pūrṇamāsa*), should the accessories also of these be extracted along with them? Or should the former words be used without these latter? In reply to this, the Context shows that all the accessories should be used in connection with both (the *Darṣa* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*). As for Indicative Power, that is common to both; because the Singular and the Dual numbers (met with in the *Sūktavāka*) are present in both.

Objection: "The words expressive of the Deities (of the *Pūrṇamāsa*) "being fully taken up with their own accessories, there can be no room "for any other accessories."

Reply: True; but that does not remove the contradiction between Syntactical Connection and Context. *Firstly*, because by Context it would seem that we could make use of the accessories even without the Deity; while Syntactical Connection points to the use of only such as have not been deprived of the Deity; and inasmuch as the latter is possessed of the superior authority, it is the latter alternative that is accepted in actual usage. *Secondly*, Context shows that it should be used several times; while Syntactical Connection shows that it is to be used only once, in accordance with the word expressive of the Deity; and this constitutes a contradiction (between Context and Syntactical Connection). *Thirdly*, Syntactical Connection is the stronger of the five because its connections are fully established. While in the case of Context we employ the accessory in accordance with its declaration in the scriptures, after we have inferred the connection between the subject-matter of the Context and the mention of the Procedure—in the form that 'one should perform the sacrifice in such and such a way'; and then again, there is the assumption of a further relationship (of the *Pūrṇamāsa*) with such words expressive of the Deities as have not their accessories fully defined. This constitutes a remoteness, in the case of Context, from the real objective in view; and hence the Context is set aside by the aforesaid Syntactical Connection.

Thus then it must be admitted either that the extraction of the accessories of words expressive of Deities is always necessary, and not optional, or that they should not be used at all.

Question: "What is the example of conflict between Order and Context? The sense of the question is that, there being no possibility "of an example of the conflict of that Order which consists of the "respective relationship between two sets of things,—while that, which "is mentioned either before or after a certain thing, being subject to the "authority of the Sub-Context consisting of Proximity,—we are perfectly

"sure of there being no example; and hence we do not put forward our 'ignorance or doubt (with regard to the example in question).'"

In reply to this, the *Bhāshya* puts forward an example, with a view to the fact that we can easily refute the fact of the case cited being amenable to the authority of a Sub-Context. The example is this: In the Context of the *Rājasūya*, we find laid down, that 'after the *Abhishēcanīya*, one should recite the *Çaunahçēpha*,' 'he conquers the Kshattriya,' 'he gambles with the *Prashhauhi* (excellent cow),' 'he is bathed,' and so forth. There is no doubt, or difference of opinion, as to all these actions being subsidiaries (to another action); consequently all that we have got to consider, in connection with these, is the exact relationship of these subsidiaries to a particular Primary action; the question being—(1) Do these accessories belong to the complete *Rājasūya*, or to the *Abhishēcanīya* sacrifice only? (2). Is there an option in this matter?—the third alternative, that of the accessories belonging to both conjointly, not being possible in this case (as the *Abhishēcanīya* also is an accessory of the *Rājasūya*). And these questions can be answered only by ascertaining which of the two, Context as Order, is possessed of the superior authority.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the *Abhishēcanīya* is pointed out by the Sub-Context, it would certainly set aside the larger Context of the *Rajasūya*."

Reply: This does not affect the case in question; because we could have a sub-context (of the *Abhishēcanīya*) only if the actions in question were mentioned before all the requirements of the *Abhishēcanīya* had been supplied. As it is however, that has had all its needs supplied, prior to the mention of the *Gambling*, etc., by means of the details mentioned in connection with the Primary sacrifice. And even though all these actions are mentioned in close proximity to the *Abhishēcanīya*, yet this sacrifice steps over them and looks to the Primary sacrifice for the supplying of its needs; because the usefulness of these actions in question has not yet been established. And when the Primary sacrifice has supplied that sacrifice with proper aids, the Context of that sacrifice ceases then and there; and it could be raked up again only if, without it, the actions mentioned in close proximity with it were useless. But that would make it tantamount to Order. And as a matter of fact while the *Abhishēcanīya*, which has had all its needs supplied, rakes up a further need,—the directly perceptible Procedure of the *Rājasūya* establishes the use to which the actions are to be put; specially as the Procedure of the *Rājasūya*, extending from the *Pavitra* down to the *Holding of the kshattra*, can very well take in the *Gambling*, etc. Consequently, in the case in question, there can be no Sub-Context of the *Abhishēcanīya*.

In the case of that modificatory sacrifice in which, after certain accessories of the original Primary sacrifice have been mentioned, there are certain accessories of the modificatory sacrifice mentioned either before or after the former,—in such cases, inasmuch as these latter accessories are mentioned in the midst of those that are included in the Procedure of that sacrifice, we recognize the fact of their having been mentioned in the *Context* of that sacrifice. There is no such thing, however, in the case in question; consequently we must accept it to be a case of the operation of *Order*.

Says the *Bhāṣya*: *Sannidhāvāmnātēna paripurnēnāpi avakalpēta śka-vakyaṭvam*—this with reference to the completing of the meaning of the sentence (the sense being that the assumption of Syntactical Connection is much easier in the case of Context than in that of Order).

Again, says the *Bhāṣya*: *Anēkasyāmnāyamānasya sannidhivipēśhām-nānamātram hi kramāḥ*. (Order consists only of the declaration of the proximity of the several things that are spoken of.) The sense of this is that in the case of Order, the proximity of something is a necessary concomitant. That is to say, that which is spoken of as serving the purpose of many things, cannot possibly be in close proximity with all the principals concerned; and hence it is only necessary for it to be in close proximity with any one of these. There is no need of any such necessary concomitant in the case of Context. Consequently whenever Context and Order both start on a common errand, the Context is quicker in getting at its corroborative Direct Declaration; and as such it is the stronger of the two.

Question: “What is the example of conflict between Order and Name?” This question emanates from one labouring under the misconception that, “inasmuch as the Name applies to its object in its literal signification, it is as operative in its indication of the relationship as Direct Declaration itself; and as such it is very much stronger than Order.”

Answer: We find that the name ‘*Paurodāçika*’ applies to the whole section of the *Darçā-Pūrṇamāsa*. And there we find the *mantra* ‘*çundha-dhvam*,’ mentioned in the Position (or Order) of the *purification of the Sānnāyya-vessel*. The Context and Indicative Power indicate that the *mantra* is to be used in the purification of the vessels connected with the *Darçā-pūrṇamāsa* in general; and then there arises the question as to the particular vessel that is to be purified, the question being—‘Is the *mantra* to be employed in the purification of the *Purodāçā-vessel*, as indicated by the Name ‘*Paurodāçikā*,’ or, in that of the *Sānnāyya-vessel* as indicated by Order?’

And on this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—“Inasmuch as

"the Order has been often found to be set aside, and as it does not express any relationship,—it must be taken to be rejected by the Name, which has never been found to have been set aside, and which indicates a distinct relationship."

In reply to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*: It is the Name that is set aside, on account of its being further removed from its objective. That is to say, in Order we find a common element, in the shape of position, which belongs wholly to the Veda,—while in the case of Name, the common element has got to be assumed, and hence is remoter.

Question: "What do you mean by the 'remoteness' from the objective? That is to say, no such is possible in the case of Name, which denotes that factor of the relationship which has the idea of that relationship included within itself."

Answer: The Syntactical Connection with something having been cognized by means of Context, that which happens to be mentioned in proximity to it leads to the assumption of a requirement and to that of Syntactical Connection,—a case wherein we have the use pointed out by Order, not contradictory to Context, but contrary only to the Name.

Objection: "How is it that in the case you speak of, the Context is not contradicted,—when we find this latter pointing to the fact of the *mantra* pertaining to all the vessels, and yet, on the strength of Order, we take it as pertaining only to the *Sānnāyā* vessel?"

Reply: This does not affect the situation; because if the use pointed out by Order, and accepted by us, pertained to something not included in the Context, then alone could there have been a contradiction of this latter. As a matter of fact, however, we find that all that the Context indicates is that the *mantra* pertains to the cleaning of *any one* of the vessels used at the *Darṣa-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice; and hence when we come to consider the question as to which particular vessel it pertains to, we find the Order alone operating (towards the pointing out of the *Sānnāyā* vessel); and this involves no contradiction of the previously-operating Context.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the Context indicates the fact of the *mantra* applying to *all* the vessels, the disjoining of the *mantra* from a single one of them would certainly involve a contradiction of the Context (to say nothing of the case when you disjoin it from all of them with the single exception of the *Sānnāyā* vessel)."

Reply: As a matter of fact, the Context does not necessarily indicate the fact of the *mantra* applying to *all* the vessels; because the *mantra* has its requirements fulfilled by being related to a single one of the vessels; and as for the other vessels spoken of in the Context, they could

have their purposes equally served by other *mantras*. In the case in question, what is accomplished, prior to the operation of the Order, is the Direct Declaration, laying down the use of the *mantra*, in general terms. And while a distinct Direct Declaration would be assumed with regard to each of the vessels, the aforesaid Order also will have assumed its own corroborative Direct Declaration; and this would swallow up the Direct Declaration indicated by the Context.

On the other hand, the Name operating in a way reverse to the Order, is contradicted by it; and being remote from its objective is weaker in authority. Then again, as a matter of fact all relationship is brought about by a certain intermediate commonality; and between the *mantra* in question and the *Purodāṣa*, we do not find any such commonality, shown by the Veda; as there is that of position between the *mantra* and the *Sānnāyā*.

The Name is a word of ordinary parlance. Though this view has been set aside in the *Adhikaraṇa* on the *Bhakshānuvāka*, yet it is brought forth here only with a view to show that the Name is very much removed from the relationship declared by the Veda.

The opponent believes the above to be an utter annihilation of the Name from its very root,—exactly like the refutation of Indicative Power; and declares thus: “If it be so, then, [in such cases as the one “under consideration, we might accept the use as shown by Order; but the “Order cannot be believed to be stronger (than Name), on the ground of the “fact of the Name being very remote from its objective; as what we are “comparing are two authoritative means of knowledge; while in the way “shown above, Name entirely ceases to be such a means, etc., etc.]”

The *Siddhānti* brings forth the same reply that had been given previously, in connection with the *Bhakshānuvāka*: Not so, etc. That is to say, if the relationship of the Accessory and the Primary were based upon the cognitions of man, then alone could Name cease to be an authoritative means of knowledge; as a matter of fact, we hold that relationship to be wholly Vedic.

The sense of this is that it is the Name ‘*Paurodāṣika*’ which, not being found in the *mantra* or in the *Brāhmaṇa*, is not Vedic; but this cannot be said of the relationship, under consideration, of the Accessory and the Primary; this relationship is quite authoritative; because even though the word (‘*Paurodāṣika*’) is not Vedic, yet the relationship that it denotes is eternal, and it has for its basis an actual *Smṛti-text*. Then again, that the word ‘*Paurodāṣika*’ denotes the relationship is not something transcending the senses; as it is as directly perceptible, as the tree f.i., to persons making use of the word; and it is quite possible that each man might be using the word, after having heard it used by some other person.

This is what is shown by the *Bhāshya* in the sentence—*man is a competent authority on such points, as that 'the mantra is mentioned in the position or order of the sūnnāyya,' 'it occurs in such and such a Context,' 'there is such and such a Syntactical Connection,' 'this word is Vedic,' and so forth.* That is to say, as a matter of fact, we find that, in all cases the action of one man depends upon what he has seen in other men; and then we do not find the Veda making any such declarations as that, 'this subject is mentioned in the same place with that subject,' 'this occurs in such a Context,' 'these words are near one another' or 'that they are related to one another,' etc. It is only when men are repeating the Veda, that we come to notice these things. Those men again must have noticed them while some other man had been repeating them; and so on and on, such noticing would be eternal; and, not being like the case of the blind following the blind, it would be authoritative also. Otherwise, from the view of the Veda alone, the Context or the Non-Context would be both equally devoid of authority. Then, inasmuch as the above facts are noticed by many men, there can be no suspicion of their being faulty on account of certain discrepancies in the perceptive faculty of any one man.

Thus then, it is clear that due authority attaches to the Name, as a means of knowledge; but though it is so in certain places, yet it is set aside whenever it is found to be more removed from its objective (than some other means of knowledge). And this setting aside of it we have explained above in the course of the explanation of the *sūtra*.

Thus then, among Direct Declaration and the rest, as put forth in the *Bhāshya*, Direct Declaration always sets aside others, while Name is always set aside by others, and the others set aside by, and are set aside by others.

The *Bhāshya* next proceeds to show, through an objection, the form of that which is set aside.

Question: "In a case of conflict between any two of these, when it 'is said that one is set aside by the other,—e.g. the Indicative Power by 'Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection by Indicative Power, etc., 'etc.—that which is set aside, is it one that has been duly accomplished, 'or not? If it has not been accomplished, then, there is no 'collision' 'or 'conflict'; and then, what would be there that could be set aside? 'If, for the sake of the 'collision,' it be held that what is set aside is 'that which is accomplished,—then, inasmuch as the objective of both 'will have been equally accomplished, they would be equally authoritative; and as such there could be no validity in the *Rejection* under 'consideration."

The *reply* to this, as given by the *Bhāshya*, is as follows: That

which is pointed out being found to be amenable to the Means rejecting (as well as to that rejected), on account of the cause (of giving rise to cognitions) being common to both,—the cognition brought about by the latter is declared to be 'false,' by the *rejecting* means which is possessed of greater authority. That is to say, we find that the cognitions of the mirage, etc. though appearing in a fully accomplished form, are rejected by being subsequently shown to be false; and being disjoined from such results, as *acceptance*, *rejection* and the like, they come to be known as "rejected" or "set aside." In the same manner, the cognition produced by the Indicative Power, though appearing in an accomplished form, is separated, by the contrary cognition produced by Direct Declaration, from the result in the shape of *performance*, and is set aside.

But this explanation is scarcely tenable. Because, in the first place, inasmuch as the way in which one sets aside the other has been already shown above, the question itself is not possible (to the point); and secondly, when, as a matter of fact, it has been actually found that what is set aside is not fully accomplished,—the answer, that the setting aside is of that which has been accomplished, is scarcely the proper one.

That is to say, a question can be rightly put only with regard to that which has not been already explained. As for the Indicative Power, etc. it has already been explained that they are set aside, by reason of their not bringing about the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declaration on account of their remoteness from their objective; consequently no question can be rightly put as to the way in which these are set aside. If, however, such a question be put (however unreasonably), then, the answer that is given should not be one that is incompatible with the *Siddhānta* view in general. And in the case in question we find that, inasmuch as Indicative Power, etc. have been shown to be set aside on account of their not succeeding in bringing about the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declarations (and thus not attaining their fully-equipped forms),—the *setting aside* is clearly of something that has not been accomplished. And this conclusion, once arrived at, would be set aside, without reason, by propounding, in answer to the above question, that Indicative Power, etc. are set aside in their accomplished forms.

It has been declared that the matter in question is amenable to both, *because of the existence of the common cause*. But as a matter of fact, Indicative Power and the rest do not, by themselves, possess the direct capability of bringing about a correct cognition; nor is this capability possible when there does not exist a Direct Declaration giving rise to that cognition; consequently, it is only through the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declaration, that Indicative Power, etc. can be said to be fully accomplished and operative (towards the bringing about of the

correct cognition); consequently when the *inferred* Direct Declaration has been brought about, there can be no difference between such a Direct Declaration and one that is directly perceptible; and hence both (Indicative Power and Direct Declaration) would come to be equally authoritative.

Or again, if the *rejection* of Indicative Power, etc. be meant to be in the form of declaring the falsity of the cognitions brought about by them, —as this could be possible only when there would be a contradiction,—the process of rejection would be quite the reverse of what has actually been shown to be the case. For instance, as a matter of fact, the previous cognition (due to Direct Declaration f.i.) is brought about without having set aside the subsequent one (due to Indicative Power, etc.) for the simple reason that this latter has not yet appeared; while the latter cognition is never fully brought about without setting aside the former cognition to the contrary.

That is to say, Direct Declaration being quicker in its operation, is the foremost to function towards the bringing about of a cognition; and it is after this that Indicative Power and the rest begin to operate. Consequently, if, for the sake of establishing the fact of the *Rejection* in question being that of something fully accomplished,—the Indicative Power, though operating subsequently, were to lead to the inference of the corroborative Direct Declaration,—then, inasmuch as this latter Declaration could not obtain a footing, without having set aside the previous contrary Direct Declaration bearing upon the same subject, the *inferred* Declaration would, in the very act of appearing, reject the cognition brought about by the previous Declaration as being false,—just like the cognition of the mirage and the like.

For these reasons, the portion of the *Bhāshya* under consideration cannot be explained, in a way compatible with what has been previously established, with regard to Direct Declaration and the rest.

Even though the passages under consideration, appearing in the *Bhāshya* at the conclusion of the *Adhikaraṇa*, would appear to be referring to the subject-matter of the *Adhikaraṇa*,—yet we proceed to explain them by taking them apart from the place in which they are actually found, as is indicated by their inherent capability; just as is the case with the *mantras* to be addressed to Pūshan (which are used in a place other than that in which they are mentioned in the *Veda*).

Inasmuch as the way in which one Means of knowledge sets aside the other has already been explained above, the sentence '*atha yattatra etc.*' cannot possibly refer to the *Rejection* by Direct Declaration, etc. In fact

the matter of Rejection must have brought to the mind of the Author all the different kinds of Rejection that are met with in the course of a treatment of the scriptures. And the idea present in the mind of the questioner, putting the question as formulated in the Bhāṣhya, is that the character of these Rejections is not exactly similar to that which we have been dealing with in connection with Direct Declaration, etc.; and yet it is necessary that the method of all Rejections should be alike; and hence the question comes to be this:—Is the method of those Rejections like that which has been shown to belong to the Rejections in connection with Direct Declaration, or the methods of these latter are like that of those others? Then, inasmuch as the method of the Rejections in connection with Direct Declaration, etc. has just been explained, there would be no use in bringing forward a question with regard to them; consequently the question '*atha yattatra tatra, etc.*' must be taken as referring to the Rejections other than those pertaining to Direct Declaration, etc.

As examples of such other Rejections, we have the following:—(1) That of Inference by Sense-perception; (2) that of the cognition of the mirage, and such other cognitions as are given rise to by mere semblances of the six means of knowledge, by those brought about by the real means of knowledge; (3) that of the *Smṛti* by the *Ṣṛuti*; (4) that of the *Smṛtis* emanating from untrustworthy and disreputable sources, by those proceeding from trustworthy and otherwise good sources; (5) that of the *Smṛti* serving a visible purpose by that which serves a transcendental purpose; (6) that of the *Smṛti* originating from Indicative Power or Valedictory Passages by that based directly on the *Ṣṛuti*; (7) that of usage by the *Smṛti*; (8) that of one usage by another of more learned people; (9) that of the Doubtful by the Certain; (10) that of the weak by the strong; (11) that of what occurs in the Conclusion by what occurs in the beginning; (12) that of that which serves an absolutely transcendental purpose by that which serves a transcendental purpose by mere restriction; (13) that of the remote auxiliary by one that is more closely related; (14) that of the Injunction of several things by the Injunction of one thing; (15) that of that which is expressed by many words by that which is expressed by one word; (16) that of that which involves the rejection of many things by that which involves that of fewer things; (17) that of what is laid down in another Veda by that which is enjoined in the same Veda; (18) that what is enjoined in a different Rescensional text by that laid down in the same Text; (19) that of the necessary by the occasional; (20) that of the necessary and occasional actions meant to serve a purpose useful to the sacrifice, by those meant to serve the desirable end of man; (21) that of that which is mentioned apart by itself, by that which occurs in the same context; (22) that of the preceding

by the following, when the two are contradictory; (23) that of that which pertains to the Original sacrifice by that which pertains to the modification (in the performance of the latter); (24) that of that which is based upon a supposed sentence recapitulating the Actions with its accessories, by that which is based upon the Injunctive sentence; (25) that of the useless by the useful; (26) that of the *Brāhmaṇa*-order by the *Mantra*-order; (27) that of that which is based upon the Deity by that which is based upon the Substance; (28) that of that which is mentioned subsequently by that which has been previously mentioned; (29) that of the small by the great; (30) that of the secondary by the primary; (31) that of that which is laid down in general terms by that which is specifically enjoined; (32) that of that which has other uses by that which is otherwise useless; (33) that of the Subsidiary by the Primary; and (34) that of the properties of the Subsidiary by those of the Primary.

And with regard to these, there arises the following question: "In all these cases, is the rejection of something that has been accomplished, or is it that of the unaccomplished, as in the case of Direct Declaration, etc.? If, as in the case of these latter, so the case of the rejection of the *implied* by the enjoined were one of something not accomplished, then in this latter case, it would be necessary to admit the total absence of the scriptural text laying down the application in question; just as in the case of the Indicative Power, etc. we admit the non-existence of any Direct Declaration bearing upon the point. In that case, inasmuch as the text laying down the use could be one only, it would be necessary to admit its non-existence in other cases also, exactly as in the case of contradiction; and thereby the rejection of that which is *implied* would be universal. If, on the other hand, we were to admit its existence, in the case of non-contradiction, then its existence would have to be admitted in other cases also; and in that case it would be equal in authority to that which is directly enjoined (which would be an absurdity).

"And further, inasmuch as the generic texts could not obtain a footing, unless they set aside the specific scriptural texts, if we were to admit the authority of such texts, the process of rejection would be reversed (i.e. the *generic* would set aside the *specific*). Specially the same text cannot reasonably be accepted as existing, with reference to one thing, and non-existing with reference to another. Consequently, in the case of such generic and specific declarations as,—'give curd to the *Brāhmaṇas*, and *takra* to the *Kaundinyas*,' 'the modification of a sacrifice is to be done in the manner of the original,' 'the grass used should be that of the *ṣara*,'—inasmuch as there could not be distinct texts for each individual *Brāhmaṇa*, or each subsidiary sacrifice, the

“text must be admitted to be one only. And if, in view of the *çara* and the *takra*, it be held that there is no text relating to the *kuça* and the *Kaundīnya*,—then there could be no text applying to the *Prayājas* and the *Māthara Brāhmaṇa* respectively. If however there be a text relating to these latter, then there must be one relating to the *kuça* and the *Kaundīnya* also. The assertion that it does not exist in reference to the latter, while it does with reference to other things, would involve a self-contradiction, striking at the very authority of the text. Nor is there, in this case, a difference of comprehenders, whereby the seeming contradiction could be explained as being due to its being comprehended by one and not comprehended by another. And, inasmuch as the text is comprehended but once, there can be no cognition of any difference in it, whereby the existence admitted would be of one, while the non-existence would be of another. This might have been possible if the denotation of words consisted of the Individual; as, however, it consists of the *Oluss*,—in the case of the Implication of certain operations relative to the sacrifice,—the object being one only, at one and the same time, there could be only one operative scriptural text.

“The same line of arguments would set aside the case of a Rejection in the form of total removal; because, inasmuch as the words *Brāhmaṇā-bhyaḥ* and ‘*Prakṛtivat*’ (in the sentences quoted above) have exactly the same grounds (for applying to every *Brāhmaṇa* and every subsidiary sacrifice respectively), there is no possibility of leaving out any of them; as will be shown, by means of question and answer, in *Sūtras* III—vi—3, and III—vi—5. That is to say, in the case of sentences emanating from human sources,—as the sense imparted to the words used resides in the heart of the speaker, it would be possible for him to make the arbitrary declaration—‘I made this assertion, but I did not mean it to apply to such and such cases,’—even though the words used do not imply anything of this exception. But even this arbitrary exception is not possible in the case of a Vedic sentence. Because in the case of the Veda, we do not deduce specific declarations from general statements, whereby we could take the generic statement as acting merely as the source of the specific deduction, with reference to which the seeming contradiction of simultaneous existence and non-existence could be easily explained.

“For these reasons, inasmuch as it is necessary for all *Rejections* to be of one uniform character, all the *Rejections* enumerated above could not be of the same form as that which is desired (as belonging to the case of Direct Declaration etc.).

“Then if it be held that the *Rejections* are of those that are *accomplished* entities,—these latter being rejected by being shown to be false,

"—and that, in this way, there would be no such self-contradiction as that "shown above,—then with regard to Direct Assertion, etc. also, the "Rejection must be admitted to be of that which is accomplished. But "with regard to these, the case has been shown to be quite the contrary. "Consequently, there can be no uniformity in the methods of all Rejections."

To the above we make the following reply:—It is by no means necessary that all Rejections should be of one uniform character; specially as there is no incongruity in their diversity, which is supported by authoritative evidence.

That is to say, just as in the case of Rejections explained before, there was no uniformity of character,—so, in the same manner, even if we admit of a diversity in their character, there is no incongruity in it.

Thus then, we conclude that in the case of Direct Declaration etc., the rejection is one of something that has not been accomplished, as has been explained before; and there is nothing incongruous in that; as we do not admit of more than one accomplishment with regard to any one thing. As for the other rejections, resembling these,—e.g. those of the *Smṛti* etc.,—which also are due to the remoteness of the objective,—these should be taken as explained by the explanation of those relating to the Direct Declaration, etc., as is implied by the mention of '*hētusāmarthyā*' (the potency of the causal agency). But as for the Rejections that have been enumerated above—viz.: those of the false means of knowledge by the true one, of the necessary by the occasional, etc., etc.,—it has been declared that '*it is the accomplished that is rejected.*'

Question: "*How is that?*" This question emanates from one who has been bewildered by the said dissimilarity from Direct Declaration etc.

Answer: *Because of the existence of the common cause.* This fact, of the commonality of cause being the reason for believing the rejection to be one of something that has been accomplished, has been explained above, in connection with the words '*Brāhmaṇa*' and '*Prakṛtivat.*'

It has been argued that "there can be no rejection of that cognition "which has been accomplished, because no non-appearance, destruction, or "cessation of residual effects is possible for such a cognition." And in reply to this it is pointed out that we do not mean that the cognition is wholly set aside; all that we mean is that it is superseded by another cognition, which is to the effect that the previous cognition was a mistaken one. That is to say, what happens in such cases, is that on finding a subsequent scriptural text to be otherwise inexplicable (i.e. irreconcilable with the cognition accomplished), one comes to the conclusion that this cognition that he had obtained had been a mistaken one, brought about on account of his

intellect having been led away by a false similarity,—just as in the case of the mirage etc. Consequently, when we come to the case of the *Prayājas* and the *Māthara-Brahmaṇa*, though we may have the ideas of the *kuṣa* and *Kaundīnya* respectively appearing, yet they are believed to be mistaken; and from this it is concluded that on account of the cognition being devoid of its legitimate result (in the shape of the carrying of it into practice), it is the *cognized* idea, or text, that is rejected in all such cases.

Question: “What, then, is the form of ‘true knowledge’? That is to say, if the cognitions that actually appear come to be set aside in the manner shown above, then, how could we have confidence in any cognition at all?”

Reply: When we find that however much we may look for it, we do not perceive any cognition setting aside the cognition that we have obtained (then we conclude that that cognition is a true one). Though, on a former occasion (in the *Ālokavārtika*) we have spoken of the ‘recognition of discrepancies in the source of the cognition,’ as the second reason for the falsity of that cognition,—yet that was with reference to ordinary human assertions; and hence, not pertaining to Vedic sentences; this fact has been brought out on the present occasion.

Having thus dealt with the side question, the *Bhāṣya* sums up the *Adhikaraṇa*, and proceeds with the next.



ADHIKARAṆA (8).

[The 'Twelve *Upasads*' pertain to the *Ahina*.]

Sūtra (15): "On account of the Context, the word '*ahina*' should "be taken in a sense indicated by the presence of a certain "qualification."

Question: "All that had been laid down at the beginning of the "*Adhyāya* as its subject-matter, having been fully dealt with, what more "of it is left to be treated of, that the fourth *Adhyāya* is not now taken up "forthwith?"

Answer: We now proceed to consider in what specific cases we have the conflict of Direct Declaration and the rest, that have been duly differentiated and explained in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

And first of all we are going to deal with the cases of the conflict and non-conflict of Context by Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.

In the context of the *Jyotishṭoma* we find the sentence—'There are to be three *upasads* for the *Sāhna* and twelve for the *Ahina*.' And in this the word '*sāhna*,' meaning 'that which is finished in a day,' refers to the *Jyotishṭoma*, with regard to which we have the declaration—'They finish it within a day'; consequently it follows that the *Jyotishṭoma* has three *upasads*. Then as regards the clause 'twelve for the *Ahina*,' there arises the question as to whether 'twelve *upasads*' also belong to the *Jyotishṭoma*, or only to the *Ahina* sacrifices, the *Dvādaçāha* (Twelve-Day sacrifice) and the rest?

If the name '*Ahina*' could, in some way or other, be found to be applicable to the *Jyotishṭoma*, then, in view of the compatibility of the Context, the 'twelve *upasads*' would certainly be taken as finding a place in that sacrifice. If, on the other hand, the name '*Ahina*' belonged to those sacrifices that extend over a number of days, then, inasmuch as the 'twelve *upasads*' would be connected with the Direct Declaration ('twelve *upasads* for the *Ahina*'), they could not be taken up by the Context, which takes up only that which is not related to Direct Declaration (Vide *Sūtra* III—iii—11), [and consequently the 'twelve *upasads*' would belong to those sacrifices that last for many days, and not to the one-day *Jyotishṭoma*]; and thus the sentence in question presents a case of the conflict between Direct Declaration and Context.

And on the above question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The continuity of the *Siddhānta* having been broken by the word "*vā*" (in the *sūtra*), we declare that, from the Context it is clear that the "twelve upasads" belong to the *Jyotishṭoma*. Nor does this involve a contradiction of Direct Declaration; because the same Context shows that the name '*Ahina*' applies to the *Jyotishṭoma* (and not to any other sacrifices), [and as such, the Direct Declaration also lends its support to the connection of the 'twelve upasads,' with the *Jyotishṭoma*]. And further, the word '*Ahina*,' by itself also, when taken as a negative compound, is found to be literally applicable to the *Jyotishṭoma*. ['*Ahina*'=that which is not devoid of any accessories, or that which is not totally neglected by any sacrifice; and these two qualifications reside in the *Jyotishṭoma* only.]

"Though in reality, the word '*Ahina*'=*ahan + kha*=group of sacrifices, —and as such it denotes the sacrifices extending over a number of days,—yet, in order to reconcile it with the Context, we should take it as synonymous with '*Jyotishṭoma*,' on the ground of this latter having the qualification of '*ahāni*' (non-deficiency and non-abandonment). That is to say, inasmuch as the *Jyotishṭoma* has all its details minutely laid down, and it serves as the archetype of all sacrifices, it is in no way deficient (*na hīyatē*); nor is it abandoned (*na hīyatē*) by any sacrifice (i.e. there is no sacrifice of which it does not serve as the archetype).

"The *Bhāṣhya* has explained the word '*ahina*,' (in its application to the *Jyotishṭoma*) as 'that which is not liable to any retrenchment (*na hīyatē*) as regards either the sacrificial gifts, or the accessory details of the sacrifice.'

"But this is not quite relevant; because the word does not contain anything to denote the 'sacrificial gift' or the 'accessory details'; and if we were to interpret a word just as we wished (without any consideration of what it actually denotes), then, there would be no fixity as to the denotations of a word. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the word really denotes what the *Bhāṣhya* has said,—we find that as a matter of fact, the 'gifts' given at the *Jyotishṭoma* are very much less ('*hina*') than those given at several other sacrifices, where gifts are computed by the thousand; and also that the procedure of the *Jyotishṭoma* is much inferior ('*hina*'), in the point of 'accessory details,' to the Procedures of its modifications, the *Ukthya* and the rest, (and as such the word '*Ahina*' in the sense given to it by the *Bhāṣhya*, could not apply to the *Jyotishṭoma*).

"For these reasons we conclude that the name '*ahina*' signifies 'that which does not abandon (*na jahāti*) any sacrifice, in supplying the details of the performance' and 'that which is not abandoned (*na hīyatē*) by any

“sacrifice (for all of which it serves as the original fountain-head)”;—
 “and inasmuch as it is the *Jyotishṭoma* alone that is possessed of these
 “qualifications (and fulfils these conditions), and as the Context too be-
 “longs to the *Jyotishṭoma*, it must be this to which the ‘twelve upasads’
 “belong.

“The word ‘*gaṇaḥ*’ in the *sūtra* must be taken as signifying ‘that
 “pointed out by the qualification,’ and not in the ordinary sense of the
 “indirect, secondary signification.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

***Sūtra* (16):** Inasmuch as the principal (*Jyotishṭoma*) is not
 connected (*with* ‘*Ahīna*’), it should be disjoined from that.

By the word ‘*mukhya*’ (‘Principal’) in the *sūtra* is meant the *Jyotish-*
toma, because it is the first to be performed; and, as a matter of fact,
 this has no connection whatsoever with the word ‘*Ahīna*.’ And inas-
 much as the *Jyotishṭoma* has no connection with this name, the number
 (‘*Twelve*’) that is found mentioned in connection with that name could
 not be taken as belonging to that sacrifice, merely because of the Context;
 consequently it must be taken (and used) apart from that. Specially
 as we find that the number ‘*Twelve*’ is connected with the *Ahīna*, by
 means of the Direct Declaration of the genitive (in ‘*ahīnasya*’); and as
 for the word ‘*ahīna*’ what it literally signifies is a *number of days*, while
 the *Jyotishṭoma* is a distinct *Sāhna*,—being finished in a *single day*.

It has been argued above that the word ‘*ahīna*’ would apply to the
Jyotishṭoma, through the presence of certain qualifications in that sacrifice;
 and we now proceed to refute every alternative that is possible, in connec-
 tion with this theory.

(1) If the word ‘*gaṇa*’ be taken in the sense of *indirect secondary*
signification, then that could not justify the abandoning of the *direct*
signification, on the mere strength of the Context. Nor does the sentence
 in question serve the purposes of an *Arthavāda*, in which case even the
one-day sacrifice could be taken as being eulogised by being indirectly
 spoken of as one extending over many days. Then again, as a matter of
 fact, it is not that there is no other word applicable (more directly) to the
Jyotishṭoma; and as such we could not be justified in taking all this
 trouble of interpreting the word indirectly, and thereby making it appli-
 cable to that sacrifice,—in the same way as the word ‘*simha*’ is made to
 indicate the presence of the *qualities* of the lion. Consequently the
 taking of the word in its indirect secondary sense is not admissible.

(2) Nor can the word be rightly made literally applicable to the
Jyotishṭoma, by being explained as a negative compound. Because any

such literal application is set aside by the meaning known to be conveyed by the word as a whole. Then again, as a matter of fact, we do not find the word bearing the marks of a negative compound; because a negative compound having the accent of the indeclinable, it is the first word, or the basic word, that should have had the *udātta* (Acute) accent in its beginning; while, in reality, we find that it has the acute accent at the middle. For this reason it must be admitted that the word is made up of the word 'ahan' (= Day) with the affix 'kha.' In that case, in accordance with the *Vārtika*,—'*āyannādishu upadēṣivadvacanam svarasiddhyartham*,'—we have the insertion of the particle 'ina'; and thereby the letter 'i' forming the beginning of the affix, it is only right that the acute-accent should be on that letter.

For these reasons, the word '*Ahina*' must be taken as the name of those sacrifices that extend over a number of days.

Then again, inasmuch as the connection of the *Jyotishtoma* with the 'twelve *upasads*' would have been signified by the use of the word '*sāhna*' only, without using another name ('*ahina*') of the same sacrifice,—the very fact of the putting in of the word '*ahina*' shows that the scripture meant, by this, to signify something other than the 'one-day' *Jyotishtoma*. Or again, inasmuch as the connection of 'three' and that of the '*sāhna*' and 'twelve' would have been indicated by the Context itself (which is that of the *Jyotishtoma*), the use of both the words '*sāhna*' and '*ahina*' would be absolutely purposeless. Whereas if the word '*ahina*' meant some other sacrifice, it would be absolutely necessary to insert it. And then inasmuch as the close proximity of the mention of 'three *upasads*' to the word '*Ahinasya*' might indicate the connection of these latter with the *Ahina*, it would be necessary to specify the '*sāhna*' also (as the one connected with 'three *upasads*').

Thus then, it must be admitted that the 'twelve *upasads*' has to be taken apart (from the *Jyotishtoma*—which is indicated by the Context as the sacrifice connected with them).

The above representation of the *Adhikarana* is not quite correct. *Firstly*, because it is scarcely right for the details of one sacrifice (the *Ahina*) to be laid down in the Context of another (the *Jyotishtoma*); *secondly*, in case such details were laid down, the continuity of the Context would be broken by that interpolation of foreign matter; and then it would involve a deal of trouble to take up the chain of the Context over again; and *thirdly*, we find that the 'twelve *upasads*' for the *Twelve-Day* sacrifice have already been enjoined in the Context of this latter sacrifice,—and

as all the sacrifices extending over a number of days have their origin in this *Twelve-Day* sacrifice, the said injunction in the Context of this latter would be enough to connect the 'Twelve *upasads*' with all such sacrifices. Consequently, the sentence in question must be taken wholly as containing the injunction of the 'three *upasads*' alone; specially as there are no objections against this. Then, as for the connection of '*Twelve*,' that has been enjoined already in another sentence; and hence its mention in the sentence in question must be taken as meant to be in praise of the propriety of the number of *upasads* at the *Jyotishtoma*,—just as in the case of the *nirita* (the sense of the sentence being that 'the *Jyotishtoma* has only three *upasads*, and as for *twelve upasads* these belong to such petty sacrifices as the *Ahina* and the rest, and not to the excellent *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice').

Now then, we proceed to show the way in which the *Adhikaraṇa* should be represented.

If the character of '*Ahina*' had belonged to the *Jyotishtoma*, then, the sentence in question would have been an Injunction; but inasmuch as that character belongs to the sacrifices extending over a number of days, for which, again, the 'twelve *upasads*' have been already laid down elsewhere,—the sentence in question cannot but be taken as meant to eulogise (the *Jyotishtoma* as shown above).

Thus then, the question of the *Adhikaraṇa* comes to be this: Is the *Jyotishtoma* the *Ahina*, for which the sentence, occurring in its Context, lays down an accessory detail? Or the word '*Ahina*' applies to the sacrifices extending over a number of days,—and inasmuch as the 'twelve *upasads*' for it have been laid down elsewhere, their mention in the sentence in question is meant to serve some other purpose (that of enlogising f.i.)?

Objection: "If such be the case, then the *Adhikaraṇa* would not be "a discussion of the conflict and non-conflict of Context (with Direct Declaration); because it would come to this, that though connected "with the *Ahina* sacrifices the 'twelve *upasads*' would be mentioned "with a view to eulogise the *Jyotishtoma*."

Reply: That does not quite affect the case. Because as a matter of fact, the *Pūrvapakṣa* (B) would favour the Context; inasmuch as the Context would take up the number 'twelve' as enjoined (in connection with the subject of the Context, the *Jyotishtoma*); while the *Siddhānta* (B) does not favour the Context; as in accordance with this view the 'twelve' belongs to the sacrifices extending over many days, which has nothing to do with the Context; which latter therefore, in this case, becomes contradicted. And that this is still of use, in another way, in the Context has got nothing to do with the main point at issue.

If however, in accordance with the law arrived at in the next *Adhikaraṇa*, we could admit of the *Removal* (or *taking apart*, of the 'twelve *upasads*'), and if while we had the Injunction in one Rescensional text, we could justify, on the ground of its having no other use, the injunctive character of that contained in another Text,—then, in that case, we could take the *Adhikaraṇa* as presented in the *Bhāṣya*.

In any case, it becomes fully established that the sentence '*dvāda-
cāhīnasya*' is to be taken apart from the Context, as it evidently pertains to those sacrifices that extend over many days.

ADHIKARAṆA (9).

[The *Pratipats* are to be taken apart, along with the *Kulāya*, etc.]

Sūtra (17): That which is associated with singleness and duality (*should be taken apart*); because it is directly enjoined (*elsewhere*).

[In connection with the *Jyōtishṭoma* we find the sentence ‘*yuvām hi sthaḥ svakṣpatī iti dvayoryajamānayoḥ pratipadam kuryāt, śīḥ asṛgramin-dāvah iti bahubhyo yajamānēbhyah.*’ And in reference to this there arises a doubt as to whether the two *Pratipats* herein laid down find place in the *Jyotishṭoma*, or they are to be taken apart from it and used in connection respectively with the *Kulāya* performed by two *yajamānas*, and with the *Dvirātra* performed by more than two *yajamānas*?]

The discussion of the present question is similar to that in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*,—with the following difference: in the former the connection was with a totally different Primary sacrifice denotable by a word having no connection with that sacrifice which formed the subject of the Context; while in the present case, it is with a property, the duality, etc. of the *yajamāna*, which is, in some way or other, suspected of being related to the subject of the Context.

The *sūtra* begins the discussion with the putting forward of the *Siddhānta*, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

SIDDHĀNTA.

The passage in question does not lay down the *Duality* and *Plurality* of the *yajamāna*; because it is fully taken up with the enjoining of the *Pratipats*; and refers to the Duality, etc. only as conditions for the use of the one or the other *Pratipat*; specially as the Injunction of many things would involve a syntactical split. Then again, inasmuch as they are not enjoined, the Duality and Plurality of the *yajamāna* can not pertain to the *Jyotishṭoma*; while they are found to exist in the *Kulāya* and other sacrifices,—those extending over one as well as those extending over many days,—wherein they are distinctly enjoined by such sentences as—“*Rājā ca purohitaṣca yajēyātām,*” “*ētēnaiva dvau yājayēt,*” “*ētēnaiva tṛṇ yājayēt,*” “*eko dvau bahavo vā hīnairyaṇjērau.*”

For these reasons the *Pratipats* should be taken apart from the Context.

Sūtra (18): Objection: "They might find place (in the "Jyotishtoma) as alternatives implied (for a special purpose)."

"The *Pratipats* must be taken as finding a place in the *Jyotishtoma*, as indicated by the Context (in which they are found to be mentioned). They are not in any way connected with any sacrifice other than that which forms the subject of the Context,—as had been found to be the case with the *Ahina*. As for the connection of the Duality, etc. of the *yajamāna*, it is mentioned merely as a condition (for the use of particular *Pratipats*), and it has nothing to do with the indicating of the connection of certain accessories with their Primaries. Nor could these serve as the means of establishing the connection of any sacrifice; as that would involve the necessity of the words being taken in their indirect secondary significations; and as a matter of fact, those that have had their use laid down by Direct Declaration, cannot rightly be brought into another use, on the ground of an indirect secondary signification. If the connection meant were that with the mere form of the Duality, etc. then the Injunction itself would become wholly useless. And there can be no doubt that the assumption of Context is far more reasonable than that of the Result.

"It has been argued that in the Context we do not find the conditions (Duality, etc. laid down for the use of the *Pratipats*). But they could be taken as implied; for the conditions are not always directly enjoined; as it is just possible for them to be indirectly implied; and in the case of the *Jyotishtoma* also we find that there is an implication of the presence of more than one *yajamāna*, in case one is found to be incapable of carrying it through. And up to this time we have had nothing to show that only one *yajamāna* is really meant for the *Jyotishtoma*; though in fact, even if due significance were attached to the singleness of the *yajamāna*,—yet, just as, in accordance with the *Sūtra* VI—iii—2, certain accessory details of the *Jyotishtoma* are left off, in the case of the *yajamāna* being found incapable of performing them all, so, in the same manner, it may be that in the case of one *yajamāna* being found incapable of finishing the sacrifice, two or more of them could very reasonably be brought in to do it. And in this way, the necessary conditions would be present in the *Jyotishtoma* also.

"Or again, it may be that the very injunction of the *Pratipats* (contained in the passage under consideration), being found to serve a

"visible purpose, would lead to the assumption of Direct Declarations
 "laying down the fact of the *Jyotishtoma* being performed by two or more
 "*yajamānas*. And this assumption would be possible only in accordance
 "with our theory, and not with the theory upholding the use of other
 "*Pratipats*. Consequently there is nothing in our theory that is incom-
 "patible with the mention of the singleness of the *yajamāna* (in connection
 "with the *Jyotishtoma*)."

Sūtra (19): Reply: Not so; because the original (Sacrifice of the Context) is connected with one only.

The word '*Prakṛti*' here is meant to signify the Sacrifice that forms the subject of the Context; and it might have been meant to indicate that, being the object of direct Injunction, the singleness of the *yajamāna* in the *Jyotishtoma* cannot be superseded; though that which is indirectly implied could be rejected, for special purposes. As a matter of fact, we know that the singleness of the *yajamāna* is directly enjoined; specially as we find that whether the *Jyotishtoma* is laid down as to be performed with a view to a certain desirable result, or as a necessary duty, the *yajamāna* is distinctly mentioned as *one* only, as is shown by the use of the word '*yujēta*.' Nor do we find any reason for not attaching a significance to the singular member of that verb; in fact we shall show later on, in Adhyāya VI, that due significance is really meant to be attached to it.

The leaving off of certain accessories of the *Jyotishtoma*, on account of the incapacity of the sacrificer to carry them all out entirely,—that has been brought forward by the *Pūrvaapakshi*,—is also based upon the declaration 'the Sacrifice should be performed in such a way as *one person* may be able to perform it'; and in other cases also we find the word '*one*,' which shows that the leaving off allowable is meant to refer to other accessories (and not to the number of *yajantānas*); as for instance, leaving off the exact amount of the 'gift,' the sacrifice can be fully accomplished by one person. Then again, inasmuch as the number '*one*' is found both in the originative injunction (of the *Jyotishtoma*), as well as in that of its actual performance, we cannot but attach due significance to that number. Thus then, we conclude that inasmuch as the original sacrifice of the *Jyotishtoma* has only one *yajamāna*, it does not fulfil the conditions of the use of the particular *Pratipats* in question; and hence these latter must be taken apart from it.

It has been argued that "the very passage under consideration would, by its capability, imply the necessary conditions." But this is not possible; because the passage is capable of being taken differently (and as such there would be no Apparent Inconsistency to justify the implication).

That is to say, if, without implying the said conditions, the passage would have been meaningless, then it could be taken as implying them; and this meaninglessness would have been possible, only if the Duality and Plurality (of *yajamānas*) did not exist in any sacrifice, in the same way that it does not exist in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; as a matter of fact, we do not find these to be non-existent in other sacrifices; as they are actually found to exist in the *Kulāya* and other sacrifices. And inasmuch as in the passage in question, we find them laid down as well-established conditions, and as they would otherwise lead to a syntactical split, they cannot be indirectly implied (with regard to any sacrifice).

If the Duality of the *yajamāna* were meant to refer to the presence of the wife of the *yajamānu*,—then, as her presence with her husband is a necessary condition for all sacrifices, such Duality could not have been laid down as the condition for the use of a certain particular *Pratīpat* only; and further, in the case of the word '*bahubhyah*,' inasmuch as it is distinctly found to denote the plurality of *men*, by making it include the sacrificer's wives, we would be assuming, without sufficient grounds, an *ekageśha* compound made up of heterogeneous elements (one male and two females).

In the case of the sentence '*kṣaumē vasānu*, etc.' (met with in connection with the *Agnyādihna*) we have had to accept the wife as the second person, as there was no other way of taking it; specially as the *Ādhānu* is nowhere laid down as to be performed by two men, in the way that we find the *Dviyajña* (*Kulāya*) laid down.

Then again, inasmuch as the sacrifice would always be performed by the *yajamāna* accompanied by one or more wives, there would, according to you, always be 'two' or 'three' '*yajamānas*'; and thus all sacrifices fulfilling the conditions laid down for the use of the *Pratīpats* in question, these would come to be used on all occasions; and the *Pratīpat* that is laid down as the unconditional invariable concomitant of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* would never be used, and would become wholly useless; or, at best, it would be taken as an optional alternative to those *Pratīpats* that are laid down apart from the originative Injunction.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Pratīpats* in question are to be taken apart from the Context.

It has been argued above that "the passage under question does not lay down the connection (of Duality, etc.) with a Sacrifice." But that does not affect the case; as the very word '*Pratīpat*' having indicated the fact of its pertaining to sacrifices, all that the mention of 'Duality,' etc. does, is to indicate the particular sacrifice with which they are connected. Or again, the word '*yajamāna*' itself would, through Apparent Inconsistency, indicate the *sacrifice*.

Thus then the *Pratipats* being taken as connected with sacrifices other than the *Jyotishtoma*, in whose *Context* the passage in question occurs,—this is a distinct case of the contradiction of Context; and as Direct Declaration is much more authoritative than that (there can be no incongruity in the *Siddhānta*).

ADHIKARANA (10).

[The *Jāghani* is not taken apart from the *Context*.]

Sūtra (20): "The *Jāghani* also (*would be taken apart*), because it is a part."

We now proceed to consider the exception to the principle of factors being taken apart from their context.

In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find the sentence '*Jāghanyā patniḥ saṇyājayanti*'; and as this admits of two distinct constructions, bearing upon the comparative predominance and subservient character of the two factors (in the sentence),—there arises a doubt as to its actual meaning. That is to say, (1) if the sentence be taken as laying down the *Patnīsamyaṅjas* as purificatory rites for the purification of the *Jāghani* (the animal's tail), then, inasmuch as the object of purification would be the predominant factor, it could not be removed from its place; and consequently, the *Patnīsamyaṅjas* would be taken to where the *Tail* might be, and not *vice versa*. And inasmuch as the ordinary animal's *Tail* would be of no use in a sacrifice, it is not this that forms the object of purification (by means of the *Patnīsamyaṅjas*); consequently the *Tail* of the animal that has served its purpose in connection with the *Agnishomiya* would come to be taken as that to be purified (by the *Patnīsamyaṅjas*) [and thus, in this case, there would be a removal of the *Tail* from all connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*]. (2) If, on the other hand, the sentence be taken as laying down the *Tail* (with reference to the *Patnīsamyaṅjas*), then, in that case, inasmuch as the idea of the sentence being a reference to the subject of the *Context* does not entirely disappear, the injunction of the *Tail* comes to belong to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* [and thus there is, in this case, no removal of the *Tail* from the *Context*].

On this question, then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"(1) Because the *Tail* helps the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* indirectly;—(2) "because that which helps directly in the body of the sacrifice is the

“ more important ;—(3) because the other (i.e. the *Patnisamyāja*) being enjoined by means of the verbal root (in ‘ *samyājayēt* ’) is more approximate to the Injunction ;—(4) because, inasmuch as any single part of an animal (the Tail) could not justify the employment of the whole animal, it would be necessary to take it out of the animal that has been used elsewhere, and hence in that case the *Samyāja* would come to have the character of a *Pratipattisamskāra* (the setting aside of that which has been used) ;—therefore the sentence in question must be taken as laying down the purification of the Tail of the animal used in connection with the *Agnishomiya* ; and hence it must be taken apart from the Context (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*).

[“ Says the *Bhāshya*—in reply to the objection that ‘ the *Patnī-samyājas* have already been enjoined elsewhere ’—: It is true that they are enjoined elsewhere, but here they are again enjoined with reference to the Tail ; the sense being that the Tail should be made connected with the *Patnisamyājas* (*sā ca tatsambaddhā kāryētyucyatē*)]. And in this last sentence, the word ‘ *ucyatē* ’ must be taken along with the preceding sentence (as shown above) ; and then follows (in the *Bhāshya*) a description of the action : such being the case, the *Patnīsamayājas* of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* do not lose anything by being disjoined from the Tail, etc. If on the other hand, the word ‘ *ucyatē* ’ were taken with what follows it—as ‘ *ucyatē evam sati*, etc.—then the sentence would fall into the semblance of an objection ; which would not be desirable ; specially as we do not find any sentence (in the *Bhāshya*) that could be taken as supplying an answer to that objection. Therefore the whole sentence must be taken as the statement of the Author’s own view (and not that of the opponent).

“ *Objection* : ‘ If what you say be correct, then, there being a Removal (of the *Patnīsamayājas*), exactly like that of the *Pratipats* (shown above),—there would be no performance of the *Patnīsamayājas* in connection with the original sacrifice (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*). ’

“ *Reply* : There might be no performance of these, if there were no *Patnīsamayājas* in connection with the *Paṇu* sacrifice ; as a matter of fact, the existence of these in this latter is quite patent, by reason of being implied ; and what the sentence in question does is simply to lay these down as connected with the Tail.

“ *Objection* : ‘ In that case you must declare that there is no Removal (of the Tail from the Context). ’

“ *Reply* : True ; there is no Removal of anything substantial ; but it is the sentence in question that, being found to serve a useful purpose in connection with the modificatory sacrifices, is spoken of as ‘ removed,’ or ‘ taken apart from the Context. ’

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (21): It is the injunction (of the Tail), because it is something new.

As a matter of fact, the Injunction in question is not taken apart from the Context; because if the *Tail* were referred to as something to be purified (by means of the *Patnīsamyañjas*), then that would have been the cause of the Injunction being taken apart; as a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Tail* is enjoined as an accessory of the Sacrifice, exactly like the other accessories, in the shape of Butter and the like.

That is to say, it has been declared above that in all such sentences, the force of the Injunctive applies to the subordinate factor. Then, as for the *Patnīsamyañjas*, these have been enjoined in a sentence immediately preceding the one under consideration; and as such being still present in the mind as enjoined actions (at the time that we come across the sentence under consideration), they cannot be taken as the objects of injunction (by this latter sentence). Nor can the sentence in question be rightly taken as merely referring to the *Patnīsamyañjas* of the *Paçu*-sacrifice; because at the time of its appearance, there is no idea of the *Paçu*-sacrifice. Nor is the *Tail* wholly incapable of being enjoined, like the Time etc., whereby it could carry any Injunctions along with itself. Nor can it be urged that it could be so, on the ground of its being an object of purification. Because there is no ground for superseding the fact of its being an accessory (to the sacrifice), as expressed by the Instrumental ending (in '*Jāghanyā*').

If the Injunction under consideration were to operate with reference to that *Tail* which has served its purpose elsewhere,—then, in that case, it might be possible to take the Instrumental as having the sense of the Accusative; just as we have in the case of the accessories of the *Prayñja*. As a matter of fact, the *Tail* that is laid down is something quite new, not made use of on any previous occasion. Consequently it is wholly incapable of being taken apart.

Nor can the *Patnīsamyañjas* bear being taken apart, as they are bound up with the Context.

It may be argued that "they would be taken apart, on account of the superior authority of Syntactical Connection." But that too is not possible; because in such cases, Syntactical Connection is dependent upon the fact of the object in question having some claim for being taken as desired; and as such, in such cases, it is much weaker than the Context. If the sentence in question were the originative Injunction of the

Patnīsamyaḍjas, then alone could the Syntactical Connection have wrested them away from the Context. As a matter of fact, however, these *Patnīsamyaḍjas* have their originative Injunction in another sentence; and hence by the time that they are taken up, through proximity, by the syntactical connection of the sentence under consideration,—they could also be taken up by the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*. Nor have we, up to this time, come to know the *Tail* as leading to any independent result of its own,—whereby it could supply the requirement of the *Patnīsamyaḍjas* as regards the purpose to be served by them. Consequently, while we are looking out for the purpose to be served by the *Tail*, it is taken up as an accessory, forming part of the Procedure of the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*, which are known to lead to distinct results.

Nor does the sentence in question contain the Injunction of any new sacrifice; as it is not found to mention the root ‘*yaji*’ only; what it mentions is the ‘*yāju*’ in conjunction with ‘*Patnī*.’ Consequently if it were taken as laying down the Action with reference to the *Tail*,—and at the same time laying down the *Patnīs* (wives) (as the Deity of that Action),—then it would come to be the injunction of many things, and as such involve the syntactical split in the form of ‘Dissimilarity’ pointed out in the *Sūtra* I—iv—8. And so long as the sentence is capable of being taken as the injunction of simpler things, the syntactical split could not be explained by taking the sentence as the injunction of the action as qualified (by the Deity, etc., etc.). Consequently, it must be concluded that the sentence lays down a *Substance* (*Tail*) with reference to a qualified sacrifice (the *Patnīsamyaḍja*).

Objection: “But this too, being a reference to the qualified sacrifice, would involve a syntactical split.”

Reply: That does not matter; as the *qualified Sacrifice* is indicated, as such, by the Context, the word ‘*Patnī*’ not being meant to be specially significant. Just as in the case of the sentence ‘*abhikrāman juhōti*’ even though the word used is the generic term ‘*juhōti*’ (meaning *sacrifice* in general), yet through capability (of Context), the *Abhikrāmana* is taken as pertaining to the particular sacrifice of the *Prayāḍjas*,—so, in the same manner, the *Patnīsamyaḍjas* are to be taken as meant by the generic term ‘*samyāḍjayanti*.’

For these reasons, we conclude that the *Tail* is not taken apart from the Context.

Sūtra (22): Objection: “But the Tail is a part.”

“It has been argued in the *Pūrvapakṣa* that, inasmuch as the “*Tail* is a part of the animal,—and as the originative injunction speaks

“ of it as related to something already existing,—it could not be utilized, “ etc., etc.” And to this argument the *Sūtra* offers the following reply :

***Sūtra* (23):** Not so; because the original (*Darç-Pūrṇamāsa-Jāghani*, Tail) is obtained by non-scriptural means.

Under the circumstances, that alone would have been useless which, without taking up the original, could not be recognized; e.g. in the case of the sentence ‘*uttarārdhāt svishṭakṛtē vadyati*’ (in this what is to be offered is not recognizable without a reference to the original Cake). The word ‘*Jāghani*’ however is, like the word ‘*Hṛdaya*’ and the like, denotative of a certain limb of the animal; and as such, it could be very easily obtained, without getting hold of the whole animal for the purpose, or even out of the animal that has been used for another purpose; specially as in the *sūtra* ‘*Rūpam vā cēśhabhūlatvāt*’ it is shown that an accessory could be used, by whatever method it may be produced or obtained. Nor is it impossible for the ‘*Jāghani*’ to be known apart from the rest of the body; for we actually find meat-vendors selling the bodies of animals, limb by limb; and certainly the ‘*Jāghani*’ (Tail) could be obtained, by purchase, from these vendors. Nor again is it necessary that it should be obtained from the goat; as all that is laid down in the text is only the particular limb, ‘Tail.’ In fact, in the *Agnishomiya* also, it is quite possible for the ‘Heart’ etc. to be obtained by purchase or other ordinary means; though it is so, yet, in the case of these, as we find their particular ‘class’ and method of obtaining distinctly specified as ‘by killing’ and all the rest,—we do not have recourse to purchase, or other ordinary means, for obtaining these. But in the case of the Tail we have no such means specified in the scriptures.

The word ‘*Prakṛti*’ is meant to give an idea of the *Darç-Pūrṇamāsa*.

Thus then, it becomes established that the *Jāghani* (Tail) is an accessory in the *Patuṣamyājus* performed along with the *Darç-Pūrṇamāsa*; and as such is to be used as an optional alternative for Butter.

ADHIKARANA (11).

[The *Joining together of the slabs* should find a place among the *Samsthās*.]

Sūtra (24): "The *Joining Together* should find a place in the "original sacrifice, because, like *Purchase*, its usefulness "does not disappear."

We now proceed to consider the cases of conflict and non-conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context.

In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*, we find two slabs of stone laid down, to serve as the receptacle upon which the *Soma* should be pounded; and with reference to these stone-slabs, we have the declaration '*Dirghasomā-santṛyād-dhṛtyai*,'—that is, 'having separated the two slabs one should join them together, for the obtaining of *Dhṛti*.' With reference to the word '*Dirghasoma*' in this sentence, there arises a doubt, as to (a) whether it applies to the original sacrifice (the *Jyotishṭoma*), as indicated by the Context, (b) or it applies to such sacrifices as extend over longer periods of time, and as such not being compatible with the Context, has to be taken apart. On the point in question we can also take the following alternatives, (a) the word applies to the *Jyotishṭoma* itself, (b) or to the *Jyotishṭoma* as performed by a tall ('*Dirgha*') *yajamāna*, (c) or to the *Uktha* and other *samsthās* or parts (of the *Jyotishṭoma*), (d) or to the *Satra* and *Ahina* sacrifices (that extend over many days), (e) or to all sacrifices excepting the *Agnishṭoma* (which is the first *samsthā* of the *Jyotishṭoma*).

On this question, we have the following

PRELIMINARY PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"(1) Because the word '*Dirghasoma*' is applicable to the *Jyotishṭoma* "as compared with such shorter sacrifices as the *Ishṭi*, the *Paṇu* sacrifice, "the *Darvi-Homa* and the like,—(2) because the purpose served by the " 'joining together,' the strength of the pounding slab, is quite applicable "to the *Jyotishṭoma*,—(3) because the Injunction of 'not-joining together' "could be taken as an optional alternative (to the 'joining together'), "just like the alternatives of *vr̥hi* and *yava*,—therefore, for the sake of "the Context, the 'joining together' should not be taken apart from it.

"The example of the optional alternative of the '*Purchase*,' as

“ similar to the ‘joining together’ in question, has been cited (in the ‘*Bhāṣya*), from the standpoint of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, irrespective of the ‘*Siddhānta*’ view that the two alternatives are to be taken conjointly (and not as optional alternatives) (and hence it should not be taken as involving a self-contradiction); nor is it necessary that all examples should always be out of the *Siddhānta*; because any example, from wheresoever obtained, is equally useful in supplying the necessary information.

“ Or, the expression ‘like Purchase’ may be explained only as an instance of the *non-disappearance of usefulness*, brought forward without any reference to the Injunction of ‘not-joining-together.’

“ In this case we would construe the *Sūtra* (and the *Bhāṣya*) in the following manner: The objection being—‘Inasmuch as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice takes very little time to finish, there would not be much use in the said *joining together* of the pounding slabs being done in connection with that sacrifice,’—we have the reply—that does not much affect the question, as the *joining together* will still have its use, ‘like the Purchase.’ That is to say, the actual price of the *Soma* not being very much, and its *purchase* having been accomplished by the payment of any one of the prescribed articles—cloth and the rest—in exchange, one still gives to the owner all these articles, in keeping with the scriptural text laying down all these articles as to be given in exchange for the *Soma*; and though the payment of these latter is not necessary, yet it is not altogether useless, serving the purpose of still further winning the good graces of the owner; because it is well known that the scriptures declare the fact of prosperity resulting from the purchase of *Soma*, if effected to the entire satisfaction of its original owner. In the same manner, even though the *unjoined* slabs would be quite efficient for the pounding of the *Soma* for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, yet, inasmuch as we are cognizant of the fact that the pounding done on the strengthened *slabs* brings about prosperity, the ‘*joining together*,’ done in accordance with the sentence under consideration, would not be entirely useless (even in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

“ For these reasons, we conclude that the ‘joining together’ is not to be taken apart from the Context.”

PRELIMINARY SIDDHĀNTA.

***Sūtra* (25): It should be taken apart; because of the mention of the speciality.**

On account of the Syntactical Connection of the ‘joining together’ with the ‘*Dirghasoma*,’ the former must be taken apart from the Context.

Because, an object is known as 'long' (*Dirgha*) only when it is compared with another thing of the same kind, which is *shorter* than itself. Consequently, one *Soma-sacrifice* could be known as 'Long,' only in comparison with another *Soma-sacrifice*; and it could not be spoken of, in comparison with such sacrifices as the *Ishṭi*, the *Paṇu*, the *Darvikoma* and the like (which have no connection with *Soma*); because these latter do not belong to the same class (as the *Jyotishṭoma* and the other *Soma-sacrifices*), and because they are not spoken of in the Context; and it is only when the two relative members of the comparison are mentioned that they are differentiated into the 'Long' and the 'Short.'—and in the case in question we do not find the *Ishṭi*, etc. mentioned, in comparison with which the *Jyotishṭoma* could be spoken of as 'Long.'

Objection: "But the different *Soma-sacrifices* also are not mentioned."

Reply: Though no *Soma-sacrifice* is mentioned, yet in the first place, the ground of comparison lies in the fact of the members of the comparison belonging to the same class; and *secondly*, because of the peculiar relationship, of the qualification and the qualified, signified by the word '*Dirgha-Soma*,' which denotes the fact of the *sacrifice being 'long' while belonging to the class 'Soma*,' thereby serving to preclude only such 'short' sacrifices as belong to the same class. And then, when we come to consider which one of these *Soma-sacrifices* is the 'long' one, and in comparison with which it is 'long,'—we find that the *Jyotishṭoma* is not 'longer' than any of them; and hence we come to take the word '*Dirgha-soma*' as referring to sacrifices other than the *Jyotishṭoma*. And inasmuch as these other sacrifices are the first to be recognized as 'Long,' the *Jyotishṭoma* comes to be recognized as the lower basis of the comparison.

Sūtra (26): *Objection*: "The speciality could be taken as pertaining to the *performer* as it is upon him that it is based."

"So long as we could interpret the word '*Dirghasoma*' in keeping "with the indications of the Context, it is not proper to entirely reject "this Context. And as a matter of fact, we find that it can be taken as "pertaining to the Performer. Nor would that make any difference in "the accent, as regards the compound; because in any case we have the "acute accent upon the last syllable; consequently we must expound "the compound as the *Genitive Tatpuruṣa* ('*Dirghasya puruṣasya* "*'Somaḥ*')."

Sūtra (27): Reply: It must pertain to the sacrifice; as, otherwise, the two words could not have their own significations [and the Arthavāda would not be explicable.]

The epithet 'Long' must pertain to the *Sacrifice* (and not to the *Sacrificer*); and the compound must be expounded as a *Karmadhāraya* ('*Dirghacāsan somaḥ*').

Question: "What special reason have you got for taking the compound thus?"

Answer: The chief reason is that it is only when the compound is thus explained that we have the direct significations of the component words; otherwise (if the compound be taken as the *Genitive Tatpuruṣa*) one of the words qualifies something wholly different (namely the *Sacrificer*), and that would make the direct primary significations of the words incompatible.

Thus then, when we come to think of the extremely large quantities of *Soma* to be pounded, we come to desire much strength and durability in the pounding slab; and in that case the injunction contained in the sentence in question (as explained by us) would be found to serve a visible purpose (that of making the slab strong by 'joining together' the two slabs). Otherwise there would be no cause for desiring any extra durability in the slab, and consequently, the Injunction would not serve any useful purpose.

So also, the *Arthavāda* contained in the word '*Dhṛtyai*' points to the propriety of our interpretation of the compound.

Thus then, it is only with regard to a case where we have doubts about the durability of the pounding slab, and fear its being broken asunder under the heavy pounding, that we can have the injunction in question (of carefully 'joining together' the two slabs). Otherwise the mere qualification of the sacrifice by specifying the *Performer* as '*dirgha*,' i.e. tall, could only serve some purpose not perceptible to us; because, whether the *Performer* is tall or short, there is no perceptible difference in the form of the sacrifice itself.

Then again, the specification of the sacrifice, through the *Performer*, would be extraneous to it, while that by itself would be more intimately related to it.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the 'joining together' should be taken apart from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself.

Sūtra (28): "In the case of (the word 'Dirghasoma' applying to) the Samsthās also, the mention of 'Dhṛtyai' would be as inexplicable as in that of (the epithet 'Dirgha' belonging to) the Performer."

This Sūtra must be taken as urged by the opponent in reply to the following argument of the *Siddhānta*: It is possible that the 'joining together' may not find a place in the first Samsthā—the *Agnishṭoma*—of the *Jyotishṭoma*; but it could pertain to the other samsthās—the *Ukthya* and the rest,—which are 'longer' than the *Agnishṭoma*, and by connecting with which, we keep our interpretation in keeping with the Context. Consequently, we must take the 'joining together' as finding a place in all the three samsthās; specially as the fact of the samsthās belonging to the same Context as the *Jyotishṭoma* has yet to be refuted by the *Samsthādhikaraṇa* (III—vi—41 *et seq.*). Or, even if there be a distinct Context of the samsthās,—then too, it would be only in those accessory details that are of use in the *Agnishṭoma*, wherein the 'joining together' could be precluded, on account of the contradiction involved in the mixture of the necessary and the unnecessary qualifications. Consequently we must admit that the 'joining together' should have a place in the second and subsequent Samsthās (sections) of the *Jyotishṭoma*.

As against these arguments we have the above sūtra, which formulates the following .

FINAL PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the quantity of *soma* used in every one of the *samsthās* is the same (as in the *Agnishṭoma*), the work of the pounding too "in every one of these would be exactly similar; and hence the eulogy " 'dhṛtyai' (= for the sake of making it strong and durable) would be as " useless in this interpretation, as in that in which the Performer (is held " to be qualified by the epithet 'Dirgha').

"That is to say, though the subsequent samsthās take a longer time "in performance (than the first samsthā), yet in every one of these, the "quantity of *soma* pounded is only 'ten-handfuls,' as per injunction " 'daṣa muṣhtīrmimīṭe' which is applied, by implication, to every one of "the samsthās of the *Jyotishṭoma*. Thus then, the strength and durability required (in the pounding slab) being the same in all cases, the "absence of perceptible use and the *Ārthavāda* (in 'dhṛtyai') remain as "inexplicable as in the former case.

"It might be argued that—'the quantity of *soma* in these latter "samsthās might undergo an increase, on account of the increase in the "number of offerings, and also because of the vessel, taken up for the holding of the *soma-juice*, not being small.'

"But this could not be; because we have the quantity of *soma* precise. ly limited by the direct declaration that it should be 'ten-handfuls of such pieces as have three joints'; consequently, if there be found to be an increase in the number of the offerings to be made, the quantity of the juice should be increased by the addition of water (and not by taking more of the *soma* itself).

"Thus then the inexplicability of '*Dhṛtyai*' being common in the case of all *saṁsthās*, the 'joining together' should be taken apart from the later *saṁsthās* also (and hence from the whole Context of the *Jyotiṣh-soma*).

FINAL SIDDHĀNTA.

[*Sūtra* (29): It should belong to the *Ukthya* and the rest : because the significations of the words are quite applicable to them.]

For reasons shown above, the 'joining together' should find a place in the *saṁsthās* of the *Ukthya* and the rest. And as an increase in the number of offerings would mean a corresponding increase in the quantity of the substance to be offered, the *Arthavāda* (contained in the word '*dhṛtyai*') would be quite explicable in this case. As for the assertion, that 'the quantity of *soma-juice* would be increased by the addition of water,'—it is not admissible; because inasmuch as the sacrifice is laid down as to be performed with the *soma*, no other substance could rightly be added to it, without the authority of a direct scriptural declaration to the effect. Consequently under such circumstances, it would be the quantity of the *soma* itself that should have to be increased. But then, this increase cannot be either in the thickness of the bundles or in the number of joints (because of these two being restricted to 'ten-handfuls' and 'three joints' respectively); consequently, the only way in which the quantity of *soma-juice* could be lawfully increased would be by getting hold of such pieces of the plant as have their joints at *longer* intervals than is ordinarily the case; and in this manner we would have increased the quantity, and yet kept within bounds of the restrictions as to the measure of the *soma*, and also preserved the compatibility of the Context and the word '*Dirghasoma*' because the 'length' of the pieces of the creeper would justify us in calling the '*soma*' itself 'long.'

Sūtra (30): Objection: The eulogy would be equally meaningless in both cases." [Reply:]

Sūtra (31): It would be quite applicable (to the case of the *saṁsthas*); because of (the restrictions) not being universally applicable.

Some people explain the word '*anityatvāt*' as referring to the fact of the restrictions as to the quantity of *soma* not being always honoured in

actual performance;—the sense being that the *quantity* of *soma* could be increased in ways other than that shown above.

But this explanation cannot be admissible; because such increase would be impossible in the case of such sacrifices as the *Satra* and the *Ahina*. Consequently the word '*anityatvāt*' must be taken as referring to the absence of restrictions in regard to the exact quantity of *soma* to be used in the *Abhyūha* laid down in the sentence '*Aviçishṭānamçünabhyūhāt*.'

Or the word may be taken as embodying the reply in accordance with the *Samsthādhikaraṇa* (III—vi—41 *et seq.*),—to one who would bring forward against the *Siddhānti* the fact of his theory involving a contradiction of the Context;—the sense of the reply being that the '*nitya*' (*Jyotishṭoma*) does not take in the *Dīrghasoma* (on account of the sub-context of the *samsthās* being distinct from that of the *Jyotishṭoma* itself).

In regard to the sentence '*tr̥tīyasavanē amçurēko grhyatē*,' there is a difference of opinion; as this '*amçu*' (portion) has also got to be taken out of the same *soma*. Consequently the only means that we could reasonably have for the increasing of the *soma* would be by taking such pieces as have the joints at longer intervals.

For this reason also, the 'joining together' should find place in the later *samsthās* (of the *Jyotishṭoma*).

Then again, the place of the 'joining together' should be restricted to these *samsthās* alone. Because the word '*Dīrghasoma*' applies to *every one* of the *Soma-sacrifices*, except the *Agnishṭoma*; and also because like the declaration '*ya ētēna, etc.*' the word applies to the later *samsthās* (of the *Jyotishṭoma*) as well as to the other *Soma-sacrifices*.

That is to say, we find that in the sentence '*ya ētēna anishṭvānyēna yajēta*' ('one who should perform another sacrifice without having previously performed this *Agnishṭoma* sacrifice'), the word '*anyēna*' refers, not only to the later *samsthās* of the *Jyotishṭoma*, but to *all sacrifices other than the Agnishṭoma*; and in the same manner, the word '*Dīrghasoma*' also would apply to *all sacrifices other than the Agnishṭoma*; and as such it could not be restricted to the later *samsthās* alone, on the sole authority of the Context; specially as these *samsthas*, being the *Vikṛtis* of the *Jyotishṭoma*, could be completed by the help of the declaration '*Prakṛtivadvikṛtiḥ kartavyā*'; and as such having no requirements, they could not have a Context of their own. And further, we find that the 'joining together' is not enjoined, after the mention of any such accessory of the Original sacrifice (*Jyotishṭoma*) as has been taken up for the occasion; because it falls within the details of the *Jyotishṭoma* which is the first to be enjoined.

For the following reason also, there can be no distinct Context relating to the *samsthās*: In all cases the Context ceases on being inter-

rupted by something not connected with its subject; and hence when these (*samsthās*) have been once interrupted by the details of the *Jyotishṭoma*, there is no idea of the continuous relationship of these (with the 'joining together').

That is to say, if the '*joining together*' were mentioned in the sub-context (of the *samsthās*), after the *Ukhtya* and the other *samsthās* had been enjoined, then we could have admitted of the Context (relating to these *samsthās*). As a matter of fact, however, we find that, in accordance with the *Samsthādhikaraṇa* (III—vi—41 *et seq.*), the continuity of the *samsthās* is broken by the intervening mention of such details of the *Jyotishṭoma* as do not pertain to the *samsthās*; and hence the 'joining together' cannot be said to be included in the Procedure of the *samsthās*. Consequently we have neither the authority of the Context, nor that of Position or Order, for taking the 'joining together' with the *samsthās*; and in fact, its connection with them is indicated by the Syntactical Connection (of the sentence under consideration); and we find that this sentence actually connects the 'joining together' as much with the *samsthās* as with all sacrifices other than the *Jyotishṭoma*. Consequently it must be taken as belonging to *all the Soma-sacrifices* (with the single exception of the *Agnishṭoma*).

ADHIKARANA (12).

[The prohibition of the *Pravargya* refers to the First Performance.]

Sūtra (32): "The sentence mentioning the number would apply to the whole sacrifice; because of the Context."

The *Pravargya* is mentioned without reference to any particular sacrifice, in the sentence '*yat pravargyam pravṛjanti*'; and it is only by the syntactical connection of such sentences as '*purastādūpasadām pravargyan-caganti*' that it becomes connected with a sacrifice; and this *Pravargya* betakes itself to the *Jyotishṭoma*, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—vi—2; specially as it is only in connection with this latter sacrifice that the *Upasads* are laid down; and by the time that these would go over to the *vikrtis*, on the strength of Inference, the *Pravargya* would also go to them. It is for this reason that the *Bhāṣya* has said—*Jyotishṭomē pravargyam prakṛtya cṛuyatē* (though in reality the *Pravargya* is not mentioned in the Context of *Jyotishṭoma*).

Or it may be that,—inasmuch as in the *Kaushītaki-Brāhmaṇa*, it is in the *Jyotishṭoma-Context* that we find the *Pravargya* laid down, in a certain order of sequence,—the *Bhāṣya*-statement is based upon a reference to this fact.

In regard to this *Pravargya*, it is declared—'*na prathamē yajñē pravṛjyāt*' ('one should not perform the *Pravargya* in the first sacrifice').

And with reference to this last sentence there arises a doubt as to whether the expression 'First Sacrifice' refers to the *Jyotishṭoma* with all its *samsthās* and all its various developments, or to only the *first performance* of that sacrifice.

And on this, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"(1) Because the expression is co-extensive with 'sacrifice'; (2) "because the word *prathama* ('first') is distinctly found to be synonymous with the '*Jyotishṭoma*, as found in the sentence '*ēsha vāva prathamō yajñānām yajjyotishṭomah*'; (3) because the sentence '*ya ētena anishṭvā*, etc.' shows that the *Jyotishṭoma* is the sacrifice to be performed before all other sacrifices, which shows that the word 'First' applies to "that sacrifice; (4) and because of the indications by the Context (in which

"the sentence under consideration occurs),—[the expression 'First Sacrifice' should be taken as referring to the whole of the *Jyotishṭoma*].

"*Objection* : 'If we take the expression as referring to the *First Performance* of the *Jyotishṭoma* (viz. the *Agnishṭoma*) only, that also would be quite in keeping with the Context.'

"*Reply* : How could that be in keeping with the Context, when even though the *Prohibition of the Pravargya*, like the prohibitions of the *Homa, Dāna, Paka*, etc., for the initiated person applies, through Context, to the whole of the *Jyotishṭoma*,—yet, by syntactical connection, it is sought to be taken along with only *one* performance of it (the *First*), and the Context is left wholly inoperative ?

"Then again, as a matter of fact, the fact of the prohibition in question applying to the *whole Jyotishṭoma* is also indicated by Syntactical Connection ; and then, if there were any sacrifice capable of being performed *first* (i.e. even before the *Jyotishṭoma*),—then alone could the Prohibition not be taken as pertaining exclusively to the *Jyotishṭoma*. As a matter of fact, however, there is no such other sacrifice ; consequently, the Syntactical Connection could not but be taken as referring to the *Jyotishṭoma*, which is found to be the only sacrifice capable of *first performance* ; and this not affecting the Context adversely, would it still involve its contradiction ?

"For these reasons, for the sake of the Context also, it must be admitted that the sentence in question, containing the mention of the number '*first*,' refers to the *Jyotishṭoma*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (33) : It (the '*First*') is conditionally relative, through the connection of the Performer ; because the Indicative Power (of the word) is actually determined by that.

If the word '*Prathama*' ('*First*') were a name of the *Jyotishṭoma* itself, then what has been said in the *Pūrvapakṣa* would be quite admissible. As a matter of fact, however, it is found to be expressive of the *Performance*.

That is to say, what the word '*Prathama*' actually denotes is *that operation of the Performer which precedes all his other operations*, and not any particular *Action* ; and it is only by its connection with the said operation that it comes to be applied to the *Action* also ; but this too would be possible when the *Action* would be undergoing such an operation as that pointed out. Specially as when one is found to be going on with the second and subsequent performances (of the *Jyotishṭoma*), he is not spoken

of as 'performing the first'; nor is one, who is not actually performing a sacrifice, called 'the performer of the first sacrifice.'

Thus then, the word 'First' having been shown to be denotative of the first operation, if it be applied, by indirect indication, to that which has that (firstness) as its qualification (the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice f. i.), then that would involve a certain degree of remoteness (of the word) from its objective; and this remoteness can be admissible only in such cases where no syntactical connection is found to be possible without it;—e.g. in the sentence '*ēsha vāva prathamō yajñānām, &c.*' In the case in question, however, we do not find the character of 'First' incapable of being taken as the ground of the Prohibition (of *Pravargya*); consequently, it would be only after having superseded this previous denotation of the word, that we could apply it to the sacrifice (*Jyotishtoma*), even in course of its first performance; and under the circumstances, the chances of its being applicable to the other performances (by the same sacrificer) would be very much remoter indeed!

Objection: "In that case the first performance of any and every "sacrifice would come to be the condition of the Prohibition in question."

Reply: Such would have been the case, if the sentence in question were an *Injunction*. As a matter of fact, however, it is a *Prohibition*; and as such requires a declaration of the possibility of that which it prohibits; and not finding any possibility of the performance of the *Pravargya*, either in the ordinary actions of the world, or in the course of such Vedic actions, as *Study of the Vedas*, *Kindling of the Fire*, *Agnihotra*, *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, and the like,—it naturally leaves these actions alone, and betakes itself to the Soma-sacrifices, through the capability (of these latter, of having the *Pravargya* performed in their wake). And among these too, it is to the *Jyotishtoma* that it betakes itself, in accordance with the law of the *Anārabhyavāda*; and of that again, only to the very first performance, because of the word '*prathama*.'

Consequently the relative term 'First' must be taken as with reference to the second and subsequent performances of the same sacrifice (the *Jyotishtoma*); as these would be most near the First Performance, as well as of the same kind with it. Otherwise, if it were made relative to other sacrifices further removed from the First Performance (of the *Jyotishtoma*), then that would involve a great remoteness of the relationship.

For these reasons, we must reject the Context, and taking our stand upon Syntactical Connection, hold the *Prohibition of the Pravargya* to apply to the First Performance only of the *Jyotishtoma* (i.e. only to the *Agnishtoma*-portion of it).

In the Taittiriya text, we find a further Injunction of the *Pravargya*, in the sentence '*Agnishṭomē pravṛṇakti*.' With regard to this there is a diversity of opinion.

(1) Some people declare thus: "If this further Injunction be taken as referring to the *Second* and subsequent performances, then, inasmuch as we have never found any Prohibition of the *Pravargya* with reference to these performances (the aforesaid Prohibition distinctly referring to the '*First Performance*'), the injunction of its performance in connection with the other performances would be contained in the previous sentence, '*yat pravargayam pravṛṇanti*'; and the further Injunction would be a useless repetition. Consequently it must be taken as referring to the *First Performance* (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); and thus the Prohibition under question, being set aside by this subsequent Injunction, would find scope for itself in the '*first performance*' of another sacrifice (other than the *Agnishṭoma*)."

But this is not admissible; because the *Agnishṭoma* exists as the *samsthā* (the first to be performed), in connection with other sacrifices also. Nor is the epithet '*first*' free to be applied to any sacrifice; because we have the Direct Declaration—'*Ya ētēna anishṭvā, etc.*'—which restricts it to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* alone,—and the name '*Prathamayajnaḥ*' ('*First sacrifice*') means '*that sacrifice which is the first to be performed*,' and as such cannot apply to any sacrifice other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

(2) In view of this, some people offer the following explanation: "The Prohibition applies to the '*first performance*' of the *Atirātra*-section of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and the subsequent Injunction applies to the *Agnishṭoma*. Because the *Atirātra* also is laid down, as the '*first to be performed*' in certain cases, in the sentence '*Tasmāt prathamam yajamāno tīrātrēṇa yajēta*.' Thus then, we find that the Prohibition (referring, in general terms, to the '*First performance*') is common to both (the *Atirātra* and the *Agnishṭoma*), while the later Injunction applies particularly to the *Agnishṭoma* only; consequently in regard to this latter sacrifice, it is the Injunction that is the more authoritative."

But even this explanation is not admissible; because, inasmuch as the name '*Agnishṭoma*' also is common to many other performances and sacrifices, the Injunction in question cannot but be regarded as common to all these (and not particularly to the *Agnishṭoma* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

(3) In view of all this, the third alternative proposed is the following: The Prohibition of the *Pravargya* is always applicable to the '*first performance*' of the *Atirātra*, and being alternatively optional with regard to the *Agnishṭoma*, in connection with this latter, it is both *prohibited* and *enjoined*.

Against this explanation, some people bring forward the following

objections: "What is here said would have been quite possible, if the 'sentence' '*na prathamayajñe, etc.*' were a real *Prohibition*; as a matter of fact, however, all such sentences are mere *Paryudāsas* (partial preclusions), as will be shown, in Adhyāya X, under the *sūtra* '*apivā vākya-ṣaṣṭhaḥ syāt*'; and we find that the sentence does not form part (syntactically) of the sentence dealing with the *Agnishṭoma*. If the sense of the sentence be explained as that 'the *Pravargya* is to be performed in that *Agnishṭoma* which is not the first to be performed' (the '*na*' being taken with '*prathamayajñe,*' and not with '*pravṛnjanti*'),—then, inasmuch as this performability will have been laid down in that general Injunction ('*yat pravargyam pravṛnjanti*'), its injunction in yet another sentence ('*Agnishṭomā pravṛnakti*') would be altogether useless. Consequently, the sentence ('*na prathamayajñe, etc.*') must be taken as connected with (and following in the wake of) the said general Injunction,—thereby meaning that 'the *pravargya* that is performed should be in that which is not-first'; and thereby the upshot of it comes to be that the prohibition of the *Pravargya* applies to the *Atirātra*. Then again, one and the same sentence cannot be taken as connected with both the sentences (relating to the *Atirātra* and the *Agnishṭoma*); as it has all its requirements fulfilled by the connection of a single sentence. Thus then, there being no exception to the Injunction of the *Pravargya* in connection with the *Agnishṭoma*, it should be performed, without fail, along with that sacrifice (and not optionally as explained above)."

To these objections, the following reply is given: What is here declared would have been quite possible, if the sentence in question were a *Paryudāsa* (partial preclusion); but as a matter of fact, it cannot be a *Paryudāsa*; as in that case, it could not be taken as connected (syntactically) with another sentence; while such connection of it you have yourself proved, with reference to the sentence mentioning the *Agnishṭoma*; and as regards the sentence mentioning the *Atirātra*, it would be connected with this sentence also, if it were uttered at the time of the fulfilling of the requirements of the Procedure of the *Atirātra*; but this you have omitted to mention. And as a matter of fact, the method of the injunctions of all *sumsthas* is similar; and we do not find any prohibition in the sub-context, and the sentence cannot be taken as connected with the words '*Prakṛtīvāḍ vikṛtiḥ kartavyā*' as used with reference to the *Atirātra*, which is separated from it by the intervention of all the other sentences dealing with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Consequently, the sentence must be taken as a *Prohibition* (and not as a *Paryudāsa*), exactly like the sentence—'the *Prajās* are not performed along with the *Paṇu*-sacrifice.'

Objection: "Even if it were a *Prohibition*, it could only be taken as "applying to the original sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)."

Reply: Such would be the case, only if its application to the Modifications were not possible; as a matter of fact, inasmuch as such application depends solely upon the possibility of the performance, it occurs in both (the original sacrifice as well as its modifications), irrespective of the fact of its applying to the one by Direct Injunction, and to the other by Indirect Implication; and in support of this we could bring forward the contention contained in the *Sūtra* III—vi—2.

Objection: "What you assert could be reasonable, only if it served 'the same purpose in connection with both (the Original and its Modification); as a matter of fact, however, it serves distinct purposes; as with 'reference to the Original (*Jyotishṭoma*) it is wholly optional; while with 'reference to the *Atirātra*, the Prohibition is absolutely necessary."

Reply: It is not so; as it will be shown under the *sūtra*—'Prati-
cēdhaḥ pradēḥ 'nārabhyaviḥhānē ca prāptapratishiddhatvād vikalpaḥ syāt'
(X—viii—1). Then again, inasmuch as a Prohibition of that whose performance is not possible without a scriptural Injunction, would not be possible, without having presupposed the possibility of such performance,—the *Prohibition* itself would necessitate the assumption of the said Injunction. And if the existence of this latter be once accepted, then, inasmuch as both the Injunction and the Prohibition would be equally scriptural, both would be equally authoritative; and consequently there would always be an option with regard to the *Atirātra*. Thus then, on account of the fact of its being mentioned twice, and of the difference in the time of the application of the Direct Declaration and the Indirect Implication, it would be by far the most reasonable to take the Prohibition as pertaining to the Original sacrifice (the *Jyotishṭoma*).

Objection: "Such being the case, inasmuch as the injunction (of 'the *Pravargya*) in connection with the original sacrifice would have 'been supplied by the sentence—'*agnishṭomē pravṛṇakti*'—the former 'sentence ('*yat pravargyam pravṛṇanti*') which does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice, would be totally useless."

Reply: This objection does not hold; because while this latter sentence ('*yat pravargyam, etc.*') would serve as the Originative Injunction (of the *Pravargya*), the other sentence ('*Agnishṭomē pravṛṇakti*') would lay down its particular application (thus serving as its *Viniyogavidhi*); and thus there would be two distinct purposes served by the two sentences. Or, the sentence '*yat pravargyam, etc.*' could be taken as serving the purpose of laying down the *Pravargya* in connection with the sacrifices other than the *Agnishṭoma*.

Objection: "In that case, the sentence '*yat pravargyam, etc.*' would 'be swallowed up by the subsequent sentence ('*Agnishṭomē, etc.*')."

Reply: Such swallowing or recapitulation would be by no means pos-

sible. Because only that general assertion is swallowed up by the particular one, which, by itself incapable of being directly connected with a sacrifice, happens to be, somehow or other, connected with it indirectly,—e.g. the number 'seventeen'. While in the case in question we find that the sentence '*yat pravargyam, etc.*,' by itself, is capable of being directly connected with the sacrifice; and as such, it does not deserve to be swallowed up. For this reason too, it would appear to pertain to the *modifications* (of the *Jyotishtoma*). And in that case, the sentence '*na prathamayajñe*' could very well be taken along with the sentence '*yat pravargyam, etc.*'; and consequently, the *non-performance* of the *Pravargya* would be absolutely necessary, in connection with the first performance of the *Atirātra*; while in connection with the *Agnishtoma*, it would be its *performance* that would be absolutely necessary; as in regard to this latter, the *Pravargya* forms the object of the sole Injunction ('*Agnishtomā, etc.*'); specially as it has already been shown that the Prohibitive sentence ('*na prathamayajñe, etc.*') is not capable of being taken along with the sentence dealing with the *Agnishtoma* ('*Agnishtomā, etc.*').

The following conclusions are what appear to be the outcome of all this discussion: The sentence '*yaj pravargyam, etc.*' does not betake itself to anywhere else except the original sacrifice. For if it did so, it would betake itself also to the *Ishti*, *Paçubandha* and the other wholly heterogeneous sacrifices, which as a matter of fact it cannot do; as in that case the restriction of its position, in the sentence '*purastādupasaddm*' (before the *Upasads*), would not be compatible; consequently it could apply only to that sacrifice where we could have the *Upasads*; so, on account of the difference in the time of the possibility of its performance,—inasmuch as we have the *Upasads* in the original (*Jyotishtoma*) sacrifice,—the *Pravargya* would apply to it, even without the further declaration (in the sentence '*Agnishtomā, etc.*'); and it does so all the more, because of this additional Direct declaration. And we have already shown under the '*Āturdhā-karaṇādhikaraṇa*' (III—i—23 *et seq.*), that there is a swallowing up of such sentences, even when their relationship to a generic factor is distinctly cognisable.

For these reasons, the two sentences being an Originative Injunction and an Injunction of Application respectively, they cannot be taken as the mere repetitions of each other.

Such being the case, the sentences would be actually connected with those sacrifices, in whose Context the *Pravargya* will be found to be mentioned. Thus then, if out of both the sentences ('*yaj pravargyam, etc.*' and '*Agnishtomā, etc.*') we could get the same sense that '*the Pravargya* is to be performed in the *Agnishtoma*,'—then these would be quite reconcilable with the sentence '*na prathamayajñe, etc.*,' which latter would mean that

'the *Pravargya* is to be performed in that *Agnishṭoma* which is not the first to be performed,' and thus this latter sentence being a *Paryudāsa*, the non-performance of the *Pravargya* would be absolutely necessary in all 'First Performances.'

For these reasons, we must explain the *Siddhānta* in the following manner: The sentence '*yah pravargyam, etc.*' having been shown to be applicable to the original sacrifice, the sentence '*Agnishṭomē pravṛṇakti*' found to be of no other use, comes to be taken as calculated to serve the purpose of pointing out the occasional allowability of what has been prohibited (the sense of the sentence being that though the performance of the *Pravargya* has been prohibited in regard to all 'First Performances', yet if it be performed along with the *Agnishṭoma*, which also is a 'First performance', that would be allowable).

Objection: "It has been shown above that the sentence '*na prathamayajñe etc.*' is not a prohibition."

Reply: We take it as a prohibition, for the purpose of making out some use for the sentence '*agnishṭomē, etc.*'; and specially as it has been shown that the sentence cannot be taken as *Paryudāsa*, along with this latter sentence. Nor does the sentence '*yah pravargyam, etc.*' apply only to those sacrifices that are not *Agnishṭoma*; when the sentence could be taken as a *Paryudāsa* referring to that. Consequently both the sentences must be taken as applying to the *Agnishṭoma*.

Consequently, even if the sentence under consideration be a *Paryudāsa*, yet, on account of the denotative power of the two sentences, we must accept both (performance and non-performance of the *Pravargya*) as optional alternatives. Because, if we had its performance in all cases (in accordance with the Injunction '*Agnishṭomē, etc.*'), then the *Paryudāsa* ('*na prathamayajñe, etc.*') would become wholly useless; while if we had no performance of it at all (in accordance with this latter sentence), then the former Injunction would be useless.

Thus then, we find that the necessity of taking the two as optional alternatives, for fear of which you had recourse to the theory of *Paryudāsa*, is found to remain also when the *Paryudāsa* is accepted. Consequently, it is far more reasonable to accept the sentence as a *Prohibition*, as is indicated by the words themselves.

Thus then, we come to conclude that it is in the *First Performance* of the *Agnishṭoma* that we have both optional alternatives (the *Prohibition* applying to it on account of its being a 'first performance,' while the Injunction does so on account of its being the *Agnishṭoma*). Then too when we meet with such a declaration, as—'if a *Ācārya* happens to be a Teacher of Vedas, he must perform the *Pravargya*';—then in that case inasmuch as the sentence ('*Agnishṭomē, etc.*') which makes the *Pravargya*—

performance allowable in the *Agnishṭoma*, and which is the sole ground for the optional alternative, comes to refer to a particular performer (the *Ārotriya* who is a teacher of *Vedas*),—the optional alternative (that of the performance of the *Pravargya* in the *Agnishṭoma*) would hold good only for that performer; while for all others, the only course admissible would be *never to perform the Pravargya in the Agnishṭoma*.

Question: "Is a non-*Ārotriya* (one who has not read the *Veda*) ever 'entitled to the performance of Vedic sacrifices,—that it should have 'been considered necessary to qualify the performer as 'a *Ārotriya*?'"

Answer: It is quite true that when a word is found to express something that is already known, the use of that word, for the sake of expressing that alone, is considered useless; consequently the force of the word '*Ārotriya*' must be taken as pointing to the excellent *Ārotriya*; e.g. in the sentence 'the girl should be given to a handsome man,' the word 'handsome' is taken in the sense of 'handsomer.' The mention of the word '*anūcāna*' (Teacher of *Vedas*) is meant to preclude the *Vaiṣya* and the *Kṣattriya*; as, though they are entitled to be *Ārotriyas*, yet they can never be 'Teachers.'

What has been said above applies to the case of the *Atirātra* also. In this case we find that the prohibition '*na prathamayajñe, etc.*' is quite applicable to it; and then not being *Agnishṭoma*, it is not subject to the declaration of the allowability of the performance (in the sentence '*Agnishṭome, etc.*'); consequently it comes to be concluded that the '*Pravargya* should never be performed in the *Atirātra*.'

As for the other modifications (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), inasmuch as none of these would be 'first performances,' the Prohibition could not apply to them; and hence it would be absolutely necessary to perform the *Pravargya* in connection with these.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the Prohibition '*na prathamayajñe, etc.*' "would indirectly apply to those other modifications as well,—and "they would not have the character of the *Agnishṭoma*, which is the only "condition of the allowability of the *Pravargya*-performance,—there should "never be a performance of the *Pravargya*, at the first performances of "these sacrifices."

Reply: It is not so; because the word '*prathama*' ('First') by itself, applying to that which *precedes all others*, could never apply (even indirectly) to those modifications.

Thus then, it is established that the Prohibition contained in the sentence under consideration ('*na prathamayajñe etc.*') refers to the *First performance of the simple Jyotiṣṭoma by itself*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13).

[The grinding of Pūsha's share is to be done at the *Vikṛti* sacrifices.]

Sūtra (34): The grinding of Pusha's share is recognised as pertaining to the ectypes; because it is not enjoined with regard to the archetypes.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*, we find the sentence *Tasmāt Pūshā prapishṭabhāgaḥ, adatko hi saḥ* ('Thus then Pushan has his share ground, because he is without teeth'); and in regard to this there arises the question as to whether this *grinding* is to be done in the *Vikṛti* sacrifice or in the *Prakṛti*.] And on this question we have a conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context; and hence, in accordance with the 'Law of the Joining-together,' III—iii—24 *et seq.*), it is clear that the *Grinding* is to be done in the *Vikṛti*; and the subject is yet introduced again, simply with a view to serve as the introduction to the next *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (14).

[The *Grinding of Pusha's share* applies only to the *Rice*.]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

Sūtra (35): "The grinding applies to all offering materials equally; because of non-distinction."

[“Whatever may be the particular material to be offered to Pushan, be it Rice, or Cake, or the Animal Body,—it is necessary to grind it; as no distinction has been made in the sentence laying down the Grinding, as to the particular material to which it should apply.”]

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (36): But it should apply to the grain only; because in the case of the Cake, it is necessarily implied by the useful purpose served by it; and in the case of the animal body, it could not apply to it, because of incongruity.

Some people might urge that—“Inasmuch as the Cake could be made even if the *grinding* done were of the ordinary kind (not the Vedic one), the *Vedic grinding* could not be necessarily implied by the very nature of the Cake and the purpose served by the *grinding* (as declared in the *Sūtra*).”

To this we make the following reply: By the word ‘*artha*’ we mean the help accorded to the original sacrifice; of this help, in the original sacrifice, the means of accomplishment has been found to consist of the *grinding*; and this previously-cognised *grinding* implies the same in the *Cake* also.

In the case of the animal body, there would be a deficiency in the character of the Primary offering. Because the primary offering has been recognized as being in the *shape of the Heart*, etc.; and this could be done only by cutting these limbs out of the body. But when the body would be ground down, the necessary shapes would be no longer there, and so the offerings could not be cut out off the masses of those shapes. Even though it might be possible to make those shapes out of the pounded mass of flesh, yet in this case the names ‘*Heart*’ and the rest

would apply to these newly-shaped masses of flesh only secondarily,—just like the name '*gavaya*' to the animal made of clay; and that causes a deficiency in the offering. Then again, we have the declaration that 'the piece is to be cut out from that region in which it has been torn from the body'; and when the Heart, etc. have been ground down, it could not be known by which particular part it had been torn from the body of the animal.

Thus then we find that it is only in the case of the Grain (or Rice), that the *grinding* does not cause any deficiency in the offering material, and that it is not necessarily implied by the purposes served by it; consequently we conclude that the *grinding* laid down should be taken as applying to the Grain.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the condition that has been laid down for 'the *grinding*—viz. the absence of teeth—is applicable to all kinds of 'offerings, the *grinding* in question becomes applicable to the *Cake* and 'the *Animal Body* also, the Cuttings of the Pieces and its attendant 'accessories should be offered after being ground down (the *grinding* 'being done *after* the limbs have been cut out). Nor do we find the 'grinding 'necessarily implied' (in the case of the *Cake*) or 'incompatible' (in the case of the *Animal body*)."

Reply: Inasmuch as the actual offering of the limbs is laid down as following immediately after their *cutting out*, it could not be proper to interrupt this immediate sequence by bringing in the *grinding* in the middle; specially as the sentence 'because he is without teeth,' which appears to be the statement of a reason, is meant to be a mere Praise, as we shall show later on.

Consequently, the Injunction must be taken to be of the *grinding* of that alone which happens to be in due order for it.

When the sentence under consideration is taken with reference to each of the three kinds of offering materials, it leads to the following conclusions: (1) in regard to the *Cake*, being necessarily implied by its usefulness, the mention of *grinding* would be the mere recalling of a previous fact; (2) in regard to the *Grain*, it would serve as laying down the allowability of the *grinding* in this particular case (of the offering being meant for *Pūshan*); (3) and in regard to the *Animal-Body*, it could only be taken as the injunction of something wholly new. And certainly, a single sentence could never be rightly taken in three diverse forms. Consequently, it being necessary to take it in a single form, we naturally accept the *second* of the above three forms; because it is the simplest of the three, and serves a distinctly useful purpose.

Thus then it is established that the *grinding* applies to the *Grain* only.

Sūtra (37): Objection: "In the case of the Grain also."

[In the case of the *Grain* also, we find that the word '*Caru*' ('cooked grain') is applicable only when each grain is distinctly visible and cooked; and if it were to be ground and then cooked, then we would have, not distinct grains, but a single mass of cooked flour, which would lead to as great an 'incongruity' as the *grinding* of the *Animal Body*.]

Sūtra (38): Reply: "Not so; because it is the name of a peculiarly-cooked preparation."

There is no incongruity of purpose in the case of the *Grain*. Because the condition of all things is determined by ordinary experience; and it is a matter of ordinary experience that it is a certain cooked preparation that is called '*Caru*' (cooked grain).

That is to say, though the word '*Caru*' is used in the sense of the 'cooked rice' and '*Caru*-bread,'—yet inasmuch as one and the same word could not rightly be accepted as having more than one signification, we take the word '*Caru*' as signifying that element which is common to the 'cooked rice' and the 'bread'; and that element consists in the fact of the (1) water in which it has been cooked not being thrown away, (2) in that of its being hot inside, and (3) in that of its being thoroughly well cooked.

The *Bhāṣhya* says—'*pakshoktam phalam*'—('the use of the inquiry lies in what has been shown to be the conclusion in each case,—according to the *Pūrvapaksha* the *grinding* is done to all offering materials, while according to the *Siddhānta*, it is done to the *Caru* only'). But this is not much of a use explained, as regards the *Pūrvapaksha*,—the principal end of which lies, not in the application of *grinding* to the *Cake*, but in that of applying it to the *Animal Body*,—though, it is true, that the case of both is almost identical.

ADHIKARĀṆA (15).

[The *Grinding of Pusha's Share* finds place only in that *Caru* which is dedicated to *Pūshan alone*.]

Sūtra (39): (There should be a grinding of the *Caru*) *only when there is one (Deity); because (the mention of grinding is) connected with one (Deity) only.*

Now then, there arises the question as to whether the *Grinding* is to be done also when the *offering* of that *Caru* is meant for two Deities—Indra and Pushan,—or only when it is meant for Pushan alone. And as the question is subject to the principles arrived at under the '*Oaturdhā-karāṇa*' and the '*Indrapita*' *Adhikarāṇa* (III—i—26 et seq., and III—ii—27 et seq.),—we (omit the *Pūrvapaksha* and) start off with the—

SIDDHĀNTA.

Inasmuch as we find the sentence, under consideration, which lays down the *grinding*, speaking of *Pūshan* alone as having his 'share ground,' the *Grinding* would apply to that *Caru* alone which is dedicated to (and meant for) *Pūshan only*.

Sūtra (40): Also because of the incongruity involved in the particular action (when applied to any other *Caru*).

For the following reason also, the grinding should be done only to that *Caru* which is meant for *Pūshan* alone:—In the case of the *Caru* meant for two deities (*Pushan* and *Indra*), would you grind the whole of it or only half? If the latter, then the cooking of it would be deranged; and if the former, the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up.

That is to say, if only half of the *Caru* were ground and the other half left unground, the *ground* half would become cooked very much sooner than the other half; consequently, if the whole thing would be removed from the oven as soon as the ground half would be ready cooked, then the other half would remain uncooked; while if we were to wait for this latter to become ready cooked (before removing the vessel from the oven), then by that time the ground half would become melted off in a single mass (of flour). A careful and neat method of cooking makes even

a 'cooked rice' of the ground grain also; but this would be absolutely impossible in the way suggested (by the *Pūrvapaksha*). It might be suggested that the portion consisting of whole Rice should be put upon the fire first, and when that should have become half-cooked, then the ground half would be put in (and then the two portions would be ready by the same time). But in that case the simultaneity of the cooking of the offering material (meant for the two deities conjointly) would disappear. Then, lastly, if for the sake of *Pūshan*, Indra's share were also ground, then the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up; and if the portion of one Deity happened to be offered to another, that would mean a great anomaly in the sacrifice.

Objection: "What you say now would apply to your theory also, as regards those offerings that are meant for two Deities conjointly. Be-
"cause in the case of the *Oaru*, or the *Animal Body*, or the *Cake*, being
"offered to two Deities,—before the offering is actually made, there is one
"whole mass of the substance to be offered; and thus certainly there is a
"mixture of the portions of various Deities. And in fact you admit of
"this mixing up of the portions,—on the ground that there is no incon-
"gruity in the mixed-up offerings being simultaneously made to the *joint*
"Deities."

Reply: This non-incongruity would be possible only in such cases where the sacrificial Details are such as are calculated to help in the bringing about of the sacrificial *Apūrva* (as we hold the *grinding* to be): as for you, on the other hand, you hold this *grinding* to be something pertaining to the Deity (*Pūshan*).

That is to say, for us the *Grinding* is meant to be an aid in the bringing about of the *Apūrva* of that sacrifice which has *Pūshan* for its Deity; and hence, inasmuch as such an *Apūrva* would not be possible in the case of a sacrifice which would have two Deities, *Grinding* could never apply in such cases. In fact, in the case of other kinds of offering materials also meant for two Deities, the conditions are the same (*i.e.* the peculiarities in the material are meant to aid in the bringing about of the particular *Apūrvus*); and as such the Deity is always the secondary element. Consequently, inasmuch as there can be no repetition of the Principal factor for the sake of the secondary, it is held that even in such cases (of two Deities) the *actual offering* is made once only; and hence the Portions of all the Deities (jointly) being offered all at once, there is no harm done by the *mixture* (in the final *Apūrva*, which is the only result of the offering, according to our view). For you, on the other hand, it is not possible to speak of the *grinding* as we have done (*i.e.* as helping in the bringing about of the *Apūrva*); and hence you must take it as due to the particular Deity. And in that case, the Deities being the Principal element,

each would want its portion separately; and the offering also would have to be made accordingly. And from the very beginning, it has been a settled fact that there is only one Portion (that meant for Pūshan) that has to be ground; and thus there would be the anomaly in cooking (as shown above).

It may be suggested that—"even that portion which is meant to be "in whole grains of rice could be ground down, for the sake of the uniformity in cooking."

But in reply to this, we urge the following arguments: Until the Portions have been differentiated out of the whole mass of substance, we do not know how much of it is the portion of which Deity; and as such till then there is no harm done by the mixing up of the Portions. But when the differentiation has been made, inasmuch as the Portions could not be mixed up again unless we actually had a text authorizing such mixing up, it becomes absolutely necessary to offer the Portions *separately*: and in that case, if the portion of one Deity were offered to another, there would be a great anomaly in the sacrifice.

Nor could it be urged that the two portions (the ground and the unground) would be cooked in separate vessels. Because the Veda lays down the *Caru* as the material to be offered, in the words '*Carum*, etc.' where '*Carum*' being the object enjoined, its number (the singular) could not but be regarded as significant; consequently if it were put into two vessels, there would be *two Carus*, which would involve a contradiction of the said scriptural text.

Thus then we conclude that the *grinding* could not but be incongruous, as regards the '*Caru*' meant for two Deities; and consequently it should not be performed in the case of such *Carus*.

[But upon the above we have the following arguments for the

PŪRVAPAKSHA.]

Sūtra (41): "Even in a case where Pūshan is coupled with "another Deity (we would have the Grinding); as the "presence of that Deity (*Pūshan*) is the only condition " (laid down for it)."

"We could have the *grinding* even in those cases where we had "Pūshan coupled with another Deity. Because if the *grinding* were laid "down either for that offering which is meant for Pūshan alone, or for "that which forms part of the sacrifice to Pūshan;—then, in that case, "there could have been no *grinding* in regard to the *Caru* meant for two "Deities, on account of its not being declared to be for that purpose. As "a matter of fact, however, we find that the only condition laid down

“for the *Grinding* is the *presence* of *Pūshan*, and not any substance qualified by that Deity. Then, inasmuch as the character of the Deity of a sacrifice is *pervasive* (that is, the Deific character pervades as one complete whole over both Deities in a Two-Deity sacrifice), though the sacrifice which has two Deities (Indra and Pūshan) could not be spoken of as ‘one qualified by *Pūshan* as its Deity,’ yet by this it is not meant that either *Pūshan*, or his *Portion*, does not exist in connection with that sacrifice; as will be declared in connection with the *Manotā* (in *Adhyāya* X) that ‘though Agni is not its Deity, yet that does not mean that he does not inhere in it.’ Consequently, even if the deific character does not belong to *Pūshan* (in the case of the Two-Deity sacrifices), as the only condition (for *grinding*) is the mere *presence* of *Pūshan*, even when the *Garu* would be meant for two Deities (Indra and Pūshan),—it is always cognized that half of it is the portion of Pūshan alone, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at under *Sūtra* X—iii—53; and thus when we would come to do the *grinding* of this portion of the *Garu*, then, in accordance with the ‘Law of *Kāṇsyabhoji*’ (which makes it incumbent upon the Teacher to eat out of the *Kāṇsya* vessel, for the sake of his Pupil who is under a penance which makes it necessary for him to eat out of such vessel, and for whom it is necessary to eat only of what has been left by his Teacher), as the condition of even that which may be the secondary factor might affect that of the other, the Portion of the other Deity also would come to be ground, (for the sake of the grinding of Pūsha’s portion); and there would be nothing objectionable in this. If, however, it be found undesirable to do something (the grinding of Indra’s portion) not directly laid down, and it be concluded to grind only the Half meant for Pūshan,—even then, the proper cooking of both (the ground and the unground grain) could be done by some clever stroke of the culinary art. Or, we could very legitimately do away with the necessity of the minor details of the fact of the cooking of both being simultaneous, or that of both being cooked in the same vessel; and thus we should do the *grinding* (of Pūsha’s portion even in the case of the *Garu* being meant for both Indra and Pūshan).

“It has been argued above (under *Sūtra* 39) that ‘the Laws of the *Chaturdhākaraṇa* and that of *Indrapīṭa* would apply to the case in question (and the performance of the grinding would be limited by the words of the sentence laying it down).’ And to this we make the following reply: As for the compound (in ‘*Indrapīṭa*’) and the word formed by a nominal affix (i.e. ‘*Āgnēya*’), these can never appear in connection with such words as are incapable of affording the sense required; consequently in the case of the use of such words, we do not

“admit the capability of the word expressive of *one* Deity referring to “that which belongs to *two* Deities. That is to say, in the case of the “words ‘*Āgnēya*’ and ‘*Indrapīta*,’ we find that they are fully capable of “referring to Agni and Indra respectively, and as such cannot in any case “refer to that which belongs to two Deities; but in the sentence under “consideration we find that the word ‘*Pushā*’ does not occur in a com- “pound, (and hence there is no exclusive capability belonging to it); “hence even though the compound ‘*Prapishṭabhāgaḥ*’ is dependent upon “something else, yet a reference to the Caru meant for two Deities does “not deprive the word ‘*Pushā*’ of any recognized capability; and hence “there can be nothing objectionable in speaking of the *offering meant for* “*Indra and Pūshan* as ‘one meant for Pūshan.’

Sūtra (42): “Also because we perceive an Indicative Force.”

“The reason (for grinding) that is given is—‘*because Pūshan is with- “out teeth*’; and this clearly indicates that the *Grinding* depends upon, and “is conditioned by, the Deity. And certainly Pūshan does not become “endowed with teeth, when joined by another Deity; hence the “condition (for grinding) remaining intact in the latter case also, it is “necessary to do the *Grinding*. Specially as it is thus alone that we “could reconcile the following declarations: ‘We should offer the Caru “meant for Soma and Pūshan, half of which has been ground’;—‘In the “case of two-Deity offerings, half of the Caru should be ground and “half unground.’ And that this is the right course is also indicated by the “fact of the presence of the Deity being laid down as the sole condition “for having recourse to Grinding.

Sūtra (43): “If the sentence were an injunctive one, then we would have the Grinding of all (offering materials); and with reference to that (the unqualified Somā-Paushna offering) the Grinding would be scripturally authorised; and it would be of the Caru that there would be no Grinding; as there would be no use for it.”

“(In regard to the sentence ‘*somāpaushnan carunnirvapēt nēmapish- “tam, etc.*’) it might be argued that ‘inasmuch as it is an Injunctive “sentence, the expression *nēmapishṭam* could not have the desired indi- “cative force; in fact it would point to the contrary view.’ And in view “of this objection, we explain as follows: If this were an Injunctive sen- “tence, then, inasmuch as it would not be right to have an injunction “of many things (by a single sentence), the ‘grinding of half’ would be “the object enjoined; and then, this could be enjoined, with reference

“either to the ‘*Caru*,’ or to ‘*Somāpaushna*’; and with reference to which—soever of these two the injunction would be made, that could not be qualified by the other,—and hence the grinding would come to have an universal application; and as such all the offerings would have to be ground; and in that case one of the two words (‘*Caru*’ or ‘*Somāpaushna*’) would become useless. That is to say, if we were to take the Injunction as ‘that which is the *Caru* should be half-ground,’ then the grinding coming to be recognised as applying to all *Carus*, the word *Somāpaushna*, as referring to only one of the *Carus*, would become useless. If, on the other hand, the Injunction be interpreted as that ‘that which is *Somāpaushna* should be half-ground,’ then, too, the Grinding would come to apply to all offering-materials; because all that the word ‘*Somāpaushna*’ would indicate would be the character of being meant for the joint Deity, *Soma-Pūshan*; and this would be equally applicable to the *Cake* and the *Animal Body* also (just as much as to the *Caru*); and thus the word ‘*Carum*’ would become absolutely useless.

“Specially would such be the case, because with reference to that—i.e. with reference to the *Somā-paushna* even when unqualified (by ‘*Caru*’)—the grinding would be scripturally authorised,—as no useful purpose would be served by the qualification.

“In fact, in accordance with this view, there would be no grinding of the *Caru*.

“Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the Grinding is necessarily implied in the very nature of the *Cake*, it does not need to be specially enjoined in connection with that; and as for the *Animal Body*, it has already been shown that the grinding when applied to it involves a most hopeless incongruity. (And as such the Injunction of the Grinding could not apply to any of these two materials; it must apply to the *Caru*).’

“Reply: Not so; because none of these objections is found to apply to the case in question; because all that we do, on finding the sentence laying down the grinding of all offering materials, is to take the ‘half grinding’ as enjoined in connection with the *Cake*; and certainly even by being half cooked, the *Cake* remains intact. And as for the *Heart* and the other limbs (of the *Animal Body*), if we were to grind the whole of these, except that part by which they may have been torn from the body,—there would be none of the incongruities shown above; nor would their shape be wholly destroyed; nor would there be any mistaking of the part by which they may have been torn from the *Body*. And as the other part, by which it may have been torn, would be quite perceptible, even if it were to be ground down, the portion of *Pūshan* would be distinctly distinguishable, and would not be lost, as it would be in the case of the grinding of the whole.

"Or, it may be that, in accordance with this view, inasmuch as the *grinding*, being based upon verbal authority, would serve only an imperceptible purpose, the *cutting* (of the Heart, etc.) would be done before the Grinding. And this *grinding* would not depend upon the presence of a Deity.

"Thus then, inasmuch as the *grinding* would apply to all materials, it could not be taken as applying exclusively to the *Caru*; and hence its mention (in the sentence '*somāpaushnan carum, etc.*') would be wholly useless. Consequently it must be admitted that this sentence enjoining the relationship of the *Caru* with the Deity (Soma-Pūshan), the '*half-grinding*,' is merely spoken of by way of reference (and not as an object of Injunction). And thus this latter word, not forming part of an Injunction, comes to be taken as having the desired indicative force ("assigned under *Sūtra* 42)."

SIDDHANTA.

***Sūtra* (44):** It pertains to one only; because it is meant to belong to the resultant (*Apūrva*); consequently, it could not belong to both, just as in the case of the *Aindrāgna*.

We could have the *grinding* only when *Pūshan* alone would be the Deity, and not when he would be joined by another Deity. Because the *grinding* does not belong either to the Deity, or to his portion; in fact it is laid down as a detail belonging to the sacrifice of which *Pūshan* is the Deity.

That is to say, (before the offering has actually been made) there is no 'Portion' (*Bhāga*) of the Deity, to which the *Grinding* could belong. Specially as the material becomes the 'portion' of a Deity, not merely by being offered to him, but by being accepted by him. And further, the word '*Bhāga*' (Portion) is made up of the root '*bhaj*' with the affix '*ghañ*,' in the Accusative sense,—it being etymologically explained '*bhajyate* (= '*sēvyatē*') *yaḥ saḥ bhāgaḥ*' (= *that which is accepted*); consequently that which is accepted by one is his '*Bhāga*' (Portion). And as a matter of fact we do not find the Deity actually *accepting* the offering; specially as the fact of the Deity actually *partaking of the offering* will be refuted later on, in *Adhyāya* IX. In fact, even if the Deity were to accept it,—yet, it could not have the capability of introducing an accessory, as also will be shown in *Adhyāya* IX (under the *Sūtra* IX—i—4 *et seq.*). Thus then, it being as impossible for the *Grinding* to be an accessory of the 'Portion' as that of the 'Deity,' it must be taken as an accessory belonging, through the sacrifice, to its resultant *Apūrva*;—as is shown by the

first *Adhikaraṇa* of *Adhyāya* IX, as also by the '*Dēvatādhikaraṇā*' (Adh. IX). The author of the *Bhāṣya* has also referred to the same fact of the *grinding* being an accessory of the sacrifice, by denying that of its belonging to the Deity.

Question: "How then could the *Grinding*, when mentioned in another Context, be an accessory of the sacrifice? That is to say, inasmuch as the "Syntactical Connection (of the sentence '*Pūṣhā prapishṭabhāgaḥ*, etc.')" refers to the Deity (and not to the sacrifice),—and as without Context "there could be no indication of the means of accomplishing the *Apūrva*,—" there can be no connection (of the *grinding*) with either the sacrifice or "the *Apūrva*."

"The reply to this (as given in the *Bhāṣya*) is: By means of *Syntactical Connection* (we are led to this cognition).

The opponent retorts by further pointing out what he means—"The *Syntactical Connection* points to its connection with the Deity."

And in reply to this, the *Bhāṣya* explains the word '*bhāga*' (in the sentence) as signifying the sacrifice, on the ground of the principal signification of the word not being found compatible with the rest of the sentence. That is to say, inasmuch as, in the case in question, there is no such '*Bhāga*' as consists in the acceptance of something offered by another, that factor of this action which consists in the mere act of the offering must indicate the sacrifice; and as this is quite possible in that sacrifice which has *Pūṣhan* alone for its Deity, the mention of it as the '*Bhāga* of *Pūṣhan*' becomes quite compatible. But this latter name cannot apply to that sacrifice which has two Deities;—because (1) the deific character is pervasive in its character, (2) and the words conveying the offering to both are inseparably mixed up; and consequently the sacrifice could not be named after any one of those two Deities. *E.g.* just as the Cake or Vessel belonging to Indra-Agni is not taken as denoted by the words '*Agnēya*' and '*Indrapīta*,' so, in the same manner the sacrifices to Indra-Pūṣhan could not be spoken of as '*Pūṣhabhāga*.'

Though we say nothing as to the difficulty that would arise in explaining the compound (as shown above), yet inasmuch as the very signification of the word '*bhāga*' is not found to be applicable to the *Āindrāpauṣhna* offering, the word '*Pūṣhabhāga*' cannot be applied to this latter.

Though, when two entities come to have the nature of the Deity, each of them could be spoken of as the 'Deity,' yet, inasmuch as in the word conveying the offering, they are not mentioned by the name of any one of them, we conclude that the 'Two-Deity sacrifice cannot be spoken of as '*Pūṣhabhāga*.'

Sūtra (45): The absence of teeth is a mere supplementary reason.

It has been argued by the opponent that "the mention of the reason 'because he is without teeth' shows that the grinding is an accessory of the Deity." And to this we offer the following reply: The sentence 'because he is without teeth' is an *Arthavāda* having a form indicative of a supplementary or corroborative reason; and as such it is only meant to be an eulogy of the particular accessory in question (viz. *grinding*); and as there would be nothing objectionable in this, it could not show that the accessory belongs to the Deity.

Sūtra (46): The other is an injunctive sentence.

Inasmuch as the 'half-grinding' has never been found to have been enjoined elsewhere, the sentence ('*Somāpaushnam, etc.*') would be an Injunction (and not merely indicative of the fact of the *grinding* applying to the *Oaru* meant for the two deities *Soma* and *Pūshan*). And as the object of the Injunction is a *qualified* one, there would be no syntactical split. And as, in accordance with the law of the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa*, the factors spoken of in the sentence would restrict one another, the Injunction of the *grinding* could not pertain to *all* offering materials. As a matter of fact, it is only in comparison with an *unqualified Injunction* that the *qualified Injunction* could be said to be *less* authoritative; in the case in question however there is no *unqualified Injunction*; consequently the sentence in question cannot be taken as merely *indicative* (and not *injunctive*).

For these reasons the *Grinding* must be taken as pertaining to the Portion of a single Deity.

Thus ends the Third Pāda of Adhyāya III.



ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARĀṆA (1).

[The mention of the *Nivīta* is an *Arthavāda*.]

Sūtra (1): "The mention of *Nivīta* is meant to be a pro-
"perty of Man; because the word has that for its predom-
"inant factor."

We continue the consideration of the subject of the conflict or non-conflict between Context and Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* we have the sentence—'*nivītam manushyāṇām, prācīnāvitam pītrṇām, upāvitam dēvānām, upavya-
yatē dēvalakṣmamēva tat kurutē*.'] And with regard to the first of these sentences—'*nivītam manushyāṇām*'—there are the following alternative explanations: (a) The *nivītam* is a property of the Man by himself; (b) it is the property of Man as related to a certain action; (c) it is the property of the Action by itself; (d) it is the property of such actions as are mentioned in the Context, and have the Man for their predominant factor—e.g. the actions of *Anvāhāryapacana* and the like; (e) it is the property of such actions with Man as their predominant factor, as are not mentioned in the Context,—e.g. the *Attending upon guests* and the like.

As for the question, whether the sentence in question is an *Injunction* or a mere *Arthavāda*, this would be of no use in the *Adhyāya* that deals with "Accessories"; and further, being related to the chapter on the "Authoritative means of knowing *Dharma*"—i.e. *Adhyāya* I—it has already been dealt with in course of the consideration of those *Arthavādas* that have the semblance of Injunctions; and consequently it need not be brought forward here. That the *Bhāṣya* has introduced this question here is simply by way of taking for granted and putting forward something, for the purpose of introducing a discussion; as it is found that unless the sentence be taken to be an *Injunction*, it cannot be suspected of

mentioning the '*nivāta*' as the *property of Man*, etc., etc. And what the *Bhāṣya* does is (1) to admit, for the sake of argument, and assert that the sentence is an Injunction, (2) to deal with subjects immediately connected with the matter of the *Adhyāya*, (3) and to sum up with the conclusion that the sentence is an *Arthavāda*. The connection of this introduction of the question of Injunction and *Arthavāda* with the other *Adhikaraṇas* also, may be explained in the same manner.

In connection with this sentence we have, first of all, the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA (A).

"The sentence is an Injunction, in accordance with the *sūtra* I—ii—19. And hence, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the '*Ahīnādhikaraṇa* (III—iii—15-16), the genitive (in '*manuṣhyāṇām*') directly denotes the fact of the *nivāta* being a property of Man; because it is cognised as belonging to him, while the Man is not cognised as an accessory of that; as the declensional ending (attached to 'Man,' '*Manuṣhya*') does not denote the subsidiary character. As the mere existence of Man, as its accessory, would have been necessarily implied by the very nature of the Action, there should have been no mention of him; but as we do find him mentioned, we conclude that the *Nivāta* is the property of Man.

Sūtra (2): "Objection: 'The sentence is merely descriptive because the object (*Nivāta*) already exists.'"

"*Object.*: 'Some people explain *nivāta* as '*winding up in the way known as gala-vēṇikā*,' while others explain it as '*winding it up carefully*.' As the former is possible only in battle, while the latter is possible in all actions, as it removes a hindrance,—it is with reference to this latter that we speak of the sentence as *descriptive*. And as for the special purpose served by this, we shall explain it later on.'"

Sūtra (3): Reply: "It is an Injunction; as it speaks of something wholly now."

"The sentence is an Injunction; because it would have been merely '*Descriptive* only if the object spoken of were already fully known to be as it is here spoken of. As a matter of fact, however, it is not fully known as such; because even without the '*careful winding up*' the removal of hindrance would be possible. While, as the '*hanging by the neck*,' it is not known previously; and hence there is room for a '*Restrictive Injunction* pertaining to this.'"

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B) [*rejecting* (A)].

Sūtra (4): "Because of the fact of the *Nivita* being mentioned in a context abounding in the mention of the properties of Actions,—this also would be a property of Actions."

"The *Nivita* is a property of the Action; because while being mentioned in an Injunction, it is found in a context that abounds in the mention of such Properties as belong to Actions."

Sūtra (5): "Specially because of the peculiar nature of the closing words of the sentence."

"Whenever we find a certain thing capable of being taken in two different ways, we should take it in accordance with that means of knowledge which may not be found to be contradictory to another means of knowledge.—And in the case in question, we find that being mentioned in the *Yajurveda*, the sentence dealing with the *Nivita*, etc., is connected with the name of 'Ādhvaryava.' Consequently if the *Nivita* were the property of an Action, then, whenever we would look for its performer, the said Name would point to the *Ādhvaryu* priest; as thus alone could the Name serve a useful purpose. And we shall show later on that the Name could not serve any such purpose with regard to the Properties of Man. Consequently, if the *Nivita* were the property of Man, the operation of the Name would be rejected (as useless); while it is duly honoured if the *Nivita* is taken as the property of the Action (as shown above).

"For this reason also, it must be regarded as the property of Actions."

PŪRVAPAKSHA (C) AND (D).

Sūtra (6): "It is connected with that which appears in the same Context; as there would be no incongruity in this."

"At first we seek to reject the theory of the *Nivita* being a property of Actions, by showing the superior authoritative character of the theory of its being a property of Man; because in this way, the theory being put forward by easy stages, it would be easy to accept it later on. As a matter of fact, we find that the Direct Denotation (of '*manuṣhyāṇām*') sets aside the indications of the said Context and Name, and distinctly points to the fact of the *Nivita* being a property of Man. Consequently we put forward another theory, which is compatible with all the three (Direct Declaration, Context and Name). It is this: The genitive in '*manuṣhyāṇām*,' based upon the distinctive relationship of those Actions

“in which Man is the predominant factor, does not take in the *nivīta* and such Actions, in the case in question, are found to be the *Anvāhāy-yapacana* and the like, and none others (as these alone of such actions are found to be mentioned in the Context). Thus then, the meaning of the sentence in question comes to be that ‘the *Nivīta* should be performed in those Actions that belong to Men.’”

PŪRVAPAKSHA (E).

Sūtra (7): “It belongs to the Action in which Man is the principal factor; because its mention is similar to that of others (the *Upavīta*, &c.) which belong to those actions in which these (the gods, &c.) form the principal factor.”

“The *Nivīta* would belong to that Action which is not mentioned in the same Context, and in which the Man forms the predominant factor. Because, inasmuch as we find the manner of declaration exactly similar in all the three Injunctions [(1) ‘*Nivītam manushyānām*,’ (2) ‘*Prācīnavītam pitrānām*,’ (3) ‘*Upavītam dēvānām*’],—just as the ‘*prācīnavīta*’ and the ‘*upavīta*’ are taken to belong to those actions in which the *Pitrs* and the *Gods* respectively form the principal factor,—so in the same manner, the ‘*Nivīta*’ in question should be taken as belonging to those Actions in which Man is the predominant factor.

“That is to say, we find that the two injunctions, ‘*upavītam dēvānām*’ and ‘*prācīnavītam pitrānām*’ are taken as applying, independently of each other, to those actions in which the Gods and the *Pitris* respectively are the principal factors; and as the ideas connected with these two Injunctions necessarily apply to the third (‘*Nivītam manushyānām*’) also, we should take the word ‘*manushyānām*’ as signifying those Actions in which Man forms the predominant element.

“The opponent putting the question—‘How do you make this out?’—and the *Bhāṣya* having given the answer—because of the relationship of the genitive ending in ‘*manushyānām*,’—the opponent again retorts:—‘this genitive ending points to the *Nivīta* as belonging to Man (and not to any Action).’

“Or, we may take the whole of this portion of the *Bhāṣya* as formulating the opponent’s question.

“In any case, the final reply of the *Pūrvapakshin* would be this: It is quite true that the *Nivīta* would come to be cognised as belonging to Man; but, inasmuch as this would involve the complication of the assumption of a distinct Result (proceeding from this performance of the *Nivīta* as belonging to Man), we give it up; and take the genitive as based upon the distinctive relationship of the Action of which Man

"is the predominant factor. This connecting of the *Nivīta* with such an Action would have the further advantage of not standing in need of the assumption of any result not connected with the *Nivīta* itself. The mention of '*Manushya*' (in '*manushyāṇām*') is meant to indicate the Action in which Man (*Manushya*) is the predominant factor; and thus our theory does not involve the assumption of the relationship of anything not mentioned in the sentence. And the further advantage that our theory has is that it does not leave any ground for taking the *Nivīta* to be syntactically connected with the original Sacrifice of the Context (i.e. the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

***Sūtra* (8): It is an Arthavāda, because of the Context.**

We find none of the above theories free from objectionable features.

In the first place, if the *Nivīta* be connected with the Action mentioned in the Context (as declared in *Sūtra* 6), it directly contradicts the Indications of Syntactical Connection; while its connection with the actions of *Anvāhāryapacana*, etc. would involve a syntactical split; and in this theory there would be a further disadvantage, in that the Context cannot serve the purposes of specification (attributed to it). Secondly, as for its connection with such actions as the attending upon guests (as laid down under *Sūtra* 7), there can be no reasonable ground for it; inasmuch as such a connection would not be amenable to any one of the means of right notion, from among Direct Declaration, etc.; in fact even its staunchest upholder only infers it from the 'relationship of Man' (expressed by the word '*manushyāṇām*'); and this would be scarcely right; because that genitive (in '*manushyāṇām*') is cognised as being based upon the distinctive relationship of that (action) which is connected with the word '*nivīta*'; specially as no case-endings appear in a case where a distinctive relationship of the member related is not expressed. Then too, that theory involves the anomaly of having to reject indications of the Context and the Name, and also of having to assume a Result; and so long as we have other alternatives at our disposal, we cannot rightly have recourse to such extreme measures; and as a matter of fact we find that we can quite reasonably take the sentence in question as an *Arthavāda*, in the manner shown under the *Aulumbārādhikaraṇa* (1—ii—19 *et seq.*).

***Sūtra* (9): Specially as it is syntactically connected.**

The '*Nivīta*' and the '*Prācīnāvivīta*' are capable of being taken along with the Injunction '*upavyayatē*, etc'; and this connection could be

possible only if the mention of the two former were descriptive *Arthavādas*, and not if they were Injunctions. Because two Injunctions, that are not in the relation of the Primary and the Subsidiary to one another, and which are both independent, not connected with each other, can never be syntactically connected; as the construction that each of them would admit of would be wholly different. For instance, the construction admitted by the Primary Injunction would be of one kind, having its sole end in the enjoining of the required element; while that of the *Arthavāda* ('*nivṛtam*, etc.') would be wholly different, being in accordance with its character of being subsidiary to another.

Then again, we do not find an Injunctive word in the sentence in question. And under the circumstances the sentence could be taken as an Injunction, only if (1) we supplied the Injunctive word from without, or (2) if we could somehow or other assume the Injunctive, found in connection with the duties of *attending upon guests* and the like, to pertain to the sentence in question also. But no such assumption can be admissible; as we cannot assume anything to be the subsidiary, when it has not been laid down as such; and that which is not a subsidiary is incapable of being taken up by the sentence declaring the performance of the whole action; as we shall show later on that 'that which is not enjoined as such cannot be an accessory'; and in this way the assumption of the accessory character would depend upon that of the Injunction, and *vice versa*,—thus involving a hopeless mutual interdependence.

Then again, so long as we find the sentence in question capable of being, in some way or other, syntactically connected with an actual Injunction, it is not right to connect it with an assumed one; specially as such a theory would involve the assumption of many invisible (transcendental) purposes.


For these reasons the property of things distinctly shows that the sentence in question is an *Arthavāda*, a Praise, its meaning being—'Just as the *Nivṛta* and the *Prācīnāvṛta* are good for *Men* and the *Pitrs* respectively, so is the *Upavṛta* for the *Gods*'; in fact we meet with such instances in ordinary parlance also,—e.g. 'just as *Arundhati* was to *Vaśiṣṭha*, *Rohiṇi* to *Candra*, and *Damayanti* to *Nala*, so is *Yajñadattā* to *Dēvadattā*.'

Or the sentence may be taken as *Praising by Contraries*; the sense, in this case, being—'the inferior methods of the *Nivṛta* and the *Prācīnāvṛta* are for such inferior beings as *Men* and *Pitrs* respectively; for the *Gods*, however, we have the superior method of the *Upavṛta*; consequently at the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, which is a sacrifice to the *Gods*, we must adopt the *Upavṛta*.'

After this there follow six *Sūtras* which we do not find mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*. And there is a difference of opinion among the Commentators, as to this omission: (a) Some people say he forgot them; (b) others say that he wrote commentaries upon these *Sūtras* also; but this portion of the *Bhāṣya* has become lost to us; (c) some say he found them easy and not of much importance, and hence omitted them; (d) while others declare that he omitted them because they are not the work of Jaimini. In support of this last theory we have the form of *Sūtra* 10, which distinctly shows that *Jaimini* had this latter *Sūtra* immediately after *Sūtra* 9.

We find however that all other Commentators on the *Sūtras* have noticed these six *Sūtras*; and as a matter of fact, we often find such *Sūtras* among those written by Jaimini, as are not of much importance; and as for the connection between *Sūtras* far removed from one another, we meet with many instances of it,—e.g. the *Sūtra* III—iv—32; consequently we should take up every one of the *Sūtras* and explain it.

These six *Sūtras* some people divided into three *Adhikaraṇas*; while others into four. They may be put forth as follows:—



ADHIKARAṆA 1 (A).

[The *Upavīta* pertains to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*.]

Sūtra (9)A: “The *Upavīta* would pertain to all sacrifices, because of the presence of Indicative Force.”

The first question to be dealt with is this: We have found in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* that the *Upavīta* method has been enjoined in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether this Injunction applies to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* only, or to all the sacrifices.

Those however who divide the *Sūtras* into three *Adhikaraṇas*, state the question as—whether it pertains to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* alone, and is an *Injunction*, or that it pertains to all sacrifices, and is merely *descriptive*.

On this question we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The *Upavīta* would belong to all sacrifices. Because the mere description of this, which is cognized as an established fact, pertaining to other sacrifices, would, through Indicative power, subdue the indications of the Context, by means of Apparent Inconsistency.

“That is to say, in connection with *Mṛtāgnihotra*, of which the Deity is the *Pitr* (the *Agni-hotri* Father who has died), we find the *mantra*—“*Prācīnavītī dohayāt, yajñōpavītī hi dēvēbhyo dohayati.*” And it is only if the *Upavīta* be taken as pertaining to all sacrifices, that we could have the descriptive declaration in the latter half of the sentence (which speaks of the *Upavīta* as pertaining to all sacrifices to the gods). Nor can this sentence be taken as merely descriptive of something pertaining to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* only; as the Context of this latter sacrifice is very far removed from the one just quoted; and specially as in that case the descriptive declaration (*‘dēvēbhyo, etc.’*), which appears in the form of showing a reason for what has been said before, would be of no use. If, however, the sentence quoted be taken as laying down a detail in connection with the same action (of the *Agnihotra*) performed under different conditions (when it is offered to *Pitr*, and not to the deities of the ‘ordinary *Agnihotra*’), then, in that case, the said descriptive

“ declaration would serve the purpose of pointing out something preclusive of that particular condition (of the same sacrifice). Nor can it be necessary for the sentence to preclude those conditions from any other sacrifice (that of the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* f.i.); because this latter is itself so very much removed by the Context, that there is no need of any special effort for the preclusion of any conditions pertaining to it. Then again, the Plural number in ‘*dēvēbhyaḥ*’ could not be reconciled with a reference to the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* (which has only one Deity); while in regard to the *Agnihotra*, the Plural is found to be quite compatible with the number of the Deities connected with its morning and evening Libations.

“ Thus on account of the apparent inconsistency of the appended descriptive declaration of the *Upavīta* in connection with the *Agnihotra*, we must admit it to pertain to all sacrifices.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (9B): Not so; because of the Context; and (as for the Indicative Power) that points to that particular sacrifice (the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa*).

The *Upavīta* does not pertain to all sacrifices: because the Context distinctly points to it as pertaining to the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* only.

The presence of Indicative Power has been brought forward in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa*; but we have already refuted the force of this contention, by showing that the Indicative Power spoken of points to it as pertaining to that particular sacrifice—i.e. to the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa*.

And when the Descriptive Declaration is not found to be connected with anything in its close proximity, there can be nothing objectionable in its being taken as connected with something at a distance from it; specially as the connection of a Descriptive Declaration always depends upon what has, and what has not, been already enjoined.

Then as for the Plural (in ‘*dēvēbhyaḥ*’), we cannot attach much significance to it. Or, it might be taken as referring to the deity of the principal sacrifice of the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* together with those of its various modifications.

Thus then, the meaning of the sentence ‘*Prācīnāvītī, etc.*’ comes to be this: ‘Inasmuch as the *Upavīta* belongs to another sacrifice which is offered to the *Gods*, consequently it should not be applied to the *Agnihotra* that is offered to the *Pitṛ* (for whom the *Prācīnavīta* would be the proper thing).’

ADHIKARAṆA 1 (B).

[The sentence '*upavyayatē*, etc.' is an Injunction].

Sūtra (9C): It is an Injunction, because of its laying down something not laid before.

With regard to the sentence '*upavyayatē dēvalakṣhamamēva tat kurutē*,' there arises the question, as to whether this is an Injunction, or a mere Descriptive Declaration.

Objection: "Before you have decided as to whether this sentence is 'Injunctive or Descriptive, how could you take up the question (considered in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*), as to whether the Injunction of the '*Upavīta* pertained to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* or to all sacrifices?"

Reply: We took the conclusion of the present *Adhikaraṇa* for granted in the last *Adhikaraṇa*; though in reality this should have been dealt with beforehand.

On the above question then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The sentence in question is a mere Descriptive Declaration; because in the first place, that the man should always wear the sacred thread in the *Upavīta* fashion is distinctly laid down by the *Smṛtis* (and as such it is nothing new that could form the subject of Injunction by the sentence in question); and *secondly*, the use of the Present Tense (in '*upavyayatē*') would not be compatible with the Injunctive character of the sentence. That is to say, (1) we have such *Smṛti* injunctions as that one should always be '*nityodaki*' and '*nityayajñopavīti*,' which would refer to the sacrifice also; and (2) the actual words of the sentence are not in keeping with the Injunctive character. Consequently, the sentence must be taken as a mere Descriptive Declaration. And there is one further advantage in this view, that the mention of '*Upavīta*' does not differ from those of the '*Prācināvīta*' and the '*Nivīta*.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: The sentence should be an Injunction, inasmuch as it would lay down something new; because,

in the first place, a descriptive declaration referring to all sacrifices would be useless ; and secondly because the eulogy appearing in connection with the sentence (e.g. those relating to the *Nivita* and the *Prācīnāvita*) points to the previous sentence as being an Injunction.

That is to say, no useful purpose is found to be served by a Description of the whole lot of sacrifices ; and the only useful purpose served by the eulogy contained in the mention of the *Upavita* and the *Prācīnāvita* would be to glorify the *Upavita*, which is enjoined in the sentence under consideration.

Then as for the present tense (in ‘*upavyayatē*’), it has been explained before as having the mere semblance of the Present Tense, having in reality the force of the Injunctive, based upon its constituting either a sentence laying down the performance of the action as a whole, or as an *Arthavāda*, or as the *Let* form of the root.

For these reasons, we must conclude that the sentence in question is an Injunction.

It has been argued in the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the *Upavita* is found to be already laid down in the *Smṛti*. And the reply to this argument also is contained in the word ‘*apūrvatvāt*’ ;— that is to say, what is laid down in the *Smṛti* is the *Upavita* as a property of the *Mun*, while what the sentence in question does is to lay it down as pertaining to the *Sacrifice*, something wholly different from what is laid down in the *Smṛti*.

Consequently the sentence cannot be taken as a mere Descriptive Declaration.

The use of this *Adhikaraṇa* we shall explain later on, under the *Kartādhikaraṇa* (IV—ii—23 *et seq.*).

The *sūtra* 9 (c) may also be interpreted differently, as formulating the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the following *Adhikaraṇa* :

ADHIKARAṆA 1 (C).

[The sentence ‘*yajñopavitī hi dēvēbhyo dohayāti*’ is a mere *Arthavāda* relating to the *Upavīta* as connected with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*].

In connection with the *Mṛtāgnihotra*, we meet with the sentence—‘*Prācinavitī dohayēt, yajñopavitī hi dēvēbhyo dohayati*’; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the latter sentence (‘*yajñopavitī, etc.*’) is merely meant to be an eulogy of the *Upavīta* as pertaining to the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*,—just as the mention of ‘Twelve’ in connection with ‘*Ahina*’ (vide *supra* III—iii—15 16),—or it is meant as an Injunction of it, as relating to the ordinary *Agnihotra*.

On this we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA

“*It is an Injunction, because it lays down something new (Sūtra 9c).*”
“By taking it thus, we are in keeping with the Context and the Plural number (in ‘*Dēvēbhyoḥ*’) (both of which would be irreconcilable with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*). Consequently, even though the sentence may have the appearance of a Descriptive Declaration, yet, with a view to make it serve a useful purpose, we must take it as having the Injunctive character, based upon the fact of the sentence being one that lays down the performance of the Action as a whole, etc., etc.”

If we take the *Sūtra* thus, we must leave off with the mere statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*; and for putting forward the *Siddhānta* in reply to this we must wait till the latter portion of our explanation of *Sūtra* 9c. (P. 1282).

So we take up another *Adhikaraṇa* for the present.

ADHIKARAṆA 1 (D).

[The mention of *northwardliness* is a mere Descriptive Declaration.]

Sūtra (9d): "The mention of *northwardliness* also (would be an Injunction), because of its being something new."

In connection with the same *Mṛtāgnihotra*, we find the sentence—*'yē purodanco darbhāstān dakṣiṇāgrāṇstṛṇāti'* ('Those grasses that formerly used to be pointed to the North, are now pointed to the South'). Some people quote this sentence as occurring in connection with the *Mahāpitr̥yajña*. And with regard to the first portion of the sentence—*'yē purodanco'* there arises the question, as to whether it is an Injunction, or a mere Descriptive Declaration.

And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The word '*ca*' in the *Sūtra* implies that the sentence in question also is an Injunction, because *what it lays down is something new*. A Descriptive Declaration is always preceded by a previous Injunction. And as regards the case in question we find that the *northwardliness* of the grass has not been previously laid down, even as pertaining to the man. Nor is it capable of being taken as a mere *Arthavāda*; because we do not find any word indicative of such character—such words, f. i., as '*hi*' and the like.

"Consequently, from the apparent inconsistency of the declaration of *northwardliness* as an accomplished fact, it must be concluded that the sentence is an Injunction."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (9e): The Indicative force of the word is based upon something that already exists.

The sentence cannot be taken as an Injunction; because we find it possessed of an Indicative force only pointing to the fact of the grass facing the North, which has been found to have been enjoined by usage.

Because, a sentence, that is devoid of the Injunctive affix, is accepted as an Injunction, only when it is found that what it speaks of has never been known by any means.

For instance, in the case in question, we find that the sentence in question has the distinct character of a Descriptive Declaration, being, as it is, wholly devoid of (such features of the Injunctive as) the word 'yat,' and of any verb, either particular or general. And this descriptive character having been once definitely cognized in some way or the other, cannot be superseded. In fact, the 'northwardliness' spoken of in the sentence, we find to have been already previously laid down, in the *Smṛti* sentence—'Agravanti prāgagrāṇi udagagrāṇi, vā 'apavargaranti. prāgapavargāṇyudagapavargāṇi vā.' And inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to describe exactly what is herein laid down, it must be taken as a Descriptive Declaration, and that too with the purpose of eulogizing the said 'northwardliness,'; the sense being, 'the northwardliness spoken of before does not pertain to the sacrifice when offered to one who is dead.'

'This very *Sūtra* is to be taken as embodying the—

SIDDHANTA OF ADHIKARAṆA 1 (C).

The word 'hi' (in the sentence 'upavitī hi, etc.') distinctly shows that the sentence stands in need of a previous mention of the same fact by means of a verb. And inasmuch as we do not find any such verb in the Context itself, should we accept its Injunctive character, as pointed out by the absence of such a verb?—or should we accept its injunction in any other Context (to be the basis of the Descriptive Declaration of the sentence under consideration)? And there can be no doubt as to the propriety of accepting the latter alternative,—accepting the fact of its having been enjoined in any Context as enough for our purpose, thereby not taking the sentence in question as an Injunction.

As for the argument based upon the indications of the Context and the Plural number (in 'dēvēbhyah'), it has already been answered before (towards the end of *Sūtra* 9a, by the *Pūrvapakṣin* himself).

And further, inasmuch as in the present case we have got another Injunction, the sentence cannot be said to be useless (as it would serve the purpose of eulogizing the matter of that other Injunction).

For these reasons, the sentence must be taken as a Descriptive Declaration; and hence in the ordinary daily *Agnihotra*, even if the *Dohā* happens to be done without the *Upavitta*, there is no harm done to the sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA 1 (E).

[The sentence '*upari hi dēvābhyo dhārayati*' is an Injunction.]

Sūtra (9f): It is an Injunction, because as regards the 'Holding' what it says is something new.

Up to this time we have been showing where, in the absence of the Injunctive word, we should take the sentence as a Descriptive Declaration. And we now proceed to show the exceptions to the rules arrived at in the last few *Adhikarṇas*.

In connection with the same *Mṛtāgnihoṭra*, or with the *Mahāpīṭryajña*, we find the sentence—'*Adhastāt samīdhandhārayannanḍravet, upari hi dēvābhyo dhārayati*' ('in pouring the libations we should hold the stick of fuel underneath the *Sruk*, as it is in offerings to the gods, that it is held over it'). And with regard to the latter part of this (i.e. '*upari hi, etc.*'), there arises the question as to whether it is an Injunction or a Descriptive Declaration.

And on this, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"(1) Because we have the word '*hi*'; (2) because we have the 'present sense (in '*dhārayati*')'; (3) because the sentence is capable of 'being syntactically connected with another Injunction; and (4) because what is herein mentioned is found to be already enjoined by 'usage;—we must admit the sentence to be a Descriptive Declaration.

"*Question*: 'How do you find it to be enjoined by usage?'

"*Answer*: All valuable materials require a protective covering over them; and as this general usage enjoins the use of some sort of a 'covering over the material being offered, we find the stick of fuel 'being specified and the object to be employed as the covering.

"That is to say, when the material to be offered to the gods is being 'carried in the *Sruk* to the altar of the *Āhavanīya* fire, common usage 'points out the necessity of covering it either by the hand, or by some 'other object; and we take up for the purpose the stick of fuel which 'happens to be nearest at hand. The Injunction contained in the sentence—'*sṛgduṇḍē samīdhamupagṛhyānḍravati*'—also, depending upon

" the aforesaid injunction of usage, is with a view to the same purpose
 " of affording a protective covering. Consequently, the sentence '*upari*
 " '*dhārayati*' should be taken as the Descriptive Declaration of something
 " laid down before, just as in the case of the *Upavita*; specially for rea-
 " sons shown under the preceding *Sūtra*."

SIDDHANTA.

With regard to the *Holding*, the sentence must be taken as an Injunction; because it is not found to have been previously enjoined; and the stick of fuel being incapable of serving as an efficient protective covering, *its being held over the material* could not be in keeping with the said usage.

That is to say, it is quite true that *Usage* points out the necessity of giving a protective covering to the valuable material; but this would not apply to the case of the *stick of fuel*, which therefore could not be employed on account of its being near at hand, for the purposes of the covering; as it would be more reasonable to employ the *hand* for the purpose, than any such thing as the stick of fuel.

Objection: " We find that, on the strength of certain Injunctions, " the *ladles, etc.* of *Soma* are given away as sacrificial gifts, for the " purpose of gaining the good will of the persons receiving the gifts " (even though as a matter of fact such useless gifts could not bring " much satisfaction to the recipients); so, in the same manner, we could " employ the *stick of fuel* for the covering of the material (even though as " a matter of fact, it could cover very little of it)."

Reply: Such would certainly have been the case, if we had a Direct Injunction laying down the covering by the *stick of fuel*, as we have one laying down the giving of the '*Soma-ladle, etc.*' As a matter of fact, we do not find any such Direct Injunction; as all that even the sentence in question is found to enjoin is the mere *Holding* of the fuel-stick. If, in the case of the *Soma-ladle* also, we had the Injunction laying down the mere fact of its being given away, and not that of its being given as a *sacrificial gift*, then, in that case, we should not have admitted it to be meant as calculated to win the good will of the recipient.

Further, the Injunction—'*Srugdandē samidhamupasāṅgrhyānudravati*'—distinctly points out the place—the handle of the *Sruk*—where the fuel-stick is to be held; and this would indicate that the stick is held before the material is poured into the *Sruk*.

Thus then, we find that the *Holding* of the stick ~~over the Sruk~~ has not been enjoined by any other sentence. And that which has not been previously enjoined cannot be merely *described* either by any verbs in

the Present Tense, or by an *Arthavāda* bearing the semblance of the statement of a reason. Consequently, by means of a process of construction, we must remove from the sentence the similarity that it bears to a Descriptive Declaration; and then, breaking up the sentence, we come to take it as having the Injunctive character; and the sense of the sentence thereby comes to be that—‘In the case of the Libation offered to *Pitṛs* the *fuel-stick* is to be held *underneath* the *Sruk*-handle, while in those offered to the gods it is to be held *over* the handle.’ The special method, to be employed in the explaining of the construction of such Injunctions, we have shown above.

For these reasons, the sentence in question must be regarded as an Injunction.



ADHIKARAṆA (2).

[The mention of the Specification of the Directions is a Descriptive Declaration.]

ADHIKARAṆA (3).

[The mention of 'parushi-dita,' etc. is a Descriptive Declaration.]

Sūtra (10): I—The Specification of the Directions is also like the same.

Sūtra (11): II—So also is the mention of the words 'parushi-dita,' 'pūrṇa,' 'ghṛta' and 'vidagdha.'

[I. In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma*, we find the sentence—'Prācīndēvā abhujanta, dakṣiṇām pitaruḥ, pratīcīm manushyāḥ, udicīm surāḥ (or udicīm Rudrāḥ); and with regard to this, there arise the questions, as to (a) whether this is an Injunction or an *Arthavāda*; and being an Injunction, (b) whether what is laid down is a property of Man, or that of the Action, or that of that Action mentioned in the Context of which man is the predominant factor, or that of the Attending upon Guests].

[II. In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we have the sentence—(1) 'yat parushi ditam tad dēvānām, yadantarā tanmanushyānām, ya samulantat pitrānām,' (2) 'yo vidagdhaḥ sa naipṛtaḥ' *tasmāduvidahataḥ śrapayitavyam sadēvutvāya*,' (3) In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* we have the sentence—'yatpūrṇantanmanushyānām upari, adho dēvānām, adhaḥ pitrānām'; and again, (4) 'ghṛtandēvānām mustu pitrānām nishpakvam manushyānām.' And with regard to these there arise the questions—(a) as to whether they are Injunctions of the properties of the Performer, or the Descriptive Declaration of the properties of Actions. (b) whether they should find a place in the Action mentioned in the Context in which the Performer is the predominant factor, and that which deals with *Rudra*, or in the Action of Attending upon guests; (c) or they are mere *Arthavādas*].

All that has been said in connection with the *Nivṛtādhiḥkaraṇa* should be brought in here also.

Objection: "With regard to the sentences that have been brought up for consideration here, what additional doubt is there (over and above those settled under the *Nivṛtādhikaraṇa*), for dealing with which you should find it necessary to refer them back to that *Adhikaraṇa*? Why too, should these two *Adhikaraṇas* have been put in at all?"

Reply: Inasmuch as the *Specification of the Directions* is spoken of by a sentence which appears in the form of the description of some past event, and which is connected with the mention of the root '*bhajati*,' we come to think of the case of this sentence to be unlike that speaking of the *Nivṛta*. And as for the other sentences,—they are connected with words which have the genitive ending and which contain within themselves the indication of the *actions* of the *yajamāna*; consequently, the Results are distinctly cognized as pertaining to the Performer.

That is to say, the Directions are, by their nature, recognized as the accessories of all Actions; and in connection with these, there is nothing new that could be enjoined, as in the case of the *Nivṛta*. And even though they be connected with the *Performer*, yet all that we have to assume is the Result that would follow from the said specification of the Directions, and not any that would follow *Action*: And the result of the specification too that is assumed would be in connection with the ordinary actions of the world; and that too only with reference to the unobstructed completion of the work in hand, and nothing in the shape of Heaven, etc.

Thus the sense of the sentences comes to be this: 'In the action that the man does for himself,' (1) he faces the *West or the North*, (2) 'the grass that he cuts is to be cut *from the middle*,' (3) 'whatever measure is used, it should be full,' (4) 'all the work of oil is to be done with *boiled butter*, which is known as '*nishpakvāyuta*,' (5) 'while in the action done for the *Nairṛitas* and the *Rudras*, the material used should be *burnt* and *uncooked* respectively.'

Consequently the method of establishing all this is exactly like what has been employed before.

On this question, then, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"What is spoken of *belongs to Man*, because of the word used signifying him as the *principal factor* (Sūtra 1),—that is to say, in the case of the first sentence, even though there is no genitive ending, yet, inasmuch as we have the word '*abhajanta*,' which makes the whole thing connected with *Man*, we must take what is mentioned as belonging to him; and in all the other sentences under consideration, it is the genitive ending that points to the fact of the thing in question belonging to *Man*.

“ So also, what has been said in Sūtra (2) may be said with reference to the case under consideration, which would mean the greater ease with which the action would be performed. That is to say, we get at the *West* as the direction, because of the fact that during the morning, if one were to turn to the West, he would have the sun at his back, and hence feel more comfortable. Similarly, the *cutting of the grass in the middle*, and the *measure being full*, are laid down because of these being easier for the performer. In the same manner, the idea of the Nairṛitis being ‘*burnt*’ is due to the fact of the burnt-offering becoming black, and as such being more easily connected with Nairṛita (which means the *earth*), because of the similarity of colour. And the idea of Rudra’s portion being uncooked was suggested by the fact that the uncooked material would bring on disease and hence be dangerous, i.e. ‘*Raudra*’ (= belonging to Rudra).

“ But since all these are not distinctly enjoined, therefore, we must take the sentences in question as Restrictive Injunctions.

“ The *Context and Name* (Sūtra 6) however point them out as belonging to Actions (and not to Man); while all the six means of knowledge jointly point them out as finding a place in that Context wherein *Man* is the principal factor.

“ But Syntactical Connection (Sūtra 7) sets aside the indications of the Context; and hence, in order to avoid the assumption of Results, we must take the factors in question as to be employed in such actions as the *attending upon guests* and the like.

SIDDHANTA.

(i) Inasmuch as there would be no ground for connecting them even with such actions (as the *attending upon guests*), (2) as there should be no removal, from the Context, of that which is capable of being taken along with it, (3) and as the sentences under consideration are connected with the Injunction of the ‘*East*’ (as the direction for the Gods),—all these sentences must be taken as *Arthavādas*. And the glorification meant would be of such things as ‘*Proper Cooking*,’ etc., by means of a ‘*Praise by contraries*’; (the descriptions given being those of things contrary to those meant to be glorified).

ADHIKARANA (4).

[The Prohibition of *Lying* pertains to the Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (12): "The prohibition of Action, connected with the sacrifice, is descriptive of something that always exists; because of its (previous) connection (with the Man)."

In course of the discussion as to the contradiction or non-contradiction of Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, we come to treat of such Prohibitive sentences as 'one should not tell a lie' ('*nāṇṛtam vadāt*') and the like, which are met with in the context of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, and with regard to which it has not been shown whether they pertain to the Man or to the Sacrifice,—sentences that are found to be prohibitions of 'telling a lie,' etc.

(I) With regard to these, in the first instance, there arises a doubt as to whether they pertain to the Man or to the Sacrifice.

(II) Then inasmuch as all Prohibitions refer to certain activities, a settlement of the said Doubt depends upon the settlement of the character of the activities; and hence the question that calls for settlement beforehand is—'for whose sake is the activity that is prohibited?' The Prohibition will be taken as pertaining to that for whose sake the activity will be found to be; because the prohibition of a thing that belongs to one could not be of any use, with regard to another; as no such prohibition would be called for; specially as in all cases, we find that whenever a man is found to be acting towards a certain end, it is with regard to the same end that he is found to be prohibited. Hence the necessity of the consideration of the question as to whom the prohibited activity belongs.

(III) Then again, we find that the cognition of that for whose sake we have the activity, depends upon the verb that denotes that activity; consequently it becomes necessary to consider the nature of Verbs;—the question being as to *for whose sake are the activities that they are capable of denoting*. And so long as we have not come to a definite conclusion with regard to Verbs, the case of Prohibition should rest aside. Thus then, the question to be dealt with comes to be this:—'Those Injunctions that we find in a Context, which are not connected

with any other words denoting a relationship with Man—for whose sake are the *Bhāvanas* that these Injunctions express?'

And in connection with this phase of the question, we shall have for examples, all such sentences, as '*Samidho yajati*', '*Tanūnapātan yajati*', etc. With regard to these we will have the same question as to whether the '*Samit-Sacrifice*' is for the sake of the Sacrifice, or for that of Man and so forth. And similarly with regard to the sentence '*nāṅṛtam vadet*,' the question comes to be whether the (prohibited) 'Telling of lies' is for the sake of Sacrifice, or for that of Man; because the qualification of 'Lie' would belong to that for whose sake there would be the 'telling.' Then, inasmuch as at the time of Prohibition, the Injunctiveness is transferred to that Prohibition, the consideration of all other words should be made subservient to that one purpose.

Thus then, in the case of the Prohibition pertaining to Man, it would mean that 'one should not do that telling of lies which is for the sake of Man'; while in the other case, it would mean that 'one should not do the telling of those lies that are for the sake of sacrifices.'

(IV) Then, inasmuch as a settlement of all the above issues depends upon the due ascertainment of the nature of Verbs, the question with which we immediately concern ourselves comes to be this: '*Does the Verbal Affix denote the Nominative Agent or not?*' If it does denote it, then, when the *Bhāvanā* expressed would come to look for its purpose, the fact of the *Agent* being *directly spoken of* by the word would set aside the idea of the action being for the sake of the Sacrifice—this latter idea being based solely upon the Context;—and we would accordingly be led to conclude that the *Bhāvanā* in question is for the sake of the Nominative Agent (Man); while if the verb does not denote the Agent, then, inasmuch as the indications of the Context would not be contradicted by any Direct Declaration to the contrary, the *Bhāvanā* would be concluded to be for the sake of the *Sacrifice*, as indicated by the Context.

Objection: "As a matter of fact, we find that even if the Verb denoted the nominative agent, inasmuch as the *Bhāvanā* would always remain the principal factor, even though the relationship of the agent, that would be denoted by the Verb with reference to that *Bhāvanā*, would be one that is *directly declared*, yet that could very well be taken as subservient to the Context; and as such, there would be no incompatibility of this relationship with the fact of the Prohibition pertaining to the *Sacrifice*. It is only when two relationships are found to be of equal strength and mutually contradictory, that they reject each other; and not when one is capable of being taken as subservient to

"another. As for instance, in the case of the sentence '*Daṣḍpavitṛēna grahaṃ sammārshti*' we find that with regard to the '*sammārga*,' which, as subservient to the *Daṣḍpavitra*, is mentioned in connection with the 'Graha,' there does not arise any question as to whether it is related to the *Daṣḍpavitra* or the *Graha*; exactly in the same manner, in the case in question, if the action (*Telling of Lies*), which has the *Agent* subservient to it, be taken as pertaining to the *Sacrifice*, there can be no thing objectionable in this.

"If the *Verbal Affix* denoted the fact of the *Agent* being the predominant factor, then alone would that have gone against the indications of the Context as to the predominance of the *Sacrifice*. Or, if the *Verbal Affix* denoted the fact of the *Sacrifice* being the subservient factor, as the *Agent* is, then we would have had the incongruity of having two auxiliaries (the *Agent* and the *Sacrifice*) coalescing in the same Primary (the action of '*Telling of Lies*').

"As a matter of fact, however, we find that none of the said contingencies is present (i.e. the verb does not denote either the predominance of the *Agent*, or the subservience of the *Sacrifice*). Consequently, the *Direct Declaration* pointing to the predominance of the *Agent*, and the *Context* indicating the predominance of the *Sacrifice*, the two are found to pertain to two distinct subjects; and thus, there being no collision of the two with regard to any one subject, there can be no conflict between them; and in the absence of conflict, the one cannot reject the other; [and hence the question as to whether the verb denotes the *Agent* or not cannot have any bearing upon the main subject of the *Adhikaraṇa*; as whether the *Agent* is denoted or not by the Verb, the '*Telling of Lies*' in question comes to pertain to the *Sacrifice*, in both cases]."

Reply: It is not so; because though in the first instance, the *Agent* is cognized as subservient to the Action, yet this does not preclude the possibility of its subsequently becoming the predominant factor. That is to say, though, at first, the Action, looking out for its accessory in the shape of its Performer, takes up the *Agent* as such a subservient accessory,—yet, when it comes to look out for its purpose, it is the *Agent* that is the nearest factor capable of supplying that need; and thus having become the Performer, he comes to look out for the good that the Action would bring to him. And thus the relationship between the two factors (of the *Agent* and the *Bhāvanā*), both of which are denoted by the same word (the verb,—in accordance with the view that the *Agent* is denoted by the *Verbal Affix*), being established, the *Bhāvana* (of the action in question) could not be connected with the *Sacrifice*, which (being indicated by the Context) is more remote (from the *Bhāvanā* denoted by

the Verbal Affix, than the *Agent*, who, being denoted by the same Verb, is more nearly related to it). Specially as, so long as the *Bhāvanā* is capable of being aided by that which is denoted by the same word as itself, it is not right to assume the aid of an extraneous factor. As for instance, in the sentence—'*Agnishomīyasya vapayā pracarya Agnishomīyam paçupurodāçamanunirvapati*' ('having made the offering of the fat of the *Agnishomīya* animal, one performs the *Paçupurodāça* sacrifice to 'Agni-Soma'),—though the nominal Affix (in '*Agnishomīyam*') signifies the fact of the Deities (*Agni* and *Soma*) being the subservient factor, yet when the purpose of the Sacrifice comes to be looked for, we come to recognise the fact of the deities *Agni* and *Soma*—which are mentioned in close proximity to it,—being the objects to be sanctified (by the sacrifice); and hence the former sacrifice (the *Vapāpraçāra*) is not taken as acting as a remote aid to the *Paçu-purodāça* sacrifice. And certainly the subsequent predominance of a thing is not incompatible with its previous subservient character. Specially as when we come to look for the purpose (to be served by an action), anything can be taken as the predominant factor.

Or again, it may be that the Verbal Affix denotes the *Agent* by himself alone, and his predominant or subservient character would be implied subsequently, in accordance with the circumstances of each case; and thus in this case, it becomes possible for both the action and the agent, to be predominant or subservient to each other, in accordance with their mutual needs, proximity and capability (and hence it is necessary to consider this question).

Or again, it has been shown to be a general rule, that in the case of all words, the basic root and the affix conjointly denote the meaning of the Affix, by reason of the order in which they appear; and in accordance with this rule, in the case of the Verb also, both (the Root and the Affix) would denote the *Agent* as the predominant factor, to which the denotation of the basic root would be subservient,—just as in the case of the *krdanta* word (the word formed by the root and the *krt* affix). Specially as to the general rule just shown, we have never found an exception, either in the shape of an argument, or a rule to the contrary. And thus, just as in the case of Roots with *nominal* and *krt* affixes, so in the case of the ordinary verbs also, it is the denotation of the Affix that comes to be the predominant factor. And thus, inasmuch as the fact of the denotation of the Root being the subordinate accessory is expressed directly by the word (the Verb), it cannot be set aside.

Objection: "The rule that you have brought forward is a general one, "and hence in the case of the Verb it could be set aside, in view of our "actual cognitions. For instance, in the case of Verbs, the denotation of

"the Root is actually cognised as the predominant factor, while the Agent is recognised as the subservient factor; as, if this latter also were the predominant factor, there would be no connection between the two. That is to say, in all cases, we have seen that there can be no connection between two factors that are either both subservient, or both predominant. Consequently, when it becomes necessary to take one of them as the subservient, and the other as the predominant factor, then such discrimination could only be made in accordance with our actual cognitions. And just as in the case of the *Kṛdanta* and *Taddhita* words, we recognise the predominance to belong to the denotation of the Affix, which has for its subservient the denotation of the basic Root,—so, in the case of the ordinary Verb, it is distinctly recognizable by all that it is the denotation of the basic root that is the predominant factor, having the denotation of the Affix subservient to it. And apart from this there can be no other cause for the discrimination of their predominance and subservience. And thus there can be no chance for the Agent to be recognised as the predominant factor [and hence the Agent being always the subservient factor, the mere fact of his being denoted by the Verb could not affect the question of the Action pertaining to him or to the Sacrifice; and as such there can be no use, in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, of taking up the question of the denotation of the Agent by the Verbal Affix."]

To the above we make the following reply: The denotation of the Root can never be the predominant factor; and thus the aforesaid general rule would not be set aside in our case (as we hold the *Bhāvanā* to be the denotation of the Verbal affix). That is to say, it has been already shown that, inasmuch as the predominant factor in the denotation of the Verb consists of the *Bhāvanā* (which is denoted by the Affix), no predominance could ever belong to the denotation of the Root, which forms the Instrumental factor in the *Bhāvanā*; and it has also been shown that the *Bhāvanā* is not denoted by the Verbal Root.

Says the opponent: "It has been shown that, in accordance with actual cognition, no predominance could belong to the denotation of the the Root."

Reply: True, it has been shown; but not with regard to your theory, but to ours: for he alone, who holds the denotation of the Verbal Affix to consist of the *Bhāvanā*, has the support of the law of Predominance as between the denotations of the Root and the Affix, as well as that of ordinary actual cognition; while, on the other hand, for one who holds the denotation of the Verbal Affix to consist of the Agent pure and simple, there is nothing (in the Verb) that could denote the *Bhāvanā*; and hence there would be no possibility of your definitions, pointing to the pre-

dominance of that (*Bhāvanā*); specially as from the very definition (of the denotation of the Affix) that you vouchsafe, it is the *Agent* that comes to be the predominant factor; and that (as you have also shown) is opposed to the facts of actual cognition. Consequently, if the trend of *actual cognition* is to be followed, then it must be in due accordance with that that the denotation of the Affix should be defined; and there is no doubt that such a definition has been supplied only by those who hold that denotation to consist of the *Bhāvanā*, and by none others. Consequently the other theorists having passed over the fact of ordinary actual cognition, like the *denotability*, the predominance also of the *Agent* should be necessarily accepted by them; and thus the *Action* (of 'Telling Lies') would come to pertain to *him* (and not to the *Sacrifice*). [Thus it is clear that the question of the denotation of the *Agent* by the *Verb* has a very distinct bearing upon the main point of the present *Adhikaraṇa*.]

Says the *Opponent*: "What you say would be possible in case "the Direct Declaration referred only to the relationship of *Tādarthyā* " (*belonging to, being for the sake of*). As a matter of fact however, what is "actually declared, and cognised as such, is the relationship between the "denotations of the Root and the Affix, of the qualification and the qualified, without any vestige of *Tādarthyā*, anything with regard to the one "belonging to, or being for the sake of, the other. And though the denotation of the Root, which is the qualification, is cognised as the subservient factor, yet, as in the case of the word '*Rājapurushaḥ*,' so in the "present case also, the characters of the Subsidiary and Primary may be "attributed in a way contrary to that indicated by actual cognition. That "is to say, in the word '*Rājapurushaḥ*' the *Rājā*, serving as the qualifying factor, is recognised as the subservient element; while when we "come to consider the case as to which one of the two is the real "subsidiary, and which the actual Primary, it is the *Rājā* that comes to "be known as the Primary, the predominant factor.

"Then again, in the case of such words '*Pācaka*' and the like, the *kāruka* "is not one that has the point of its predominant factor doubtful; and "yet, even in such cases, the Action is not cognised as belonging to the "Agent. For instance, in connection with the '*singleness*,' and '*masculinity*' etc. of '*Paṇu*,' which are all shown to be connected with one "another by the fact of being denoted by the various factors of the same "word ('*paṇunā*'),—when these come to be considered as being subservient "to the action (of '*sacrifice*'), the declaration will be made to the effect "that '*Direct Declaration does not mean that there is no signification of the Syntactical Connection*' (*Bhāṣhya* on *Sūtra* IV—i—15); and in the same "manner, we can declare, in the present connection, that '*Direct Declaration does not mean that there is no indication by the Context.*'

“Further, even though the *Agent* may be denoted, in the present case, as the predominant factor, yet the Import should be taken as indirectly implying its subordinate character. That is to say, though the *Agent* may be denoted as the predominant factor, yet the Import does not show it to be the principal factor. Consequently, if the Verb were to indicate the character of the *Agent*, it could not be indicated as the subordinate factor; and if one is called an ‘*Agent*,’ a ‘performer,’ while *performing* an action, then, inasmuch as one who ‘performs’ an action must be a factor subordinate to that Action, he could never be recognised as the Primary (or Principal) factor.

“The same may be said to be the case where the actual denotation is wholly indifferent (as to the *predominance* or *subservience* of the *Agent*).

“It has been urged above that ‘the *Agent* is merely denoted by the verbal affix, and as for its subordinate or predominant character, that would be implied indirectly.’ But even then, if the *Agent* were denoted simply as an *object*, its predominant or subordinate character could be taken as one may please, because the actual denotation would be wholly indifferent as to this. But as a matter of fact, the *Agent* is always denoted in the *form of the Agent*, which consists of the subordinate character; and hence there cannot be said to be an indifference on the point.

“Then, it has been argued that, ‘even though it may be denoted as the subordinate factor, yet the second further requirement (of the sentence) would show it out in the character of the predominant factor.’ But this is scarcely admissible;—as it directly contradicts the Direct Declaration on the point; as we have found that the verb has directly denoted it as the ‘*Agent*,’ which is synonymous with the ‘subsidiary’; and if subsequently we were to set aside this character, we would be going directly against the said Direct Declaration. Nor does the absence of an assumption of the subordinate character leave anything meaningless, that might necessitate such an assumption necessary; because all that is necessary for the required connection is indicated by the Context. Just as in the case of the non-denotation of the *Agent* (by the Verb), the Context is capable of indicating, unopposed, all that is necessary for the actual preformance of the Action,—so would it also do, in cases where the *Agent* is denoted in the way shown above; and as such there would be no contradiction involved in this.

“Then again, the single verbal affix could not, at one and the same time, denote the subordinate, as well as the predominant character (of the *Agent*); and hence when accepting any one of these, if we were to accept it as the predominant factor, then, it would lose its *nominative character*, which consists of being *subsidiary to the Action*; and coming

"to be something that is *obtained* or *approached*, it would come to have the character of the objective; and consequently, inasmuch as the Declensional endings would be based upon that (objective) (in accordance with Pāṇini's Sūtra '*laḥ karmapi, etc.*'), we should have the *Ātmanēpada* (or Passive) form of the verb (i.e. '*ijyate*' instead of '*yajati*'), in accordance with Pāṇini's sūtra '*Bhāvakarmānoryak.*'

"The following argument might be brought forward here: 'All Agents take to certain courses of action, never without a distinct purpose in view; consequently, he always appears in a two-fold character—(1) that of the Performer, the nominative, and (2) that of the possessor of the results issuing from the Action. And hence, when the Agent would be denoted in both these characters, both the said requirements following from the Action would be found to be duly supplied.'

"But this is scarcely admissible; because the character of the Agent is distinctly known to consist in the shape of the Performer, the Nominative; and it is this that would be denoted (by the Verbal Affix); and then, as for the fact of being the possessor (of the result of the Action), that comes to be recognised subsequently, by other means of knowledge. Though it is a fact that the character of the nominative Agent is not possible without that of the Possessor (of the Result of the Action), yet, inasmuch as this latter is cognisable by other means of knowledge, what the Verb must be taken as denoting is only the character of the Performer (of the Action). In fact, we actually find other words (than the Verb),—words such as '*svargakāmaḥ*' and the like,—used with a view to the pointing out of the character of the Possessor of Results.

"For these reasons, it must be admitted that the character of the Agent (even when denoted by the Verb) is always that of the subordinate factor.

"And in this case, we have the following further advantage: We find that even insentient objects, like the piece of wood for instance, are spoken of as Nominative Agents; and certainly, the character of these could not be based upon any desire for results; consequently there can be no such certain notion (as that the nominative character always implies that of the Possessor of Results).

"That is to say, the definition of 'Nominative Agent' that we should admit must be one that applies to all such Agents. And as a matter of fact, we find that the characteristic of '*desiring the results*' does not apply to all; inasmuch as it is not possible in insentient objects (which are often found to serve as nominative agents); while as for the character of '*being the performer*,' it is found to exist in all

"such objects. Consequently, this latter alone should be accepted as constituting the differentia of the 'Agent.'

"Thus then we find that the Action cannot belong to the Man (or Agent) (even in the case of its being denoted by the Verbal Affix).

"And hence, there is no need of taking up the consideration (of the question as to whether the Agent is, or is not, denoted by the Verbal Affix)."

To the above, we make the following reply: Though it is quite true that the verb does not denote the subsidiary character of the Action (when it is taken as denoting the Agent), yet such character of it is shown by the very fact of its qualifying the Agent, and thereby being subordinate to it. Consequently, one kind of its subservience to the Agent, with regard to its denotation by the verb (along with the Action), is found to be distinctly mentioned. And that should be accepted, with regard to the *Performance* also (of the action; and not with regard to the *denotation* only).

In the case of such expressions as '*Rājapurushah*' also, the operation of the words themselves distinctly indicates the fact of the *Rājā* being the subordinate factor; while on the strength of other means of knowledge, the actual relation of subserviency between the *Rājā* and the *Purusha* is accepted to be quite the contrary (i.e. the *Purusha* is recognised as subordinate to the *Rājā*); as has been shown under the '*Saktvadhikaraṇa*' (II—i—11 *et seq.*); and it has also been explained that this latter recognition of the contrary relationship does not necessarily make such relation the actual denotation of the words.

In fact, that subordinate element which really subsists in the *Rājā*, is that upon which the operation of the word (in '*Rājapurushah*') is based. That subordinate element really exists. Because the *Rāja*, providing for the subsistence of the *Purusha* (his servant), comes to be endowed with the subordinate character; and as for his 'lordship' over the man, he comes to assert it later on; and the way in which he may be spoken of (either as the Lord or the subordinate) depends upon the wish of the speaker (in whichever character he may wish to represent him).

That is to say, if what is meant to be spoken of is the '*Purusha* (servant) qualified by (belonging to) the *Rājā*,' then, it must be admitted that what is meant to be indicated by the compound is the fact of the *Rājā* according such aids (to his servant) as the providing for his subsistence, as this would be exactly in keeping with the actual denotation of the words. When, on the other hand, the *Rājā* is meant to be spoken of as one that is helped (served) by his servant, then it would be necessary to take the fact of the *Rājā* being the qualified, as indicated by the word;

and in that case, the *Purusha* (servant) comes to be indicated as his qualification, carrying out his orders; and in that case the expression used should be in the form of '*Purusharājah*.' Thus then, while the use of the two forms ('*Rājapurushah*' and '*Purusharājāh*') is found to be conditioned by the two meanings shown above as those desired to be conveyed, why should we have recourse to the complicated alternative of having the use of them conditioned by the mere *desire to express*, as based upon the help accorded to the action to be spoken of afterwards? Thus then, when the use of a word is found to be brought about by a previously existing cause, we conclude that in the case of the word '*Rājapurushah*,' the subsidiary character (of the *Rājā*) that is meant is that based upon the fact of his *helping* (the servant). Though, in the case of such possessions as the Cow, the born slave and the like, the subsidiary character (of the Master) is absolutely non-existing, yet such character should be taken as imposed upon him by the possibility of his extending his helping hand to them.

It may be argued that in such cases as that of the word '*Rājapurushah*,' with a view to establish the superiority of the *Rājā*, we can explain '*upasarjana*' (the character whereof is attributed to the *Rājā*) as '*Helper*,' and not as '*Subsidiary*.' But even then, the character of the *helper* would be more proximate to the *Subsidiary*, whose function tends to '*helping*,' and not to the *Primary*; and hence the '*helping*' also would only establish the *subsidiary* character of the *Rājā*.

In the case of all such words as '*pācaka*' and the like, inasmuch as the very existence of the word is due to the action of *helping* (by cooking, etc.), we accept the existence of this *helping* in the *actions* (of cooking, f.i.), which thus become endowed with the character of the *Subsidiary*, and not with that of the *Primary*, which could be based only on the fact of their being *something to be accomplished*.

Objection: "In that case, in the sentence '*prokshītābhyām ulūkhala-musalābhyām*, etc. ('by means of the *ulūkhala* and *musala* duly washed, etc.'), the *washing* would become subservient to the *substance* (pounded)."

Reply: Who denies that fact? (We quite readily admit it.)

Objection: "Then, the consideration of the question as to whether "or not the said *washing* is for the purpose of *threshing*, *pounding*, etc., " would be wholly incompatible."

Reply: Why should it be incompatible, specially when the fact of something tending towards the accomplishment of another is quite different from its being *for the sake of* that? For instance, the accessory, though being *for the sake of the substance*, yet *tends towards the accomplishment of the action*; and under the circumstances, it is only natural that there should arise the question as to whether the particular accessory-

detail (of *washing*) tends towards the accomplishment of the intervening action of *threshing* and *pounding*, etc., or to that of the much remoter *Apūrva* (of the Sacrifice). And as for the consideration of the question as to for whose sake we have the *washing*, that could not be very well carried on, without a reference to the *Ulākhala* and the *Musala*,—the question to be considered being whether the *washing* is for the sake of the capability of the *Ulākhala* and the *Musala* to bring about the actions of *threshing* and *pounding*, or to that capability of these which tends to bring about a certain transcendental result (*Apūrva*).

Then again, though the hidden objective character of a certain thing would not include the action, yet, when the Nominative character becomes manifested, as located in (manifested by) the Verb, this latter would certainly include it. That is to say, those *kāraḥas* (the Accusative, etc.) that are denoted by *kṛdantas* (nouns formed by *kṛt* affixes), being hidden (not explicit), could not take up the action as being for their own sake; those, however, that reside in Nouns and Verbs proper, are quite manifest, and would be capable of taking up the action.

It has been argued above that, "as in the case of the *singleness* of the animal, so, in the case in question also, if the Action, that has got rid of the relationship of being for the sake of the Agent, were taken as pertaining to the Sacrifice, there would be nothing objectionable in this."

To this we make the following reply: Inasmuch as the *singleness*, etc., are included in the *Kāraḥas*, they would be for the sake of the Action, because of their being amenable to the direct denotation of the *Kāraḥas*; and this would set aside the idea of those (*singleness*, etc.) being subsidiary to the substance. That is to say, it would be solely on the ground of proximity (consisting of the fact of its being expressed by the same word) that the *number* could be taken as subsidiary to the *substance*; but it is taken up and connected with the Action by the *kāraḥa*, which is the predominant factor, being more proximately related to the *number* (inasmuch as the *kāraḥa* and the *number* are denoted by the same case-ending, while the *number* and the *substance* are denoted by two distinct parts of the Verb). In the case of the denotations of Verbal Roots, however, they are not shown, by any other more authoritative means of knowledge, to pertain to the Sacrifice, which could reject the fact of those root-meanings being subsidiary to the Nominative Agent.

Then again, an argument that has been urged is that, "inasmuch as the character of the Nominative Agent is in the shape of the *Subsidiary*, even though it be denoted as the predominant factor, it all the more comes to be established as the *Subsidiary*."

But this is not correct; in the matter of actions mentioned in the

Scriptures, it is only intelligent agents that are entitled; consequently, there could be no injunction of actions for such agents, unless it were accompanied by a distinct definition of the Result (to follow from the performance of those actions).

That is to say, though the character of the Agent generally consists in that of his being the *performer*, yet, for all intelligent performers, the performance is always accompanied by a definite idea of the result to follow from it; and, as a matter of fact, it is only such intelligent persons, and not non-intelligent ones, that are entitled to the performance of actions laid down in the Veda; and all these actions are connected with certain Injunctions,—even Prohibitions being based upon the presence of the Injunctive affix; and, as a matter of fact, there can be no Injunction, unless there is something desirable by man to be accomplished (by the action enjoined). Consequently, when the Man comes to be spoken of as the ‘performer’ of a certain action, he at once comes to the conclusion that the action is calculated to accomplish, either directly or indirectly, something desirable for himself; and so long as it is possible to have the help accorded directly, it is not right to assume an indirect help. Nor is the performer wholly incapable of undergoing *preparatory purifications*, because, being meant to be the substratum of the result of the Sacrifice, his purification would serve a distinctly useful purpose. As for the particular help that could be accorded to him by the action, we can, at the first instance, take it to be a mere *help* in general; as this would be enough to set aside the idea of the action being for the sake of the Sacrifice; and when this has been done, then we can go on assuming, as we wish, the particular helps accorded to the performer (by the action in question); but this seeking after particular helps would be of no use in the present connection, as the mere fact of the action according *some help* to the Performer would be enough to show that the action cannot be for the sake of the Sacrifice. (That is to say, in case the Verb be accepted to be denotative of the Performer, the Nominative Agent).

Even though the mere denotation of the Nominative Agent would not express his *predominance*, which is not included in the former denotation,—yet, the apparent inconsistency of the former denotation would necessarily imply the fact of the *predominance* also being signified by the same Verb. As for instance, even though the word ‘*svargakāmaḥ*’, which denotes a particular Person, does not denote the fact of the *svarga* being the *object to be attained*, yet this latter is assumed (on the strength of the apparent inconsistency of the previous denotation) (as we shall show in *Adhyāya* VI). In the same manner, the ‘lordship’ of an intelligent person (over a certain action) would be signified by the cog-

tion of the nominative character being based upon the presence, in that person, of a desire for the acquiring of the results (to proceed from that action). And then again, in the case of the Deity, which is the recipient of the offering made in the action, we find that its *predominance* is recognized only as leading to its being cognised as instrumental in the completion of the Sacrifice, and not with the sole end of merely establishing the said predominance; and similarly in the case in question, the *subsidiary character* of the Agent should be taken only as calculated to establish his *predominance* (consisting in the fact of his being the possessor of the result following from the action).

Then again, the subsidiary character of the Nominative Agent is not recognized as referring to the significations of the verbal roots, (but as with reference to the *Bhāvanā*); and when the Agent comes to be known as subsidiary to the *Bhāvanā*, do not you even then admit the signification of the verbal root to be subsidiary to him?

That is to say, even for one who holds the Nominative Agent to be denoted by the Verbal Affix (*i.e.* for the *Vāiyākaraṇa*), it is absolutely necessary to admit the existence of the *Bhāvanā*, on the strength of its actual cognition. And then, inasmuch as it is the *Bhāvanā* that is denoted by the same Verbal Affix, and is the predominant factor in the denotation of that affix, it naturally takes with itself the Nominative Agent as its subsidiary; and as such, the Agent does not become subsidiary to the signification of the verbal root. And hence, the Agent, being engaged with the *Bhāvanā* which he cannot turn aside to any other purpose, comes to take up, as his subsidiary, that which is signified by the verbal root (connected with the affix that denotes the *Bhāvanā* and the Agent).

Nor is there any incongruity involved in the fact of the Agent having the twofold character (of being subsidiary to the *Bhāvanā*, and yet the predominant factor in comparison to the signification of the verbal root); because the two are two subjects totally apart. If the Agent were taken as also subsidiary to the Root-meaning itself, then even a single such signification would be self-contradictory. As a matter of fact, we find that, in the case in question, it is with reference to the *Bhāvanā* that the Agent is regarded as the *subsidiary*, while with reference to the Root-meaning, it is the predominant factor; and as such there can be no self-contradiction in this. Because, if a thing that is naturally endowed with a twofold character, should be denoted by words also as having both of those characters,—what incongruity can there be in this? Or it may be that while one of these characters is expressed directly by the word, the other is implied only indirectly; and thus, too, there can be no self-contradiction.

And thus, inasmuch as there is always a possibility of the nominative agent being the predominant factor, that which is signified by the verbal root would certainly become subservient to that Agent (if he be admitted to be denoted by the verbal affix).

There is yet another point of difference deserving of notice; it is this: The words '*pācaka*' and the like are recognised as connected with another action; and hence in the case of such words the mere denotation of the word would make the root a qualification (of the Agent).

That is to say, we have the following point of difference between the subservient character based upon verbal denotation and that based upon the nature of things:—In the case of the sentence—'*pācakam rājapuruskām ca ānaya*' ('Fetch the cook and the King's-servant')—we find that the action of cooking and the king become subservient to the Man that is connected with the action of fetching (i.e. the man that is to be fetched) merely through the peculiar character of the denotations of the words ('*pācaka*' and '*rājapurusha*'); and so it is just possible that the two (the cooking and the king) may not go so far as to become the actual auxiliaries (to the Man and the action of fetching). On the other hand, in the case of such sentences as '*nāṇtam vadāt*,' we find that the words do not make a mention of the connection of the nominative agent with any other action (than that of 'telling' f.i.); so that we do not stand in need of a subservient character based upon the mere denotation of words; and consequently, we are led to accept the subservient character of the root-meaning (the Action of telling) as based upon the nature of things; and this character can be none other than that of being the auxiliary.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that, in the event of the Agent being accepted to be denoted by the verbal affix, there is a distinct authoritative means of knowledge pointing to the fact of the Action signified by the verbal root being subservient to the Man.

Objection: "But, even if the Agent were not denoted by the verbal affix, then too, inasmuch as he would be indicated by the *Bhāvanā* that is denoted by the same word (as the Agent, i.e. by the verbal affix). it would be he that would be most nearly related, by Context, to the verbal root; and hence, in this case too, when the Action signified by the verbal root would come to look for its purpose, this want would be supplied by the said Agent; and hence in this case also, just as in the case of the Agent being denoted by the verbal affix, the Action would be subservient to the Agent."

Reply: This objection does not quite apply to the case; because only that word can be taken in its indirect indicative sense, which is not capable of affording a sense by direct denotation; and when the word has once afforded this direct denotation, it is then that the Indication

appears as its concomitant (and hence it is that this latter cannot have a preference over Direct Denotation).

That is to say, if the Agent were *denoted* (by the verbal affix), then, if he should happen to be spoken of, in a general way,—without having his specialities pointed out,—by Direct Denotation,—then, he would certainly be able to fulfil all the requirements of every one of the actions that he would perform; and as such, in no case, would he fall off from the sense of the Scriptures. On the other hand, if he is only *indicated* (by the *Bhāvanā*), then, from the very beginning, we would have the idea that what is cognized is not in keeping with the sense of the Scriptures. And certainly we cannot attach any importance to that which is not mentioned by the Scriptures. Consequently, if we could find out some scriptural authority pointing to the fact of the Agent being *indicated* by the *Bhāvanā*, then alone could we accept it as being in keeping with the Scriptures, and hence admissible. But as a matter of fact, we find that all the words of the Scripture betake themselves to the indirect method of *Indication* only when their direct signification is not found to be of any use with regard to the Action; and in the case in question we find that the *Bhāvanā* is of use (in the Action), only in the shape in which it is directly denoted (by the verbal affix). But it is not possible for the verbal affix to operate, at the same time, both directly (with regard to the *Bhāvanā*) and indirectly (with reference to the Agent).

Consequently, just as in the case of the utterance, '*Pūro dhāvati*' ('the former is running'), though the '*latter*' is also implied as the correlative of the '*former*,' yet it is not connected with the *action* (of *running*),—so, in the same manner, the fact is that the expression in question (i.e. the verbal affix) being really given to something else (the *Bhāvanā*), the Agent is simply implied as the correlative of this *Bhāvanā*; and as such, this implied Agent is not cognized as of any use with regard to the Action in question. Then, as for the mere cognition of the Agent by Indication, that would be possible only when the Agent would be a subordinate factor, and hence the said Indication could not point to the fact of the Agent being the predominant factor. And then the upshot of the whole affair is that, for the sake of its own accomplishment, which would not be otherwise possible, the *Bhāvanā* implies the Agent, only as a subordinate, and not as a predominant factor; and hence an idea of his predominance would be wholly unfounded. Specially as the *Bhāvanā* would not be able to *imply* the Agent, if he were the predominant factor. Consequently as soon as the Agent begins to bring itself forward to a predominant position, and we look for an authority for this latter position, we find both the word (the verbal affix) and the *Bhāvanā* wholly indifferent on the point; and as a matter

of fact, there can be no other right means of the cognition of the said predominance (which thus becomes wholly unfounded).

Thus then, we find that the consideration of the question, as to, whether, or not, the Agent is denoted (by the verbal affix),—has a very important bearing upon the main point of the Adhikaraṇa.

And upon this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The sentence—‘*nanṛtam vadēt*’—must be taken as prohibiting the telling of lies that the man does for his own sake, on account of the general tendency of speech to be false; that is to say, it lays down the prohibition of telling lies for the sake of saving man from a grievous sin.

“(1) Because the word ‘*vadēt*’ directly denotes the Man (as the nominative agent); (2) because it is only when taken in this manner that the Injunction is found to serve a useful purpose; and (3) because if it pertained to the sacrifice, it would be altogether useless.

“That is to say, in the first place, the connection of the action of ‘telling’ with the Agent is directly denoted by the fact of both of them being denoted by the same word (the ‘telling’ by the root ‘*vada*,’ and the Agent by the verbal affix, in the word ‘*vadēt*’); and this connection sets aside the indication of the Context (which is the sole authority for connecting the ‘Telling’ with the Sacrifice). Secondly, the operation of the Injunctive (in ‘*vadēt*’) also is found to serve the distinctly useful purpose of laying down something not mentioned before (i.e. the prohibition of the telling of lies for the sake of Man); while if it were meant to be for the sake of the Sacrifice, then, the Injunctiveness would rest wholly in that which is signified by the root (i.e.—the mere ‘telling’), which would be brought up by the declaration of the performance of the sacrifice as a whole; and as such an actual injunction to the same effect would be absolutely useless. This is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya*,—*Otherwise, the meaning of the word ‘vadēt’ comes to be merely that ‘telling is’*; and the use of the word ‘*vadēt*, which denotes the nominative as well as the Injunction, for expressing the mere fact that ‘telling is,’ would be absolutely useless.

“Thus then, inasmuch as all Injunctions are for the sake of Man. Prohibitions also, following in the wake of Injunctions, must be taken as being for his sake (and not for that of Sacrifice); and the sense of the sentence in question comes to be that, ‘for the sake of helping himself a Man should not tell lies.’

“To explain the *Sūtra*—Inasmuch as what the sentence is found to express has already been previously laid for the Man by the Smṛti, at the time of his *Upaṅgyana*, long before he became entitled to the per-

formance of the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*,—the same declaration made for the sake of Man, in connection with this sacrifice, must be taken as merely descriptive of that which has permanent existence (for the Man, ever since his *Upanayana*).

“*Question*: ‘When the Prohibition is for the sake of Man, why should the *Sūtra* speak of connection with a sacrifice?’

“*Answer*:—What is meant to be set aside by the *Sūtra* is that (1) which the *Siddhānti* takes to be connected with the sacrifice, (2) which is spoken of as connected with it, and (3) which is indicated, by the Context, as being thus connected; the meaning of the *Sūtra* would thus be this: That which is meant by the *Siddhānti* to be related to the sacrifice, or that which is spoken of as related to it, or that which is indicated by the Context to be related to it,—inasmuch as all this would really pertain to the Man, the sentence in question must be taken as merely descriptive of what already exists.

“*Objection*: ‘The sentence in question, which is a *Ṛuti*, must be taken as the basis for the *Smṛti*-text that prohibits the telling of lies at the *Upanayana*. That is to say, it has already been shown (in the *Smṛti-pāda*) that all *Smṛtis* are authoritative only by reason of their being based upon corroborative *Ṛuti* texts; and consequently, inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to be expressive of the same thing as the *Smṛti* text (prohibiting the telling of lies) found in connection with the *Upanayana* ceremony, the former should be taken as the basis of the latter (and not as merely descriptive of it). That is to say, if the authority of the *Smṛti* rested in itself, independently of everything else, then, on the strength of this fact, the *Ṛuti*-sentence under consideration might have been taken as merely descriptive of what has always existed (on the strength of the aforesaid *Smṛti*-text). As a matter of fact, however, in the case of all *Smṛti* texts, it is necessary to trace the corroboration of a *Ṛuti*-text. And in the case in question, the only alternatives at our disposal are—(1) to assume some other *Ṛuti*-text as the basis of the said *Smṛti*, and take the one under consideration as merely descriptive, or (2) to take the sentence under consideration as the basis of that *Smṛti*. But so long as we actually find the necessary corroborative *Ṛuti*-text in the shape of the one under consideration,—there can be no ground for assuming one that does not exist (or, at least is not as easily perceptible). In fact, such an assumption would involve two unjustifiable things—the rejection of the text that already exists, and the assumption of that which has no existence. Consequently we cannot take the sentence in question to be a mere descriptive declaration.’

“The reply to the above as given by the *Bhāṣya* is this: (If the

"Smṛti rule were based upon the Ṛuti-text in question, then) the
 "Smṛti should have mentioned the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice; as a matter
 "of fact, however, we find the Smṛti rule being taught at the time of the
 "Upanayana; consequently the sentence in question cannot be taken as the
 "Vedic basis of the Smṛti rule.

"To this answer, however, some people object as follows: 'In the
 "Bhāṣya, there does not appear to be any connection or relevancy of
 "that which follows to what has gone before. Because if the sentence
 "in question were taken as pertaining to Man, being taken apart from
 "the Context,—then in that case, inasmuch as the sentence would have
 "the same meaning as the Smṛti rule,—why should not, in that case,
 "the sentence in question, be taken as the basis of the Smṛti? That is
 "to say, if the sentence under consideration were meant to pertain to the
 "Sacrifice, and thus serve as the basis of the Smṛti,—then, in that case,
 "as it would be necessary for the basis and that which is based upon it to
 "be of the same nature, and as the two (the basic Ṛuti and the based
 "Smṛti), in this case, would not be similar in character (the Ṛuti per-
 "taining to the Sacrifice, while the Smṛti pertains to Man), the one
 "(the Ṛuti sentence under consideration) could not have served as the
 "basis of the Smṛti rule. When, however, the indications of the
 "Context are set aside, and the sentence under consideration is taken as
 "pertaining to Man, then, inasmuch as this also would come to pertain
 "to the time of the Upanayana (and thus being exactly similar in charac-
 "ter to the Smṛti rule), wherefore should not the *Pūrvapakshi* have
 "admitted the fact of the Smṛti being based upon the sentence in ques-
 "tion? Why too would it be necessary for the Smṛti rule to have
 "mentioned the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* (when both the Smṛti and its corrobo-
 "rative Ṛuti-text in the shape of the one under consideration would
 "come to pertain to Man)? For these reasons, we conclude that the
 "denial (in the Bhāṣya passage under consideration) of the fact of the
 "sentence in question being the basis of the Smṛti rule was ill-advised.'

"But this objection is not quite admissible; because in the present
 "Adhikaraṇa, the Bhāṣya puts forth three distinct *Pūrvapakshas*;
 "from among whom, the first can admit of the fact of the sentence
 "under consideration being the basis of the Smṛti rule, while the other
 "two insist upon the former being taken merely as descriptive of what
 "has been laid down in the latter.

"That is to say, if the only declaration of the *Pūrvapaksha* were that
 "in regard to the sentence pertaining to Man, then the Bhāṣya passage
 "under consideration would have been irrelevant. As a matter of fact,
 "however, the existence of this very passage in the Bhāṣya shows that
 "the author of the Bhāṣya had in view three distinct *Pūrvapakshas*

“ which are as follows:—(1) First of all is one that is wholly independent of the *Sūtra*,—and this is that the sentence in question pertains to *Man*; and in this case, the *Smṛti* rule is not brought forward at all; and if it were absolutely necessary to bring it forward in this case also, then, there would be nothing to prevent us from accepting the *Smṛti* to be based upon the sentence under consideration. And in the case of this *Pūrvapakṣa* both of these (the *Ṛuti* and the *Smṛti*) would be accepted as free from all doubt as to whether they are *Injunctive* or *Descriptive* (as both would be admitted to be *Injunctive*).—(2) But finding the two *Sūtras* (12 and 13) not connected with one another in regard to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, the *Bhāṣya*, with a view to put forward the theory of the sentence being a *Descriptive Declaration* (which *Pūrvapakṣa* would be in keeping with the *Siddhānta Sūtra* 13), takes up the view that the sentence in question pertains to the *Man* as connected with the *Sacrifice*; and hence makes the declaration—*The telling of lies was prohibited at the time of the Upanayana*. And the objector, taking his stand upon the first *Pūrvapakṣa*, objects to the declaration of the sentence in question being merely descriptive, when it should be taken as forming the very basis of the *Smṛti* rule. And in reply to this objection, the *Siddhānti* (of the *Pūrvapakṣa*) denies the fact of the sentence in question being the basis; and in doing this he practically accepts the *second Pūrvapakṣa*; his meaning being that we have not admitted the sentence to pertain to the *Man* by himself, but to him as connected with the *Sacrifice*, just like the *Abhikramaṇa*, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—iv—15; and certainly this would not apply to all men, or even all through the life of one man even. This view would be in keeping with *Direct Declaration* (which connects the *telling* with the *Man* as well as with the *Context* (which connects it with the *Sacrifice*). And thus the *Smṛti* rule, which has a universal application, could not have all its requirements supplied by the *Ṛuti*-text in question, which has a limited scope of application, applying to one man only, and that too, only during the time that he may be engaged in the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; consequently the *Smṛti* would certainly point to a *Ṛuti*-text exactly like itself (that could serve as its basis); and when this latter has been assumed, the *Prohibition* (of *telling lies*) in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, being found to be a part of that contained in the assumed sentence, comes to be taken as merely *descriptive*. For certainly, that which serves as a *Prohibition*, from the very day of the *Upanayana*, would act as one during the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* also. Thus then, inasmuch as the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* would fall within the time between one's *Upanayana* and his death, the sentence that speaks of the *prohibition*

"of telling lies during these Sacrifices must be merely descriptive of
 "the wider Prohibition pertaining to the man's whole life; and it
 "could not form the basis of the *Smṛti* rule. The sentence in the
 "*Bhāṣhya*—'*apica puruṣadharmam evopodīṣanti*'—(which appears in the
 "course of this second *Pūrvapakṣa*)—should be taken along with the
 "former; as it speaks of the Prohibition pertaining to the *Man*.—(3),
 "Or, this very sentence—'*apica* etc.'—may be taken as putting forward
 "the third theory of the *Pūrvapakṣa*. And in this case the sentence
 "would not be taken as referring to the question of the Prohibition
 "pertaining to the *Man* or to the *Sacrifice*; but the question being
 "as to whether the Prohibition of telling lies, that we find in
 "connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, is the Injunction of some-
 "thing never laid down before, or it is only descriptive of what has been
 "previously laid down,—we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* that, because of the
 "Prohibition being contained in the *Smṛti*, it is merely descriptive of
 "what already exists.

"*Objection*: 'The connection of the Prohibition as found in the
 "*Smṛti* is wholly different from that found in the sentence in question;
 "because in the former it relates to *Man*, while in the latter it relates to
 "the *Sacrifice* (and hence the one could not be merely descriptive of the
 "other).'

"*Reply*: 'True, it is so; and yet the sentence in question is merely
 "descriptive of what already exists; because, even in the sacrifice, the
 "telling of lies must belong to the *Man*, and not to the *Sacrifice*; conse-
 "quently that prohibition of the telling of lies, which relates to the *Man*,
 "would apply to the *Sacrifice* also.

"That is to say, though it is true that the Prohibition relating to
 "the *Sacrifice* is something different from that relating to *Man*, yet the
 "former could not have the true character of the Injunction,—as it
 "would certainly be implied by the impossibility in the former. For
 "certainly, it is not possible that a *Man* should avoid the telling of lies
 "for his own sake, and go on telling them for the sake of the *Sacrifice*.
 "Thus then, inasmuch as the prohibition of telling lies for the sake
 "of the *Sacrifice* would be included in that of telling them for the sake
 "of the *Man* himself, the former could not but be taken as merely descrip-
 "tive of the latter.

"In this latter *Pūrvapakṣa*, there would be no question as to the
 "Prohibition forming the Vedic basis for the other; because the
 "*Smṛti* rule relates to the *Man* (while the *Ṛg* one relates to the
 "*Sacrifice*).

"Or the portion of the *Bhāṣhya*, from the beginning of the passage
 "under consideration, down to '*darṣapūrṇamāsayoriti hi smaryeta*,'

"should be taken as containing the *answer*; the sense of which would be that, inasmuch as the sentence in question is only descriptive of what has been already laid down in a *Smṛti* rule based upon another Vedic text, it only serves the purpose of eulogizing the sacrifices (of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*),—the form of the eulogy being that, 'inasmuch as this Sacrifice becomes connected with even such Prohibitions as really pertain to other things, it becomes endowed with many accessories; and as such it is very praiseworthy.'

"And thus the sentence comes to be a mere '*Ārthavāda*.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (13): It is an Injunction; because of the connection being wholly different.

First of all, the *Bhāṣya* takes the argument herein propounded, viz., the *difference of connection*—as against the first *Pūrvapakṣa*, that the Prohibition relates to the *Man* by himself.

In the *Smṛti*, we find the rule 'One should tell the truth (*'Satyam brūyāt'*),—enjoining the telling of truth as a source of *Dharma* (Virtue); while the sentence in question—'*nṛṇāṃ vadāt*'—lays down the *Prohibition of telling lies*; and thus there is a distinct difference between the subject-matter of the two rules. And as a matter of fact we know that the mention of one thing cannot be descriptive of that of a totally different thing; consequently the sentence in question must be taken as an independent Injunction.

Objection: "There are only two ways in which a man can speak, —the telling of the truth, and the telling of untruth; consequently the restriction of telling the truth would naturally involve the prohibition of the telling of the untruth; and thus the latter would certainly be descriptive of the former."

Reply: It is not so; because of the difference of connection. That is to say, that sentence alone can be taken as descriptive of another, which is found to serve exactly the same purpose as the other does. In the case of one being an Injunction and the other a Prohibition, there is a distinct difference between the purposes served by them, specially as the results brought by the two are so wholly different. For instance, whenever the Injunction operates, it operates towards the fulfilment of something desirable, while the Prohibition operates in a wholly different manner, serving the purpose of setting aside from a sin.

That is to say, in the case of the Injunction 'one should tell the truth', we find that when the resultant *Bhāvanā* stands in need of a purpose, this latter is found to consist in the form of Heaven, etc.,

because of the fact of all Injunctions relating to something desirable to Man; thus then, the meaning of the Injunction comes to be that, 'it being possible for man to tell the truth as well as the untruth, if he sticks to the telling of the truth, he comes to be endowed with something desirable'; and hence one who would tell the truth would attain to Heaven. But the Injunction says nothing as to whether the telling of untruth constitutes an excellence or a defect. In the same manner, the Prohibition contained in the sentence 'one should not tell lies', simply declares that the *telling of lies* leads to Hell; and it says nothing as to whether the *telling of truth* constitutes an excellence or a defect. And thus inasmuch as the meanings of the two sentences are wholly different, any one of them cannot be taken as a mere repetition of the other; and hence the sentence in question must be taken as an Injunction (of Prohibition).

Objection: "The 'connection' of the sentence in question would 'have been 'different', if the declaration of the Smṛti had ended 'with 'one should tell the truth.' As a matter of fact, we find that 'the Smṛti contains also the *Prohibition of telling lies*, exactly like 'the *Injunction of telling the truth*; and thus in view of this Prohibition, the connection of the sentence in question cannot be said to be 'different from that which is found in the *Smṛti*."

Reply: Inasmuch as the said Smṛti Prohibition is found in course of the 'Observances laid down for the religious student', it must be taken as an Injunction (of telling the truth) by contraries (*Paryudāsa*), on the same grounds as those shown in connection with the sentence 'one should not look upon the rising sun.' That is to say, all that the Prohibition, under the circumstances, means is that 'one should say what is not untrue.' And thus the connection of the sentence in question—'*nāṃtam vadēt*'—would certainly be different from any that may be found in the Smṛti.

In the case of the latter Prohibition '*nāṃtam vadēt*', which is found in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find none of the reasons that could justify us in taking this also as a *Paryudāsa* (i.e. an Injunction by contraries); the only two reasons capable of this are—(1) the use of the word 'observance', and (2) the chance of optional alternatives. As for the latter, an optional alternative is possible only in a case where what is prohibited is something the performability of which is pointed out by the Scriptures themselves, and not in that where what is prohibited is only that which one would perform for a certain end of his own, (because in the former case both what is prohibited and the Prohibition would have the support of Scriptural authority, while in the latter case, the Prohibition alone would have

this authority),—as we shall see later on. [And in the case in question, the *telling of lies* that is prohibited is not based upon any Scriptural text.] Consequently, the sentence in question must be taken as an Injunction.

If, however, the opponent should urge the argument, that—"we find, in the *Smṛti*, many *Prohibitions of telling lies*, apart from the one found in the course of the 'observances of the religious student' (and the sentence in question could be taken as descriptive of these),"—then, in that case, we would explain the 'Difference of Connection' in the following manner: That which is mentioned in the *Smṛti* is mentioned for all men, with a view to the fulfilment of certain desirable ends; whereas that which is mentioned in the sentence in question is for the man engaged in the sacrifice (of the *Dārça-Pūrṇamāsā*), with a view to a distinct result (in the shape of an *Apūrva*).

Objection: "This very reason would show that while the former has a universal application, the latter is very limited in its scope,—and as such this latter could certainly be taken as merely descriptive of the former."

Reply: It is not so; because there is a difference in their results, as just shown above. For instance, all that the Prohibition contained in the *Smṛti* shows is that, 'with a view to remove sinfulness from himself, the Man should not tell a lie.' And hence if a person performing the *Dārça-Pūrṇamāsā* sacrifice should come to infringe this prohibition, he would, by that, be infringing something that is wholly apart from the Sacrifice; and hence all that such an infringement would do would be to bring upon him a sin; and it could not cause any discrepancy in the sacrifice itself (if we did not attach any distinct significance to the Prohibition that we have found laid down in connection with the *Sacrifice*. Because we know it as a fact that the infringement of such *Duties* as pertain to the *Man* only (apart from the *Sacrifice*) does not cause any discrepancy in the Sacrifice. For instance, if one, in the course of the performance of a certain Sacrifice, should eat of the flesh of the animal killed by a poisoned arrow, that would cause no discrepancy in the *Sacrifice* itself, which would be accomplished, all the same, exactly in accordance with the Injunctions laid down in regard to it.

That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that all sacrifices stand in need of certain Injunctions and Prohibitions, relating to themselves; and hence whenever any of these Injunctions or Prohibitions is infringed, this infringement causes a discrepancy in the Sacrifice. While those Injunctions, etc. that relate to the *Man* are, in relation to one sacrifice, just as if they were related to a distinct Sacrifice; and they are wholly

indifferent to these; consequently, inasmuch as those have never come to be known to be accessories to that Sacrifice, the Sacrifice does not come to be regarded as the least deficient in its accessories, by an infringement of such foreign Injunctions and Prohibitions.

For these reasons, the sense of the *Smṛti* rule would come to be this: 'One who would tell a lie in course of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* would go to hell, but he would obtain the results of the Sacrifice all the same.' And as for the *Ṣṛuti*-rule (the sentence in question), it applies to the Man connected with the particular context of the Sacrifice; and hence the meaning of this would come to be that, 'The *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices bring about their true results, only when performed by persons who do not tell a lie in course of their performance.' In this latter sentence, we find that the *telling of lies* has been prohibited, with a view to the instrumentality of the Man towards the accomplishment of the *Apūrva*,—this instrumentality being indicated by the context; and hence an infringement of this would cause a discrepancy which would stand in the way of the due accomplishment of the *Apūrva* (the transcendental result) of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; but it would not cause any *Sin* in the Man, for even if we were to assume the appearance of a *sin*, at the time, that assumed sin could not attach itself to the Man independently by himself.

Thus we conclude that the connection of the sentence in question is different from that of the other; and hence it must be admitted to be an Injunction.

In the same manner, in the case of the theory that the Prohibition pertains purely to the *Sacrifice*, the fact of the connection being different should be explained on the ground of the difference between the *sin* accruing to the Man and the *discrepancy* appearing in the *Sacrifice*.

And thus, it becomes established that the sentence in question is not merely descriptive of what has been already declared elsewhere.

As for the difference in the two theories—that the Prohibition relates to the *Sacrifice*, and that it relates to the Man performing the *Sacrifice*—this will be explained later on. Inasmuch as in both these cases, the Injunctive character of the sentence remains untouched, a consideration of the difference between them would be of no use in the present discussion.

Says the Opponent: "We admit that the sentence is an Injunction; but "we hold that it is an Injunction relating to Man, for reasons that "we have shown above. This brings up the other two alternative *Pārvapakṣa* theories: (1) that the sentence relates to Man, and is "an Injunction, because of the connection being different; (2) that it "is an Injunction relating to the Man performing the Sacrifice."

To both of these we offer the following reply: We do not admit any Conjugational Affix to be expressive of the Nominative agent; and as for the idea of the Nominative that is found to follow from the Conjugational Affixes, that must be attributed to a *different relationship* ('*Samyogāntarāt*').

That is to say, in all cases, when the utterance of a word is found to give rise to the cognitions of a number of things, this does not make all these things 'denotable' by that word; because the assumption of the denotative potency of the word with regard to an object depends upon the apparent inconsistency of the concomitance between them (the word and the idea of the object); and only that object is known as 'denotable' by a word, with regard to which the denotative potency of that word has been duly assumed. And such assumption of the denotative potency that is not perceptible, is allowable only in those cases where, without such assumption, we could not explain a certain use of the word and the cognition actually brought about by it; e.g. we assume such a potency of the words (denotative of classes) with regard to Individuals, and that of such words as 'Lion' and the like with regard to the 'Boy' etc. (i.e. in the cases of recognised Indicative signification).

Now then, in the case of such verbs as '*Pacati*' and the like, we find them giving rise to ideas of the following things: (1) the *Bhāvanā*, (2) the *Root-meaning*, (3) the *Nominative Agent*, (4) the *number* of this Agent, (5) the fact of the personal results accruing to the Agent (in the case of the *Ātmanepada*), (6) a *particular point of time*. And among these we cannot easily distinguish which is actually denoted by the word (and which is implied or indicated); specially as the only definition of the 'directly denoted' is that *it is not implied or indicated*.

Of the *Bhāvanā*, in the first place, we do not find any other denotation than the word itself ('*pacati*'); specially as the *Time*, etc. are not found to be invariably concomitant with the *Bhāvanā*, as these are found to exist even without the *Bhāvanā* (hence this latter could not be indicated by Time and the other factors signified by the word). Nor can it be urged that the *Bhāvanā* would be implied by the Nominative Agent and the Root-meaning (both of which are among the factors signified by the verb), because in that case, the *Bhāvanā* would not be the predominant factor, exactly as in the case of nouns formed with *kṛt* affixes. That is to say, if the *Bhāvanā* were implied either by the Nominative or by the Root-meaning, then it could be cognised only in a subdued form, just as it is in the case of such words as '*pācaka*' and the like. But as a matter of fact we find that the *Bhāvanā* is always cognised as the predominating factor (in the verb); and from this we conclude that it is denoted directly by the verb itself.

Then again, the *Bhāvanā* does not indicate the *Time*, etc., because it is found to be present with other Times, other Numbers, other Root-meanings and other Personal results (than those signified by the word '*pacati*'); and hence not being invariably concomitant with these particular *Time* and the rest, the *Bhāvanā* cannot be taken as indicating them). In the same manner, inasmuch as *Time*, *Number* and the rest are not found to be invariably concomitant with one another, they cannot be spoken of as indicating or implying one another. We find, however, that the *Bhāvanā* is not possible without its accessory Nominative, in the shape of one that is signified by the verb; so that we conclude that the *Bhāvanā* is capable of indicating the Nominative agent, either by the said apparent Inconsistency or by Inference.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the *Bhāvanā* is related to the other "*Kāraṇas* (the Objective, etc.) also, it cannot be invariably concomitant "with the Nominative, and as such it should not be accepted as denotative "of this latter."

Reply: Not so; because the mere fact of being related to something else cannot be admitted to necessarily establish the non-concomitance of the *Bhāvanā* with the Nominative. There are two ways in which an object can be related to a number of objects—(1) some objects renounce their connection with everything else before being connected with another thing; (2) while others take to new relatives, without renouncing the previous ones. And among these, that which is of the former kind is not invariably concomitant with any one of its relatives, and hence it could not denote them; e.g. *Tallness* is not accepted to be denotative of the *Man*. But in such cases, the reason for non-concomitance does not lie in the fact of being related to another, but in that of the one being found to have an existence even without the other. In a case, however, where the thing in question, even when existing elsewhere, does not totally abandon its former relative,—we cannot take them to be non-concomitant; e.g. the class '*Çiṅcapā*' with the classes, '*Trees*', '*Earthy*' '*Substance*' and '*Entity*'; because every one of these is found to have, intact within itself, the requisite denotative potency. In the case of *Bhāvanā* also, we found that it subsists in the *Kāraṇas*, not alternatively, one by one, but in all of them simultaneously. And certainly this simultaneous subsistence in all cannot be called 'non-concomitance'; because even when existing in another, the *Bhāvanā* does not abandon its former substrate. Consequently it must be admitted as an indubitable fact, that the *Bhāvanā* indicates all the *Kāraṇas*. Though in certain cases—as those of the Intransitive Verb, where there is no Objective to be indicated, and that of the Dative and the Ablative, which do not form integral parts of the Verb—it might be argued that the *Bhāvanā*

does not indicate these *Kāraḥas*, and as such is non-concomitant with them; yet even this doubt could be raised only in regard to those other *Kāraḥas*, and never in regard to the Nominative; because there is no such Verb (or Action) as ever exists without the Nominative; as it is this that forms the very source of the Action. And as a matter of fact what we require here is the concomitance of the Nominative (with the *Bhāvanā*); and while the other *Kāraḥas* are found to be non-concomitant with it, this fact strengthens, all the more, the capability in the *Bhāvanā*, of indicating the Nominative.

This requires special justification and proof, for the sake of establishing the fact of the Nominative being singularly fitted for being related to the *number* (which is one of the factors signified by the Verb). In the case of such Roots as '*Āsi*', '*Sthā*' and the like, we find that they do not need the Instrumental; in the case of the roots '*cala*' and '*pata*' we find no need of the locative substratum; in the case of Intransitive Verbs, there is no Objective; and in that of '*Āsi*', '*Sthā*', '*pata*' and the like, there are no Datives or Ablatives; (while in all these the Nominative is always present); hence finding the Nominative alone to be invariably present in all *Bhāvanās*, we conclude that it is that (Nominative) alone which is singularly capable of being related to the *Number*. Specially as it is a fact perceptible to all men that in the case of all Verbs ('*pacuti*' and the like) the *Number* is always cognized as determined by the Nominative, and not by any other *Kāraḥa*.

At this stage of the discussion, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* might argue thus: "All *Kāraḥas* being equally indicated, why should the *Number* be "connected with the Nominative alone, and not with the Instrumental "and the rest?"

To him, however, we offer the following explanation: It would be so for us, just in the same way as it is for you.

He might retort thus: "For us, the Nominative and the *Number* are "both denoted by the same word (i.e. the Conjugational Affix), and as such "they qualify each other; and hence it is only natural that the *Number* "should be set aside from the other extraneous *Kāraḥas*, which are "not similarly denoted, and joined to the Nominative (while the *Siddhānti* "does not admit the Nominative to be denoted by the Conjugational "Affix; hence the same grounds are not available for him)."

But then, we should reply as follows: When all *Kāraḥas* are equally constituted, what reason is there for you that the Nominative alone and not the Instrumental, etc., are denoted (by the Conjugational) Affix? There is no other way out of this but the assumption of a peculiar potency in the denotative word in question, pointed out by certain perceptible

facts resulting therefrom,—on account of which potency, we could have the cognition of that particular thing by the word. And this assumption would be as available for us as for you. For inasmuch as we actually perceive the Number as always belonging to the Nominative,—from this very fact we could, quite reasonably, infer the existence of the necessary potency in the conjugational affixes.

Question : “ All the *Kāraḥas* being equally indicated by the *Bhāvanā*, “ what reason could there be for restricting the assumed potency (to “ the Nominative alone) ? ”

Answer : We have already said that our reason for restricting the potency (of connecting the *number* with the Nominative) would be the same that the *Vaiyākaraṇa* has for restricting the potency (of the Conjugational Affix) to denote the *Nominative* only, though all the *Kāraḥas* are equally constituted. And further, no objections can rightly be raised against the potentialities of things ; specially as we have already explained that they have to be inferred from certain perceptible facts which are found to be explained only as the effects of those potentialities.

Further, for you it would be necessary to assume the potency (in the Conjugational Affix) of indicating the *number* of the Nominative, over and above its potency to indicate the Nominative itself. (While for us the potency necessary to be assumed would be that of the Verbal Affix to indicate only the *number* of the Nominative, this latter itself being only implied by the *Bhāvanā*).

Objection : “ The potency necessary for the indication of the number “ of the Nominative would be based upon the fact of both of them “ (the Nominative and the Number) being indicated by the same term “ (the Conjugational Affix) ; and hence no assumption of any second “ potency would be necessary for us. ”

Reply : But without the assumption of several potencies, how could you have the desired restriction ? That is to say, it would certainly be necessary for you to assume a potency in the Conjugational Affix, whereby this latter could indicate the Number of that alone which is denoted by the affix (*i.e.* the Nominative), and not of the other *Kāraḥas*, even though every one of these latter is equally capable of being related to the number. In fact, without such an assumed potency, the effect would be quite contrary to what you desire, the idea being to some such effect as—‘ for the very reason that the Nominative is denoted, it is not necessary that its number should be expressed ; in fact it would be much more reasonable to distinguish, by means of this number, those (*Kāraḥas*) that are not distinctly denoted. ’ Specially as the mere fact of being denoted by the same Affix can be sufficient reason for the said restriction (of the Number to the Nominative) ; because we

find that though the *Bhāvanā*, *Time*, the *Personal Result* and the *Person*, are all denoted by the Conjugational Affix, yet they are not connected with the *Number*; and in fact, if the mere fact of being denoted by the Affix were the sole ground for being connected with the *Number*, then the *Bhāvanā*, as being the most predominant factor among those denoted by the word, would be more entitled than any other factor of the Nominative and the rest, to a connection with the *Number*. If this connection of the *Bhāvanā* be denied on the ground of its inherent incapability for such connection, then the same might be said (by us) with regard to the other *Kāraṅkas* (the instrumental, etc.) that are also similarly denoted.

The following argument might be urged here: "The other *Kāraṅkas* are quite capable of being connected with the *Number*; and as such, they could very well be connected with the *Number* denoted by another word."

But in reply to this we could urge that the capability of being connected with the *Number* is present in the *Bhāvanā*, etc., also, which are denoted by such words as '*Bhāvanā*' and the like.

Objection: "Inasmuch as we do not find the number present in these (*Bhāvanā*, etc.), we cannot admit of the existence of the said capability in them."

Reply: This is scarcely proper; as the question of the absence of number in these is still an open one (being still under consideration); for the '*absence of Number*' is nothing other than the '*incapability of being connected with it*' (and it is this latter that we are still considering). Consequently, it must be admitted that, that number, or *Bhāvanā*, etc., which are denoted by such and such a term (the Conjugational Affix f.i.), are not capable of being connected with one another. And this would be equally applicable to both of us. Because the *number* that is denoted by that word would be incapable of being connected with the other *Kāraṅkas* (except the Nominative). To the question "How do you know that it would be incapable?"—we would reply—exactly as you do in the case of *Bhāvanā* and the rest.

Objection: "As a matter of fact, we have found the Objective quite capable of being connected with the *Number* signified by the Conjugational Affix; and hence the *Number* could be taken as connected with that,—in such sentences (in the Passive form) as '*pacyatē odanaḥ*'."

Reply: It is not so; because, as a matter of fact we find that though signifying the objective in certain cases (i.e. in sentences in the Passive form), the Conjugational Affix does not signify it in others (where we have the sentence in the Active form); and in the same manner, the *Number*

of the objective also would be limited (in its relationship) by the potentialities of the words used.

The opponent apparently thinks that, because in certain cases he has found the Objective capable of being connected with the Number signified by the Conjugational Affix, it must be so in all cases. But, if we were to argue thus, then the fact of the Objective being, in certain cases, denoted by the Verbs with Conjugational endings, would lead us to the conclusion that it is always denoted by such Verbs!! If there be some ground for limiting the denotability of the Objective in this latter case, then we could have a similar ground for restricting the connectibility of the Number with the Objective. And hence it is scarcely right for the opponent to urge the above objection against us.

The following argument might here be brought forward by the Opponent: "The *number* that is qualified by the *Nominative* could not "be spoken of without speaking of the *Nominative* also."

Reply: Though it is true that the *qualified* cannot be cognised without the cognition of the *qualification*, yet this general dictum says nothing as to the *qualification* being directly denoted or not; that is to say, it is true enough that, unless the *qualification* is cognised, there can be no cognition of the *qualified*, and as such due importance should be attached to the cognition of the *qualification*; but there can be nothing objectionable in this *qualification* not being directly denoted; for certainly, when we find that even when not so denoted, but simply indicated indirectly by some means or other, the *qualification* is quite capable of bringing about the cognition of the *object qualified by it*,—why should we stick to the assertion that it is actually denoted?

Thus then, in the case in question, we find that the *Nominative* is capable of serving as the *Nominative* only when it is indicated by the *Bhūvand* itself; and as such it does not stand in need of being actually denoted. With regard to all qualified cognitions we have laid down the general law that 'that alone out of the various factors cognised is to be taken as denoted by the word which is not found to have been expressed by other means' (*vide Sūtra I—iv—9*). Consequently, whenever we have a qualified cognition, and proceed to consider the question as to which out of the *qualification* and the *qualified* is denoted directly by the word, and which is indicated by other means,—we come to the conclusion that wherever the *qualified* is found to be indicated by other means, the denotative operation of the word pertains to the *qualification*, and where it is the latter that is found to be indicated by other means, the operation of the word pertains to the *qualified*. In fact, in all cases, it is by means of the Apparent Inconsistency of the *qualified cognition* itself that we admit of the denotative operation of the word pertain-

ing either to the qualification alone, or to the qualified alone, or to both of them; and this Apparent Inconsistency is possible only with regard to that factor (in these two) which is not otherwise attainable (i.e., which cannot be indicated by any other means).

Thus then, in the case in question (in the verb '*vadeti*') we find that the *singleness* (which is found to be expressed by the Singular Affix), whether it be the *qualification* or the *qualified*, is not found to be indicated by any other means; and as such this cannot but be regarded as *denoted* by the word. If the Nominative were capable of indicating the said *Singleness*, then in accordance with the law relating to the 'class' (by which the class is taken to be directly denoted by the word, and, in its turn, to indicate the Individual), the Nominative would be taken as directly *denoted*, while the *singleness* would be taken as indicated by it. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the cognition of the Nominative is invariably concomitant with that of *Singleness*; and hence the former cannot be accepted as capable of indicating the latter; consequently we must admit the *Singleness* also to be directly denoted by the word. And the denotative potency of the word being thus transferred (to the *singleness*), the Nominative comes to be the object of Indication; and as such, even though recognised as the qualification (of *singleness*), it cannot be accepted as being *denoted* by the word. When it is the *singleness* that is recognised as the *qualification*, then too it is this that should be the first to be *denoted* by the word; and when this has been denoted, the denotative potency having been spent up in this, it looks out for the indication of the qualified Nominative by some other means; and as a matter of fact, this is found to be indicated by the *Bhāvanā* (which consists of the functioning of *man* towards a certain action); and consequently, there can be no ground for assuming a potency, in the word, for the direct denotation of the Nominative.

Though there are other *Kāraṇas* also that are found to be cognised (through the *Bhāvanā*), yet a cognition or non-cognition of these is not of any consequence, either one way or the other, in the matter under consideration. In any case, all that we need (for the sake of the *Bhāvanā* itself) is the Nominative; and there is no doubt as to this latter being actually cognised; and then, if in the wake of this, something else also be cognised, what harm does that do us? It is only the non-cognition of something that could have troubled us, and not the cognition of something over and above what is actually needed. And as a matter of fact, even though the *Instrumental*, etc. are cognised, yet the peculiar potency of the word is such that they are not taken up by the Number which stands in need of the Nominative only. Nor is it necessary that the *Number* should take in every factor that happens, to be cognised. In

all cases, there are three causes that combine in making a thing taken up; these are—(1) Cognition, (2) Requirement, and (3) Capability; and in the case in question, we find that the fact of the Number being related to the Nominative is admitted by both of us; and hence it does not become related to the other *Kāraṅkas*, simply because it does not stand in need of these latter, and because these themselves are incapable of such relationship; and conversely also, these *Kāraṅkas* do not stand in need of the Number denoted by the Verbal Affixes of Conjugation; because they are qualified by that number which is denoted by the Declensional Affixes. The Number in question also, cognised only in a general way, does not stand in need of any other relative (than the Nominative); specially as we have already shown above that the only difference between the Word and the Sentence lies in the fact of the cognition of the meaning of the former always preceding that of the meaning of the latter.

Consequently, in the case of a Verb ('*pacati*' f.i.) as soon as we have cognised the meaning of the Verbal Root ('*paca*'), it is at once concluded that there must be a *Bhāvanā* and a Nominative with it; and the Nominative being cognised beforehand, when the Number comes to be subsequently denoted by conjugational (the Verbal Affix itself), it is found to be capable of being taken either as qualifying, or qualified by, that Nominative.

Or again, the Nominative is the very first factor to be indicated by the *Bhāvanā*; and there can be no reason for the Number to pass over this (Nominative) and connect itself with something else.

That is to say, though all *Kāraṅkas* are equally related to the *Bhāvanā*, yet, it is the Nominative that is the first to be sought after and taken up by this latter, specially as its relationship with the other *Kāraṅkas* is dependent upon that (i.e. the Nominative). It is for this reason that the *Bhāvanā*, which consists of the *functioning* in general of the Nominative agent, indicates most particularly, the Nominative; whereas the other *Kāraṅkas* come up only as distant relations, either through their connection with the meaning of the Verbal Root, or through their forming parts of the *method* (of action) which forms the most subordinate element in the *Bhāvanā*. And there is no reason by which the Number should pass over the Nominative, which is the first and the most predominant factor to be indicated by the *Bhāvanā*,—and betake itself to the other *Kāraṅkas*.

Then again, even the teachers of *Vyākaraṇa*—Patanjali f.i.—declare the Nominative to be that particular *Kāraṅka* whose intermediate *functioning* the Verbal Root denotes as the most predominant of all; and hence it is also held that the signification of the Root also takes no notice of the other *Kāraṅkas* together with their functions, and points

to the previously manifested Nominative only; and it is for this reason that it is this latter that becomes connected with Number, and appears as if it were actually denoted, in its particular form (by the Conjugational Affix). In the other *Kāraḥas*, however, we do not find any such thing; even though they are indicated, they are considered of no consequence, and as such appear as if they did not exist at all. But when we come to look into the real state of things, we find that all the *Kāraḥas* are equally indicated by the *Bhāvanā*,—with which they are equally concomitant; and it is for this reason that they are not neglected altogether.

Objection: "In that case (i.e. if the Number belongs to the Nominative exclusively), we could not have the number pertaining to the Objective, as we have in the sentence '*Oḍanaḥ pacyatām tvayā*'. "Because in this sentence the action of the Rice (that of *being cooked*) is not spoken of as the principal factor; for if it were, then what would be denoted would be the Nominative character of the *rice* and not the *Bhāvanā*."

"That is to say, in the sentence cited, the action of the *Rice* is not spoken of as the principal factor, on account of which the *number* could be cognised as belonging to the Objective (*Rice*) cognised in the particular form (of the Nominative). If it were so, then alone could the *Rice* lose its Objective character, and become the Nominative; but as it is not so, it is not the Nominative; and as it is not the Nominative, its functioning would not constitute the *Bhāvanā*; and as such there would be no particular indication of the Objective by the *Bhāvanā*. As a matter of fact, it is necessary that the *action of the human agent* should be spoken of as the principal factor (in all Injunctions); it would not be possible for him to be directed to the performance of an action that belongs to something else (the Objective, f.i.) (and such would be the case if the principal factor spoken of by the Injunctive sentence were the action of something other than the Nominative). And further, the Nominative character too, not being expressed by the Conjugational Affix (in the sentence cited), could not apply even to that ('you') which is spoken of by a distinct word ('*tvayā*'); and then we could not have the Instrumental in '*tvayā*' (as this Instrumental is expressive of the Nominative, which has been found to be inapplicable to '*tvam*'). And as the Objective (*Rice*) too would not have its operation subdued by the action of the Nominative, it would cease to be something that is *got at*, and thereby losing its Objective character, it would acquire that of the Nominative, specially on account of having its action duly brought forward (by the word '*pacyatām*'); and on account of this it would sever its connection with its own *number*, and become connected with that of the Nominative."

"And thus we would find that, as in the case of the word '*pucati*' (Active,) so in that of '*pacyatē*' (Passive) also, the Number signified 'by the word, not being subdued by that of any other, would come to 'belong to the *Nominative*, and not to the *Objective* (as is really the 'case)."

Reply: The above objection applies also to one who holds the *Kāraku* (Nominative or Objective) to be denoted (by the Conjugational Affix): and as such applying to both parties, it should not have been brought forward against any one of them. Because, in any case, the *Number*, which we hold to be denoted by the Verbal Affix, belongs to the very same Nominative or Objective that you hold to be denoted by the same Affix. Consequently, if even in the case of sentences in the Passive Voice (*lit.* those in which the Conjugational Affixes appear in relation to the Objective), the Number signified by the Affix comes, for us, to belong to the Nominative (which is absurd),—then for you also, it would be the Nominative (and not the Objective) that would be signified by that Affix (which would be equally absurd, as the sentence is in the Passive Voice). And if you could have some means of avoiding this absurd denotation of the Nominative, then the same would be available for us, for avoiding the denotation of the number belonging to the Nominative; and as such we are no more open to the above objections than yourself.

Thus then it becomes equally incumbent upon both of us to set aside the said anomaly; and this can be done in the following manner: In all cases, inasmuch as the Objective is *that which is most desired* (by the Nominative), it is, by its very nature, the predominant factor, in comparison to the other *Kāraṅkas* (the Instrumental and the rest); and as it is the *object to be accomplished*, its action forms part of the *Bhāvanā*. Consequently, when the speaker wishes to show the predominance of the Objective by means of the Verbal Affix itself,—even though it is the Nominative, which, verbally, has its action, in the *general* as well as in the *particular* form, signified, as the most predominant, by means of the Conjugational Ending and the Verbal Root (respectively), and as such it attains to the position of the Nominative,—yet, inasmuch as what is meant to be spoken of is the predominant character, in the nature of things, of something else (the Objective), the Conjugational Endings are used in relation to the Objective (according to us) or to its Number (as held by the *Vaiyākaraṇa*) (i.e. the Verb is used in the Passive Voice *pacyatē*). When, however, even though existent, the predominance of the Objective is not meant to be spoken of,—or when the particular Root used indicates that that predominance does not exist,—and what is meant to be spoken of is merely Verbal

predominance,—then, the predominance of the Objective is accepted to be manifested by the Accusative Declensional Ending (in the noun, '*adanam*' f.i.), and the Conjugational Ending is brought in in relation to the Nominative (according to the *Vaiyākaraṇa*) or to its *Number* (according to us) [i.e. the Verb used is in the Active Voice—'*pacati*']. As for the other *Kāraṇas*, the Instrumental and the rest, they can have no sort of predominance, either *verbal* or *real*; and as such there can be no desire to speak of the predominance of these,—and hence these are always spoken of by words other than the Verb (and they do not, in any way, affect the form of the Verb).

Some people declare as follows: "When the potentiality of words 'is ascertained to be in some such form as that,—'such and such a word (the Active) is capable of denoting the *number* of the Nominative, while such other (the Passive) is capable of denoting only that 'of the Objective,'—then, in that case, the *Bhāvanā* would be expressed 'by some other word; and the said Number, being denoted as not belonging to any other thing, would betake itself to the Nominative.

"For instance, in the case of the word '*Ḣḡṇa*' (which, though signifies *Red*, is yet applied only to the *Red Horse*), we find that even "when the *Horse* is not mentioned by any other word (in the shape "of '*Aḡva*' and the like), the word '*Ḣḡṇa*', expressing a property "belonging to the Horse, comes, by itself, to indicate the '*Horse*' also. "And in the same manner, all things, such as the Cow and the like, "would cease to be denoted (by the words '*Cow*' and the like). Because "the word '*Cow*' (like the word '*Ḣḡṇa*') could be taken as expressing "such properties of the Cow as its particular Gender, Number etc.; "and these properties, being denoted by the word, would subsequently "come to indicate the animals themselves. That is to say, if the "sole potentiality of the word were to lie in the fact of its denoting "the properties of a certain object, then, there would be no use for "assuming any further potentialities for it; as all usage would be carried "on through that single potentiality.

"If, however, it be held that in the case of such words as '*Ḣḡṇa*' "and the rest their relationship is limited by the fact of both (the "Property as well as the Object) being denoted by the same word, "and not by any such peculiar potentiality in the word itself,—then "similarly in the case of the *Number*, etc. of the Nominative also (it "may be held that the connection of the Number with the Nominative "is due, not to any potentiality in the Verbal Affix, but to the fact "of both being expressed by the same Affix); and thus, in this way, "there would be no harm done to the *denotability* of the Nominative."

To the above, other people make the following *reply*: The word

'Çoṇa' also can never denote the properties belonging to the Horse, until it has denoted the Horse itself; because we have never found any cognition of a thing appearing without taking in the properties belonging to it. While the class 'Horse' remains unexpressed, how could the word 'Çoṇa' be used to denote the *Redness* qualified by the *Class* 'Horse'? Because the 'Çoṇa' is nothing more than a particular form of *Redness*. Nor can it be held that "the property (*Redness*) would imply that object to which it belongs (the Horse)." Because the *Redness* exists in the *Cow* also. That is to say, it is only that which is invariably concomitant with something else, that can indicate this latter; while, as a matter of fact, we find that *Redness* is not invariably concomitant with the *Horse*; consequently all that the word 'Çoṇa' could indicate would be the 'substance,' with which latter alone is *Redness* invariably concomitant, and not any particular substance (in the shape of the Horse). Thus then, inasmuch as both *Redness* and *Horse* are non-concomitant with one another, they cannot indicate one another; and then, inasmuch as it would not be possible for either of them to take up the other,—and this latter would be brought up by something else,—we must admit the fact of the word 'Çoṇa' actually denoting the *Red Horse* (and not denoting mere *Redness* which would indicate the *Horse*).

But in this case, there is nothing to show that what is invariably concomitant (with the word 'Çoṇa') is the 'Horse', along with many other things. While in the case of the Nominative, we find that it is absolutely the only factor that is invariably indicated, and that too, in a particular form, by the *Bhāvanā*; as explained above (and hence there can be no real Analogy between the case of the word 'Çoṇa' indicating the Red Horse, and that of the Verbal Affix denoting the *Bhāvanā*, which would indicate the Nominative).

Or, we can even admit that what the word 'Çoṇa' denotes is only the *Property* that coinheres in the same substrate (i.e. the individual Horse) with the *Class* 'Horse.'

Question: "How could we have a cognition of the qualified (*Redness*) 'until we had that of the qualifying (*Class* 'Horse')?"

Answer: We do not admit the *Class* 'Horse' to be a qualification of *Redness* ('Çoṇatva'); because 'Redness' is a *Quality*, and as such forms a *Class* wholly distinct from the *Class* 'Horse,' and it is by a mere chance that it has become connected with this latter *Class*.

That is to say, if the word 'Çoṇa' had denoted mere *Redness*, then it could have stood in need of either a qualification by the *Class* 'Horse,' or a distinct potentiality whereby it could denote only that *Redness* which would coinhere with itself in the same substrate. As a matter

of fact, however, we find that, just as the word is not denotative of 'Sattā' (Being) or the Class 'Quality', so also it passes over the more extensive Class of "Redness" (in general), and restricts itself to the denotation of a particular kind of *Redness*. And this peculiar kind of *Redness* belongs only to the Horse, and not to the Cow and other animals; and it is for this reason that the word 'Çona' is found to be indicative of the *Horse* precisely, and not vaguely (and doubtfully), as in the case of the generic word 'Red'.

Question: "Which peculiar *Redness* is that which, being different from the Redness belonging to the Cow, etc., inheres in the *Horse*, and not in anything else?"

Answer: It is a fact known to all people that there is a distinct property for each Class; and this property is spoken of, sometimes in general, and sometimes in particular words.

That is to say, in all Classes, we distinctly perceive distinct properties of *Blackness*, *Whiteness*, *Redness*, etc., in keeping with the Individuals of each Class. And in some cases, there being no words expressive of the particular shade of the property meant, the property is spoken by the general word, the specification of the property being left to be done by something else;—while in other cases, there being words, like 'Çona,' expressive of the particular grade of the property, this is mentioned in its particular form;—while in a third case, the particular grade of the property is expressed by certain words of the Vernacular peculiar to each country;—e.g. we have the expression 'Rauhinikā gauḥ' for the 'red cow'; and the word 'rauḥinikā' would never be used in connection with the *red horse*, the *red cloth*, or any other *red* thing. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the 'Çona' (the Red Horse, i.e. the Chestnut Horse), the 'Kāruka' (the Horse born in the Karaka country), the 'Gaura' ('Fair') etc. are distinct classes of properties, belonging to the Horse, the Man and other things; and hence when pronounced, they indicate these latter also; just as the Class 'Cow' indicates the individual animal with the dewlap, etc. But this would not justify our speaking of the *Horse* and the rest as directly 'denoted' or 'expressed' by those words ('Çona,' etc.).

The same reasoning holds respecting such words as 'Kumāra' ('Boy'), 'Karabha' ('Elephant-cub'), 'Kalabha' ('young of the Camel'), 'Vatsa' ('Calf'), 'Varkara' ('Kid') and the like,—all of which are expressive of a certain age in the various animals, Man, Elephant, Camel, Cow and Goat respectively,—and though indicating these animals, they can never be admitted to be directly *expressive* of them, as has been already explained. That is to say, in all these words, though the element of *youthfulness* is common to all, yet each word marks that age in each

different animal, as evinced by the youthful ways peculiar to each class.

It has been argued above that, "In the case of the Cow also, inas-much as the word '*gauḥ*' would only denote the Number, Gender, etc. belonging to the animal,—and as the particular Class would be pointed out by these,—the Class itself would not form the denotation of the word."

To this we make the following reply: The Number does not vary in each different Class, in the way that we have found in the word '*Ṣaṇa*' etc.; and the word by itself, for that very reason, cannot denote both (the Number and the Class).

That is to say, if the idea of *singleness* in the Horse were recognized as different from that in the Cow,—in the same way as the *Redness* of the one was recognized as different from that of the other,—then what you say could have been admissible. Then again, in the case of the word '*Ṣaṇaḥ*', we have found that the basic noun '*Ṣaṇa*' by itself as one composite whole, becomes expressive of both the Property (of *Redness*) and the Class 'Horse'; and hence in order to avoid the consequent assumption of a multiplicity of denotative potencies in the word, we take it to be directly expressive of one of the two only; and then finding that it is not invariably concomitant with the "Horse", we conclude it to be expressive of the Property of *Redness*, with which it is found to be invariably concomitant. And we could say the same with regard to the word '*gauḥ*' also, only if, in the same manner, we found that the Class 'Cow' and the Number (Singular) being denoted by the same word ('*gauḥ*'), it was one of the two only (i.e. either the Class only or the Number only) that formed the direct denotation of the word, on the ground of that alone being invariably concomitant with it. As a matter of fact, however, we do not find this to be the case, because, the Number being a universal qualifying factor, we cannot perceive any difference in it (with reference to any particular Class). Nor can the word alone in its basic form ('*Go*') denote both (the Class 'Cow' and the Singular Number); because by invariable concomitance and non-concomitance, it is found that the word in its basic form denotes the Class, while the case ending denotes the Number. Nor could there be anything objectionable in accepting a multiplicity of denotations, when there is more than one denotative agent (in the shape of the basic noun and the case-ending). In fact when there is more than one denotative agent, if we did not admit of more than one denotation, then the use of one of the former (either the basic noun or the case-ending, f.i.) would be wholly superfluous.

Nor is there an invariable concomitance between the Number

and the *Numbered*, by which one of these being denoted, it would necessarily indicate the other; for instance, there is no number in the world that does not qualify (or belong to) the *Cow*, etc.; nor is there any Number which, while belonging to one object, does not belong to another (and thus there can be no invariable concomitance between the *Cow* and any particular *Number*).

Objection: "(What you say may be quite true as regards the 'Number') but the *Gender* is always denoted by the basic noun itself, "and as such this would be distinct with each *Class*; and hence being "invariably concomitant with it, it could denote that *Class*, exactly "like the word '*Ḍona*'."

Reply: It is not so: (1) because, in the case of inanimate objects, the *Gender* cannot be distinguished; and hence your reasoning could not set aside the fact of the *Class* '*Vṛksha*' ('Tree') being directly denoted by the word '*Vṛkshaḥ*' (instead of the *Gender* of the *Tree*, as you would have it); and (2) similarly, in a case where the feminine character is denoted by the feminine affixes, '*ṭāp*' and the rest, we would have the *Class* denoted by the word, prior to the addition of that affix.

That is to say, in the case of such words '*ajā*' and the like (= '*aja*' + '*ṭāp*'), the affixes '*ṭāp*' etc. being merely indicative of the feminine character, they do not become distinct denotative words by themselves; but all that they do is to create, in the previously existing word, a fresh potency (expressive of the feminine character). And yet, prior to the addition of these feminine affixes, we still find the word in a definite form ('*aja*' f.i.); and while we have yet to recognize its *Gender*, we come to recognize its capability of denoting the *Class* '*Goat*'; and this capability once recognized can never be set aside.

Similarly too, in the case of those words in which the Masculine or Neuter character is manifested by the case-termination (the words '*Sādhuḥ*' and '*Mudhu*' f.i.), we would have a denotation of the *Class*, prior to the manifestation of the *Gender*.

In the case of those words, however, in which, even before the addition of the case-endings, or after the elimination of these, the pure basic form of the word gives an idea of the *Gender*,—e.g. the words '*Hasti*', '*Nā*', '*Devadatta*', '*Ḍrī*', '*Sarit*', '*Toya*' and '*Vāri*'—if we admit what you say, there would be nothing objectionable in it. Or even in the case of these words, inasmuch as the meaning would be correctly recognized, even without a differentiation of the word (into its basic form and the case-ending),—it is the *Class* (and not the *Gender*) that should be regarded as the very first to be cognized, by a process of differentiation known to all men.

Then again, *Masculinity* etc. are properties belonging to the Individuals; and as such there can be no cognition of these before the Individuals have been cognized. While the Class is so intimately connected with the denotative potency of the word, that unless *that* is cognized, there is no cognition of any such potency in the word.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that it is the *Gender* that is indicated by the *Class*, and not *vice versa*. Specially as the *Gender* is always recognized as the subordinate element, and hence it could never set aside the denotability of the *Class* which is found to be denoted as the predominant factor. As a matter of fact too, we find that in the case of the words 'go', 'pāṇu' and the like, there is no manifestation of any *Gender*, as there is that of the *Class*. Consequently it is the *Class* that should be admitted as forming the denotation of the word. And in a case where it would not be incompatible with the *Gender*, it would indicate this latter also; and in a case where the *Class* is not compatible with the *Gender*, and this is cognized by some other means, it is this latter means that would serve as its indicator; or it would be either the *Class* as aided by the other means, or the basic form of the word itself,—we could assume anything we liked.

For these reasons, the case of such words as 'Go' and the rest (that denote the *Class*) cannot be said to be similar to that of the word 'Ḫōṇa'.

In the case of the words 'pacati' etc. also, if the *Number* were cognized as separate from all the other *Kārukas*, as following in the wake of the Nominative only,—like the character of 'Ḫṇatva,' which resides in the *Horae* only,—then, in that case, we could very well admit the fact of the Nominative being indicated by that *Number*. But that too would leave the Nominative *untenoted* (by the Conjugational Affix). As a matter of fact, however, we are cognizant of a difference in *Number*; and certainly we could not very well go on assuming the existence of an endless number of 'singlenesses', with regard to each single Individual that we might come across; and hence we cannot but accept the fact of the Nominative being indicated only by the *Bhāvanā* and the *Root-meaning*.

Then again, in the case of the assertion 'Ḫṇo dhāvati' ('the Chestnut is running'), we find that there is no other word (except 'Ḫṇaḥ') giving us an idea of the *Class*; and it is for this reason that in this particular case, we have admitted of the aforesaid complicated process of interpretation. That, however, cannot be admitted in the case in question. That is to say, if we had another word pointing to the 'horse' (in the case of the sentence 'Ḫṇo dhāvati'), then we could not have twisted this same word 'Ḫṇaḥ' so mercilessly. In the case of the *Number*, however,

we have the *Bhāvanā* and the *Root-meaning* that would bring forward (and indicate) the Nominative related to it; and hence there is no need for twisting the Number itself (into giving us the idea of the Nominative). And the special reasons, that we have for believing the Nominative to be indicated by the *Bhāvanā* alone, we have already explained before.

Thus then we find that, even when the Nominative is directly denoted (by the Verbal Affix) it is quite capable of bearing (to the Number f.i.) the relationship of the qualification and qualified; and consequently we conclude that the assumption of the denotability of the Nominative is wholly groundless.

The denotability of the Nominative having, in the above manner, been shown, by reasonings, to be groundless, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* proceeds to show the incompatibility of the view thus arrived at with the scriptures (i.e. the Rules and Maxims laid down in the Grammatical Scriptures).

"Inasmuch as we have the teacher's declaration that the basic word and the affix conjointly express the denotation of the Affix, we must admit that what is actually denoted by the Conjugational Affix is the Nominative, and also the Objective. That is to say, we have *Pāṇini's Sūtra* III—iv—69 laying down that the Conjugational Affixes denote the Objective, as well as the Nominative; and then again, inasmuch as the Substitute resembles that for which it is substituted (in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—i—56), the affixes 'tip' and the rest would also denote the Nominative and the Objective.

Objection: 'The *Siddhānta* theory having been shown to be contradictory to the verbal authority of the *Sūtra* itself (*Sūtra* III—iv—69), the bringing forward of the popular saying—*prakṛtipratyayaṇau pratyayārtham, etc.*, is wholly irrelevant.'

"*Reply:* How can it be said to be irrelevant, when it is necessary for the *Purvapakṣi* to establish the fact of the Nominative being the predominant factor (and it is only the Assertion quoted, and not the *Sūtra*, that has any bearing upon that point). And hence what is meant by citing the authority of both is to show that there are *Smṛtis* in support of the theory that the Nominative is directly denoted, as also that it is the predominant factor. Thus then the sense of the whole comes to be this: Inasmuch as the basic word and the Affix conjointly perform the work of denoting the meaning of the Affix, which latter is declared (in *Sūtra* III—iv—69) to consist of the Nominative as well as the Objective,—it must be admitted that what the Verb denotes is the Nominative and the Objective as qualified by the Action (denoted by the Verbal Root); and, as such there is a

"distinct contradiction between Direct Declaration (which connects the 'telling of lies' with the Nominative Agent) and the Context (which connects the same action with the Sacrifice).

"The *Sūtra* III—iv—69 (of *Pāṇini*) lays down only the denotability of the Nominative and the Objective. While the *Sūtra* '*Kartari śap*' (*Pāṇini* III—i—68) shows, in the first instance, that the Nominative is actually found, in usage, to be spoken of as denotable; and secondly, it also uses the form '*Kartari*' with the sequential Locative ending; and inasmuch as, in a number of words, the Nominative Agent itself cannot find a place in a sequential order, the sequence (signified by the Locative) comes to be recognized as pertaining to the word (denoting the Nominative),—in accordance with the *Sūtra* '*Ānarthakyaṅt taḍaṅ-geṣhu*' (III—i—18); the sense of the *Sūtra* thus coming to be that, "when the Conjugational Affix denoting the Nominative is preceded by, etc., etc."

"In any case we find that the Teachers (of Grammar) have distinctly laid down that the Nominative is denoted by the Conjugational Affix; and hence any reasoning to show that it is not denotable is most improper."

To the above we make the following reply: The Teachers of Grammar say nothing as to the relationship of the Denotative and the Denotable (i.e. they do not say anything as to certain things being denoted by certain words); this is inferred from actual usage, through the Apparent Inconsistency (of this usage).

That is to say, the incompatibility of Verbal Authority could be rightly urged only in that case where the Reasoning and the Verbal Authority both pertain to the same subject. In the case in question, however, we find that while the Reasoning treats of the question as to what is directly denoted, and what is indirectly implied (by the Affix).—the grammatical authorities cited treat of a wholly distinct question, as to which among a number of synonymous words is correct, and which incorrect, in form. And certainly when two things treat of two wholly distinct subjects, one cannot set aside the other, even though this latter may be weaker in authority; and a rejection is all the more improper when what is sought to be rejected treats of the wholly different subject of the denotation and implication by the Verbal Affix, and is as well known to all men as any fact of ordinary sense-perception.

Thus then, even if the Teachers of Grammar had actually made the declaration that 'the Nominative is denoted by the Conjugational Affix,' we could not attach much importance to such a declaration in the present connection, which deals with a wholly different subject. As a matter of fact, however, we find that they do not make such a declaration.

Objection: "But we have just cited the *Sūtra* III—iv—69 (which distinctly declares the fact of the Nominative, as well as the Objective, being denoted by the Conjugational Affix)."

Reply: True, you have cited that *Sūtra*; but in citing it you have looked into one part of the *Sūtra*-text and not into the whole of it. And certainly you cannot reasonably bring forward against one theory the incompatibility of the verbal authority of certain *Sūtras* the import whereof has not been fully considered in all its bearings. Because all scriptural texts give correct teachings, only when they are taken along with the other portions of the Context in which they occur.

If one could rightly bring forward the incompatibility of Verbal Authority, only in view of a portion of the Context, then, (1) in the case of the sentence '*should not drink wine*,' we could take out only the two words '*drink wine*,' interpreting them as enjoining the drinking of wine; and in that case one not drinking wine could be hauled up for disobeying this Injunction; and thus doing something against scriptural authority; (2) we could take the sentence '*one should perform the Agnihotra all through his life*,' by itself, apart from the other sentences found in the same Context; and in that case, even if one, who had passed through the ceremony of Initiation, should omit to offer the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, we could accuse him of having committed a grievous sin (as the sentence cited by itself makes the life-long *Agnihotra* as necessary for the Uninitiated as for the Initiated); (3) in fact, in Grammar itself, if we took the *Sūtra* '*mīṛṅṇah*' (*Pāṇini* VII—iii—82) entirely by itself (without taking it along with the other *Sūtra* I—i—5, which limits the application of the former), then the form '*Minna*,' without the *guṇa* (broadening of the vowel), would have to be pronounced *ungrammatical*. Consequently, it is not right for you to bring forward, against our theory, the incompatibility of any one disjointed part of the Grammatical *Sūtras*.

In support of our contention we have the following declaration: 'Any single part of the text, when taken independently by itself, expresses something wholly different from what is expressed by it when taken along with the whole, together with all its accessories and auxiliaries.'

Specially is this the case with the text of Grammatical *Sūtras*; because, in this, we find almost the whole Eight *Adhyāyas* of the *Sūtras* operating in the formation of a single word. Consequently it is necessary to avoid an incompatibility with that which is expressed by the *Sūtra* '*Lakṣarmanī*,' etc. (*Pāṇini* III—iv—69) when taken along with all its auxiliary *Sūtras*.

For instance, in the case in question, the full Injunction with regard to the Conjugational Affixes is completed by the following *Sūtras*:—III—i—1, 2, 3, 4, 91, 92, 93, 94; III—ii—123; III—iv—67; II—iv—

69, 77, 78; I—iii—12, 78; I—iv—106, 107, 108, 101, 102, 21, 22; and besides these many *Sūtras* relating to *Nomenclature* and *Definitions*, dealing with eliminations, additions, modifications of letters, etc., etc. And all these have to be taken as syntactically connected (forming a single sentence), laying down all that is necessary in connection with the Conjugational Affix ('tip' f.i.). And this syntactical connection is possible only when one *Sūtra* is taken as qualifying the other; and this relationship of the qualification and the qualified, between words having the same case-endings, is either by coextensiveness or its contrary; and is of the nature of that which subsists between the Action and the Agencies (*Kāraṇas*) pertaining to it, or that between the Primary and its Subsidiaries.

In the case in question, however, we do not find some of the above *Sūtras* to have any useful bearing; and hence we take up for consideration only the following *Sūtras*—'the Conjugational Affixes appear in the sense of the Nominative and the Objective' (III—iv—69), 'when there is only one Nominative we have the Singular Affix, when there are two we have the Dual, and when there are many we have the Plural' (I—iv—21, 22),—in connection with which we shall consider whether the relationship of the qualification and the qualified among them operates by coextensiveness or otherwise.

First of all, then, in these *Sūtras*, we find that the words 'one,' 'two' and 'many' are denotative of *Numbers*; and unless they denote these Numbers, they cannot be applied to any objects, as we have shown under the *Ākṛtyādhikaraṇa* (I—iii 30 *et seq.*). In fact, in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali, we find that he puts the question, in connection with the *Sūtra* '*Bahushu bahuvacanam*' (I—iv—21),—'*Kēshu bahushu?*' ('what are those that are meant by *bahushu* in the *Sūtra*?'),—and then, having put forward the objections to the wording of the question, he comes to the conclusion that the words '*bahu*' etc. (in the *Sūtras*, '*Bahushu bahuvacanam*' and the rest) signify *Numbers*; specially as we find him explaining the words '*bahushu*' and '*dvyaśrayaṇa*' (in the *Sūtras*) as '*bahutvā*' and '*dvitvāyakaṭvayaṇa*' respectively. Then he proceeds to put another question—'In the absence of an abstract affix, how can the declaration have an Abstract Noun for the predominant factor?' And to this question he gives the answer—'This is quite possible, when, in the very first instance, the Property is meant to be spoken of in its due predominance.'

The sense of this reply is as follows: There are three ways in which a Property is spoken of—(1) in certain cases it is mentioned, in the very first instance, independently by itself; (2) some Properties are mentioned as accessories to a certain substance; and (3) there are some which,

though really belonging to certain substances, are spoken of as abstracted from these substances.

That is to say, (1) in a case where, in the very first instance, the Property is meant to be spoken of independently, as a predominant factor by itself,—there is no appearance of the Abstract Affix, and the Property becomes connected with the substance, even without coextensiveness;—e.g. in the expression '*patasya çukluḥ*' (where '*Çukla*' = '*Çuklatra*'). (2) In a case where the Property is meant to be spoken of as subordinate to the substance, and no separation or abstraction is meant,—we have coextensiveness,—e.g. in the expression '*Çuklaḥ patuḥ*'. (3) Lastly, in a case where the Property is meant to be spoken of as subordinate to a substance, and its abstraction from it is desired subsequently,—we have the Abstract Affixes '*tva*' or '*tal*' attached to the word denoting the Property;—in accordance with the rule that, 'when a word denotes that Property the existence whereof in the substance makes the word applicable to it, then that word takes the Abstract Affixes *tva* and *tal*'; and in this case we have the expression '*patasya çuklatvam*'. In a case, however, where the Property is meant to be spoken of as an independent predominant factor by itself, the Property is not a qualifying Property at all, but an independent substance by itself; and hence there can be no application, through this Property, of the adjective expressive of it, to the substance; and as in this case, the Property does not affect ('*bhāvayati*') the use of the word denoting the substance, we do not find it spoken of by means of the Abstract Affixes ('*tva*' and '*tal*'). Specially because, inasmuch as the Property has been already *abstracted* beforehand, the use of an Abstracting (or Abstract) Affix would be wholly superfluous.

Objection: "If such be the case, then in all cases, that to which the Number would belong would always be in the Genitive Case."

Reply: It is quite true that such would be the natural consequence; but, just as in certain cases, the Adjective, with a view to point to the Substance to which the Property (denoted by that Adjective) belongs, becomes coextensive with the word (substantive) denoting that substance,—so, in the same manner, there is the coextensiveness, with the Adjective, of the Substantive which is used with a view to express the Property to which the Substance (denoted by that Substantive) is subordinate; specially as in both cases we have the same grounds for taking both (the Adjective and the Substantive) as non-different, or one of them as indirectly indicating the other. But even though such an expression would be correct in form, yet, inasmuch it is never found in actual usage, it does not become comprehended as quickly as it should be. If, however, it happens to be met with, in a certain case, then it should be explained in the manner shown above; this is all that we mean by putting it forward.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that even without the use of the Abstract Affix, we can speak, quite intelligibly, of a Property (Number f.i.) as the predominant factor. And it is only thus that we could justify the Dual number in the word '*dvēṣṭakayoḥ*' (in the *Sūtra* I—iv—22). For if 'two' and 'one' in the *Sūtra* meant 'two things' and 'one thing' respectively, then the total of these being *three*, we should have had the Plural Number; and in that case we should have had the form '*dvēṣṭakeṣu*,' if it referred to the objects qualified by the Numbers. That is to say, if the expression were meant to speak of the *Substances qualified by the Number*, as the predominant factors, then in that case, the 'two' Substances together with the 'one' Substance would make up *three*, and thus necessitate the use of the Plural ending. When, on the other hand, it is the *Numbers* that are meant to be spoken of as the predominant factors, then, inasmuch as 'Duality' and 'Singleness' would be the predominant factors meant to be spoken of, they would take their own Numbers; and as such there would be only two factors (those of 'duality' and 'singleness'), and we would have the Dual ending; and as such the form '*dvēṣṭakayoḥ*' would become justified.

Question: "How is it that the Abstract Affix does not denote the 'substance qualified by the Property?'"

Answer: The chief reason for this lies in the fact of the wish of the speaker being of various kinds. Or, if the *Sūtra* '*Bahushu bahuvacanam*' (*Pāṇini* I—i—21) meant that 'we should have the Plural Number whenever we have *bahuvra*'—then we would have the Plural Number in cases where the word '*bahu*' is used in the sense of *great, large quantity, big, extensive, etc.*, as in the case of such expressions as '*bahnḥ samudraḥ*,' '*bahurodanaḥ*'; as also in connection with all numbers above 'two,' which have the common character of 'being above two.' [Both of which would be inadmissible; as in the former case, the expression itself would be absurd; while in the second the Plural applied to the Numbers over twenty would be wrong, as all such numbers are laid down as to be used always in the Singular.] As a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Sūtra* uses the word '*bahushu*' (and not '*bahuvā*'), with the sole view of showing that the Plural ending should be used only for the denoting of that number which depends upon diversity among the individuals. And thus it is that we have the expression '*bahurodanaḥ*' [without the Plural; simply because there is no diversity among the individual grains of the rice].

We find in the *Mahābhāṣya* that, against the theory of the Number being the predominant factor, has been raised the objection that in accordance with that theory, we could not have the expression '*śte manyantaḥ*,' because '*śku*' signifying *singleness* as the predominant factor, it

should have had the Singular ending; but this objection has been met by showing that in such expressions the word 'eke' means 'others' (and as such is capable of taking the plural ending).

Thus it becomes established that what the *Sūtras* '*Bahushu bahuvacanam*' etc. (I—iv—21, 22) mean is that we have the Plural ending where there is *multiplicity* ('many-ness'), and the Singular and the Dual endings, where we have *Singleness* and *Duality* respectively.

Thus then, in connection with the Injunction of Conjugational Affixes, we have the following two declarations:—(1) Inasmuch as the affix '*tip*' is substituted in the place of the Conjugational endings, it should be taken as used in the sense of the Nominative (in accordance with the *Sūtra* '*lakṣarmanī*, etc.' III—iv—69). (2) Inasmuch as the affix '*tip*' is called a 'singular affix,' it appears only when there is *Singleness*. Thus then, we have two alternatives: (a) that the Nominative and the Singleness are both related to the '*tip*,' without being related to each other,—in this case the sense of the above two declarations being that 'the *tip* affix appears either in the sense of the Nominative, or in that of Singleness';—and (b) the meaning of the two declarations is that 'the *tip* affix appears when there is *Singleness of the Nominative*,'—in this case, the Nominative and Singleness bearing to each other the relationship of the qualification and the qualified.

The former alternative is untenable; as the *tip* cannot be related to any one of them unless they are specified (or qualified) by the other. Because, in accordance with this alternative, we would have the *tip* affix even in a case where we have more than one Nominative; as also whenever there would be *Singleness*, even in any of the *Kāraṅkas*.

That is to say, if it be held that the *tip* affix is laid down as to be used, in connection with the *Nominative*, or with *Singleness*, each of these being independent of the other, then, at the time of actual usage also, we would have the same independence; and hence we would have the '*tip*' also in cases where we have two or more Nominative agents; as also when we have *Singleness*, even in connection with the other *Kāraṅkas*.

Consequently (in order to avoid these anomalies) we should, at the very outset, admit of the fact of the *Nominative* and *Singleness* being related to each other by the relationship of qualification.

And this relationship is by coextensiveness, because of the two taking the same case-ending (the expression being '*ekasmin kartari*'). And as for the relationship by *Vaiyyadhikaranyā* (difference in the substrata), inasmuch as no such relationship is directly expressed by the words, it could only be due, either to the process of indirect Indication (by one or the other), or to the modifying of the case-endings (the form being changed into '*Kartuḥ śhatvam*'). In fact, in the case of the said

coextensiveness also, for the sake of the established predominance of the Number, it is the word 'Kartṛ' (Nominative) that betakes itself either to the indirect indicating (of 'kartṛguṇa,' the property of the Nominative), or to the attributing of non-difference (between the Nominative and the Number relating to it);—and not so the word 'śka'; because if this latter did so, then the Substance related to the Number would become the predominant factor. And hence we conclude that in the expression 'kartuḥ śkatvā' we have the Genitive (in 'kartuḥ') in the subordinate factor, simply with a view to show, by direct denotation, the object that is related (to the predominant factor of the Number) by coextensiveness.

Or, we may explain the expression 'karturēkatvā' in the following manner: Inasmuch as the two words denote two distinct things, they cannot be coextensive; and when there is no coextensiveness, they cannot have the same case-ending; nor could the desired relationship be expressed by any other ending save the Genitive; and without such a relationship, the sense that is desired to be conveyed would not be possible. And hence, the changing of the case-ending of one of the two being inevitable, inasmuch as the Number has already been shown to be the predominant factor, and as it is in connection with the qualification that we always have the Genitive ending,—it is the case-ending (the Locative) of the word 'kartari' that is changed into the required Genitive,—and this process gives us the expression 'karturēkatvā' (in the place of 'śkasmin kartari').

In any case, there is not the remotest possibility of the modification of the case-ending of 'ēkatvā'; as any such modification would give us the idea of a wholly different object; because if we have the expression 'ēkatvāya kartari karmani ca,' then the sense would be something wholly different, viz.: 'One who does the Singleness, and whose action that is'.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole set of *Sūtras* comes to be that the Numbers—Singleness etc. as qualified by the Nominative or the Objective—are denoted by the Conjugational Affixes; and hence there is no incompatibility in our theory with the verbal authority of the said grammatical rules.

The said *Sūtras* being explained in the above manner, the conclusion that we have arrived at by a course of reasoning—viz., that 'there is no denotation of the *kāraṇas* because of their being indicated by the *Bhāvana*'—would be found to be quite in keeping with the sense of the *Sūtras*. And the words of the *Sūtras* also—such f.i. as 'dvyēkayoḥ' and the like—would have their scope limited by the said reasonings; and as such would be in keeping with the reasonings relating to the qualifications, the qualified, etc. etc.

The sentence in the *Bhāṣya*—'*Laukikanyāyānugataṣa sūtrārthaḥ*'—may be explained in a different sense also, which would be as follows: In

ordinary experience we find that the Number (denoted by the Conjugational Affix) is always recognized as qualified by the Nominative or the Objective; and the sense of the *Sūtras* would be in keeping with this fact of ordinary experience, if these were explained in the way shown above. Otherwise, if each *Sūtra* were interpreted by itself, independently of the other, the *Sūtra* would come to mean that the Conjugational Affix denotes the Number and the *kāraka*, each independently of the other, which would be totally contrary to the aforesaid fact of ordinary experience.

Nor would this be all; in fact the sense of the *Sūtras* would become incompatible with those reasonings that are put forward by the *Vaiyākaraṇas* themselves. While if the Number is taken to be denoted (by the Conjugational Affix) as qualified (by the Nominative or the Objective), then all things become duly reconciled to one another.

Against what has been said above, the opponent might bring forward the following *Objection*: "The above interpretation of grammatical rules is the mere outcome of the ingenuity of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, who is exceptionally clever at the manipulation of sentences and their constructions and interpretations. The view that the *Vaiyākaraṇas* themselves take is not such as has been shown by you."

Reply: The authority of the Grammatical writers also points to the same conclusions that we have arrived at; the declaration of Patanjali himself being to the effect, that 'When Singleness etc. form the denotations of Affixes, the Objective and the rest become their qualifications.' The sense of this is that in treating of 'Plurals,' and 'Anabhihita Nominatives and Objectives,' the authors of both the *Vārtika* and the *Bṛāhmya*, having discussed, in great detail, the two theories of the 'Objective' and the 'Singleness' (being the denotation of Affixes), are found to have come to the following flawless conclusions: What is denoted by the Affixes are *Singleness*, etc.; otherwise, we could have the Plural Number in any and every word (without restriction); and further it would not be necessary to lay down the rules for the use of the Nominative and the Objective terminations on the condition of the Nominative and the Objective being 'not expressed' ('*Anabhihita*') for the appearance of the Nominative or Accusative terminations; as even in other places (i.e. where we have not these terminations, but only verbs, like '*pacati*,' which latter, according to you, would denote the Nominative or the Objective), we would not have the denotation of that which has been already denoted. For if the Objective were already denoted by the Conjugational Affixes, Nominal affixes or Compounds, then there would be left no reason for any further denoting of the Objective by the Accusative (or the Nominative terminations), with a view to which we should have had the conditional *Sūtra* '*Anabhihite*' [preceding the *Sūtras* laying down the case-terminations]. On the

other hand, when the Objective etc. are not denoted (by the Conjugational Affixes, etc.), then, unless we had the *Sūtras* specially laying down the Accusative terminations, with reference to the Singleness, etc. of that Objective, we could not have the Accusative ending in such cases. [And hence it is only in accordance with our theory that we can justify the conditional *Sūtra* 'anabhihitē']. Specially as it makes no difference in reasoning, whether the Objective etc. are or are not denoted.

It is in view of these facts that, in recapitulating the position taken up by the author of the *Vārtika* (Kātyāyana), Patanjali has declared— 'It is only when the *Singleness*, etc. are denoted by the Conjugational Affix, etc. that the conditional *Sūtra* 'anabhihitē' becomes necessary; while if the *Objective*, etc. were denoted by them, the *Sūtra* would be absolutely meaningless.'

Objection: "In the *Mahābhāṣya*, we meet also with this declaration " (to the contrary): 'When the Objective, etc. are denoted by the Affixes, " then the *Singleness* etc. appear as qualifications' [and hence we cannot " admit the fact of the *Mahābhāṣya* lending unqualified support to the " position taken up by the *Mīmāṃsaka*]."

Reply: The sentence quoted by you represents the position opposed to Patanjali's own; and though, as such, it did not deserve a place in the *Mahābhāṣya*, yet Patanjali has put it forward, simply by way of admitting the opponent's view, for the sake of argument. The sense of the whole being that, even when the *Objective* etc. happen to be the objects qualified (by the Number), and as such, being the predominant factors, form the denotations of the Affixes,—even then, *Singleness* etc. are actually denoted, as their qualifications; because they could not serve as qualifications, unless they were themselves fully denoted (or expressed); and as for the *qualified* factors, they are got at by other means; and it is a well-known fact that, under such circumstances (where the qualified is got at by other means) the Injunction betakes itself to the qualifying subordinate; as we find in the case of the Injunction 'lohitoshvishā riviṅgaḥ pracaranti' (where the *Riviks* and their *pracaraṇa* being found to have been laid down elsewhere, the Injunction contained in the sentence is taken as applying to the subordinate factor, the 'red turban' only).

Or, we can take the word 'artha' (in the phrase 'vibhaktyarthaḥ') as signifying 'purpose'; the sense being that 'when they (the objective etc.) constitute the purpose, then the case-termination is used for the sake of them.'

Or again, inasmuch as both the above declarations of Patanjali are equally in keeping with the nature of things, we can take both of them as equally true, but limited in their scope,—the former pertaining to the Conjugational Affixes, and the latter to the Declensional Affixes; and

certainly we do admit the denotability of the Objective etc. by those latter affixes.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the rules regarding the Plural etc. are the same with regard to both (the Conjugational and the Declensional Affixes), there must be an uniformity in them; and hence just as the Conjugational Affix (according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*) would denote the Number qualified by the Objective etc. and not the *kārikas* themselves,—so would it also be in the case of the Declensional Affixes. And in that case, your theory would be incompatible with such expressions as—*'yatkaranābhidhāyinyā ṛtīyāvibhaktiā samyujya nirdiṣṭi,* *'tadāgamē hi tad dr̥ṣyatē,* *'tasya jñānum'* etc. (which are found in your own *Bhāṣya*)."

To this some people make the following *reply*: Inasmuch as we find that it is quite possible for the same rule to be taken differently, in accordance with the different purposes served by it, with regard to different objects,—and that the nature of the qualifying relationship is found different in different cases,—we speak of the *Number* as the qualified factor, in the case of Conjugational Affixes, and as the qualifying factor in that of the Declensional ones.

If however this explanation should not satisfy you, we offer you another: Though the Rules do not accept the denotability of the Objective etc., yet they speak of such denotability, only for the sake of the accomplishment of that which has been accepted as the *denotable* (i.e. the *Number*).

That is to say, we find that the grammatical rules often speak of the 'denotability' of certain factors, merely as a conventional technicality, for certain definite purposes. But this mere technicality can justify our acceptance of such denotability, as an actuality, in ordinary parlance. Nor have we any rules laying down that the *Objective and the rest are never denotable*; what they do lay down is that these Objective etc. are the qualifications of the *Numbers, Singleness* etc. which are the actual denotations (of the Conjugational Affixes),—as we have already explained above. Hence it must be admitted that the Objective and the other *kārikas* always serve as qualifying subordinates (in the case of Conjugational Affixes). Thus then, in a case where the Objective etc. are not found, either by reasonings, or by Verbal authority, to have the said denotability,—they are at once recognized as absolutely undenotable. In that case, however, where it is found that unless themselves denoted, they could not serve as qualifications,—we must, for this *reason*, admit them to be denotable. Or again, on the ground of the Apparent Inconsistency (of the denotability of the *Number*, which would not be quite possible without a denotation of its qualifying subordinate, in the shape of the *Objective* etc.), we can

accept the denotability of these to be laid down by the grammatical rules also.

In the case of Conjugational Affixes, however, we find that the Nominative (or Objective) is indicated by the *Bhāvanā*, and as such, quite capable of serving as the qualification (of Number); and hence, in this case (there being no Apparent Inconsistency) it is not necessary to admit its actual direct denotability. But in the case of the Declensional Affixes, we find that either the denotations of the basic words, or the *Singleness* etc., are not invariably concomitant with the *kārakas*,—inasmuch as they appear both with and without these latter; and hence their capability of indicating any of the *kārakas* is set aside (by the said non-concomitance); then again, in this case, we do not find the word denoting either the *Bhāvanā* or the *Root-meaning*, or any other factor indicative of the *kārakas*; hence, inasmuch as without the denotation of the *kāraka* itself, it would not be possible to have the denotation of the *Number qualified by that kāraka*, we must (on the ground of this last Apparent Inconsistency) accept the *kāraka* also to be directly denotable.

Objection: "Inasmuch as the Noun is never used by itself, it is "necessary that it should always be accompanied by a Verb; and as this "Verb would denote a *Bhāvanā*, it would be as indicated by this *Bhāvanā* "that the *kārakas*, in this case of Declensional Affix also, would be "connected with the *Number* denoted,—exactly as in the case of the "Conjugational Affixes."

Reply: How could it be so, when, as a matter of fact, we find that in sentences, whereof the order of sequence among the words is not fixed, the Noun is used before the Verb, (e.g. in the sentence '*Vrksham chin-dhi*'); and in this case we find that the cognition of the *kāraka*—'*Vrksham*'—appears before that of the Verb; and certainly this cognition (of the *kāraka*) would not be possible unless the *kāraka* were denotable, independently by itself.

Objection: "Even in this case, as the *kāraka* would not be a true "*kāraka*, unless connected with the Verb, the *kāraka*-endings would not "appear until the relationship with the Verb were distinctly shown. "And hence in this case also, the *kāraka* would be preceded by the Verb " (and hence the conditions would be exactly the same as those in the "case of the Conjugational Affixes."

Reply: This is quite true, as regards the speaker 'of the sentence '*Vrksham chin-dhi*'; but as regards the person to whom the sentence is addressed, at the time that he hears the first word '*Vrksham*,' he has no idea of any Verb or of its connection (with the word heard); consequently what he does is to recognize the *kāraka* alone as expressed by the word ('*Vrksham*').—and then, through Inference, or through Apparent Incon-

sistency (of the *kāraka*-character which is not possible without a Verb denoting an action), he comes to have an idea of the Verb which the speaker may have previously determined upon.

If it were not so, there would be a mutual inter-dependence. Because the Verb would indicate the *kāraka*, and this latter would indicate the Verb; and neither of these would have an independent basis of its own. In all cases of two things related together, it is necessary to accept one of them to have a basis independent of the other. But in the case in question, if the *kāraka* were to be indicated by the Verb, —then it would be necessary to explain by what the Verb is indicated. Then, we find that the basic Noun '*Vṛksha*' (in the sentence '*Vṛkṣam-chindhi*') cannot indicate the verb; because what the word denotes is the *Class* characterized by the presence of branches etc. Nor could the denotation of the basic Noun indicate it; as this is quite possible even without the *action* expressed by the verb (and as such there could be no Apparent Inconsistency justifying the indication).

The following might be urged by the opponent: "There is no such thing as is absolutely devoid of some sort of an action; consequently in the case of all Nouns, we would always have the indication of some such Verb as 'is', 'exists' and the like. Or again, the indication of the Verb would be by means of the *kāraka*, which is always accompanied by a Verb, in accordance with the rule that 'the Verb is in the Present Tense Singular is always understood even where it is not actually uttered.'"

But this is not possible; because even when such intransitive verbs, as 'is' and the like, are actually uttered, what they indicate is only the Nominative (which alone is its necessary concomitant), and not necessarily the Objective and the other *kārikas*. That is to say, the Verb that is indicated by the denotation of the basic Noun, is only some such generic one as 'is' and the like; but this Verb is not capable of indicating all the *kārikas*; consequently we should look out for some other agency for the indication of the Objective etc. Then, we find that the case-endings do not signify the Verb, by which the Objective could be indicated. Nor is the Number (denoted by the ending) capable of indicating any particular Verb or *kāraka*, as we have explained before. Consequently, we can find no other indicator of the Verb, save the idea of the *kāraka* itself. And such being the case, if the Verb also were to be the indicator of the *kāraka*, then this would be a clear case of mutual inter-dependence, which would make both (the idea of the Verb, as also that of the *kāraka*) equally devoid of a foundation.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that, in the case of the Declensional Affixes, it is the *kāraka* (Objective or Nominative) that is

denoted by the Affix; and the *kāraka* indicates the Verb, in keeping with its own character, through the relationship borne by them to each other.

Objection: "In the case of a sentence in which the Verb precedes the Noun (e.g. '*chindhi vrksham*'),—inasmuch as the Verb, capable of bearing the relationship of the *kāraka*, would be recognised before this latter,—and as in this case the Verb would have the capability of indicating the *kāraka*,—the Affixes would denote the Number only."

Reply: Such would certainly have been the case, if the sentences had always begun with the Verb. As it is, however, we find that there is no fixity in the order in which the words of a sentence might occur; as we have sentences in the form of '*gām paçya*,' as well as in that of '*paçya gām*.'

Hence it cannot be denied that, in the case of Declensional Affixes, the Objective and other *kāra*kas are denoted by them.

Objection: "If such be the case, then there would be no fixity in the denotative potency of Affixes (as it would vary with the order in which the words in the sentence would be found)."

Reply: This could not be; because when the denotative potency (that of the Affix with regard to the *kāra*kas f.i.) will have been once definitely ascertained, in connection with the sentence in which the Noun precedes the Verb,—could it ever be set aside in the case of another sentence? Specially as the relationship between words and their denotations is not transitory; and it has already been shown above that this relationship is conditioned by the mutual limitation imposed by the potentialities (of the Word and its Denotation) upon each other.

The opponent might bring forward the following counter-argument: "When, in connection with the sentence in which the Verb would precede the Noun, it will have been definitely ascertained that the Affix is incapable of denoting the *kāra*kas,—inasmuch as it would be necessary for the potency of the Affix to be of one kind only, it would follow that the Affix is absolutely without the capability of denoting the *kāra*kas."

But this is not admissible; because, as a matter of fact, there is nothing incongruous in the fact of a potency, though existing, being inoperative; as such inoperativeness may be due to its purpose having been already fulfilled. On the other hand, when the potency does not exist, it would be absolutely useless to seek for its effects.

That is to say, in all cases we find that a certain thing may be existent or non-existent. And as it would not be possible for both existence and non-existence to be accepted at one and the same time, we must accept only one of them; and under the circumstances, it is the existence that should be accepted; because when something exists, even if we do not perceive any of its effects, there would be nothing incongruous in this;

as it is quite possible that this absence of its effects may be due, either to certain obstacles in the way of its due functioning, or to the absence of the necessary auxiliary causes, or to the fact of the effects having been already brought about by other causes. When, on the other hand, the thing does not exist, even when its supposed effects would appear, it could not be got at even by the gods themselves; and as such we would have to admit the appearance of an effect without a cause (an absurdity),—as we have already explained in course of our explanation of the eternality of the relationship (between words and their denotations; *vide Çloka-Vārtika*, section, '*Sambandhākṣēpārihāra*').

Consequently when the denotative potency (of the Affix with regard the *kāraṇas*) has been definitely ascertained, it will operate, to its fullest extent, in the case of the sentence in which the Noun precedes the Verb; while it will be indifferently inoperative in the case of the sentence where the reverse is the case (i.e. where the Verb precedes the Noun); or even in this latter case, it would serve the purpose of setting aside the idea that the *kāraṇa* is inferable, and not directly denotable, by words.

Thus then, it is established that the Declensional Affixes denote the *Objective* etc.

As for the Conjugational Affixes, inasmuch as their order of sequence is always fixed, the Nominative and the Objective are always indicated by the Denotation of the Root and the *Bhāvanā*; and it is only subsequently that those two (the Nominative and the Objective) come to be connected with the Number (denoted by the Conjugational Affix); and there is no occasion for admitting of any denotative potency with regard to the *kāraṇas* (the Nominative, the Objective and the rest). Consequently it is fully established that the Nominative and the Objective are always the objects of Inference (or Apparent Inconsistency) [in the case of Conjugational Affixes.]

At this stage of the discussion, a certain *Vaiyākaraṇa*, very clever at ingenious argumentation, comes forward with the following arguments:—

"Inasmuch as we find a verb in the Singular when there is one Nominative Agent, in the Dual when there are two, and in the Plural when there are more than two,—we must conclude that it is the Nominative that is denoted by the Conjugational Affixes. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the verb—'*pacati*' f.i.—always follows, in all things, the word—'*Dśvadattaḥ*' f.i.—that is used to point out the particular Nominative Agent; and this could only be due to a

"coextensiveness between the two; coextensiveness too is possible only when the two factors concerned pertain to the same object. Consequently, in the case in question, the necessary coextensiveness could be obtained only if the word '*pacati*,' in general, denoted the Nominative Agent, *Dēvadatta*.

"It might be argued that the word '*pacati*' may indicate the Nominative, in the way shown under the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—33 *et seq.*) and the *Arunādhikaraṇa* (III—i—12 *et seq.*).

"But this could not be, because the Nominative (in the sentence '*Dēvadattaḥ pacati*') could not be indicated by the 'cooking' ('*Pāka*'), which subsists in the *Rice*; in fact the 'cooking' could indicate only the singleness etc. inhering in the *Rice*, and not a thing that inheres in another substratum.

"The following might be urged: 'Inasmuch as the actions of *laying the pot on the fire* and the rest (that go to make up the action of *cooking*) inhere in *Dēvadatta*, these actions might be taken as meant by the word '*pāka*' ('*cooking*')."

"It is true that these actions are called 'cooking'; but the coordination (between *Dēvadatta* the Nominative and the Verb) could not be through those actions. The case of the *Arunādhikaraṇa* is different from this; because in this latter we found that the class 'cow' and the Property of *Redness* brought about, in regard to the object qualified by them (i.e. the individual cows, ideas in keeping with their own characters; and hence we admitted the Elimination of the Possessive Affix (by taking '*aruna*' as '*arunavat*') and the Imposition of Identity (of the class on the Individual); and it was on account of these two causes, that the words were found to have brought about the necessary coordination. In the case in question, however, we find that the sentence does not give rise in us to any idea of such actions of *Dēvadatta*, as the *laying of the pot* etc.; and hence we cannot admit of any such facts as the Elimination of the Possessive Affix and the Imposition of Identity. Consequently, just as we never find the word '*Daṇḍa*' to be coextensive with '*Dēvadatta*', in any such sentence as '*Daṇḍo Dēvadattaḥ*',—or just as we have no such expression as '*Adhiprayanādayo Dēvadattaḥ*', or '*Pāko Dēvadattaḥ*',—so, also, we could not have the expression '*pacati Dēvadattaḥ*'!

"Thus then, we have the following (inferential) arguments in support of our view:

"(1) The word '*pacati*' is denotative of the Nominative and the Objective,—because it is coextensive with the word expressive of these,—just as in the case of the words '*pakti*' and '*pakvaḥ*'!

"By the expression 'coextensive with the words expressive of these'

“we mean the ‘identity of substrates.’ The sense of the Instance is that “in the case of the Nouns formed by *kṛt* affixes,—which are admitted “by all parties to be denotative of the Nominative, etc.,—e.g., in the “sentences ‘*paktā Devadattaḥ*,’ ‘*pakva odanaḥ*’ and the like,—we actually “find what we hold to be the case with the expression ‘*pacati*’ “*Devadattaḥ*.’

“(2) In a case where there is no word denotative of the Nominative “or the Objective, we do not find any coextensiveness; e.g. in the case “of the word ‘*pākaḥ*’ (i.e. we have never such an expression as ‘*pāko* “*Devadattaḥ*’; which shows that the very presence of the expression “‘*pacati Devadattaḥ*’ shows that there is a coextensiveness between the “denotations of these two words, and that therefore the word ‘*pacati*’ “must be taken as denoting the Nominative).

“(3) Then again, the word ‘*pacati*’ must be denotative of the “Nominative,—because it is found to follow the changes of Number that “are made in the word expressive of the Nominative,—just as is the case “with the two words cited above (‘*paktā*’ and ‘*pakvaḥ*’).

“That is to say, we find such expressions as ‘*pacati Devadattaḥ*,’ “‘*pacato Devadattayajñadattaḥ*,’ ‘*pacanti Devadattayajñadattavishnu-* “*dattāḥ*’; and from these we infer that the Number of the Verbs is “exactly the same as that in the words expressing the Nominative. “Wherever we find such to be the case, (i.e. such keeping in accordance “with the Number of the Nominative word) we find the word to be “actually denotative of the Nominative; e.g. in the case of the word ‘*paktā*,’ “in connection with which also we have such expressions as ‘*paktā* “*Devadattaḥ*,’ ‘*paktārau Devadattayajñadattaḥ*,’ and ‘*paktāraḥ Deva* “*dattayajñadattavishnūdattāḥ*.’ So also in the case of the Nominative, “we find the expressions ‘*pacyatē odanaḥ*,’ ‘*pacyētē odanaḥ*,’ ‘*pakva* “*odanaḥ*,’ ‘*pakvaḥ cakaudunau*,’ and so forth,—all of which serve as “instances similar in character to the minor term of the syllogism (i.e. the “word ‘*pacati*’).

“(4) [The word ‘*pacati*’ denotes the Nominative and the Objective] “Because it is found that the rules of grammar lay down the dropping “off of the Nominative and the Objective endings, on the occasion of “these being denoted (by other words—e.g. the verb); for the corroborative instance of similarity, we have the same that have been brought “forward before; while that of dissimilarity we have the sentence ‘*Dēva-* “*dattāḥ pacyatē*.’

“That is to say, for the following reason also the Verb must be “regarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective: Because “we find a dropping off of the case-endings whose appearance is “conditioned by the fact of the *Kāraṇas* being ‘not-denoted,’—e.g. ‘*pacati*

"*Devadattaḥ*" and "*pacyatē odanaḥ*." If the Verb were not denotative of "the Nominative, then there would be nothing to justify the dropping "off of the affixes laid down by such *sūtras* as '*anabhihitē karmaṇi dvitīya*, "*(Pāṇini)*, '*karṭṭhakarapoyostṛīyā*' (*Pāṇini*) [as the Nominative, etc. "would always be '*anabhihita*,' not being '*abhihita*' or denoted by any "other word, such as the Verb];—such as we find in the expression "*'pacyatē Devadattlēna*,' '*pacatyodanaḥ*.' As a matter of fact however, in- "asmuch as we find that these affixes are actually dropped off, we con- "clude, from this, that, like the words '*paktā*' and '*pakvaḥ*,' the Verb "*('pacati')*" is denotative (of the Nominative and the Objective). This "instance of similarity having thus been shown, it becomes necessary "to show that of dissimilarity; and this we have in such sentences as "*'pacyatē Devadattlēna*, etc.,' in which we find that, inasmuch as the Verb "does not denote the Nominative, there is no dropping off of the Nomina- "tive ending.

"(5) The Verb denotes the Nominative and the Objective;—because "it expresses the qualifications of these,—just as the Ear, being the "indicator of the letter '*a*,' is indicative of *Sound* in general.

"That is to say, if the word '*pacati*' did not denote the Nominative "and the Objective, then how could it denote a particular qualification of "these, in the shape of *Number* (which you also accept as denoted by "the Verb)? To assert that it does not denote them, and that it denotes "their qualification, would involve a self-contradiction. For instance, "the Ear is not found to be non-indicative of *Sound* in general, and yet "indicative of the particular sound of the letter '*a*.' And for words, "there can be no other indicativeness than that of being denotative. If "the Nominative were indicated by the *Bhāvanā*, then the indicator of the "Nominative would be something (i.e. the *Bhāvanā*) which is itself "denoted, and not a word. And for this reason also, the Verb must be "regarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective.

"(6) Lastly, the Nominative and the Objective are denoted by the "Verb,—because of the connection of these with qualifications,—as that "which is itself not denoted could never be connected with its qualifica- "tions.

"That is to say, for the following reason also, the Verb must be "regarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective: Because "we find these connected with their qualifications,—e.g. in the sentences "*'ṣoḇhanaḥ pacati*,' '*ṣoḇhanaḥ pacyatē*.' Whenever we find them con- "nected with their qualifications, we find them to be denoted; e.g. in the "expressions '*ṣoḇhanaḥ paktā*,' '*ramaṇīyaḥ pakvaḥ*.' On the other "hand, where there is denotation of these, there we do not find them to "be connected with any qualifications,—e.g. in the expression '*ṣoḇhana-*

"*māsyatē*" (where the Verb does not denote either the Nominative or the "Objective"). Nor could the connection with qualifications belong to "that which is indicated (by the *Bhāvanā*, f.i.); e.g. though the word "smoke" indicates the *Fire*, yet it does not indicate it as connected with "the qualifications of Heat, Brightness, and the like.

"All these arguments the *Bhāshya* has indicated in the single argument—'*nanu karturēkatvānāḍkavacanam*, etc.'; and hence it has not "shown them in detail. The sense of the *Bhāshya*-argument is that the "relationship of the Nominative with the number of the Verb could not "be possible, unless there were, between them, coextensiveness, etc., etc.

"In view of the above arguments, it must be admitted that the only "reasonable theory admissible is that the *Nominative* (and the *Objective*) "are directly denoted by the Verb."

To the above, we make the following *reply*: It has been urged above that 'the word *pacati* is denotative of the Nominative and the Objective, because of its coextensiveness with these' (I and II).

(1) If by this argument, you seek to infer the existence of the particular denotative potency,—then, inasmuch as the way, to such a potency, of all means of right notion is blocked by the aforesaid explanation of Apparent Inconsistency, you would be contradicting the authority of Negation. And it is a well-known fact that of all potencies, Apparent Inconsistency is the only means of cognition; and inasmuch as in the case in question, this Inconsistency is capable of being explained in another way (i.e. by means of *Bhāvanā*), it could not justify the assumption of a distinct potency.

(2) Your argument is also contrary to the following Inferential arguments:—(a) The word '*pacati*' is not denotative of the Nominative and the Objective,—because it denotes something with which they are invariably concomitant (i.e. the *Bhāvanā*),—and that which denotes something with which another thing is invariably concomitant can never denote this latter,—e.g. the word '*çiṅcapā*,' being denotative of the class '*çiṅcapā*' which has the class 'tree' for its invariable concomitant, does not denote the latter. (b) Similarly, the Nominative and the Objective are not denotable by the Verb,—because the Verbal Affix does not abandon its own denotable object; (c) also because they are cognisable, even without the operation of the Verb,—just like the substance; or like the class 'Tree' by the word '*çiṅcapā*.' (d) They are not denotable by the Verb,—because they are *kāraṇas*,—like the Instrumental and the rest. (e) The word with the Verbal Affix is not denotative (of the Nominative and the Objective),—because it is a Verb,—like the word '*āsyatē*.'

It might be urged here that—"Your arguments are as opposed to universally recognised facts as the assertion that 'the moon is not-moon.'"

But it is not so; if we had absolutely denied the fact of the Verb signifying the Nominative, etc., or that of these latter being signified by the Verb, then alone could we be accused of asserting something contrary to universally recognised facts. As it is, however, what we do is to deny the absence of the capability, in the Verb, of *directly denoting* the Nominative and the Objective, and that, in these latter, of being *denoted* by the Verb; and certainly in this denial there is nothing incompatible with any commonly recognised facts. Because ordinary people rest contented with the fact of having the mere idea (of the Nominative and the Objective) brought about by the Verbal Affix; and they do not take the trouble to make any distinctions as to what is *directly denoted*, *indicated*, *implied* and what forms the subject (of the Verb).

If what you have sought to prove, by the aforesaid series of arguments, be the mere fact of the verb giving some sort of an idea of the Nominative and the Object,—then all your effort is absolutely superfluous; as we also admit of a cognition of these being brought about by the Verb, through the *Bhāvanā*.

In fact it is your theory that is contrary to popular notions. Because what is got at by any other means, is never attributed, by ordinary men, to the action of denotation; for instance, the *form* of the word, being cognised by the Ear, is never held to be *denoted* (by the word itself). [Hence inasmuch as the idea of the Nominative, etc. is found to be got at through the *Bhāvanā*, people cannot attribute it to the denotative action of the word].

The other fallacies, pertaining to the conclusion, could also be brought forward against the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, by putting forward the various alternatives as to the denotation of word being based upon the letters themselves, or upon the *sphota*, or upon the *class*, etc.,—and also as to whether the denotable object consists of the potency of the word, or the substance, or the *kāraṇas*,—and lastly, by putting the question as to whether the *denoted* is different or non-different from the denotative word,—as we have explained before (in the *Śloka-vārtika*).

Then again against each inferential argument, we can bring forward the following objections:—

I. As regards the 'coextensiveness' urged in the first argument, we ask,—is this coextensiveness (a) directly denoted or (b) indirectly indicated?

(a) As for its being directly denoted by the Verb, such cannot be admissible for either of us. "Why so?" Well, because, for us all that the Verb denotes is the *Bhāvanā*; and for you, the *kāraṇa* is nothing

more than a mere potency; as it is only such words as '*Dēvadatta*' and the like that denote *substances*, and not *potencies*; consequently, if the Affix would denote the *kāraka*, it could denote it only in the form of the *potency*, and in that of the *substance*, as the *substance* is not the *kāraka*; while for one, who holds the *kāraka* to be the *substance*, it would be necessary to admit the *potency* as its necessary qualification;—as without potency, there can be no functioning of the substance. Consequently, in accordance with the *Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—30), the denotation must be accepted to be that of the *potency* (and not of the *substance*); and as such no 'coextensiveness' with substance would ever be possible.

Nor do we find any word, mentioned along with the Verb, that could denote the *potency*,—and with which word there could be a directly denoted 'coextensiveness.' Because such a word could only be in the form ending with a case-ending; while as a matter of fact, we find no such case-ending in the case in question.

In the case of one who holds the *kāraka* to be a *substance*, that substance, which, somehow or other, would be recognised as having the character of the *kāraka*, would wholly lose its character, and would, therefore, pervade over all the *kāraḥ* that there might be in the sentence, —just like the *Class* (which pervades over all individuals); and as such it could be spoken of as all these other *kāraḥ* also. Nor can it be urged that "the same would be the case, even if the denotation consisted in the potency." Because when a number of potencies exist in a certain substance, each of these is expressed, or not expressed, in accordance with its appearance and disappearance (and hence in this case there would be no possibility of all of them being expressed all at once); while as for the *substance* itself, inasmuch as it can be of one form only, there can be no ground for the exercising of any option with regard to it; and as such there could never be any chance of its being spoken of in any other way (and thus the objection urged above does not apply to our case).

If words with the Conjugational and the Declensional Affixes be accepted as denoting *substances*, then, on account of their being connected with definite genders, etc. they would have the character of '*Sattva*' (i.e. a '*Being*' or '*Entity*' which is defined as that which is capable of a definite Gender, etc.),—just like the words with the *kṛt* affixes. That is to say, just as in the case of the word '*Pācaka*' (which is formed with a *kṛt* affix), we find that, inasmuch as its denotation consists of the substance as the principal factor, we have the notion of its being an '*Entity*,'—so would we also have in the case of the words with Conjugational and Declensional affixes (if these also had the *substance* as the principal factor in their denotation). And hence, just as we have such expressions as '*pācakam brūhi*,' '*pācakēna kṛtam*,' '*pācakāyu dēhi*' etc., the

word '*pācaka*' taking many other *kārakas* (case-endings),—so also we would come to have in connection with the sentence '*pacati odanam*' (the word '*pacati*' also taking along with it all the *kāraka* endings, which is an impossibility).

Consequently in accordance with the theory of the denotation (of words with the two kinds of affixes) being that of the *kāraka* with a certain potency, it must be admitted that the Conjugational and Declensional Affixes denote the factor of the potency alone, as abstracted (from the denotation of the whole word).

And in that case, when the substance will have been taken up by one potency that will have appeared first, it could not, at the same time, be connected with any other potency. And thus it becomes established that the Verb '*pacati*' differs from the word with the *krt* affix, which has the substance for the principal factor in its denotation,—on account of the following facts: (1) It is not capable of taking up more than one *Kāraka* at a time (while the latter is); and (2) it is devoid of Gender and Number.

Thus then, it is proved that the directly-denoted 'Coextensiveness' is not possible for any of us.

(b) If, on the other hand, the 'coextensiveness,' upon which your premisses are based, be one that is indirectly indicated, or without any qualifications,—then inasmuch as even in the case of such expressions as 'the lion of the boy' we find such a 'coextensiveness,' though that does not make the word 'lion' directly denotative of the *Boy*,—the 'coextensiveness' could not be accepted as invariably concomitant with 'denotativeness'; and thus your premiss would be 'too wide.'

Then again, even in the case of the directly-denoted 'coextensiveness,' we would ask—what do you mean by this 'coextensiveness'? It means 'sameness of substrate'; and this must mean 'sameness of denotation'; as in no other way could the denotation be the substrate of the word; as in reality, the word can have no substrate (according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*); or, even if it has, it can have only the *Ākāṣa* for its substrate (according to the *Naiyāyika* and others). As for the denotation, it is spoken of as the 'substrate' (of the word), because it is cognised as its object. And this ('substrateness') also will have to be qualified by the epithet 'primary,' with a view to preclude such indirect significations of it as indication and the like. And thus the word 'coextensiveness' ('*Sāmānādhikaranyā*') comes to signify 'the fact of the directly-denoted substrate being the same,' which means that the 'object' or 'denotation' is the same.

For these reasons your argument comes to mean this: "The word '*pacati*' is denotative of the Nominative *Davādatta*,—because it is synony-

mous with the word '*Dēvadatta*,'—i.e. because it denotes *Devadatta* "; and this reasoning would be exactly like—'Sound is transient, because it is transient,'—the premisses being contained in the conclusion (thus involving the fallacy of *Begging the Question*, *Petitiō Principii*).

(c) In accordance with the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (I—i—25), and the *Adhikaraṇa* at the close of *Adhyāya* VI,—we can raise the question as to whether the 'coextensiveness' meant is that of the two words ('*Devadatta*' and '*pacati*'), or that of their denotations,—at the time of the actual utterance (of the sentence '*Dēvadattah pacati*'); and then we can show that neither of these alternatives being possible, the premiss becomes absolutely uncertain (or impossible); and also that, the words in question not being different in character from the words '*Go*,' '*Aṣva*,' etc. the premiss would be too 'wide.'

(d) Then again, by the same reasons that have been shown above, in connection with the inferences brought forward against those of the opponent, it can be shown that 'coextensiveness' in the primary form is impossible; and this also would make your premisses absolutely uncertain.

II. Then again, we may show your reasoning to be subject to another fallacy,—that of having counter-arguments to the contrary (which shake its validity).

III. As regards your *Instance* also,—(a) if it be taken as cited with regard to the denotation of the *potency*, then it becomes inapplicable to the Major Premiss (of your syllogism); because the words '*pācaka*' and the rest (that have been cited as instances) do not pertain to any *potency*; they pertain to *those possessed of the potencies*, because they are incapable of being connected with any other potencies,—as we have already explained above.

(b) If the words '*pācaka*, etc.' pertained to *potencies*, then, the instance would not be applicable to your Middle Term,—just as has been found to be the case with 'coextensiveness' in its primary form.

(c) If the case of the word '*pacati*' were similar to that of the word '*pācaka*, etc.' then, like these latter, it could not denote the *potency* that forms the principal factor; and hence your argument would prove quite the contrary of the particular property (in the word) that you seek to prove.

IV. And further, inasmuch as the directly-denoted 'coextensiveness' is impossible, while the indirectly-indicated is found to exist in the case of non-denotative words (e.g. in 'lion of the boy'),—your argument would be 'contrary' (to what is sought to be proved). Specially as we have shown, under *Sūtras* I—IV—23 and III—ii—1, that there is no denotative *potency* either in the case of indication, or in that of secondary signification.

Thus then it cannot be said that your argument is unchallengeable.

The fallacies shown above, in connection with your first argument, may be shown to relate to your other arguments also.

(a) For instance, with regard to your *third* argument, it may be shown that, the taking up (by the Verb) of the *Number* (of the Nominative) is not possible, in connection with the *potency* (in which the *Kāraṇa* consists). That is to say, no one accepts the *number* as belonging to the *Kāraṇas* which have been shown to consist of certain potencies; as *numbers* always belong to *substances* (and not to potencies). If then, it be held that the Verb would be denotative of that substance whose number it would take up,—then there would be a contradiction of what has been admitted before; as there is no *Vaiyākaraṇa* who admits of the fact of the Verb being denotative of a *substance*.

(b) If then, the 'taking up of the number' be meant to be that of the number belonging to that which is *indicated* by the Noun, either by an imposition of identity, or by the process of secondary signification:—and as such, your premiss be one that is to be taken in its secondary signification,—then, inasmuch as such would be the case with the words 'lion' and 'boy' also,—as we have such expressions as '*Simha Devadattaḥ*,' '*Simha Devadattayajñadattaḥ*,' and '*Simhā Devadattayajñadattarīṣumitrāḥ*,'—your premiss would become too 'wide.'

(c) In the case of the word '*pācakaḥ*,' (that has been cited as an instance in support of this argument also), we find that that part of it which denotes the *nominative* of '*pacati*' (i.e. the basic noun), does not take the varying *numbers* of the noun ('*Devadatta*'); as does the affix (and not the basic word) that signifies the *Simha*. And thus your instance does not apply to your Middle Term.

(d) And that part of the word which does take up the varying numbers,—i.e. the Affix,—is not found to be denotative of the Nominative; and thus, in this case, the instance is inapplicable to the Major Term.

(e) For these reasons, it is necessary that a certain word with the instrumental ending should be cited as the corroborative instance of your syllogism. But this too would be open to all the objections that have been urged above, against 'Coextensiveness': and so this too could not serve your purpose.

(f) There is yet another 'uncertainty' attaching to your argument: As a matter of fact, we find that though the word '*Go*' does not denote the *substance* (but the *class*), yet it takes up the varying numbers of the substance (as we find in the words '*Gauḥ*,' '*Gāvaḥ*' and '*Ġāvaḥ*'). [And this shows that if a word take up the varying numbers of a certain substance, it is not necessary that it should be denotative of that substance; as you seek to prove by means of your syllogism]. If you retort by saying

that the instance (of the word 'Go') that we have cited does not go against your argument,—then (with a view to convince you) we shall explain to you the whole of the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—30);—wherein we have found that the *Bhāṣya* has raised the question—*which ones of the various reasons are capable of rejecting the Inference?*—and in answer to this, it has brought forward the presence of counter-arguments,—and thereby having shown the opponent's argument to be uncertain, it has come to its own conclusion, in the words 'just as the word in the denotation of the *Class*,' etc. etc.

The fourth syllogism that you have brought forward is that based upon the fact of the Nominative and other affixes dropping off on account of their being denoted (by the Verb)—. (a) And if what is meant by the 'dropping off of affixes' be the dropping off of *all affixes*, then it is not true (as regards the sentence in question '*Dēvadattaḥ pacati*'); because the Nominative affix that we find (in '*Dēvadattaḥ*') is a *Denoted-Kāraka-Affix*. (b) If, however, the 'dropping off' meant be that of any Affix, then, inasmuch as there is such dropping off of those affixes that serve the purposes of mere denial, and yet these are not denotative—the premiss would be too wide. And we find that, on account of the exclusion in the *Sūtra* '*ubhayapraptau karmāṇi*' (Pāṇini II—iii—66) the Genitive pertaining to the Objective does not denote the Nominative—though it does bring about the *dropping off* of Nominative-Genitive Endings, that are connected with the *action* denoted by the word with the *kṛt affix* [and thus the mere 'dropping off of affixes' cannot serve as the reason for denotability of the Nominative].

It has been argued above that (in the sentence '*pacati Dēvadattaḥ*' and *Devadattina pacatāḥ odanah*) we would have those Accusative and Instrumental Endings that are laid down as appearing in the case of non-denotation (of the Objective, etc. by the Verb). But this is not possible; because as a matter of fact, we know that wherever an affix appears, it does so with the purpose of bringing about an idea, either of *Number* or of the *Kāraka*; while in the case in question, we find that both of these (the *Number* and the *Nominative*) are fully established by the *Bhāvanā* and the Declensional affix.

That is to say, in the sentence '*pacati Dēvadattaḥ*,' the Nominative is found to be signified by the *Bhāvanā*; and as for the *Number*, it is signified by the verbal Conjugational Affixes; and what is then left unexpressed, for the sake of which we could have another Affix?

Question: "When, as a matter of fact, there is quite a group of '*Kārakas*' (in the sentence under question), how is it that the *Bhāvanā* "should indicate only the Nominative character of *Dēvadatta*, and not the "character of any other *kāraka*?"

Some people explain thus: "This is due to the peculiar capability in 'Devadatta,' whereby he is recognised as the Nominative. That is 'to say, he is capable of being the Nominative of 'cooking,' and not of 'being its Objective or Instrumental, or any other *kāraka*. And the Verb is never related to anything that is not a *kāraka*, and it is for this reason that it is his Nominative character that is taken up."

But this explanation would not apply to the case of the sentence '*kāṣṭhāni pacanti*'; because the 'fuels' are 'capable,' not of the Nominative character, but of the Instrumental, as is well known. [And hence the Nominative ending in '*kāṣṭhāni*' would not be justified on the afore-said ground].

The following might be urged in favour of the aforesaid explanation:—
 "In the sentence '*kāṣṭhāni pacanti*' the *kāṣṭha* (fuel) is not indicated (by the *Bhāvanā*) to be the Nominative agent, (of the *cooking*), but as the Instrumental, the said ground of 'capability'; and this *instrumentality* being indicated by the *Bhāvanā*, the verbal affix (in '*pacanti*') would signify the Number (plural) of that Instrument; and hence, (just as in the case of the sentence '*Dēvadattaḥ pacati*'), the Nominative character of '*Dēvadattaḥ*' does not bring in its specific case-ending (that of the Nominative-Instrumental, in the form of '*Dēvadattēna*'),—so in the same manner, the Instrumentality of the 'Fuel' also does not bring in its own case-ending (that of the Instrumental) [and the reason for this is that the effect, in the shape of the indication of the number of the *Kāraka*, has been already brought about, just like the Nominative, by the *Bhāvanā* and the Verbal Affix]. In the same manner, in the sentence '*sthāli pacati*,' the containing-character of the *sthāli* (cooking pot) does not bring in the Locative ending; in the sentence '*tanulālāḥ pacanti*,' the objective character of the 'Rice' does not bring in the Accusative ending; in the sentence '*Kuṣūlāḥ pacati*,' the character of the '*Kuṣūla*' (granary) of being the source from which the rice is got, does not bring in the Ablative ending; and in the sentence '*Brāhmaṇāḥ pacanti*,' the fact of the *Brahmanas* being the recipients of the cooked rice does not bring in the Dative ending. In all these cases, it is only the *capability* that serves as the reason for the appearance of the particular case-endings."

But this is by no means possible; because in all the sentences cited, all men recognise the nouns as Nominatives.

Says the upholder of the explanation in question: "In the sentences cited, there is no cognition of the Nominative; the cognition that we have is of the various *kāraṅkas* (the Objective, etc.); but this appears to be the cognition of the Nominative, because, on account of the persisting idea of the well-known character of the Nominative signified by the Verbal Affix, there is an idea of all the nouns in question being co-

"extensive with the said Nominative. But when one comes to carefully look into the matter, he can fully distinguish the presence of the several *kāraḥas*. For instance, even in a case where the 'cooking vessel' is cognised as the Nominative (as in the sentence '*sthāli pacati*'),—the functioning of the vessel towards the cooking is in no other way save in that of containing the rice cooked. That is to say, that function, which it performs while serving as the container of the rice, is exactly the same which it performs while it is cognised as the Nominative. And hence it is far more reasonable to accept it as simply spoken of as Nominative, while it really serves the purposes of the container.

"When, however, the Nominative is denoted by the *Lakāras* (the conjugational forms),—inasmuch as these forms do not appear in connection with the Container (*Adhikaraṇa*), etc.,—and hence no 'co-extensiveness' (of these with the Nominative) would be possible in this case,—and as the Verbal Affix would not denote the Number (pertaining to the *sthāli*),—one would necessarily expect the appearance of the Locative ending, etc.; and hence it will have to be admitted that it is only with a view to explain the actual presence of the Nominative ending (in '*sthāli*'), that we speak of the Container and the rest as having the character of the Nominative, signified by the verbal affix. When, however, the Nominative is not denoted by the conjugational forms, that which is meant to be spoken of as being related to the number signified by the Verbal Affix would be duly cognised, even if it did not bring in its special case-ending; because it will have obtained its result, and the Ending is only one such result; while the other *kāraḥas* (i.e. those that are not meant to be spoken of as connected with the said number) would certainly bring in their respective case-endings.

"*Objection*: 'If such be the case, then, inasmuch as all the *kāraḥas* would be indicatable by the *Bhāvanā*, and equally capable of being related to the number (denoted by the Verbal Affix), there could never be an appearance of the Accusative and other case-endings.'

"*Reply*: This objection does not apply to the case in question; because, though the *kāraḥas*, being indicated, in their forms, by the *Bhāvanā*, could not bring about their respective case-endings for that same purpose (of indicating those forms),—yet the number signified by the Verbal Affix becomes fully utilised by being connected with any one of the said *kāraḥas*; and hence for the sake of the other numbers (i.e. those belonging to the other *kāraḥas*), it would be necessary to make use of the other case-endings.

"*Objection*: 'That number alone, which is signified by the Verbal Affix, would be equally related to all the *Kāraḥas* (and hence the use of no case-endings would be necessary).'

"*Reply*: How could that *number*, being one only, be related to all? "If it did become connected with all of them, different numbers would "have to appear (in regard to each *Kāraṇa*). As for the possibility of "the various numbers being optional alternatives,—we accept it as nothing "undesirable for us. Because even this option would be limited by "actual usage; and the assumption could not be carried on just as one "might happen to wish at the time of using the word. Consequently, it "must be admitted that it is the word that has been used, at the very "outset, with the Nominative case-ending, which is meant to be spoken of "as connected with the Number denoted by the Verbal Affix; and hence "the other words would stand in need of the case-endings belonging to "the several *Kāraṇas*.

"*Objection*: 'But in a case where the number denoted by the Verbal "Affix is the *Plural*, inasmuch as there would be enough numbers to be "connected with every one of the *Kāraṇas*,—there would be no necessity, "in this case of the case-endings pertaining to these *Kāraṇas*.'

"*Reply*: This also is quite acceptable to us,—in a case where all "the *Kāraṇas* are spoken of as equally related (to the Verb), as in the "case of the sentence '*Kāṣṭhādīni pacanti*' (where every one of the "*Kāṣṭhādī*' is similarly related to the action of cooking). When however, "the Verbal Affix denotes the Plural Number pertaining to the Nomi- "native only,—while the other *Kāraṇas* are directly spoken of as mere "subsidiaries,—then, inasmuch as, on account of the fact of the Nomi- "native being the first to be mentioned, and also of its being the predomi- "nant factor, the Number would be connected with the Nominative,—and "as there would be no reason for passing over this Nominative,—the "Number could not betake itself to the other *Kāraṇas*; consequently it "becomes wholly swallowed up in the Nominative; and as for the Num- "bers of the *Kāraṇas*, they are expressed by their own respective case- "endings.

"*Objection*: 'If such be the case, then in all cases, the Number "denoted by the Verbal Affix would never pass over the Nominative; and "in that case, how could we have the expression *Sthālī pacati* (where we "find the Number signified by the Verbal Affix betaking itself to the "Container (of the Rice) ?'

"In reply to the above, we put the question:—Which of the following "two alternatives is more reasonable to accept,—whether that the Num- "ber (denoted by the Verbal Affix in *Sthālī pacati*'), for some reason or "other, passes over the Nominative, and betakes itself to the Container? "or that the expression actually speaks of the '*Sthālī*' itself as having "the character of the Nominative, which is, by itself, capable of being "related to the said number?

"There can be no question as to the latter alternative being the more reasonable of the two,—namely, that the '*Sthāli*' is meant to be spoken of as possessing the character of the Nominative. Because we do not find any reason, by which the principal factor (the Nominative) should be passed over (by the Number in question); and as for the Nominative character being meant by any person to be expressed, there can be nothing objectionable in that. As a matter of fact, we find that wherever two meanings are possible, it is only right that we should desire the one or the other to be conveyed by the word; and in the case in question, we find that, all the *Kāraḥas* are endowed with the character of the Nominative, with regard to their own respective functions; specially as the diversity of the *Kāraḥas*, with regard to the principal Verb, could not be possible, if they were wholly devoid of the Nominative character, in regard to their own respective functions. Consequently, it is only right that this Nominative character should be accepted as that which is desired to be spoken of (by means of the word '*Sthāli*'); and as such the Verb ('*pacati*') cannot be taken as denoting the numbers pertaining to the other *Kāraḥas*.

"Thus then, the same reason would also apply to the case where the Verbal Affix denotes the number of the *Objective* (e.g. in the sentence '*taṇḍulaḥ pacyatē*') [*i.e.* in this the *Bice* is endowed with the character of the Nominative]. But the same reason does not apply to the other *Kāraḥas* (besides the *Objective* and the Nominative); and as such there is a distinct limit to the application of the said reasoning.

"And thus, the '*anabhihita*'-rules would be explained as follows:—
 "When we have the singleness, duality or plurality, of the *Objective* not mentioned, (then we have the Accusative Ending), etc., etc., etc.' The qualification 'not-expressed' ('*anabhihita*') could rightly be applied to that alone with reference to which we find the case-endings laid down; and it cannot be applied to the qualification of this latter. Because no qualifications could apply to that which is the subordinate factor (*i.e.* the *Kāraḥas*). As a matter of fact we find that '*singleness*' and the rest are what are *qualified*, and as such, being the predominant factor, cannot brook the connection of any other qualification. It is for this reason that we have a declaration, in connection with compounds, to the effect that—'even if the Primary factor be wanting in certain elements, it can form a compound.' Consequently the *sūtra* '*anabhihita*' (*Pāṇini* II—iii—1) must be explained as 'when the singleness, etc. are not explained.' "

But in accordance with this interpretation, we would have the Accusative Ending in both words, in the expression '*Kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*'; as in both of them we have the *singleness* of the *Objective* 'not-expressed.' It

might be argued that inasmuch as the *singleness* is expressed by the Nominative Ending, there could be no Accusative Ending ('non-expression' being the necessary condition for the appearance of this latter). But this is scarcely correct; because the possibility of the appearance of the Accusative Ending precedes that of the Nominative.

Then again, in the sentence '*Kaṭam karoti bhiṣmanuḍḍam darganiyam*,' the number of the Objective having been 'expressed' by the Accusative Ending in '*Kaṭam*,' we could not have that ending in the other words ('*Bhiṣma*' etc.).

Objection: "The same might be urged against one who holds that 'the Accusative and other endings denote the objective, etc. (because in that case also, as the objective character will have been expressed by the 'Accusative in '*kaṭam*,' the same affix could not appear in connection 'with the other words).'"

Reply: Not so; because he takes '*anabhihita*' as a preclusive *sūtra*, meaning that 'when the objective etc. are not expressed by *Verbal Affixes*, or *Nominal Affixes*, or *Compounds*'; and in the case in question the Accusative in '*Kaṭam*' is not included in any of these three; and as such the objective character expressed by it could not preclude itself from the other words.

Objection: "For me also, the *sūtra* would serve the purposes of the "said preclusion."

Reply: This could have been possible, if the number were denotable by the *Kṛt* and other affixes also (i.e. the affixes other than the Verbal and the Nominal). As a matter of fact, however, we do not find any such Affixes, either laid down to be expressive of the number, or actually expressing it, in any sentence. Consequently it is the Verbal conjugational Affix only that can be accepted to be expressive of *number* (the Nominal Affixes and Compounds not expressing the Number by themselves). As for the Objective, etc., on the other hand, they are expressed by all (i.e. the Verbal Affix, the Nominal and *Kṛt* Affixes, etc., etc.); and this constitutes a great difference between the denotation of *Number* and that of the *Objective*, etc. And hence it is quite possible for the Accusative Ending to appear in connection with such (*kṛt*) words as '*kṛta*,' '*pācaka*,' and the like. Consequently another explanation must be given (in regard particularly to the sentence '*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*').

And the only explanation that is possible is as follows:—

In the sentence '*kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ*' also, the *Objective* character is expressed by the '*kṛta*' affix (in '*kṛtaḥ*'); and on this character having been expressed, the mere *Number* could not bring in the Accusative Ending (in '*kaṭaḥ*') [and hence there could not be any Accusative Ending in the sentence].

For one for whom the *Kāraḥas*, the Objective, and the rest, are denoted (by the Verbal Affix),—as also for him who regards the *singleness*, etc. as qualified by these (Objective, etc.) to be denoted by it,—the fact of being 'not-expressed' ('*anabhihita*') must be taken as qualifying the Objective and the other *Kāraḥas*; the meaning of the *sūtras* being—that 'when the Objective is not-expressed we have the Accusative,' or that 'we have the Accusative Ending in connection with the *singleness*, etc. that reside in the Objective that is not-expressed.'

Though the Objective and other *Kāraḥas* are the subordinate factors, yet they become connected with qualifications. It is only when the subordinate factor forms part of a compound that it does not remain capable of any relationship with words outside the compound; when, however, it appears as a distinct part of the sentence,—as in the sentence '*Ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*'—we do find the subordinate '*Rāja*' being actually related to the qualification '*Ṛddha*' (Rich). This is what would constitute the difference between a compound and a sentence. As for the Objective, etc. we find them appearing in sentences; and hence even though they be the subordinate factors, yet they are capable of being qualified by the conditional 'not-expressed' with regard to their own respective case-endings.

Objection: "If such be the case, then, in the sentence '*pacati Dēva-dattah*,' we should have the Instrumental-Nominative ending for the expression of the Number of the Nominative, which is not-expressed. It cannot be argued that, 'on account of the Number having been already included in the denotation (of the word '*pacati*'), it would not be necessary to have the Instrumental ending.' Because this reasoning would not be compatible with the case of the words '*bhīṣmam*,' etc. (in the sentence '*Kutaṅkaroti bhīṣmamudāram*, etc.'), where it has been shown that even though the Objective has been signified by the Accusative in '*kaṣam*,' yet we have it also along with the other words ('*bhīṣmam*' and the rest). If the Instrumental Ending would not appear, for the mere reason of the Instrumentality having been already indicated, then, inasmuch as the Number signified by the Nominative Ending would also have been already indicated, there should be no appearance of the Nominative Ending. It might be argued that 'the Nominative Ending would appear, simply because the mere basic Noun could not be used by itself (without a case-ending).' But this could not be; because in that case what we would have would be the Instrumental-Nominative, which is the case-ending laid down as pertaining to the Nominative agent,—and not the mere Nominative Ending."

Reply: The anomaly that you have brought forward is not through

any Reasonings, but through Verbal authority; and a Reasoning that is contradictory to Verbal authority is not capable of doing anything.

For these reasons the word '*anabhihite*' (in the *sūtra*, *Pāṇini* II—iii—1) must be taken in its secondary sense, indicating the fact of *not being cognised in a particular form*. Thus then, in the words '*pacati*' and '*pacyatē*,' we find that, on account of their paying special regard to the relationship of *Number*, we do cognise the Nominative and the Objective respectively, in their particular forms, and as such they do not take these case-endings—the Instrumental-Nominative in the case of the former word, and that of the Objective in that of the latter (as both those characters have been found to be 'expressed'). As for the other *Kāraṅkas* however they are never cognised in the aforesaid particular form; and as such they always bring up their respective case-endings.

We have already expressed before how, though all are equally '*Kāraṅkas*,' yet the *Bhāvanā* (denoted by a Verb) indicates only two of them, the Nominative and the Objective, and the Number too (that is denoted by the Verbal Affix) is related to these only (and not to the others).

It has been argued above that—"in the case of such Impersonal forms "as—'*nēha bhuṅyatē*,' '*nēha pacyatē*,'—we find that all that is denoted "by the Verbs is the mere action of '*eating*' or '*cooking*,' and there is no "indication of the Nominative or the Objective; and as such the Root-
"meaning and the *Bhāvanā* cannot be accepted to be invariably concomi-
"tant with these (*i.e.* the Nominative and the Objective); and as such
"the *Bhāvanā* cannot be regarded as necessarily indicative of them."

To this we make the following reply: Inasmuch as this *non-concomitance* (that you bring forward) rests upon the word, it applies as much to our theory (of the Nominative being *indicated* by the *Bhāvanā*) as to that of its being directly *denoted* (by the Verbal Affix); because the *non-concomitance* of the Denotative is as undesirable as that of the Indicative. That is to say, you have shown that in the case of Impersonal forms the Verb is found to be non-concomitant (with the Nominative and the Objective); and from this you have argued that it cannot be indicative of these latter. But, inasmuch as the word (Verb) does not denote the Objective, we would not have any denotativeness in the case of the sentence '*odanaḥ pacyatē*.' Even though non-concomitant, if the Verb, in this latter case, were yet to perform the denotative function, by being aided by some other agency,—then for us also, it could similarly perform the function of indicating the same thing. And hence, just as for the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, the *denotativeness* of the Verb is cognised through such agencies—as the Transitive and Intransitive Verb, the presence of intermediate affixes other than '*cyan*,' and certain particular prefixes,—so would also its *indicative*

new (as held by us); and hence the above taunt could not be reasonably directed against us.

Otherwise, we find that the particle 'tē' (that we find in 'pacyatē') is found in all the three forms of Verbs—the Active, the Passive and the Impersonal, (e.g. 'edhatē,' 'pacyatē,' and 'bhūyatē'); and as for the particle 'yatē,' that too is common to all such forms, as that caused by the Intermediate affix 'cyān' ('mr̥syatē'), that due to the 'Yak' affix of the *Ātmanēpada* ('kandūyatē'), the 'kyān' affix (*kr̥ṣṇāyatē*); consequently, the signification of the Nominative would be extremely doubtful, if it were to be denoted by the Verb.

For these reasons, both the theories, yours as well as mine, could be equally justified only in the way in which the denial of Concomitance and Non-concomitance has been refuted before, under the *Tadbhūtādhikaraṇa* (I—i—25). But, in view of various other reasons shown above, adherence should be accorded to the theory that the Nominative is indicated (by the *Bhāvanā*).

Or, we may take the word 'anabhihitē' in its direct denotative sense.

Question: "But, in that case, why should not we have the Instrumental (Nominative) in the sentence 'pacati Devadattah'?"

Answer: Simply because its appearance has been negatived (i.e. precluded by the condition of being *not-expressed*).

Question: "How has it been precluded?"

Answer: It has been precluded by the fact of the Nominative having been expressed by the Verbal Affix.

Question: "As you now admit the fact of the Nominative being 'denoted by the Verb,—wherefore should you have taken all the trouble 'you have, to show that it is not so denoted?'"

Answer: We did that for the sake of (with reference to) ordinary parlance of the world, and for the *Veda*,—and not for grammatical purposes.

Question: "Are the purposes of grammar something different from those of ordinary life and the *Veda*?"

Answer: Certainly; for instance, such technical words as '*Vṛddhi*' and '*Guna*' are not found, either in ordinary parlance or in the *Veda*, to denote *āt-aic* and *āt-ān* respectively.

Question: "It may be possible for such technical names and postulates as you have cited to be something unconnected with ordinary parlance; but that cannot be said of the significations of Basic words and Affixes; because these latter that are used in grammar, are not 'wholly apart from ordinary parlance and the *Veda*.'"

Answer: How can you say that no such are used, when we find such assertions as '*Lak karmāṇi ca*, etc.' (*Pāṇini*), where we meet with the

word 'Laḥ' used as signifying the Nominative and the Objective, while there is no such word either in ordinary parlance or in the Veda.

Objection: "It is only natural that the word 'la' should be used for 'the *lādēṣas*'—the substitutes for 'la,' i.e. the affixes '*tip*' and the rest; "as it is a general rule that the attributing of a certain meaning to the "original (i.e. 'la') is always for the sake of the substitute."

Reply: This is scarcely admissible; (1) because in that case by taking the letter as signifying the substitutes, we have recourse to the indirect process of Indication; (2) and it could be only an indirect Indicateness that would pertain to the substitutes through the original. That is to say, though the word we hear is only 'la,' yet, we would take it as signifying the substitutes; and this would involve a rejection of Direct Denotation. Then if the Objective and the rest also be said to form the denotations of the letter 'la,' then, inasmuch as they are not actually denoted by it, they could not be recognised as so expressed, until the substitutes had been brought in. And yet, all this would be quite contrary to reason. Thus then, it being absolutely necessary to assume a certain unreasonable fact, it would be far better to assume that 'la' is the conventional technical name for the Nominative and the Objective; because what should be admitted as denotative of something with which it is invariably concomitant; for while in the condition of mere 'la' it could not denote anything, unless such denotativeness were conventionally and technically attributed to it. And thus when we come to consider the question,—as to whether the attributing of the particular signification to the letter 'la,' by the *sūtra* '*laḥ karmani, etc.*,' is done through the substitutes ('*tip, etc.*'), for the sake of ordinary parlance and the Veda, or only for the sake of certain technical uses to which the name might be put in the grammatical works themselves,—we find that we can accept it as being for the sake of ordinary parlance and the Veda, only if it could be shown, by proper reasoning, that even in such parlance and the Veda, the Nominative and the Objective are actually denoted by the Verbal Affixes; and if this cannot be shown, then it must be regarded as being meant only as a technical nomenclature adopted for use in grammatical works alone. We have already shown above that the name in question does not serve any purpose in connection with ordinary parlance and the Veda; and hence it must be admitted that it is only meant for use in grammatical works. Thus then, the sense of the *sūtra* ('*laḥ karmani, etc.*') comes to be this: 'For me, Pāṇini, the Nominative and the Objective should be taken as denoted by the letter *la*.'

Question: "What is the use of this nomenclature, when it is not utilised in ordinary parlance and the Veda?"

Answer: Though it is not utilised in these, yet it does serve many

useful purposes in grammar itself. For instance, unless 'the Nominative and the Objective were accepted as to be denoted by the term 'la,' we could not have the preclusion of the case-endings relating to these, by means of the conditional *sūtra* 'anubhihite'.

Thus then, even though the Nominative and the Objective are not actually denoted by the Verbal Affix, yet, inasmuch as in grammar itself, they are technically admitted to be so denoted, the case-endings, whose appearance is conditioned by the Nominative and the Objective being 'not expressed,' could not come in. And thus we have shown that there is no chance of the appearance of other *Kāraka*-affixes (*i.e.* of the Instrumental, in the expression 'pacati *Dēvadattaḥ*').

Now, there remains the *fifth* syllogism brought forward by the Opponent—viz: "The Verbal Affixes are denotative of the Nominative and the Objective, because they signify their particular qualifications." But this reasoning is found to be too wide, in view of such words as '*cinṣapā*' and the like. Because, we find that the word '*cinṣapā*' is not denotative of the classes, 'tree,' 'earthy,' 'substance,' 'entity,' 'cognisable,' and 'knowable,'—though it is found to denote a particular phase of these, the class '*cinṣapā*.' And just as in this case (1) we find that the denotation of the particular is not inconsistent with the non-denotation of the general, —(2) and as in the case of the *Eye* we find that its non-perceptiveness of the generic fact of 'Impermanence,' is not inconsistent with its perception of *Colour*,—and (3) as according to you also, though the Verbal Affix does not denote the generic element of 'substance,' yet it denotes a particular phase of it, in the shape of the 'Nominative character,'—so exactly, in the same manner, even without the denotation of the Nominative itself (by the word '*pacati*') there would be nothing incongruous in the denotation of its particular qualification (in the shape of *Number*).

As for the argument that—"that which is indirectly indicated cannot be connected with any qualifications; and hence from the fact of the Nominative bearing certain distinct relationships, we must conclude that it is directly denoted,"—this must be rejected at once; simply because we find both of these facts actually occurring in experience, as shown under the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* (I—iii—30) and the *Arunādhikaraṇa* (III—i—12). Then again, your argument becomes too wide, in view of such sentences as '*Madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ ṣīto guruṣa.*' In this sentence we find that the 'sweet taste' being a property, and as such incapable of being related to other properties of '*snigdha*' (soft) and the rest,—it is the *sweet object indicated* by the words '*Madhuro rasaḥ*' that is regarded as related to these properties; and certainly the word '*rasaḥ*' can never

denote the *substance* directly. Similarly, too, we often come across such sentences as '*Āpvasahasrēṇa nagaram mushitam*' ('The city was sacked by a thousand horses'), wherein what are connected with the action of 'sacking' are not the 'horses,' but the *riders* indicated by the word 'horse.' The mere fact, of a certain particular indicated object not being connected with qualifications,—as in the case of *Smoke*, or in that of *Colour*,—cannot justify the assertion that such would be the case everywhere.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Nominative is not *directly denoted* by the Verbal Affix.

And thus, inasmuch as (in the sentence '*nāṇṭam vadēt*') the Nominative would not be directly denoted by the Verb, the connection of the *Human Agent* with the 'telling of lies' would not be *directly* expressed by the sentence; and as such there would be no Direct Declaration to set aside the indications of the Context, to the effect that the Prohibition of 'telling lies' pertains to the *Sacrifice*—the *Darṣa-Purnamāsa*.

There has been another argument to the effect that if the Prohibition contained in the sentence pertained to the sacrifice, then, inasmuch as it would have been laid down by means of the one Collective Injunction of the *Darṣa-Purmanāsa*, a separate Injunction for its sake (in the shape of the sentence '*nāṇṭam vadēt*') would be wholly useless.

To this argument we make the following reply: So long as the 'telling of lies' has not been touched by the Injunction, there is no use for it; and in the absence of such use, the Root-meaning (of the word '*vadēt*') would not be recognized as belonging to the sacrifice. That is to say, a Root-meaning, devoid of the Injunction, becomes itself the object to be accomplished; and thus, not being of any use to any other result (such as the *Apūrva* of a sacrifice), it could not be taken up by the Procedure of the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*; and not being taken up by this, it could not be included in the Collective Injunction of those sacrifices.

Thus then, it must be admitted that the distinct Injunction serves, in the first instance, to point out, either directly or indirectly, the fact of the 'Prohibition' being of use to the human agent; and then, having recourse to the instrumentality of that which is denoted by the verbal Root,—and thus standing in need of something apart from that, as the object to be accomplished,—it comes to be recognized as related to the *Darṣa-Purnamāsa* sacrifices, which are mentioned in close proximity to the sentence in question, and as subsidiary to these. Otherwise there would be a mutual inter-dependence: the subsidiary character being based upon the Injunction, and the Injunction upon the subsidiary character. And thus we find that the Injunction of the subsidiary (*Prohibition of telling lies*) serves a distinctly useful purpose.

Thus then, the various factors of the Injunction ('*nāṇṛtam vadet*') come to mean as follows :—

(1) The word '*vadet*' means that 'a certain help should be accorded to the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa* sacrifices by means of '*telling or speaking*.' (2) The force of the word '*anṛta*' implies—'that which is to be done by *speaking* should be done by *false speaking*?' (3) The presence of the negative ('*na*') signifies—'that the help should be accorded by false speaking is *not*.' And thus we find that the sense of the sentence as a whole turns out to be the *Prohibition of that falsity that is possible in the talking as done for the sake of the Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa*; and this leads us to the general rule—'We should avoid falsity in all the talking that is done for the sake of the sacrifices.' That is to say, when the *Adhvarya* priest has once said 'make the cakes of barley,' he should not contradict himself by saying later on—'the barley will be of use in making the *Saktu*, make the cake of the *Vrihi* corn.'

In showing this use of the *Adhikarana*, the *Bhāṣhya* says—'*Vrihi-mayaḥ saṅkalpya na yavamayaḥ pradēyaḥ*', and the word '*saṅkalpya*' indicates the *saying*;—because the action of *saṅkalpa* (conveying of the offering) is always preceded by the *saying* of the words; or it may be taken to mean 'having, by his words, made the *Adhvaryu* priest to do the *saṅkalpa*',—the word '*saṅkalpya*' in this case being explained as formed by two causative affixes.

Says the Opponent : "Whether the sentence in question be taken "as *descriptive* of something laid down elsewhere, or as an Injunction, on "account of its connection being different,—in any case the factor in "question—'should not tell lies'—would be equally present; and as such "what is the use of the discussion as to whether the sentence is *descriptive* "live or *Injunctive*?"

Reply : If the sentence were merely *descriptive* of what has been laid down in the *Smṛti*, then the Expiatory Rite would be that which is laid down in the *Smṛtis*; while if it be *Injunctive*, then, inasmuch as it would be an Injunction contained in the *Yajurveda*, the Expiatory Rite attendant upon its infringement would be one that is laid down in that *Veda*. [And in this discrimination of the Expiatory Rite lies the use of *Adhikarana*]. That is to say, if the sentence be merely *descriptive*, then the *telling of lies* (during the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa* also) would necessitate the performance of that Expiatory Rite, which is laid down in the *Smṛtis* in connection with *Lying*; while if it were an Injunction, then as it occurs in the *Yajurveda*, its infringement during the sacrifice would mean a discrepancy in it through the *Yajurveda*; and hence the Expiatory Rite to be performed would be the pouring of libations into the *Anvāhārya-pacana Fire*, with the *Mantra* '*Bhuvah svāhā*' (which is the rite laid down

in the Yajurveda, as Expiatory of *Lying*). As for the *Smṛti*,—since we would not know in which particular Veda it may have its origin, there would be no certainty as to the *Veda*, in accordance with which the Expiatory Rite should be performed. Thus then, even if we grant that the sentence in question (*'naṣṭam vadet'*) is the origin of the *Smṛti*-Injunction (*'satyam brūyāt'*), as its meaning, as well as its infringement, will have been followed up by the *Smṛti*, the Expiatory Rite too would be that which is laid down in the *Smṛtis*.

Objection: "When we would be sure of the fact of the *Smṛiti* being "based upon the sentence in question, which occurs in the *Yajurveda*, the "Expiatory Rite performed would be that which is laid down in that "*Veda*."

Reply: It is not so; because the Rite laid down in the *Yajurveda*, pertaining to such *sacrificial* fires as the *Āhavanīya* and the like, distinctly relates to such a performer as 'laid the fire' (performed the *Agnihotra*); while the prohibition of *Telling lies* (contained in the *Smṛti*) pertains to *all men*; and as such would relate also to one who has not performed the *Agnihotra*; and hence the latter would certainly stand in need of some other equally universally applicable expiatory rite laid down in the *Smṛti*. And when this would be found out,—inasmuch as the occasion for the Rite would be the same, in the case of one who has performed the *Agnihotra*, as well as one who has not performed it, the former also would perform the Rite that is laid down in the *Smṛti*; so that there would be no performance of that expiatory rite which is laid down in the *Veda*.

And further, in the case of sacrifices, the Veda lays down distinct expiatory rites to be performed for discrepancy in any of the details of the sacrifice; and hence when there would be no discrepancy in any of the sacrificial details, there would be no occasion for those rites.

That is to say, in all such sentences as '*yadrkto yajña ārtimiyāt, etc.*,' we find that certain discrepancies in connection with the *Sacrifice* are laid down as occasions for Expiatory Rites. The sentences however occur in the context of the *Jyotishṭoma*; and as such would appear, by Context, to be related to that sacrifice; but this Context would be superseded by the superior authority of Syntactical Connection, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—iii—8; nor is there any reason for the said sentences abandoning all connection with the sacrifices other than the *Jyotishṭoma*. And hence we conclude that even in the case of those *Smṛtis* whose source in the particular Veda is distinctly traceable, if these happen to pertain to certain qualifications of the human agent, then their infringement could not lead to the performance of the expiatory rite laid down in the *Veda*.

If however, on account of avoiding the necessity of assuming a result,

and because of the indications of the Context, the *Pūrvapakṣa* standpoint be that such prohibitions as that contained in the sentence in question belong to the *human agent as connected with the sacrifice*,—then the corresponding *Siddhānta* would be that they belong to the *sacrifice purely by itself*. But in the case of both these theories, the expiatory rite attendant upon an infringement would be that which is laid down in the *Yajurveda*; and hence we should find some other use for the *Adhikaraṇa* than the one noted above.

And in this case, the use of the discussion would be this: In the case of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the Injunctions too would become relegated to the region of 'Purificatory Rites'; and as such they would all pertain to the *Yajamāna*, exactly like the actions of the kind of *Initiation*.

That is to say, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*, all the sacrifices of the *Samit*, etc. (as laid down in the sentences '*samidho yajati*,' etc., etc.), when performed in the course of other sacrifices, as also the Repetitions of the Hymns and Prayers (*Stotras* and *Ṣastras*), would come to be *purificatory of the human agent*; and as such, they would all pertain to the *Yajamāna*, in accordance with *Adhikaraṇa* under *Sūtra* III—viii—4. And in the case of the *Samit*-sacrifices,—as *sacrifices*, they consist of the action of *offering certain materials*, and as such, like the *Dikṣantīyā* (Initiatory Sacrifice), they would, in any case, pertain to the *Yajamāna*; and hence even when there would be an increase in the number of *Yajamānas*, the sacrifice would be performed once only, as tending, in common, to the purification of all of them,—(with regard to these, there would not be much of a difference between the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*). But, in the case of the *Stotraṣastra-japādi* (the Repetitions of the Hymns and Prayers), these could, like the actions of cleaning the teeth and the like, pertain to the *Yajamāna* only, only after they had set aside the indications of the Names '*Audgātṛa*' and the like, which are quite capable of singling out the *performer* of the action, while quite incapable of putting any restrictions upon the principal action; and then too, in the case of an increase in the number of *Yajamānas*, they will have to be performed by each of them,—as, in this case there could be no performance, applying in common to all of them, as laid down in the law '*Yajamānavivṛddhau sūdhāranadravyatyāgaḥ*.'

If in the case Prohibitions also, the element of Injunction (*i.e.* the part '*ānṛtam vadēt*') be taken to mean 'the telling of lies as helping the man related to the sacrifice,' then inasmuch as the Prohibition would be of this *telling* as qualified by *falsity*, its meaning would come to be that—'whatever benedictory declarations the *Yajamāna* makes for his own purification,—in these there should be no falsity, either as to any optional matters, or as to the actual forms of the utterance; but other persons, and the

Yajamāna also in other cases, could speak just as one likes. This is in accordance with *Pūrvapakṣa*.

In accordance, on the other hand, with the *Siddhānta*,—that the Prohibition pertains to the *sacrifice purely by itself*,—its meaning would be this: 'In whatever speaking there is, in course of the sacrifice, to be done by the *Yajamāna* or by the Priests, all false utterances, that may be possible, should be completely eschewed,' because all these persons are equally connected with the sacrifice. And hence, just as when the *Yajamāna* has once conveyed by words the offering of the Barley-cake, he should not offer, in deed, that of the *Vrihi* corn,—so, in the same manner, when the *Adhvaryu* and other Priests have once determined upon a certain course of action, they should not stultify themselves by actually taking up another course, for the sake of ease and comfort, etc. Even in regard to those few actions that are done for the purification of the human agent, the *lying* would be eschewed, on the ground of those actions also forming part of the *Sacrifice*.

Objection: "As a matter of fact, in the Prohibition, the human agent "is the subordinate factor; and as such *his* agency would be conditioned "by the name '*Ādhvaryava*,' by which the Prohibition in question would "betake itself to the *Adhvaryu* priest only, exactly like the actions of the "*Pranītāpranayana* and the like."

Reply: True, it would betake itself that way, if the sense of the prohibition were *something to be performed*. As a matter of fact, it is of the nature of *non-performance* (*i.e. not-telling*); and as such it does not stand in need of any particular Agent (for its performance). We find that the Prohibition, expressed by *Direct declaration*, is connected with such conditions under which there may be a chance of what is prohibited being present; and as such it would betake itself to all such places, by its inherent capability; and in this it could not be stopped by the very much inferior authority of the Name ('*Ādhvaryava*').

Objection: "The Name could certainly restrict the Injunctive "element in the sentence ('*vadēt*'); and then, inasmuch as the Prohibition "also would follow in the wake of that Injunction, the latter too would be restricted by that Name."

Reply: It is not so; because it is only when the meaning of the whole scriptural sentence has been completed, that there arises the question as to by whom is to be performed that which the sentence has laid down; and it is only after this that the use of the Name comes in as indicating the performer. And in the case in question we find that the sense of the sentence does not end with '*vadēt*'; because this word serves the purpose of a mere reference (to *speaking*), in connection with the *Prohibition* meant to be conveyed; and it is well known that that

which is thus a mere reference is not qualified, even by that which is directly declared, as we have proved under the *Grahādhikarāṇa* (III—i—13 *et seq.*); and under the circumstances it is all the more improbable for it to be qualified by the *Name*, whose sole function lies in pointing out the relationship of the particular performer of the action that is enjoined. Thus then, inasmuch as '*telling*' is merely *referred* to, it cannot be taken as qualified (by the *Name*); while as for the Prohibition, that cannot be specified as belonging to any particular person.

Thus the conclusion is that the present discussion serves useful purposes in all cases; and as such, there can be no doubt that we did right in taking up this inquiry.

ADHIKARANA (5).

[The actions relating to the 'yawning person' should find a place in the Context.]

Sūtra (14): "They pertain to the human agent, as they are for his sake; and as such, like the Ahina, (they should be taken apart from the Context)."

In the foregoing *Adhikarāṇas*, we have dealt with the question of the contradiction, or non-contradiction, of Context by Direct Declaration. We now proceed to consider its contradiction, or otherwise, by Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find laid down the "*Tīrtha-snāna*" (Bathing at a sacred place); and in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamasa*, there is laid down the recitation of the *mantrā*, '*Mayi dakṣha-kratū, etc.*' as to be done with each yawning. And on the question as to, for whose sake these actions are laid down, we can have all the alternatives that we had in the *Nivṛtādihikarāṇa* (III—iv—1 *et seq.*). But out of these we picked out, in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, only three, as being more reasonable than the rest. These were—(1) that the action in question pertains to the Agent only, (2) that it pertains to the Agent as connected with the sacrifice, and (3) that it pertains to the sacrifice only. And on the present occasion also we take up the same three alternative theories.

The conclusion of the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* pointing out, on the strength of the Context, that the actions in question pertain to the sacrifice,—we have, as against this, the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Just as, disregarding the indications of the Context, the *Ahina* was found to take up the number 'twelve' (*Adhikarāṇa* III—iii—15/16),—so, in the same manner, would the two actions in question be taken up by the human agent.

"First, as for the *Bath*, inasmuch as it tends to the purification of the body, it is taken, by its very capability, as pertaining to the human agent. As for the qualification of '*Tīrtha*' (the *Bathing in a Tīrtha*),—

"inasmuch as the term signifies that which is *easy of approach*, it serves to preclude all places that are difficult to be got at; and by this, they help the human agent, and not the sacrifice. As for the *Smṛti* rule regarding the fact of the *Bath* always preceding the Breakfast, that too pertains to the Agent alone, and makes the transcendental result following from that restriction, betake itself to him. Thus then, the specification of '*Tīrtha*' also, being connected with the Bath, whose use has been definitely ascertained, comes to be regarded as pertaining to the human agent. One use of this specification,—that the place of bathing being such as is got at easily—is quite perceptible; and even if it be necessary to assume certain transcendental results as following from observing the rule of not bathing outside the river or tank, with water taken out of them, which is not found to have any visible purpose,—we find that that result too is distinctly laid down in the Veda itself, in the sentence '*Tīrthamēva saṣātānām bhavati*' ('He becomes great among his relations.') And certainly that which is so distinctly pointed out by Syntactical Connection as related to the purpose of the human agent, cannot be affected by the Context; because of the *Sūtra* III—iii—11.

"In the same manner, though the word '*brūyāt*' does not signify the Nominative agent, yet, the word '*janḡhabyamāna*',—being formed by the *kṛt* affix, and the *Sūtra* '*Kartari kṛt*' (*Pāṇini*) indubitably laying down the fact of the *kṛt* affix being denotative of the Nominative,—cannot but be taken as signifying a particular performing agent. And the *mantra* being mentioned in the same sentence with it, as connected with the person thus pointed out,—it could not be taken up by the Context. Specially as we find a distinct result following from its connection with the human agent;—the one that is mentioned in the text itself, '*prāṇā-pāṇvātman dhatḡḡ*', which signifies *long life due to the control of the upper and lower breathing*.

"For these reasons, it must be admitted that the actions under consideration pertain to the *human agent* (and not to the *sacrifice*)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (15): But from the peculiarity of the Context, they would constitute the purification of one connected with it,—like the substance.

We admit that the Actions pertain to the human agent; but we can accept the statement that they pertain to the agent, independently by himself, and as such they should be taken apart from the Context.

Because, so long as it is possible for two means of knowledge to be reconciled, it is not proper to have one set aside by the other. Specially

as, in the case in question, the mention, at a distance, of the result, does not constitute an actual '*Phalagruti*' (Declaration of Results). In the case in question, we find that if the Actions in question are connected with the human agent only, the indications of the Context are set aside without any reason.

Objection: "The acceptance of the other alternative theory would "also mean the rejection of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection."

Reply: True, these latter would be rejected, only if we connected the actions with something other than the human agent. As a matter of fact, however, it is with the *Agent as engaged in a sacrifice*, that we hold the actions to be connected; and in this not a single means of knowledge is rejected. For if the 'yawning person,' as well as the 'bathing person,' were taken as that indicated by the Context,—that would not be incompatible, either with the sense of all the words of the two sentences (as pointed out by Syntactical Connection), or with the capability of things (as indicated by Indicative Power).

Objection: "The idea of the *unspecified* Person (the Agent by himself "being related to the two actions), being based upon the superior authority " (of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection), could not be set aside "by that of the *specified* Person (one who is engaged in the performance "of the sacrifice), which is based upon the inferior authority (of the "Context)."

Reply: The idea of the unspecified person cannot but be set aside (even by you); because the ignorant and the incapable persons could not be entitled to the actions in question (and so you cannot take *all men* to be connected with the actions).

Objection: "In the way that you suggest, the Context would come "to be taken as the means of the necessary specification."

Reply: It is not so; because in this case also, the Context remains only a *comprehender*; and it could not become the means of specifying the 'yawning person' that forms the subject of the sentence. Nor do we find the functioning of the Context, in the matter of the said specification; because the 'How' is always related to something other than the 'Thus.' One who, seeking for the person mentioned in the Context, obtains, from that source, the necessary specification of that person,—for him, when the Context has ceased to function, there only arises a desire to find that person mentioned in the Context; which, thus, does not come to be the means of specification.

Question: "How, then, do you get at the idea of the Person indicated by the Context?"

Answer: Even without the Context serving as the means of specification, we can, in the present case, get at the idea of the Person indicated

by the Context. Because just as the '*Prokshana*' of the *Vrihi* corn for ordinary purposes would be wholly useless, so also would the actions in question be (if they pertained to an ordinary person); and hence for the sake of their usefulness, they must be regarded as pertaining to the Person indicated by the Context.

That is to say, the *Vrihi* corn, connected with the *Prokshana*, is not thereby specialised by the Context; but what happens is that in order to save it from becoming useless, and on account of there being no reason for assuming an imperceptible result,—and lastly, because as an auxiliary to the sacrifice, it has to serve a distinct purpose,—we accept the *Vrihi* mentioned in the Context (to be the one to which the *Prokshana* is to be applied). And in the same manner, in order to avoid the assumption of a distinct result, and in consideration of proximity, we take that 'yawning person' who is connected with the Context. And so long as this is possible, there can be no grounds for the assumption of any other result.

Objection: "The result of the two actions in question is already 'definitely ascertained, and has not got to be assumed, as we have already explained above."

Reply: It is true that you have explained it; but the result is never found to be mentioned by such words as are found in the sentences in question; as their mention is always found to be accompanied by the word '*Kāma*' ('desire'). This is what is meant by the assertion—"we do not find any injunctive word here;"—the sense of this assertion must be taken as—"such words cannot serve the purpose of enjoining the results,"—as we shall explain later on. Otherwise, inasmuch as we have an actual Injunctive word in the shape of '*brūyāt*,' it would not be quite true to assert the absence of the Injunctive word. Nor can the opponent be taunted with the fact of the word '*dhattē*' not being injunctive. Because in all cases, the factor of Result never forms the object of Injunction. Consequently the said sentence must be taken in the manner just shown. Specially as we shall show under *Sūtra* IV—iii—1, that such sentences are *Arthavādas*; and under *Sūtra* IV—iii—3, that the mention of the Result is only by means of such sentences as contain the word '*Kāma*' ('Desire').

Objection: "We might accept the actions to be purificatory of the human agent. By using the word '*Sāmskāra*,' it is meant to show that we admit the fact of the actions in question pertaining to the human agent; because an independent action, having a result of its own, could not be spoken of as '*Samiskāra*.' But we do not accept it to belong to only that person who is performing the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. That is to say, the repetition of the Mantra '*mayi dakshakratū, etc.*,' being recognised as belonging to the 'yawning person,' would be precluded from such a person in the ordinary course of life, because of the repetition

"being of no use in ordinary life. But the person who would be 'yawning' during the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the other sacrifices, will take the *Mantra*, "with as useful an effect as one connected with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; "and there would be nothing to preclude the *Mantra* from these. Consequently we take the *Mantra* as pertaining to the human agent engaged "in any sacrifice."

The sense of the reply that is given to the above (by the *Bhāṣya*) is difficult to be grasped. It is this: *There is no useful purpose to be served by his purification.* Because, just as the *Nivṛta* has been found to have no connection with the duties of attending upon guests, etc., simply because of its not being mentioned by Direct Declaration, etc. (as related to those duties),—so, in the same manner, the repetition of the *Mantra* in question would, for the same reason, have no relationship with the other sacrifices.

That is to say, if the *Mantra* were laid down as to be used everywhere, and were precluded from the ordinary actions of the world, simply because it would serve no useful purpose with regard to these, then what you say would have been quite correct (i.e. it should have been related to all sacrifices). As a matter of fact, it cannot be so precluded; as the Injunctions that have once operated can never be precluded by anything; and in all cases of preclusion, the preclusion is recognised from the very beginning; and this preclusion is made in the following manner: Inasmuch as, in accordance with *Adhikaraṇa* '*Dravyasaṅkhyāhētusamulāyanca*' (VI—i—11), the mention of the mere form of the 'yawning person' would be useless,—the word '*janjabhyamāna*' (*yawning*) should be taken as indicating the means to a certain *Apūrva*; and as a matter of fact, we find that this Indication would not be possible except through the Context; and as for the Context, we have no other available save that pertaining to the *Apūrva* of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*. Consequently, it must be admitted that the purification, involved in the repetition of the *Mantra*, pertains to that 'yawning person' who is engaged in the bringing about of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa-Apūrva*.

The same may be said of the Bath ('*Tirthasnāna*') also.

The above objection, as well as the reply to it, the Author of the *Sūtra* will himself explain, under the *Sūtras* III—vii—3 and 4.

Then, it has been argued that, inasmuch as the Injunction of the Repetition of the *Mantra* would be included in the Collective Injunction of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, that contained in the sentence in question would be wholly useless.

In reply to this it is said that it is very much more reasonable to take the sentence in question as merely descriptive of the Injunction contained in the said Collective Injunction, than as the useless Injunction of a detail pertaining to the human agent only.

Objection: "The objection of the opponent is that what the *Bhāṣhya* has here dealt with is exactly the same as that dealt with in the preceding *Adhikarāṇa*,—but the replies given on the two occasions are mutually contradictory. For instance, on the former occasion, the explanation given was that it is only when a certain action has become subsidiary to another, that it comes to be taken up by the Collective Injunction of the latter Action; and until the former action has been enjoined, it does not become subsidiary to any other action; while on the present occasion it is held that the sentence would not be an Injunction, but a mere Descriptive Declaration. And in view of the contradictory character of these two explanations vouchsafed by the *Bhāṣhya*, we must consider which of these two is true and which is false. In view of what has been said on the previous occasion, it would seem that the former was the correct explanation; while the latter is put forth simply by way of admitting the opponent's position (for the sake of argument). But it is possible to show that this latter is the correct view. Inasmuch as there is a single Injunction that takes in all the subsidiaries collectively, distinct Injunctions of them cannot but be said to be merely descriptive declarations. That is to say, under the *Sūtra* X—viii—16, it will be shown that, on account of all subsidiaries tending to fulfil a single purpose, there is a single collective Injunction of all these; and this could be possible for only those that are laid down in the Collective Injunction; because each of the distinct Injunctions of these subsidiaries operates separately. An Injunction is that by which a man is urged to activity; and in the case of the *Bhāraṇā* that pertains to the principal as well as the subsidiary sacrifices, the man is urged to activity, all at once. Consequently, the distinct Injunctions must be regarded as mere descriptive declarations."

To the above we make the following reply: Both portions of the *Bhāṣhya* are quite correct. Because the declaration contained in the former is not wrong, for the reason that is given therein—viz., that until an Action is enjoined, it cannot be subsidiary to another Action, specially as it has been already explained that if we do not admit the Injunction, only that which is signified by the Verbal Root would come to be the object to be accomplished; and as this would not serve any useful purpose, it could not be taken as subsidiary to any other Action; consequently the sentence in question must be admitted to be an Injunction. It may also be taken as a mere descriptive declaration. Because the Action having been ascertained, through the previous Injunction, to be the subsidiary of a certain action, up to the time that it is carried along to be taken up by the collective Injunction of this latter Action, it continues in the position of the Injunction; when, however, it once becomes taken up

by the said Collective Injunction, inasmuch as the activity of the Agent towards the Action would be accomplished by the mere fact of its forming the subsidiary of the other Action, its former Injunction would now come to be taken as a mere Descriptive Declaration. Thus then, we find that, inasmuch as, prior to being taken up by the Collective Injunction, its performance would not be possible, the sentence laying it down as a distinct sacrifice, is taken as an *Injunction*; while subsequent to that, as its performance comes to be accomplished, through the Collective Injunction of the Action to which it is the subsidiary, the former Injunction comes to be taken as a mere Descriptive Declaration. Thus both the declarations of the Bhāshya are true, under different conditions.

Sūtra (16): *It could be taken apart from the Context, only through the mention of a particular character.*

In the case of the *Ahina*, we found that, it has no existence at all, in the Context; and hence the mention of 'twelve-upasads' in the sentence, not being taken up by the Context, had to be taken apart from the Context. In the case in question, however, there is no such mention; and hence the example of the *Ahina* cannot apply to the present case.

ADHIKARAṆA (6).

[The threatening, etc. pertain to the Human Agent].

Sūtra (17): *In the case of the Camyu (we would have to take it apart from the Context); because of the protection having been extended to all.*

The word 'Camyu' is the name given to all such prohibitions as those pertaining to the *Threatening of a Brāhmaṇa, the striking of him and the shedding of his blood* [that we hear of in the passage—'Dēva vai Camyum Bārhaspatyan abruvan havyanno vaha kimmē prajāyā iti; te 'bruvan (1) yō Brāhmaṇāyāvagurēt tam çatēna yātayāt, (2) yo nihanētam sahasrēṇa; (3) yo lohitaṁ karvut yāvutaḥ praskandya pāñcūn, etc., etc.']. In connection with this also we have the same alternative theories as in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. But from among these, we pick out only two, taking the two connections into one; and these two alternatives are:—these Prohibitions pertain to the sacrifice, or to the Man only.

And on this, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"In accordance with all that has been said with regard to the Prohibition of Telling Lies, the Prohibitions in question must be taken as pertaining to such *Threatening*, etc. as are possible for the sake of the sacrifice. The possibility of these in course of the sacrifice may be explained thus: The Darṣa-Purṇamāsa sacrifices require the help of four Brāhmanas; and for winning their acquiescence one could have recourse to the four ordinary means of Peaceful Request, Gifts, Division and Punishment; but we find the Veda distinctly laying down that 'one should win their acquiescence by means of the *Anvāhārya* Gift'; but it is possible that they might not be won over by this Gift; and in that case one would be called upon to do all that he could to win it out of them; and in this he could have recourse to the four aforesaid means of subjugation; and hence as a *punishment*, he might come to do the *Threatening*, etc.; and it is these latter that are prohibited by the sentences in question; the sense of these prohibitions being—'These, threatening, etc., should not be done; one should have recourse to the other means of subjugating the Brāhmanas.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above, we make the following reply : (1) Because the sentence points to the connection of all (Brāhmanas) ; (2) because the results are distinctly mentioned ; and (3) because the boon of protection was granted to all of them ;—we cannot connect the prohibition in question with the Context only.

That is to say,—(1) the word '*yaḥ*' (in the sentence '*yo Brāhmaṇya etc.*') distinctly points to *Man*. Nor can the Prohibition in question be held to pertain to *that Man who is connected with the Context* ; because what the sentence speaks of is not a purificatory action, but only a Prohibition calculated to save man from falling into hell. And as the *falling into hell* pertains to the *Man*,³ and not to the *sacrifice*,—and as the Prohibition for saving from a trouble must pertain to one who is liable to that trouble, (the Prohibition, in the case in question, cannot but pertain to the *Man*, and not to the *Sacrifice*).

(2) We find the results mentioned, in the sentences '*ṣaṭēna yātayāt, sahasrēna yātayāt, etc.*,' which means that the punishment that he would suffer would be a hundred, and a thousandfold ; or, inasmuch as the sentence does not speak of any particular object to which the numbers ('hundred' and 'thousand') would apply,—and as we find the '*samvat-sara*' ('year') mentioned later on,—we must take the sentence '*saṣasrēna yātayāt*' as meaning that '*he should undergo the punishment for a hundred years.*' As for the result of the Prohibition, it connects itself by being merely expressed ; and it does not stand in need of the word '*kāma*,' as has been shown to be the case with the mention of the results of Injunctions ; specially as no person '*desires*' (*kāmayatē*) that which has to be abandoned ; nor is there any other way of mentioning an undesirable result ; and hence its mention should be taken as duly accomplished by the word '*anubhavet*' ('he should suffer') ; and this word we find present in the case in question. Though the *Bhāṣya* has explained the word '*yātayāt*' as Injunctive, yet that cannot be quite relevant ; because the result spoken of is not meant to be enjoined. That which is desirable is not enjoined ; while that which is not desirable can never call forth the activity of *Man* ; and as such the introduction of the Injunctive is wholly contrary to the nature of this latter. Consequently all that we can rightly assert is that the Prohibition is accomplished by the mere mention of the undesirable result,—that the undesirable result pertains to the *Man*,—and hence the Prohibition must also pertain to the *Man* (and not to the sacrifice).

(3) Then again we find in the passage quoted that *Çamyu* asks—'*What would happen to my offspring if I offered the libations to you ?*'—

which shows that what he asked for was the protection of *all* his offspring; and the *Devas* also answer—‘As thou desirest.’ And thus we find that Çamyu made over *all* Brāhmanas to the protection of the gods; and the protection that the gods extended was to *all* Brāhmanas; and hence these declarations become reconciled only by taking the Prohibition to pertain to *Man in general* (and not to the *sacrifice*, or to the *Man connected with the sacrifice*).

ADHIKARAṆA (7).

[The Prohibition of conversing with a woman in her courses pertains to Man in general].

Sūtra (18): *Inasmuch as the woman in her courses has been previously removed (from the place of the sacrifice, the Prohibition cannot pertain to the sacrifice; it must pertain to Man in general).*

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the passage—‘*malavadvāsā na samvālet*,’ ‘*nāsyā annamadyāt*’]. Though the latter sentence occurs in a different place, yet it has been quoted by the Bhāṣhya along with the former, because it is to be utilised in the next *Sūtra*, by way of showing that it is for another purpose, ‘*malavadvāsā*’ is the woman in her courses; and in regard to the Prohibition of conversing with her, we have three alternative theories:—(1) It pertains to the sacrifice; (2) it pertains to the Man as connected with the sacrifice; and (3) it pertains to the Man in general]. And on this we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The Prohibition must be taken as pertaining to the words—‘*patni ēsha tē lokah*, etc.’—that are addressed by the *yajamāna* to his wife, in course of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; (1) because in this we have not got either the word ‘*yat*’ (pointing to Man), or some such word as ‘*jañjha-bhyamānu*’ (which could indicate the relationship of Man); (2) because the *conversing* is as possible in connection with the sacrifice, as apart from it; and (3) because of all that has been said in connection with the Prohibition of the Telling of Lies.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

As against the above, we make the following observations: All Prohibitions are only of such things of whose occurrence there is a possibility; and the possibility of *conversing* rests in the *Man*; and then again, inasmuch as the woman in her courses has already been removed from the place of sacrifice (in accordance with the sentence ‘*yosya vrātyē haṁ patnī anālambhukā syāt tām aparudhya yajeta*’ (‘He, whose wife should

be impure on the day of the sacrifice, should perform the sacrifice, after removing her from there'),—there would be no possibility of any *conversing* with the woman *in course of the sacrifice*. Because, in accordance with the sentence just quoted, she having been moved away from all sacrificial performances, how could there be any chance for the *yajamāna* *conversing* with that woman, in course of the sacrifice? As for the *Man* in general, on the other hand, inasmuch as his ways would be independent (of all such restrictions as pertain to sacrifices), there is every possibility of his conversing with the woman; and in reference to him, the Prohibition would serve a distinctly useful purpose.

Even if we have *Smṛti*-rules prohibiting the said conversing, we could take those as having their source in the sentence under consideration; and neither of them should be taken as a mere descriptive declaration.

Sūtra (19): *Also because of the prohibition of intercourse.*

For the following reason also, the Prohibition must be taken as pertaining to *Man in general*.

It has been shown above (II—iii—16) that all doubtful points are settled by reference to a sentence abounding in the matter under consideration; and in the case in question, we find that the phrase 'not have intercourse with her' is distinctly meant to pertain to *Man*.

That is to say, we have another Prohibition—'*nāsyā annamadyāt*,' where '*anna*' = *abhyañjana*, which, from the subsequent portion of the sentence, comes to be taken as meaning 'Intercourse.' Among the *Lātas*, also, we find the word '*abhyañjana*' synonymous with '*mrakṣhaṇa*,' which is known to be synonymous with 'Intercourse.' And we know full well that there could never be any possibility of this *intercourse*, during the performance of the *sacrifice*; while as regards the *Man*, there is always a possibility of the said intercourse. And we have already explained that the Prohibition can pertain only to one, for whom there is a possibility of that which is prohibited. And further, inasmuch as '*celibacy*' is one of the necessary conditions imposed upon the sacrificer, there would never be any possibility of intercourse even for the sake of the *Man* himself, *during the performance of the sacrifice*; and hence the Prohibition could not pertain to the time of the sacrificial performance.

Consequently, we must pass over the Context, and connect the Prohibition with *Man in general*; and hence in accordance with the maxim '*Tatsāmānyāditarēṣu tathātvam*', we must take the *Conversing* also to belong to *Man in general*.

ADHIKARANA (8).

[The wearing of Gold, etc. pertains to the Man].

Sūtra (20): *Not mentioned in any particular Context, it must belong to the Man; because it differs from that mentioned in a particular Context.*

We now proceed to consider the question as to whether, or not, Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—not occurring in any particular Context,—come to a coalition with the Context.

In regard to the sentence, '*Tasmāt suvarṇam hiranyam bhāryam, durvarṇo'sya bhrātrvyo bahvati*' [and '*suśāsā bhavitavyam, rūpamēva bibharti*'], there arises the question as to whether the sentence lays down '*suvarṇatā*' (excellence of colour) with reference to the wearing of gold during the performance of a sacrifice, and '*gobhanatva*' (excellence) with reference to the wearing of cloth during the sacrifice,—or it only lays down the *qualified wearing* as pertaining to the Man in general.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is this :—“With a view to avoid a multiplicity of objects for the Injunctions, we must regard the sentences as laying down the *excellence of colour* and *excellence* with reference to the wearing of *Gold* and *Cloth* respectively, during the performance of the sacrifice.”

SIDDHANTA.

The Injunctions must be taken as pertaining to the Man in general; because if the Injunction pertained only to the Gold and the Cloth, it would be absolutely useless; while as for its connection with any particular sacrifice, we do not find any ground for such relationship.

The one purpose served by the mention of something in the Context of a particular sacrifice, is to point out the fact of its being related as the subsidiary to that sacrifice; and under the circumstances, if even that, which is not mentioned in the Context of any particular sacrifice, were to be taken as subsidiary to that sacrifice, then there would be no use in anything being mentioned in a particular Context. But inasmuch as the Veda itself makes a distinction between a thing being mentioned and not being mentioned in a particular Context, we conclude that those things that are not mentioned in any particular Context, must pertain to the Man in general.

Sūtra (21): Objection: "Not having a substance, it would be subsidiary (to the sacrifice)."

Says the opponent: "Even if the sentence in question be a qualified Injunction, it could not but be subsidiary to the sacrifice; otherwise it would be necessary to assume a distinct result in connection with the Injunction in question."

"Objection: 'Its connection with the sacrifice too will have to be assumed.'"

"Reply: True; but this latter assumption would be fully authorised. Because when there arises the question, in regard to an Action, as to the purpose served by it, it is another Action that turns up as the one to be helped by it; and hence the connection of the *Wearing* with the *Sacrifice* would be authorised; but not so its connection with a Result, in the shape of Heaven.

"What we mean is this:—No other action, save *Yāga*, *Dāna* and *Homa*, can ever be the principal action: and in the case in question we find none of these three actions,—as the sentence does not contain any word expressive of the *Recipient of the offering, gift, etc.*; and thus by its very nature the action of *wearing* would be a subsidiary, and that too to another action.

"Or, it may be that the sentence mentions the *wearing*, and this action, by its very nature, is subsidiary to *that which is worn*. And as any such thing, that would be worn in ordinary life, would not deserve a purificatory rite, consequently, it must be admitted that the Injunction in the sentences under consideration is of the *wearing* of that *Gold* and *Cloth* which form the auxiliaries of a sacrifice.

"Or, inasmuch as such an Injunction would involve a multiplicity in its objects,—and as, when it is possible, the Injunctive potency should, perforce, be transferred to the *Property*,—we should take the sentence as laying down the 'excellence of colour' ('*sūvarṇatā*') with reference to that *wearing of gold*, which we find laid down in many such sentences as—'*Hiranyam hastē bhavati*,' '*Atha grhṇāti hiranyam hastē*,' '*Sampradāya śhodāṇinā stuvatē*' and so forth; and the other sentence also should be taken as laying down 'excellence,' with reference to the *Cloth*, the wearing whereof is laid down in the sentence '*Vāsakṣaṁ paridhattē*.'

"And thus we find that it is this Injunction that forms the basis of the definition of '*Hiranya*,' that is given in the *Kalpasūtras*, as 'that gold which bears its natural excellent colour.' Otherwise (if the definition '*Hiranyam jātarūpam pratīyāt*' were not explained as above, but only as 'that which bears its natural excellent colour'), inasmuch as the word '*Hiranya*' would apply equally to the gold and silver (as both

"these metals retain their 'natural excellent colour'), it would be necessary to look out for another authority for applying the word to any one of the two only.

"The expression '*adravyatvāt*' (in the *Sūtra*) means that, we find the sentence in question laying down, not a *substance*, but a particular property of it, and hence the Injunction herein contained should betake itself to that sacrifice where we do have a *Substance*.

"Though the *Bhāṣya* has mentioned the 'Deity' also along with 'Substance' (in the course of his explanation of the expression '*adravyatvāt*'), yet, inasmuch as it is something wholly unconnected with the *Sūtra*, and hence most improper. Specially as we have other actions also,—in the shape of *Japa* and the like,—which are neither *Yāga*, nor *Dāna*, nor *Homa*,—and yet which are performed as principal actions; and hence there is no use of mentioning the Deity.

Sūtra (22): "Because of connection with the Veda."

"In case of the *Wearing* being subsidiary to the Sacrifice, we find that the name '*Ādhvaryam*' serves the purpose of pointing out the use to which it is to be put; while if the *wearing* pertained to the *Mān* in general, then the indication of that *Name* would be set aside. If the sentence be taken as laying down 'excellence of colour' with reference to the *Gold*,—then, too, the said *Name* would be wholly inoperative; because that 'excellence of colour' would be under the influence of certain other Injunctions, and it would not be of the nature of *actions*.

"The word '*Vēdasamyoga*' (in the *Sūtra*) means the *fact of both being equally Vedic*; and hence, if some one were to argue that 'there is a possibility of the wearing of the *Gold* and the *Oloth* in ordinary life' also, and hence the Injunction of the property (*excellence of colour*) could be taken as referring to the *wearing* met with in ordinary life,—this argument too would be met by the said reason of '*Vēdasamyoga*.'

Sūtra (23): "Because the substance is the principal factor (in the sentence)."

"On the former occasion (*Text*, page 990), it has been said that the *Wearing* is naturally possessed of the character of a *purificatory action*; and now we proceed to show additional reasons for the same opinion: *Because of the mention of the Objective character*. Inasmuch as we find the word '*hiranyam*' with the Accusative Ending '*am*,' and as the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the *presence of the Objective*, the Accusative Ending (in '*hiranyam*') might be mistaken to be similar to that in the word '*crikhā*.' But in the case in question we find that the *Objective* is ex-

"pressed (and not 'not-expressed'—'anabhihita') by the *Kṛt* affix (in "*bhāryam*"); and as such the Accusative that we see in '*hiranyam*' we must take, not in the sense of the *Objective*, but in that of the *Nominative*, the former being expressed by the '*nyat*' affix in '*bhāryam*'; "this is what is meant by the expression '*dravyaparatvāt*' ['because the substance is the principal factor'] in the *Sūtra*. That too is the reason "why the *Bhāṣya* has spoken of the 'connection of the sense of the *Objective*,' and not 'the connection of the *Objective*.'

"Thus then the *wearing*, being of the nature of a *purificatory act*, "must be taken as subsidiary to the sacrifice."

Sūtra (24): *Reply: But there would be a connection with the Result; just as in the case of the presence (of words to that effect); and hence it is an Action,—as declared by Aitiāyana.*

As a matter of fact, we find that the Action (of *wearing*) is not connected, by a sentence, with any sacrifice. Because every sentence, that is not found to be mentioned in any particular Context, lays down a subsidiary, either by means of the connection of a sentence, or by that of an invariably concomitant Indicative Power. In the case in question, however, we find that there is no connection of any sentence; nor is there any such Indicative Power as is required; because the *wearing of gold* is common to both (*ordinary life* and the *Vēda*). That *wearing* could have been specialised by the declaration of its performability; but if that declaration be taken as serving the purposes of the said qualification, all its potency being spent up in that qualification, it would cease to be injunctive. Consequently all that has the support of authority, is the mere relationship of the substance in question (*i.e.* gold). And as any *purificatory action* in connection with that would be wholly useless, we cannot accept the *wearing* to be such an action. Nor could the relationship of the *purificatory action* with the substance be held to be due to the fact of its tending to bring about a certain *Āpūrva*, as the character of bringing about the *Āpūrva* is pointed out by the Context.

Thus then, in accordance with the principle that—'when something accomplished is spoken of along with that which has to be accomplished, the former should be taken as helping in the accomplishment of the latter,'—the sentences in question should be taken to mean that, 'one should perform the action of *wearing* with the help of the Gold, and with that of the Cloth'. And when we come to look for the use for such *wearing*, we come to assume a certain useful purpose that it serves for the *Man*; specially as there is nothing incongruous in an Action

being related to an Agent that is merely implied (and not directly mentioned). In the case of the word '*suvāsasā*,' however, we have the *Man* distinctly pointed out as the principal factor; as the word is a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, and in this compound the object other than those expressed by the component words is accepted as the principal factor (i.e. the word means, *He who wears good clothing*).

Objection: "But in that case, it would be necessary to assume a 'result (as following from the wearing).'"

Reply: That would not matter; because when it has been ascertained, in general terms, that the Action serves a useful purpose for the *Man*, the assumption of a particular result becomes an easy matter. As for the appearance of Heaven and the like, inasmuch as that would be an *action*, and based elsewhere (in the case of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* f.i.) upon the *Veda*,—both the sentences would be equally capable of pointing to that (appearance); and hence there remains no chance for these sentences pointing to any particular sacrifice.

Then again, in fact we find the sentences themselves mentioning the results,—in the shape of the '*durvarṇatā*' (*spoiling of the Visage*) of the '*Bhrātṛvya*' (*Enemy*), and the *keeping up of one's own beauty* (*Rūpa-dhāraṇa*). Even though the sentences mentioning these results have the appearance of *Arthavāda*, yet inasmuch as they are not known to be subservient to any other Injunction, they can, as such, be taken as the Injunctions of Results,—as explained under *Sūtra* IV—iii—18. And all that we have got to do, in the present case, is to assume the merely desirable character of that whose relationship with the Action is fully established, and then to take the Action as serving the purpose of accomplishing that result. If, on the other hand, we were to assume a result, we would have to assume everything, beginning from its connection with the sacrifice onwards. Consequently, just as in the case of the presence of such words as '*desiring Heaven*' and the like, so, in the sentences in question also, we have the connection of results; and as such containing qualified Injunctions, these must be taken as laying down independent actions (of *wearing the gold*, and *wearing the cloth*, for the sake of *Man in general*). We have *Smṛti* rules also to the same effect:—e.g. '*One should not keep on himself worn-out and dirty clothing*,' '*He should hold a bamboo stick, and a pair of good ear-rings of gold*,' etc., etc.—which are reconcilable with the *Siddhānta* theory.

ADHIKARANA (9).

[The *Jayā*, etc. are subsidiaries to Vedic Actions].

Sūtra (25): “*They would be subsidiary to all actions; because of there being no distinctiveness in the Context.*”

We now proceed to consider the special relationships of such factors as have been ascertained, through Syntactical Connection, to be subsidiary to certain sacrifices.

[We have the Injunction—‘*yāna karmaṇā irtṣēt tatra Jayām jñhuyāt*, —‘One should perform the *Jayā* sacrifice, if one desires prosperity from the action that he is performing.’ And with regard to this, there arises the question as to whether this *Jayā* is to be performed along with all such actions—even those like agricultural operations and the like, or only with those that are laid down in the *Vēda*—e.g. the *Agnihotra*, etc.].

And though the opponent is fully cognisant of the fact of the *Jayā* being connected with the *sacrificial fire* (the *Āhavanīya*), yet he thinks that this fire is introduced into the *Jayā*, simply with a view to the *Homās* that constitute the principal class of actions; and hence finding the qualification of ‘that whereby one desires prosperity’ applying also to such actions of ordinary life, as Agriculture, Service and the like,—he puts forward the following theory as the—

PŪRVAPAKṢHA.

“*The Jayā and other such-like sacrifices are subsidiary to all actions; and the sense of the Injunction comes to be—‘Desiring prosperity by means of service, etc. one should perform the Jayā and other sacrifices in the Āhavanīya Fire.’ Nor could it be argued that Service, etc. do not require this sacrificial Fire; because the purpose served by the mention of this Fire would be to preclude the possibility of the performance of the Jayā by those that have not laid the Fire; while as for those who have done it, they should perform the Jayā, even when going to perform ordinary actions in accordance with their respective castes.*”

“This interpretation has the advantage of being in keeping with the indication of the fact of the sentence in question occurring apart from the Context of any particular action; as such actions, not being directly

"connected with any action as their primary, would not necessarily be 'subservient to any such Primary. Nor would they abandon the modifications for fear of there being needless repetition. Specially in the 'case of Agriculture, etc. there being no fear of any repetition, there 'would be no abandoning of the modifications."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (26): *Being Homas, they would be restricted in their performance; because of the connection of the Āhavanīya Fire.*

These *Homas*—the *Jayā* and the like—would be restricted in their performance; that is to say, they would be performed only in connection with *Vedic* actions. Because there is always a certain co-existence desirable for the Subsidiary and the Primary; and as a matter of fact, we find that there could be no such co-existence between the *Jayā* and the Agricultural operations, etc. As the *tilling* (which is a part of these operations) would be done in the ground, and service at the king's palace; while as for the *Jayā* sacrifice, inasmuch as it is a *Homa*, and has no distinct substrate laid down for itself, it would always be done in the *Āhavanīya Fire*. And thus, if this latter were subsidiary to the former, then, there would be a difference in the positions of the two (the Subsidiary and the Primary) which cannot be allowable, without an express authoritative sanction to that effect, and would create a discrepancy in the sacrifice itself.

This discrepancy would be all the more unallowable, because there are cases where these sacrifices could be performed without such a discrepancy; and consequently there is no Apparent Inconsistency which could justify the unwarrantable difference of position referred to. And we know that when an action is performed in a way not sanctioned by the Scriptures, it does not bring about its proper results. Hence in order to make the sacrifice complete in all its details, the *Jayā* should not be performed in connection with actions other than the *Vedic*,—just in the same way as it cannot be performed by persons who have not *laid the fire*, or by those who are not learned in the Scriptures, or by such agents as do not belong to the human species.

Objection: "The *Āhavanīya Fire* might be carried over to the field, "and the *Jayā Homa* might be performed there, (and thus there would be "the desired co-existence of this subsidiary *Homa* with the Primary, "Agricultural Operations)."

Reply: Even then the *Homa* would not be in the same place as the furrows (made during the tilling and other agricultural operations). As

even if we were to carry the Fire to the field all that we would have would be a certain degree of proximity between the two, and there would not be any identity of their positions; specially as it is not possible for the Fire to be taken to every furrow, and the *Homa* performed there. In fact, even if this were possible, it would not constitute an identity of position between the *Homa* and the *Ploughing*, etc.

The expression '*homāstu*' (in the *Sūtra*) contains a reason,—the sense being, '*because they are Homas, they would be restricted in their performance.*'

Sūtra (27): They are subsidiary (to Vedic Sacrifices), because of the Name.

For the following reason also, the *Jayā*, etc. are subsidiary to Vedic sacrifices: Because thus would they be in keeping with the indications of the Name ('*Ādhvaryava*' which is applied to the Chapter in which the *Jayā* is mentioned). As a matter of fact, we find that we have the *Adhvaryu* priest in the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; and hence it is only when the *Jayā*, etc. are performed as subsidiary to this *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* that they could have the *Adhvaryu* for their performer. In the Agricultural Operations, however, there are no priests; and then too, in connection with the *Jayā*, etc., we have no separate injunctions regarding the appointment of the sacrificial priests (apart from those of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*); consequently, if the *Jayā*, etc. belonged to the Agricultural Operations, etc., they would be wholly independent of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; and as such, they could not take up any details (in the shape of the Priests, etc.), out of those belonging to the other sacrifice (such as the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*). And if an *Adhvaryu* priest were appointed independently, for performing the *Jayā*, then, in that case, this latter would not be performed by the same person as the Agricultural Operations; as these latter are not performed by the *Adhvaryu* priest. Thus then, we find that on account of the name '*Ādhvaryava*,' and also of the fact of such subsequent sentences (occurring in connection with the Injunction of the *Jayā* sacrifice), as '*it should be done by the Adhvaryu,*' we must have the *Jayā* performed by the *Adhvaryu* priest, which would be possible only if it were performed as subsidiary to such Vedic actions as the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* and the like.

ADHIKARANA (10).

[The *Ishti* should be performed on the acceptance of the Horse-gift in connection with Vedic Sacrifices].

Sūtra (28): “*The Ishti should be performed on the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift; as it is this acceptance that would be sinful; while there would be no sinfulness attaching to that of the Vedic Horse-gift, which is enjoined in the Scriptures.*”

In connection with the discussion as to the relationship of the Primaries among the ordinary everyday actions, and those among the Vedic actions,—we proceed to consider the case of those actions, with regard to which it is doubtful whether their prompting cause consists of some action of everyday life, or one of those laid down in the Veda.

[In course of the Injunction of the *Aṣvapratigrahēṣṭi*, we have the following passage,—‘*Varuṇo vā ētam grhṇāti yo’ṣvam pratigrhṇāti; yāvato’ yvān pratigrhṇīyāt tāvato Vāruṇān catuṣṣkupālān nīrvapēt.*’] Hence we find that the acceptance of the *Horse-gift* is the prompting cause of the *Ishti* in question,—as is shown by the word ‘*yāvato*’. But there arises a question, as to whether the performance of the *Ishti* is prompted, (1) by the acceptance of any horse-gift, (2) or by that of horse-gift received in ordinary life, (3) or by that of the horse-gift received during a Vedic sacrifice.

Question: “What do you mean by the ‘acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift,’ and the ‘acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift’? The sense of this question is that the acceptance of the Horse-gift in ordinary life is distinctly prohibited; and in regard to the Vedic Horse-gift also, we do not find any such Injunction as that ‘it should be accepted’; and consequently there is no ‘acceptance of Horse-gift’ in either case.”

In answer to this, the *Siddhānti* simply shows the forms of such acceptances (of the Horse-gift) independently of Injunctions and Prohibitions: when the Horse-gift is made apart from any sacrifices, and accepted simply as desirable by the recipient,—this acceptance is what is called the ‘ordinary acceptance of the Horse-gift’; while when the gift is made in connection with a sacrifice, its acceptance is called that of the Vedic Horse-gift.

In regard to the point at issue in the present *Adhikarana*, the current

idea being that the acceptance of any sort of Horse-sacrifice is the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi*, because of the Injunction of this sacrifice not specifying any particular Horse-gift, and also because of the impossibility of any qualifications for the subject of a proposition,—we have, as against this, the *Purvapaksha* that—"it is the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift that is the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi*."

The *Bhāṣya* however has taken no notice of the theory that 'the acceptance of any Horse-gift is the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi*'; and with a view to justify the use of the word '*ta*' (in the *Sūtra*), it takes the *sūtra* as brought forward (by the opponent) against a previous statement of the *Siddhānta*, in the following words: Inasmuch as the *Ishṭi* also is a Vedic action, and as it would not be desirable to assume a distinct result for it, we must admit that it is the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift that is the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi*. Because when the enjoined consequential action (the *Ishṭi*) is a Vedic one, it indicates its prompting cause also to consist of a Vedic action; and as all requirements would be fulfilled by this latter action, there would be no need of the *Ishṭi* being connected with any action of the ordinary world. Specially as any such connection would necessitate the assumption of a distinct result; while in the case of the Vedic Horse-gift, it would be an easy matter to assume the fact of its helping in the sacrifice in connection with which it is made.

And against this representation of the *Siddhānta*, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The *Ishṭi* would be performed at the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift. Because the acceptance that is declared to be the cause of the *Ishṭi* is that which is *sinful*; and as a matter of fact we find that sinfulness attaches only to the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift; in the case of the Vedic Horse-gift, on the other hand, we do not recognise any sinfulness, as it is laid down in the *Veda* (and as such, cannot be *sinful*).

"That is to say, the sentence '*Varuṇo vā etam pratigrhṇāti yo'evam pratigrhṇāti*' distinctly shows that the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi* is that acceptance of the Horse-gift which is *sinful*; and it is this *sinfulness* that is referred to in the sentence. If this *sinfulness* were enjoined in this sentence, then, perhaps, it could, on the strength of this sentence, be taken as applying to the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift also. As it is, however, it is not enjoined, as no results of actions (and *sinfulness* is such a result) can form the object of Injunction. Nor does the sentence contain the Injunction of an action; as an action that would be

"enjoined could never result in anything sinful. Nor does the sentence prohibit the acceptance of the Horse-gift; as we do not find any mention in it of that acceptance; and also because it serves the only purpose of pointing out the prompting cause of the *Ishti*. Thus then, inasmuch as there is an absolute relationship between *Sinfulness* and *Prohibition*, the sinfulness must be admitted only where there is Prohibition. Then as a matter of fact, we find that the Prohibition that we have is of the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift, —e.g. in the sentences 'no horses are to be given,' 'no such animals are to be received in gift as have two rows of teeth.'

"*Objection*: 'The Prohibition in these sentences is found to be, applying in common to both kinds of Horse-gift, —the *ordinary* as well as the *Vedic*.'

"*Reply*: True, it appears to be so; and it is for this very reason that we take it as pertaining to the *ordinary* Horse-gift; because the *Vedic* one forms the subject of another distinct Injunction; and as such it could not form the subject of a Prohibition.

"And for this reason, inasmuch as the *Ishti* is mentioned along with the said *sinfulness*, the former would be taken as pertaining to the acceptance of the *ordinary* Horse-gift.

"*Objection*: 'On account of the presence of the prompting cause, the acceptance of the Horse-gift would form the subject of the Proposition; and as such could not be qualified by *sinfulness*; and if the mention of *sinfulness* were taken as a mere eulogy of the *Ishti* that is laid down, then the acceptance of even the *Vedic* Horse-gift would become the prompting cause of that *Ishti*.'

"*Reply*: In the sentence in question, the *sinfulness* is not taken as the qualification; but from the very nature of the *Ishti* which is performed for the removal of the evil effects of sinfulness, we infer the fact of its being subsidiary to the acceptance of the *ordinary* Horse-gift.

"That is to say, we do not take the sentence to mean—'that acceptance of the Horse-gift which is sinful'; all that we mean is that when we look for the prompting cause of the *Ishti*, the sentence puts forward the mere fact of the acceptance of the Horse-gift in general (without any specifications). That is to say, when we come to look for the purpose of the *Bhāvanā* of the particular *Ishti*, we find that there is neither proximity nor any need for such purposes as the Heaven, nor any other aids to the Action,—and that the aforesaid *sinfulness* is in close proximity, being spoken of in the same sentence (as the *Ishti* in question); but the *sinfulness* by itself would be of no use in the Action, and as such is incapable of being accepted by itself as the result aimed at by the *Ishti*; and hence, for the sake of being compatible with the

"said Injunction, it stands in need of the mention of its 'removal,' which
 "would be useful for the man; and it is thus that the sinfulness comes to
 "be connected with the Action (*Ishti*), as *something to be removed* by it.
 "And as the needs of the action would be supplied by this one purpose
 "(the removal of sinfulness), we cannot rightly assume any other purpose
 "for it. Thus then we come to the conclusion that the *Ishti* is to be per-
 "formed where the result sought after is the removal of sinfulness, and
 "then we could have a Removal only in a place where the sinfulness
 "would be present; and the sinfulness too would be in accordance with
 "the Prohibition; and as a matter of fact, we find that the Prohibition
 "pertains distinctly to the Acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift; and
 "hence even without any qualification, from the very exigencies of the
 "case, it must be admitted that it is the acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-
 "gift that is the prompting cause of the *Ishti*. This is what is meant by
 "the declaration (in the *Bhāshya*) that—*The action consists of the freeing*
 "*from the Varuna-illness*; and this is possible only in the case of the ac-
 "ceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift.

"While pointing out the sinfulness, the *Bhāshya* says as follows:
 "Sinfulness proceeds from the acceptance of the Horse-gift from the *Çūdra* or
 "from some other sinful person. (Question) The acceptance of the gift from
 "such sinful persons even in the course of Vedic sacrifices would be equally
 "sinful? (Answer) Such would have been the case if the *Ishti* were performed
 "by the Receiver of the gift; as it is, it is performed by the Giver.

"Against this last answer, the following objection has been raised:—
 "This last answer would apply equally to the case of the ordinary
 "Horse-gift; as even in this case, the Giver, the *Çūdra* f.i., would not be
 "incurring any sin (by the giving of the Horse); then, as for the sin
 "attaching to the Receiver, that would be exactly the same in both
 "cases.

"That is to say, if on the ground of the *Ishti* being performed by
 "the Giver, the prompting cause of that *Ishti* were said to be free from
 "any sinfulness attaching to it,—even though there would be a distinct
 "sin attaching to the Receiver, due to his having received the gift from
 "improper sources, or in return for having officiated at the sacrifice of
 "some person not entitled to its performance,—then, even in the case of
 "the ordinary Horse-gift, even though there might be a distinct sin
 "attaching to the Receiver of it from such improper sources as the *Çūdra*
 "and the like, that would not bring any sin to the door of the Giver;
 "and so in this case also the prompting cause of the *Ishti* would be
 "without any sinfulness attaching to it. If, on the other hand, it be
 "held that it is the action of the Receiver that is the prompting cause
 "of the *Ishti*, and that his action is certainly sinful,—then the same could

“be said of the *Vedic* Horse-gift also. Then if it be assumed that, in the case of the *Vedic* Horse-gift it is to be performed by the Giver, while in that of the *ordinary* Horse-gift, by the Receiver,—it will be necessary to show particular reasons for this distinction.

“Then again, the *sinfulness* that we are cognisant of in the case in question distinctly appears to be that which follows from the *acceptance* of the Horse-gift; specially as the *sinfulness* that would be due to the unclean character of the Giver, would apply equally to all Gifts; and in that case, any specification of the gift as that of the *Horse* would be meaningless. That is to say, if the mere *Receiver of gifts from unclean sources* were meant, he could not be specified as *one who receives the gift of a horse*; because the unclean character of the source of the gift would apply equally to *all gifts* (and not to that of the *Horse* only).

“Thus then, inasmuch as we find the *Bhāshya*, in the first instance, speaking of the action of the *Receiver*, and then latterly, of that of the *Giver*,—the whole thing would be unconnected (and irrelevant).’

“Some people offer the following explanation (on behalf of the *Bhāshya*): Irrespective of the *Siddhānta* of the next *Adhikarana*, what the *Bhāshya* has here brought forward is the theory that the *Iṣṭi* is to be performed by the *Receiver* of the gift; as in ordinary life it is the acceptance of the Horse-gift that is prohibited, by such sentences as one should not accept the gift of such animals as have two rows of teeth; and under the circumstances, the receiving of such a gift from the *Ādru* is all the more reprehensible. On the other hand, in connection with sacrifices, the receiving of such a gift is quite allowable for the Priests (in view of such *Vedic* sentences as lay down the Horse as the sacrificial gift). It might be argued that what such sentences lay down is only the *giving* of the horse, not its *acceptance*. But this would be most improper; as the *Injunction of the gift* implies that of *acceptance* also; inasmuch as the ‘*gift*’ is not complete until the ownership of the recipient has been fully established by his *acceptance* of the gift. And then again, in the case of all actions, the *Injunction* is accepted as resting in the *completion* of the action enjoined; and hence the *Injunction* ‘should give the horse’ must be accepted as signifying the *renunciation of one’s ownership in the thing given*, and the *bringing about of the ownership of another person*; and thus we find that the very *Injunction of the Gift* involves that of the *Acceptance* also. And further, when we find that the *Acceptance* is made in the course of the Action, and is accompanied by *Mantras* and other restrictions, how can we believe that it is not pointed out by the *Injunction*? If the *Acceptance* itself were not enjoined, then why should we have the details of its procedure (in the shape of the repetition of certain *Mantras*, etc.) distinctly laid down in

"the *Veda*? Or, why should the neglect of any such details have created any discrepancy in the action of Acceptance itself?

"But the explanation that we have to offer is as follows: The sentence—'one should give gifts to the Priests'—lays down the *giving*; while as for the *acceptance*, as its possibility is already established by the covetousness of the Priest, and by the fact of its forming a part of his livelihood,—that does not form the object of Injunction. The expression 'should give' does not mean 'should accept.' It might have been taken as necessarily implied by it, if the Injunction of 'giving' were absolutely impossible without that of the 'Acceptance.' As a matter of fact, however, we find that the needs of the Injunction of 'giving' are fulfilled even by such *acceptance* as would be dictated by the inherent covetousness of the Priests; and consequently, the former Injunction itself could not necessarily imply that of the latter; specially as even hundreds of Injunctions could not urge the Man to activity, in the way that his covetousness would. Then again, even if the Injunction pertained to the actual completion of the action enjoined (that of 'giving' f.i.), yet the *creation of the ownership of another person* (which is said to be the completion of the action of *giving*) would be the function of the giver. We find that in such cases, there are two distinct functions,—one, that of the Receiver, consisting of the *acceptance*; and another, that of the Giver, consisting of the *making over of the gift to the person, and enabling him to accept it*. And as a matter of fact, we find that it is this latter that is enjoined, and not the former. Hence, just as in the case of the Injunction of the *Purchasing of Soma*, we find that its selling (by the vendor), being possible by the mere covetousness of this latter (for the object he would receive in exchange), does not form the object of the Injunction, nor does it form a part of the sacrifice (for which the *Soma* is purchased),—so, in the same manner, in the case in question also, the *Acceptance* would neither be enjoined, nor form part of the Action (of *giving*). Then, as for the Injunction of the procedure to be adopted in the *acceptance* of a gift,—that could be taken as being in reference to such *acceptance* as is *implied* (and not directly *enjoined*),—the sense of the Injunction of the Procedure being—'when one accepts a gift as a means of livelihood, he should do it in such and such a manner.'

"*Objection*: 'If such be the case, then, inasmuch as the *Acceptance* would only be for the sake of a certain end desirable by Man, the *Mantra*, etc. also in connection therewith would come to be the same.'

"*Reply*: That would not matter much; because the idea that we obtain from the Context is that 'the gift that helps in the completion of the sacrifice is such as ends in its acceptance in such and such a manner.' And thus, even though the Procedure be connected with the

"Acceptance, it would really belong to the *giving* itself; and hence it is this *giving* that should be taken as the object of Injunction. Such being the case, though the *Acceptance* is not enjoined, yet, as regards the gifts of the *Oow*, etc., we have no *prohibition* of their *acceptance*, and hence there would be no sin attaching to the *acceptance* of such gifts. As regards the *acceptance of the gift of the Horse* however, inasmuch as we have a distinct prohibition of it, if one should be found willing to disobey the Prohibition and accept the gift of the horse,—him alone should the sacrificer appoint as the Priest (to officiate at the sacrifice) in which the sacrificial gift consists of the Horse. Just as in the case of a *Brāhmaṇa-killer* performing the *Aṣvamēdha* sacrifice,—in accordance with the Injunction '*Brahmahā'ṣvamēdhēna yajēta*,'—this Injunction would certainly pertain to such a Priest as would be willing, and covetous enough, to officiate at the sacrifice of one who has '*fallen*' (deep in sin). But it cannot be believed that such *officiating* is enjoined by the Apparent Inconsistency of the former Injunction (of the *Aṣvamēdha*). In the same manner, in the case in question also, we cannot admit of there being any Injunction for the *acceptance* of the Horse-gift. Thus then, inasmuch as the *sinfulness* attaching to the *acceptance* would be present as much in case of the *ordinary* Horse-gift, as in that of the *Vedic* one, the *sinfulness* could not be taken as specifying the occasion, for the performance of the *Iṣṭi*.

"There is yet another explanation of the *Bhāshya* passage in question; it is as follows: In the case of the *ordinary* Horse-gift, the *Iṣṭi* would be performed by the Receiver; while in that of the *Vedic* one, it would be performed by the Giver; as in this latter, it forms part of the sacrifice that is being performed by the latter; but as for the *acceptance*, it is sinful in both cases; as in the former, it is actually prohibited, and in the latter also it is not distinctly allowed (or enjoined). But as for the *giving*, it is actually enjoined in the case of the latter. And thus the explanation given in the *Bhāshya* is the only one that is admissible.

"Or again, it may be that in both cases, the *Iṣṭi* is performed by the Giver. Then as for the *giving*, we find that this, in ordinary life, is distinctly prohibited, as will be shown under the *Dakṣhinaḍhikarāṇa*, where we find the declaration—'Horses would have been very useful, if their *giving* and *acceptance* were not both prohibited'; and in connection with the *Vipvajit* sacrifice, when one is said to give away all his property, the Horse is not given, simply because its *giving* is prohibited. In the case of the *Paundarika* sacrifice however, we find it distinctly laid down that the sacrificial gift should consist of 'a thousand horses,' and in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* also, the giving of one horse is laid down as necessary; and hence as regards these two particular cases,

"the general Prohibition is set aside by these particular Injunctions; and hence such *giving* is not considered *sinful*. And hence we conclude that the *Ishti* has to be performed only by one who, in ordinary life, makes a gift of the horse, in the way of a friendly present and the like; and also by one who *sells* the horse; as in the case of *selling* also, we have the element of *renouncing one's own ownership and creating that of another*; and as such it fulfills all the conditions of the denotation of the Verb 'to give.' Nor do we accept that alone as 'gift' which is given for the sake of an imperceptible result; because it is after the character of the 'gift' has been established, that we come to ascertain whether it leads to a perceptible or an imperceptible result. Though the gift that brings about a perceptible result (in the shape of the money that he receives for the thing sold) is spoken of by means of the word 'selling' (and not 'gift'), yet there would be nothing incongruous in the two words ('selling' and 'gift'), of which the former is only a particular form of the latter, applying to the same action (of 'selling'). In ordinary experience also, we find that when a man has sold paddy, he says, 'I have *given away* the paddy,' and he who has bought it, says, 'I have *taken* the paddy'; and hence the *selling* also is a *gift*; and as such the *selling* also of the horse would constitute the prompting cause of the *Ishti*.

"*Objection*: 'Inasmuch as we find the horse mentioned among the things that should be given as sacrificial gifts, such for instance as Cloth, Horse, Land, etc., etc.,—we cannot believe the giving of the Horse to be sinful.'

"*Reply*: The giving of the Horse would not be sinful, in a case where it is laid down as the object to be given. In the sentence that you speak of, we have only an enumeration of the things to be given, and not an actual Injunction of the *giving away* of those things. Thus then, inasmuch as the enumeration stands in need of the Injunction of *giving away*, we must conclude that the said declaration of the Horse as an object of gift pertains to that action in connection with which the Horse is specially enjoined as to be given away, while for the Cow and other things, that are not prohibited even in a general way, they might be admitted as gifts even in those cases where what is laid down is the mere 'giving' in general.

"For these reasons, we conclude that it is the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift that is the prompting cause of the *Ishti*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (29): It is an *Arthavada*; because we do not actually find (the *Varuna*-illness) following (from the

acceptance of the Horse-gift); consequently, the *Ishti* should be taken as to be performed in connection with a sacrifice.

If the *Ishti* in question were meant to serve the purpose of removing the evil effects of an action, then, it might be taken as pertaining to the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift. As a matter of fact, however, it is not meant to serve that purpose. Because it is only when a certain evil effect has been cognised by some other means that a certain action can be held to be meant for the purpose of removing that effect; in the case in question, however, we find that the evil effect that is here spoken of does not exist.

That is to say, when we find an evil effect mentioned in the sentence laying down a certain Action, we recognise that evil effect to be something to be removed; in the case in question, however, we find that the evil effect that is mentioned is not cognised, by any means of knowledge, as existing in the case of the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift,—even though it is found to be prohibited; as we find that ‘an attack of Dropsy’ is the evil effect mentioned in connection with the action, by the word ‘*Varuṇa*’; but in none of the works on Medicine do we find the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift as the cause of that illness; nor do we find this to be its cause, either by Sense-perception or by Inference, or by any other means of knowledge; nor is it spoken of in the sentence—‘One should not give the horse,’ and ‘One should not accept the gift of the animal that has two rows of teeth’; because the sentence says nothing as to the fact of the acceptance of the gift being the cause of ‘an attack of Dropsy’; specially as all that the sentence (enjoining the *Ishti*) does is to lay down an action for the removal of that evil effect, which is merely referred to as already existing. As for the evil effect—in the shape of ‘fall into hell’—that is assumed on the strength of the said Prohibition; it is not what is spoken of in the sentence in question; because the sentence, which is in the form—‘*Varuṇō vā etam grhṇāti*’—can never express the ‘fall into hell.’

If all evil effects be spoken of as ‘*Varuṇa*’—that which ‘covers’ (‘*vr̥ṇoti*’); and hence an attack of this were spoken of as the effect (of the acceptance of the Horse-gift),—then, in that case, we would be abandoning the well-known fact of the expression ‘*Varuṇa-grhīta*’ meaning ‘an attack of Dropsy.’ And further, if we accepted the aforesaid etymological signification of the word ‘*Varuṇa*,’ inasmuch as in the case of the Vedic Horse-gift also, we find a certain pain consequent upon the giving away, as also in the receiving, which entails the trouble of keeping and feeding the horse, there would be an ‘attack of *Varuṇa* (pain)’; and

hence the mere presence of the 'evil effect' would not justify our taking the *Ishti* as pertaining to the case of the ordinary Horse-gift, as also to that of the Vedic one. The *Bhāshya* brings forward the pain entailed in the keeping and feeding of the animal, though belonging to the Receiver,—because it has not yet been proved that his action is not the cause for the *Ishti* (because the fact of the *Ishti* being performed by the giver will be proved in the next *Adhikaraṇa*). Or it may be taken as said with reference to the giver, who also, prior to his creating the ownership of another, has got to undergo all the trouble of keeping and feeding the animal. And further, *Dharma* (Virtue) also is found to cover the man, while he exists in the metempsychic current; as the body that 'covers' the Person is not made of sin alone.

Consequently, whether we take the word '*Varuna*' in its etymological sense, or in that which belongs to it as a complete whole,—in any case, the 'evil effect' that it signifies cannot be cognised as belonging to the acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift; and hence there being no 'following' of the principal effect, the sentence '*yo'cūdān pratigṛhṇāti, etc.*' must be taken as a mere *Arthavāda*.

And what this *Arthavāda* does is to eulogise, through metaphorical imposition, the event, described in the passage '*Prajāpatirvaruṇāya, etc.*' as holding good at the present time also,—the purport of the eulogy being this: (1) 'Just as *Prajāpati* was attacked by *Varuna* (Dropsy), so also even at the present time, the same evil effect comes about whenever there is an acceptance of the Horse-gift; (2) just as for *Prajāpati*, the *Vāruni Ishti* proved the means of freedom from that disease, so also, at the present time, is the same *Ishti* known to be a means of freedom from the same; (3) consequently, just as being attacked by Dropsy *Prajāpati* performed the *Vāruni Ishti* for getting rid of that disease, so at the present time, one who happens to be attacked by the same disease should perform the same *Ishti*.'

And then, inasmuch as we find no result mentioned in the sentence itself (as following from that *Ishti*), we could assume either *Heaven* (in the case of the performance of *Ishti*, on the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift), or the aid accorded to a sacrifice (in the case of its performance on the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift), to be its result. But we find that it is very much easier to assume its relationship with a sacrifice than that with any such thing as *Heaven*; as we find no reason for the proximity of this latter (to the *Ishti*), while we find its proximity to the Vedic Action (of sacrifice) established by the fact of its having the common character of being Vedic, as also by the Acceptance of the Horse-gift. It is the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift falling within the sacrifice, that is recognised to be the prompting cause of the *Ishti*; and as such it

brings up the Primary sacrifice (of which it forms part), which it included in the Procedure occupying the same place as the said *Ishṭi*; and thus there being a mutual want, this would establish between these two (the *Ishṭi* and the Horse-sacrifice) the relationship of the Primary and the Subsidiary.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Ishṭi* is to be performed by one who has accepted the Horse-gift at a *Vedic* sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (11).

[The *Varuṇi Ishti* is to be performed by the Giver of the Horse].

Sūtra (30): "It is not laid down (for the Giver); because
"of the difference in the functions (of the Giver and
the Receiver)."

In regard to the *Ishti* dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether it is to be performed by the Receiver of the Horse-gift or by the Giver of it.

Question: "When we have the sentence—'yo'c'vampratigrhṇāti,' etc.'—distinctly laying it down for the Receiver, wherefore should there arise any such question?"

Reply: Because the beginning of the passage is found to begin with a sentence that points to the Giver,—i.e. the sentence '*Prajāpatiḥ Varuṇāya, etc.*'—as we shall show later on.

Question: "Well, in that case, inasmuch as the rest of the sentence points to the Giver, the question sought to be dealt with here will have been fully settled by the Law enunciated in the *Sūtra* I—iv—29; and "there would be no use of taking up the present *Adhikaraṇa* at all."

Reply: It is only a doubtful point that has been said in that *sūtra*, as to be settled by the 'rest of the sentence' (*Vākyaçeṣha*); but in the case in question, we find that when the matter is definitely settled by the object of the Injunction itself,—what else is there that could be done by 'the rest of the sentence'? It is only when the object of the Injunction is doubtful that there can be nothing incongruous in the doubt being settled by reference to the 'rest of the sentence.' In a case, on the other hand, where the object of the Injunction is definitely known, the superior authority of the Injunction would justify us in rejecting the indications of the 'Rest of the Sentence.'

Thus then, in the case in question, we find that the sentence '*Prajāpatiḥ Varuṇāya, etc.*' describes Prajapati as the Giver, and Varuṇa as the Receiver of the gift; then again, the sentence '*sa svām Dēvatām anayāt*' points to *Prajāpati*, by means of the word '*sa*,' inasmuch as this word has the same case-ending (the Nominative) as '*Prajāpatiḥ*' in the previous sentence, and as such the two are coextensive; and Prajāpati's 'own Deity' ('*Svā Dēvatā*') would be *Varuṇa*; because it is he that has been previously mentioned as the Recipient of the offering; and Prajāpati's

own self could not be 'his own Deity,' because, if the same thing had the mutually contradictory characters of the *Nominative* and *Recipient*, one of these two will have to be taken as figurative. Nor can *Varuṇa* be taken as the *Giver* to *Prajāpati*; because that would involve a reversing of the case-endings (i.e. the *Nominative* in '*Prajāpatiḥ*' and the *Dative* in '*Varuṇāya*' would have to change places). Consequently the sentence must be taken to mean that—'Prajāpati, having given the horse, got to *Varuṇa*; and thereby he *burst*'—i.e. the skin of his stomach burst owing to Dropsy and Oedema.—'He saw the *Qatushkapāla*-sacrifice, and performed it'—the word 'he' referring to *Prajāpati*, it is he that is spoken of as the Person that *performed* the sacrifice; and not *Varuṇa*, as he has been previously shown to be the *Recipient* of the offering; and certainly it is not possible for *Varuṇa* to offer the sacrifice to himself; because the offering that would be made to one's self, would not be 'given.' And thus we find that the sense of the whole passage comes to be this—'Prajāpati, having given the horse to *Varuṇa*, and thereby being attacked with Dropsy, got rid of that disease by performing the *Vāruṇī Ishti*; consequently if one should happen to make the gift of a horse, he should perform the same *Ishti*,'—which shows that the *Ishti* has to be performed by the *Giver*. Then again, inasmuch as the accessories of a sacrifice are its subsidiaries, it is necessary that they should have the same performer as the Primary sacrifice; and in the case in question it is the Performer of the Primary sacrifice that is the owner and the *Giver* of the Horse.

Notwithstanding all this, however, inasmuch as we find the object of the *Injunction* ('*yo'ṣvan pratigṛhṇīyāt, etc.*') and the *Arthavāda* ('*Prajāpatiḥ, etc.*') having contrary significations,—there should be no doubt as to which of these should be accepted (as it is well known that the *Injunction* is more authoritative than the *Arthavāda*); and as such the law of the *Sūtra* I—iv—29; and thus it would be necessary to accept the signification of one of these two and reject that of the other. And to this effect, it would be necessary to consider the whole of the passage in question, from beginning to end (and reconcile the indications of its first portion with those of the last); and as this could not be done easily, it is absolutely necessary that we should devote a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* to this question.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the *Arthavāda* depends for its functioning upon the "object of the *Injunction*, it is subservient to its purpose, and without "it, it would be absolutely meaningless,—and as the *Injunction* is quite "capable of serving its purpose, even without the *Arthavāda*,—as we have

"the eulogy of that which is enjoined, and not the Injunction of that which is eulogised, because of the needs of the eulogy being supplied by the Injunction,—it must be admitted that, in accordance with the law of the *Sūtra* 'aṅgaṇavīrodhē ca tādārthyāt' (XII—ii—25), it is the *Arthavāda* that should be rejected as inadmissible. Especially as *Arthavādas* are always found to pertain to objects that have been subject to other means of knowledge; and hence it is only proper that these should be taken in their secondary (indirect) significations, and not that which forms the object of a Direct Injunction. Because such Injunctions have for their object something that has not been subject to any other means of knowledge; and as such an assumption, in the case of these, of any signification other than the *direct* one would be wholly unwarrantable. For instance, we have already shown before that it is *Arthavādas*—like 'urgudambaraḥ,' 'ādityo yūpaḥ,' etc.—that are taken in their indirect figurative sense, and not any of the Injunctions; and for this there could be no other reason except what we have just pointed out.

"Consequently, even though the first portion of the passage—which is an *Arthavāda*—is a distinct eulogy of the action of the *Giver*, yet it should be taken as indirectly (figuratively) applying to its correlative, the action of the *Receiver*; just as in the case of the sentence 'āpo vai śāntāḥ' (*vide supra*).

"Thus then, on account of the two functions, of *Giving* and *Receiving*, being wholly distinct and different, this action (*Ishṭi*), that we find mentioned in connection with the *Receiver*, we can never accept as laid down for the *Giver*.

"The word 'ca' in the *sūtra* should be taken as used in place of 'tu,' just as in the sentence 'Kiñcēha bhavataḥ, etc.'

"Or, the *sūtra* may be taken as—we do not believe the *yajamāna* to be laid down as the Performer of the *Ishṭi*.

"Or it may mean—the action of the *yajamāna* we cannot accept as the prompting cause of the *Ishṭi*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (31): On account of Indications, it should have to be performed by the Person appointing the Priests (for the sacrifice).

The said *Ishṭi* would be performed by the 'Ārtviṣṭa'—i.e. by the *yajamāna*,—the word being explained as 'one who is the lord or appointer of the Rtvik priests. Or the word may be taken as applying to the *yajamāna* by reason of this latter also being a 'Rtvik,' like the *Brahmā*,

as shown under the *sūtra* III—vii—38; and hence the offering made by the *yajamāna* also may be spoken of as the '*Ārtviṣa*' offering. Or the *sūtra* may be explained thus: There being a doubt as to whether the *Iṣṭi* would be done by the *yajamāna* or the *Rtvik*, we should conclude it to belong to one, with whom it would be pointed out by Indicative power to be connected.

We now proceed to show how the fact of the prompting cause of the *Iṣṭi* consisting of a certain functioning of the *yajamāna* is pointed out by Indications. First of all, we hold that there is one Indicative Force in the shape of the capability of the Action itself; and the second is that belonging to the sentence, and cognisable by looking closely into what precedes and follows it.

(1) It has been almost proved in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* that the *Iṣṭi* is to be performed by the *Giver* of the Horse, and when it is definitely ascertained that the *Iṣṭi* is a subsidiary of that sacrifice at which the Horse is given and accepted as the sacrificial gift,—then, in accordance with the Law, that 'the Primary and its subsidiaries should all be performed at the same place, and by the same person,' it follows that the *Iṣṭi* is to be performed by the same person that performs the said sacrifices; and the person that performs is also the giver of the Horse-gift, in accordance with the *sūtra* III—viii—1; and hence there can be no doubt as to the fact that the *Iṣṭi* should be performed by the Giver of the horse. There is a peculiar potentiality in the subsidiary, whereby it is only when it is performed by the same person that performs its Primary sacrifice, that it can help in the completion of this latter,—which it can never do, if performed by another person. And hence, in the *Iṣṭi*, the duties that belong to the priests would be performed by them, just as in the case of the Primary sacrifice; while they could not perform that which belongs to the *yajamāna*.

(2) Even though this is a fairly well-established fact, yet, inasmuch as some people might have doubts caused by certain misconceptions arising out of the apparent contradiction of the first portion of the passage by the subsequent portions, it is necessary to consider the present *Adhikaraṇa*, for the setting aside of those doubts. And as a matter of fact, we find that the potency of the syntactical connection, from beginning to end, is such as distinctly points to the fact of the *Iṣṭi* being performed by the Giver. Because the sentence does not extend only so far as that—'One should perform as many *catuṣṭkapāla* sacrifices as there may be horses that he accepts'; but it is found to begin with quite a different sentence—'*Prajāpatiṛvaruṇāyaśvamanayat*, etc.; and it has already been explained that this latter points to the fact of the *Iṣṭi* being performed by the Giver.

Objection: "It is true that this has been explained; but it has also been explained that the indications of the first portion of the passage (i.e. '*Prajāpatir varuṇāya, etc.*') are rejected by the superior authority of the Injunction ('*yo'cchān pratigraṇṇāti, etc.*')."

Reply: It is not so; because the indications of the eulogy are set aside by the Injunction, only when this latter has fully obtained its footing; in the case in question, however, the Injunction with regard to the Receiver of the gift (for performing the *Ishti*) has not quite obtained its footing, at the time that we come across the *Arthavāda*.

If the Injunction in question had been fully established, as referring to the *Receiver*,—then there would have been no need for the discussion at all. As a matter of fact, however, we find that it has not been so established. Because it is only in a case where the *Arthavāda* appears after the Injunction, that the latter is fully established independently by itself (before the *Arthavāda* comes to view); whereas when it is the *Arthavāda* that appears before the Injunction, this latter is always based upon, and conditioned by, the former.

That is to say, even though the *Arthavāda* is subservient to the Injunction, yet there is another peculiarity in their mutual relationship, due to the order of sequence in which they appear. In all cases, the idea that is the first to appear easily obtains a footing, by reason of the second idea to the contrary not yet having appeared on the scene,—as in accordance with the *sūtra* XII—ii—23, and as shown under the *Ṛutilingādhi-karana* (III—iii—14); while that which appears subsequently, does so in connection with an object that is already pervaded over by a former idea to the contrary; and as such being opposed from the very beginning, by the former idea, it could not but appear, in a form in keeping with that idea; and as such its character is likely to be reversed before it succeeds in obtaining a footing.

Consequently, in the case in question, we reject that difference in the bearings of the *Injunction* and the *Arthavāda* which is based upon their intrinsic character,—in view of the difference caused by the order of sequence in which they are found to appear; and then we find—(a) that the first and the last portions of the passage, pointing, as they do, to the performability of the *Ishti* by the *Giver* and the *Receiver* respectively, have mutually contradictory indications; (b) that under the circumstances the two cannot be reconciled; (c) that if each of them be taken independently of the other, it would be likely to become meaningless, as their mutual proximity would not allow them to have the support of any other *Arthavāda* and *Injunction* (respectively), their need for such a support would remain unsupplied. Consequently, in view of the fact of a reconciliation between them being absolutely necessary, when we

come to take them as pertaining to the same subject, we do not find it possible to completely abandon the notion of the *Iṣṭi* belonging to the *Giver*, which was the first to appear on the scene unopposed; and hence in view of the superior claims of this notion, we come to take the subsequent notion of the connection of the *Iṣṭi* with the *Receiver*, before it has quite obtained its footing, as figuratively (indirectly) indicating its connection with the *Giver*, by reason of the Verb '*grhṇīyāt*' (in the Injunction) being taken as indicative of the Causal Verb '*grāhayāt*' (offers).

And further, this way of taking the whole enables us to keep the form of the rest of the sentence intact (the only change necessary being that of the Verb '*grhṇīyāt*' into '*grāhayāt*,')—while in the other case (if we were to modify the *Arthavāda* in accordance with the Injunction), the whole of the former would be found entirely incompatible (and hence calling for modifications). That is to say, the *Arthavāda*, as modified in accordance with the changes necessitated by the latter view, would come to have this absurd form:—'*Prajāpati obtained the horse from Varuṇa, and then he got to his Deity from whom he had received the gift, etc., etc.*': while in accordance with my view, the only change that is necessitated is that of the ordinary form '*grhṇāti*' into the causal form '*grāhayati*.'

It has been argued above that the Injunction is possessed of an authority superior to that of the *Arthavāda*. We readily admit that that which is an Injunction is of superior authority; but in the case in question, we have no such *Injunction* as that '*the Iṣṭi should be performed by the Receiver of the gift.*'

In the case of all sentences, what is not signified by the previous words, or is required by them, that alone is taken out of the subsequent words; and nothing beyond that, even if some such be found to be actually signified by these latter. For instance, we shall show, in Adhyāya X, that, in the case of the sentence '*satrādudavasāyu*,' the very presence of the '*Ktvā*' affix indicates that, in the action following the said *Udavasāna* also, we should have, just as in this action of the *Udavasāna*, many performers independent of one another, and not necessarily acting conjointly (as no significance would be attached to this conjoint action, on account of their being the *subject* of the proposition); and then follows the sentence '*prsthacamanīyaṇīna yajēran*'; and in this, the nominative agents forming the Predicate, though their *plurality* and *conjoint activity* are duly cognised, are not found to be required by the former sentence, and hence they are not regarded to be of any consequence.

Similarly, in the case in question, as soon as we come to recognize the *Arthavāda*—'*Prajāpatirvaruṇāya, etc.*'—as eulogising the *Iṣṭi* as the means of freeing the *Giver* of the horse from the attack of Dropsy,—we have an idea that there still remains something unsaid which requires to

be said on the subject; and this something is ascertained to be the *Injunction of this Ishṭi*. And then, one Person, who has been previously recognised as the object of the Injunction, looking forward to the Inference of the Injunction (as pointed out by the *Arthavāda*), stands in need of that *Injunction* only, and nothing else besides that. And as for the *Arthavāda* and the Injunction, both of them are equally capable of signifying their own respective objects; and the only faculty that the *Arthavāda* does not possess, is that of *enjoining*; and hence it is only the element of *Injunction* that it would borrow from the subsequent Injunction; but by this borrowing, it does not take in all the other factors also of the Injunction; as it does not stand in need of these. Consequently, inasmuch as the use of the Injunctive Affix for the sake of the mention of the prompting cause (of the *Ishṭi*) would not be possible without a Verbal Root, it becomes necessary to use some Verbal Root or other; and we find the root '*grhṇati*' used (in '*grhṇīyāt*'), which is however taken in the sense of the functioning of the *Giver* (and hence there is nothing incongruous in the use of the word '*grhṇīyāt*'). If we did not take the two (the Injunction and the *Arthavāda*) thus, the sense of the whole would be—'because in olden times the *Giver* of the Horse did so and so, therefore at the present time, the *Receiver* should do likewise,'—which would be wholly irrelevant and absurd.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Injunction also has referred to the *Giver* as described in the *Arthavāda*. All this we have explained in detail, under the *Sūtra* III—iii—1.

Objection: "Then, inasmuch as it will have been dealt with under that '*Sūtra*, there would be no need of the present *Adhikaraṇa*."

Reply: True; it has been dealt with under that *Sūtra*. But still, we find it necessary to take up the present *Adhikaraṇa*, with a view to setting aside the misconceptions produced by other *Bhāṣyas* (on the *Sūtras*).

If this were not necessary, then, we could take the two *sūtras* (dealt with under the present *Adhikaraṇa*) along with the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, in the following manner:—The *Pūrvapakṣa-sūtra* (30) may be taken as putting forward the following views:—"Just like the actions of *Ālambha* and *Nirvāpa*, the action of accepting the horse would be exactly similar in ordinary life and in the Veda; and as such there being no absolute concomitance (between the said acceptance and a Vedic action), the acceptance could not be taken as necessarily forming part of the Vedic sacrifice; and hence we must conclude that the acceptance is *not enjoined*, as belonging to the sacrifice, specially as the two actions (of acceptance and sacrifice) being wholly different, there is no cause for such ascertainment."

To the above arguments, the *Siddhānta sūtra* (31) may be taken as offering the following reply : '*Sa līṅgādarvivjē syāt*' ; that is to say, the *Ishti* would be performed in the case of that Horse-gift which is made to the sacrificial Priests, because of the indicative power pointing to the *Vedic* and *Sacrificial* character (of the action) ; as though the Injunctive Affix (in '*grhṇiyāt*') serves the purpose of pointing out the prompting cause (of the *Ishti*), yet it can be taken as supplying the Indication in question ; the sense of the Indication being that it is only the *Vedic* action that is generally found to be connected with the Injunctive Affix, which never relates to any ordinary action of the world.

Or, we may have the *Pūrvapakṣa* independently of the *sūtras* ; and in that case, both the *sūtras* (30 and 31) would be taken as supplying the answer to that *Pūrvapakṣa* ; the sense of this reply being as follows :— Inasmuch as the ordinary (Horse-gift) is *not enjoined*, there can be no idea of that forming the prompting cause of the *Ishti* (as explained before) ; as it might be argued that,—“ the action of the acceptance of the Horse-gift being one and the same, there could be no difference between the *Vedic* and the ordinary gift, and hence both are equally capable of serving as the prompting cause of the *Ishti*,”—it is added (in the next *sūtra*) that it is not so ; because *there is a difference in the actions* ; that is to say, the *Vedic Horse-gift* differs from the ordinary *Horse-gift*, on the following points : (1) the former is enjoined, while the latter is not, (2) they occur at different places, and times, etc., (3) they are distinct individuals ; and on the ground of this difference there would be a restriction as to the capability of serving as the prompting cause (of the *Ishti*). In fact, the ordinary *Horse-gift* is distinctly prohibited, and hence there would be an absolute absence of that, in all matters relating to the *Veda*. Consequently only that can be regarded as the said prompting cause, the existence of which is a certainty. Nor is the acceptance of the *Horse-gift* mentioned simply with a view to the pointing out of the prompting cause ; as the mention ends with the mere pointing out of the particular relationship between the two. Consequently, we come to the conclusion that the *Ishti* forms part of the procedure to be observed in the giving away of the Horse ; and this use of the *Ishti* shows that the giving away meant is that connected with *Vedic* sacrifices. Thus then the *Ishti* cannot be taken as related to anything that is *not enjoined*.

Though both the above interpretations of the two *sūtras* were possible, yet it was for a special purpose that the *Bhāṣya* propounded a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* (out of these *sūtras*).

Then as for the word '*grhṇāti*,' inasmuch as it is never found to be used, in that form, in the sense of the Causative, it might lead to a misconception ; and hence it should be taken in its indirect sense (as indicat-

ing the causative of *accepting*); specially as it is quite possible for the *causative* to be spoken of as the *caused*. Or, inasmuch as the Nominative character resides in the *causative* also, when the causal character would be meant to be spoken of, then, in that case, we would have the causative affix, even in connection with the root signifying the functioning of the *caused*; while when the mere Nominative character would be meant to be expressed, then even without the causative affix,—anyone who, in some way or other, helps in the accomplishment of the *Acceptance of the Horse-gift*, we may speak as ‘*accepting*’ (‘*grhṇāti*’).

For instance, in the sentence ‘he tills the ground with six ploughs,’—we find that, though the word ‘tills’ signifies the *making of the lines of furrows*, yet through the force of the mention of the ‘six ploughs,’ we take the Verb as indicating the action of the Director of the Ploughing, as the actual operating of *six ploughs* could not be done by any single Ploughman; consequently we conclude that the Person, who directs the operations of all the six Ploughmen, is also the Performer of the *tilling*, through these men; and hence it is he that comes to be spoken of as ‘tilling the ground with six ploughs.’

Similarly, the root ‘*grhṇāti*’ having its signification conditioned by the *Arthavāda*, would come to be taken as indicating the function of the person *causing the grahana* or acceptance (*i.e.* the Giver). As for Verbal roots, it is a well-known fact that they are endowed with multifarious potentialities (of signification); and as such they could be used in the simple as well as in the causal sense,—as has been shown under the *Bhāvarthādhikaraṇa* (II—i—1 *et seq.*); and it often happens that, in view of the peculiar character of their auxiliaries, they are taken even in such a sense as is not generally known.

For these reasons, we conclude that the word ‘*pratiḡrhyāt*’ in the sentence in question, has been used in the sense of ‘*dadyāt*’ (should give); and hence the *Ishti* in question should be performed by the *Giver* of the Horse.

To the above conclusion, some people make the following objections:—“In the passage, as read in the text of the *Maitrāyaṇī* Recension of the ‘*Yajurveda*, we find the first sentence of the passage in question read as “*sa esho' evaḥ pratiḡrhyatē*”; and thus this being quite in keeping with “the subsequent Injunction, it is clearly cognisable that the *Ishti* is to be performed by the Person receiving the Horse-gift.”

To this some people make the following reply: Our position having been proved, by reasonings, to be stronger than yours, if we come to be vanquished by means of another scriptural text, what can we do?

But this fear of being ‘vanquished’ is wholly groundless. Because even if we had another scriptural text distinctly laying down the perform-

ance of the *Ishti* by the Receiver,—then too, all that we would have to admit is that it would be performed by the Receiver *also*; but that would not set aside its performability by the Giver.

That is to say, it has been proved that the text of the passage as quoted above,—which is the one found in the text of the *Taittirīya* Recension of the *Yajurveda*,—distinctly points to the fact of the *Ishti* being performed by the Giver. And this conclusion is not found to be set aside, either by any other reasonings, or any scriptural text. In fact, even if we had a text prohibiting the performance of that *Ishti* by the *Giver*, we would have two optional alternatives, and there would be no necessity of abandoning the conclusion once accepted before. As for the sentence ('*yo'ṣvam pratigrhṇīyāt, etc.*') which lays down the performability of that *Ishti* by the *Receiver* of the Horse-gift, if, by reason of its forming part of the sacrifice, it be taken in a manner in keeping with the previous sentence,—without paying any heed to the particular way in which the passage might open—then, in that case, that sentence too would point out the performability by the *Giver*. If, on the other hand, through the presence of the word '*pratigrhṇāti*,' the sentence be taken independently by itself, as laying down its performability by the *Receiver*,—then, in that case, inasmuch as the previous sentence will have indicated its performability by the *Giver*, it would come to be performed by both (the *Giver* as well as the *Receiver*); with this difference however, that the *Ishti* performed by the *Receiver*, being only calculated to serve the purposes of the *Man* (independently of any Vedic sacrifice), it would have to be performed, in the case of the acceptance of the *Ordinary* Horse-gift also.

Some people, taking their stand upon the word '*Ārtviṣṣ*' in the *sūtra*, argue that the previous sentence ('*Prajāpatirvaruṇāya, etc.*') also speaks of the performability of the *Ishti* by the *Receiver* (i.e. the *Rtvik*).

But the *Ishti* that would be performed by the *Rtvik* Priest, could not form part of the sacrifice itself (which is being performed by the *Yajamāna*); and hence the relationship of the result of the *Ishti* would be as possible for the ordinary man of the world as for that Priest; consequently we would have the performance of the *Ishti* even in the case of the acceptance of the Horse-gift in ordinary life; and under the circumstances, it becomes incumbent upon those persons to explain what grounds the *sūtra* would have for declaring, as the conclusion '*tasmāt yajñe pratiyāta*' ('consequently it would be cognised as to be performed in connection with the Vedic sacrifice').

Thus then, from the mere fact of the *Ishti* being laid down as forming part of the sacrifice, we conclude that it should be performed by the *Giver*.

ADHIKARANA (12).

[The *Somaindra Caru* is to be offered on the occasion of the vomiting of that *Soma* drunk at Vedic sacrifices].

Sūtra (32): "The case of the vomiting of the drink is similar."

Apart from any particular Context, we find another sentence—'*Somaindran carunnirvapēti yah somam vāmati.*' ('One who vomits the *soma* should offer the *Somaindra caru*'). And in regard to this, too, we proceed to consider the same questions as those dealt with in the two preceding *Adhikaraṇas*,—i.e. (1) whether the Offering is to be made when the *Soma* vomited is that drunk at a sacrifice, or that drunk in ordinary life as medicine; [and (2) whether it pertains to the vomiting of the *Yajamāna* or that of the sacrificial Priests].

And this being the question, the expression '*tadvat*' in the *sūtra* indicates the two theories (of the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—viz.: (1) that the *Soma-drinking* meant is both that which is done at a sacrifice and that done as medicine; and (2) that it is the latter only (as propounded in *Sūtra* 28).

Or the expression '*tadvat*' may be taken as indicating the application of the *Siddhāntas* of the last two *Adhikaraṇas*, to the present question also.

And as the *Pūrvapakṣa* (of the present *Adhikaraṇa*) differs a little from that of the last two *Adhikaraṇas*, we lay it down, in the following words:—

"In the case of the *Soma-drinking* at a Vedic Sacrifice, inasmuch as "the disposal of the substance (*Soma*) will have been done by the mere "drinking of it, if there were to be any subsequent disorders, in the shape "of vomiting and the like,—it would not necessitate any remedial "measures; and hence in that case, the laying down of the *Iṣṭi* (the "*Somaindra*) would be absolutely useless. While in the case of the *Soma* "drunk in ordinary life,—if the *Soma* happens to be vomited out, there "would be none of the medicinal effects desired; and hence in the case, "there would be a possibility of the loss of virility, etc. (mentioned as "following from a neglect of the *Somaindra Iṣṭi*); and there is no im- "possibility of such evil effects, as we found in the case of *Dropsy* (in the "preceding *Adhikaraṇa*); and thus as the evil effects would be possible, "the *Somaindra Iṣṭi*, that is laid down in connection with those effects, "also comes to be recognised as a remedy for these effects. Consequently,

"this *Ishti* should be performed at the vomiting of the *Soma* drunk in "ordinary life."

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (33): *It would be performed at the (vomiting of the Soma drunk at the) Vedic sacrifice; as it is only at this that it creates an evil effect; while in the case of that drunk in ordinary life, as this would be done for a visible purpose, there could be no evil effects attached to its vomiting.*

Objection: "Why do not you bring forward the same arguments "that you did in the last two *Adhikaranas*,—that the action in question "being *Vedic*, it would apply only to the Vedic sacrifice, etc., etc.?"

Reply: The reason is that there can be no Vedic character attaching to the *vomiting*; because no *vomiting* is found to be enjoined in the *Veda*. Consequently, the result of *vomiting*, even in the case of *Vedic Soma-drinking* would be the same as those in that of the *ordinary Soma-drinking*.

That is to say, the *Disposal* of the unused *Soma* (remnant of the sacrifice) that is laid down is that up to the *proper digestion* of it; and hence if it happen to be vomited (there would not be a *proper digestion* of it), the results of the Principal Sacrifice would not appear in the proper way.

That is to say, as a matter of fact, there are no evil effects attaching to the vomiting of the *Soma* drunk in *ordinary life*; because it is drunk only for the sake of being vomited. Even if there were some evil effects, their remedy would consist of certain measures laid down in works on medicine, and there would be no need of any *Vedic* remedy (such as the *Somaindra Ishti*). In the case of the *vomiting* of the *Soma* drunk at a Vedic sacrifice, on the other hand, we have definitely ascertained that the *Disposal*, that is laid down for the *Soma*-remnant, is one ending with the proper digestion of it,—as is distinctly shown by the words of the *mantra* recited for the digesting of it; and certainly this enjoined *Disposal* would be interfered with by the *vomiting*; and as such there would be a discrepancy in the final result of the Principal Sacrifice (of which the *Soma-drinking* forms a part); consequently, there would be a likelihood of the performance of the *Somaindra Ishti*, as a remedy calculated to correct that discrepancy.

If the sentence (laying down the *Somaindra Ishti*) were the *Artha-vāda* pertaining to the result,—then it would be all the more inapplicable to the case of *ordinary Soma-drinking*, by reason of the necessity, in this case, of the assumption of a result (as there is none actually perceptible). While in the case of the *Soma-drinking* at the *Vedic* sacrifice, the '*vomiting*' (spoken of in '*yo vamatī*') indicates the *drinking*; and this *drinking*

indicates the *Sacrifice* (at which the *drinking* is laid down as the *Disposal*); and of this sacrifice, the *Ishṭi* would be a subsidiary; and hence in this case the relationship among all the factors concerned would be easily established.

ADHIKARANA (13).

[The *Somaindra Ishti* is to be performed when the vomiting is by the *Yajamāna*].

Sūtra (34): "(The *Ishti*) would pertain to all; because there is no distinction (made)."

Though it is fully established, from the analogy of the case of the *Ishti* for the acceptance of the Horse-gift, that the *Ishti* in question also is to be performed by the *Yajamāna*,—yet it is still as undecided as to whether the prompting cause of the *Ishti* is the vomiting by the *Yajamāna* himself or also that by the Priests.

And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as there is no specification, the vomiting of both (the *Yajamāna* as well as the Priest) would be the prompting cause of the *Ishti*. Because the vomiting of the *Yajamāna* causes as much discrepancy in the Disposal, as that of the Priests, as the drinking of both is meant to serve as purificatory of the substance (*Soma*). Consequently, whether the *Ishti* be meant to be a remedy for the evil effects caused by the vomiting, or an aid in the accomplishment of the *Apūrva* (of the Principal sacrifice),—it has to be performed at the vomiting by the *Yajamāna* as well as at that of the Priest."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (35): *It would pertain to the Master only; a (the action) is performed for his sake.*

Even though the *Ishti* be really a mere indirect aid to the Principal sacrifice, yet it would be performed only on the vomiting by the *Yajamāna*. Because, as the first portion of the sentence ('*yaḥ somam vamiṣṭ*') contains the word '*yaḥ*,' it is not recognised as pointing out the prompting cause (of the *Ishti*); and when it does come to be recognised, through the subsequent appearance of the word '*saḥ*' (in '*sa nirvapeṭ*'), we also come to recognise the Performer to be one only.

That is to say, in the sentence—‘*yaḥ somam vāmati sa nirvāpāt*’—we find that the two words ‘*yaḥ*’ and ‘*saḥ*’ distinctly indicate that there the performer of the *Ishti* and of the *vomiting* is one and the same; and thus there can be no doubt that the action of the sacrifice (*Ishti*) is to be performed by the Master of the sacrifice (i.e. the *Yajamāna*). And from this certain fact we come to a definite conclusion with regard to the doubtful case of the *vomiting* also,—that it is only when the vomiting is done by the *Yajamāna* that it serves as the prompting cause (of the *Ishti*).

Nor is the *vomiting*, independently by itself, capable of serving as the prompting cause; as the mere Verb (‘*vāmati*’) is incapable of giving any idea of such a cause; it is only when it is accompanied by the word ‘*yaḥ*’ that it expresses that Cause; and in that case, the fact of the two actions (of *sacrifice* and *vomiting*) having the same performer is cognised before the fact of the *vomiting* being the prompting cause (of the *Ishti*).

Now then, if the Priests were to perform the *Ishti* on account of their own *vomiting*, they would be offering substances either for a Deity or in exchange for some services,—as they could not effect this exchange for themselves, it would be necessary for them to engage other *Adhvaryu* and other priests. And on account of the *Ālmanāpāda* affix in the word ‘*ādadhīta*’ (in the sentence ‘*agnināḍadhīta*’), it is clear that the sacrificial fire can have no connection with any person other than the one who has duly *lighted* it; and hence it is necessary for all performers of sacrifices to make the offering in the Fire lighted for themselves. Consequently if the Priests perform the *Ishti* in question, with a view to help in the Sacrifice, the *Soma* drunk at which had been vomited by them, then the *Ishti* which they would perform would be performed in a place, and at a time, different from that of the original Principal Sacrifice. (As those *Ishtis* would be performed in distinct Fires lighted by each of the Priests separately); and as such the help accorded by these *Ishtis* would not accrue to the Original Sacrifice. Nor is there any direct Injunction to the effect that the auxiliary *Ishtis* should be performed in a place and time other than that of the Original Sacrifice,—in consideration of which Injunction we could admit of even faulty Auxiliaries. As for the sentence—‘*yaḥ somam vāmati, etc.*’—inasmuch as this has all its requirements fulfilled by the *vomiting* by the *sacrificer*, it cannot be taken as permitting the difference in the time and place of the Auxiliary *Ishtis* from those of the Original Sacrifice. Specially, how could it be possible for a single text (‘*yaḥ somam, etc.*’) to lay down the sameness of the time and place of the two (the Auxiliary and the Original), in the case of the *vomiting* by the *Yajamāna*,—and difference of them, in the case of the Vomiting by the Priests?

If, then, they were to perform the *Ishti* for their own sake,—then, in

that case, inasmuch as that *Iṣṭi*, which has once (in the case of the vomiting by the *Yajamāna*) been ascertained to be for the sake of a sacrifice, could never be for the sake of *Man* himself, even if it came to be performed as for this latter, such performance would be absolutely useless. And if, for the sake of justifying such performance, the *Iṣṭi* be taken, on the strength of scriptural texts, to be for the sake of *Man*,—then, that would involve the abandoning of the 'sacrifice' that appears in close proximity to it, as also the assuming, for such an *Iṣṭi*, another result, in the shape of Heaven or some other end, that would be desirable by the *Man*.

This same assumption of a result has been shown to be necessary, in the case of the *Iṣṭi* being taken as to be performed at the vomiting of the *Soma* drunk in ordinary life. But it could not be said with regard to the *Iṣṭi* that would be performed at the vomiting of that drunk during a sacrifice; as we have already shown that, in this latter case, the assumption of a fresh result is not necessary (the effect of the *Iṣṭi* being simply to accord help to the sacrifice, by the remedying of the discrepancy caused by the vomiting).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Iṣṭi* should be performed only when the vomiting would be that by the *Yajamāna*.

It might be urged that, even in the case of the vomiting by the Priests the actual offering of the *Iṣṭi* would be made by the *Yajamāna* himself. But in that case, we have the aforesaid anomaly of the two actions (of the Offering of the *Iṣṭi*, and the vomiting) not having the same performer. And for the justification of this, it would be necessary to take the word 'yah' (in 'yah somam vomati') in the sense of the Genitive 'yasya,' and hence to reject the co-extensiveness (between 'yah' and 'sah'). And these interpretations would make the text inapplicable to the case of the Vomiting by the *Yajamāna*, which therefore would no longer be a prompting cause (for the *Iṣṭi*). Then if both (the vomiting by the *Yajamāna* as well as that by the priests) were to be accepted as the said prompting cause, then that would necessitate the taking of the sentence in question in two different ways, which would involve a syntactical split,—the sentence being taken as 'yah somam vomati, yasya ca somam Rtvik vomati su nirvapeṭ' ('He who vomits the *Soma*, and he whose *Soma* the Priest vomits, should perform the *Iṣṭi*'). Then, if, with a view to avoid this syntactical split, we have got to accept only one of them (either the vomiting by the *Yajamāna*, or that by the Priests) as the prompting cause of the *Iṣṭi*,—it is only right that we should accept the former; as that would be in keeping with the sense of the words of the text.

The above applies to the case when we take the *Iṣṭi* as indirectly helping the Principal Sacrifice. When, however, it is assumed that the purpose served by the *Iṣṭi* is that it remedies the incapacity (of the Sacri-

fice) of attaining the final result, caused by a discrepancy in the correct observance of the *Disposal* of the remnant of the sacrificial substance,—the necessity of such *Disposal* being indicated by the subsequent words (of the texts relating to the Principal Sacrifice),—then, in that case, inasmuch as it would be the Result accruing to the *Yajamāna* (in the shape of the *Apūrva*) that would be absolutely imperceptible, and as such, capable of being interfered with in its proper fruition (by the *vomiting*), it would become all the more certain that the *Remedial Ishti* would be performed by the *Yajamāna* himself. As for the Result that accrues to the Priests,—in the shape of the sacrificial gifts,—they are found to obtain it, in any case, whether there be a *vomiting* or not; and as such there being no fear of this Result being interfered with (by any *vomiting*), it would not stand in need of the *Remedial Ishti*, and as such could not bring about its performance.

Then, it might be assumed that—"the drinking of the *Soma*, forming "part of the observances necessary for the Performer of the Principal "Sacrifice, is meant to serve the purpose of purifying the person that "drinks; and hence any discrepancy in this *drinking* would create a flaw "in the Performer (*i.e.* the Priest), as the purification of the *Soma*, which "would consist in the useful effects it would bring to him, would not have "been duly accomplished." But even so too, (1) inasmuch as the said flaw only being an obstacle in the way of the due realisation, by the *Yajamāna*, of the Results (of the sacrifice), the *Ishti* would serve the purpose of removing that obstacle, and (2) as we have in the sentence the words 'yah' and 'sah' (which indicates the performer of both actions to be one only), it must be admitted that the *Ishti* should be performed, at the *vomiting* by the *Yajamāna* only.

The same reasoning holds respecting the view that the *Ishti* is meant to affect the final *Apūrva* (of the Principal Sacrifice).

Some people hold that—"the vomiting of the *Soma* does not mean "the neglect of an enjoined Duty, nor the doing of that which is prohibited; "and as such, there being no discrepancy in the sacrifice on its account, "the performance of the *Ishti* could not be meant to remedy any discrepancy; and hence the *Ishti* must be regarded as a subsidiary to the "Principal Sacrifice, to be performed only when the *Soma* drunk at it "happens to be vomited."

But in that case also, inasmuch as we find the word 'yah' distinctly pointing to the *Man*, the *Ishti* must be regarded as a purification of the *Man* mentioned in the Context, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at (under *Sūtras* III—iv—14, 15) in connection with the sentence 'yajñabhyamāno'nubṛūṣ.' And hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—viii—4, it must be taken as to be performed by the *Yajamāna*. And as

the *Iṣṭi* pertains to the same object as the *vomiting*, it is the *vomiting* by the *Yajamāna* that should be regarded as the prompting cause of the *Iṣṭi*.

Then as for the argument,—“the *vomiting* of the Priests also causes “either a discrepancy in the proper *Disposal* of the *Soma*, or a total destruction of the purification of the Performer; and as such, that too “would stand in need of a remedy,”—the reply is that, even though it would require a remedy, yet, no such remedial action could be performed, for the simple reason that no such has been laid down; as we have already shown that the Injunction of the *Iṣṭi* does not pertain to the *vomiting* by the Priests,—whether the *Iṣṭi* itself be taken as to be for the sake of the *Man* or for that of the *Sacrifice*. Consequently we come to the conclusion that if the *vomiting* by the Priest should be a flaw in the sacrifice, then whenever it should happen, all that we have to do is to quietly ignore it altogether; while if it do create a discrepancy in the sacrifice, then, in that case, we might perform some ordinary expiatory rite.

In connection with question under consideration, there is no use of considering the question as to whether the *Iṣṭi* is for the sake of *Man*, or for that of the *sacrifice*, etc., etc. But if it be necessary to learn the true fact, then we must admit that theory which has been found to be applicable to the case of the sentence ‘*jañjabhyamāno'nubhrūte, etc.*’ (III—iv—14, 15). (That is to say, it must be regarded as being for the sake of the *Man* connected with the *principal Sacrifice*). It is in view of this that we have the present *sūtra*—‘*Svaminō vā tadarthatvāt.*’

Sūtra (36): *Also because we find certain indicative (words).*

In connection with the sentence under consideration, we find the sentence—‘*śsha vyrdhyatṣ yat somam vamatī*’ (‘He who vomits the *Soma* loses his prosperity’); and there can be doubt that this ‘*loss of prosperity*’ applies to him alone whose prosperity is sought to be accomplished by the *drinking of the Soma*, and for whom a discrepancy in this *drinking* could cause a ‘*loss of prosperity*.’ And we find that both of these apply to the *Yajamāna* only; and hence the *Iṣṭi* must be taken as to be performed by him.

ADHIKARAṆA (14).

[Out of the *Āgneya-ashtakapāla-Caru* it is only the *Dvayavadāna* that is to be offered in *Homa*].

Sūtra (37): "The whole should be offered; as the material is meant for that purpose."

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find the sentence 'yaḥlāgneyo'shṭākāpālo'māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñcācyutō bhavati'; and in regard to this there arises the question as to whether the whole of the material prepared is to be actually offered, or only a portion of it is to be offered, and a little left as a remnant. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The words 'ashṭākāpālāḥ' 'āṅgnēyaḥ,' etc., distinctly indicate that "the whole of the material is to be offered; as it is only when the material "has been actually thrown into the Sacrificial Fire that it comes to belong "to the Deity,—as is clearly indicated by the Injunction 'āhavanīyē "juhoti,' and by the *Arthavādā* 'Agnimukhā vai Dēvāḥ.' [And hence the "material could not be called 'Āgnēya,' until the whole of it had been "offered to *Agni*]. Such being the case, if a part of the material were left "behind, then that would mean the doing of something contrary to what "has been laid down (in the Veda). Hence it must be admitted that the "whole of the material is to be offered into the Fire."

Question: Does the propounder of this *Pūrvapaksha* not perceive the Injunction of those actions that are done with the *Remnants* of the materials offered—such actions, for instance, as the *Svishtakṛt Offering*, the *Idā-prāpitra*, the *Sanyavākakāla*, the *Bhākshacaturdhākaraṇa*, and the like? [That is to say, he must be wholly ignorant of the Injunctions of these actions, otherwise he should not have asserted that no 'remnants' should be kept].

In answer to this, some people declare that the *Pūrvapakshi* does not perceive the Injunctions of these actions.

But that answer is scarcely correct; because if we were to lose sight of such palpable facts, as distinct Injunctions, in propounding the *Pūrvapaksha*, there is no theory, howsoever absurd, that could not be put forward as one. [That is to say, the *Pūrvapaksha* is always such as has all the semblance of a reasonable theory, and not one that, on its very face, bears the stamp of untenability]. Consequently it must be admitted

that the opponent is fully cognisant of the said Injunctions, and yet he puts forward the above *Pūrvapakṣha*, in view of the following arguments:

"The actions laid down as to be performed with 'Remnants' would not justify the bringing in of fresh supplies of materials, only in cases where there are 'Remnants' of the previous supplies. When, however, the whole of the material has been offered (and there is no 'Remnant' left), those actions would certainly justify our bringing in fresh supplies.

"That is to say, in a case where only the '*Dvayadāna*' ('Two-slices') are offered out of the whole Cake, and the rest is left as 'Remnant,' the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering, and the other actions—enjoined by such sentences as 'out of the other half a slice is cut for *Svi-ḥtakṛt*' and the like—would not justify the bringing in of fresh supplies of that material, as shown under *Sūtra* IV—i—28. When, however, we come to recognise the necessity of offering the whole of the Cake (and the impropriety of keeping 'Remnants'), then inasmuch as the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering will have no 'already existing substance' to be related to, there would be an impossibility of the carrying out of that part of the Injunction which refers to that Offering; and hence in this case, we do certainly recognise the necessity and advisability of bringing in fresh supplies of the material; and hence, other Cakes, etc., would certainly be prepared for the sake of the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering (and other similar actions).

"Question: 'In that case, how would you explain the word '*Āśha*, in such Injunctions as *āśhāt sviṣṭakṛtē vadyati*?'"

"Answer: In such sentences, the word '*āśha*' would be explained as used in the sense of 'another material,' just as in the sentences '*ājyēna āśham*' and '*tacchēśhēṇa*.'

"That is to say, in the sentence '*ājyēna āśham saṁsthāpayati*' ('He finishes the rest by means of Butter'), we find the word '*āśha*' used in the sense of an action *other than*, or similar to, that whose performance has been finished; so also, in the sentence '*tatoḥ āśhēṇa viśiṣṭadēśajāt-tyādīmunto janma pratipadyuntē*' (Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*—),—the sense of which is that the action resulting in Heaven having been fully used up in bringing about that result, and that action which has a definite result of its own not being capable of being used for the sake of another, it is by means of *other actions* that people take birth, etc., etc.,—we find the word '*āśha*' in the place of '*anya*,' ('other'); and similarly in the sentence '*āśhāt sviṣṭakṛtē*,' the word '*āśha*' would mean a material *other than* the one offered at the original Primary Sacrifice, or *another supply* of the same material.

"Or, the word '*āśhāt*' may be taken in the sense of a *secondary material*, a material other than that used at the Principal Sacrifice, which, however, is kept ready at it, as a subsidiary material. Though

"there may be none of the Principal Material left, yet all others have the character of *being similar to it*. Consequently at all such sacrifices, other materials would have to be used; as will be explained under *Sūtra IV—i—29*.

"Even if, in consideration of the word '*ṇṣha*,' there should be kept a 'remnant' of the same material (that is used at the Principal Sacrifice),—then too, there is another purpose served by the present discussion; it need not necessarily be that which is laid down by the *Siddhānti*; as the following also is possible; when, in accordance with the sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice, there comes to be the possibility of the *whole* of the material to be offered,—and yet 'Remnants' of it are kept, for the sake of those actions that are laid down as 'to be performed with such 'Remnants,'—then, these latter actions (the *Sviṣṭakṛt offering* and the rest) would be as instrumental in the bringing in of that material as the Principal Sacrifice itself; and hence if the *slice* kept for any of these actions, happen to be destroyed, spoilt, or stolen, it would be necessary to prepare another supply of the material,—just as in the case of the Principal Sacrifice. While, on the other hand, if these actions were to take in only the mere 'remnants' of the material spoken of in the Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice, then, inasmuch as they would depend solely upon the material used at the latter sacrifice, they would not be themselves instrumental in the bringing in of any materials on their own account; and hence even if the *slice* kept for these actions happen to be destroyed, spoilt or stolen, there would be a simple non-performance of those actions. Thus then, even though the fact of the *whole* not being offered at the Principal Sacrifice be accepted by both (of us, the *Pūrvapakṣi* as well as the *Siddhānti*), yet there is a necessity of the present discussion."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (38): *There would be a 'remnant'; inasmuch as the slices are cut 'out of' (the Cake).*

If '*agnēyo'shṭākapālaḥ, etc.*' were the only text bearing upon the case in question, then, of course, we could not but admit the necessity of the *whole* (Cake) being offered. As a matter of fact, however, we find we have also the texts—'*dvirhaviṣho'vadyati*,' '*madhyātṭpūrvārdhāccu dviravadyati*,' '*aṅguṣṭhāparvāmātramavadānam bhavati*,' '*dviyavadānam juhōti*,'—all of which lay down the offering of certain *slices cut out of the Cake*; and all these texts taken together show that only a portion of the Cake is to be offered (at the Principal Sacrifice); and hence it follows that a 'Remnant' should be kept.

Sūtra (39): Objection: "These other texts merely lay down the method; and as the whole is meant for the Deity (the offerings are to be repeated)."

Objection: "If the sentences quoted could not be explained otherwise than by rejecting the necessity pointed out in the original injunction of the offering of the whole of the material,—and if they were in proximity to the sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice,—then alone could they set aside the indications of this latter. As a matter of fact however, the sentences in question dealing with merely purificatory actions they could be very well reconciled with the original sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice in question; as it is quite compatible for the whole of the material to be offered, piece by piece,—each piece, measuring an inch (*lit.* of the size of the part of the thumb from the middle-joint to its tip), being purified by a process of *cutting*, repeated twice over, out of the middle and the former half of the material (Cake).

"Thus then, the sense given by all the sentences (those brought forward by the *Siddhānti* taken along with the original Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice) comes to be this: 'The offering of the whole Cake is to be done by such and such a method'; and thus we have no prohibition of the *homa* of any portion of the Cake; from which it follows that the whole of the Cake should be offered.

"Then, it has been argued that—'The Homa could not be performed all at once in the way declared in these sentences, as that would not be a *Homa* of Two-slices (*Dvyavadāna*).' But then, the *Homa* of the slices could very well be repeated (till the whole is finished), like the *Jyotishṭoma*; the reason for this being—'*tadarthatvāt*'—i.e. because of the fact of the whole *Aṣṭākapaḥa* Cake being meant for the Deity, or, for the Sacrifice, or, for the *Apūrva* (resulting from that Sacrifice), the injunction, contained in the original sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice, would not be fulfilled by the offering of a mere portion of it.

"Or, the expression '*tadarthatvāt*' may be taken in the sense—'because the purificatory action of *Cutting* is meant for the material.'"

Sūtra (40): Reply: It could be done once only; as the action will have been complete (in that single performance); specially as the Material is only a subordinate factor.

Reply: What has been urged above, by the *Pūrvapakṣi*,—that "the two-cuttings, and the corresponding *Homa*, should be repeated over and over again"—is not possible. Because, though it is quite possible for the *Cutting*, which is a subordinate factor, to be repeated any number of

times, yet, the *Homa*, being a principal factor, could never undergo a repetition.

That is to say, the sentence 'cuts the material twice' laying down the mere 'Cutting' as a purificatory action, it would be possible to carry it on, as long as there may be the material to be purified; as for the *Homa*, however, it is an action leading to a distinct result, and as such it is a Predominant factor, as shown under the *Sūtras* II—i—7 and 8; and hence as it would be completed by a single '*Dvyavadāna*' (Cutting into two slices), it would not be proper to repeat it over again, simply because there is a portion of the material left behind; and the *Homa* not being repeated, there would be no use for repeating the 'Cutting' either; as it is only that substance which is employed in an action that takes up purifications, and not that which has got nothing to do with the Action in hand; in the case in question, we find that there is no other use for the material, save the said '*Dvyavadāna*' offering, and hence when that has been done, the material would stand in no further need of any purification (by the 'Cutting'); and consequently there can be no repetition of the 'Cutting.'

If the *Homa* were merely for the sake of the material, then, on account of this latter, it would have to be repeated itself, as well as lead to the repetition of the *Cutting*; but as it is not for the sake of the material, it cannot be repeated. Specially as we find that the sentence in question does not mean—'*yajjuhōtīti hūyamānasya dviravakhaṇḍanamupāyo vidhiyatē*' ('the twice-cutting is the method laid down for the material offered,'—the word '*yajjuhōti*' pertaining to the material offered); for certainly the word '*juhōti*' does not denote the material; nor has the Verb '*juhōti*' the Passive Affix, by which it could be taken as pointing to *that which is offered in Homa* ('*Hūyamāna*'). The fact is that the sentence lays down the *twice-cutting* with regard to the Action (denoted by the Verb '*juhōti*'). As for the idea of the material, that we have from the word '*yat*' in the phrase '*yat juhōti*,'—it is based upon a misconception, and as such, we cannot attach any importance to it; because the word is not found in the Vedic sentence, but has simply been put in by the commentators by way of a qualifying adjunct to the Verb, with a view to show the fact of the *Homa* being merely referred to in the sentence (for the sake of the enjoining of the *Dvyavadāna* with regard to it).

As for the argument,—“The *Homa* should be repeated for the sake of the utilisation of the whole material, spoken of in the originative Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice,—just as we have repetitions in connection with the *Jyotishtoma*,”—it is wholly inadmissible. Because if the necessity of the offering of the whole material had been established, then alone could there be a similarity with the case of the *Jyotishtoma*; as a

matter of fact however, we find that, in the case in question, the offering of the *whole* is distinctly precluded; and as such it can never be regarded to have been established.

That is to say, in the sentence '*āgnēyo'shākapālāḥ*,' the relationship with *Homa*, of all parts of the *Cake* equally, would, at best, be based upon Inference; consequently, before this inferred relationship has had time to be duly accomplished, we find that there is *directly* established, by means of the sentence '*Dvayavadānāñjuhōti*,' the relationship, with the *Homa*, of a *part taken out of the Cake*, and when this latter direct relationship has been once established, there is no appearance of the inferred relationship (of the *whole* cake). And hence we find that the property of *being dedicated and offered to Agni* (being *Āgnēya*), which was spoken of as belonging to all the parts of the *Cake* (in common), becomes restricted, in its application, to the '*Dvayavādāna*' (*Two-slices*) only, by means of the Injunction '*Dvayavadānan juhōti*'; just as the number 'seventeen' is restricted by means of the factors met with in the Context. And the meaning comes to be this: 'One makes the *two-slices* *Āgnēya* (i.e. dedicated and offered to Agni).' Consequently, the Injunction not affecting the other portions of the *Cake*, there can be no *Homa* with these latter.

Then again, it is not necessarily the actual *offering* of the *whole* of the material that makes it '*Āgnēya*'; even if only '*Two-slices*' are taken out of it (for being offered to Agni), that alone would make the whole of it '*Āgnēya*.'

That is to say, all that the Nominal Affix (in '*Āgnēya*') signifies is that the *Cake* is *for the sake of Agni*, and not that it is actually *offered* to Him; and there are two ways in which it could be *for the sake of Agni*: (1) by being actually *offered*, and (2) by *supplying the portion that is offered*. For instance, in the case of the sentence '*Vṛihibhīryajāta*,' we find that the *Vṛihī-corn* is not what is actually *offered*, but it serves as the original substance out of which the *offering material* is made; and it is as such that the *Corn* is laid down in the sentence. Consequently, even though the *whole* of the *Cake* is not actually *offered*, yet inasmuch as it would form the original substance out of which the '*Two-slices*' are taken to be offered, it would be '*Āgnēya*' all the same; and hence it is the offering of the '*Two-slices*' only that make the *Cake* '*Āgnēya*.'

There are two ways of explaining (the word '*Āgnēya*' as applying to the *Two-slices*,—(1) that the relationship of the Deity is transferred from the *whole* *Cake* to the '*Two-slices*,' and (2) that it is the fact of the '*Two-slices*' (offered) being taken out of the *Cake* that makes this latter '*Āgnēya*.'

For these reasons we conclude that the *whole* is not to be offered in *Homa*.

Sūtra (41): Also because we find the word 'Remnant.'

It is only when we accept the above conclusion, that we can justify the use of the word '*Ṣeṣha*' ('Remnant'), in its direct meaning of *that which has been left after the offering has been made*. Then again, we are saved from the trouble of assuming the existence of a second *Cake*, for the sake of the 'latter half,' etc., out of which the slices for the subsequent *Homas* are laid down as to be taken out. (This assumption would be absolutely necessary for the *Pūrvapakshi*, as for him, the whole of the former *Cake* having been offered, it would be necessary to find a second *Cake*, out of which the slices for the subsequent *Homas* would be out).

Against the above, the Opponent brings forward the following arguments : " It has been urged that, like the number 'seventeen' the name of '*Āgnēya*' is restricted to the 'Two-slices' only. But this is not possible ; " because *one* 'seventeen' has been mentioned, without reference to any " particular Context, in regard to the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, and not to any " *Sacrifices* ; and hence its relationship with these latter could only be " inferred, through that with the *Sāmidhēnīs* ; but so long as a *direct* relationship is possible, it cannot be right for us to accept one that could " only be *inferred* ; and hence in this case, it is only natural that there " should be a restriction. In the case in question, however, we find that " the relationship with Deity (*Agni*) is not far-fetched, being distinctly " signified by the nominal affix (in the word '*Āgnēyah*') ; in fact it would " be the relationship of the 'Two-slices' (with the Deity *Agni*) that would " be far-fetched and indirect ; as in the original Injunction, it is the whole " of the *Aṣṭākapāla* *Cake* that is spoken of as related to *Agni* ; while it is " only a supplementary Injunction ('*Dvyavadānēna juhōti*') that connects " the 'Two-slices' with Him.

" The following argument might here be urged : ' of the *Aṣṭākapāla* " *Cake*, the relationship with the *Sacrifice* is far-fetched ; while that " of the *Two-slices* is direct ; and so long as this latter is possible, there can " be no necessity of assuming a far-fetched one (that of the Deity *Agni*).'

" But this is not right ; because in that case, the sentence *Dvyavadānājuhōti* would come to be accepted as the original Injunction of the " *Homa* (and not the sentence '*Āgnēyo'sṣṭākapālaḥ*, etc. ') ; as if the " sentence '*Āgnēyo'sṣṭākapālaḥ*, etc.' were to be restricted in its applica- " tion, by the sentence '*Dvyavadānājuhōti*, then it would be this latter " sentence that would serve as the original Injunction of the *Homa* in " question ; and that would give rise to a Syntactical split in the sentence " '*Āgnēyo'sṣṭākapālaḥ*, etc.' as shown under the *Sūtra*, II—ii—6 ; as it " has been already explained that unless a *Sacrifice* is inferred, such sen-

"tences as 'Āgnēyo'shṭākapaḥ, etc.' can neither stand in need of another sentence, nor be related to any sacrifice. Consequently, even though the connection of this latter sentence with a Sacrifice be an inferred one, yet, inasmuch as its signification would not be otherwise complete, it must be admitted that that connection has been already established (as without the sacrifice the *Cake* would not be offered, and as such it could not be spoken of as 'Āgnēya'), and thus this connection being once established, it could not be set aside by any number of *direct connections* appearing subsequently.

"Nor, in the case in question, is any such relationship as that of the general and the particular possible; because there is no such relationship possible between the whole (*Cake*) and the part (the 'Two-slices'). As a matter of fact, we find that the sentence 'Āgnēyaḥ, etc.' distinctly enjoins the *whole* *Cake* (as to be offered to Agni); and so also does the sentence 'Dvyavaddnam, etc.' directly enjoin the 'Two-slices'; and hence the offering of both is equally authoritative (and as such, the former could not be set aside by the latter).

"*Objection*: "The offering of the portions other than the *Two-slices* would be laid down, only in a general way, by the generic word *puro-dāṣa*; and as such, would be less authoritative than that of the *Two-slices*."

"*Reply*: If the *Cake* had been laid down, with regard to its parts, then alone would the Injunction apply to the other parts, in a general way (as you say); as it is, however, the *Cake* is laid down directly by itself (as one complete whole).

"That is to say, those texts that relate to *Classes* are taken as indicating the Individuals of those classes, because of the fact of no action being possible with regard to any *Class*; and in this case, inasmuch as they would apply to the Individuals only by indirect Indication, it is only natural that they become a little weakened in their authority, on that account. In the case in question, however, we find that the *whole* (*Cake*) itself is not incapable of accomplishing the action (i.e. of being offered); and as such there can be no ground for having recourse to an indirect indication with regard to that word ('*Āshṭākapaḥ*'). If we were to go on assuming such Indications, without sufficient cause (in the shape of Apparent Inconsistency and the like), then, in that case, even those texts that relate to the parts of the *Cake* (the 'Two-slices' f.i.) we could go on taking as indicating the other parts; and as such these too would become weakened in their authority. Consequently, we must admit that, just as in the case of the sentence '*Dvyavaddnāñjuhōti*,' the '*Dvyavaddāna*' (Two-slices) is accepted as being, by itself, independently of its parts, the material enjoined for the *Homa*,—so, in the

"same manner, the *Ashṭākāpāla* Cake also could be taken up as the material directly enjoined, by itself, independently of any of its parts (such as the 'Two-slices' and the like); and when the *Cake* has been taken up as a *whole*, if its parts come in its wake, why should any one stop them (from coming in)? All that we insist upon is that these parts do not become related (to the Sacrifice) by reason of any inherent capability in themselves; and that the Injunction in question does not refer to them. And as to the fact of the *whole* and the *part* not being wholly distinct from each other, that would apply as much to the other parts of the *Cake* as to the 'Two-slices' (and hence there could be nothing to justify us in restricting the original Injunction '*Āgnēyaḥ*, etc.' to the offering of the 'Two-slices' cut out of the *Cake*).

"Thus by taking the two Injunctions ('*Āgnēyaḥ*, etc.' and '*Dryavadānanjanuhoti*') together, we come to the conclusion that what they mean is that (1) 'having offered the *Two-slices* we should offer the Remnants'; or (2) 'there is an option', by which at times we could offer the *whole* *Cake*, and at others the *Two-slices* only; (3) or, inasmuch as the *whole* *Cake* is enjoined in the original Injunction, the offering of that (like that of the *Āmīkṣā*) would be more authoritative; and as such the 'offering of the *Two-slices*' could not be accepted either as rejecting it, or as an optional alternative to it, or as to be offered conjointly with it; and hence this latter offering (of the 'Two-slices') would have to be taken as a wholly distinct action by itself, in accordance with *Sūtra* II—ii—23; and at this action, the material (of the 'Two-slices') would be taken from elsewhere, as it would have no connection with *Ashṭākāpāla* *Cake*. For, even if this latter action were related to the previous action (at which the *whole* *Cake* has been offered), as the 'Two-slices' would have to be taken from elsewhere (as the *Cake* will have been wholly offered up),—there would be all the objections due to the question as to whether this other substance is to be taken conjointly with the former *Cake*, or only as its optional alternative. (4) Or, lastly, when it has been duly ascertained that the *whole* of the *Cake* is to be taken up, and we find that the Injunction with regard to the 'Two-slices' is incapable of laying down another action, on account of its laying down a mere accessory in the shape of the material,—we come to recognise this latter action as pertaining to the aforesaid *Ashṭākāpāla* *Cake* (as its purificatory rite); and then, inasmuch as the *purification* has to be repeated as long as there is an object to be purified, it would become necessary for the 'offering of the *Two-slices*' to be repeated (just like the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), for the purpose of producing, in the principal material (the *Cake*), the qualities laid down in the *Veda*; and this would become tantamount to the *Pūrvapakṣa* position taken up in *Sūtra* 39—that the Injunctions in connection with the

“ ‘Two-slices’ etc., merely lay down the method by which the whole Cake is to be offered; as there would be no authority for the offerings to be made of the slices *cut out* of the Cake.

“ In fact the offering of slices *cut out* of the Cake would involve a most objectionable *Parisankhyā* (Preclusion). Because, in that case, the Injunction could not have the Restrictive character; because all parts of the Cake are equally capable of being offered. If it were yet to be known which one of its parts should be offered, and then in answer to that we had the Injunctions as to the offering of slices ‘from the middle’, ‘from the front half’ and so forth,—then alone could the Injunction serve the purposes of a Restriction. As a matter of fact however, the *whole* of the Cake is known as the material to be offered; and under the circumstances, the subsequent specification of the ‘Two-slices’ could not but be taken as *precluding the use of the other parts* of the Cake; and as such it would be open to the three usual faults of the Preclusive Injunction—*viz.* the non-signification of its own meaning, etc. etc. These faults are capable of being explained away only in those cases, where an Injunction pointing to the taking of that which is sought to be precluded by the Injunction under consideration, is not definitely ascertained, and has got to be assumed (on the ground of Indicative Power, etc., etc.). In the case in question, however, the Injunction of the *whole Cake* (which is sought to be precluded by the Injunctions as to the offering of the ‘Two slices,’ etc.) is fully ascertained, and has not got to be assumed; and when it is thus fully established, the said Preclusion could never be shown to be free from the said objectionable features. Hence it must be admitted that there can be no offerings of *slices cut out of the Cake*.

“ Then again, if the name ‘*Āgnēya*’, as mentioned in the sentence ‘*Āgnēyo’shṭākapālaḥ, etc.*’, were to be restricted in its application to the ‘Two-slices’ meant to be offered in the sacrifice, then, in that case, the other portions of the Cake would cease to belong to any Deity; and hence the ownership of the *Yajamāna* in these would continue intact; and in that case, we could never reconcile with this the Sutra III—iv—50, wherein it is argued that all the sacrificial priests are equally entitled, with the *Yajamāna*, to the eating of the ‘Remnants’, as the latter has ceased to have any ownership over them, after they have all been dedicated to the sacrificial Deities.

“ The following argument might here be brought forward :—It is the ‘Two-slices’ alone that is related to the actual *dedication* to the Deity; but it is the *whole* material that is spent; and the ownership ceases by mere *expenditure*, and not by the connection of the gift with the Deity. Consequently there can be no incompatibility of what we hold with the

"assertions as to the cessation of the *Yajamana's* rights of ownership over the '*Remnants*.'"

"But this is not true. Because at the very time that the sacrificer is laying out the materials, he knows full well that such and such a quantity of them would be offered; and we see no reason for assuming that he spends more than what he knows he has actually to offer.

"That is to say, at sacrifices, people spend the materials simply for the purpose of making offerings to the Deities, and not by mere lavishness. Consequently, whatever they may have, in excess of what is meant to be actually offered to the Deities, would be as *unspent* as the materials that might be lying in the house of the Sacrificer. Nor, in the case in question, have we any Injunction for mere *spending* apart from the *offering*; in fact, we find that the *spending* (even of that which is to be offered) is only implied by the Apparent Inconsistency of the *relationship to the Deity* (Agni) which is what is enjoined (by means of the word '*Āgnēyah*' in the sentence in question). And this Apparent Inconsistency can point to the expenditure of just that much of the material which would be required for the offering to the Deity; because there can be no ingratitude or inconsistency in the non-expenditure of any material over and above that (which is meant for the Deities). Because in all cases what is desired is the proper *completion* of an Action; and thus too, the said Apparent Inconsistency can point to the Injunction of the expenditure of only that much of the material as would be necessary for the proper completion of the Sacrifice, and of no more than that; consequently, just as at the time that the Corn is brought to the place of the Sacrifice, in a cart, and four handfuls are taken and laid out near the altar, the ownership of the master does not cease with regard to all the corn in the cart (but only to those four handfuls),—so, in the same manner, in the case in question also, even though the whole of the Cake might be brought up, the ownership of the sacrificer would cease with regard to the '*Two-slices*' etc. only, and not with regard to the other portions of the Cake.

"The opponent might bring forward the following argument: 'At the time that the Cake is laid out on the altar, it could not have till then been divided into the *middle part*, the *front part*, etc.; and so even though the *whole* may not be meant to be actually offered, inasmuch as the parts to be actually offered have not been differentiated, it would be necessary, till such differentiation, to consider the whole as *spent* (even though not offered). Because before such differentiation, it is not yet known from which part of the Cake the *Two-slices*, etc., would be cut out for the actual offering; consequently if the whole were not actually regarded as *spent*, it is just possible that the said *slices* might

"be cut out from that portion of the Cake, which may not be that which had been previously considered as *spent* (or given away); and this would involve the unauthorised anomaly of offering that which had not been considered as *spent*, and not offering that which had been so thought. Consequently the *expending* (though not the actual offering) must be of the *whole* Cake (and as such the sacrificer's ownership over it will cease all the same, whether the whole be offered, or only a part).

"But it is not so; because when a general law has been carried into effect, there can be no occasion for the particular one; consequently (if it is to have any functioning) this latter must operate from the very beginning (i.e. before the general law has been actually carried into action).

"That is to say, when a general law once becomes carried into action, it can never be set aside by anything; consequently if the Corn has been brought in and laid out, in regard to the Deities, for the making of the *Ashtākapāla Cake*, it has begun to be looked upon as actually offered to the Deities, and then if any portion of it be not offered, with regard to that portion, we shall have committed the anomaly of not finishing what we had begun; and thus it is necessary that the *whole* should be actually offered. If, however, it be meant to qualify the said general law by the particular one, that 'the *Two-slices* alone should be offered,'—then, this must be done from the very beginning; and from the very beginning we must have it in our mind that—out of the four handfuls of corn that have been brought in for the preparing of the *Ashtākapāla Cake*, I am laying out, for the sake of Agni, only that much which would be required for the making of the *Two-slices*; and though we do not perceive any difference (among the various portions of the Corn for the Cake), yet the words used for the conveying of the offering may be such as—'Only that much of the Corn, as will be required for the *Two-slices*, is *not mine*.' Just as in ordinary life, we find that when out of a heap of substances, one is told to take 'as much as he likes,' no particular portion of the Cake is specified, and yet the whole is not looked upon as *spent away* (by those words), so, in the case in question also (the whole heap of the Corn brought in for the Cake, could not be looked upon as *spent away*). That we do not bring in only that much of Corn as would be required for the *Two-slices* only, is due to such express Injunctions as—'brings in four handfuls,' 'the Cake is made of the size of the horse's hoof'; and in view of these Injunctions, the '*Two-slices*' offered to the Deity is recognized to be only that which is taken out of the Cake of the specified size, etc.; and hence the bringing in of the Corn other than that required for the '*Two-slices*' must be looked upon as done in mere

"obedience to the said injunctions as to the quantity of Corn and the size of the Cake, and not for the purpose of actually *spending* away anything more than the aforesaid 'Two-slices.'

"Thus then, it must be admitted that, just as in accordance with the sentence 'brings in the corn from the cart,' which qualifies the *bringing in* and *laying out* of the Corn by the fact of its being brought in the cart, though there is a large quantity of corn in the cart, yet the ownership of the Sacrificer does not cease with regard to the *whole* quantity therein; so, in the same manner, even though the whole Cake would be laid out for the cutting out of it of the 'Two-slices,' yet the ownership would not cease with regard to it (except over the slices); and thus the ownership of the Sacrifice continuing over the rest of the Cake, he is quite entitled to execute, by means of that, any exchanges or purchases (of service, etc.); and this could not be reconciled with the declaration that the Sacrificer and the Priests are *equally* entitled to the 'Remnants.'

"The above reasoning also serves to set aside the theory that the *Ashṭākapāla* Cake becomes 'Āgnēya' (dedicated to Agni) by the fact of its supplying the 'Two-slices' actually offered to that Deity. Because in that case, too, there would be no justification for the *spending* of the rest of the Cake. Nor, like the Corn, could the Cake be spoken of merely as the *origin* (or *source*) of the 'Two-slices.' Because the Corn, by itself, is inedible, (and as such not capable of being offered by itself), and enjoined in a wholly different sentence ('*Vrihībhīryajēta*'); and as such it is necessarily regarded as laid down merely with reference to the Sacrifice, at which, however, the only material to be offered consists of the Cake, which is enjoined in the original Injunction (of the Sacrifice itself), and which requires a substance out of which it could be made; and hence the Corn could not be recognized as helping the Sacrifice, except by serving as the substance of which the Cake is made. As for the *Ashṭākapāla* Cake, on the other hand, it is quite edible by itself, and enjoined by the original Injunction of the Sacrifice; and as such it is quite capable of helping in the Sacrifice, directly by itself; specially as it is not found to be laid down as subsequent to the Injunction of the 'Two-slices,' which would be in need of the mention of a substance out of which it could be taken out; and hence the Cake cannot be regarded as helping the Sacrifice, by merely serving as the substance out of which the 'Two-slices' is taken.

"Under these circumstances, we should like to know how the Sidhānti meets the arguments in favour of the whole Cake being offered."

To the above, we offer the following *reply*: The above arguments cannot be successfully met by those who are deluded into the belief that *Yāga* and *Homa* are identically the same thing. As a matter of fact, however, these are two distinct actions; and on that we base our explanation.

That is to say, if the Injunction '*Āgnēyaḥ*, etc.,' had also laid down the actual *throwing in* of the offering, then, it could not be precluded by the Injunction in regard to the '*Two-slices*'; and in that case we would have the offering of the *whole* Cake. But this *throwing in* could be regarded to be laid down by the Injunction '*Āgnēyaḥ*, etc.,' only if '*Yāga*' and '*Homa*' were identically the same action. As a matter of fact, however, these two are wholly distinct actions, as we have proved under the *Ṣabdāntarādhikaraṇa* (II—ii—1); and as for the arguments propounded in support of this view by the *Sūtra* itself, we shall deal with them under the *Sūtra* IV—ii—28; where we shall show that while '*Yāga*' consists in the mere *resigning of one's ownership in favour of the Deity*, '*Homa*' consists of the *throwing in of the material, ownership over which has been resigned in favour of the Deity*. Though there are certain likely objections against this view,—such, f.i., as that in this case, the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, not being '*Homa*,' should not be performed in the sacrificial fire, etc., etc., etc.; but all these we shall refute under the same *Sūtra*.

Thus then, there being a distinct difference between the two, we come to the conclusion that the sentence '*Āgnēyaḥ* etc.' enjoins just that much without which the Cake mentioned would not be '*Āgnēya*' ('dedicated to Agni'); and as a matter of fact we find that for this (accomplishment of the character of '*Āgnēya*') all that is necessary is that the Sacrificer should *resign his ownership*, and *that too in favour of the Deity Agni*,—and not that the offering should be actually *thrown in*. Under these circumstances, if we had no other sentence (such as '*Dryavadānaṅjuhōti*'), then the action enjoined would be regarded in the following light: '*Having brought in the well-cooked and complete Cake, prepared in eight pans, and placed it in a clean place (as is necessitated by usage), we should utter the words this is no longer mine, thereby resigning our ownership (over the Cake) in favour of the Deity; and in due observance of this resignation, we should never again assert our ownership over that Cake; for if we did assert it, we would undo the former offering and would be acting a lie; specially as in a case where one thinks from the very beginning, of asserting his ownership, he does not use the words, this is not mine, it belongs to the Deity; but when we have once resigned our ownership in favour of the Deity, we would not mind what happens to it subsequently.*' This much having been ascertained

to be indicated by the sentence in question, it would have nothing to say regarding what might be done next (and hence in accordance with this sentence the *Yajamāna* could have no further responsibilities with regard to the cake).

But at this stage we meet with other sentences,—such as '*upastr-nāti*,' '*dvirharishovadyati*,' '*abhighārayati*,' '*caturavattanjuhōti*,' and so forth; and these lead us to the conclusion that 'Two-slices out of the aforesaid Cake should be thrown into the fire'; in fact, every one of these sentences stands in need of a substance out of which the materials spoken of should be taken; and as such every one of them has reference to the aforesaid Cake; and they do not lay down independent substances.

For instance, in the sentence '*Caturavattanjuhōti*,' we find that inasmuch as the *Homa* has not been laid down in the previous Injunction, the sentence cannot be taken as laying down the material (*Caturavattu*)' in regard to the *Homa*; but as for the material *Caturavatta* (Four-slices), brought about in accordance with the preceding sentence (*Dvirharishovadyati*,' which speaks of cutting the Cake 'twice'; and this twice-cutting would give rise to four-slices), we find that it stands in need of some purpose for which it could be used; and hence all that the sentence can be regarded as enjoining is the 'throwing in' (*Homa*) of the 'Four-slices'; and as such it cannot be taken as laying down the '*Homa* as qualified by the *Four-slices*.' As for the *Homa*, it consists of three factors extending to its very completion [these factors being, (1) the resigning of the ownership, (2) in favour of the Deity, and (3) throwing into the Fire]; and hence whenever the last of these factors (*i.e.*, the *Throwing in*) is laid down, there arises the question, as to whether the other two factors are to be taken as enjoined independently by Injunctions assumed through Apparent Inconsistency, or they should be accepted as enjoined elsewhere (in connection with some other action). And so long as we can get at these in a simple way, there can be no justification for having recourse to a more complicated method; and hence, in accordance with *Āgneyyadhikarana*, it must be admitted that the sentences refer to the *Ashṭākapāla Cake*, with regard to which the two factors—of giving away, and that to a Deity—are already known (being laid down in the sentences '*Āgneyah*, etc.'). Nor would this involve any incompatibility with the fact of this Cake having been originally laid down as a direct auxiliary to the Sacrifice; as that which is thrown into the Fire, loses nothing of its character of being an auxiliary to the Sacrifice to Agni. There would have been incompatibility, only if the slices were thrown in as offerings to a Deity other than Agni, or if they were used in an action quite contrary to the nature of *Sacrifices*. In the case in question, however, we find none of these two conditions.

Thus then, the sense of the whole comes to be this: 'The *Sacrifice* should be performed with the *Ashtākāpāla* Cake kept in a certain place,' and 'Two-slices out of that Cake should be thrown into a certain place'; and then coming across the sentence 'at the altar one keeps the offering material on the grass,' we conclude that 'the *Sacrifice* should be performed with the Cake placed on the grass at the altar'; and in accordance with the injunction that 'the *Homa* is offered into the Sacrificial Fire,' we come to the conclusion that 'the *Two-slices* offering is to be thrown into the Sacrificial Fire.'

Now then, there remains yet another question to be dealt with: Is this *Homa* (of the *Two-slices*) something wholly different from the previous *Sacrifice* (of the *Cake*), and forms a mere part of the procedure of this latter? Or is it a part of the same *Sacrifice*, which, being stretched to a further point (to that *Homa*), becomes a little modified in its form?

And on this question, we unhesitatingly declare that the latter alternative is the correct one. Because if it were a wholly distinct action, then it would have a wholly different material and Deity,—just as we find in the case of the *Nāriṣṭha* and other such *Homas*. While in the case in question we find that, in accordance with the *Ḣabdāntarādhikaraṇa* (II—ii—1), it must be admitted that it is the same *Sacrifice* that, being stretched further, develops into the *Homa*.

Nor does this involve a disappearance of the original *sacrificial* character of the action, as the *Homa* also is a particular form of *Sacrifice*; and though it is possible for the *General* to exist without the *Particular*, there is however no *Particular* possible without the *General*. Just as, when we say 'bring the *tree*'; if we add 'of the *Ḣimḡapā*,' this addition is in no way contradictory to the original sentence,—so, in the same manner, having said 'one should *sacrifice*,' there can be no contradiction in the subsequent addition of '*Homa*.' Thus then, it must be admitted that in the case in question, it is the *Sacrifice* itself that is performed in two forms,—with the *whole* Cake: the one, that is modified into the *Homa*, being performed with the 'Two-slices,' and the generic form (in the form of an offering in a general way) being accomplished with the rest of the Cake,—and both these forms of the *Sacrifice*—the *General* and the *Particular*—are accomplished at one and the same time; as at the very time that the 'Two-slice' offering is being thrown into the Sacrificial Fire, the *Yājyā* and the *Anuvākya* *Mantras* (that are being recited at the time) keep on recalling the fact of the *whole* Cake having been previously set aside for the Deities.

Thus then, it must not be thought that, because it is the 'Two-slice' offering only that is contained in the *Juhū* (the Offering Ladle), and which is taken up, by the operations known as '*Āgavana*' and '*Pratyā-*

gravana for being offered,—therefore, it is that alone that has been set aside for the Deities. Because what should be done by the Sacrificer and the *Adhvaryu* Priest, who are both versed in scriptural lore, is that in accordance with the injunctions of the Veda, they should jointly perform the *setting aside* and the *dedicating* to the Deities, while the *Adhvaryu* should perform the additional operation of *throwing* the 'Two-slice' offering into the Fire. Nor does this additional operation produce any change of form or ugliness in the Sacrifice; because, on the strength of Vedic texts, we are led to believe that this additional operation adds to the beauty of the Sacrifice. For, certainly, the fact of one foot of man having gone forward before the rest of the body does not make any difference in the man; and in the same manner, in the case in question, if the one foot (part of the Sacrifice), the 'Two-slice' offering, is made to go a step farther, in the shape of being *thrown into* the Fire, that does not involve an incongruity, inasmuch as the enjoined fact of the *Sacrifice* being performed with the *whole* Cake will have been duly accomplished, all the same. Consequently we might take the Principal Action (Sacrifice) itself to have the said aforesaid two forms.

Or, the factor of '*Yāga*' may be taken as the *Principal*, and that of '*Homa*' as the *Subsidiary*: inasmuch as in the sentence mentioning the *result* (i.e. the sentence '*Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajētu*'), we find it mentioned in direct connection with the '*Yaga*'; and as for the '*Homa*,' it is simply found to be mentioned in close proximity with it, whence it is regarded to be the *subsidiary* (of that *Yāga*).

Though the *Homa* is accepted to be out of the same material as the *Yāga*, yet the former could be very well taken as subsidiary to the latter, just like the *washing*, etc., of the Corn. Nor is it absolutely necessary that all actions that pertain to a common object should be regarded as equally Primary in their character; as we actually find all purificatory rites (which are admitted to be subsidiaries) pertaining to the same object as the Primary Sacrifice; there being some of these rites that are performed before, and some after, the performance of the Primary Sacrifice, while some are done simultaneously with this latter.

Some people declare thus: "The *Homa* under consideration (i.e. that of the 'Two-slices') is of the nature of those purificatory rites that are done after the Primary Sacrifice, as this Sacrifice, in the shape of dedicating the material to the Deity, is found to have been completed at the time that the material is laid out on the altar."

But this is not correct; because the *Sacrifice*, that is to be performed with the *Cake*, cannot be completed by means of the Corns in the inedible (uncooked) state; and further, if the Sacrifice could be accomplished at the time of the laying out of the Corns, then, in that case, if,

after that, the material should be destroyed, spoilt or stolen, there could be no need of bringing in a fresh supply (as the Sacrifice having been completed there would be no further need); and this would be a direct contradiction of what is said under *Sūtra* VI—iv—2; and also of what the Bhāṣya says in connection with the animal that has been killed at the Sacrifice—'it is protected as belonging to somebody else, as it would, in time, be connected with the Deity (to whom it should be offered).' Hence it must be admitted that, at the time of the *laying out* of the materials all that is done, in the way of offering it, is the *determination to give*, in the words 'I shall offer this to such and such a Deity,'—and not the actual *Sacrifice*; as this latter, which has for its procedure the aforesaid *offering*, and consists of the making of that offering to a certain Deity, is found to be duly completed only at the time that the material is actually *thrown* into the Sacrificial Fire; and hence it is only at this time that the Sacrifice is accomplished by means of the *whole* Cake; and the '*Two-slices*,' which is a part of that sacrificial auxiliary (in the shape of the Cake), is purified by means of the '*throwing* into the fire,' which is a subsidiary of the Principal Sacrifice.

Thus then, inasmuch as the due accomplishment of the *Sacrifice* is accompanied (or marked) by the said 'throwing in' (or *Homa*), before this latter is done the *Sacrifice* must be looked upon as incomplete; and hence if the material be destroyed, spoilt or stolen (before the *Homa* has been done), it is only right that another supply of the material should be brought in. For even though the *Homa* is a sanctificatory rite, yet it is not absolutely incapable of being the means of having fresh materials brought in; specially as even such offerings as the *Sviṣṭakṛt* and the like will be shown to be incapable of justifying the bringing in of fresh materials, on the sole ground of the Sacrifice having been duly completed (even before these offerings).

If, however, this 'throwing in' (*Homa*) were the Primary action, then the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* would be spoken of as '*Homa*' (and not as '*Yāga*'); and further, inasmuch as no Primary actions are ever found to be transferred to the Modifications of Sacrifices, there could be no '*Homa*' in the *Saurya* and other modifications of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*; and as such at these, the materials would have to be offered, without being *thrown* into the Sacrificial Fire. Whereas in case the *Homa* is taken as *subsidiary*, there would be a transference of this into those modifications, and so the offerings at these would have to be *thrown* into the Sacrificial Fire.

As for those Injunctions which originatively lay down the *Homa* itself, even though the factor of 'Sacrifice' would form the first half of such actions, yet it would be this latter that would constitute their

Soul. Or, in these cases, the 'Sacrifice' may be taken as subsidiary to the *Homas*; as in these cases the factors of 'giving away' and 'dedicating to the Deity' may be taken as implied by the '*Homa*' itself. In the case of the originative Injunctions of *Sacrifices*, on the other hand, inasmuch as the two factors of 'giving away' and 'dedicating to the Deity' are already pointed out by the mention of 'Sacrifice' itself, the subsequent mention of '*Homa*' comes to be taken as pointing out only the third factor of 'throwing in,'—just as in the case of the sentences '*Āhavanīyē yupaḡakalā hotavyāḡ*.' And thus it is established that the *Homa* is subsidiary to the *Sacrifice*.

Such being the case, we find that the *Cake* is mentioned in connection with the '*Yāga*' ('Sacrifice'), and not in connection with the *Homa*; and the *Homa* also is laid down for the 'Two-slices,' and not for the whole *Cake*; and hence the *Homa* comes to be recognized as being done with the 'Two-slices' only, and with no more of the *Cake*. Then as for the whole *Cake*, inasmuch as it has been *given away* (or dedicated) to the *Deity*, even though it be not *thrown* into the Fire, it is only natural that the Sacrificer should not look upon it as his 'own'; nor would there be any of the objections attendant upon Preclusions.

Consequently, the operations, that are laid down as to be done with the 'Remnants,' would be duly accomplished by means of the 'Remnants' left after the 'Two-slices' etc. have been *cut out of the Cake*.

Or, we might even go so far as to declare that there is no difference between the '*Yāga*' and the '*Homa*'; as both form the fore and hind parts of the same action; just as we find in the case of the God *Narasimha* (Man-Lion, who has the head of the lion and the body of Man).

ADHIKARANA (15).

[The *Svishtakṛt* should be performed out of all Remnants]

Sūtra (42): “*Inasmuch as the Actions do not tend to the bringing in (of materials), they should be performed out of one (Remnant) only: specially as the Remnant is a secondary factor.*”

We have found that after the offerings have been thrown into the Sacrificial Fire, there are left behind the Remnants of the materials; and we now proceed to consider how, in what manner, the *Svishtakṛt* and other offerings are to be made out of these Remnants.

[The question is as to whether these actions should be done with every one of the materials, or with only any one of them].

Inasmuch as the opponent thinks the actions in question to be primary ones, he puts forward the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“They should be done with only one of the materials. Even though these actions are primary actions, yet, if the materials had been brought in solely for the sake of these actions, then, for the sake of paying regard to all of those materials, even though the Sacrifice would be accomplished by means of any one of the materials, like the slices cut out of the animal body, yet we would have connected the Sacrifice with every one of the materials. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so; as the actions in question do not tend to the bringing in of materials (for the sake of themselves); and hence, just as in the case of the *Tushopavāpa-kapāla*, so in the case in question also, the actions would be performed with any one of the materials only.”

Sūtra (43): “*Also because of the sanctification having been accomplished.*”

“The actions in question, even if they are merely sanctificatory rites, accomplish only such sanctification of the Principal Action, as is not perceptible to the senses; and inasmuch as such a sanctification would be duly accomplished by the offering of the Remnant out of a single material, there would be no need of any other material.

“Then as for the word ‘sakṛt’ (in the sentence ‘*sakṛt sakṛt svishtakṛtē vadyati*’) refers to the single cutting; otherwise, inasmuch

"as the singleness would be duly observed only by the offering of all the materials, in the manner of a single action, there would be no need for the mention of 'once' ('sakṛt').

"Or, the *Sūtra* may be explained as that the offering of the Remnants would have been out of all the materials, only if they were sanctificatory actions; as a matter of fact, however, they are not so, inasmuch as the Remnants are already sanctified by means of other purificatory rites.

"It might be argued that even if it were so, there would be nothing wrong in having yet another purificatory rite performed. And in reply to this also we have the *Sūtra* itself, taking this to mean that, (that is not possible) as the time for purifications has passed off, that is to say, the material stands in need of purifications, only so long as it has not been utilized; consequently, after the completion of the Principal Sacrifice (at which a certain material has been used), there can be no need for any further purificatory rites performed with regard to that material; and as such there can be no further occasion for any such rites."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (44): They should be done out of all materials: as the reason applies equally to all; and also because the sanctification is for that purpose.

According to the definition given in *Sūtra* II—i—8, the Actions in question are merely purificatory in their nature; and among 'Purificatory actions' also, they belong to the sub-class of 'Pratiputti' (or Actions of Disposal), in accordance with the *Sūtra* IV—ii—19; and as such these are required by all the materials concerned, as all of these have equally served their purpose in connection with the Principal Sacrifice. Though it is quite true that these actions do not tend to bring in any materials, yet inasmuch as these actions themselves are such as are brought about by the substances (Remnants) under question, they cannot but pertain to all of these. Even when the Principal Sacrifice has been duly completed, if we find the Remnants of the materials offered at it, there arises a desire to know in what way these should be disposed of, and as such it is only right that we should have the Injunctions as to the particular offerings through which the said Remnants are to be disposed of.

Sūtra (45): Also because we find indications (by certain words).

In the sentence 'sakṛt sakṛt svistakṛtē avadyati,' we find that the repetition of 'sakṛt' (once) is explicable only if the 'cutting' ('ava-

dāna ') be taken as to be done out of all the Remnants, and that too only for offerings, which are merely *sanctificatory* in their character.

These *Sūtras* also serve the purpose of showing the uses of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*. That is to say, the question being, that—if for the sake of the *offerings of Remnants*, the *Pūrvapakṣi* also should admit of the fact of the *whole* material not being given away (at the Principal Sacrifice), what would be the use of all the discussion in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*?—the answer to this is to be taken as supplied by the *Sūtras* (of the present *Adhikaraṇa*), explained in the manner shown above: That is to say, inasmuch as, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the materials would not tend to bring about the *offerings* in question, these latter would have to be done out of a *single* material; and in that case, the material of the *Svishtakṛt* would have to be wrested forcibly from the Principal Sacrifice; and as the *single offering* would have completed the whole offering (to *Svishtakṛt*), the whole material would be purified by that, and there would be no need of the offering being made out of the other materials. Whereas, in accordance with the *Siddhānta*, the fact of all the materials equally tend to the *offerings* in question, as also that of certain words of the Vedic texts being indicative of it,—distinctly point, to the view of the *Siddhānta* (that the offerings are to be made out of *all the materials*), which appears as the useful conclusion arrived at by the help of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; just as in the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the *Paurṇamāsī* Sacrifices.

ADHIKARĀṆA (16).

[The Offerings of the *Sviṣṭakṛt* and the rest should be made out of the First Material.]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

Sūtra (46): “*If the offerings were to be made out of one only, then they could be done out of any one that one might like; as all of them are equally capable of being used.*”

[Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the said Offerings are to be made out of a single material, there arises the question as to whether they should be done out of the first, or out of any of the Remnants that we might like to utilise;—and on this we have the *Pūrvapaksha* as laid down in the *Sūtra*.

Though the word meant to be used was ‘*yāthākāmyam*,’ yet, inasmuch as it is meant to be a qualification of *Buddhi* (Idea), it is spoken of in the Feminine gender; and as such we have the Feminine ending ‘*niṣ*,’ in accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*śhidgaurāḍibhyaṣca*’ (*Pāṇini*, IV—i—41); and then there being an elimination of the ‘*ya*’ of the ‘*shyañ*’ affix, in accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*halastuddhitasya*’ (*Pāṇini* VI—iv—150), we get the form ‘*yāthākāmi*.’

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (47): *They must be done out of the principal material, as that is the first (to present itself).*

The Offerings of Remnants are due to the existence of the Remnants, as also to the necessity of doing what is enjoined in the Veda; and hence, they come to be related to that material which happens to be mentioned first (before the other materials) in the scriptural text bearing upon the question; and as, at that time, there would be no incongruity in the offering being made out of that material, it is directly made. And when this has been done, the injunction has been carried into effect, and hence its injunctive function ceases forthwith; and there being no reason for the offering of any other *Remnants*, if such offerings were made, they would be incompatible with the sense of the Injunction. Consequently, they are not to be performed.

ADHIKARANA (17).

[The division of the Cake is for the purposes of eating.]

Sūtra (48): “*Inasmuch as the ‘Eating’ is not found to be mentioned, the word ‘Dāna’ should be taken in the sense of ‘Purchase’ (or Exchange).*”

In connection with the Quartering of the Cake, we find the parts pointed out as ‘*Idam Brahmanah*’ etc. And there arises the question as to how these parts come to be pointed out as belonging to the Brahman and others; and it being found that these sentences lay down giving of the parts to the priests, there arises the question as to whether this *Giving* is laid down simply as a means of *purchasing* the services of those Priests, who could do anything they liked with the portions of the Cake received by them,—or it is laid down for the due fulfilment of the action of *Disposal* (of Remnants), which is accomplished by their being eaten by the Priests.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The giving is laid down as the means of the *purchasing* of their services. Because in the case in question we do not find any such sentences as, ‘*Yajamānapancamā idām bhakṣayanti*,’ laying down either the predominance of the *material*, or the actual *Eating* of that. Consequently, inasmuch as Materials are accessories to Sacrifices, and as they are found to be given to only those that have been connected with the performance of the sacrifice, it must be admitted that, even though there is no direct declaration of *Purchase*, yet the giving of the Cakes, like that of the Sacrificial Fee, cannot but be regarded as serving the purposes of the said *purchase*.”

Sūtra (49): “*Also because of these being praised as such.*”

“We find the Giving of the Cakes enlogised as—‘*śhā vai Darṣapūrnamāsayordakshinā Rtvijām utsāhakārini*’; and there can be no doubt that this pertains to the *purchase* (of the services of the Priests).”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (50): *It must be for the purposes of eating; because as regards the material, they are all equal.*

The Divison of the parts of the Cake among the Priests is not for the purposes of the *Purchase*; because in all cases we find that a *Purchase* is effected by something belonging to one's self; and when the Cake has been given away to the Deities, there is no person having any sort of ownership over it.

That is to say, inasmuch as the *whole* Cake has been given away to the Deity, the Sacrificer is no longer its owner; and as such he has as much ownership over it as the Priests, Brahmā and the rest; consequently just as these latter could not make any gifts of the Cake, so too the Sacrificer. Consequently if he were to effect a *purchase* (by giving the Cake in exchange for the services rendered), he would be asserting his rights of ownership over it; and thereby he would be undoing the gift that he has previously conveyed to the Deity. For these reasons, we cannot admit the *giving* to be for the purposes of *Purchase*.

Then there remains the question—"On what grounds do you take it to be for the purposes of *Eating*?"

And to this we offer the following answer:—

We have already explained that the *Līṅga* (or Indicative face) of a thing consists of its *capability*; and this is admitted, on all hands, to be the means of ascertaining the use to which that thing is to be put; then there can be no doubt that the Cake is *capable of being eaten*, as it is found to be so by its very nature.

The *Bhāṣya* has made the declaration—'We have never seen the *Brahmā* and other priests in any way helping the parts of the Cake.' But this is not quite proper; as they are actually found to help them in their Disposal. Then goes on the *Bhāṣya* with another declaration—'On the other hand, we find the Parts of the Cake helping the Priests'; and this too is not proper; as in that case the *giving* would come to be for the purposes of the *Purchase*; as, (1) it is not by being *eaten* alone that the Cake could help them,—it might help them, in some way or other, even merely by being taken home; (2) as it will be explained in all cases, that the *Eating* is meant as a purificatory of the *material* (and not as helping the Priests); and (3) the *Eating* is not spoken of as being left off, on the occasion of any Penance, etc., and certainly all things connected with the *Man* himself would certainly cease on such occasions.

For these reasons, we must explain the *Bhāṣya* in the following manner: There is no doubt that there is a Disposal of the parts of the Cake; but still, when we come to seek for the special purpose served by

the restriction of the performers (of this Disposal, to the Priests only), we conclude that the purpose of this lies in the fact of the action bringing about a certain purificatory power in those performers; because so long as we can find a visible purpose, we can have no authority for assuming an imperceptible one. And there can be no doubt that the purificatory rite that is most intimately connected with the performer is the *Eating*; and hence even if they were to carry their shares home, unless they would eat them, they would not bring about any effects in themselves; consequently, howsoever far they might carry them, it is absolutely necessary that they should at last eat them.

Thus then, (1) inasmuch as there would be no reason for passing over the first of such rites that is cognised,—(2) as the capability (of the Cake itself), and the fact of the portions being pointed out as belonging to such and such Priests, distinctly point to the necessity of the *Eating* that has been commenced,—we conclude that it is the *Eating* that helps the Priests, *Brahmā* and others. As for the 'Remnant' that stands in need of *Disposal*, its natural capability shows that the best manner of its disposal consists of its being *Eaten*.

Sūtra (51): *As for the said Praise of the Giving, it is due to the said pointing out.*

As for the above-quoted eulogy—'*Eshā-Dakṣiṇā*,' it must be explained, as referring to the desirable effects that follow in the wake of the *Eating*, or as due to the fact of the portions being pointed out as *belonging to Brahmā*, and thus bearing some sort of a similarity to the Sacrificial Fee (*Dakṣiṇā*).

For these reasons, it must be admitted to be fully established that the Injunction with reference to the Division of the Cake, is for the purpose of its being *Eaten* (by the Priests).

Thus ends the *Fourth Pāda* of *Adhyāya III*.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA V.

ADHIKARĀṆA (1).

[The offerings of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, etc., are not to be formed with the Butter in the *Dhruva*-vessel, etc., etc.]

Sūtra (1): “(The Offering of the Remnants should be made) out of the Butter also; (1) because of the mention of “all’.”

We now proceed to deal with the suppression of the too extensive application of the law propounded in *Sūtra* III—IV—44.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we have the sentence ‘*uttarārdhāt Sviṣṭakṛtē samavadyati*,’ ‘*Idamupahvayati*,’ and so on, laying down the various Offerings of Remnants. And with regard to these sentences, there arises the question as to whether the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering, herein laid down, should, or should not, be made out of the Butter used at the *Upamṣuyāja*.]

And the *Sūtra* recalls, from the *Sūtra* III—iv—44, the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“(The offering in question must be made out of the said Butter), as “it is only then that we could justify the subsequent description ‘out of all materials,’ which mentions *all materials*, without any exception (and “hence the leaving out of the Butter would not be in keeping with the “Description.)”

Sūtra (2): (2) “Also because of the reason.”

We have a historical narrative in the Veda (“The Deities said to “*Sviṣṭakṛt*, carry offerings to us; he replied, I crave the boon of having “a share in the sacrificial offerings; they said—name it; he replied—may “they offer to me, one by one, the slices out of the latter half;—which shows “the reason for which offerings are made to *Sviṣṭakṛt*; and there can be “no doubt, that this reason is as applicable to the case of Butter as to

"any other materials; as the reason given is that—'because *Sviṣṭakṛt* carries the Offerings to the gods, he craved the boon of a share in the offerings'; and as a matter of fact, we find that the Butter also has been carried by him to the Deities of the *Upāṃṣuyāja*; and it follows from this that he should have an offering out of this Butter also."

Sūtra (3): (3) "*Because in regard to a certain (action) we find the word 'samavatta.'*"

"The word '*Ekasmin*'=in regard to a certain action; or it may mean that, according to you, the *Siddhānti*, if a single material be cut out for the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, then there would be no sense in the word '*Samavatta*,' which signifies 'being cut out together with other materials; whereas according to us, inasmuch as the Butter would also be cut out and offered to him, along with the other materials, the word '*Samavatta*' would be quite relevant and compatible.

"We now proceed to show where this word '*Samavatta*' is actually found: we have a Sacrifice laid down in the sentence, '*Ādityaḥ prāyaṇi-yaścāsurabhavati*'; and in connection with this same Sacrifice, we find the declaration, '*ājyasyainam carumabhipuryājyabhāgāḥ Pathyādyaḥ-catasro dēvatā yashāvayāḥ*', which lays down four sacrifices, which, by reason of their having the same material as the *Upāṃṣuyāja*, must be regarded as the modifications of this latter; while the Sacrifice laid down in the first sentence—i.e. the *Ādityacaru* Sacrifice—is the modification of the *Āgnēya* Sacrifice; and in connection with this last Sacrifice, we find the declaration, '*Agnaye Sviṣṭakṛtē samavadyati*'; and if only one part of the *Caru* were to be offered to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, then we should have had the word '*avadyati*'; whereas if the offering be made also out of the original Butter used at the *Upāṃṣuyāja*, then in this latter case also the Sacrificial offering would have to be made; and this necessitating the cutting out (and offering) of both the *Caru* and the Butter, the use of the word '*Savadyati*' becomes fully justified. For this reason, too, it must be admitted that the Offerings of Remnants are to be made out of the Butter also."

Sūtra (4): (4) "*Because we find an Arthavāda of Sviṣṭakṛt with reference to the Butter.'*"

"We find the passage—'*Avadāya avadāya dhruvām pratyabhighārayati*, *Sviṣṭakṛte 'vadāya na pratyabhighārayati*' ('Having made each offering, one refills the *Dhruvā* vessel, but when he has made the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, he does not refill it'); and in this the word '*prāti*' (in '*pratyabhighārayati*', 'Refills') distinctly shows that the offerings re-

“ferred to are those taken out of the *Dhruvā* vessel, as is also justified by
 “the very nature of this vessel itself, which is apparently found to be meant
 “to serve the purpose of holding the offering materials. And hence it
 “follows that the offering that is made to *Svistakrt*, is also taken out of
 “the *Dhruvā*; as is shown by the prohibition (in the passage quoted) of
 “the *Refilling* of that vessel, after the offering to *Svistakrt* has been
 “made. And then again, the distinct injunction, that ‘there should be no
 “offerings after that to *Svistakrt*’, also indicates that the previous *Re-*
 “*fillings* (spoken of as following after each offering has been made) were
 “solely for the sake of (being offered to) *Svistakrt*. Consequently, in
 “accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*Tatsāmānyāl, etc.*’ it must be admitted
 “that the offerings of Remnants should be performed out of all the
 “materials.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (5): There being no Remnant (of the Butter), it could not be so;—the absence of Remnant being due to the whole of it having been taken up.

The offerings of Remnants are made only when there is a Remnant, left of the material used at the Principal Sacrifice. As a matter of fact, we find that there is no Remnant left of the Butter used at the *Upamṇu-yāja*; for the simple reason that the whole of it has been taken up by the Sacrifice.

By the next *Sūtra* we proceed to show why the whole of the Butter is taken up.

Sūtra (6): There could be no ‘Remnant’ in the Dhruvā; because this belongs in common (to many actions).

In the *Dhruvā*, there can be no ‘Remnant’ of the *Upamṇu-yāja*; (1) because the Butter that is brought in it is not related exclusively to any particular action; and hence all actions that are to be done with Butter, are done out of the Butter in the *Dhruvā*; as is distinctly authorized by the sentence ‘*Sarvāsmāi vā etad gṛhyatē*.’

For the *Tattirīyas* also (though they have no such text as ‘*Sarvāsmāi vā etad gṛhyatē*’), we find that the *Upamṇu-yāja* is mentioned in the course of the mention of such actions as the *Upastarana*, *Abhighāraṇa* and the like; and hence the sentence ‘*upastrāṇnabhighārayannājyasya yajan*’ shows that the *Ājya* (Butter) is a material belonging in common to all these actions.

And then, in the case of all things that are common to many—f. i. an Assembly, a Forest-picnic, Company-dinners, and such other things,—we find, that when the share of one has been taken away by him, his connection

with the material ends then and there; and to the rest of the thing, the remaining owners are entitled, and as such that cannot be spoken of as the 'Remnant' of the share taken away; and consequently, in such cases, the rest of the material, not having served its purpose, could not stand in need of *Disposal*. When, however, all the persons entitled have taken up their respective portions, then there does arise a need for *Disposal*, but that too in keeping with the common character of the material. Thus then in the case in question, when a portion of the Butter in the *Dhruvā* is taken out for the purposes of the *Upāṃṣu-yāja*, there is no 'Remnant' of the portion of that Sacrifice; as the rest of the Butter in the vessel has still got to serve its purpose in connection with the subsequent actions of *Upastaraṇa*, *Abhighāraṇa*, and the like; and it is admitted on all hands that the Offerings of Remnants are merely meant to be the Disposal of materials that have served all the purpose that they had to serve, and are no longer required; and as such they could not take up those materials which have yet to serve certain purposes. For these reasons it must be admitted that there can be no 'Remnant' (of Butter) in the *Dhruvā*.

As for the common 'Remnant' that would be left after all the said actions have been completed, we have an altogether different *Disposal* laid down for that,—in the form known as '*Samashṭiyajuh*.' If this ('*Samashṭiyajuh*') also be regarded as an independent Principal Action, just like the *Upastaraṇa* and the rest (and not as a mere 'Offering of Remnant'), then, in that case, the presence of any 'Remnant' in the *Dhruvā* would be all the more impossible (as the '*Samashṭiyaju*' is distinctly laid down as consisting of the offering of *all the Butter* that might be found in the *Dhruvā*, after the *Upastaraṇa* and the other actions have been done). As a matter of fact, however, we can quite reasonably take this *Samashṭiyajuh* as a mere Action of *Disposal*; (1) as, on referring to the text of the *Taittirīya*, we find that it is originatively related to another action; (2) and as, being mentioned as '*Homa*', it cannot be regarded as a *Sacrifice*. And then, inasmuch as this Action is laid down as taking up all the Butter in the *Dhruvā*, it naturally precludes the performance of all the other Offerings of Remnants. Hence, too, it must be admitted that there can be no Remnant in the *Dhruvā*.

Sūtra (7): *Though it is taken out in the Juhū, yet it is the whole of that that is connected with the Homa.*

The opponent might argue, that—"there is a portion of the Butter taken out in the *Juhū*, exclusively for being offered in the *Upāṃṣu-yāja*; and there would be a Remnant of that attached to the *Juhū*,—just as there is of the *Soma* in the vessels and cups." But this is not possible; because it is the *whole* of that Butter (in the *Juhū*) that is laid down as

to be offered in the *Homa*, by the Injunction '*caturavattāṇ juhōti*'; and we have already shown, in connection with the *Caru* meant for the *Upadhāna*, that that which is laid down for one purpose cannot be rightly used for another. For this reason there can be no 'Remnant' in the *Juhū* either.

Sūtra (8): *Obj.*:—"As in the cups (so it would be possible in the *Juhū* also)."

It is argued that—"Though the *Soma* in the cups is laid down as to 'be offered in *Homa*, yet we always find *Remnants* of it in those cups; and 'similarly, we could have a 'Remnant' in the *Juhū* also (in the case in 'question)."

And we have got to refute this argument (which we proceed to do in the following *Sūtra*).

Sūtra (9): *It is not so; because (in the case of Soma) there is no infringement of the Injunction; and also because it is brought up simply as an offering material (and not as connected with Homa).*

The case in question is not similar to that of the *Soma*; because in the case of the latter, it is brought up into the Vessels and Cups, simply by way of being laid out as mere *offering materials*; and as such there is no *Homa* of it,—as we shall explain in the *Adhikaraṇa* on the *eating of the Soma-remnant* (*Sūtras* III—v—19 *et seq.*). And hence for one, who would refute the *infringement of Injunction* brought forward in *Sūtra* III—v—19, there would not be a *Homa* of the whole quantity of the *Soma*; and as such, in this case, there would be no incompatibility, either with the fact of the Offering of Remnant being found to serve another purpose, or with the fact of its being taken from all quarters in accordance with such sentences as '*Somasyāgnē vihi, etc.*', or with the names given to the Cups, in the sentences '*Sarvataḥ parihāram aśvinam bhakshayati*' (where '*Āśvina*' is the name of one of the ten Cups); while every one of these facts would have been contradicted if the whole of the *Soma* were offered (and no Remnant was left).

Or ('*codanāvirodhāt*' may be explained in the following manner)—In the case of the *Soma*, the non-offering of the *whole* is not found to infringe any Injunction; and as such, in view of this '*non-infringement*,' the *whole* is not offered. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find the *non-offering* of the whole of the Butter to be contradictory to a distinct Injunction. And it is this *non-infringement* (in the case of the *Soma*) that is the reason for there being a *Remnant* in the Cups. Such is the sense of the *Sūtra*.

The *Bhāṣya* did not bring forward the case of the 'Cups,' before it introduced the present *Sūtra*; and hence, in that case, it is necessary to assume an *Objection-Sūtra*,—showing that the existence of the material is not necessarily accompanied by the offering of the *whole* of it,—and then to supply the answer to that (assumed *Sūtra*). And this answer is that, in the case of the *Soma*, we would have a *Remnant* in accordance with another declaration to that effect; whereas in the case in question, we have no such other Declaration (and hence there would be no *Remnant*); and thus the reason '*Homasamyogāt*' ('because of connection with *Homa*') being qualified by—'while there is no declaration to the contrary,'—there can be no flaw in the reason given.

Or again, in *Sūtra* 7, we could substitute the word '*ca*' in the place of '*tu*,' and then take the *Sūtra* as embodying an objection brought forward by the *Purvapakshi*; and those who would take the *Sūtra* thus would have to cite, in support of their contention, the instance of the 'Cups'; and then *Sūtra* 8 would be taken as recalling that instance. And, in this case, the sense of *Sūtra* 7 would be thus:—The opponent having urged that—'because of its being taken out in the *Juhū*, there would be a *Remnant*, as in the case of the *Cups*,'—the reply is that, 'that is connected with *Homa*'; and this has already been explained above.

***Sūtra* (10): The word 'all' applies to that which exists (in the case in question); because the word pertains to those alone that have been mentioned in connection (with the case).**

As for the descriptive reference contained in the sentence '*Sarvabhyaḥ havirbhyaḥ*',—a reference which is based upon a previously indicated possibility (of the offering of 'all materials'),—we take the 'all' referred to be that which we perceive in the case in question; because in any case the word 'all' can only be used relatively with reference to things that may appear in the present connection; as it is absolutely impossible to speak anything of the *Absolute All*; and as such our view is not incompatible with this use of the word 'all.' Thus then the words '*Sarvabhyaḥ havirbhyaḥ*' must be taken to refer to those materials which, on account of their being remnants of those, are capable of *Disposal*, or those that exist merely as *Remnants* of the original materials. [This *Sūtra* meets the *Purvapaksha* argument in *Sūtra* (1)].

***Sūtra* (11): The other is based upon a particular genus.**

As in the previous case, so in the present one also, the word '*samavadyati*' is a mere descriptive reference; and as such it could apply to—

the Butter also; consequently, when the *Caru* would be cut up (for being offered), that would inevitably involve the *cutting up*—even though not desired—of its parts also, on account of these being intimately mixed up. Consequently the prefix 'Sam' (in 'Samavadyati') should be taken as a mere descriptive reference based upon the fact of the two subtly mixed up genuses (of *Caru* and *Butter*). [This meets the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument contained in *Sūtra* (3)].

***Sūtra* (12): The last refers to the non-emptiness (of the vessel).**

The last argument that has been brought forward by the *Pūrvapakṣa* (in *Sūtra* 4), is that based upon the *Arthavāda* with regard to the *Sviṣṭakṛt*. But that is quite explicable in accordance with our theory also, as indicating *non-emptiness*. That is to say, in the sentence '*Sviṣṭakṛte-vadāyanaṁ pratyabhīhārāyati*', the '*avadānu*' ('offering') spoken of must be taken as that '*cutting*' which is made out of that material from which it is actually made, or from which it can be done. As a matter of fact, we find that this '*Avadānu*' is capable of being done out of such materials as the *Cake* and the like; while what is done out of the *Dhṛuvā* is only the action of *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhīhārāṇa*. Nor do we find the *Avadānu* out of the *Dhṛuvā* connected with the Dative (in '*Sviṣṭakṛtē*'). Specially as even though some other substance may have been offered to the Deity, yet the *Dhṛuvā* would stand in need of '*Refilling*' ('*Pratyabhīhārāṇa*') for the sake of the actions of *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhīhārāṇa*, in connection with which it has been found to be useful. And thus there would be a use for the *Dhṛuvā*, before the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering, even after the other offerings have been made, and hence with each offering, it should be refilled; but when the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering has been made, there is nothing more to be done; and hence there is no further need for *refilling* it. Nor can the *refillings* be regarded as purificatory of the previous offerings; as that would necessitate the assumption of an invisible result for them.

As for the *non-emptiness* (of the Vessel), it is clearly for the sake of the action to be performed next; consequently without making the *Arthavāda* in question apply to the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, we could explain it as referring to the *non-emptiness* of the Vessel prior to the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering.

ADHIKARANA (2).

[The 'Offering of Remnants' should not be performed in connection with the Sākamprasthāyya.]

Sūtra (13): *The performance of the Svistakṛt and the Idā in connection with the Sākamprasthāyya, also is like the above.*

In connection with the *Amāvāsyā* Sacrifices, we have always the performance of the *Svistakṛt* and the *Idā*, out of the *Sānnāyya* material; and the *Sākamprasthāyya* is a modification of the material (of the *Sānnāyya*); and hence there is an idea that those actions should be performed out of that modification also; and on this point the case of the *Sākamprasthāyya* differs from that the Butter in the *Dhruvā* (though, in accordance with the rule '*Prakṛtival Vikṛtiḥ*', the Offering of Remnants would be performed in connection with the *Sākamprasthāyya*, just as with the *Sānnāyya*). And hence there being a doubt as to whether the case in question is amenable to the reasonings of the foregoing *Adhikarana*,—the present *Sūtra* serves the purpose of pointing out the fact of the case of the *Sākamprasthāyya* being exactly the same as that of the Butter in the *Dhruvā*. That is to say, just as in the case of the latter, so in the former also, *there would be none of the offerings, on account of there being no Remnant, —this absence of Remnant being due to the whole of it having been taken up* (*Sutrā* 5). And in this case the fact of the whole of it having been taken up is shown by the following: We find the sentence '*Homārthē prasarpataḥ saha kumbhībhiḥ*', which lays down the unpartitioned milk, as to be offered '*along with the milking pots*'; and this distinctly shows that the whole of the material is offered (because when the pots also have been offered, there cannot be any Remnant); and hence it is not possible for any Remnant to be kept.

ADHIKARĀṆA (3).

[In connection with the *Sautrāmaṇi* there is no 'Offering of Remnants'].

Sūtra (14): *So also in the case of the Sautrāmaṇi (there would be no Remnants) in the vessels.*

The phrase '*tadvat*' is to be supplied from the preceding *Sūtra*.

In connection with the *Sautrāmaṇi*, we find mentioned certain vessels of wine, and of milk, named '*Ārvina*' and the like; and inasmuch as these vessels only serve the purpose of keeping the various materials separate—just as in the case of the *Cups* (of *Soma*), so in this also—there would be no possibility of the whole of the materials being offered up. And hence inasmuch as this would lead to the idea of the case in question differing from those dealt with before (and hence not amenable to the previous reasonings),—the present *Sūtra* points out the amenability of the case in question to the reasonings of the previous *Adhikaraṇas*.

And each of these Vessels is taken up for *Homa*, in the same order that it is held; and the Vessels as held are laid down as to be offered up, in the sentence—'*Yathāgrhitau rtvijā upādadātē, uttare 'gnau payograhān juhvati, dakṣhinēsurāgrahān*' (which shows that there can be no Remnants, as even the Vessels are offered up).

Sūtra (15): *The mention of 'Remnant' also is to be explained as before.*

The Prohibition, contained in the sentence '*ucchinasta, na sarvaṃ juhoti*,' which is not subsidiary to an Injunction, is a mere descriptive reference. '*Ucchinasthi*' is an Injunction, and the subsequent Prohibition is a descriptive reference to it; and this latter would point out the impossibility of the 'Offering of Remnants,' through the fact of the whole of the material being offered up in *Homa*. Then as for the 'Remnant' that is spoken of, there may be some other action, either in the shape of a distinct *Disposal*, or in that of another Principal Action. And for these reasons, the *Svistikṛt* and the *Idā* should not be performed (out of the *Sautrāmaṇi*).

ADHIKARANA (4).

[In connection with the *Sarvaprshthēṣṭi*, the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, the *Idā* and the other 'Offerings of Remnants' should be performed only once].

Sūtra (16): "*The material being one, and the Actions diverse, the actions in question should be performed with each action.*"

It having been established that there are certain 'Offerings of Remnants' to be performed, we now proceed to consider the case of particular 'Offerings of Remnants.'

In connection with the *Sarvaprshthēṣṭi*, we find the passage '*Indrāya Bathantarāya, Indrāya Vārhatāya, Indrāya Vairūjāya, Indrāya Vairājāya, Indrāya Čakvarāya, etc.*'; and we find that this passage speaks of six independent Deities, shown by the six words with the dative ending, and hence also six different connections of the Deity and the Material; and as in the Sacrifice occupied by one Deity there could be no room for the other Deity, the distinctive feature of the Deity cannot be regarded as pointing to six different actions. For some of these actions there are distinct offering materials laid down; while for some of them, there is laid down a single material, in common, in the shape of the *Oake of the size of the Cart-wheel*. And when we accept this fact, we come to the consideration of the question, as to whether the 'Remnant-Offering' would be different for each of these latter Actions, or, on account of the material being the same, there would be a single offering, in common amongst them.

Objection: "The question forms a subject of *Adhyāya XI*, and as "such would be dealt with in that Chapter, under the Sūtra, '*ekadravyē, etc.*' (XI—iv—42); and consequently it need not be taken up for consideration, in the present connection."

Reply: Inasmuch as, in the case in question, the material has to be Disposed of, it bears the Action distinctly; and as it is piece by piece that the material is subsidiary to the Principal Actions, there can be no single performance in common; and hence, though the discussion really belongs to *Adhyāya XI*, yet, inasmuch as it involves the consideration of the Remnant and the Original, it forms a fit object to be dealt with in connection with the matter of 'Remnant-Offerings.'

And on the above question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"It is only when the Material is one, that there would be a single performance common to all the actions concerned; specially in a case where it is in the same condition that the Material helps in all the actions; the more so as, in such cases, we do not perceive any reason for making any difference; in fact no such difference can ever be made. In the case in question however, the Material is found to help in the Sacrifice, piece by piece (and not as one complete whole); and the sanctification of the Material also lies only in the help that it accords to the Sacrifice; and hence a difference in the Principal Sacrifice would make a difference in the said *Sanctification* (the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering, the *Idā*, etc.); and as such these could not be performed once only, as common to all the Principal Sacrifices. As a matter of fact, we find that, even though one part of the Cake (that is offered at one action, f.i.) may have been disposed of, yet there could be a Disposal of another part of it. Inasmuch as the exact places out of which the various offerings are cut out are different, it is quite natural that there should be a differentiation into the 'Northern half', the 'Southern half,' etc., etc. And hence we conclude that the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering and the *Idā* are to be repeated with each action."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (17): *The Remnant of each action not being distinguished, it would belong equally to all (and hence there can be but one Disposal).*

The *Sviṣṭakṛt* and the *Idā* are to be performed once only; because these offerings are not purificatory of the Sacrifice, nor of the material that is offered in *Homa*; then as for the 'Remnant of the *Homa*' (that which has been left after all the *Homas* have been performed), that is one only (for all); and as such it is only right that the 'Offering of Remnant' should be done once only, which would apply, in common, to all the *Homas*.

That is to say, if the offerings in question were purificatory of the Sacrifice, or of the Material that is offered in *Homa*, then, the difference among the Sacrifices, and among the Materials, would have led to a diversity in the offerings in question. As a matter of fact, however, we find that they are purificatory of the Remnants; and we also know full well that in the case in question, there is a single Remnant, common to all the *Homas*; and it is the 'Northern' and 'Southern' halves of this common Remnant that are taken up for the offerings in question; and they are not the parts of that slice which has been cut out and offered at the Principal Sacrifice; as no such parts have been spoken of in connection with

the original Sacrifice ; and as such we can certainly assert the fact of its specifications not being cognized. For if one could take up the ' Northern half ' for the sake of *one* of the Principal Sacrifices, that would suffice for the due fulfilment of what has been enjoined ; and hence the other Principal Sacrifices also will come to have all their needs supplied by that very slice.

For these reasons it must be admitted that the offerings in question are made only once, as common (to all the *Homas* concerned).

As for the excesses left after the *Disposal-Offerings*, they would be utilised in a subsequent *Disposal-Offering*, f.i. in the *Caturdhākaraṇa* (Quartering of the Cake).

ADHIKARĀṆA (5).

[Out of the Indra-Vāyu Vessel, the Eating of Remnant should be done twice.]

Sūtra (18): *In the case of the Aindravāyava, there should be an Eating with each action, because of a distinct declaration to that effect.*

[At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we have several vessels containing Soma, and each vessel is dedicated to a distinct Deity; one of these is dedicated jointly to Indra and Vāyu; this is called the '*Aindravāyava-Graha*'; as the Remnants in every one of these vessels has to be eaten, with regard to this *Aindravāyava* vessel, there arises a question as to whether the Remnant in it is to be eaten once only, as in the case of the other vessels, or twice, in view of the fact that out of this two offerings have been made, one to Indra and another to Vāyu; and as such it practically contains two Remnants.]

Though the proper place for this discussion would have been after Sūtra 19, where the question of the *Eating of Soma* in general has been dealt with,—yet it has been introduced here, simply because, being an exception to the conclusion of the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, this presents itself to us more quickly than the said general question.

On this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*, based upon reasoning: "the material being one and the same, a single Eating would suffice for the due carrying out of the scriptural Injunction."

SIDDHĀNTA.

In view of a distinct Declaration that to the effect,—'*Dviraindra-vāyavasya bhakṣayati*,'—we must admit that the Remnant should be eaten twice.

Though it is quite true that we have certain *Adhikarāṇas* where, as in the present case, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is based upon reasoning, while the *Siddhānta* in reply is based on Verbal Authority,—yet that does not appear to be quite the proper method; because in such cases no Doubt is possible.

Such an *Adhikarāṇa* is put forth only in a case where a certain thing, having been found to be possible on the ground of Reasoning, is, however, set aside on the ground of Verbal Authority; and hence the thing in ques-

tion not being admissible, such an *Adhikarāṇa* would be of use in all cases that might be found to be amenable to the said *Reasoning*. [In the case in question however we find the reverse to be the case, as the 'Twice Eating' was not possible, on the ground of any Reasoning; but has been found to be *made possible* by Verbal Authority.] And as this Reasoning in question has been already shown in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, there would not be much use for the present discussion.

Consequently we must explain the *Adhikarāṇa*, not as it has been done above (in accordance with the *Bhāṣya*), but in the following manner: The Opponent brings forward the following arguments against the *Siddhānta* of the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*,—and this we might take as—

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B).

"At the *Sarvapr̥sthā*, the *Svishtakṛt* and the *Idā* should be performed 'with each action; as all these principal actions are wholly different from 'one another. For example, we find that, in reference to the *Aindravāyava*, 'where the Principal Actions are admittedly distinct, we have as many 'Purificatory Remnant Offerings as these Actions, in accordance with 'such declarations as—'*Dviraindravāyavasya bhakṣayati*', '*Dvirhyētasya vashaṭkaroti*'; and hence it must be admitted that there should be as 'many purifications of the Remnant as there are *Vashaṭkāras*."

For this reason, the present *Sūtra* (18) we should take as explaining the case of the *Aindravāyava* (that has been cited by the Opponent in support of his view in regard to the *Sarvapr̥sthā*), and then supplying the *Answer* to these arguments. And this *Answer* we can represent as—

SIDDHĀNTA (B).

In the case of the *Aindravāyava*, though the *Eating* should have been done *once* only, it is done *twice*, because of the direct Declaration to that effect,—and not because of the diversity of the Principal Actions concerned; specially as we have shown under the '*Hetvadhikarāṇa*' (I—ii—28 *et seq.*), that a Vedic sentence cannot be taken as giving the *Reason* for any thing.

In this way, the present *Adhikarāṇa* comes to be a mere supplement to the previous one; and inasmuch as it also serves the purpose of reminding us of the Discussion in regard to the *Eating of Soma*, there would be no incongruity in the order of the *Adhikarāṇas* (sought to be explained away at the beginning of the present *Adhikarāṇa*).

ADHIKARANA (6).

[There should be an Eating of the Soma-Remnant.]

Sūtra (19): "There should be no Eating of Soma, as there is
"no Declaration to that effect."

In the case of the *Aindravāyava*, there might be an eating, even on account of the qualified Injunction; so it is with regard to the Soma in the other Vessels and in Cups, that there is a doubt as to whether, or not, there is an Eating of those.

Though among these also, the case of the *Somas* referred to in the sentences '*Sarvataḥparihāram Ācvinam bhakṣayati*' and the like would be amenable to the same reasoning as that in regard to the *Aindravāyava*,—yet with regard to these also, we have to consider the question as to whether these sentences merely serve the purpose of laying down qualifications with regard to the *Eating* whose performability is already fully recognized, or they lay down the *qualified Eating* itself.

Question: "What difference does this make?"

Answer: If these sentences themselves are also the Injunctions of the *Eating*, then this has to be done only in the cases specified in these sentences; while if the Injunction of the mere eating is got at elsewhere (and the sentences quoted be the Injunction of mere qualifications), then, in that case, even though the Indicative Force of the words might point directly to only a part of the *Soma*, yet it would apply to all the *Somas*.

In regard to this *Question*, then, there are three probable alternative theories, viz. (1) Inasmuch as the sentences that are found to serve the wholly different purposes of laying down qualifications, they stand in need of an Injunction,—and as there is no Injunction,—there can be no *Eating*; (2) or, those very sentences may be taken as Injunctions, and accordingly, there is to be an *Eating* out of those vessels only that are specified in them; (3) or, there is to be an *Eating*, on the aforesaid grounds of the *Name* (that is, given to the Cups and Vessels, as '*hotuṣcamasuh*', and the like), the performing of the *Vashatkāra*, the *Homa*, and the *Abhiṣava*.

And out of these, we having the following as the—

PŪRVAPAKṢHĀ.

"All the *Soma* in the vessels and cups being entirely taken up by the *Homa*,—just as in the case of the *Butter* (Adhi. 1), the *Sākanpras-*

"*thāyya* (Adhi. 2) and the *Sautramani* (Adhi. 3),—there would be no *Bemnant*; whence, then, could there be any *Eating*? The *Eating* cannot be said to be implied by any Original Primary Sacrifice (as the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, in which we have all the Vessels and Cups under consideration, is its own *Original Primary*). Nor do we find any direct Injunction as to the *Eating* in question; the Injunction that we have refers to a wholly different thing; and as such, is incapable of laying down the *Eating*. For these reasons, there can be no *Eating* of the *Soma*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (20): *The Eating should be done; because we find it mentioned in connection with the other purposes.*

[There should be an *Eating* of the *Soma*; because we find sentences, really mentioned in other connections, pointing to such *Eating*,—such sentences, for instance, as '*Sarvataḥparihāram Ācvinam bhakṣayati*'; '*bhakṣitāpyāyitaṇcamasān dakṣiṇasyānaso* '*valambē sādyaṇti*'; as certainly, if there were no *Eating* at all, how could there be such specified *Eatings* as those mentioned in these sentences.]

Sūtra (21): *These (sentences) would be direct declarations (of the Eating itself); as they lay down something new; and hence the Eatings should be in accordance with these Injunctions.*

If these sentences were merely meant to serve some other purposes, then we should have sought for other reasons (such as the *Name*, etc., etc.) for the *Eatings* in question; as a matter of fact, however, these sentences are direct *Declarations* (of the *Eating*); and hence the *Eating* should be done, only in accordance with the Injunctions contained in these sentences,—and not elsewhere.

ADHIKARANA (7).

[The *Remnant-Eating* is to be done by the Priests holding the Cups.]

Sūtra (22): *Inasmuch as the Cups are named (after the Priests), (the Eating should be done by these), specially as the connection (of the name 'Camasa,') is due to that (Eating).*

We admit that the *Eating* would be done, in accordance with the Injunctions; but these Injunctions are to be followed as qualified by the aforesaid Name, *Vashaṣkāra*, etc., and not merely as mentioned in those sentences.

Though in regard to the Cups, we do not find any direct Injunction (in the *Brahmaṇas*) of the *Eating*, yet such Injunctions are inferred from the names contained in the Directions ('*Praitu hotuṣcamasaḥ*', etc., etc.); that is to say, we find the Directions for the fetching of the Material accompanied by such names as '*hotuṣcamasa*' (the '*Hotri's* Cup') and the like; and these names could not be applicable, if the *Hotri* and other priests did not actually *Eat* ('*camanti*') out of these Cups. Because the word '*camasa*' is formed out of the Root '*cam*' = to eat, with the Locative affix '*asan*' of the *Uṇādi* class (the word being etymologically explained as '*camanti asmin iti, camasaḥ*'); and hence at the time that the Direction ('*Praitu hotuṣcamasaḥ*') is heard, the name '*camasa*' indicates the connection with actual *Eating*, either in the past, or in the future, or in the present; and as we do not perceive any *Eating* in the *past* or the *present*, we conclude that the *Eating* indicated is that in the *future*; otherwise, the Direction, '*Praitu hotuṣcamasaḥ*', could not be carried into effect.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that there should be an *Eating* by the *Hotri* and other priests.

Then, inasmuch as the Cups that are brought forward (in obedience to the said Directions) are those that contain the *Soma*,—and as it is the *Soma* that stands in need of *Disposal*, and is most proximately related (to the Cups),—the *Eating* is to be of the *Soma* contained in the Cups; specially as we have such declarations as, '*Saṣṣaṣcamaso hūyatē, alpam juhōti*'. Nor do we cognize the presence of any other substance, such as *Rice* and the like, the *Eating* of which could justify the name of '*camasa*'; nor would the *Eating* of any other such material form part of the Sacrifice; and

hence such Eating (of some extraneous material) would be open to the following anomalies; (a) the indications of the Context would be contradicted; (b) the Direction in question would have to be removed from its legitimate context; (c) the name of '*Somacamasa*' would be incompatible; (d) if the material eaten were Rice or (anything other than *Soma*), the Cups would become impure by the *Eating*, and as such no further offerings could be made by those Cups (as is laid down) (the case of the *Soma* is different, inasmuch as the Veda distinctly declares that there is no impurity attaching to the *Eating* of the *Soma*); (e) if, for the sake of purification, we were to scratch out certain portions of the Cups, then, the particular Cup that had been named '*hotricamasa*' will have ceased to exist, and the newly repaired one, and the material contained in it, could not bear the said name (of '*hotricamasa*'); and as such, there would be a contradiction of the Injunction of the *Homa* as to be performed with the material specifically named (as '*hotricamasa*').

The same reasoning holds respecting the taking up of other Cups; as the bringing in of such would involve an infringement by exceeding the exact number of the Cups laid down. Nor (in the case of the *Eating* being of *Rice*, etc.) could we perform the subsequent *Homas* with the Cups made impure by the *Eating*, on the sole strength of the Injunction (of the *Homa*); as this Injunction has the chance of being carried into effect, in the case of the *eating* of *Soma*, which would not involve any infringement of the rules of conduct with regard to impure Cups. Nor can it be urged that "the infringement would be exactly the same in the case of the *Eating* of *Soma*." Because in regard to the *Soma*, we have the distinct Declaration that—'there is no impurity attaching to the *Eating* of *Soma*.'

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Priests holding the Cups should eat the *Soma*.

The *Bhāṣya* also must be taken in the above manner,—and not as it appears on the face of it; for if one Proof becomes interrupted by another Proof, its comprehension becomes an exceedingly difficult matter. Therefore all that the text brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* does is to prohibit the *Eating* of *Soma* by other than *Brāhmanas*. If the name '*Prayajñānāśya*' does not indicate the *Eating* of the *Soma*, then we could not explain, either the declaration—'*Sa yadi somam vibhakṣhayiṣṭi*'—contained in the Injunction of the *Phalacamasa*, or the Prohibition '*na Somam*.'

Hence it must be admitted that the Priests holding the Cups should eat the *Soma*.

ADHIKARANA (8).

[The Udgātri Priests are to eat, together with the Subrahmanya Priest.]

Sūtra (23): "I. Only one should eat out of the Udgātri-
"camasa (the Cup held by the Udgātri Priest); because
"of only one such being directly mentioned."

Before explaining the *Eating* consequent upon the performance of the *Vashatkāra*, the *Homa* and the *Abhiṣava*, the Author proceeds to show that particular *Eating* which is based upon *Name*.

In the *Direction* referred to in the foregoing *Adhikarana*, we meet with the name 'Udgātrrñām camasaḥ'; and with regard to this, there arises a fourfold doubt: (1) should the *Eating* be done by only one Udgātr Priest; or (2) by all the Priests; or (3) by only those Priests that do the Hymning; or (4) by all the four *Chandogas* (*Sāmavedi* Priests)? Some people take the (2) and (4) together, on the ground that the word 'Sarva' is used in both *Sūtras* (24 and 26), and that through proximity, the Indication in question is applicable to the *Ohhanloga* Priests alone.

Question: "Wherefore should there be any doubt in regard to the matter in question?"

Answer: The reason is this: In the word 'Udgātrrñām', we find a distinct incongruity in the significations of the basic word and the affix (i.e. the basic noun denotes naturally only one Udgātr Priest, while the affix denotes *plurality*); and hence it is only natural that there should be a doubt as to the acceptance of the signification of the one or the other.

On the point under consideration, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA (A).

"In accordance with the *Pāṇadhikarana*,—and with the law that 'it is in regard to the secondary factor that an illegitimate assumption can be made,'—it is the denotation of the basic noun that forms the pre-dominant factor; and then again, in the original Injunction of the appointment of the Udgātr Priest—'Udgātāram vṛñta',—we find the Singular number, which distinctly shows that the Cup in question is to be given to only one Udgātr Priest; and hence it is only one Udgātr Priest that would eat out of it; and as for the denotation of the Plural number, inasmuch as we do not find it compatible with that of the basic noun, we can not but disregard it as not meant to be significant."

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B).

Sūtra (24): "II. *All should eat it, because of the connection of all.*"

"It is not right to wholly disregard the plurality. Because in the case of the 'Pāṇamantra', we disregard the Plural number because there is no room for any plurality in the Context, in which it occurs. In the case in question, however, inasmuch as an Indirect Indication (of all Priests by the word 'Udgātr') is found to be quite compatible, we can have no reason for disregarding the Plurality. Consequently it must be admitted that the Cup in question belongs to all the Priests. Or, by sub-division (i.e. inasmuch as all Udgātr Priests are Chandogas, the term 'Udgātr' would indicate all Chandogas, the Sūtra may be taken as referring to 'all Chandogas'.")

PŪRVAPAKSHA (C).

Sūtra (25): "The Hymn-singers (should do it); as they are connected with that ('singing'); specially as we have the distinct declaration of Plurality."

"Inasmuch as the Priests other than the Udgātr are not denoted by the basic noun ('Udgātr'), the plural number (in 'Udgātrṇām') could never have any connection with those other Priests. Nor can we have recourse to an Indirect Indication, without very special reasons; specially as, in the case in question, by not having recourse to such an Indication, we do not find any meaninglessness (which could justify our having recourse to it); because we find the word 'Udgātr' (=singer) quite applicable, etymologically, to the Hymn-singers. Consequently, by reason of their connection with 'Singing,' the three Hymn-singers should eat of the Remnant in question."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (26): *All (four should do it); because of their connection with the (Sāma-) Veda; but for other special reasons, it would pertain to some of them only.*

So long as a basic noun can be taken in its conventional signification (as a complete word), we cannot accept its etymological signification. As a matter of fact, however, we do not find the word 'Udgātr' applying, even etymologically, to the Hymn-singers; because the Hymn-singing Priests, the Prastotr and the Pratihartṛ, are mere 'Gātr' ('Singers'), and not 'Udgātr' ('High-singers'); and hence the plural number (in 'Udgātrṇām') is actually incompatible (as there is only one Udgātr

Priest). This is shown by the further fact of only the *second part of the Sāma* being spoken of as 'Udgātra.'

The Bhāṣya should have used the word '*bhakti*' with reference to the *parts* of the *Sāma*; and the use of the word '*parva*' is due to mere oversight.

Thus then, we find that, there cannot be many *Udgātr* Priests, either by actual appointment as such, or by the connection of '*Singing*'; and hence the *Plurality of the Udgātr* must be taken as based upon the connection with the *Veda* (the *Sāma Veda*); because as a matter of fact, we find that the *teaching of the Sāmaveda* is spoken of as '*Audgātra*'; and thence also the action inhering in that *Teaching* (comes to be spoken of as '*Audgātra*'); and from this it is an easy matter to infer that, through their connection with these two (the *Teaching* and the *Action*), in the capacity of the *Teacher* and the *Performer* respectively, it is the *Men* (thus connected) that are spoken of as '*Udgātr*,'—in accordance with the reasonings pertaining the '*Audamēghi*.'

Objection: "This reasoning that you have brought forward has already been refuted under the *Avēṣṭyadhikaraṇa* (II—iii—3). And in the case in question we find that it is only after the addition of the nominal affix ('*an*') to the word '*Udgātr*' that this latter gives rise to the word '*Audgātra*'; and the word '*Udgātr*' cannot be explained as having its etymological origin in the word '*Audgātra*.' That is to say, in accordance with the rules of Grammar, the word '*Audgātra*' is explained as formed out of the word '*Udgātr*' with the nominal affix '*an*'; and in no way could any rule explain the word '*Udgātr*' as 'the performer of the *Audgātra* functions,' which would mean an elimination of the affix ('*an*'; in the word '*Udgātr*'). Consequently the name '*Udgātr*' cannot be taken as based upon the word '*Audgātra*'; but it must be regarded as based upon the actual appointment of the Priest as such, as will be explained later on. For these reasons, the above explanation is not admissible."

Reply: In any case, the word '*Udgātr*' will have to be taken in its indirect secondary signification; and hence it would have to be taken as applying to the Priest, by means of a backward process (of etymology: as the '*performer of the Audgātra functions*'); just as we find the word '*Rāja*' applying to the *Brāhmaṇa* (which is possible only in the sense of '*performer of kingly functions*').

In connection with the word '*Rāja*,' it has been shown, by the sentences 'in ordinary parlance the word is used in its etymological sense, etc., etc., etc.' (in the *Avēṣṭyadhikaraṇa*, II—iii—3), that, in the first instance, the word '*Rāja*' is used in the sense of the *caste* (*Kṣātrīya*); and hence, through connection with that *caste*, the functions of protecting and

the rest come to be spoken of as '*Bḍjya*'; and thence, through the connection or presence of these functions, the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc., also come to be spoken of as '*Bḍjā*,' this word being applied to these, either on account of their being substitutes for the *Kṣātriya*, or through Inference (based upon the presence of the functions of *Protecting* and the like). In the same manner, in the case in question, though, by actual appointment, there is only one *Udgātr*, yet through his connection, his functions of *teaching* and *performing* being spoken of as '*audgātra*,' the *Hymn-singers* also would be spoken of as '*udgatr*,' by reason of these priests being related to those functions. But, inasmuch as one word cannot have more than one direct signification, this latter application of the word must be regarded to be *indirect* (or *secondary*); and we have already explained that this secondary signification would be admitted, for the sake of the compatibility of the plural number (in '*udgātrrṇām*'); it was only the ground for this signification that we did not point out before; and this we have done now, by showing it to be based upon the functions of *Teaching* (the *Sāma-Veda*).

Thus then, we must admit, on the ground of there being no incongruity involved in this, that the *eating* is to be done by all the four *Chandoga* priests (the *Udgātr* and the three *Hymn-singers*).

The above explanation is not quite admissible. Because as a matter of fact, those that are found to be operating, at the time of the *Eating*, as well as those accompanying these operators at the time of the *Direction*, come to be connected with the *Eating*; and we find that the *Subrahmanya* (who is one of the *Chandoga* priests) does not perform any operation at the time of *Eating*, and as there is no proximity of this priest, either in the Outer Assembly Room, or in the Inner Court, there is no reason by which he could be entitled to the *Eating*. And hence, just as in the case of other *Chandogas* we find that though they perform the *Teaching* of the *Sāma Veda*, yet, not being in any way connected with the *Sacrifice*, they have no *Eating* to do, so would it be in the case of the *Subrahmanya* Priest also. Then as for the plural number (in '*Udgātrrṇām*') that might be taken as resting with *three* Priests only, just as in the case of the word '*Kapīñjalān*' (vide *Sūtra* XI—i—38 et seq.). Nor is the *Eating* a purification of the Performer; whereby it should be necessary to make it apply to the *Subrahmanya* also, for fear of leaving him unpurified. In reality we find it to be a purification of the material, as we shall show in several *Adhikaraṇas*.

Hence it must be admitted that the present *Sūtra* sets aside, by means of the word '*tu*,' only the argument in *Sūtra* 25, and puts forward the same view, of the *Eating* pertaining to the *Hymn-singers*, though for

reasons totally different from those propounded in the previous *Sūtra*. And thus the sense of the *Sūtra* comes to be this: Though all of them are denoted by the word 'Udgātr,' and not the *Hymn-singers* only, yet, for reasons shown, it should be taken as applying to a part (i.e. some) of these only,—i.e. to all except the *Subrahmanya*; just as in the case of the sentence 'Upanishadyodgātāraḥ sāmnaḥ stuvanti.'

Or, we can take the *Sūtra* as accepting, by means of the words 'Sūroṣṭu' the *Second Pūrvapaksha* (*Sūtra* 24),—and then, by means of the sentence, "Kāranādekadēṣe syāt", laying down the theory of the word applying to the *Hymn-singers* only.

ADHIKARANA (9).

[The *Grāvastut* should also eat the *Soma*.]

Sūtra (27): “*There is no eating for the Grāvastut;
“as it is not laid down.”*”

We have finished the treatment of the *Eatings* based upon Name; and the Author now proceeds to explain those based on Direct Declarations to that effect.

We have the Declaration—‘*Yathācamasamanyāñcamasasāñcamasino bhaṣayanti, athaitasya hāriyojanasya sarva śva, etc.*’ (‘The other cups of *Soma* are eaten by those persons holding the Cups, but out of the *Hāriyojana* Cup, all of them wish to obtain ’); and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the sentence, pointing to the Eating by *all* priests, lays down that of the *Grāvastut* Priest also,—or pointing only to the Eating of the *Priests holding the Cups*, mentioned in the sentence, it does not lay down any for the *Grāvastut* Priest.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that “there is to be no *Eating* by the *Grāvastut* Priest, for reasons just given.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (28): (He should eat) *out of the Hāriyojana, as it is mentioned as related to ‘all.’*

The word ‘all’ denoting *all* Priests connected with the performance of the sacrifice, we can not restrict it to only a few out of those (i.e. only those that hold the Cups), unless we have very special reasons for doing so. Consequently, it must be admitted that the *Grāvastut* Priest also is to eat out of the *Hāriyojana* Cup.

Sūtra (29): *Objection: “The eating would be done by
“those holding the Cups because of their proximity.”*

This *Sūtra* explains the sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa*: “The former portion of the passage quoted above—‘The Cups of *Soma* are eaten by those holding the Cups’—serves no other purpose save the restrictive qualifying of the word ‘all’; specially as the words ‘*atha*’ and ‘*eta*’

"all the more point to the fact of the *Eating* belonging to those Priests alone; as the word 'eva' can apply to those alone that are specially mentioned. Hence we conclude that the sentence does not point to any *Eating* by the *Grāvastut* Priest."

Sūtra (30): *Reply: The eating would belong to all, because of the Injunction; as for the mention of the 'camasins', that is meant to be merely subservient to that.*

Inasmuch as we have the word 'all', which denotes every one of the persons concerned, and which, being once restrictively qualified by the substrates (*Hāriyojana*), cannot be restricted and qualified again, by the word '*camasin*', which serves a wholly different purpose; because every time that we limit the scope of a word used in the *Veda*, we are setting at naught the direct Vedic Declaration. Hence we conclude that the '*camasins*' are not mentioned for the sake of showing the relationship of each Priest with each Cup; but they are spoken of as having a very much limited scope, with a view to eulogising the *Hāriyojana* as having a much wide scope. Consequently it must be admitted that what the sentence means is that 'out of the *Hāriyojana* Cup, all the priests should eat' (and thus the *Grāvastut* Priest also eats out of that Cup).

ADHIKARANA (10).

[The performance of 'Vāṣaṭkāra' is a ground for eating.]

Sūtra (31): There should be an eating, due to the Vāṣaṭkāra.

Another sentence in the same connection is—'Vāṣaṭkartuḥ parthama-bhakṣaḥ.' And with regard to this, there arises the question, as to whether it lays down the *First Eating* (*Eating* qualified by *First*), as due to the *Vāṣaṭkāra*,—or it lays down merely the character of being *First*, with reference to the *Eating*. And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"In accordance with the law—'nacāḍanyēna ṣiṣṭāḥ' (I—iv—9), so long as the qualification can, in some way or other, be taken as a mere descriptive reference, we cannot rightly take the sentence as a qualified Injunction; and then, the character of the *First* is something that has not been got at by any other Injunction; hence it is not possible for the *Eating* to be enjoined with reference to that; consequently, the sentence must be construed as—'yo Vāṣaṭkartuḥ bhakṣaḥ sa prathamāḥ' ('The eating of the performer of the *Vāṣaṭkāra* should be the *first*').

"*Question*: 'Inasmuch as the *Eating* too has not been enjoined before, we cannot take that as mentioned merely by way of descriptive reference (for the Injunction of '*First*').

"*Answer*: Inasmuch as the Injunction of the *Eating* is involved in the very name (of the *Cup belonging to the Vāṣaṭkartā*), it is quite possible for it to be mentioned merely by way of descriptive reference. One of the *Cups* is named '*Vāṣaṭkartuḥcamasaḥ*,' and as the very name '*camasa*' implies *Eating*, this can very well be spoken of by way of descriptive reference; and hence the sense of the sentence comes to be that 'whoever does the *Vāṣaṭkāra* has the *First Eating*'.

"The following argument might be brought forward here: Inasmuch as in connection with the *Vessels* and the other *Cups* (except that belonging to the *Vāṣaṭkartā*), no *Eating* has yet been found to have been enjoined (as the said name indicates the *eating* out of that one *Cup* only), no such could be mentioned merely by way of descriptive reference."

"*Reply*: That does not matter; as it is not necessary that what is spoken of by way of descriptive reference must have been recognized as to be performed in all cases; as all descriptive references stand in need of only that much of recognition as is possible. Nor, in the case in question, is there any harm in the *Vaśatkār* Priest not eating out the vessels and the other Cups. It might be urged that, 'such non-eating would leave *Disposal* unaccomplished.' But, in the case of there being no *Disposal* laid down in the Veda, we can have one as in ordinary life; or we could have the *eating* also, through reasons to be shown below.

"The following argument might be brought forward: 'The possibility of the *eating*, by reason of the *Name*, being very remote, it cannot be spoken of, by way of descriptive reference, by the very much more quickly-operating Direct Declaration; and hence while the former is yet to be pointed out as to be performed, the Direct Declaration will have begun its functioning, and denoted, without any specifications, the *Eating* wherever there might be the *Vaśatkāra* (i.e., it will have laid down the *Eating*, and not the *First* only with reference to any particular *Eating*).'

"But this is not admissible; because *proximity* and *remoteness* are sought after only in cases where there is some sort of a contradiction. In the case in question, we find that the Direct Declaration, in order to avoid the chance of an Injunction of more than one thing, stands in need of the *Eating* being already laid down by some other means; and when it is found that it is not laid down by any means, it has to admit the Injunction to be of the *Eating qualified* (by *First*); as we do often admit Direct Declarations to be injunctive of accessory qualifications with reference to such things as have been laid down by even such remote means as those of the Context and the like.

"And thus, inasmuch as the sentence lays down the *character* of *First* only as the condition for the *Eating*, the *Vaśatkāra* cannot be regarded as a ground for *Eating*."

SIDDHANTA.

To the above we make the following *reply*: Inasmuch as there can be no descriptive reference of only one factor extracted out of the compound (i.e. of the *Eating* as extracted from the compound '*prathamabhakṣaḥ*'), just as in the case of the expression '*tryaṅga*,'—the sentence must be taken as laying down all the factors (i.e. the '*First Eating*,' as due to the *Vaśatkāra*).

That is to say, just as in the case of the sentence "*tryaṅgaḥ viṣṭakṛtam yajati*," we do not find the 'three' laid down with reference to the 'subsidiaries'; but what is laid down is that which is expressed by the whole com-

pound (i.e. the *three subsidiaries*); so, in the same manner, inasmuch as it is always the *whole* word that is connected (syntactically) with another word,—and as the withdrawing of one factor would deprive the compound of its expressive potency,—we cannot take that withdrawn factor as that with reference to which something is laid down; i.e. we cannot construct the sentence as—‘that which is the *Eating* of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ* should be the first.’ Specially as before the compound (*‘prathamabhakṣaḥ’*) has been accomplished, the ‘Eating’ cannot be connected with the ‘*Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’; because in that case the former would be dependent upon the latter (not a factor of the compound), and as such could not be compounded (with the word ‘*prathamaḥ*’).

Objection: “We often find that even though the principal factor of the ‘compound’ be dependent upon some extraneous factor, it forms part of a ‘compound’; and hence in the case in question also, even though the ‘Eating’ would be connected with the ‘*Vaṣaṭkartṛ*,’ yet it could be ‘compounded (with ‘*prathamah*’).”

Reply: It could be so, if the ‘Eating’ were the only factor dependent on an extraneous factor; in the present case, however, we find that the ‘first’ also is so dependent, on account of the relationship of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*; as the cause of the ‘first’ is not the ‘Eating,’ but the character of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*; and hence the syntactical connection would be ‘*Vaṣaṭkartur prathamah*’ (‘the first of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’); and that would involve a distinct incongruity. While, if we were to take the injunction (of ‘first’) as with reference to ‘that which is the Eating of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’ (*‘yo Vaṣaṭkarturbhakṣaḥ’*) we would have the anomaly of having a qualified reference (the reference being to the ‘Eating’ qualified by the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’); as mere ‘Eating’ could not indicate the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*; and as for the character of the ‘*Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’ that is found to be concomitant with actions other than the *Eating* (and as such could not necessarily indicate it). If the reference were to any one of the two only (i.e. either the ‘Eating’ alone, or the ‘*Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’ alone), then the ‘first’ would be enjoined for *all Eatings* (if the reference were to *Eating only*), as also of all the operations of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ* (if the reference were to the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ only*); and both of these would be equally absurd. Consequently, the sentence must be taken as laying down the ‘first Eating of the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*.’ And as both, (‘*first*’ and ‘*Vaṣaṭkartṛ*’) qualifying each other, would be related to the same object (the action of *Eating*), where we would have *Vaṣaṭkāra*, there alone we could have the ‘first Eating.’

Question: “Inasmuch as the *Vaṣaṭkāra* is the causal condition, how “could it be enjoined? And if it is not enjoined, how could there be a “restrictive qualification (by means of this)?”

Answer: Mutual restriction is always due to the two being related to the same action; and it does not make any difference whether the factor is *enjoined* or *not enjoined* (vide *Sūtra* III—i—12). As a matter of fact, however, the '*Vaśatkāritva*' is not wholly incapable of being enjoined. Because the fact of the *Vaśatkāra* being the causal condition is not signified by such agencies as the word '*yadi*,' the Locative ending, and the like; but the fact is that the *Vaśatkār* having been enjoined as accessory to an action, the fact of its being a causal condition is only implied. Hence the objection urged above does not affect our theory.

Objection: "In the sentence '*tasmādēkam sāmātrcē kryatā stotr-
'yam*,' we find the 'three' enjoined with reference to the '*Rk*,' even though this occurs in a compound; and in the same manner, we could have the Injunction of the 'First' only."

Reply: Not so; because in the sentence quoted by you also, what is held to be enjoined is what is signified by the compound ('*trca*'); as what is taken to be enjoined by it are the 'three verses' for all the *Hymn-
sāmas*. But then what happens is that the whole ('three verses') could be accepted as the object of the Injunction, if both the factors (of the compound) were such as are not got at by other means; but as a matter of fact, we find that the factor of the '*Rk*' is already got at by the general Injunction of *Sāma*, as also by the order of the text; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—iv—9, they are not taken as enjoined by the sentence in question (whose injunctiveness is taken as restricted to the number 'three' only). In the sentence '*Vaśatkartuḥ prathamabhakṣaḥ*,' we find that what is signified by the compound is enjoined only to the extent of the *Vaśatkāra*, and hence if, like the '*Rk*' (in the case of the other sentence), the 'Eating' (of the present sentence) also were already enjoined and known as existing everywhere, then it would be abandoned by the Injunctive potency (in the sentence). As a matter of fact, we find that it is not known or enjoined as existing in regard to the *nine cups* and the *vessels*; and being (in the sentence in question) presented only as the causal condition, it could not be abandoned (by the Injunctive potency); nor could it be taken as merely spoken of by way of a descriptive reference. In the case of the other sentence also, if the '*Rk*' were not known to exist in any place, then, inasmuch as there would be no difference in the nature of the compound, we should have had to admit the fact of the Injunction applying to the *Rk* verses also; but as a matter of fact they are already known to exist in connection with all the *Hymnal Sāmas* (and hence these cannot be taken as enjoined by the sentence). Then again, the sentence enjoins the member 'three' of the *Rk* verses; and as the '*Rk*' forms the principal factor in the compound ('*Trca*'),—even though it be dependent upon an extraneous factor, there would be

nothing incongruous in its being compounded (with 'three'). In the case in question, however, we have already explained that the 'First' is not related to all '*Āttings*.'

For these reasons it must be admitted that the '*Ātting*' of the *Vaṣaṭkarṭṛ* Priest, to be done first, is that which is due to his *having performed the Vaṣaṭkāra*, and then that *Ātting* to which he is entitled by reason of the *name* (of the Cup); and it is not the latter that is to be done first of all.

[Thus there are two '*āttings*' for the *Vaṣaṭkarṭṛ* Priest.]

[The actions of *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* also are causes for eating.]

Sūtra (32): *Homa and Abhiṣava also* (entitle to drink).

Those enumerated above are not the only causes for *Eating*; as the actions of *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* give rise to another *Eating*; because of the sentence 'Havirdhānē grāvabhirabhiṣutya, āhavanīyē hutvā, pratyāñcaḥ parētya, sadasi bhakṣān bhakṣayanti.' ('Having, in the storeroom, pounded the Soma by means of stones, and offering it into the sacrificial Fire, and coming back into the Assembly Room, they eat of their portions').

(1) Inasmuch as the actions *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* themselves, with all their accessories are already laid down elsewhere, they could not be taken as being enjoined by this sentence (which, therefore, must be taken as laying down the *Eating* due to these actions).

Objection: "Like the *Dikṣāvākya*, the sentence might be taken as "laying down the order (in which the actions of *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* and "*Eating* are to be performed)."

Reply: But this is not possible; as the order of sequence is implied by the very nature of the actions themselves; as there could be no *Abhiṣava* (pounding and extracting) of that which has been offered into the fire, nor could there be an offering of that which has been *Eaten* [hence the order of the actions must be—(1) *Pounding*, (2) *Homa*, and (3) *Eating*].

(2) And then as for the 'coming back' ('*pratyāñcaḥ parētya*'), that also is implied by the very nature of things; as in coming from the place of the Sacrificial Fire to the Assembly Room (such is the way in which the houses are constructed, that) one could not but 'come (or walk) back' (and hence the sentence cannot be taken as laying down this *coming back*).

(3) Inasmuch as the *Hotṛ* and other Priests are performing their operations in the Assembly Room, it is necessary to bring the *Soma* into that Room, for the sake of those *Eatings* of it that are due to the performance of *Vasatkāra*, and to the *names* (of the various Cups); and here it is also necessary for the *Adhvarya* Priest to convey the invitation for *Eating* (to the various Priests concerned); and hence the mention (in the sentence) of the 'Assembly Room' is only by way of a descriptive reference (and hence this too cannot be taken as the object enjoined by the sentence).

And thus we find that the only factor, spoken of in the sentence, which is not already implied or got at by other means, is that of *Eating*; and hence it is this alone that can be regarded as the object of Injunction.

And the purpose served by the mention of the actions of '*Homa*' ('*hutvā*') and '*Abhiṣava*' ('*Abhiṣutya*') is simply to show that the Eating enjoined in the sentence is to be done by the same persons that perform these two actions. And these two actions, of *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* having been found to serve distinct purposes of their own, they can not be taken as mere accessories to the *Eating*. As for the *Eating*, we have already found that it serves as the purification of the material; and hence the mention of the relationship of other things (*Homa* and *Abhiṣava*) is not for the purpose of showing its subsidiary character. Hence it must be admitted, from the very nature of the things concerned, that the *Homa* and the *Abhiṣava* are the causal conditions of *Eating*.

And for this reason, it must be admitted that the Performer of the actions of *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* should also eat the *Soma*.

ADHIKARANA (12).

(The *Vaṣaṭkartr* and others should eat the *Soma* out of the Cups.)

Sūtra (33): "*Because of the direct declaration with regard to the Cups, the general declaration would apply to the others.*"

[We find the sentence '*Praitu hotuṣcamasaḥ, pra Brakmanaḥ, prod-gātrṇām*'; and then there arises the question as to whether the Performers of the *Homa*, *Abhiṣava* and the *Vaṣaṭkāra* should eat of the said Cups or not. That is to say]. In a case where we have a coalition of the aforesaid causal conditions of *Eating*,—(1) should we take the two *Eatings* conjointly, (2) or as optional alternatives, (3) or as one setting aside the other?

The common notion being that, inasmuch as they would all serve the same purpose, they should be taken as optional alternatives,—against this we have the following —

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the sentences, '*praitu hotuṣcamasaḥ*,' etc., speak of the Cups as specifically related to the *Hotr*, etc., the generic declaration, as to the *Eating* consequent upon *Homa* and *Abhiṣava* should be taken as duly observed by the *Eating* of these out of the *Vessels*; and as such the connection of these with the *Cups* must be regarded as set aside by the former specific declarations. And hence the eating (by the Performers of *Homa*, etc.) should be out of the *vessels* (other than the aforesaid *Cups*)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (34): *There should be (eating by the Performers of Homa, etc., out of the cups); because there is equal cause for this; specially as the sentences quoted are not meant to specify the Performers (Holders) of the Cups (to the preclusion of all others); because they merely speak of these (Holders, as also, among others, related to the Cups).*

There would be a possibility (of the Performers in question eating out of the Cups); because of the presence of the causal conditions. In a case

where we have the causal conditions, in the shape of the *Vaṣaṭkāra*, we would have the said possibility, by Direct Injunction, bearing upon the relationship of the *Vaṣaṭkāra*. Nor does this Injunction operate only in a general way; as it is directly laid down, in a specific form, in regard to the *Soma* for which the *Vaṣaṭkāra* has been performed. In fact the *Name* ('*hotuṣcamasah*, etc.) would certainly be weaker in authority, on account of its extreme remoteness from its objective; but with all that, we do accept the indications of that *Name* to be authoritative, as we find that there is no other function to be served by it. And such being the case, all that the sentences ('*paitu hotuḥ*, etc.') must be regarded, as laying down the eating of these priests, and not as setting aside anything else, in the shape of the *Eating* by the Performers in question, being out of the said Cups. And then again, in the case of a material that consists of various parts, it is quite possible for many persons to eat out of the same Cup; specially when the substance that is eaten is the bitter and hot *Soma*. In fact we have a direct declaration to the effect that 'only a little should be eaten'; and certainly if one were to eat up all that would be in the Cup, it could not be said to be 'a little'; while if he leaves a little in the Cup, that little would stand in need of *Disposal*; and as such there would be room for another *Eating* (out of the same Cup). Hence it is necessary that there should be room for the eating, by the Performers in question, out of the said Cups.

[Though the *Bhāṣya* has another *Sūtra* here, yet the *Vārtika* does not take it up; and the reason for this omission seems to lie in the fact of the *Sūtra* not being found in the *Sūtra* text.]

ADHIKARANA (13).

[The first *Eating* is that by the Hotṛ Priest.]

Sūtra (36): “*There being a single vessel, it is the Adhvaryu that should eat first; as such is the order of sequence.*”

It has been proved that more than one person should eat out of the same vessel; and we now deal with the order, etc., in which the *Eating* is to be done by them. (And on the question, as to which Priest should eat the *Soma* first of all) we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“If the *Adhvaryu* eats it first, then there would be no disorder in the performance, due to an unnecessary increase in the number of the pass-ings from hand to hand; otherwise (inasmuch as it is the *Adhvaryu* who holds the Cup after the *Homa* has been offered), if he did not have the first *Eating*, but had to pass on the Cup to others, then it would be necessary for the Cup to be offered back again to him (for his own *Eating* out of it) (and then it would be passed on to others); and this would involve a deal of unnecessary disorder. Hence it must be admitted that it is the *Adhvaryu* priest who should do the first *Eating*.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (37): *The Hotṛ priest (should eat first); because of the words of the Mantra.*

Inasmuch as, after the more authoritative proof has been put forward, the introduction of the weaker becomes very difficult, the Author begins with the putting forward of the words of the *Mantra*.

The *Mantra* that is recited in praise of the *Stone* shows that the first *Eating* is to be done by the Priests performing the *Hautra* operations. This *Mantra* is as follows:—‘*ṛiṣ vadanti* [at the time of the Pounding they emit the sound] *ṣatavatsahasravaccābhikrandanti* [this qualifies the afore-said sound] *haritābhirasabhiḥ* [with faces made blue by the touch of the *Soma*] *viśeikarmani grāḍāṇaḥ sukrataḥ* [behaving well] *sukṛtyaya* (by this good behaviour) *hotuṣcēt purvā haviradyam ācata* [ate up the portion

that was to have been eaten by the *Hotṛ* first of all]; and the *Mantra* distinctly shows that the 'first Eating is to be done by the *Vaṣaṭkartr* (he being one of the *Hotṛ Priests*) (and this is also pointed out by the sentence '*Vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamo bhakṣaḥ*'). Indicative of the same thing we have also the *Mantra*, '*Hoṣṇa nah prathamampāhi*'—i.e. just as the *Hotṛ* is the first to drink the Soma, so, etc., etc.—which, by the simile put in, distinctly shows that the *Hotṛ* is the first to eat.

Sūtra (38): *Also because of a distinct Declaration (to that effect).*

We have already spoken of the qualified Injunction '*Vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathama bhakṣaḥ*'; (and this distinctly declares that the first eating is to be done by the *Vaṣaṭkartr* who is one of the *Hotṛ* priests). And as the several factors have been laid down before, there can be no incongruity in the fact of the sentence enjoining more than one thing. In fact, the compound ('*prathamabhakṣaḥ*') supplies a further reason (for the multifariousness of the Injunction); that is to say, inasmuch as the Compound lays down a single *Kāraka* which has been mentioned in the same word with another, the present case is not subject to the law enunciated in *Sūtra* II—ii—6.

Sūtra (39): *Also because of the order of sequence in the prompting causes.*

The effects always appear in the same order as their causes; and we find that the prompting cause (of eating), in the shape of the performance of a certain action in connection with the sacrifice which is the first to appear is the *Vaṣaṭkāra* (a function of the *Hotṛ Priest*), which is followed by the *Homa*, the function of the *Adhvaryu*;—as is distinctly pointed out by the Injunction '*Vaṣaṭkṛtē juhōti*.' [And as such the eating of the *Vaṣaṭkartr*—*Hotṛ* would necessarily precede that of the *Adhvaryu*.]

Objection: "The action of Pounding (*Abhiṣabha* by the *Adhvaryu*) "preceded even that of the *Vaṣaṭkāra*."

Reply: True, it did appear before; but that alone did not make it the prompting cause of the Eating of Remnants; as it is the Pounding as taken along with the *Homa* that constitutes the prompting cause (of the Eating),—as will be shown under *Sūtra* VI—iv—25. [And though the Pounding be done before the *Vaṣaṭkāra*, yet as the *Homa* is done after this latter, the Eating due to the two actions of Pounding and *Homa* would necessarily come after that due to the *Vaṣaṭkāra*].

Some people might be led away, by the sentence '*hotuṣōti pūrve*

haviṛadyamaṇata’, to believe that any of the *Hotr* priests might do the first eating; but the present *Sūtra* and the last have made it quite clear that the first eating is to be done by the *Vasatkartr*—*Hotr*, and hence the word ‘*hotuḥ*’ in the sentence just quoted should be taken as denoting the *Vasatkartr*.

ADHIKARANA (14).

[The Eating should be done after the Permission has been given.]

Sūtra (40): *The Eating should be done only when permitted; because of the direct declaration to that Effect.*

[In the case of many persons eating out of the same vessel, there arises a question as to whether every one of them should eat only after the permission to do so has been given, or without any such permission and for simplicity's sake, the *Pūrvapaksha* is that "there should be no restriction as to this"; but the *Siddhānta* is that the *Eating* should be done only when permitted; because of the direct declaration to that effect—viz. ' *Tasmāt Somo nānupahutēna pēyah* ' ('Therefore the *Soma* should not be drunk by one who is not invited to do it').]

This *Sūtra* has been put in, simply for the purpose of explaining the sense of the sentence ' *tasmāt, etc.*,' and for that of preparing the ground for the next *Adhikarāṇa*.

ADHIKARANA (15).

[The Permission should be by the words of the Veda.]

Sūtra (41): *The Permission should be conveyed by means of the words 'Upahūta upahvayasva'; because of the indicative force of these (words).*

In answer to the question as to by means of which words the Permission is to be conveyed, it is declared that it is to be done by the words 'Upahūta upahvayasva.' Both of these words have been put in with a view to show what is to be said by the Person conveying the Permission (or Invitation), as well as by one who is permitted (or invited). [The word 'Upahūta' = you are invited, being the former, and 'Upahvayasva' = please invite, being the latter.]

The sense of the Sūtra is that, in any case, the Invitation should not be conveyed by means of the words of ordinary parlance.

ADHIKARAṆA (16).

[The Acceptance should also be by means of Vedic words.]

Sūtra (42): *The words conveying the acceptance (of the Invitation) are implied in the same (that have been quoted before).*

[In the place of 'vacanam', some people read 'vadanam'.]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "either both the Invitation and its Acceptance, or only one of these should be made by means of the words "of ordinary parlance."

And in reply to this we have the *Siddhānta* as follows :—

Inasmuch as the mere verbal order is always set aside by the order of its Denotation, the word 'Upahata' should be taken as the one conveying the Permission (and the word 'Upahvayasva') as the one signifying the Acceptance.

ADHIKARANA (17).

[The Permission is necessary for those Eating out of the same vessel.]

Sūtra (43): *The Permission should be for those who eat out of the same vessel; as it is only those that are associated together (in that Eating).*

If the Permission herein laid down were such as had not been found elsewhere, then it might have been obtained from any person; as a matter of fact however, we find that the 'Permission' here restricted (as to be given by means of Vedic words) is only such as is generally found in ordinary life. And hence its possibility could never be set aside in a case where it is found to exist. It is only among the priests eating out of the same vessel that the shares being equal (in accordance with the *Sūtra* X—iii—53) there are chances of differences arising; and hence the Eating is to be done by mutual Permission (or Agreement). Even though the Eating by one person would not cause any impurity in the *Soma*, and as such there is no imperceptible (supersensuous) harm done by such Eating, yet the fact of a number of people eating together out of the same vessel, is actually found to give rise to such perceptible disagreeable results, as the *hurting of one another's feelings*; and as such, there is, in such cases, a necessity for the said Permission. Hence it must be admitted that the Permission is necessary only for those eating out of the same vessel.

ADHIKARANA (18).

[The Sacrificer himself should also eat the *Soma*.]

Sūtra (44): “*The transference of the Yājyā-mantras from the Hotṛ does not transfer the Eating (from him), just like the Appointment.*”

In connection with the *Rtugrahājyās* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find that the appointment of the six Priests with the Sacrificer as the seventh is laid down for the performance of the *Yājyā*; and we also find it declared that the ‘*Yājyā* belongs to the Sacrificer’; with regard to the last there are two alternatives—the Sacrificer himself reciting the *Yājyā mantras*, or relegating the reciting to the *Hotṛ* Priest. And in case he should do it himself, there arises the question as to whether, or not, this taking up, by the Sacrificer, of the *Yājyā-recitation* (which might have been done by the *Hotṛ* Priest), leads to the transference, from the *Hotṛ*, also of the performance of the *Vaṣaṭkāra*, and the *Eating* consequent upon this latter.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“There can be no such transference of the *Eating*; because there is no Vedic declaration to that effect; and certainly the removal of one thing does not necessarily imply the transference of the other; as there is no sort of connection between the two; so in the case in question what we find laid down is the transference of the *Yājyā* only, and not of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the *Eating* also. Consequently, just as the transference of the *Yājyā* does not transfer the *appointment* of the *Hotṛ*, so in the same manner, it would not transfer his *Eating*.

“*Objection*: ‘At the time that the Sacrificer performs the *Yājyā* himself, there is no transference (of it from the Sacrificer),—because of the declaration—the *Yājyā* belongs to the *Hotṛ*; but when he directs the *Hotṛ* (to do it for him), then, certainly, there would be a transference; and as such what we have to consider is the question, as to whether, or not, the transference of the *Yājyā* from the Sacrificer involves the transference of his *Eating* also.’

“*Reply*: The *Yājyā*, the *Eating* and the *Vaṣaṭkāra* are found to belong to the *Hotṛ*, on account of the name ‘*Hautra*’ (given to all the

"three); and out of these it is only the *Yājyā* that has been set aside, "and transferred to the Sacrificer, by the declaration 'the *Yājyā* belongs "to the Sacrificer.'

"That is to say before the appearance of the sentence 'the *Yājyā* "belongs to the Sacrificer,' the name '*Hautra*' indicated all the three to "belong to the *Hotr*; and when the said sentence did appear, it trans- "ferred the *Yājyā* only to the Sacrificer, and left the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and "Eating in the same position as before (i.e. connected with the *Hotr*). If "we were to explain the 'transference' as being from the Sacrificer (to the "Hotr, and not as from the *Hotr*, to the Sacrificer, as explained above) "then the only factor that belonged to him (i.e. the *Yājyā*) would "be transferred from him; and as such, there being no idea of the "possibility of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the *Eating* belonging to him, such "there could be no question as to whether these latter should be "transferred from him or not. Consequently, we must explain thus: "The sentence—'the *Yājyā* belongs to the Sacrificer'—having transferred "the *Yājyā* only (from the *Hotr* to the Sacrificer),—the *Vaṣaṭkāra* "being something wholly distinct from the *Yājyā*, and hence there being "no possibility of the relationship (between these two) of the primary "and the subsidiary (a whole and part),—the process adopted would be "that after the sacrificer has finished the *Yājyā*, the *Hotr* would do the "*Vaṣaṭkāra* and the consequent *Eating*. Inasmuch as the *Eating* is due "to the performance of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and not to that of the *Yājyā*, it "cannot be transferred to the Sacrificer by the transference (to him) "of the *Yājyā*."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (45): (The *Eating*) should belong to the Sacrificer, because of the transference of the cause (of *Eating*, to the Sacrificer).

If all the declaration we had were in the sentence '*Yājyā* belongs to the Sacrificer,' then, in that case, there may not have been a transference of the *Eating*. As a matter of fact, however, we find the further declaration '*svayannishadya yajati*' ('sitting down himself he performs the sacrifice'); and then it is well known that the sacrifice is performed, not by means of the *Yājyā* only, but by means of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* also; inasmuch as this latter is used in connection with the offering of the material; then again, we have the declaration—'*anavānanyajati*' ('performs the sacrifice without resting')—which shows that beginning with the *Yājyā*, till the completion of all that is denoted by the verb '*yaji*' (to sacrifice), there should be no resting by the Performer; and as a matter of fact, this would be possible only if the *Yājyā* and the *Vaṣaṭkāra* were

both performed by one and the same person,—and not if these two were performed by two different persons (the *Sacrificer* and the *Hotr*). And for this reason, it must be admitted that the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the *Eating* should belong to the same person to whom the *Yājyā* belongs,—even though the actions be not one and the same, and there be no relationship of the whole and part; and hence we conclude that there should be a transference of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the *Eating* also (from the *Hotr* to the *Sacrificer*).

Sūtra (46): As for the Appointment, it cannot be set aside, because it has been already made.

The *Purvapakṣin* has argued that “just as there is no transference of the Appointment, so far there can be none of the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the *Eating*”. And to this we make the following reply:—

The Appointment having been already made in the past there is no transference of it at the time of that of the *Yājyā*; while as for the *Eating*, it has yet got to be done; and hence we accept the transference of that.

That is to say, a transference of the cause would lead to the transference of that alone which would be capable of being transferred from one thing to the other. As a matter of fact, we find that, at the time of the transference of the *Yājyā*, the *Appointment* of the *Hotr* is not capable of being transferred or set aside; nor would the Appointment, even if done in connection with the *Sacrificer* after its proper time has passed, be in the correct form. As for the *Eating* on the other hand, we find that it is both capable of being transferred, and of being connected with another person, without any incongruity; and hence there can be no analogy between the case in question and that of the *Appointment*.

There is, however, something to be said against the above explanation; it is this: “Why should the Appointment be incapable of being transferred, when, as a matter of fact, we find that it is after every one optional alternative has been definitely fixed upon, as to be followed,—that the performance of the sacrifice is begun? It is quite possible, at the very time that the sacrificial appointments are made, for us to decide as to whether the *Yājyā* would be recited by the *Sacrificer* or by the *Hotr*; and when this has been done, the Appointment could be made accordingly,—any one of the two persons being appointed. If the Recitation of the *Yājyā* were a conditional action, like the *Urukrāma*, the *Viṣṇuyāga* and the like, then in that case, inasmuch as, prior to the appearance of the condition, the Recitation would not have to

“quired an existence, it might not bring about the said Appointment
 “As a matter of fact however, the Recitation is not *conditional*, but
 “absolutely *necessary*,—and as such could always bring about the Appoint-
 “ment in accordance with itself.

“Then, it has been argued that ‘the Appointment could not be set
 “aside from the *Hotr*, because how could it be set aside from the *Hotr*
 “when it is absolutely necessary for the sake of his own *Yājyā*’? But
 “then there is no distinct Appointment solely for the sake of the *Yājyā*
 “the transference whereof would be suspected. As even for a thousand
 “recitations of the *Yājyā* we could have a single Appointment, in common
 “for all of them. And this Appointment is done with a view to certain
 “supersensuous results; and then, inasmuch as it is done after the
 “Appointment for the whole performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has been
 “made, there would be no difference perceived in it, and as such it
 “could be done in common for all (the Recitations).

“Then, it has been urged that ‘the appointment of the Sacrificer
 “being made after the proper time for it has passed, it would be
 “defective.’ But this argument is contrary to what has been said
 “in the *Sūtra* ‘*Guṇḍopē mukhyasya*’ (X—ii—12). Specially as in
 “that case there is no distinct performance of the original Primary and
 “its Modification.

“As for the declaration, that ‘in the original sacrifice everything
 “should be done in accordance with the direct declarations bearing upon
 “the subject,’—this is contrary to the *Sarvashaktyadhikaraṇa*, where
 “it is shown that anything can be done according as the time for
 “it presents itself.”

In view of these arguments, we must explain the *Sūtra* in the follow-
 ing manner: At the very outset (in *sūtra* 45) we have shown that ‘the
 transference of one thing does not necessarily imply that of the other,’—
 this dictum being taken for granted, as quite well known and based
 upon other reasons; and in the present *Sūtra*, what is pointed out is that
 ‘there can be no transference of the Appointment as it has been
 already made,’—that is to say, done for the sake of a different *Yājyā*.
 Consequently, when the Sacrificer would perform the sacrifice, and
 would give directions (to the *Hotr*,) then too, there would be an Appoint-
 ment for the sake of a different *Yājyā*. But there is this difference
 (between the Appointment on the one hand, and the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and the
Eating on the other), that the Appointment does not like the *Vaṣaṭ-*
kāra and the *Eating*, follow the trend of the *Yājyā*.

ADHIKARANA (19).

[The *Phalacamasa* constitutes a modification of the material for Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (47): “*The Phalacamasa that is prepared under certain conditions constitutes a modification of the Eating-material; because of the Direct Declarations.*”

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find it laid down that under the condition of the sacrifice being performed by the *Kṣātrīya* or the *Vaiśya*,—instead of the ‘*Oup of Soma*,’ we should prepare the *Phalacamasa* (the ‘*Fruit-Cup*’),—which is thus laid down:—‘Having pounded the sprouts, or the fruits, of the *vata* tree, we should mix it with the curd, and then offer it to the *Kṣātrīya* or the *Vaiśya* sacrificer, for eating.’ And with regard to this *Phalacamasa*, there arises a question, as to whether it is a modification of the material for *Eating*, or of that for the *Sacrifice* (i.e. is it meant only for being *eaten*, or for being offered in *Sacrifice*).

And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

“(1) Because we have the direct declaration—“*if he wishes to eat*” then the said *phalacamasa* should be given to him for eating’,—(2) because “the direct declaration of the pronoun ‘*tam*’ (in the sentence ‘*tamasamai bhakṣam prayacchēt*’) points to that which has been mentioned before,—(3) because we have the direct declaration of the *eating*,—(4) “because it is the *eating* (of *Soma*) that is spoken of immediately before “the sentence under consideration,—(5) because the *Soma* (for *eating*) is “mentioned in the same sentence as the *Phalacamasa*;—therefore we “conclude that the *Phalacamasa* becomes an object for *eating*; and there- “by taking the place of the *Soma*, it would replace only that *Soma* which “is eaten, and not that which is offered in sacrifice. Because that which is “declared in regard to one thing cannot set aside the *Soma* which is with “regard to something else.

“Then again, the connection of the *Phalacamasa* with the *Sacrifice* “is shown by the fact of its appearing in the Context (of the *Jyotiṣ-*

“(soma) ; and the indication of the Context is certainly much less authoritative ; and as such it could not set aside the *Soma*, which is directly laid down in the original Injunction, from the Principal action of the Sacrifice (and as such in regard to the Sacrifice, the *Phalacamasa* could not be substituted for the *Soma*).

“As for the neglect of the Disposal of the *Soma* (caused by the substitution of the *Phalacamasa* for it, at the time of the *Disposal-eating*), it would not be very sinful, even if there were no Vedic text authorising such substitution ; and hence it is all the less so, when we have a Direct Declaration (of the *Phalacamasa* as to be substituted for the *Soma* at the time of eating).

“For these reasons, the *Phalacamasa* should be regarded as a modification of the material that is eaten (and not of that which is offered in sacrifice).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (48) : *It is a modification of the material for Sacrifice ; as all purification is for the sake of that*

The Bhāṣya begins with showing the Indicative force of the words. It is only when the *Phalacamasa* is a modification of the sacrificial material, that it can obtain a relationship with the *Soma*-sacrifice. And it is only when the presence of the *Soma* is set aside by the fact of its place having been taken by the *Phalacamasa* that we can have the phrase ‘*na somam*’ by way of a descriptive reference ; just like the expression ‘*na girā girēti*’ in the sentence, ‘*Airam kṛtvā udgayati-, na girā girēti.*’

Objection : “Without connection with a sacrifice how could the *Phalacamasa* be a modification of the sacrificial material ! That is to say, the Indicative force (of the expression ‘*na somam*’) could not be applicable to the case in question without some sort of connection with a sacrifice.”

In reply to this, the connection with sacrifice is shown by the quoting of the whole passage—“*sa yadī Rājanyam vā Vaiśhyam vā yājyāt, nyagrodhastibhīh, etc., etc.—tābhīryājyāt.*” (‘In case one be called upon to officiate at a sacrifice performed by the Kṣatriya or the Vaiśhya, he should fetch the *Vatā*-sprouts . . . and have the sacrifice performed by means of these’). It is not necessary that the connection must be with only such a verb as appears afterwards ; specially as it is not the mere fact of the verb occurring in the first part of the sentence that forms the basis of the signification of ‘precedence in time,’ by the affix ‘*kṛtvā*’ (in the words ‘*upaniyojya,*’ etc., etc.) ; as we find in the sentence ‘*gacchati paktvā*’ where the precedence, in time, is that of the ‘*eating*,’ in comparison with the ‘*going*’ ; and hence in the case in question, the connection with a sacrifice

is shown by the sentence itself. Though the actual word used in the sentence is the causative ('*yājayēt*'), yet the connection should be taken as being with the simple 'sacrifice,' just as in the sentence *grāmakāmam yājayēt*; because as for the subsidiary performer (who would be the nominative of the causative '*yājayēt*'), he is already known, and not leading to any result, cannot form the object of Injunction.

Such being the case, the expressions '*tamasmai bhakṣam*' and '*na somam*' would thereby serve the purpose of a descriptive reference to the 'offering of the *Phalacamasa*' and the 'absence of *soma*,' both of which are previously laid down.

The above explanation is not admissible; as it involves the following anomalies: (1) Remote syntactical connection; (2) the rejection of the signification of '*tasmāi*'; (3) absence of injunctive potency; (4) the assumption of the injunctive potency for that which serves the sole purpose of pointing out the prompting cause; (5) assumption of the sense of the Instrumental ending; (6) rejection of the Accusative; (7) the removal of all *Soma*; and (8) the assumption of the factor of simple 'sacrifice' from the causative '*yājayēt*.'

That is to say—(1) though between the latter '*yājayēt*' and the former conditional declaration '*sa yadi, etc.*', we have the sentence '*sa yadi somam vibhakṣayīṣēt*,' yet we take the former two as syntactically connected, irrespective of the interruption. (2) Though the Pronoun in '*tamasmai*' is, by direct declaration, known to have the power of referring to the person spoken of in the context, the above explanation would necessitate the rejection of this power, as also the immediate sequence. (3) The presence of the conditional 'if' in the sentence '*sa yadi, etc.*', sets aside the injunctive potency of the sentence; and hence it could not be taken as laying down the sacrifice as connected with the *Phalacamasa* (unless we were to assume an injunctive potency in the sentence). (4) The sentence '*sa yadi, etc.*', having served all its purpose by having pointed out the conditions, any further assumption of the injunctive potency would be most incongruous. (5) It will be necessary to assume the absolutely non-existing word '*tābhiḥ*' (with the Instrumental ending) along with the latter '*yājayēt*.' (6) Though in the expression '*tamasmai*,' the word '*tam*' (with the Accusative ending) signifies the predominance (of the eating-material), yet that would be lost sight of; and further, the word '*prayacchēt*' being clearly found to have the character of the injunctive, it would not be correct to take it as a mere descriptive reference. (8) Nor is it quite admissible to extract the subordinate factor of the mere 'sacrifice' from the causative '*yājayēt*' and then connect it

with the *Phalacamasa*. (7) Inasmuch as the *Phalacamasa* would be recognised as connected with the whole of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Soma* would be wholly rejected, and the whole of the sacrifice would be performed with the *Phalacamasa*. All these right anomalies are most incongruous and inadmissible.

The author of the *Bhāṣya* also says—‘*yājyāyitumiti gamyātā*,’ and not that there is a connection with the causative ‘*yājyāt*.’ And the author of the *sūtra* also has put forward the reason—‘because all purification is for the sake of the sacrificial material’, and not that ‘because it is connected with *yājyāt*.’ And for these reasons we cannot admit the above explanation.

Some people explain thus:—“Inasmuch as there is a sacrifice ‘mentioned in the Context, the sentence in question does not establish ‘the necessary relationship with the sentence (of that sacrifice); and ‘hence on meeting with the sentence ‘*tam prayacchēt*,’ when there arises ‘a question as to for what purpose, this should be given (*prayacchēt*); ‘the answer to this is that it is given for the purposes of *yājñana* ‘(officiating at the sacrifice of the *Kṣattriya*), as is shown by the ‘Context.”

But this explanation also is open to the following objections: (1) All the *Soma* in the sacrifice would be replaced by the *Phalacamasa*; (2) the absence of connection (of the *Phalacamasa*) with the eating, which is expressed by the word ‘*tam*’ and as such is cognized by means of the same sentence as the *Phalacamasa* itself; (3) and in that case (there being no such connection, we could not explain the Masculine affix in ‘*tam*’ (as the Pronoun would apply to the ‘*nyagradhashthiviḥ*,’ which is not masculine); (4) and the ‘*tam*’ would be construed along with ‘*prayacchēt*,’ notwithstanding the intervention of ‘*bhukṣam*’ (the construction being ‘*tam yājyāyitum prayacchēt*’).

For these reasons, it becomes necessary that the *Siddhānta* should be explained in such a way as would not do away with connection of ‘*bhukṣam*.’ Because at the very outset we have to consider these questions—(1) Is the ‘eating’ that is enjoined (in ‘*tamasmai bhukṣam prayacchēt*’) one that has not been laid down before; or is it the same that has been spoken of before? (2) Is the ‘eating’ enjoined as a purificatory rite, or an independent action by itself, or as a purificatory rite auxiliary to the sacrifice?

If it be an altogether new ‘eating’ that is enjoined, then it comes to be an indirect aid to the sacrifice, which is not admissible; as (1) that would involve the assumption of a transcendental result (following from the eating); (2) the use to which it would be put would be very far from that indicated by the Context; and (3) it would be aiding something with

which it has no direct connection. Then again, the Accusative ending in 'tam' distinctly shows that the material to be eaten is something to be purified; as otherwise we should have had the word 'tēna'; and hence the 'eating' must be regarded as a purificatory action. It is in the very nature of *purificatory actions*, that they take up substances that have been used, or those that have to be used; but as that which would be 'eaten' could not possibly be used again, the 'eating' must be regarded as *purificatory of that which has been used*. Thus then, when the *Phalacamasa* would be betaking itself to the purificatory *eating*, it could be thus addressed—'thou couldst be purified by the *eating*, only if thou wouldst be used for some purpose or other, and not otherwise'; and thus looking for its being used, the *Phalacamasa* becomes, through the Context, taken up as an auxilliary to the Sacrifice. And then, before it has been used, and thereby become capable of being purified by the *eating* of the sacrificer,—it becomes related to the sacrificial portions, by means of the Apparent Inconsistency (of its being eaten by the sacrificer); and this fact having become duly ascertained, the *Phalacamasa* would be taken as forming the material for the repetition of the offering out of the Cup of the Sacrificer; because the fact of its not being used in the other vessels or Cups would not interfere with its being *eaten* by the *Sacrificer* (and it is only the apparent Inconsistency of this that has been made the ground of its connection with the sacrificial portions). And in this manner, use would be found for the *Soma* also (as the other vessels and Cups would contain the *Soma*, only that of the *Kṣatriya* or *Vaiçya* sacrificer being filled with the *Phalacamasa*).

Or, it may be that the word '*Bhakṣa*,' pronounced in connection with the context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, would be based upon the original '*bhakṣa*' of the *Soma*; and as this latter *Bhakṣa* is known as *purificatory of the remnant of the material used at the Sacrifice*, the *bhakṣa* (eating) of the *Phalacamasa* too could be purificatory of it only as the remnant of that which has been used in the sacrifice; and it could not be taken as serving any purpose other than that *purification*; nor, lastly, could it be taken as an independent action by itself; as we find none of the causes—such as 'other words,' etc., described in *Adhyāya II*—that would show it to be an independent action.

And further, the clause—'*sa yadī somam vibhakṣayīṣet*'—distinctly shows that the 'eating' of the *Phalacamasa* is correlative to the 'eating of *Soma*', which is thus mentioned in the same sentence with itself; as otherwise, the mention of '*Soma*' would be absolutely meaningless.

Nor is it possible for the clause '*na somam*' to be taken as a mere descriptive reference; because if the '*eating of the Phalacamasa*' that is laid down in the sentence were a wholly different 'eating,' laid down as

an indirect aid to the sacrifice, then, in that case, it would not oust the *Soma*; as the two would not have the same functions to subserve (the *eating* of *Soma* being a *Disposal*, while that of the *Phalacamasa*, being, according to this view, an indirect aid); and when the *Soma* would not be ousted, there could be no mere descriptive reference of its *prohibition*.

Nor can the clause '*na somam*' be taken as an Injunction; because that would involve a syntactical split, and the assumption of a transcendental result; and further, the sentence would become wholly irrelevant and absurdly out of place; as the construction of the whole would be something like this:—'*yadi somam bhakṣaṇēna samskartumicchēt* (if one should wish to purify the *Soma* by *eating*), *tataḥ phalacamasobhakṣaṇa-māradupakāraḥ kuryāt* (then he should do the *eating* of the *Phalacamasa*, which is an indirect aid to the sacrifice), *phalacamasam vā samskuryāt* (or he should purify the *Phalacamasa*)!! And if the sentence is construed as—'*yēna bhakṣaṇēna yathābhūtam somam samskartumicchēt tēna tāthābhūtamēva phalacamasam samskuryāt*' ('one should purify, by *eating*, the *Phalacamasa* in the same character, and in the same way as he wishes to do with regard to the *Soma*'),—then, in that case, by Apparent Inconsistency, we would come to take it as the *Phalacamasa* as related to (and forming the material for) the repetition of the offering made out of the Cup of the sacrificer.

For these reasons it must be admitted that the *Phalacamasa* constitutes a modification (substitute) for the *Soma*, as regards the offerings at the sacrifice.

Says the *Bhāṣya*: '*Saiṣā vyavadhāraṇakalpanā*.' That is to say, just as in the case of the *sacrifice performed for the Acceptance of the Horse-gift*, though the assertion was '*as many horses as he should accept*, yet it was taken in the sense of '*as many as he should give*,' and accordingly the *Iṣṭi* was taken as to be performed by the *Giver*,—so, in the same manner, in the case in question, though the declaration is to the effect that '*it should be offered for eating*' ('*bhakṣam prayacchēt*'), yet it is taken in the sense that '*it should be offered as the material to be offered in sacrifice*.'

The same reasoning holds respecting such sentences as '*putikāma-bhiṣṭayāt*' ('one should pound the *putikā*, if *Soma* be unavailable') and the rest (where the *putikā* is to be taken as laid down, not simply as an object to be pounded, but as one to be offered).

Sūtra (49): Because of the Homa.

The Injunction of the 'kuṣa-sprout,' with reference to the *Homa* of the material in the 'other cups' (in the sentence, '*yādi anyāṃcamasān juhvati athaitasya darbhataraṇakēnopahutya juhvati*'), distinctly show,

that the *Phalacamasa* is meant to be a substitute for the material to be offered at the sacrifice.

Sūtra (50): *Because we find (the Phalacamasa) spoken of as to be held up at the same time as the other cups.*

It is only when the *Phalacamasa* is similar, in character, to the other cups, that we can explain the fact of its holding up being spoken of along with that of the other cups, with regard to which latter there is no doubt as to the materials contained in those being offered at the sacrifice.

Sūtra (51): *Also because of the indicative force of words.*

We have already explained how the reference to the prohibition of *Soma* (in the words 'na somam') indicates that the *Phalacamasa* is to be dealt with in the same way as the *Soma*—that is to say, by being offered at the sacrifice.

ADHIKARĀṆA (20).

[The *Rājanya*-cups should be eaten out of by the *Brāhmanas*.]

Sūtra (52): "In regard to the 'Anuprasarpana,' (the *Eating* "should be regulated by Caste."

In connection with the *Daçapēya* (which is a part of the *Rājasūya* sacrifice), we have the sentences—'*Çatam Brāhmaṇāḥ somam bhakṣayanti*,' and, '*Duçadaçaikaṇcamasamanuprasarpēyuh*'; and in regard to these, there arises the question as to whether the *Rājanya*-cups also should be eaten out of by the ten *Brāhmanas*, or by *Kṣattriyas*.

Question: "What is the ground for this doubt?"

In answer to this, some people put forward the diversity of construction that the sentences admit of. For instance, if the sentence '*daça-daçaikam*, etc.,' be an Injunction, then, ten men of each caste having been enjoined by this Injunction, the sentence '*çatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*' would be a mere descriptive reference to those therein enjoined,—the name of '*Brāhmaṇa*' being used in view of the fact of the number of that caste exceeding that of the other castes;—just as we find in the case of the expression the '*Brāhmaṇa*-village'; and in that case it would be ten *Kṣattriyas* that would eat out of the *Rājanya*-cups; on the other hand, if the sentence '*çatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*' were an Injunction, then, in that case, the other sentence '*daça*, etc.,' would be a descriptive reference; and inasmuch as there is no possibility of an indirect secondary signification in the case of an Injunction, it would be the *Brāhmaṇas* alone that would eat out of all the cups; and hence out of the ten *Rājanya*-cups also, the eating would be done by ten *Brāhmaṇas*.

Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"Inasmuch as the word '*anuprasarpēyuh*' (in the latter sentence) "has the Injunctive form, while the word '*bhakṣayanti*' (in the former "sentence) has the descriptive form, we must take the sentence '*daça* " "*daçaikam* as the Injunction; and then there arising the question as to "which 'ten' should do the *eating*, we are led, by the fact of the "number always pertaining to homogenous things, to conclude that the

"eating out of the *Brāhmaṇa-cups* should be done by *ten Brāhmaṇas*, while
 "that out of the *Rājanya-cups*, by *ten Kṣātrīyas*.

"The word '*Sāmānyāt*' in the *Sūtra* may be explained in three
 "different ways: (1) The Injunction having ceased to operate after
 "having laid down the number '*ten*,' it becomes necessary to find out the
 "individuals that would make up that number; and the individuals to be
 "accepted should be only those of whom we may have some indications
 "(in the text itself); as a matter of fact, we find that for persons
 "belonging to the same *caste*, we have an indicative agent in the shape of
 "one '*class*' or '*commonality*' ('*sāmānya*'), whereas for persons of
 "different castes we have no such indication. (2) Or, the '*sāmānya*'
 "meant might be the '*commonality of objects*'; that is to say,
 "in accordance, with the *Sūtra* III—i—12, 'the number '*ten*' and the caste
 "'*Kṣātrīya*' should be taken as qualifying each other, on the ground of
 "both of them being laid down in regard to the *Phalacamasa*; and this
 "would mean that the '*Kṣātrīya*'-hood extends only over those objects
 "that are contained in the number '*ten*,' and *vice versa*; and on the
 "strength of this, we must admit that *ten Kṣātrīyas* should eat out of the
 "*Rājanya-cups*. (3) Or, '*sāmānyāt*' may be taken to mean that when
 "two things belong to the same class, or happen to have the same function,
 "the one sets aside the other; and hence in the case in question, we find
 "that the caste '*Kṣātrīya*' is already laid down in the Injunction of the
 "*Rājasūya* sacrifice ('*Rājā Rājasūyēna svārājyakāmo yajāta*'), which
 "also lays down the number '*one*' only (by the singular number in
 "'*Rājā*"); and as the *Rājasūya* forms the original primary of the actions
 "spoken of in the sentences under consideration, the number '*one*' comes
 "to be taken as pertaining to these latter also; but we find these
 "sentences distinctly laying down the number '*ten*'; and this latter is
 "taken as setting aside the former number '*one*' on the ground of its
 "having been laid down in a *general* way, '*sāmānyāt*' (while the number
 "'*ten*' is specially laid down), and on that of its applying to the actions
 "in question merely by way of implication (and not by direct Injunction);
 "but that does not set aside the '*Kṣātrīya*' caste also. Hence we
 "are led to the conclusion that the sacrificer's cup, without being
 "disjoined from the caste '*Kṣātrīya*,' should be connected with the
 "number '*ten*'; that is to say, it is the *ten Kṣātrīyas* that should eat out
 "of the *Rājanya-cups*.

"Objection: 'The sentence having laid down the number '*ten*,' inas-
 "much as the reference would be a qualified one, the sense of the
 "Injunction being '*yadekaikam camasamanuprasarpanti*, etc., etc.' (i.e.
 "'those that eat out of each of the vessels should be *ten*'), there would be
 "a distinct syntactical split.'

"*Reply*: That would not affect our position; because it is only the 'cup' that is referred to by means of the word '*camasam*' with the 'accusative ending; and all that this shows is that the *cup* is the 'object to be purified; and as for the 'cups,' we find that they are 'capable of no other purification save that by means of *eating*; and hence 'it is this *eating* that should be taken as indicated by the word '*anuprasarpēyuh*'; and as that *eating* is found to pertain to every one of 'the *cups*, this *eating* also comes to be mentioned in the sentence in 'question, by way of reference; and as such there can be no syntactical 'split.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (53): The Brāhmaṇas should do it; because of the same word.

The *Kṣattriyas* should not eat out of the *Rājanya-cups*; because in the case in question, we find the Injunction speaking of '*hundred Brāhmaṇas*,' which would have to be taken in its secondary signification, if we did not admit the fact of the *Brāhmaṇas* eating out of the cups in question.

That is to say, the connection of the *Brāhmaṇas* with all the *cups* is shown by the same word '*Brāhmaṇa*' being used. And as such the *Brāhmaṇas* should not be disconnected from any of the cups. Nor do we find any ground for taking the word ('*Brāhmaṇa*') in its secondary sense; (as indicating the *Kṣattriya*); specially as we do not find the *Kṣattriya* mentioned by any more authoritative means of knowledge; and if the word were taken in the said indirect sense (and the Injunctive character were attributed to the sentence '*daça*, etc.') the whole of the sentence '*ṣaṭam Brāhmaṇāḥ* etc.' would be a meaningless repetition; while in accordance with our theory, the Injunctive potency of the sentence '*ṣaṭam Brāhmaṇāḥ* etc.,' being inferred from the nature of the declaration in regard to the performance of the sacrifice as a whole, it would enjoin 'the hundred *Brāhmaṇas*'; and this being done, the repetition contained in the sentence '*daça*, etc.' would serve the purpose of pointing out the various shares.

Or, it may be that, in accordance with the *Sūtra* X—iii—53, it would be by direct signification that the 'tens,' enjoined in the former sentence, would be spoken of by way of descriptive reference, in the sentence '*daça*, etc.' (and thus in this case, there would be no recourse to indirect-secondary signification). And as all the ten cups would be occupied by the 'hundred *Brāhmaṇas*,' in ten parties of ten *Brāhmaṇas* each, there would be no room for any *Kṣattriya*. Hence it must be admitted that ten *Brāhmaṇas* should eat out of the ten *Rājanya-Cups*.

The above representation of the *Adhikaraṇa* however, is not admissible. (1) Because, in the first place, if the sentence '*Çatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*, etc.', were the Injunction, then, inasmuch as the descriptive reference would be the *eating* which is implied by its presence in the Original Primary (the *Rajasāya* sacrifice),—and as no qualified Injunction (of the *Brāhmaṇa* qualified by the number 'hundred') would be possible,—it would be necessary to take the Injunction as pertaining to one of these only (either the *Brāhmaṇa* or the number 'hundred'); but if the Injunction were applied to the number 'hundred,' then the word '*Brāhmaṇāḥ*' would be absolutely meaningless; (2) while if it were applied to the *Brahmaṇa*, the word '*Çatam*' would be meaningless. (3) If then, the sentence be taken as enjoining the *Brāhmaṇa* with reference to the number 'hundred,' then it becomes necessary for you to point out the authority for declaring the *eating* as to be done by *hundred* persons. (4) Further, if the Injunction be taken as that of the number 'hundred' with reference to the *Brāhmaṇa*, then, through the preclusion of the *Kṣattriya*, the mention of the *Brāhmaṇa* would become a qualifying adjunct; and as such the reference being to a qualified object, we would have a syntactical split; and there would be nothing done in connection with the *Rājanya-Cups* (as the Injunction would be restricted to the *Cups out of which the Brāhmaṇas eat*). Then again, inasmuch as the sentence *ekaikam*, etc. could not be taken as a mere reference, in regard to the *Rājanya-Cups*, it would be taken as enjoining *ten Kṣattriyas*, with regard to those cups; while for the other cups, we have the Injunction of 'hundred *Brāhmaṇas*' in the sentence '*Çatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*,' and we do not know how the nine cups are to be divided among the 'hundred *Brahmaṇas*.' (5) If, on account of the connection of the *Soma*, the word '*Brāhmaṇāḥ*' were taken as a mere descriptive reference, then too, inasmuch as that would involve a preclusion of the *Phalacamasa* (by the '*Brāhmaṇa-Soma*'), there would be the anomaly of a qualified reference; and further, as there would be no functioning (of the *Brāhmaṇas*) in regard to the *Phalacamasa*, we would, as before, have the possibility of (the *eating* by the *Kṣattriya*). That "the two words '*Soma*' and '*Brāhmaṇa*' are never found to be used in the sense of the *Phalacamasa* and the *Kṣattriya*, respectively"—cannot be regarded as any authority. (6) Then if the reference be taken as to the *unqualified eating*, then we would have the number 'hundred' applicable even to those *eatings* that are done out of the animal body, the cake, etc. Because it is not only the '*eating* at the Principal sacrifice' that is spoken of as '*Bhakṣa*'; and as such, being a purificatory act (of the Remnants), it would pertain equally to all Primaries and Subsidiaries, as shown under the *Sūtra* III—vii—2; and further, in this case, the word '*Soma*' would be absolutely meaningless. (As what would be laid down would be mere *eating*

in general). (7) If the number 'hundred' be taken as enjoined with reference to the *Soma*, then, in that case, beginning from its *Purchase*, all the rites that would be done in connection with the *Soma* would have to be done by hundred persons; and in that case the word '*Bhaksayanti*' would be meaningless. (8) If with reference to 'eating,' the connection of the 'hundred' Brahmanas, be taken as enjoined,—then too, this latter would apply to the case of the (eating out of the remnants of the) Animal Body, and the cake, etc.;—and hence the use of the word '*Somam*' would be absolutely meaningless. (9) Then, if the 'hundred Brāhmaṇas' be taken as enjoined with reference to the *Soma*, this would be absolutely impossible, because of the word '*Soma*' not being expressive of the *Action*; and hence there would be no preclusion of the connection of the *Kṣattriya* with the *Phalacumasa*, in the form of the '*Vaṭa-sprout*,' which is *not Soma*.

For these reasons, it is not possible for the sentence '*Çatam Brāhmaṇaḥ*' to be taken as an Injunction.

Then again, there would be no use, or authority, for taking, as a mere descriptive reference, the sentence '*daṣaduṣaikaikam*,' etc., whose Injunctive Potency is intact, and which has been ascertained to be possessed of an independent injunctive character. How, far could the former sentence ('*Çatam Brāhmaṇaḥ*,' etc.), which has its verb in the Present Tense, be taken as an Injunction? Consequently it must be taken as a mere descriptive reference. Nor, in the absence of the conditional character, etc., is it possible for several verbs to be syntactically connected (and forming a simple sentence, which would be necessary if the sentence '*daṣa*,' etc., were taken as a mere descriptive reference). Nor do we find any idea of the conditional character in a sentence that is wholly devoid of such conditional words as 'if' and the like. Nor is the sentence '*daṣa*,' etc., found to contain an enology, for the sake whereof the sentence could be taken as a descriptive reference, and as syntactically connected (with the Injunction; in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—ii—7). Consequently, inasmuch as the whole of the sentence ('*Daṣa*,' etc.), which is wholly distinct from the other sentence, cannot be rightly taken as a mere descriptive reference,—we must take it as enjoining something.

Thus then, if, in view of the absence of any limit as to 'hundred,' the sentence be taken as enjoining the various parties of ten, then, in that case, the mention of '*Ēkaikam*' would become inexplicable (incongruous); specially as the Injunction of this latter would involve a syntactical split. And, inasmuch as the (*Vaṣatkṛit*) and the other Priests are entitled to several Cups, the '*Ēkaikam*,' etc., could not be a mere descriptive reference; and as their eating out of the vessels also is pointed out by the previous sentence, the specification of '*Camasa*' (Cup) would be meaningless; and if this word were taken as qualifying or specifying (the *material* as *that*

contained in the *Cups*), it would give rise to a syntactical split. Nor, as a matter of fact, is it possible for the sentence '*daṣa*, etc.,' to be taken as a mere descriptive reference; because the number 'hundred,' which is laid down for the sake of the purification of the *Cups*, would appear to be applicable, as a whole, to each of those *Cups*. If it be taken as mentioned for the sake of the purification of the Performer (of the *eating*), then there would be a possibility of *Division*, as in the case of the Sacrificial gift; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* X—iii—53, we would have the Division as 'parties of *ten* to each one of the *Cups*.' And in this case, even though there would be an Injunction, yet it would have the character of Preclusion; or, it might show that with regard to a *single Cup* there may be *ten persons* eating out of it; or that with regard to a *single Cup*, *ten parties of ten* eating out of the same *Cups*; in any case the eating out of the *Cup* would be done by hundred persons, in parties of *ten* each.

Thus then, we find that neither of the two sentences in question is compatible with the above explanation (and as such both are incapable of being taken as independent Injunctions). Consequently, we must explain the *Adhikaraṇa* as follows:—

Both the sentences are injunctive; because both have the form of an Injunction. And then too, in the first place, it is the sentence '*Duṣa*, etc.,'; which, as in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, is taken as the Injunction; because, as shown above, no other order of sequence is possible. The word '*Anuprasarpanti*' indicates that *eating*, whose existence is already implied by *Atidēṣu* (the Implicatory Law that 'the Modificatory Action is to be done in the same way as the Original Primary'); and as such, it indicates the *Sacrifice*, just as the *eating* of the *Phalacamasa* has been said to do; and hence, in the sentence '*daṣa*, etc.,' the portion '*camasamanuprasarpanti*' should be taken as a descriptive reference, because of the relationship of the *qualification* and the *qualified* (between the '*Camasa*,' *Cup*, and the '*Anuprasarpaṇa*,' *eating*), based upon the fact of either one of these being in need of the other; while the portion '*daṣa*, etc.,' is to be taken as an Injunction; and the *repetition* of the words may be explained as being due to the fact of the number 'ten' differing with each 'one' (*Cup*), as would be indicated by the predominant character of the '*Camasa*.'

Thus then, the number 'hundred' having been completed (by the repetitions of 'Ten'), the other sentence ('*Ḡatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*') is to be taken as *enjoining* the '*Brahmaṇa*' with reference to that *hundred*,—the construction being '*yacchatam śoman bhakṣayanti tad Brāhmaṇāḥ*' ('The hundred that eat out of the *Soma-cups* should be *Brāhmaṇas*'). So long as any portion of the sentence is capable of being taken as an Injunction, it is not proper to take the whole as a mere descriptive reference:

nor, under the circumstances, would it be right to take the word '*Brāhmaṇa*' as indirectly indicating (the other castes); as it has all its needs supplied by being connected with the number 'hundred' (and thus there is no Apparent Inconsistency in it that could justify our having recourse to a secondary signification with regard to the word '*Brāhmaṇa*'). Then, as for the words '*soma*' and '*bhakṣayanti*,' they are not meant to be significant; and as such there can be no anomaly of *qualified reference*.

Nor would the mention of the *Soma* be wholly anomalous; as all that it is found to do is to indicate *something used at the sacrifice*, and as such, it could be taken as pointing to the *Phalacamasā*.

Consequently, while we would be still on our way to the assumption of the *Kṣattriya*, for the making up of the number 'hundred' (enjoined by the sentence '*daṣa*, etc. '),—the other sentence ('*Ḍatam Brāhmaṇāḥ*, etc. ') will have supplied the want by laying down another object (the *Brāhmaṇa*) for making up that number. Nor would this extend to the case of the *vessels* also; as the sentence '*daṣa*, etc. ,' refers distinctly to the *Cups*.

Thus then, we find that, even as regards the *Rājanya-Cups* the Injunction having pointed out the *eating* as to be done by the said 'party of *ten*,'—the place is taken up by the 'party of *ten Brāhmaṇas*,' (as shown above); and thus the material in question having all its needs of purification fulfilled by being *eaten* by these latter (and thus being duly *disposed* of), it is the Sacrificer (the *Kṣattriya*) who would have no *eating* to do.

Thus it is established that it is *ten Brāhmaṇas* that should eat out of the *ten Rājanya-Cups*.

In the *Bhāṣya*, we find that the question has been raised as to the prohibition (and consequent impropriety) of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Kṣattriyas* *eating* together out of the same Cup,—and answered by the declaration that 'there is no impurity attaching to the eating of the *Soma*.'

And against this portion of the *Bhāṣya*, some people urge the following objection: "Inasmuch as there would be no *Soma* in the *Phalacamasā*, how could there be any impurity attaching to the *eating* out of that?"

But this does not affect the situation; because the *Phalacamasā*, being substituted for the *Soma*, becomes endowed with all the properties of this latter; as we shall show under the *Sūtras*, '*Naimittikam*, etc.' (III—vi—36), and '*Dharmasārtha-kṛtadvāt*' (IX—ii—40).

Objection: "The absence of impurity is a property of *Man*; and as such it could not be attributed to the *Phalacamasā* merely by reason of "its being substituted (for the *Soma*)."

Reply: It would certainly be not attributed, if it really were a property of *Man*. As a matter of fact, however, it is not a property of *Man*; as that would involve the assumption of a distinct result (in connection

with the sentence, 'no impurity attaches to the eating of *Soma*). Specially as we find that the 'absence of impurity' has been spoken of in answer to the possibility of an impurity attaching to the 'eating of the *Soma*'; and this shows that the said 'absence of impurity' is a property of the *Action*. Consequently, it must be admitted that, just as the *Soma*, when it purifies (by eating), does not bring about an impurity in the performer,—so also would its substitute, the *Phalucamasa*, do.

And thus, on the strength of the aforesaid reasons, it must be admitted that the *eating* out of the ten *Rājanya-Cups* is to be done by ten *Brāhmanas*.

THUS ENDS THE FIFTH PĀDA OF ADHYĀYA III.

ADHYĀYA III—PĀDA VI.

ADHIKARĀṆA (1).

[Such Injunctions, as that of the *Sruva* being made of the *Khadira* wood, pertain to the Original Primary Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (1): “ *It pertains to all; as it does not occur in “any particular Context.*”

In regard to those declarations that do not occur in the wake of any particular sacrifice, and which contain indications of the Original Primary Action,—we come to consider the question as to when they become connected with a Context, they do so with the Context of the Original Primary Sacrifice, or they pertain to *all sacrifices*. Even in the absence of any of the six means of Cognition, in the shape of Direct Declaration, etc., we can establish a connection with sacrifices, just in the same way as in the case of the *Aṅvapratigrahēṣṭi*.

In connection with the *Sruva* and the *Juhū*, we have the Injunctions of the ‘*Khadira wood*’ and ‘*leaves*’ respectively; and the *Sruva* and the *Juhū*, are laid down, as accessories of sacrifices, in such sentences as—(1) ‘*Sruvēṇāvadyati,*’ ‘*Sruvēṇāghāramāghārāyati,*’ ‘*Sruvēṇa parvanan juhāti;*’ (2) ‘*Juhvā juhāti,*’ etc., etc. And as soon as the ‘*Khadira wood*’ and ‘*leaves*’ are shown to be related to the *Sruva* and the *Juhū*, they become at once taken up by the sacrificial procedure relating to the *Sruva* and the *Juhū*; as they do not serve any other purpose (than that of helping in the sacrificial procedure); as we shall explain later on, in *Adhyāya IV*. Because no result can follow from the class (‘*Khādiratva*’ denoted by the word ‘*Khādiraḥ*’ in the Injunction ‘*Khādiraḥ sruva bhavati*’), which is absolutely without any sort of function; nor do we find any *Action* put forward, calculated to bring into play any activity in that *Class*; nor is any such action actually mentioned in the sentence itself. Nor can we take the sentence ‘*Khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati,* etc.,’ as enjoining the *Sruvo* also; as such an Injunction would involve a syntactical split. Consequently we must take the sentence as laying down the ‘*Khadira wood*’ with reference to the *Sruva*; and inasmuch as the material form of the *Sruva* would be accomplished even without such Injunctions (as the *Sruva* is quite capable of being made of many woods other than the *Khadira*)

the said Injunction of the *Khadira* wood would be absolutely useless; and it is this Apparent Inconsistency of the Injunction that points to some sort of a connection of that Injunction with a *Sacrifice*.

Thus then, in regard to the question spoken of, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

“Because of the Injunction not occurring in connection with any particular sacrifice, the *Sruva*, being equally connected with the all Primary and Subsidiary Sacrifices, it should be taken as pertaining to all sacrifices.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (2): *It should pertain to the Original Primary alone; as there would be no (needless) repetition (in that).*

Inasmuch as all Injunctions pertain to only such factors as have not been got at by any other means, the Injunction of the ‘*Khadira* wood’ must be taken as pertaining to those sacrifices, in connection with which it is not cognisable by any other means. And as a matter of fact, we find that it is only in regard to the Original Primary Sacrifice, that the ‘*Khadira-Sruva*,’ is not cognised by any other means, as being connected; while as for the modifications of the sacrifices, the connection with the said *Sruva* would be cognisable by means of the Implicatory Injunction (that ‘the Modification is to be done in the same way as the Original’) the assumption whereof would be absolutely necessary for the sake of the bringing in of the other accessories (from the Original to the Modification); and as such the modifications do not stand in need of any direct Injunction of the said *Sruva*; specially as it is only when there is no such Injunction, with regard to the modifications, that we are saved from the *Repetition* (that would be inevitable in case there were such an Injunction; as the connection of the *Khadira-Sruva* with these modifications would, in that case, be expressed by this Injunction, and it would also be indicated by the aforesaid Implicatory Injunction).

We can read the *Sūtra* as ‘*dviruktatvāt*,’ or as ‘*adviruktatvāt*,’ the sense of the former being that the view of the *Purvapakṣa* involves a *needless repetition*,—and of the latter, that *there is no repetition* involved in the view of the *Siddhānta*.

Sūtra (3): *Objection: “(The Implicatory Injunction) would apply to (the accessory details) other than the one*

"in question; as this latter is found to be laid down by Direct Injunction."

[The Sūtra may be read as 'Vacanaprāpti,' or as 'Vacanaprāptih.']

Objection: "A needless Repetition would certainly be inadmissible. But we do not understand why the indication (of the *Khādira-Sruva*) by the assumed Implicatory Injunction should be taken as closing the way of the Direct Injunction in question,—and why it is not held that this Direct Injunction itself does not allow of the application of any Implicatory Injunction. In fact the proper course would be not to admit of this latter in face of the Direct Injunction; because there is no doubt that an assumed Implicatory Injunction is very much farther removed from its objective than the Direct one, which latter should be accepted, on the ground of the proximity of the objective, as also on that of its being naturally very much quicker in its operation (than any assumed Injunction). It might be argued that—'inasmuch as the Direct Injunction is generic in its application, it would be weaker than the assumed one which has a particular application to the case in question.' But this argument could be turned against the Implicatory Injunction also; as that too applies to all the Accessories of the Original Sacrifice; and as such can have no particular application to the case in question. For those reasons, it must be admitted that the Injunction that does not occur in connection with any particular sacrifice, applies to *all sacrifices*."

Sūtra (4): "(It might be urged that) '*in view of a perceptible fact (we must regard the Implicatory Injunction as more authoritative than the Direct one)*.'"

"Against our conclusion, the following might be urged"—'If the Direct Injunction were stronger in authority than the Implicatory Injunction, then, in that case, inasmuch as the way would have been previously blocked by that, there would, certainly, be no Implicatory Injunction at all; because in that case, the *Khādira-Sruva*, applying in common to the Original Primary as well as to its modifications,—and having its capability of aiding in the Original Primary distinctly perceived,—could fulfil the requirements of the Modification also (and it would not be necessary to actually apply it separately to the case of the latter). But this would be directly contrary to the distinctly perceptible fact of the Accessories of the Original Primary—in the shape of the *Prayājas*,—actually entering into the very constitution of the modifications. Hence (in view of this fact) it must be admitted that

“the said *Khādīra-Sruva* finds a place in the Original Primary only,
 “which is entirely free from the Implicatory Injunction.”

Sūtra (5): “Reply: It is not so; because the Injunction can have only one object.”

“Reply: The argument brought forward cannot set aside the fact of the Injunction in question applying to *all sacrifices*. Because the rejection of the Implicatory Injunction with regard to one factor (i.e., the ‘*Khādīra-Sruva*’ f.i.) does not mean that it is rejected in regard to all the factors; for instance, in connection with a certain modificatory sacrifice, we find the Injunction to the effect, ‘in place of the ordinary *Kuṣa-grass* one should use the *Ḷṛu*’; and though this Injunction sets aside the application of the *Kuṣa* (which finds place in the Original Sacrifice, and which would come in accordance with the Implicatory Injunction), yet it does not reject the presence of the *Prayājas* and the other Accessories (pertaining to the modification in question, in accordance with the said Implicatory Injunction); as we recognize a rejection in cases where the two Injunctions are found to have the same objective. Similarly in the case in question, the Injunction under consideration would preclude the application of the Implicatory Injunction, only so far as the factor of the ‘*Khādīra-Sruva*’ is concerned. Nor is the ‘*Khādīra*’ capable of supplying the requirements of the modifications; inasmuch as it does not partake of the nature of an *action*. And further, inasmuch as it would operate with regard to both the Original Primary and the Modification, at one and the same time, it could not, at the time of the performance of the latter, be recognised as having already served a useful purpose in connection with the Original Primary. Then again, we find that the Injunction of the ‘*Khādīra*’ is wanting in certain elements, inasmuch as the *Sruva* has not been found to be applicable; nor can this be recognized as applicable, without the operation of the permission conveyed by the Implicatory Injunction; specially as the Injunction under consideration cannot be regarded as laying down the *Sruva* also; because there being no Principal Action mentioned in it, no qualified Injunction would be possible; and as such, there would be an inevitable syntactical split. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Injunction under consideration having laid down the ‘*Khādīra-wood*’ with reference to the *Sruva*, the Implicatory Injunction (that ‘the Modification should be performed in the same manner as the Original’) should be taken as applying to all the Accessories *except the wood of which the Sruva is made*.”

Sūtra (6): "Objection: 'But the origination (of this is similar to that of the other accessories of the Original Sacrifice.)'"

"The *Naiyāyika* comes forward with the following reasoning in his favourite syllogistic form: 'The Injunction that does not occur in connection with any sacrifice pertains to the Original Primary Sacrifice,—because it lays down things in an abbreviated and in an extensive form,—just like the *Prayāja* and the rest.'

Sūtra (7): "Reply: not so; as the reason applies equally to both cases."

"*Reply*: In the first place we have already shown that subjects like what we are dealing with are not amenable to any Inferential process of reasoning. And secondly, the inferential argument brought forward is not quite admissible, as the reason is too wide, inasmuch as in regard to Modifications also, we often find Injunctions in abbreviated, as well as in extensive forms.

"The following argument might here be brought forward:—In such cases, either the abbreviated Injunction alone, or the extensive Injunction alone, having enjoined the Action, the other could not exercise an injunctive function.'

"*Reply*: But that objection would apply equally to the case of the Original Primary Sacrifice also; and so, in any case the aforesaid inferential argument would be fallacious (and doubtful). Consequently, in order to avoid this, what should have been brought forward as the reason is the mere fact of the brief and extensive declarations, irrespective of the Injunctive or the descriptive character; and we have already shown that this reason would be much too wide.

"Or, the two *Sūtras* (6 and 7) might be taken as emanating from the *Mīmāṃsakas* themselves: In that case, the former *Sūtra* (6) may be explained as embodying the following objection: 'If you take the Injunction in question as pertaining to *all sacrifices*, you are very much mistaken. 'Because in a case, where the vessels and implements are laid down as calculated to be utilised in a certain way,—in such cases, it is possible for the *class*, subsidiary to those vessels, etc., to be enjoined. As a matter of fact, we find that the Originative Injunction of any such vessel, etc., is not found in connection with any *modificatory sacrifice*; and as such, the sacrifice being devoid of such vessels, the subsidiary *class Khādīra* could not be enjoined in regard to it. Specially as the connection of the *Khādīra* with the Original Primary is far more easy and

“direct than that with the Modificatory Sacrifice. If the vessels, etc.,
 “had been enjoined equally, in connection with the Original Primary
 “and the Modification, then, in that case, we could have taken the In-
 “junction of the subsidiary class *Khadira* as pertaining to the sacrifices
 “in all conditions (i.e. the Original as well as the modified states). As
 “a matter of fact, however, they are not so enjoined; and hence we can-
 “not but take the Injunction as pertaining to the Original Primary
 “Sacrifice.”

“And in reply to this we have the next *Sūtra* (7), the sense of which
 “would be this: All such Injunctions as do not occur in connection with
 “any particular sacrifice stand in need of a previous Injunction; and as
 “for such an Injunction, it is all the same whether this be a Direct or an
 “Implicatory one. Though it is quite true that the Direct and the In-
 “direct (Implicatory) Injunctions differ from each other, on the ground of
 “the former being more proximately related to its objective than the
 “latter,—yet it is only within their own respective spheres that the said
 “proximity and remoteness differ in their authoritative strength; and they
 “do not make any difference in regard to an Injunction that does not
 “occur in connection with any sacrifice; because, inasmuch as it is only
 “through the vessels, etc. (i.e. the *Sruva*) that such an Injunction betakes
 “itself to the Sacrifice,—it is always remote from its objective. For these
 “reasons, it must be admitted that the Injunction under consideration
 “pertains to all sacrifices; and that the Implicatory Injunction applies to
 “all other accessories except the *Khadira-Sruva*.”

Sūtra (8): Reply: It must pertain to the Original Primary; because the object of the Implicatory Injunction is one complete whole; and because the application of the Principal (Direct Injunction, to the modification) would be incompatible.

The only admissible theory, in connection with the present question, is that put forward in *Sūtra* (2). As for the objection urged in *Sūtra* (3), that is not tenable; because if the Implicatory Injunction had applied to each of the Accessories of the Original Primary,—then alone could be possible what is said in that *Sūtra*; as a matter of fact, however, we find that it applies to all the accessories at one and the same time.

In accordance with the theory that the Implicatory Injunction applies to the objects, or to the scriptures,—inasmuch as these factors are found to differ from one another, it might be possible to make a distinction among the objects amenable to the Implicatory Injunction. In reality however, what forms the object of Implicatory Injunctions is the operation relating to the Sacrifice,—as we shall explain in *Adhyāya* X. And as the

sacrificial operation is one impartible whole, it could only be implied all at once, and that too, as one complete whole. And this sacrificial operation, for its own accomplishment, takes up, all at once, all the *Apūrvas* relating to the *Prayājas*; these *Apūrvas*, in their term, take up the *Prayāja* and the rest; and these latter take up their own Injunctive texts (in the shape of the Implicatory Injunction). Thus then, the Implicatory Injunction,—in the form of '*Prakṛtīvād virkṭiḥ kartavyā*'—being one only, it would apply or not apply, equally to all accessories, and not to portions of these. In the case of the substitution of the *Çara* for *Kuça* also, what the Direct Injunction sets aside is the *Kuça*, whose existence has been already pointed out by the Implicatory Injunction,—as we have already shown under the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the comparative authoritative strength of Direct Declaration, etc. (III—iii—14).

Thus then, if, in consideration of the Direct Injunction under question, the Implicatory Injunction be set aside from the factor of the *Khadira-Sruva*,—then it would cease to apply to the other accessories also; and that would lead to the total rejection of all the accessories (of the Primary sacrifice) in the Modification. And this would not be admissible or desirable, as we have already shown above. But if, in consideration of the accessories of the Original Primary, the Implicatory Injunction were accepted as applying to some of these accessories, then it would come to apply to the '*Khadira-Sruva*' also; and thus there would be a distinct '*Repetition*,' in the case of the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory (as shown under *Sutra* 3).

Then again, we shall have occasions to show, later on, that, inasmuch as the *Modification* stands in need of the operations of the *Original, Primary*, it often abandons the accessories mentioned in its own context, and takes up only that which belongs to that Primary. It is for this reason that it is necessary to admit the priority of the functioning of the Implicatory Injunction to that of the Injunction that does not occur in the context of any sacrifice.

And further, it is absolutely necessary to seek for an injunction of the *Sruva*, in connection with the *Modifications*; and the effort that would be necessary for getting at the Injunction of the *Sruva* would be sufficient for that of the '*Khadira wood*' also; and so this latter need not necessarily be taken as forming the object of a Direct Injunction (in connection with the *Modifications*).

Nor is the connection, with the sacrifice of such Injunctions as those under consideration, very distinctly perceptible. In fact it has to be assumed, through the *Sruva*, on the ground of Apparent Inconsistency. But one who takes the Injunction under consideration to apply to *all sacrifices* accepts the existence of a certain connection of it with a sacrifice. And the uselessness of the Injunction being thus set aside (and explained),

there would be no Apparent Inconsistency (of the Injunction) that could justify us in connecting the Injunction with the Modifications. While, on the other hand, the connection of the Injunction with a sacrifice established by the Implicatory Injunction is based upon a very much stronger authority.

Those Injunctions (not occurring in the context of any particular sacrifice), whose connection with sacrifices is distinctly perceptible, would always pertain to all Sacrifices, even though they may not be found in the context of any particular Sacrifice; just as we find in the case of such sentences as—‘*Eṣa vai Prajāpatiḥ saptaśaḥ yajñāḥ nṛāyattaḥ.*’

Thus then it must be admitted that the *Khadira-wood*, etc. are laid down, in regard to the Original Primary Sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (2).

[The number 'seventeen' of the *Sāmidhēnis* pertains to the Modification].

[An exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.]

Sūtra (9): (The number) *being contrary* (to that of the Original Primary), *it would apply to the Modification; specially on account of the particular Context.*

[Independently of any Sacrifices, we find the number of the *Sāmidhēnis*, laid down in the sentence '*Saptadaśa Sāmidhēnīranubhūyāt*'; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether this number ('seventeen') refers to the Original Primary, or to the Modification.]

And on this question we have the present Adhikaraṇa, calculated to set aside the idea of *Option*, created by the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"In accordance with the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the Injunction of '*seventeen Sāmidhēnis*,' which does not occur in connection with any sacrifice, pertains, for this very reason, to the Original Primary Sacrifice; while in the Context of that Sacrifice itself we find the number 'fifteen' laid down in connection with the *Sāmidhēnis*; consequently we conclude that the two numbers are optional alternatives.

"*Question:* How can that which is laid down by an Injunction, not occurring in the Context of the Primary sacrifice, and which is weaker in authority, be taken as an optional alternative to that which is particularly laid down in the same Context with it?"

"*Answer:* The Particular sets aside the General, only in cases where the Particular denotes a distinctly preceptible connection. That is to say, it is only when the Particular is equally authoritative with the General, and not when it is based upon a weaker authority, that it sets aside this latter. As a matter of fact, the *Sāmidhēnis* (i.e., the recitation of these verses) have no place outside the performance of the sacrifice; and this makes the chance of both the numbers ('fifteen' and 'seventeen') equally possible, in connection with the performance of a sacrifice. Such being the case, what more than this would the Context

"indicate (in regard to the number 'fifteen')? For it is only when two "apparently equally authoritative means of knowledge are found to contradict each other that we are to draw our conclusions in accordance "with that one which is found, upon due examination, to be possessed of "greater authoritative strength; and it is never possible for the Context "to be possessed of an authority higher than that of Syntactical Connection; consequently, while the indications by the Context have yet to be "made, the equally authoritative Syntactical Connection will have established the fact of the two numbers being optional alternatives. Such "being the case, even if a thousand Contexts were to help the Context "in question (in laying down the number 'fifteen'), we can pay no attention to it. And we conclude that the number 'seventeen' also pertains to "the Original Sacrifice (and hence the two numbers must be taken as "optional alternatives)."

SIDDHANTA.

To the above, we make the following *reply*: Even though both the numbers are equally related to the *Sāmidhēnis*, yet, inasmuch as there is a distinct difference in the degrees of their relationship to the Sacrifice,—the two cannot be taken as optional alternatives.

(1) The mention of *number* not being of any use, in connection with the *Sāmidhēnis* only, we must take its relationship to the Sacrifice based upon the fact of its helping in the accomplishment of the sacrificial *Apūrva*: and this fact of helping in the accomplishment of the sacrificial *Apūrva* cannot be indicated by any other means, save by the Context, as we shall show in *Adhyāya* IX. Thus we find that the connection of the number 'fifteen' is much more authoritative than the Syntactical Connection, on account of the former being more nearly connected with the sacrificial *Apūrva*.

(2) An Injunction always, in the first instance, prompts the person to that cause of action which serves a distinctly useful purpose; and in the case in question, there is no doubt that 'fifteen' is more directly and easily recognised as *useful* (because of its direct relationship to the sacrificial *Apūrva*); and hence, there being a difference in the time of the appearance of the Injunctions relating to the two numbers, they cannot be regarded as equally authoritative.

(3) Then again, the action of man is calculated to perform the sacrifice in such a way as not to leave it deficient in any point; and it is not meant to give out perfect *Sāmidhēnis*. And as for the number 'seventeen' appertaining to a sacrifice, we do not find it to be pointed out by any of the six means of knowledge—Direct Declaration and the rest though we find these pointing to the fact of the number 'fifteen' pertain—

ing to the sacrifice. And thus we come to the conclusion that the number 'fifteen' belongs to the *Sāmidhēnis* as well as to the *Ducapūrnamāsa* sacrifices, as pointed out by Syntactical Connection and Context respectively; whereas the number 'seventeen' pertains to the *Sāmidhēnis* only as pointed out by the sentence under consideration: and with a view to set aside the apparent uselessness of this latter number, we could have assumed its connection with the sacrifice,—just as in the case of the '*Khadirā-Sruva*,'—if the sacrifice had stood in need of such a connection; as a matter of fact however, we find that the sacrifice has its requirements already supplied by the mention of another number ('fifteen'); and as such it does not stand in need of the connection of any other number. Thus we find that the *Sāmidhēnis* have their deficiency supplied by means of both the numbers 'fifteen' and 'seventeen'; while the sacrifice has its wants fulfilled by the number 'fifteen' only. We find that even if the accessory attendant upon the subordinate factor were to modify the character of the Principal also, there would be no incongruity in this, as this would be in keeping with the '*law of the Kāmsyabhoji*' (according to which the observance of the Pupil modifies the conduct of the Teacher); and it is all the less incongruous in a case where what is distinctly perceptible is only the incongruity of the subordinate factor of the Subsidiary.

Thus then we find that the number 'seventeen' is precluded from all connection with the sacrifice, by the number 'fifteen,' which latter is strong in its prior relationship to the sacrifice; and as for the modifications of that sacrifice, while the number 'fifteen' will be still on its way to being connected with them, by the extremely round—about agency of the Implicatory Injunction ('*Prakṛtivadvikṛtiḥ*, etc.'),—they would, long ere this, become connected with the number 'seventeen,' which is mentioned in the Direct Injunction; and thus '*fifteen*,' being thrown aside from these modifications, comes to be recognised as pertaining to the Original Primary sacrifice only.

In regard to the above differentiation however, we have got to say something; and it is this: The directly enjoined 'seventeen' has no greater authority for pertaining to the modifications, as all that the Direct Injunction under consideration—which does not occur in the Context of any particular sacrifice—shows is that the number 'seventeen' belongs to the *Sāmidhēnis*; and as for the modifications taking the number 'seventeen', there appears to be no authority whatever. In fact it is the 'fifteen' that is shown to pertain to the modifications also, by the Implicatory Injunction. And hence just as the connection of 'fifteen' with the Original

Primary, is based upon the superior authority of the Context, so too would its connection with the modifications be,—being applied to these, as it is, by means of the Implicatory Injunction.

As a matter of fact, we find that until the *Sāmidhēnis* themselves have been shown to be connected with the modifications,—and this can only be done by means of the Implicatory Injunction,—the number 'seventeen' could not enter into these, as it is only through the *Sāmidhēnis* that it could enter into the modificatory sacrifices. And when the operation of the Implicatory Injunction has once been admitted, with reference to the connecting of the *Sāmidhēnis* with the modifications, it would, along with the *Sāmidhēnis*, take the number 'fifteen' also, the usefulness of whose connection in a sacrifice has been already recognised in regard to the *Original Primary*; and thus having obtained, along with the *Sāmidhēnis*, a prior entrance into the modifications, just as in the *Original Primary*, it would block the way of the 'seventeen' entering into them.

Hence we must conclude that the number 'seventeen' would pertain to only such modifications as the *Paṇu*, the *Mitravindā*, the *Adhvarakalpa*, etc., the connection whereof with that number is distinctly pointed out by the Context, and in the case of which, therefore, the number would set aside the connection of the number 'fifteen,' which could be indicated only by means of the Implicatory Injunction. And it does not enter into *all* the Modifications, on the sole strength of the fact of its Injunction not occurring in the context of any particular sacrifice; because in regard to the Modifications other than the *Paṇu*, the *Mitravindā*, etc., its entrance would be blocked by the prior entrance of the number 'fifteen'; as all these would be pervaded by this latter number, on the authority of the Implicatory Injunction; and as such they could not take up the 'seventeen' which is laid down only as belonging to the *Sāmidhēnis*. This we shall explain in detail, in Adhyāya X. Consequently we can admit the connection of 'seventeen' with all Modifications to be more authoritative (than of 'fifteen').

The author of the *Sutra* also has used the words—'*Vikṛtam, virodhi*' which shows that all that he meant was that the 'seventeen' did not pertain to the *Original Primary*.

Though as regards the *Sāmidhēnis*, both the numbers are equally applicable, on the ground of Syntactical Connection, yet there is this much difference that 'fifteen' is related to the *Sacrifice*, by Context (while 'seventeen' has no sort of connection with any sacrifice). Hence even though Context is weaker in authority than Syntactical Connection, yet, inasmuch as the two apply to two distinct subjects (the *Context* connecting 'fifteen' with the *Sacrifice*, while *Syntactical Connection* connects 'seventeen' with the *Sāmidhēnis*), it is the former that serves the purpose

of pointing out that which is to be done in connection with the *sacrifice*. It is only when both of these apply to the same object that the former is weaker in authority than Syntactical Connection. As regards the 'sacrifice' however, inasmuch as the Syntactical Connection (as not applying to the *sacrifice*) would not be contrary to the Context, it would not reject this latter. Specially as the difference between the two is that the number 'fifteen' is specifically singled out as pertaining to the *sacrifice*. And hence, even though Syntactical Connection shows that the two numbers are equally subservient to the Sāmidheni,—yet as regards the sacrifice, the case of 'fifteen' is different from that of 'seventeen'; and as such, the former would always set aside the latter, because the number 'seventeen' is not found to be spoken as belonging to the sacrifice, either directly by means of Direct Declaration, or indirectly, by means of the Implicatory Injunction. Thus then, we conclude that 'fifteen' is enjoined in connection with the Original Primary, as also with those *Vikrtis* (Modifications of Sacrifices) with regard to whom we have not the Direct Injunction of 'seventeen.'

ADHIKARANA (3).

[The milking of the Cow pertains to the Original Primary Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (10): *All that is 'conditional' finds place in the Original Primary; as it brings about a change only on account of the special relationship (of the Original Primary with the condition).*

[(1) We have the sentence—'For the *Vaiṣya*, seventeen *Sāmidhenis* should be recited.' (2) In connection with the *Daṛṣapūrṇamāsa*, we find the sentence—'The water should be brought in *by means of the milking vessel*, by one who desires Cattle.' (3) And in connection with the *Jyotiṣ-toma* we find the sentence—'one who desires Brahmic glory, should have the post of the Bilva-wood.' And with regard to these there arises the question as to whether they find place in the Original Primary, or in the Modifications.]

The Injunction of the number 'seventeen,' as pertaining to the *Sāmidhenis* recited for the *Vaiṣya*, would find a place in the Original Primary itself, setting aside the number 'fifteen'; as for such use of this Injunction, we have the same authority of *Context*, as in the case of the 'fifteen'; and it possesses the superior authority of the mention (and presence) of the *condition* that the sacrificer is a *Vaiṣya*; and as such sets aside the original details (as to the number being 'fifteen'). Because until the original (*nitya*) number 'fifteen' were set aside, the conditional (*Naimittika*, due to certain specified conditions) 'seventeen' could not obtain a footing, as we find this latter to have been enjoined in the face of the fact of all the number 'fifteen' appertaining to *all performances* of the action in question. While on the other hand, inasmuch as the 'seventeen' has been laid down only with regard to that performance which is done by the *Vaiṣya*, the original number 'fifteen' has a place in the performances of the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kṣātriya*, in which latter we could have the number 'fifteen' without setting aside the conditionally enjoined 'seventeen' (and hence the Injunction of 'fifteen' would not justify the rejection of 'seventeen,' while that of the latter could not but lead to the rejection of that with regard to 'fifteen,' specially in connection with those cases where the action is performed by the *Vaiṣya*).

Thus there being a difference in the potentialities of the two In-

junctions, the two numbers cannot be regarded as optional alternatives. Nor could the two be used conjointly, at one and the same time; because both serve the same purpose, with regard to the *Sāmidhenis*; as at any one performance, when these *Sāmidhenis* are recited as qualified by one number ('fifteen' f.c.), they could not, at the same time, be qualified by the other number ('seventeen').

Nor can the Original (*Nitya*, pertaining to all performances in general) number ('fifteen') be taken as having the potency of setting aside the other, on the ground of Apparent Inconsistency (as it has its place in the performances not touched by the specified conditions).

Then again, just as in the case of one Injunction appearing after the other, it is the former that is taken as rejected,—so, in the same manner, it is the *Nitya* (Original) that is always set aside by the *Kāmya* (that which is laid down as leading to a particular desirable end) and the *Naimittika* (that which is laid down with reference to certain specified conditions). And the reasons for this are as follows: (1) At the time that the *Nitya* is enjoined, it has no opposing factor (which it would have to set aside to obtain a footing for itself); while as for the *Naimittika* this is always enjoined with reference to something that is already pervaded over by the previously enjoined *Nitya*; and as such it always comes into existence in opposition to this latter; and when there is this opposition, due to the fact of both the Injunctions referring to the same object, it is the *Nitya* that is always set aside by the other. And inasmuch as the opposition does not appear simultaneously with regard to both, both cannot be accepted as optional alternatives. (2) All the *Nitya* accessories are enjoined with regard to the performance in general (of the action); whereas the *Naimittika* is enjoined with regard to a *particular* performance; and for this reason also, this latter, being the more authoritative of the two, always sets aside the former. (3) The injunction of the *Nitya* accessories is always prompted by (due to) the remote *Apūrva* of the Principal Action; and the highest authority for that (*Apūrva*) has been found to lie in the indications of *Context*; whereas for the *Kāmya* and *Naimittika* accessories, we have the prompting cause mentioned in the same *sentence*; and as such being more quickly prompted (by the quick functioning authority of *Syntactical Connection*), these latter always set aside the former.

Then again, as between the *Kāmya* and the *Naimittika*, it is the former that is possessed of greater authority, and as such sets aside the latter; (1) because the former is more nearly related to the end desired by man, while the latter has its result remote from itself; and (2) because the former is much quicker in its functioning than the latter; because as regards an action cognised as bringing about an end desired by man,

the man is quickly prompted to its performance by Direct Declaration itself; whereas in regard to the *Naimittika*, inasmuch as the result is found to be remote, the prompting of the man takes some time.

Thus then, though it was the *Naimittika* that was spoken of in the *Sūtra*, yet the *Bhāṣya* has dealt with the *Kāmya* only; and the reason for this is that both the *Naimittika* and the *Kāmya* are equally contrary to the *Nitya*; while there is no contradiction between the *Naimittika* and the *Kāmya*.

As regards the question of the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* indicates the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"In the case in question, there is one point of difference between the '*Nitya*' and the '*Kāmya*', viz.: the '*Cup*' and the '*Khadira-wood*' are 'laid down (by the sentence '*camasēṇi apāh prañayēt*,' and '*Khādirō yūpo bhavati*,' respectively), as for the sake of the Sacrifice; as for the '*Kāmya*' accessories of the '*milking vessel*' and the '*Bilva-wood*,' these, as '*Kāmya*,' are laid down (by the sentences '*godohēṇa paṇukāmasya prañayēt*,' and '*Bāilvo yupō brahmavarcasakāmasya*,' respectively) for the sake of the '*Man*'; [And as such the former would be more authoritative than the '*latter*].

"Then, it might be urged that, 'through a desire for the desirable result, the '*Kāmya*' would always set aside the '*Nitya*.'

"But such a course would lead to the same disastrous results as in 'the case of the fool who fell upon the beehive, being led to it by a sight of the Honey (and not noticing the bees). Because a rejection of the 'sacrificial accessory would certainly cause a discrepancy in the due fulfilment of the result of the sacrifice; nor could any desirable result be obtained from the '*Naimittika*' or '*Kāmya*' accessory either, as this would rest in a sacrifice which has been bereft of its own natural ('*Nitya*') accessory; because as a substitute for the '*Kāmya*' or '*Naimittika*' accessory, it is always necessary to have a sacrifice which is exactly like the 'Original Sacrifice in question; and this Original Sacrifice is always recognised as the '*Nitya*' with connected accessories of the '*Khadira-wood*,' etc., etc.

"And thus we find, that, inasmuch as it is only the Modification (of that sacrifice) that is not already pervaded over by those '*Nitya*' accessories, the '*Kāmya*' ones must be regarded as having a place in this 'Modification only.'

"As for the sacrifice, it is found to be more intimately related to the 'Context, and to that which is laid down for its own sake; and for this reason, it always takes up that which is for its own sake (i.e., the '*Nitya*'

“accessories), and never the *Kāmya* ones; because, inasmuch as all that “the Context seeks is the details of the procedure, it does not take in “that which is connected (with the result, i.e. the *Kāmya*) [*vide Sūtra* “III—iii—11]; and as such that which is indicated by the Context (i.e. “the *Nitya* accessory) is possessed of authority superior to that of one “which is connected with the Result (i.e. the *Kāmya*); specially as the “Context is found capable of pointing to the employment of the *Kāmya* “accessory.

“Lastly, it is not possible for the *Kāmya* to obtain a substrate that “would be for the sake of the Sacrifice (and not for that of *Man* only); “as such a substrate is already pervaded over by its own (*Nitya*) acces- “sories.

“Thus then the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* “must be regarded as applying to the *Naimittikā* accessories also [that “is to say, these, as well as the *Kāmya*, accessories should be regarded as “having a place in the Modifications, and not in the Original Primary “Sacrifice.]”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply : The *Naimittika* (Condi- tional) always pertains to the Original Primary, setting aside the *Nitya* —reasons for which we have already been shown before (*Text.* Page 1079). The only ground for the *Naimittika* not setting aside the *Nitya* is non-connection (as has been shown to be the case with the Injunction not appearing in the Context of any action). In the case in question however, we find a distinct connection of a performance qualified by a particular performer (the *Vaiçya*),—a performance which, being calculated to ac- complish a desirable end of *Man*, is not capable of betaking itself to any other substrate. The superior authority of the *Naimittika* being thus established, it must be admitted that it pertains to the Original Primary Sacrifice.

Objection : “It is not proper to assert the rejection of that which is “for the sake of the Sacrifice (the *Nitya*) by that which is for the sake of “*Man* (i.e. the *Kāmya*), when these two do not pertain to the same object ; “because when they pertain to two different objects, there can be no oppo- “sition between them. Consequently we admit that in all cases, apart “from those that are for the sake of *Man*, the *fetching of water* is to be “done by means of the *Cup* ; as the *Apūrva* of that sacrifice can be accom- “plished by that means alone. And just as the *Cup*, which helps the “sacrifice, does not accomplish such desirable results as *Cattle* and the “like,—so, in the same manner, the *Milking Vessel*, which helps in the “accomplishment of a different purpose (in the shape of some end desir-

“able by man), can never help in the fulfilment of the sacrifice. Nor
“can the Milking Vessel be taken as serving both the purposes (of help-
“ing the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, as well as the accomplishment of the
“purpose desired by Man); as that would involve a syntactical split.
“Nor is there any Injunction syntactically connecting the *Result* and the
“*Fetching* (whereby the syntactical split could be avoided); because the
“syntactical construction of the sentence would be totally different in the
“case of its being an Injunction of the *Fetching* with reference to the
“*Result*, from what it would be in the case of its being an Injunction of
“the *Result* with reference to the *Fetching*; and hence the sentence could
“not be taken as enjoining both simultaneously (without involving a
“syntactical split). Specially as the connection of two remote factors is
“not admissible, unless that of the proximate ones is found quite impos-
“sible; and hence (of the *Fetching*) there could not be at one and the same
“time, possibility as well as impossibility. For these reasons it must be
“admitted that, inasmuch as in the sentence ‘*gadhēna paçukāmasya*
“*pranayēt*,’ the Injunction is found to be taken up by the word ‘*Kāma*’
“(desiring), the sentence cannot serve as an Injunction of the *Milking*
“*Vessel* with reference to the *Fetching*; and hence not being enjoined,
“and as such not having the character of the sacrificial accessory, it can-
“not set aside the use of the *Cup* which is a sacrificial accessory. And
“thus being not set aside, it would be absolutely necessary to employ the
“*Cup* in connection with the *Sacrifice*; and when the purpose of the
“*Sacrifice* has been served by one accessory (i.e. the *Cup*), there can be
“no room for any other (in the shape of the *Milking Vessel*). Conse-
“quently in view of the accessory (*Milking Vessel*) that is laid down with
“reference to a particular desirable end, it would be necessary to repeat
“the action of *Fetching* (as the *Fetching* by means of the *Cup* would also
“have to be done). Just as in the case of the Vessel dedicated to *Indra*-
“*Vāyu*, inasmuch as the connection of *Mitāvaruṇa* and other deities with
“that Vessel is not possible, the Injunction (‘*Mitāvaruṇan grhṇāti*, etc.),
“is taken as laying down further repetitions of the Vessel,—so, in the
“same we would have the repetition of *Fetching*, with a view to the par-
“ticular Result desired by Man. This would have the further advantage
“of causing no discrepancy, either in the Sacrifice, or in the Result desired
“by the Agent. Nor do we find the purpose of actions served by them,
“when they abandon their own accessories, and are accomplished by the
“help of extraneous accessories;—specially when that purpose is not in-
“dicated by the Injunction of those Actions.”

To the above we make the following reply: That Accessory,—which
being laid down with reference to a particular desirable result, is not
taken up by that which helps in the accomplishment of the Sacrifice,—

betakes itself, for the accomplishment of its own purpose, to that action which does help in the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. Because an Accessory, wholly devoid of functioning, could never fulfil any desirable result; as when devoid of functioning, it can have no Instrumentality towards the fulfilment of that result; consequently it is absolutely necessary for it to have taken up a certain Action (or functioning) which is authorised by the Scriptures; and in the case in question, we find that the Accessory is supplied with such an action, in the shape of the *Fetching*. But then, we find that in regard to this action of *Fetching*, there is already an enjoined accessory in the shape of the *Cup*; and inasmuch as this cannot be set aside, there can be no Injunction of the *Milking Vessel*, etc. We find that the *Cup* has been laid down without any view to the rejection of the *Milking Vessel*; but of this latter, we do not find any Injunction, without the rejection of the *Cup*. The action of *Fetching* too is taken up by the Accessory pertaining to the desirable result; and hence it could not keep up its own Original Accessory, which is remote from the desirable Result. Then again the non-acceptance of the original (*Nitya*) accessory would constitute an excellence; while its acceptance would be a defect; just as in the case of the connection of what is distinctly prohibited.

Even though the Accessory (*Milking Vessel*), laid down with a view to a desirable result, serves quite a distinct purpose (from what is served by the *Nitya* Accessory), yet, on account of the intermediate action (*Fetching*) being the same, it is capable of establishing the falsity of (i.e. rejecting) the idea of the other accessory (i.e. the *Cup*). Because the *Kāmya* accessory (*Milking Vessel*) also brings about the accomplishment of the Sacrifice, though indirectly (i.e. as the means of accomplishing the result for which the Accessory is laid down); and in that case, the Sacrifice, having its purpose served by that, does not take up its original (*Nitya*) Accessory (*Cup*); as all things take up their Accessories only for the sake of certain purposes served by them; and hence when that purpose has been served by an Accessory, which, in reality, had been meant for another purpose (the bringing about, through the Sacrifice, of a certain desirable result),—what would be the use of taking up the original Accessory at all? Thus then, in the case in question, the *Fetching of water*, that is done for the purpose of the *Kneading*, etc., of the sacrificial material, having been accomplished by means of the *Kāmya* Accessory (the *Milking Vessel*); would not lead to the bringing in of its original Accessory (the *Cup*), and hence the *Cup* cannot be regarded as an Accessory of that performance of the *Fetching of water* (which is done with a view to the obtaining of Cattle); and under the circumstance, the non-employment of the *Cup* could not cause any discrepancy in the Sacrifice.

Thus, then, there could not be a repetition of the *Fetching* (for the sake of the employment of the *Cup*), even for the sake of the Sacrifice itself; as any such repetition would be absolutely useless; and hence in one performance, at least, of the Sacrifice, there would be a rejection of the *Nitya* accessory. Because it is only when the *Fetching* is actually accomplished that it serves as the substrate of the (use of the) *Milking Vessel*. Consequently, in course of that performance of the Sacrifice which is done with a view to the obtaining of Cattle, the *Fetching*,—having been accomplished by means of the *Milking Vessel*, which has laid down for it a purpose other than the mere accomplishment of the Sacrifice,—could not take up the *Cup*. Because in all cases, the accessories are taken up for the accomplishment of certain actions, and not for the bringing in of the mere presence of the accessories themselves. And in the Twelfth *Adhyāya*, we shall show that the Animal, the Cake and the other offering materials, when accomplished by means of other accessories, do not take up their own specific ones, and this abandoning of the accessories does not cause any discrepancy (either in the materials or in the Sacrifice); in the same manner, the abandoning of the *Cup* would cause no discrepancy in the case in question. Because, even though a certain accessory be such as belongs originally to the Action itself, yet, if it happens to be abandoned by the Injunction (of the actual performance), it ceases, for that occasion, to be an accessory of that action; and certainly there can be no discrepancy in the abandoning of that which is not an accessory; in fact it is its employment that would cause a discrepancy. Nor could there be a repetition of the principal factor, the *Action of Fetching*, for the sake of the secondary factor, the *accessory*, in the shape of the *Cup*; nor is the *Cup* an absolutely inevitable accessory of the *Fetching*; and we actually find that in the case of the *Fetching* having been done by the *Cup*, there arises no question as to the necessity of doing it by the *Milking Vessel* also; and under the circumstances, we see no reason why, when the *Fetching* has been done by means of the *Milking Vessel*, there should be any question of having to do it over again, merely for the sake of employing the *Cup*.

Question: “How is it that the injunction of the *Milking Vessel* is possessed of an authority superior to that of the *Cup*?”

Answer: (1) Because the *Milking Vessel* has been laid down as a special case; (2) and hence its Injunction would become absolutely useless, if even in that particular case, we were to employ the *Cup* only; and (3) because it is enjoined in proximity to a result desired by *man*; therefore it sets aside the use of the *Cup*.

That is to say, (1) and (2) the Injunction of the employment of the *Cup* is a general one, indicating the possibility of its employment in all

performances (of the *Fetching* of water); while that of the *Milking Vessel* is a particular one (laying it down as to be employed under certain conditions); and hence it is possible for the former to have a place without necessarily setting aside the latter (i.e. in those performances where the specified conditions are absent). This however is not possible for the *Milking Vessel*, which can find no place without setting aside the *Cup* (as this latter is connected with all performances). (3) The *Cup* is very much farther removed from the result desired by Man, than the *Milking Vessel* (whose use is directly connected with the acquiring of *Cattle*); and it is a well-known fact that all Scripture tends towards the fulfilment of some end desired by Man.

As for the difference between the two (the *Cup* and the *Milking Vessel*), consisting in the fact of one serving the sacrifice, which the other does not,—that has got nothing to do with the case in question; as we shall show under *Sūtra*, '*Arthasyāvikṛtatvāt*'; nor is there much use in such specialisations as, that 'a generic accessory helping in the sacrifice can be set aside by a particular one only when this latter also is such as helps in the sacrifice.' And thus, on account of proximity, the two (the *Fetching* and the *Milking Vessel*) must be regarded as affecting each other's potency and thereby restricting the utility or applicability of each other. For instance, the *Fetching* which has obtained its existence in another performance, loses its potency of bringing in its original accessory (the *Cup*); while the *Milking Vessel* also loses the potency of prompting any other *Fetching*.

And thus, it is only in such performances of the *Fetching*, as are not related to a 'desire for *Cattle*,' that the employment of the *Cup* could be accepted as authorised by the Scripture; and hence it must be admitted that the '*Milking Vessel*' (which is laid down as to be used in performances connected with that *desire*) is a 'modification' of the *Cup*.

That in the *Modificatory Sacrifices* the *Cup* alone could be employed will be explained in *Adhyāya* VIII under the *Sūtra* VIII—i—24. Hence we conclude that the *Modification* (of the *Cup*, in the shape of the *Milking Vessel*) is employed at the *Original Primary* only.

ADHIKARAṆA (4).

[The *Ādhāna* is not subsidiary to the *Pavamānēṣṭi*.]

Sūtra (11): “*The laying of fire is for the sake of the Iṣṭi; “because of the Context.”*”

In course of the treatment of such Injunctions as do not occur in the Context of any Sacrifice, the Author first of all proceeds to show that the *Laying of Fire* is enjoined without reference to any particular Sacrifice.

The fact of the Injunction of the *Laying of Fire* (*‘Vasantē Agnīṇāddadhita’*) occurring in the Context of the *Pavamānēṣṭi* (which is laid down in the sentence *‘Agnayē pavamānāyāṣṭāka pālannīrvapēt, etc.*) indicates that the said *Laying* belongs to that *Iṣṭi*; while from Direct Declaration it appears to pertain to the Sacrificial Fire purely by itself (and not as connected with any particular Sacrifice); hence there arises the question as to whether, or not, the *Laying of Fire* belongs to the *Pavamānēṣṭi* in particular.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

“In accordance with the *Sūtra* III—iv—15, the *Laying* being a purification of Agni, for the purposes of the *Iṣṭi*, we conclude, through “Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection, and Context,—all of which “are quite compatible with one another,—that the *Laying* is of that *Fire* “which is connected with the *Iṣṭi*. [This view is not incompatible with “Direct Declaration, as all that this declares is that the *Laying* is of the “*Fire*; and this is not infringed in the case of the *Laying* being done for “the *Fire* of the *Iṣṭi*.] The *Laying* of the fire by itself (without reference to any Sacrifice) would be absolutely useless; and it is this “fact of its belonging to the *Fire*, that makes it capable of being taken “for the *Fire* in connection with the *Iṣṭi*; and hence we must admit “that the general statement (contained in the sentence *‘Agnīṇāddadhita’*) “refers to the *Iṣṭi*; and then too, the Context distinctly shows that it “pertains to the *Pavamānēṣṭi*.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (12) : *not so; as it is the Iṣṭis that are for the sake of the Laying of Fire.*

If the *Laying* were meant to be an indirect aid to a Sacrifice, then, through Context, it could have been taken as being for the sake of the *Iṣṭi*. Through Syntactical Connection, however, we find that the Accusative ending (in ' *Agnīn ādadhīta* ') clearly shows that the *Laying* is meant to be a purification of Agni. Under the circumstances, if the *Agni* were solely for the sake of the *Paramānēṣṭi* then, in that case, through the *Agni*, the *Laying* also would be for the sake of that. But we have already shown that not bringing about any definite results, the *Iṣṭis* themselves are for the sake of (subservient to) the *Agni*; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* VI—iv—13, the *Laying* and the *Iṣṭi* could not bear the relation of subserviency to each other (as both are accessories of *Agni*). Nor have we any reasons for making the Context set aside the denotation of the Accusative ending.

Sūtra (13) : *Also because we find indications to the effect.*

The sentence ' *Tēnaivam punarnavannavam kuroti* ' (where ' *tena* ' refers to the *Laying*) shows that the *Laying* is meant to be the purification of Agni.

ADHIKARANA (5).

[The *Laying* is for the sake of all Sacrifices.]

Sūtra (14): “*It is for the sake of the Original Primary sacrifice; just as are all injunctions not occurring in the Context of any particular sacrifice.*”

The question being as to whether the said *Laying of Fire* is for the sake of the Original Primary Sacrifice, or for that of all Sacrifices,—we have, upon this, the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“It having been established that the Injunction of the *Laying* does “not occur in the Context of any particular Sacrifice, it must be admitted “that, like the injunction of the *Khādīra-Sruva*, the *Laying* is for the “sake of the Original Primary Sacrifice, entering into this latter, through “the *Agni*.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sūtra (15): *It is for the sake of all sacrifices; because the Laying has its own specific time (distinctly subjoined) [Or, because the Laying is laid down independently by itself].*

The sense of the *Sūtra* appears to be as follows:—If the *Laying* were done at the time of the Original Primary Sacrifice, then it could be taken as being for the sake of this latter; as a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Laying* is done at a time that is laid down for itself,—such time being the *Vasanta*, etc. (laid down in the sentence ‘*Brāhmaṇo vasante Agninādadhita*, etc.’); and thus not being connected with any particular sacrifice, we must conclude that the *Laying* is for the sake of *all* Sacrifices (the Original Primary as well as the Secondary Modifications). Specially as the fact of the performance of the *Laying* being common to all sacrifices will be fully established, under *Sūtra* XI—iii—2. If it were for the sake of the Original Primary alone, then its performance would belong only to the *Darṣa Pūrṇamasa*; and in that case, inasmuch as its performance would depend upon that of this Principal Sacrifice, it

would from its very nature come to be performed in its own time in the *Vasanta*, as well as on the *Anāmāsya* and the *Pūrṇamāsī* days. And in that case, such declarations, as '*Vasante ādadhīta*,' '*Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsya-yorādadhīta*,' would become absolutely useless. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Laying* is for the sake of all *Sacrifices*.

This position however could not be maintained, because we have no authority for connecting the *Laying* either with the Original Primary, or with the Secondary Modifications. We have found that, notwithstanding the indications of the Context, the *Laying* was not admitted to be for the sake of the *Pavamānēṣṭi*; and then, how could we take it to be for the sake of any other Sacrifice, when we have none of the six means of knowledge—Direct Declaration and the rest,—pointing to that fact?

Objection: "In that case, the present *Adhikaraṇa* will have been included in the last (and as such there would be no need of treating of it "separately)."

Reply: True, it would certainly have been included in it, if the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* also were as devoid of results as the *Pavamānēṣṭi*. As a matter of fact, however, the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* are found to lead to distinct results; and as such not being a subsidiary action, it could not be subject to the law of the *Sūtra* VI—iv—13; and hence it is quite possible for the *Laying* to be taken as being, through *Agni*, for the sake of this Sacrifice. The *Laying* being devoid of any results of its own, it becomes necessary to find out some use for its performance; and just as in the case of the '*Khādīra-Sruva*,' so in this also, the *Laying* would come to be recognised as being, through *Agni*, for the sake of the Sacrifice. Specially as the fires, appearing in the course of performances, are quite capable of accomplishing the Sacrifices. We have found that the *washing* of the *Vrihi*-corn is not for the sake of the mere form of it,—and so also the mention of '*Khādīra*' is not for the sake of the mere form of it,—and that both of these are meant to be the means to the accomplishment of the *Apūrva* (Transcendental Result) of Sacrifices; and exactly in the same manner, the *Laying* of Fire would be not for the sake of the mere form of *Agni*, but for the bringing about of the Sacrificial *Apūrva*. If the *Laying* were merely meant to be the means of bringing about the form of the Fire, then, in that case, the *Sacrifice* would come to be performed even by those who may not have laid the *Sacrificial Fire* (performed *Agnyādihāna*). As a matter of fact however, what the Man requires is the *Sacrifices* to be complete in all its details, and not the mere Fire; and hence the connection of some Sacrifice being absolutely necessary, it must be admitted that the *Laying* is for the sake of the Original Primary, in order to avoid a useless repetition, as shown under *Sutra* III—vi—2.

As for the *injunction* of a distinct time for the *Laying*,—that could be

taken as pertaining to the common character of the performance; just like the *Cutting of the Sacrificial post* laid down by Direct and Indirect Injunctions; and hence that could not justify our taking the *Laying* to be for the sake of *all Sacrifices*. Then, as for the mention of '*Vasanta*,' etc., (as the time for *Laying*), that could be taken as serving the purpose of pointing out a time that has not been mentioned elsewhere. For certainly the *Laying of Fire* that would be done in connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* could not always be performed in the *Vasanta*, as that *Laying* has got to be performed every fortnight (on every *Amāvāsyā* and *Pūrṇamāsī*). But this time of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* would not apply to that *Laying* which is done in connection with the *Darvi-Homa*, apart from the *Agnihotra*. And for these reasons the common character of the *Laying* could not be cognised without the declaration of its own time (*Vasanta*); and hence this declaration is not found to be useless (which would cause an Apparent Inconsistency that could justify our accepting the fact of the *Laying* being for the sake of all Sacrifices.)

In view of these reasons, we explain the *Sūtra* as follows:—The *Laying* is not subsidiary to any Sacrifice; it is for the sake of the *Agni* only, as is distinctly shown by the Accusative ending in '*Agnīn*.' And inasmuch as the *Agni* is related to all Sacrifices,—as shown under Sūtra III—vii—39,—we speak of the *Laying* also as being, through the *Agni*, for the sake of all Sacrifices.

The clause '*Svakālatvāt*' (in the *Sūtra*) is to be taken in the sense of '*Svātantryāmnānt*,'—i.e. *because the Laying is laid down independently by itself*.

It has been argued that, "from the Analogy of other Injunctions that do not occur in the Context of any particular Sacrifice, we must infer the fact of the Injunction of the *Laying* also to pertain to all Sacrifices." But to that we offer the following reply: In the case of those other Injunctions, we took up the question of the actions to which they pertained, after it had been taken for granted that they were subsidiary to some such Sacrifice. In the case in question however, you have no authority for taking the *Laying* to be subsidiary to any Sacrifice. That is to say, as for the '*Khādīra*,' etc., though they are connected with the *Sruva*, etc., yet they are not recognised as to have been laid down merely for the sake of the form of the *Sruva*, etc., because the use of the word '*Sruva*,' which is expressive of the *Class*, would be quite possible, even without the '*Khādīra*' (inasmuch as the *Sruva* could be made of other woods also). As for the *Khādīra*, that also, on being connected with the particular shape (of the *Sruva*), comes to be spoken of as '*Sruva*.' And before the *Sruva* has been recognised as being Accessory to a Sacrifice, there is no necessity of restricting the *Class* '*Sruva*' (to that which is made of the *Khādīra* wood

only); and hence it is only right that we should pass beyond the making of the mere *shape* of the *Sruva*. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the use of such words as 'Āhavanīya' and the like depend, for their denotation, upon the due performance of the sanctificatory rite of the *Laying*; and as such, they are not applied to the Fire, until that rite has been duly performed; and hence the *Laying* comes to be recognised as having its use in the supplying of the basis for the denotation of the said words ('Āhavanīya,' etc.).

Then, it has been argued that,—“even without the *Laying* of fire, there would be no discrepancy in the Sacrifices.” But the discrepancy is due, not to the absence of the *Laying* itself, but to the non-accomplishment (without the *Laying*) of the *Āhavanīya* Fire (which is a necessary factor in all Sacrifices). If all the effect of the neglecting of *Laying* consisted merely in the non-fulfilment of the *Laying* alone, then, there would be no discrepancy in the Sacrifice (by such neglect). As a matter of fact, however, we find that without a due performance of the *Laying*, no *Āhavanīya* and other sanctified Fires are possible; and there can be no doubt as to these Fires being very necessary Accessories of Sacrifices; and as such, the non-accomplishment of these would surely cause a discrepancy in these. Then again, if the Sacrifices were connected with the *Fire* alone, (without any sanctifications) then, inasmuch as the mere form of the *Fire* would be accomplished even without the *Laying*, this *Laying* could not be accepted as due to (necessitated by) the performance of the Sacrifice. But, as a matter of fact, we find that such Injunctions, as 'yadāhavanīyē juhōti' and the like cannot be duly carried out, without the performance of the *Laying*. And hence it must be admitted that one who would perform the Sacrifices must perform the *Laying* also.

For these reasons, we conclude that the *Laying* is for the sake of the Fire.

As for the *Sūtra* 'Dravyasyākarmakālanirpattēḥ' (XI—iii—2), which might be quoted against the present *Siddhāntu*, we shall explain, under that *Sūtra*, that it puts forward a theory only by way of admitting for the sake of argument.

The above reasonings also tend to show that the *Paramānēṣṭis* also are for the sake of (the due preparation of) the Fire. The further questions, in connection with the relationship between the *Paramānēṣṭi* and the *Laying*, we shall deal with in the following *Adhikaraṇu*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6).

[The *Paramānēṣṭis* should be performed in the unconsecrated Fire.]

Sūtra (16): “*The Fire for Pavamānēṣṭis should be obtained from the Original Primary; just like the Prayūjas.*”

The question that we proceed to deal with is, that as to whether, or not, the *Paramānēṣṭis* are performed by means of the Fire consecrated by the *Pavamāna*-offerings, in accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*tasyāntu syāt prayūjavat*’ (X—i—6).

And on this question, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“In accordance with the declaration—*Iṣṭiṣu Darṣa-Pūṇamāsayoh* “*pravṛttiḥ*,’ we are led to the conclusion that the *Darṣa-Pūṇamāsa* sacrifices, form the Original Primary of the *Paramānēṣṭis*; and hence “just as the *Prayūjas* enter into these latter, on the authority of the “Implicatory Injunction (‘*Prakṛtivadvikṛtiḥ*’),—so, in the same manner, “the fact of their being performed in the Fire consecrated by the *Pavamāna*-offerings would also enter into them, by reason of the same authority.

“*Objection*: “The *Āhavanīya* and other Fires become recognised as “occasions for all sacrifices, by means of Direct Declaration; and as such “it is not right to assert that they are obtained (for the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis*) “from the original Primary.’

“*Reply*: This does not affect the case; as it is only in cases where “the ‘*Homa*’ is directly mentioned, that the relationship of the *Homa* “would be recognised as the same as that with the Original Primary. “In cases, however, where it is the mere ‘Sacrifice’ that is assumed “from the relationship of the material and the Deity,—while the ‘*Homa*’ “is obtained from the original Primary, through the sentence ‘*Oatura-vattam juhoti*,’—inasmuch as the means (in the shape of the *Homa*) “would be obtained from the Original Primary, the *Āhavanīya* Fire also “should be obtained from the same source;—and it is only right to assert “that it is obtained from the Original Primary.

“*Objection*: ‘Those *Pavamāna Iṣṭis* that are performed for the “sake of mere purification, would stand in need of other such *Iṣṭis* for “their purification; and those of others; and so on and on, *ad infinitum*.’

“*Reply*: This objection does not affect our position ; in all cases of “such *regressus ad infinitum*, we can proceed only so far as is justified by “due authority ; and hence the *Iṣṭis* would go on being performed only “so long as the time would permit, without trespassing on the prescribed “time, such as the *Āmāvāsya*, the *Pūrṇamāsī*, and the like.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (17): Not so ; because the Pavamāna Iṣṭis are performed for the sake of (the consecration of) the Fire.

It is only the accessories of the Original Primary, such as the *Prayāja* and the like, that are transferred by Implicatory Injunction. The *Pavamāna Iṣṭis* however, are not the accessories of sacrifices, as we have just shown in the *Adhikarāṇa* on the ‘Laying of Fire.’ Hence what is transferred by Implicatory Injunction, is the mere form of the *Āhavanīya* and other Fires, and not the *Iṣṭis*,—as shown under the *Sūtra*, ‘*Rūpam vā açṣabhūtāt*’ (VII—iii—29).

As for the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* however, it is the accessory of a sacrifice ; and hence to the question of this *Iṣṭi* we shall devote another *Adhikarāṇa* ; and the law arrived at in connection with that *Iṣṭi* would apply to the present case also. Even if the *Paramāna Iṣṭis* were accessories of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*,—until they are actually enjoined, they are not seen in connection with the Original Primary ; and until the *Bhāvanā* is fully supplied with its three constituent factors—of the *object*, the *Instrument* and the *Procedure*,—the Injunction would not be operative. Hence the Original Primary being without the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis*, the procedure that these latter could take up would be only that which is laid down by sentences other than that enjoining the Original Primary. Otherwise, in one and the same sentence we would have the thing referred to as already enjoined, and also as enjoined as if not already enjoined ; and this would involve a self-contradiction in the very form of the thing. Hence it must be admitted that the *Āhavanīya* and other Sacrificial Fires necessary for the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis*, are exactly the same as those that existed before those *Iṣṭis* ; and hence it is only when the Sacrificial Fire has been duly accomplished, and stands in need of some purpose to serve, that we could take it as an accessory pointed out either by Direct Injunction or by indirect Implicatory Injunction. As a matter of fact, however the *Iṣṭis* serve the purpose of accomplishing the said Sacrificial Fires ; and as such could not stand in need of any help from these latter ; and that which is not wanted could not be laid down, either directly, or by Implication.

For these reasons we conclude that the *Iṣṭis* are to be performed in

connection with the Fire which has undergone the simple consecratory rite of the *Laying* (without being subjected to the further purificatory rite of the *Pavamaṇa* *Iṣṭis* themselves).

ADHIKARANA (7).

[The *Upākaraṇa* (Killing) and other accessory details belong to the *Agniṣomīya* animal only.]

Sūtra (18): “*The Injunction with regard to the Paçu-Sacrifice would have pertained equally to all animals, if they had all been mentioned in the same Context.*”

We now proceed to consider the contradiction and non-contradiction of *Position* (or Order) by Context, as well as by the former three (Direct Declaration, Indicative Force, and Syntactical Connection).

In connection with the *Agniṣtoma-Terminus* (*Samsthā*), of the *Jyotiṣtoma* Sacrifice, there are laid down three Animal-Sacrifices, of the *Agniṣomīya*, the *Savaniya* and the *Anubandhya* animals. All these animals stand in need of certain accessory details, in connection with the procedure to be adopted in those Sacrifices. We find that there are certain details,—such as *Killing*, etc.,—laid down as to be performed on the *Upavasathya Day* (the day previous to the actual performance of the Sacrifice), after the *Agniṣomīya* animal has been brought in.

With regard to these accessory details, there arises a four-fold doubt: (1) Are the details laid down for all the three animals; (2) or, for the *Savaniya*, only; (3) or, for the *Savaniya*, and the *Agniṣomīya*; (4) or, for the *Agniṣomīya*, only?

And with a view to the relevancy of the *Sūtras* ‘*Sthānācca pūrvasya*’ and the rest, the Author propounds the *Pūrvapakṣa* that “they are laid down for all the three animals.”

But if this theory were put forward by the *Sūtra*, then the next *Sūtra* would be wholly irrelevant; as the ‘*previous*,’ ‘*Pūrvā*,’ being included in the ‘*all*,’ what would be the use of this second *Sūtra*, when the present *Sūtra* will already have pointed out the applicability of the Details to *all* the three animals?—specially as the applicability of these to the ‘*Previous*’ animal also would be due to the non-differentiation of the Context. Then again, how could we connect the whole thing with the preclusion (contained in *Sūtra*, 20) of the fact of the Details belonging to the *Savaniya* only, which has not been declared by the mention of the absence of Context?—and this *Siddhānta Sūtra*, being found to be irrelevant, would make all the subsequent accessory *Sūtras* irrelevant also.

Or, it might be possible for us to take what is put forward in the present *Sūtra* as the first *Pūrvapakṣa*; and as the second *Pūrvapakṣa*, we would have the theory that the details belong to the *Savanīya* only (which has not been put forward in any *Sūtra*); and then we would have the *Siddhānta* put forth in *Sūtra* (20). But this procedure has not been adopted by the *Bhāṣya*; which has recourse to the much simpler method of putting forward the first of the aforesaid alternatives (i.e. the details belong to all the three animals),—but, as not contained in the present *Sūtra*. Inasmuch as the assumption, for the sake of the relevancy of the subsequent *Sūtras*, of an extraneous *Pūrvapakṣa*, in between the two *Pūrvapakṣas* put forward in the *Sūtras*, would throw the charge of negligence (or absent-mindedness) on the author of the *Sūtras*,—we take the assumed extraneous *Pūrvapakṣa*, in the very beginning of the *Adhikaraṇa*. And in support of this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following arguments, which we put forward as—

PŪRVAPAKṢA (A).

“The accessory details in connection with Animals, that are laid down in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*-Context, are not found to be related to any particular animal. Because, though, through Syntactical Connection, it is the *Agniṣomiya* animal that is recognised as to be dealt with in the same place as the accessory details in question,—yet at the place of the actual appearance of these, the Context of the Animal would be in proximity to the Purchase.

“That is to say, in connection with the Initiatory Sacrifices we find the *Agniṣomiya* animal laid down, in proximity to the Purchase of *Soma*; and though, through the force of Syntactical Connection, it would appear that this animal is to be dealt with in proximity to the details relating to the animal,—yet it is not found to be so dealt with in view of the Context; because all Contexts operate in regard to the place of origination (or appearance). As for the *Savanīya* animal, the time for its appearance is that of the *Sutyā* (*Pounding of the Soma*); and as for its declaration in connection with the Previous Day, that is simply for the purpose of pointing out certain details; but, this declaration does not constitute the Context; as it occurs at a distance from the *Anubandhya* animal, which is dealt with at the end of the *Soma* (Sacrifice). And thus we find that the Details in question belong to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself, and to none of the animals concerned; as the indication of the *Position* of the *Agniṣomiya*, being at a distance from its objective, would be rejected by those of the Context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which is not interfered by any *Sub-context* or *Syntactical Connection*. But, in view of the fact of the material employed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*

“being the *Soma* (and not the body of any animal), we come to take the said details as belonging to its subsidiaries (in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—i—18); and as all the three Animal-Sacrifices are equally subsidiaries to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we take the details to belong to all the three animals.

“As for the *Dikṣanīyā Iṣṭi*, however, even though that too is a subsidiary of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, yet the details do not pertain to it; for the simple reason that it is incapable of utilising them. Nor do they pertain to the animals that come in as accessories of the *Dikṣanīyā Iṣṭi*; because even though they are capable of taking in those details, yet there is no sort of general relationship (between these animals and the said Details). For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Details in question apply equally to all the three animals.”

In reply to this extraneous *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the present *Sūtra* (18), which embodies the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢA (B).

“What has been said would be possible only if there were no difference in the Context, through the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. As a matter of fact however, we find that there is an actual difference in the Contexts of the Animals; inasmuch as the *Savanīya* is mentioned in connection with the *Previous Day*;—the appearance of *Savanīya* animals having been laid down, in proximity to the Details of the Animal-Sacrifice, in the sentence—‘*Agnēyam ajam Agniṣṭomē, ālabhēta Aindrāgnamukhiyē dvitīyam.*’ Hence we conclude that the Details in question belong to the *Savanīya* animal only.”

[In reply to *Pūrvapakṣa* (B), we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKṢA (C).

Sūtra (19): “Through Position, they should be taken as belonging to the previous animal (i.e. the *Agni-somīya*) also.”

“Question: ‘How is it that this *Sūtra* declares something in direct contradiction to the Law of the *Ḍṛuti-līṅgādīkaraṇa* (III—iii—14)? For certainly, the conclusion therein arrived at is not in the form that by Context *Vidēvana*, etc., are subservient to the *Rājasūya*, while by Position they are subservient to the *Abhishēcanīya*; or that by Direct Declaration the *Aindrī* belongs to the *Gārhapatya*, while by Indicative Force it pertains to *Indra* [and this is what is declared

“in the *Sūtra*, that by *Context* the *Details* in question belong to the *Savanīya*, while by *Position* they belong to the *Agnīśomīya*].”

“*Answer* : In the case of the *Videvana* (dealt with under the *Ṛtulingādhikaraṇa*), it was found that all requirements being fulfilled by means of the superior authority of the *Context*, there would be no occasion for the operation of the inferior authority of *Position*; and as such it was only right that both alternatives should not be accepted conjointly; specially as in such a case, the non-assumption of the further relationship (shown by the inferior authority) does not cause any discrepancy either in the nature of the Accessory (the *Aindri Mantra*) in question, or in that of the Primaries (Indra, Agni, etc.); because they are capable of being recalled to the memory by other means (than the *Mantra* in question). In the case in question, however, though the requirements of the Accessory Details in question are supplied by their connection with the *Savanīya animal*, yet, inasmuch as the *Agnīśomīya* is found to be incomplete without these Details, it becomes absolutely necessary to recall them again (by some means or other, for the accomplishment of the *Agnīśomīya*); specially as there would be no incongruity in the acceptance of both at one and the same time. As a matter of fact, without the Details in question, the *Agnīśomīya* could never form part of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices* as that which forms the origin of the Animal-Sacrifices, viz.: the *Agnīśomīya*, is a modification (or part) of the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, while others, having the common character of having for their material a living being, are modifications of the Animal sacrifices themselves; and then when we come to consider the question as to whether the *Agnīśomīya* (not taking in the details directly by itself) is to obtain them out of those belonging to the *Savanīya*, through the Indirect implication based upon similarity (of the two animals),—or it is to obtain them by means of some sort of a direct Injunction,—we come to the conclusion that the Details find place in the *Agnīśomīya* by means of *Position*, which forms a part of Direct Injunction; as it is only when all the six methods of Direct Injunction (in the shape of *Direct Declaration*, *Indicative Power* and the rest) have ceased to operate that we can admit of any Indirect Implication. Consequently, just as in the other case, the operation included in the sacrifice comes to be taken as subservient to the Original, as well as to the modifications through *Direct Injunction* and *Indirect Implication*, respectively,—so, in the same manner, in the case in question, the Details in question are subservient to the

" *Agnishomīya*, as well as to the *Savanīya* through *Position* and *Context* respectively.

" As for the *Anubandhya* animals, however, inasmuch as we do not find any the slightest Direct Injunction to be applicable, the Details could come in only through *Implication*.

" And as such there can be nothing objectionable in the "*Sūtra*."

SIDDHĀNTA

Sūtra (20): According to some people, the accessory details belong to the *Savanīya*; but the previous declaration only serves the purpose of pointing out an accessory.

We quite readily admit of the fact of the Details belonging to the *Agnishomīya*, through *Position*; but we cannot accept the assertion of that they belong to the *Savanīya*, by reason of the *Context*. Because the re-mention of the *Savanīya* animals in connection with the Previous Day serves the purpose of pointing out an accessory; while as for the appearance of those animals, which actually occurs after the *Holding of the Ācvinā Cup* (on the day following the sacrifice), it is pointed out by the *Context*.

The originative Injunction of the *Savanīya* Animals is contained in the sentence—'Taking hold of the *Ācvinā* Vessel, and tying a three-fold string round the sacrificial post, one should kill the *Savanīya* animal.' And as for the word '*evah*' ('to-morrow') used on the *Aupnāsathya* Day, this refers to the *Sutyā* (the day after the sacrifice).

Question: "What is that accessory (for the sake of which we have the previous declaration)? We do not find any mentioned in the sentence dealing with the *Savanīya* itself?"

Answer: It is this; with reference to all *Savanīyas*, we find the deprecatory declaration; *Yathā va matsyah, etc., etc.*, the meaning of which is this: 'Just as when a fish is moving about in the water its exact position is not known, and the man looking for it is kept moving this way and that,—so, in the same manner, with regard to these *Savanīya* animals it is not exactly known where they should be dealt with, and this keeps the Performers in a state of suspense,'—and the previous mention of the *Savanīya* is in connection with this deprecation, and not for the sake of an Injunction of it. The said *deprecation* also is taken as explanatory of the following question: 'In what way are we to employ the animals known as *Savanīya* in connection with *Savana* offerings?' And this question again is in connection with another

Infjunction,—‘*Vapayā prātaḥ savanē pracaranti*,’—which has the form of an answer to the previous question.

And thus we find that the previous mention of the *Savanīya* is for purpose of pointing out this accessory (the *Vapā*, *Fat*) of it, as to be used in the offering; and it gives us an idea of the Context.

Question : “ *What are the words by which the Accessory is laid down ?* ” That is to say, the sentence quoted—*ācvinam graham grhitvā*, etc.,—is found to serve the purpose of pointing out the order of sequence of certain actions; and as such it could not serve as the originative Infjunction of the *Savanīya*.

In reply to this, the Author of the *Bhāṣhya* shows that it is only the *Agnēya* animal, out of the many *Savanīya* animals, that is spoken of as appearing ‘to-morrow.’

And some people explain this portion of the *Bhāṣhya* in the following ways : (1) No significance should be attached to the specification of the ‘*Āgnēya*’ *Savanīya*, as it is spoken of simply with a view to show that the accessory belongs to all the *Savanīyas*. (2) This is meant to show that there are many such sentences; but in any case, it is the mention of the *Āgnēya* only that serves any useful purpose. Even though the *Aindrāgna* and the other *Savanīya* animals have their original appearance on the Previous Day, yet, inasmuch as they are used in the subsequent ‘*Terminusus*’ (the performance whereof is not absolutely necessary),—they have not the power to take in (utilise) those accessory details of animals, which are laid down as absolutely necessary. And thus there could be no doubt as to the superiority of the authority of the *Position* of the *Agnishomīya*. As for that *Savanīya*, which, being necessary, is capable of utilising the said details,—we have already shown that the *Context* does not point to that.

For these reasons, we conclude that the details do not belong to the *Savanīya*.

Sūtra (21) : Objection : “ *The latter declaration would only serve the purpose of laying down the time for that which is transferred (to a subsequent occasion).* ”

The whole *Adhikaraṇa* turning upon the due ascertainment of the exact sentence that serves as the originative Infjunction of the *Savanīya*, the Opponent brings forward the following arguments :—

“ If you think that there is no Context of the *Savanīya*, then you are very much mistaken; because as a matter of fact, the original appearance of the *Savanīya* animal is due to the previous sentence

‘(*agnēyāmajam, etc.*)’; then the sentence ‘*Vāpayā pracaranti*’ transfers the ‘fat’—portion of the body of that animal to a subsequent occasion; and lastly, the exact time being still unknown, the last sentence ‘*āsvinam, etc.*’ points out the particular time.

“That is to say, the sentence ‘*Vāpayā prūtaḥ savanē pracaranti*’ transfers the chief of the *details* in question—namely, the ‘*pracāra*’ of the Fat; and inasmuch as the subsidiaries always follow the Principal, the other *Details*—of *killing, etc.*—also are transferred; but with all this there remains an uncertainty as to the exact time; and the ‘time immediately after the *Holding of the Āsvina Vessel*’ is then laid down (by the sentence ‘*āsvinam grhītvā, etc.*’). Hence it is this last sentence that serves the purpose of laying down the accessory (of *Time*); otherwise there would be a syntactical split; because if the sentence were not taken as laying down the time for the *Savanīya*-sacrifice, it would be taken as laying down the time for the *Parivyāṇa* (Tying of the rope round the Post) and the *Upākaraṇa* (Killing), as well as the Sacrifice together with its Deity and Material (and this multiplicity of enjoined objects would certainly cause a syntactical split).

“*Objection*: ‘The *Tying of the Rope*, being already related to the sacrifice through Implication, the sentence can be taken as laying down the Sacrifice as to be performed *at the same time as the Tying*,—the mention of this latter being merely by way of a *descriptive reference* (and in this way, there would be no syntactical split).’

“*Reply*: It is quite true that the connection of the *Tying of the Rope* is pointed out by Implication; but as a matter of fact it is not actually done at the time of the *Savanīya*; for the simple reason that the Sacrificial Post remaining the same (at all the Animal sacrifices), all the aid due to the said *Tying*, becomes accorded to the *Savanīya* also, by the *Tying* that has been done previously at the time of the *Agnishomīya*,—in accordance with the law ‘*Tatkālāstu, etc.*’ (XI—iii—6).

“*Objection*: ‘In that case the *Tying of the Rope* would be applicable through this commonality of the Post; and as such could be taken as spoken of (in the sentence ‘*Āsvinam grhītvā, etc.*’) merely by way of *Descriptive Reference*.’

“*Reply*: No such descriptive reference is possible; for the simple reason that the *Tying* is not recognised to be the same that is spoken of by way of descriptive reference which is recognised to be in the same form in which it had appeared on the previous day; and

“certainly that which will have been done on the Previous day, could not be referred to as existing on the day after the Holding of the Āṇvina Vessel : nor is there any Tying of the Rope done on this latter day ; and as for the Tying that may have been done on the previous day, that could not be spoken of by way of reference by such words, as by the word ‘*pariyagirikṛta*’ and the like ; because the Tying is limited by limits of the two actions performed at the two points of time.

“*Objection* : ‘In that case we can take the sentence *āṇvinam Yūpam parivīya*, etc. as referring to the Tying of the Rope which is laid down in the sentence—*āṇvinam graham grhītvā upanishkramya yūpam parivyayati*.’

“*Reply* : But this also is not the case ; for the same reason of non-recognition. That is to say the Tying of the Rope, in connection with the *Savaniya*, which is not the same as the Tying originally done, is found to be laid down (in the sentence ‘*yūpam parivyayati*,) in its base form (i.e. without any mention of the substance that is to be tied round) ; while the Original Tying is distinctly spoken of as done by means of the Rope ; and hence if the former Tying were done by means of some such other substances, as a piece of Cloth and the like, there could be no reference to the ‘three-foldness’ (which could apply to the Rope only) ; and as such it would be necessary to take this ‘three-foldness’ also to be an object of Injunction by the sentence ‘*Āṇvinam ṛtvā yūpam parivīya*,’—over and above the Tying itself ; and this would involve a syntactical split.

“Thus then, the sense of the *Bhāshya* comes to be this : If it were not as we say, then, it would be necessary for the sentence to lay down, in regard to the Tying, something, in connection with which the ‘three-fold’ substance and the particular time (after the Holding of the Āṇvina Vessel) could be enjoined ; and the clause ‘*upākaraṇasya ca*’ also would lay down the Time for the Killing, as well as the Action qualified by the said Substance and Deity. And hence, inasmuch as these sentences are found to serve the purpose of laying down accessories, it must be admitted that there is a Context of the *Savaniya* Animals.”

Sūtra (22) : *Reply : It cannot be so ; as that (which is transferred) is only a part (of the Animal).*

When the *Savaniyas* with all their accessories are laid down in connection with the Previous Day, we are led to believe that all

actions (offerings) in connection with the *Savanīyas* are to be performed on that same day ; but out of these the '*Vapā-pacāra*' (the carrying of Fat) is transferred to the next day,—by reason of the direct declaration to that effect ('*Vapayā prāṭahsavane pracaranti*'),—and not the other actions of *Killing* and the like, in accordance with the *Sutra* V—i—24, the sense of which is that, 'those actions, that are to be performed, either after, or along with, the *Fat-offering*, are to be transferred, and not those that are performed before it,—such as the *Killing* and the like ;' and as for those subsidiaries the exact time whereof is not known, they are to be performed at the same time as the Principal Sacrifice, as we shall show later on ; but as regards the subsidiaries of the *Paṇu* (Animal) Sacrifice, it is fully known that they are to be performed on the previous day ; and hence these do not come to be performed at the time of the Principal Action. Thus then, it would be necessary for you to have recourse to a transference,—by the sentence '*Ācvinam, etc.*' of the *Savanīya*, which, however, is not transferred along with the '*Vapā-pracāra*' ; and this sentence ('*Ācvinam, etc.*'), in that case, becoming a secondary Injunction, there would be a syntactical split involved in its being taken as laying down many accessories. On the other hand, if this sentence be taken as an Originative Injunction, there would be no such anomaly ; hence we conclude that the sentence is an Originative Injunction.

Objection : "As a matter of fact we find that the *Bhāṣhya* has "shown that the sentence contains the Injunction of many objects ; "as we find in it, the assertion, that *the sentence serving the purpose of pointing out accessories, there would be a syntactical split*. But the "syntactical split is capable of being avoided by taking the sentence "to be an Injunction only of the transference of the *Killing* which had "been taken as to be performed on the previous day."

Some people seek to justify the *Bhāṣhya*, on the following grounds : In the case of the sentence '*Āgnēyyā Āgnīdhram*,' we find that what are enjoined are the general relationship of the *Jyotishtoma*, and also a particular phase of it ; and hence it was asserted, on a previous occasion, that there was a multiplicity of objects enjoined ; and in the same manner, in the case in question, the sentence can be taken as having a multiplicity of objects for Injunction, in that it lays down the *transference of the Killing*, which has not been transferred along with the *Vapāpracāra*, as well as a particular phase of it.

"But the case of the sentence under consideration is not similar "to the sentence '*āgnēyyā āgnīdhram*' ; because in the case of the

“latter, the Injunction was found to pertain to a particular phase of the relationship (of the *Jyotishtoma*); and hence we were led to seek for an Injunction elsewhere, of the general phase of that relationship; and then, finding this latter already inhering in some of the *Āgnēyis*, we found the force of the Apparent Inconsistency of its non-injunction considerably weakened; and hence there being no such Inconsistency to justify the assumption of Injunctions of the said general relationship with regard to the other *Āgnēyis*, such an assumption would certainly involve a most objectionable Syntactical Split, inasmuch as such an Injunction is not found to be admitted by the Veda. In the case in question on the other hand, we have no such contrary element, in the shape of an Injunction of *transference in general*, which could weaken the Apparent Inconsistency pointing to the Injunction of the particular *Transferences*. If, in the case of the *Āgnēyī* also, there were no such contrary factor, as the existence of the general relationship, which weakened the Apparent Inconsistency,—then, in that case, there could be nothing to set aside the fact of the sentence laying down the relationship of every *Āgnēyī*; as it has been already shown, in connection with such words as ‘*Çoṇa*’ and the like, that even though the Action may be an already enjoined one, there is nothing incongruous in having a multiplicity of enjoined objects, if these happen to be expressed by means of one and the same word. Consequently, though the sentence ‘*Āçvīnam graham, etc.*’ enjoins the *Prātaḥsavana* (the morning offering), as well as the fact of its being performed after the Holding of the *Āçvina* Vessels, yet, inasmuch as the Injunctive Agency is confined to a single word, there is no case of these being wholly distinct Injunctions for each of the factors concerned, as shown under *Sutra* II—ii—6; in fact it is only of one factor (i.e. of the *time*) that we have an actual Injunction, which, however, implies that of the other (i.e. the *Prātaḥsavana*) also.

“It is for this reason that the *Bhāṣhya*, in the course of pointing out the objectionability of a multiplicity of enjoined objects, has declared, that *many things could not be enjoined* (by the same Injunctive), *unless they were related to one another*; this declaration has been made in full recognition of the fact that when there are many things related to one another, the Injunction of any one of these implies the others also, without any further effort in that direction. Hence if the Injunction of one could imply that of a thousand other things, there could be no incongruity in this, nor any extra effort on

“the part of the Injunctive agency ; and hence we readily admit of such an implication. The only way to make such an implication untenable is to show that the Injunction (sought to be implied) is otherwise obtainable (and as such there is no Apparent Inconsistency to justify such implication). But as a matter of fact, in the case in question, we find that there is no such alternative as would admit of the Injunction pertaining only to the *sequence (of the Savanīya) to the Holding of the Ācvinā Vessel*, without pointing out any sort of relationship between that (*Savanīya*) and the *Sutyā* and the *Morning-offering*. And hence there can be nothing objectionable in the aforesaid Implication.

“In fact, the objection is applicable to you (who have sought to justify the *Bhūshya* in the aforesaid manner),—who take the Injunction to be one of an Action qualified by many Substances and Deities. Then again, it would be necessary for you to make a still further assumption, of the relationship, of the Action, with the *Jyotishtoma*, the *Sutyā*, the *Morning-offering* and the *particular time (after the Holding of the Ācvinā Vessel)*. And it is a well-known fact, that in all cases of Transference and Subtraction, there is involved an incongruity in the shape of having a general and a special Injunction ; and hence, in view of this incongruity there could be no Injunction of Accessories with reference to a previously enjoined action ; and as such the sentence would come to be taken as enjoining a distinct action altogether. For instance (1) in the case of the sentence ‘*Māhēndrasya stotram pratyabhishicyate*,’ inasmuch as the Injunction pertains to the *Mid-day-offering*, the *Māhendra Hymn* and the *Time*, *Abhishēcanīya Mantra* comes to be taken as serving many purposes ; (2) and the same may be shown to be the case with the sentence ‘*Tishṭhantam paçum prati prayuñjanti*.’

“And further, when there is a single object that is both *enjoined* and *dealt with in action*, any other object coming in could do so in two ways : either by reason of a distinct effort with regard to such an object, or as following in the wake of some such object. As for instance, in the case of the Injunction of *Eating (of the Remnants)*, the *taking up of the Vessels* belonged to the former, while the satisfaction (or pleasure due to the *Eating*) to the latter kind. Out of these two kinds of objects, that which is due to a distinct effort, is found to be such that unless it is done, that which is enjoined cannot be done ; and hence with regard to that we have to assume, on the ground of that Apparent Inconsistency, another Injunctive agency,—

“but just to such extent as is found t^o be based upon scriptural authority. While as regards that which follows in the wake of another object, it is found to be accomplished, even though there be very many of it, without any distinct effort on the part, either of the human agent, or on that of the Scripture.

“In the case in question, we find that the *sequence of the Savanīya* to the Holding of the *Āṣvina Vessel* being enjoined, it would not necessitate any distinct effort to establish the connection (of that *Savanīya*) with the *Sutyā*, the *Morning-offering*, etc.; and hence there is nothing that enjoins *Transference in general*. And when what is actually enjoined is the mere sequence to the Holding of the *Āṣvina Vessel* which is distinctly mentioned, what would it matter, if in the wake of that sequence there should appear the attendant factors of the *Sutyā*, the *Morning-offering*, the particular part of the day, the particular hour, minute, second, etc., the generic character of *Time, Substance and Entity* (that is to say the implication of these would not involve a Syntactical split)? — For if there were to be a syntactical split in such cases, there would be one in the case of the sentence ‘bring the *Ḡimcapā*’; because in this also, we have the word ‘*Ḡimcapā*’ implying the generic factors of ‘tree,’ ‘Earth,’ ‘Substance,’ and ‘Entity.’ Consequently it must be admitted that all that the sentence (*Āṣvinam*, etc.), lays down is another time,—in the shape of that following after the Holding of the *Āṣvina Vessel*,—for the *Killing* which has been previously laid down as to be done on the Previous Day. And there can be nothing objectionable in this.”

II. In view of the above, others seek to explain the “Syntactical split” spoken of in the *Bhāṣya*, as that which is caused by the fact of both the *Tying of the Rope* and the *Killing* being transferred by means of the same sentence.”

“But this also is very easily refuted: as it is only the *Tying of the Rope* that is transferred by the sentence; the transference of the *Killing* being implied by the same transference, in accordance with the *Sūtra V—i—24*.

“The following might here be urged: ‘It is only the Accessory that is obtained from the Original Primary, and not that which is altogether new, which, being transferred, brings in the others in its wake, as spoken of in the said *Sūtra* (while in the case in question, the *Tying of the Rope* is found to be an altogether new accessory, not mentioned before.

“But this cannot be admissible; because, in the *Sūtra V—ii—21*,

“we find described the *transference* of even such accessories as the ‘*Vidēvana*, etc., that are not obtained from the Original Primary ; and as for the *Sūtra* ‘*Tathā pūrvam*’ (V—i—29), which lays down the fact of a new Accessory not being transferable), that too has been explained as referring to an accessory with certain qualifications. Or, even if we have the transference of the *Killing* only, as the sentence in question could be taken as referring to the *Tying of the Rope* laid down in the sentence ‘*sa vai Ācvinam*, etc.,’ it would involve no syntactical split.

“It might be argued that, ‘inasmuch as the sentence *Sa vai*, etc., mentions the *Rope* without any qualifications, the mention, in the sentence under consideration, of *threefoldness* could not be taken as a mere descriptive reference to a previously-enjoined object.

“But this is not quite tenable ; because the reply to this argument would be exactly the same which the *Siddhāntin* would give later on to a question put to him by the *Pūrvapakshin*.

“*Objection* : ‘Inasmuch as the *Siddhāntin* holds the sentence to contain the Injunction of a new Action, it is possible for him to admit an Injunction of more than one thing ; while as for the *Pūrvapakshin*, this cannot be possible for him (as he takes the sentence to be an Injunction of Accessories) ; and as such the Injunction of more than one Accessory would involve a syntactical split.’

“*Reply* : That does not make any difference ; because in a case where several qualifications are mentioned in connection with one action, an Injunction of all those is quite possible, as through that Action ; and hence such cases are quite in accordance with the Law of Qualified Injunction (which does not involve a syntactical split) ; but in cases where the Action enjoined is without any of its qualifications, it becomes necessary to bring in, for the sake of that Action, the qualifying accessories of other actions ; and for this purpose it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive word (and this would involve a Syntactical split). For instance, when the *Sacrifice* is enjoined along with its Deity, it is only its own qualifying accessories that it could imply (and bring in), and not a qualification of the *Tying* (in the shape of *threefoldness*). Hence even in the case of the Injunctions of new actions (not previously enjoined), it is necessary to differentiate its own qualifying Accessory from those of others. Thus then, inasmuch as the objection brought forward is equally applicable to both of us (the *Pūrvapakshin* as well as the *Siddhāntin*), it should not have been urged against one only.

"Then again, the only reply that the *Siddhāntin* could give to the "said objection, would be that—'the *Rope* is common to both *Tying*s " (*parivyāna*),' as is actually declared in *Sūtra* III—vi—31. And this "would indicate that the *Threefold Rope* spoken of in the sentence under "consideration ('*Tṛyā yūpam parivyā*),' would apply to any and "every '*Tying*' of the *Sacrificial Post*; so that, in the case in ques- "tion, the mention of the '*Tying*' (in the sentence under considera- "tion) is only by way of reference to that previously enjoined (in the "sentence '*sa vai ācvinam, etc.*') ; and hence there would be no Syntac- "tical split.

"Or, the sentence may be taken as laying down the *immediate* "sequence to the *Holding of the Ācvinā Vessel*, in reference to the "sequence of the *Killing to the Tying*, which latter has already been "enjoined in connection with the *Previous Day*,—the sentence, in this "case, being construed as '*yat tṛyā yūpam parivyā upākaroti tat* " '*Ācvinagrahavānantaram kāryam*' (the *Tying of the threefold Rope* "round the *Post*, as laid down in regard to the *Previous Day* should, on "the *second Day*, be done after the *Holding of the Ācvinā Vessel*).' "In this way we avoid the *Syntactical split* complained of, and cer- "tainly any far-fetched construction is more acceptable than a Syntac- "tical split."

In view of these arguments, we explain the '*Syntactical split*,' spoken of in the *Bhāṣya*, as follows :—

It must be admitted that of the *Savanīya* sacrifices, one sentence should enjoin the *originative appearance*, while the other lays down its *accessories*. As a matter of fact we have no grounds for taking the sentence speaking of the *Previous Day* as the *originative Injunction* (of the *Savanīya* sacrifices).

Objection : "Nor do we find any grounds for taking the other "sentence either, as the said *originative Injunction*."

Reply : Though it is so, yet, inasmuch it is not possible for the two sentences to be taken either as *optional alternatives* or *conjointly*, it becomes necessary to find out which of the two could, through a certain peculiarity in it, be accepted, by preference, as the required *Originative Injunction*. And hence we proceed to find out such a peculiarity. It has already been shown above that it is only a *desirable Accessory* that can be laid down with reference to an *Action* laid down in the recesses of a *remote Injunction*. Because an *accessory* that is not desired (in connection with that *Action*) would, if brought in, make it an altogether different action, like the *Homa* in connection

with the *Kundapayināmayana*. Thus then, in the case in question, we find that it is the *Vapā-pracāra*, (the Fat-offering) that is the desired accessory, which is capable of being enjoined with reference to the *Savanīya* occurring at the time of the *Sutyā*; and when the declaration of the *Morning-offering* brings about a recognition of the *Savanīya* appearing along with that Offering,—and it having been found to serve a useful purpose in connection with another mention of it in connection with the ‘next day,’—it cannot be regarded as bearing the relation of subserviency with the *Holding of the Āṇvina Vessel*; and the sentence (‘*Āṇvinam grhītvā, etc.*’) being found to be meant to point out the *Time*,—and *Time*, by its very nature, not being an object desired to be acquired, could not be enjoined with reference to an Action; and hence it is necessary that a certain Action (the *Vapāpracāra*) be enjoined with reference to the *Time* thus pointed out. Even if the Injunction (of this action) be as subsidiary to the *Āṇvina Vessel*, then too, inasmuch as the principal member (*Time* of the *Āṇvina*) is not capable of being desired as something to be acquired, the sentence could not but be interpreted as before.

Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence cannot be taken as an Injunction of accessories; and hence the peculiarity, whereby, the originative Injunction not being interfered with, the cognition of the original appearance of the Action would make it a distinct Action, in accordance with the Law of the Difference of Actions being due to the difference in the Contexts,—that same peculiarity would make the sentence an originative Injunction with regard to the time therein pointed out. And thus the other sentence, naturally, comes to be taken as the Injunction of Accessories; as under the above circumstances, there would be no justification for a syntactical split.

It was for this reason that we considered the question as to whether the ‘*Vāpāpracāra*’ does, or does not, lead to the *transference* (of the *Savanīya*). Because in case there be such a transference, inasmuch as the idea of the *Savanīya* mentioned in the previous sentence would be still present in the mind (at the time of this transference), and as such it being recognized to be the same, we could not but take the other mention of it, as being for the sake of enjoining it in regard to the particular time therein pointed out; as we have explained under the *Sūtra* ‘*Sannidhantvavibhāgāt*’ (II—iii—26). And when the Action as well as the *Time* is found to be enjoined,—the operation of the Injunctive affix always pertains to that which is in closer proximity to it; and in the case in question, we find that the *Time* of the *Vapāpracāra* is the

qualification of an action other than the Originative appearance of the *Savanīya*; and as such it would be impossible to take the sentence as a qualified Injunction; and hence a Syntactical split would be inevitable. And as to how the two sentences are reconciled and taken along with each other, in accordance with our view,—that we have explained already.

Thus then, the sentence could also speak of the subsidiary character of the *Tying*—as shown by the Context—by way of descriptive reference; otherwise it would have to refer to it, as enjoined by the remoter agency of Position.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the originative Injunction of the *Savanīya* is contained in the sentence ‘*Ācvinam graham, etc.*’

Question: “How could you reconcile the above explanation with “the mention of ‘Syntactical split’ made in the *Bhāṣhya*?”

Answer: What the *Bhāṣhya* means by the expression ‘*Vākyabhēda*’ is the *difference of actions* (and not ‘*Syntactical split*’); as even if there be many factors, if they happen to be related to one another, the whole is quite capable of being taken as a single sentence syntactically connected.

That is to say, all that the *Bhāṣhya* says is ‘*Vākyam bhidyēta*,’—which means that the sentence in question could not be syntactically connected with the other sentence; just as in the *Sūtra* ‘*Kartṛgunē tu karmasamavāyād vākyabhēdaḥ syāt*’ (III—i—19,) though there is no actual *vākyabhēda* (Syntactical split,) yet what is meant by the word ‘*vākyabhēda*’ is the *want of mutual connection*; and in the *Sūtra* ‘*Sākāñkshantvōkavākyam*’ (III—i—20), the expression ‘*eka-vākyam*’ has been used in the sense *mutual connection*; and in the same manner in the case in question, what the *Bhāṣhya* means is that—‘When the sentence in question is taken as an originative Injunction, then it can be connected (syntactically) with the other sentence,—this connection being possible only if the sentence is not taken merely as laying down accessories.’

Sūtra (23): *Objection*: (The Transference) could be “implied.”

[*Objection*: “The sentence may be taken as containing an implied Injunction of the *Time* for the transferred *Savanīya*; that is to say, “we find the declaration—‘One should cover the Fat with his closed fist’; and certainly there could be no covering of the Fat extracted

“on the previous day ; as that would mean that the man should stay with his fist hiding the fat, for fully two days ; which would be an impossibility ; hence the sentence quoted must be taken as implying the presence of the *Savanīya* on the next day also ; and it is for this *Savanīya* that the sentence in question would lay down the *Time*.”]

Sūtra (24): Reply: This cannot be ; because (such implication could be possible only) if we had a contradiction of the Direct Declaration.

[The said transference could have been implied by the Apparent Inconsistency of the sentence quoted, only if there were an actual inconsistency ; as a matter of a fact, however, we find that the ‘Covering’ spoken of could be done by means of the ‘handful’ of leaves or grass ; and this could certainly continue for four days.]

Sūtra (25) : But, through Position, (the Accessory details in question) belong to the previous (animal, the *Agnishomīya*) ; specially as the purification pertains to that.

Having thus set aside the fact of there being any Context pointing to the connection (of the Details) with the *Savanīya*, the Author recapitulates the *Siddhānta* view, by means of the same arguments as those shown before.

Or, the great Context (of the *Jyotishtoma*), being found to be not interfered with by any sub-context (of the *Savanīya*), would point to the Details as belonging to all three animals ; and as such would set aside the indications of the *Position* (of the *Agnishomīya*) ; and it is with a view to preclude this view, that we have the word ‘*tu*’ in the *Sūtra*.

Though it is quite true that *Context* is superior in authority to *Position*, yet, in accordance with the Law of the *Upamçuyājanumantrana* (II—ii—9 *et seq.*), it is the *Position* aided by *Indicative Force* which, in the present case, becomes more authoritative than the said Context. Through their inherent capabilities, what the Accessories of the Animals want is the *Animal Sacrifice*, and not the *Sacrifice of Soma*. And that which is not wanted cannot be taken up by Context ; as the bringing in of that which is not wanted would be all the more remote from the sense of the Direct Declaration. Nor can the Law of the *Sūtra* ‘*Ānarthakyāt tadanṣeṣhu*’ (III—i—18) be applicable, unless

there is a direct relationship expressed by means of the Genitive Ending,—as we have already explained before.

Objection : “ Inasmuch as the *Agnīshomīya* has no other accessory detail laid down for itself, it actually stands in need of some such accessories ; being brought in, from another place, to the place where the Accessories are laid down ; and thus being in close proximity to these Accessories, the *Agnīshomīya* would take them up, through *Context* ; and under the circumstances, it should not be said that it is through *Position* that it takes them up.”

Reply : This objection is not applicable to the present case ; because in a case where the Modificatory Sacrifice is completed by means of the subsidiaries obtained from the Original Primary, and certain new subsidiaries are also introduced into it,—there alone we have the Modification taking up the Subsidiaries, through *Context*. In the case in question however, we find that the *Agnīshomīya* has originally appeared in another place ; and in that place, it has all its requirements supplied by means of the subsidiaries obtained from the Original Primary (the *Jyotishtoma*), which have had their usefulness previously established, and which have nothing to oppose them ; and then, being brought up to the place in question, the *Agnīshomīya* finds certain other Accessory Details, apparently without any other purpose to serve, and standing in need of something (to which they could belong) ; and then, having its procedure (with regard to these details) inferred from other facts, the *Agnīshomīya* becomes connected with them ; and it is in the nature of *Position* alone that, finding the Accessories in need of a relative, it creates a procedure for the Principal factor, and thereby establishes the relationship of those details with this latter ; and hence it is only right that the *Sūtra* should speak of ‘ through *Position*.’ (Specially as we could have *Context* only if the *Agnīshomīya* also stood in need of the Details, just as these do in that of the former).

Sūtra (26) : Also because of Indications.

We have the sentence—‘ *Vapayā prātaḥsavanē caranti, puroḍācēna mādhyandinē savanē* ’—which speaks of the *Paṇu—Puroḍāca* (The Animal Fat, and the Cake) in connection with the *Savaniya* offerings ; and this could not be explained, if the Details in question belonged to all the three, or to two of the animals. Because it will be shown later on that the *Cake-offering* is meant as a purification of the Deity ; and as a matter of fact, in the case in question, the Deity

that the Cake-sacrifice could purify, is the joint *Agni* and *Soma* (those connected to the *Agnīshomīya*), and not *Agni* alone (which is connected with the *Savanīya*),—as is shown by the Indicative Force. In case both (the *Agnīshomīya* and the *Savanīya*) were equally related to the Details, there could be no such *Ūha*, as we have in accordance with the *Siddhānta*. Hence, inasmuch as we find the quoted text speaking of the '*Purodāça*,' we conclude that it is only by Indirect Implication that any accessory details can belong to the *Savanīya*.

Sūtra (27): It is no Injunction; as it serves the purposes of an Arthavāda.

Objection: "It is true that the Cake-offering that is done for "the purposes of the purification of the Deity, could not apply to the "*Savanīya*; but as a matter of fact, that is not the only purpose "served by the *Cake-offering*; as we find it spoken of as serving the "purpose of 'covering the hole,'—in the sentence '*Sushiro va ētarhī* "*paçuh* *chidrapīdhānartho*' '*pi*'; and hence, even though "there is no Deity in connection with the *Savanīya*, yet the *Cake-offering* "would be made for the purpose of *Covering the hole* of the *Savanīya*; "and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the fact of the "Details belonging equally to both (the *Savanīya* and the *Agnīshomīya*)."

It is in reply to this that we have the present *Sutra* (27); the sense of which is as follows: As a matter of fact the Cake is not laid down for the purpose of 'covering the hole'; as we have already shown, under the *Arthavāda-Pāda*, that all such sentences, as have the appearances of Injunctions, and also those that appear as argumentative in form, are mere *Arthavādas*. Nor, as a matter, do we find the Sacrifice standing in need of a 'covering of the hole'; nor do we find any *hole covered*, even after the *Cake-sacrifice* has been performed. Hence it must be admitted that the *Covering of the hole* is not the purpose served by the *Cake-offering*; and as such the Indications, shown under the previous *Sutra*, remain fully established.

ADHIKARANA (8).

[The *Fetching of the Branch*, etc., belong to both Milkings.]

Sūtra (28): “*Inasmuch as the two Milkings are done at different times, the mere Milk would be prepared without connection (with the Accessories).*”

Having shown the non-contradiction of *Position*, we now proceed to deal with its contradiction (by Direct Declaration, etc.).

[There are two *Milkings*, the *Evening* and the *Morning*; and as accessory details of the *Milking*, we find laid down—the *Fetching of the Branch*, the bringing in of the Cows, making the Cows to yield milk, the actual milking, and so forth; and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these pertain to both the *Milkings*, or to the *Evening Milking* only]. And on this we have the following:—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the Details in question are found mentioned in connection with the Previous Day, they would pertain to the making of the *Curd*, because of the similarity of *Position*, and of the Sub-context (that is to say, as it is the Milk drawn on the previous Day that is made into *Curd*, and as the Details too are mentioned in connection with that Day, these latter would belong to the *Evening Milking* only; while the mere *Milk*, which is used in the form of pure milk, and which is drawn in the *Morning*, would be prepared, independently of the said Accessory details).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (29): *Inasmuch as both appear in the same Context, the Text only lays down the time (the Previous Day) for the details connected with both.*

When the Principal is performed in the place of the Accessory Details, it becomes subject to the authority of *Position* (or *Order*); while when it is only found to be mentioned in their place, then it is subject to the authority of *Sub-Context*. As for the *Curd-Sacrifice*, we

find that it is both spoken of, and performed, in connection with the *Amāvāsyā* Day ; and as such the *Curd* is, in all respects, equal to the *Milk*. And though it is true that, for the purpose of making the *Curd*, some of the details are done on the Previous Day,—yet those details do not include the *Fetching of the Branch* and the rest enumerated above ; as has been shown under the Sutra III—i—22, that ‘ there can be no connection between two accessories.’ Hence it must be admitted that the *Fetching of the Branch*, etc., etc., that are done on the Previous Day, in accordance with the Direct Inflection to that effect, are done as related to both *Milkings* ; and not for the sake of the *Curd* only ; and there can be nothing objectionable in this.

ADHIKARĀṆA (9).

[The *Sādāna*, etc., belong to the three *Savanas*.]

Sūtra (30): *Similarly the mention of the Vessels is connected with the other Savana also.*

[In connection with the Morning-offering of the *Jyotishtoma*, we find *ten Vessels*, the *Aindravāyava*, etc., mentioned; and with regard to these we find mentioned such accessory details as, the *Seating* and the *Cleaning*. Then again, we find other Vessels mentioned in connection with the *Midday-offering*, and others again in connection with the *Evening-offering*; and there arises the question as to whether the said details should be performed in connection with these latter Vessels also, or only in connection with those of the Morning-offering. And on this question, we have the PURVAPAKSHA, that—"They would belong to those of the Morning-offering only; as they are mentioned in their *Position* (or *Order*)."]

SIDDHĀNTA.

Though the fact of the Accessory Details of the Vessels, and the Morning-offering, being mentioned, as well as performed in the same place, would give rise to the idea that the case of these Details is not similar to those dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, yet the *Sūtra* lays down that the case of these is similar to that of the former ones. And the reason for this is that there is one and the same Context, that of the *Jyotishtoma*, including the Three Offerings. There can be no Sub-Context of the Morning-offering by itself; as there is no result laid down as following from this offering. Then as for *Position*, it cannot, when contradicted by Context, serve the purpose of indicating the use of things. Hence it must be admitted that the Details should be done in connection with the Vessels of the other *Savanas* also.

The same reasoning holds regarding the fact of all the accessory details of the *Cake* being common to the *Agnishomīya*, and to the *Āgnēya*, and the rest.

ADHIKARĀṆA (10).

[The Threefoldness of the Rope pertains to all the Animals.]

Sūtra (31): *The Rope also (as well as its accessories) (is applicable to all); because of words indicative of this.*

Having mentioned the Tying of the Rope round the Sacrificial Post, in connection with the *Agnīshomīya*, the Veda goes on to make the declaration—‘Having held the *Ācvinā* Vessel, and having tied round the Post, etc., etc.’—in connection with the *Savanīya*; and inasmuch as this latter is a mere repetition of the *Tying*, without any mention of fresh accessories, the two *Tyings* must be regarded as distinct actions. And then, it becomes necessary to have some material for these two *Tyings*. The *Rope* is the material that is universally known as the material to be used for all *Tying*, whether in the course of a Vedic Sacrifice, or in an ordinary Action of the world. And hence we come to the conclusion that it is the *Rope* that should be used in both cases, as being the only thing could serve the purpose.

And then, there arises the question, as to, the material that the *Rope* is to be made of, and also its distinguishing features.

And on this question, we have the following :—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“In the Context assumed on the strength of the Position of the *Agnīshomīya*, we find a special declaration to the effect that *the Rope is to be made threefold, out of well beaten grass*; and these peculiarities pertain to the Tying of the Post in connection with the *Agnīshomīya*, and not to that in connection with the *Savanīya*. And hence, like the other accessories of the Animal, the said details of method, etc., with regard to the making of the *Rope* pertain to the *Agnīshomīya* only.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: Because of Indications, the said Details must be regarded as applying to all animals. Because a reference to the *threefoldness of the Rope*, in the originaive

Injunction of the *Savanīya* ('*trvrlā yūpam parivīya savanīyama-pākaroti*'), could not be possible, unless the details in regard to the making of the Rope belonged to both.

The Author then proceeds to show how these Details become connected with the *Savanīya* also: The sentence above quoted (laying down the method of making the Rope) distinctly shows that these methods pertain to *all Ropes*; while it is the mere *Position* of the *Agnīshomīya*, that points to the fact of the methods applying to this latter alone; and there can be no doubt as to the superior authority of the *Sentence* (and hence it must be admitted that the said methods belong to all the animals).

Objection: "In accordance with what will be shown under *Sūtra* "—'*na tadvākyam hi tadarthatvāt*' (III—vii—4), it must be admitted "that the said details of method tend towards the accomplishment "of the particular *Apūrva* of the *Agnīshomīya* only (and as such they "cannot belong to the other animals)."

Reply: It is not so; as the *Rope* is not a direct subsidiary of the *Animal*, but that of the *Post*, as will be shown under *Sūtra*—'*yūpāṅgam vā tatsamskāraṭ*' (IV—iv—23); and hence the Syntactical Connection would have to be explained in the following manner: 'The details in question belong to that by which the two Tyings would be done'; and the way in which the *Tying of the Post* is done in connection with the *Agnīshomīya*, is exactly the same in which it is done in connection with the *Savanīya*; as the *Post* remains one and the same in both cases. Because both these *Tyings* are recognised as a means to the accomplishment of *Apūrvas*; and they could not be taken as resembling the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* grass, in connection with the *Pindapitryajña*. Thus then, on account of the difference from the Details of the said grass, the Details of the *Rope* should be taken as belonging to all the animals.

ADHIKARAṆA (11).

[The *Amṇu* and the *Adābhya* belong to the *Sādana*, etc.]

Sūtra (32): "That which is laid down at a distance is not
"related to the other qualifying Accessories; because of
"non-proximity."

In connection with the above, we proceed to consider the question of the contradiction and non-contradiction of Syntactical Connection and Context.

[For the *Jyotishtoma*, we find laid down, at a certain distance (i.e. in a different context), certain Vessels in the shape of the *Amṇu*, the *Adābhya* and the like. And there arises a question, as to whether, or not, the qualifying accessories, laid down in connection with the Vessels of the *Jyotishtoma*, should be performed in connection with those Vessels.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The qualifying accessories of the Vessels must be regarded as
"pertaining to those mentioned in the same Context,—notwith-
"standing the indications of the *Position*; and as such, they cannot be
"regarded as pertaining to those that are not mentioned in the
"Context (such, for instance, as the *Amṇu* and the *Adābhya*). Conse-
"quently, the performance of the acts in connection with these Vessels,
"cannot be related to the qualifications in question."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (33): *It is related to these accessories; as they
are laid down for the sake of the Vessels (of the
Jyotishtoma); and the accessory is always due to
those.*

Inasmuch as the Context does not serve the purposes of differentiation, the qualification must be regarded as pertaining to those Vessels that help in the accomplishment of the Transcendental Result

of the *Jyotishtoma*; and as such, being dissociated from the Vessels of Wine, they become confined to the Context. Consequently, even those Vessels,—which, though not mentioned in the same Context of the *Jyotishtoma*, are yet found to help in the accomplishment of the said Transcendental Result,—come to be connected with the qualifications in question, in accordance with the previous reasoning based upon Syntactical Connection. And hence the *Amṣu*, the *Adābhya*, and such other Vessels (of the *Jyotishtoma*, that are not mentioned in its Context) must be regarded as connected with the qualifying Accessories (laid down in connection with the *Jyotishtoma*-Vessels).

Sūtra (34): (In the case of the *Maitrāvaruṇa*) the restriction would be due to Syntactical Connection (which is not the case with the case in question).

In the case of the preparation, etc., in connection with the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Vessel, we had the Context indicating the fact of the accessories belonging to all the Vessels; and hence it was only right that we should have taken them as restricted to that particular Vessel only, as indicated by the superior authority of Syntactical Connection. In the case in question, on the other hand, we have the Context indicating the fact of the details being restricted (to those Vessels alone that are mentioned in the *Jyotishtoma*-Context); while the fact of their pertaining to all the Vessels is indicated by Syntactical Connection (and hence it is the latter conclusion that is accepted). Consequently, the case of the *Maitrāvaruṇa* cannot be cited as similar to the one under consideration.

ADHIKARĀṆA (12).

[The *Citrinī* and other Bricks belong to the Fire.]

Sūtra (35): *The qualifications (of Bricks), as pertaining to the Sacrificial Fire, would belong to those also that are not mentioned in the same Context: just like the qualifications just dealt with.*

[In a Context, other than that of the Sacrificial Fire, we find such Bricks laid down as the '*Citrinī*,' the '*Vajrinī*' and the like; but in the Context of the Fire, we find mentioned such qualifications of the Bricks, as that 'they should not be black, they should be entire' and so forth; and there arises the question as to whether, or not, these qualifications belong to those Bricks that are not mentioned in the Context of the Fire. The *Pūrvapakṣa* being, that—"they do not belong to those Bricks, for the simple reason that they are not in close proximity to them,"—the *Siddhānta* is that, inasmuch as these qualifications are laid down as pertaining to the Fire, they must be regarded as belonging to those other Bricks also; as these latter are as well connected with the Sacrificial Fire, as the Bricks that are mentioned in the same Context with it.]

ADHIKARAṆA (13).

[The *Māna*, *Upāvaharaṇa* and the rest belong to the *Soma* only.]

Sūtra (36): *The Conditional, not being equal (to the Nitya) would not take in all that is laid down in connection with the Nitya (obligatory):*

[In connection with the *Jyotishtoma*, we find the sentence ‘*Sa yadi Rājanyam vā Vaiṣyam vā Yājyēt, sa yadi Somam vibhakshayishēt. nyagrodhastibhīrāhṛtya tāḥ sampishya dadhani unmrjya tamasmai bhaksham praya cchinna Somam.*’ Then again, in connection with the *Jyotishtoma*, we find certain accessory details with regard to the *Soma*—such as, its *Māna*, *Upāvaharaṇa*, *Kṣaya*, *Abhishava*, and so on. And with regard to these, there arises the question, as to whether these details belong equally to the *Soma*, and its substitute, the *Phalacamasa*, laid down in the former sentence, as to be given to the *Kshatriya* sacrifice, or to the *Soma* only.]

And on this question, we have the following:—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“In the last two *Adhikaraṇas*, it has been shown that the Details “being due to the particular purpose served, belong to all; and the “*Phalacamasa* also being a substitute for the *Soma* as the sacrificial “material, serves the same purpose as the *Soma*; and hence the “Injunction of the details of *Soma* must be regarded as common “to both (the *Soma* as well as the *Phalacamasa*); just as the Injunction “‘*Vṛihīn prokshati*’ pertains to the *Vṛihī*, as well as to its substitute, “the *Yava*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

It is only right that the Details of the *Vṛihī* should be done in regard to the *Yava*; because both are equally optional alternatives; and as such are equally transient in their character. As for the Details of the *Soma* however, they are taken up, as necessary factors, by the Transcendental Result of the *Jyotishtoma*; and as such, it is absolutely necessary that they should rest in an equally necessary and unchanging

Substrate. And as a matter of fact, it is the *Soma*, and not the *Phalacamasa*, that is a necessary factor in the *Jyotishtoma*; because the latter does not appear when the Sacrifice is performed by the *Brāhmana* while as for the *Soma*, it is present in all performances of the *Jyotishtoma*; even in that by the *Kshatriya*, its substitute, in the shape of the *Phalacamasa*, is brought in simply for being eaten by the Sacrificer, and for no other purpose. If the substitution of the *Phalacamasa* had meant the total setting aside of all *Soma* from the Sacrifice, then, inasmuch as the *Soma* would be absent in the performances by the *Kshatriya* and the *Vaiçya*, it would not be a necessary factor in the *Jyotishtoma*; and as such it would equal, in that respect also, the above-mentioned *Phalacamasa*. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Soma* is absent only from the Cup of the Sacrificer (in the case of a *non-Brāhmana-Sacrificer*); and it is present in all the other Cups; and hence it must be regarded as a necessary factor in the *Jyotishtoma*; consequently the Details can never have an existence apart from the *Soma* (and thence from the *Jyotishtoma*).

Question: "If such be the case, then, how could the accessory "details due to the *Soma* be applied to the *Phalacamasa*?"

Answer: By reason of the latter fulfilling the functions of the former.

Question: "Is this reason—the fulfilling of its functions—something apart from, or included in, Direct Injunction and Implication?"

Some people hold it to be something wholly distinct; but, if it were so, then it could not be recognised as authoritative; consequently, we must regard it as included in Implication.

Question: "How could there be an Implication in regard to the "Original Primary Sacrifice (of the *Jyotishtoma* itself) (as it is only "with regard to the Subsidiary and Modificatory Sacrifices that "generally we have recourse to Implications)?"

Answer: It is quite true that we could not have Implications in regard to an Original Primary; but that is the case only when the accessories of one action are attributed, by Implication, to another Action; for the simple reason that one and the same Action cannot, by itself, be taken as an *Original Primary*, as well as a Subsidiary Modification. In the case in question however, we find that it is the Accessory detail of the Substance that is attributed, by Implication; and it is a perceptible fact that there may be different substances for the same Sacrifice (for the sake of the different castes of Sacrifices). And just as a Sacrifice, standing in need of certain accessory details,

takes up these latter, from out of those belonging to another action,—so, in the same manner, it could take up the Substance also. Thus then, the Injunction being—‘ One should make the Sacrificial Material out of the *Phalacamasa*,’ there arises the question as to *how* it is to be done; and the answer to this is that—‘ it should be done in the same way as the *Soma*;—this answer presenting itself to our mind, by reason of the presence in our mind of the previously-conceived *Soma*, as also on account of similarity; and thus it is that the Accessory Details of the *Soma* become applied to it.

Question : “ When, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa* as well as “ the *Siddhānta* the accessory details of the *Soma* come to be attributed “ to the *Phalacamasa*,—what would be the use of the present *Adhikarāṇa* ? ”

Answer : Even though they are so attributed, yet, just as in other cases, what is Directly Enjoined finds a place in the performance whereby a certain definite result is sought to be obtained by means of a particular substance, while what is *Implied* does not find a place in it, so, in the same manner, in the case in question also. Then again, we could bring forward the *Sūtra* ‘ *Nirvṛttavād dravya bhēdāt* ’, as showing the use of the *Adhikarāṇa*. That is to say, these accessory details of the *Soma*, that are based upon its *Pounding, Measuring, etc.*, and which are known as leading to a distinct result (in the shape of the *Apūrva* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, could never accomplish this Result, when inhering in the *Phalacamasa* (and not in the *Soma*). All that the *Phalacamasa* is meant to accomplish, is the mere *form* of the Sacrifice; and as such, it could take up only such details of the *Soma* as are calculated to help in the fulfilment of that end, and not those that tend to the accomplishment of the Result; and hence, these latter details could not apply to the *Phalacamasa*.

The above reasoning also shows that there is to be an *Ūha* (change in the *Mantras*, in the case of the *Phalacamasa*); that is to say, the Context of the Action being the same, inasmuch as there is no Injunction with regard to any *Substance in general*, there could always be substitution of the substance actually employed; and as such the word ‘ *Soma* ’ is changed into other words (‘ *Phalacamasa* ’ and the like), because of the incapability of the word ‘ *Soma* ’ (being used in connection with a Sacrifice at which the Substance employed is *Phalacamasa*, and not *Soma*).

ADHIKARĀṆA (14).

[The accessory details of the Principal are to be employed in the case of the Substitutes also.]

Sūtra (37): “*Similar is the case with the Substitute.*”

[The Veda lays down certain substitutes for sacrificial materials ; f.i. the *Nivāra* as a substitute for the *Vṛīhi*, in case this latter be stolen (and no other alternative substance such as the *Yava* be available); and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these substitutes are equally related to all the accessories laid down in connection with the original substance, or not.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“What has been said in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* applies to the present case also (i.e. just as the accessories of the *Necessary* do not belong to the *Conditional*, so also those of the *original* substance do not belong to the *Substitute*).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (38): *It is not so: the Substitute would be like the Original, as it serves exactly the same purpose.*

If the *Nivāra* had helped in the Action, by its own inherent capability, then it could be connected with the accessories, only on account of its fulfilling certain functions of the *Original* substance (and as such it could not be equally related to all the accessories of the original, as we have found in the case of the *Phalacamasā* and the *Soma*). As a matter of fact however, we have no authority for taking the *Nivāra* as a direct auxiliary to the Action as the substance that is laid down as such an auxiliary is the *Vṛīhi*; and people take up the *Nivāra*, only when no *Vṛīhi* (or its enjoined alternative, *Yava*) is available; and that too, because of the presence, in the *Nivāra*, of certain properties that belong to the *Vṛīhi*, and which properties are what the performer is anxious to get hold of (in the absence of the exact *Vṛīhi*); and it is

only as the inevitable concomitant (a substrate) of those properties, that he is led to take up the species of corn, called '*Nivāra*,'—which latter is not taken up as a Direct Auxiliary, to the Sacrifice. The said accessory properties of the *Vṛīhi* are enjoined directly; and hence the *Nivāra* must be regarded as equally related to these; specially as we shall show later on that we do not cease to have the idea of '*Vṛīhi*' with regard to the *Nivāra*, under the *Sūtra* '*sāmānyantaccikīrṣhā hi*' (VI—iii—27). It is with a view to all this that we have the declaration in the *Sūtra*, that the *Nivāra* would be like the original *Vṛīhi*.

Sūtra (39): Also because of its not being laid down by a Scriptural Injunction.

Some people take the *Sūtra* to mean that the substitute, not being enjoined by the Veda, is brought in, only through its similarity to the substance that is enjoined; and hence too, it cannot be spoken of as fulfilling certain functions of the Original.

But as a matter of fact, the substitute is not altogether devoid of scriptural authority; because it is actually laid down for the supplying of the deficiency in the *Original substance* (caused by *theft*, etc.). If it were wholly devoid of scriptural authority, it could never be taken up; nor would its abandonment cause any discrepancy in the Sacrifice (even though the *Original* may have been stolen or otherwise spoiled).

For these reasons, we must explain the *Sūtra* in the following manner: Inasmuch as the species '*Nivāra*' is not laid down in any Scriptural Injunction, it cannot be regarded as fulfilling the functions of the *Vṛīhi*; while as for the Accessory details of the *Vṛīhi*, we find that it is impossible for all of these to be brought in their completeness, as laid down by the Injunction of the Principal; and hence only a portion of them has been brought in, as resting in the *Nivāras*, through the Injunction of the *Vṛīhi*; but this is done simply because there was no other purpose to serve, and not because they fulfil the functions of the *Vṛīhi*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15).

[Even in regard to those *Substitutes* that are directly laid down, the qualifying accessories of the *Original* should be applied.]

Sūtra (40): *The declaration of the Accessory is meant to preclude the bringing in of other substances as substitutes.*

[We have the sentence—‘If *Soma* be not available, one should pound the *Putika*’; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether, or not, the details laid down in connection with the *Original Soma*, are to be applied to its *substitute*, *Putika*.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“If by the mere fact of the *Nivāra* not being enjoined by “scriptural texts, it cannot be regarded as fulfilling the functions (of “the *Vrihi*),—then, as regards the *Putika*, inasmuch as it is found to “be directly enjoined, and as it is not a constant concomitant of the “Sacrifice (being laid down as to be employed only under certain “conditions),—it must be regarded as fulfilling certain functions of the “*Soma*, just like the *Phalacumasa* (and as such, according to “*Adhikarana* 13, the accessory details of the *Soma* could not be “applied to it).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

If the text had pointed out the *Putika* as the means of accomplishing the Sacrifice, then, we could take it as fulfilling certain functions of the *Soma*; as a matter of fact however, such is not the case.

That is to say, the text lays down the *Putika* as the substance to be employed, in case the *Soma* got for the sacrifice should be stolen or spoilt; and it does not lay it down as actually helping in the performance of the Sacrifice. Consequently this serves the purpose of limiting the choice of substitutes,—the sense being that ‘if all the properties of the *Soma* cannot be obtained, and it be necessary to bring in even a portion of those, we should call in those that are found

to exist in the *Putīka* ; as will be explained later on, under the *Sūtras* ' *Niyamārthaḥ kvacid vidhiḥ* ' (VI—iii—16), ' *Tannityantaccikīrṣhā hi* ' (VI—iii—17).

For these reasons, the species of ' *Putīka* ' cannot be regarded as subsidiary to the Sacrifice ;—it being brought in simply as the substrate of the properties of the *Soma*. Consequently, even though it is directly laid down, its case must be regarded as similar to that dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

Consequently the purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa* is the same as that by the previous one ; hence, inasmuch as the notion of *Soma* is not wholly absent from the said substrate of its properties (i.e. the *Putīka*), even those who would desire certain results as following from the particular accessory substance (*Soma*) could take up (in its absence) the *Putīka* also.

Others hold as follows : " The said desire for results is dependant upon all the individual properties of the particular accessory (*Soma*) ; and as such people could not take up the *Putīka*, which does not contain all those properties. Inasmuch as it is absolutely necessary to begin the performance of a necessary action,—and as it is equally necessary to finish what has been begun,—it is quite possible, in the case of a necessary action, to speak of it as duly completed, even though it may be wanting in certain small details. In the case of the *Kāmya* Action, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is never begun with a substance that is only laid down as a substitute for the original substance, it could not be spoken of as complete, unless all the properties of the original substance were present. And for this reason, it must be admitted that the *Putīka* can never be employed by persons desiring certain results to follow from the use of *Soma*."

As a matter of fact, however, when we have begun the performance of an action with a certain definite substance calculated to lead to the desired result,—if that Substance should become stolen, or otherwise destroyed,—we do employ a substitute which is laid down only for such contingencies. Thus then, inasmuch as it would be necessary to finish the Sacrifice (that has been begun), it would be completed all the same, whether the remaining portion of it be done with a substitute or a modification of the Original substance. And the present *Adhikaraṇa* also serves the purpose of showing whether there is to be an *Ūha* (modification in the *Mantra*) or not (in cases where we employ the substitute). [That is to say, if the *Putīka* were regarded as a substance wholly distinct from *Soma*, then there would be an *Ūha*,—while if it were not so regarded, then there could be no *Ūha*.]

ADHIKARĀṆA (16).

[The Accessories of the *Dikshanīyā*, etc., belong to the *Agnishtoma*.]

Sūtra (41): “*The Samsthās (Terminuses of the Jyotishtoma) are all equally related (to the enjoined ‘accessories’): as all of them occur in the same ‘Context.’*”

The *Jyotishtoma* has been held to consist of four *Terminuses*, made up of several repetitions of the many offerings of Vessels and Cups; and over all these *Terminuses* pervades the character of the *Jyotishtoma*. Just as whether he be sitting, or walking or sleeping, Devadatta all along remains ‘*Dēvadatta*’; so, in the same manner, the disappearance of one *Terminus*, and the appearance of another does not make any difference in the applicability of the name ‘*Jyotishtoma*.’ As for the *Terminuses* themselves, they are incompatible with one another; but the character of the ‘*Jyotishtoma*’ is compatible with every one of them. This *Jyotishtoma* has been laid down as to be performed for the acquiring of a certain desirable result,—in the sentence—‘one should perform the *Jyotishtoma* Sacrifice for the acquiring of Heaven.’ Similarly, the *Terminuses*, the *Ukthya* and the rest, also are laid down with reference to distinct results,—in such sentences as ‘one desiring cattle should get hold of the *Ukthya*,’ and so forth.

With reference to such a *Jyotishtoma*, the Veda lays down such accessory details as the *Dikshanīyā* and the rest. And with regard to these details, there arises the question as to whether these have been laid down with reference to the *Jyotishtoma* as constituted by all the *Terminuses*, or only to that consisting of the *Agnishtoma* *Terminus* only.

“This propounding of the question is not quite proper. Because “at the time that the Details are laid down with reference to the “*Jyotishtoma*, it is not spoken of as qualified by any of the *Terminuses*. Even if some such qualifications were mentioned, no significance could be attached to them, as they would be qualifications of the “subject of a proposition (i.e. that with reference to which something “is laid down). Nor could the fact of the *Terminuses*, the *Ukthya* “and the rest, taking up an accessory justify our speaking of the

"*Jyotishtoma* itself taking up that accessory. Because these Termini-
 "nuses also lead to distinct results of their own, and as such every one
 "of them would have its own procedure wholly to itself; and as for the
 "*Jyotishtoma*, it could only serve as the substrate of all these, and as
 "such would occupy only a secondary position; and as such it could
 "not be recognised as capable of taking up any accessories. Then
 "again, inasmuch as the sentences—'one should perform the *Jyotish-*
 "*toma*, for the acquiring of Heaven' points to the fact of all the details
 "of the *Jyotishtoma* being equally related to all the Terminuses, any
 "specification of the '*Agnishtoma only*' would be absolutely meaning-
 "less."

In view of these arguments, we must put forward the question in the following words: Are the Details laid down meant for the *Jyotishtoma only*, or for the *Ukthya* and other Terminuses also? The *Bhāshya* also may be thus explained as really putting forward the question in this same form.

Though the Details are taken up by the Terminuses, yet inasmuch as these themselves have not the character of *action*, it is the *Jyotishtoma* which, serving as their substrate, becomes the means by which they take up the details; and it is with a view to this fact that the *Bhāshya* says: '*Kīm sarvasamsthām Jyotishtomam prakṛtya*';—the sense of the question being whether the Details are laid down with reference to that which serves as the *means* and leads to a desirable result (i.e. the *Jyotishtoma*), or to that which simply leads to a desirable result (i.e. the Terminus). When the details are laid down for the *Jyotishtoma only*, then it comes to belong to its particular terminus of the *Agnishtoma*, which is the one Terminus peculiar to it, and which is the only one of the Terminuses that remains behind; and it is for this reason that the name '*Jyotishtoma*' is applied to that Sacrifice as resting in the *Agnishtoma* Terminus. In the case of the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses, though they have the capability of taking up the *Jyotishtoma*, yet this capability is not clearly indicated, as to whether the Details taken up by the *Ukthya*, etc., belong to, the *Jyotishtoma*, through the fact of this latter serving as the means of the former, or only through its own capability of bringing about the desired result. As for the *Agnishtoma* Terminus, however, it is the one particular subsidiary that specially belongs to the *Jyotishtoma*; and hence the fact of the *Agnishtoma* taking up the Details can be spoken of as the *Jyotishtoma* itself taking them. Consequently the putting forward of the question in the *Bhāshya* cannot be said to be altogether improper.

Inasmuch as the fact of the Accessory belonging in common to all

the *Terminuses* is admitted by both parties,—the *Purvapakshī* holding them to belong, by Direct Injunction, while the *Siddhanti* holds that they belong, by *Implication*, to the *Ukthya*, etc., while to the *Agnish-toma* alone they belong by Direct Injunction,—the question speaks of ‘Direct Injunction’ (as the difference of opinion is with regard to this alone).

On the question above stated, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The Details are laid down as belonging, in common, to the *Jyotishtoma* and to the *Terminuses*; because all of them belong to ‘the same Context. The *Jyotishtoma* leading to a distinct desirable result, there arises, with regard to this, a desire to know its procedure; and hence it takes up, in its procedure, the Details, on account of their being laid down in close proximity to it,—and not because of the fact of its being *Jyotishtoma*. And inasmuch as this *proximity* is found to apply equally to the case of the *Terminuses* also, they must be regarded as equally related to the Details in question. And as it is only when there is no trace of Direct Injunction that we have recourse to *Implication*, we must regard these Details as ‘applying to all the *Terminuses* by Direct Injunction.

Sūtra (42): “Also because all of them are spoken of
“as equal.”

“I. The Vedic text, laying down the Disposal of the Remnant of Butter, distinctly indicates the fact of all *Terminuses* and the Sacrifice (*Jyotishtoma*) as equally related to the Context. For instance, we have such sentences as—‘*Yadyagnishtomo juhōti; yadi Ukthyah, tēnaiva cēshēṇa paridhimanakti: yadi Atirātrah, etadēva Homayajuryamagnē pṛtsu martyām ili japan havirdhānam pratipa-dyēta.*’ All these specifications with regard to the said Disposal distinctly shows that all Injunctions of accessories pertain equally to the *Jyotishtoma* and its *Terminuses*.”

“This however looks like an Inference from Analogy, and as such not quite admissible. If, through Syntactical Connection, something laid down in the Context (of the *Jyotishtoma*), be taken as related to the *Terminuses*,—then, can there be a connection with a relation-ship that is wholly unconnected? We have seen, on a former occasion that the mere fact of the *Dvādaśaha* being related to the *Ahina* did not lead us to take the details in connection with the

“Remnants, as belonging (being subservient) to the *Ahina*; specially
 “as the force of all declarations is spent up over what is directly
 “expressed by the words.

“Hence, we have recourse to the following explanation: If that,
 “which is laid down in regard to the *Jyotishtoma* in general, belonged
 “to its one particular Terminus of the *Agnishtoma* only,—then in that
 “case, the Disposals laid down would have been recognised as subsi-
 “diary to the *Agnishtoma*, even if this latter were not mentioned
 “specially. As a matter of fact however, we find this also mentioned
 “(just in the same way as the other Terminuses); and this leads us to
 “the conclusion that the accessories (such as the Disposals spoken of.
 “are not laid down with specific reference to the *Agnishtoma* only)
 “And this (specific mention) would not be possible, if the Context
 “belonged equally to all the Terminuses. If however, the Context be
 “taken as belonging to the *Jyotishtoma* only, then there would be no
 “sense in the re-mention (of the *Agnishtoma*, in the sentence laying
 “down the Disposals) [as ‘*Jyotishtoma*’ has been spoken of as *synony-*
 “*mous* with ‘*Agnishtoma*’]. While if the Context belonged, in com-
 “mon, to the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses,—then it would be
 “only right to speak of the Disposal with regard to each of them,
 “with a conditional ‘*if*’; on the other hand, if the Context did not
 “belong to these *Terminuses*, then, even without the word ‘*if*’, the
 “relationship of every one of them (with the particular Disposals)
 “would be readily recognisable; just as in the case of the sentence
 “*Dvādaçāhīnasya*. With regard to details laid down in the Context
 “of the *Jyotishtoma*, we could not have such conditional declarations
 “as that ‘*yadi Jyotishtomaḥ*, etc.’; As such conditional declarations
 “are possible only when there are several things available at hand
 “(equally connectible with the Details in question). For this reason
 “also, we must regard the Context as belonging equally to all the
 “Terminuses.

“II. There is yet another sentence indicative of the same conclu-
 “sion: ‘*Āgnēyamajamagnishtoma ālabhēta, Aindrāgnamukthyē dviṭi-*
 “*yam, Aindram Vrishnim shodaçini tṛtiyam.*’ This mention of the
 “‘second’ and ‘third’ is explicable only when all the Terminuses are
 “equally related to all the enjoined accessories, as it is only in that
 “case, that all the details directly spoken of in the previous part of
 “context would be connected with all the Terminuses mentioned in
 “the latter part; otherwise if the Terminuses were regarded as second-
 “ary modifications, then, inasmuch as there would be only one such
 “detail (the *Aindrāgna* f.i.) laid down in connection with one *Terminus*

“ (i.e., the *Ukthya*), it would bar the applicability, to the same
 “ *Terminus*, of all the other details, the *Āgnēya* f.i.; and hence there
 “ would be only one such *Detail* with each *Terminus*. [While, in
 “ accordance with the sentence just quoted, we should have the
 “ *Āgnēya* goat only at the *Agnishtoma*, the *Agnēya* as well as the
 “ *Aindrāgna* goat, as the *second*, at the *Ukthya*, and these two, together
 “ with the *Aindra Vrishni* as the *third*, at the *Shoḍaṣi*].

“ *Objection* : ‘ Even though these *Details* (of the goat) are directly
 “ mentioned (in connection with all the *Terminuses*), yet, inasmuch as
 “ one *Terminus* could not be present in the other, the *Detail* laid
 “ down in connection with the previous *Terminus* could not enter into
 “ the other. Because what is called ‘ *Agnishtoma* ’ is that sacrifice which
 “ ends with the *Agnishtoma-Hymn*, and not that which merely contains
 “ that *Hymn*; and similarly that which ends with the *Ukthya Hymn*
 “ could never be finished at the previous *Terminus*; and hence, in that
 “ case, we could not justify the use of the words ‘ *second* ’ and ‘ *third*, ’
 “ in accordance with any theory (either the *Purvapaksha* or the
 “ *Siddhānta*).’

“ *Reply* : True, it would have been equally inexplicable for both
 “ of us if the Goats had been specialised by the *Terminuses* only. As a
 “ matter of fact however, they are based upon the presence of parti-
 “ cular *Hymns*; and as such it is quite possible for the details to be
 “ taken together. It is this what the *Bhāshya* declares as a well-estab-
 “ lished fact, in the sentence ‘ *Dvā hi tatra nimitte, Agnishtomastotram*
 “ *Ukthyastotranca*’.

“ *Question* : ‘ When all the words, *Agnishtoma*, *Ukthya* and *Shoḍaṣi*,
 “ are equally spoken of as applying to the *Terminuses* as well as to the
 “ *Hymns*,—how is it that you hold the particular *goats* to be prompted
 “ by the *Hymns*, and not by the *Terminuses* ? As a matter of fact, we
 “ find that it is the *Terminuses* that, as serving the useful purpose of
 “ bringing about distinct results, are more readily capable of being
 “ taken as the prompting causes of the *goats*.’

“ To this question, some people make the following reply :
 “ (1) Even though the words are common (to the *Hymn* as well as
 “ to the *Terminus*), yet, it is with a view to a more extensive scope of
 “ the scriptural text, that we take them as specified by the *Hymns*.

“ (2) Or, the words are applicable to the *Terminuses* as qualified
 “ by the particular *Hymns*; and hence so long as we can take the
 “ animals as prompted by the previously-cognized qualifications
 “ (*Hymns*), we cannot rightly take it to be due to the subsequently-
 “ cognized *Terminus*.

“(3) Or, in accordance with the *Ākṛtyadhikarana* (I—iii—30 *et. seq.*), “the words denote the *Hymns* directly, while the *Terminuses*, they only “indicate indirectly; and it is only when the acceptance of the directly “denoted is incompatible, that we can have recourse to what is indirect- “ly indicated. And the Hymn also can be taken, through the presence “of the Locative affix (in the sentence ‘*agnishtomē alabhēta*’), as the “prompting cause. Even though the Hymns may not bring about “distinct results, yet, on the sole strength of Direct Declaration, we “could, quite reasonably, accept them as *prompting causes*,— just as “in the case of the ‘*breaking*’ (in the sentence ‘*bhinnē juhōti*’).

“(4) Or, lastly, we accept the Hymns as the prompting cause, in “accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*sandigdheṣhu vākyaçēṣhāt*’ (I—iv—29): Even “though the *Terminuses* from the Principal Denotation (of the words “‘*Agnishtoma*,’ etc.), yet we accept the Hymns as the prompting “cause, through indirect interpretation, based upon the *Vākyaçeshu* “(i.e. subsequent sentences bearing upon the subject). That is to say, “in continuation of the sentence, ‘*āgnēyamajamagnishtoma ālabhēta*’ we “find the words ‘*Āgnēyo hyaginshltamah*’; and the meaning of this is “that the *Āgnēya goat* is to be employed at that *Agnishtoma* which is “*Agnēya* (that which belongs to the Deity of Agni); and then we find that “it is the *Hymn*, and not the *Terminus*, which belongs to the Deity of “Agni, which is the Deity to whom the Hymn is addressed. As for the “*Terminus*, it consists of the *cessation of operations*; and as such it is a “negative entity; consequently it could not be required by the Deity. “Then again, as for the Deities appearing in connection with the various “repetitions of the Sacrifices, those also pertain to the *Hymn*, and not to “the *Terminus*. Nor could the Repetition itself be taken as the “‘*Terminus*’; because what is signified by the root ‘*san + sthā*’ is the “*state of indifference* that follows after the completion of an Action. “Nor could one thing (the *Terminus*) be spoken of as connected with “the Deity of another (the Hymn).

“The same may be said with regard to the *Ukthya* and the *Shodaçi*. “In fact by certain sentences, such as ‘*Aindrāgnāni Ukthyāni*’ it is “clear that these refer to *Hymns*, and not to the *Terminuses*, because “these latter are never spoken of as ‘*Ukthyāni*’.

“Thus then the specification of the Goats being due to the “*Hymns*, it is only right that they should be employed together.

“Objection: ‘Even if we regard the *Ukthya*, etc., as mere second- “ary modifications, inasmuch as the sacrifices of the animals (the “*Āgnēya goat*, etc.) lead to invisible (transcendental results), they could “never be performed in the place of one another; and hence it would

“be only natural for all the animals to be employed together. Because, it is not necessary that a Direct Declaration should always set aside that Declaration whose existence can only be a matter of Inference; as a matter of fact, there can be such a rejection only when there is a contradiction between these, and a contradiction is possible only when (both the Declarations, Direct and Inferential) pertain to one and the same subject. That is to say, if the mere fact of one Declaration being directly mentioned in the Veda were the sole reason for the setting aside of all other declarations bearing upon the question, there would be nothing that would not be set aside,—no matter whether it pertain to the same Sacrifice or to others, whether it bring about visible or invisible results, and whether it occur in the same process or not. And certainly this is very far from desirable; and hence the joint employment of all the goats is quite compatible with both theories—as will be explained under the *Sūtra* ‘*Prakṛtiliṅgāsamyogāt*’ (X—iv—1), as also under the *Sūtra* ‘*Prājāpatyeshucāmnānāt*’ (X—iv—6), where it will be shown that those that are not incompatible with one another can be taken conjointly.’

“To the above, the following *reply* is made: We have, in the name ‘*Savanīya*,’ a word indicating the connection of these with the Original Primary, all these (several Goats) being spoken of by means of the word ‘*Savanīya*.’ And hence, through this common Name, all of them come to be regarded as performing the same function. And as such there is a distinct contradiction, which tends to one being set aside by the other.

“*Objection*: ‘If such be the case, then, even in a case where certain things are equally related to a number of enjoined details, there would be a possibility of the setting aside of the *General* by the *Particular* because the Animals spoken of first, being recognised as having a more extensive scope, come to be taken as *general*, while those spoken of later on, being more limited in their scope, are taken as *particular*; and certainly the general, which is more extensive in its scope, is always set aside by the Particular, whose scope is limited.’

“To this some people make the following *reply*: It is only the last of all which, having no scope at all and thus being the most particular of all, would set aside all the rest; and the middle one could not have any such rejective potency. Because even though their scopes may vary, their authority and means of cognition remains the same. For instance, the *Agnēya* goat, being employed at the four Terminuses, is ‘common’ (or general); and so is the *Āindrāgna* also, which belongs to three Terminuses. And the effort necessary for getting

“at the former is just the same as that for getting at the latter. As
 “for the *Ewe* (the last of the animals mentioned), however, it does not
 “matter even if it be due wholly to the Terminus itself; because there
 “is no other Terminus of the *Jyotishtoma* beyond that (at which the
 “*Ewe* is employed); and as such, there could be no rejection of this
 “last one.

“This explanation however is scarcely admissible. For even
 “though there be no rejection, yet it could be taken only as an option-
 “al alternative; because we do not find any case where two things,
 “serving exactly the same purpose, are both employed at one and the
 “same time (according to the law *Tulyārthānām vikalpak*). And thus
 “you have a most undesirable *Noose*, as it were, on each side of yourself.
 “That is to say, if, for the sake of their being taken together, you admit
 “of even the slightest difference in their functions, then this *conjoint*
 “*appearance* would be quite possible, even in accordance with the
 “theory that the Terminuses are mere modifications of the *Jyotishtoma*;
 “and then, if, for the sake of showing that in this latter case, there is
 “a rejection of the one by the other, you admit the functions of the
 “two to be exactly the same, then, even in accordance with the
 “theory that all the Terminuses are equally related to the enjoined
 “details, there could be no conjoint employment at all; just as in the
 “case of the *Vrihi* and the *Yava*; nor would the declaration of *conjoint*-
 “*employment* support the *Pūrvapaksha* only; the *Siddhānti* also
 “will speak of it—in *Sūtra* 45,—only on the strength of an Indica-
 “tive Force, which he puts forward as *Direct Declaration*, simply
 “because there is no other way for it.

“Hence, it becomes absolutely necessary for us to indicate some
 “such point of difference as would show the *Pūrvapaksha*, and
 “not the *Siddhānta* theory to be supported by the said ‘Declaration.’
 “And this point of difference is as follows: In accordance with the
 “*Pūrvapaksha*, all the Animals would be equally present in all the
 “subsidiaries; and the mere name (*Savanīya*) could not preclude
 “them, as they would have been brought in by reason of that fact.
 “That is to say, all the Animals would be liable to be employed at all
 “the Terminuses; and hence, the absence, in the previous Terminuses,
 “of the Animals mentioned subsequently, would be due to the simple
 “fact of there being no cause for their presence at these; but the
 “previously mentioned Animals would certainly be employed at the
 “subsequently mentioned Terminuses; as there would be a direct cause
 “for this; specially as this is distinctly indicated by Syntactical Con-
 “nection. And then, the question being as to—(1) whether we should

“ take all of them to be syntactically connected, by the name (*‘savanīya’*)
 “ and then take them either as setting aside one another, or as optional
 “ alternatives, or (2) in view of the fact of all of them being employed
 “ conjointly, as indicated by Syntactical Connection, we should take
 “ every one of them as serving distinct functions.--we cannot but
 “ conclude, on the strength of Syntactical Connection, that they should
 “ be all employed together. Just as, in the case of the *Prayājas* and
 “ the *Anuyājas*, even though they have a single name, yet, on the
 “ strength of Syntactical Connection, they are taken as having distinct
 “ functions, and as such, to be employed conjointly.

“ In accordance with the *Siddhānta* theory, on the other hand,
 “ they would have to be taken as having the same function, in accord-
 “ ance with the indication of their common Name ; while by Implica-
 “ tion, they would have distinct functions, and as such they would be
 “ employed conjointly ; but, inasmuch as the Name, forming part of
 “ the Direct Injunction, would be endowed with superior authority,
 “ it would be necessary for us to take all of them as serving the same
 “ function ; and then, there being a contradiction amongst them, they
 “ would set aside one another. As a matter of fact, every modification
 “ (as the *Siddhānti* regards the Terminuses to be) stands in need of some
 “ words indicative of its Original Primary ; and hence the animals could
 “ be taken as serving the functions of one another. In the case of the
 “ *Pūrvapakṣa* however, every one of them being equally related to the
 “ Injunction, there can be no presence of words indicative of any
 “ Original Primary ; and hence, in this case, there is nothing that could
 “ lead us to take the Animals as serving the functions of one another.

“ Some people explain the point of difference between the two
 “ theories, in the following manner : In accordance with the *Pūrvapak-*
 “ *ṣa*, we regard the actions to be distinct, on account of their being
 “ related to such Deities and Substances as are independent of one
 “ another ; while in accordance with the *Siddhānta*, what is done by the
 “ sentences is merely the laying down of certain accessories, with
 “ reference to the sacrifice pointed out by Implication ; and hence there
 “ would be only one sacrifice, and no second, or third.

“ But, though this Injunction of Accessories may be possible, in
 “ the case of the *Aindrāgna* Animal, yet, it could not be possible in the
 “ case of the *Aindra Sarasvatī* ; as the Injunction of several Substances
 “ and Deities would involve a syntactical split ; and hence in this case,
 “ the Actions could not but be regarded as distinct.”

“ For this reason, we offer the following explanation : The
 “ question being as to--(1) whether the distinct action laid down should

“be regarded as leading to a distinct *Apūrva*, or (2) only as helping in the accomplishment of the *Apūrva* of the original *Savanīya* Sacrifice,—we are led to the conclusion that, inasmuch as the only use of the Action possible is that with reference to the previously-ascertained *Apūrva*, it is not proper to assume another *Apūrva*, and then to take the Action as bringing about this latter. Similarly, in the case of the *Apūrva* of the *Savanīya*, the liability of whose performance is shown by Implication,—at the time that it would be seeking for the means to its accomplishment, it could not abandon the directly-enjoined *Savanīya*, and take to an altogether different *Savanīya*; as in all cases, a new factor is admissible, only when the original is found to be absolutely inadmissible. As for the operation contained in the Sacrifice, it has its relationship definitely ascertained by means of the Original *Apūrva*; and as such, it cannot be taken as related to any other *Apūrva*.

“*Question*: ‘How could the other *Savanīya*, not having its potency definitely ascertained, help in the accomplishment of the Original *Apūrva*?’

“*Answer*: Exactly in the same manner as in the case of the *Pūrvapaksha*, the other *Apūrva* leads to the operation of the *Sacrifice*.

“*Question*: ‘What then would be the difference between the two theories?’

“*Answer*: When the Sacrificial Operation stands in need of *Apūrvas*, then, in that case, the *Apūrva* of the Modificatory *Savanīya* is not duly recognised; and hence the said operation could fall in with this *Apūrva*. When, however, it is the *Apūrva* that stands in need of the Action (Sacrificial Operation), then, inasmuch as we obtain the idea of a distinct Action, connected with the word ‘*Savanīya*’, which is indicative of the Original Primary,—it rejects the Original Action. As regards the Original Sacrifice, there are opportunities, in it, for assuming distinct *Apūrvas*; and hence we assume four distinct *Apūrvas* as following in the wake of the four *Savanīyas* that are laid down. And among these it is not distinguishable, which of them is assumed before the other, and which, for this reason, could be related to another means (Action). Specially as, at the time that we are looking into the Actions, what we are cognisant of are the mere forms of the Actions themselves; and simultaneously with these comes the assumption of the corresponding *Apūrvas*; and thus also no differentiation is possible. In the case of the *Siddhānta* however, it is distinctly recognised that it is the Original *Apūrva* that is the first to be assumed; and hence it being absolutely neces-

“sary to abandon some one of the Actions, it is the Original Action
“that is found capable of being abandoned; and hence, in this case,
“we would have the rejection of this Original Action.

“*Objection*: ‘In accordance with the *Siddhānta* also, we find that
“the subsequent Terminuses are mere modifications of the *Agnishtoma*
“Terminus,—and not that they are modifications of one another; and
“as such it is only the *Āgnēya* goat (connected with the *Agnishtoma*)
“that would be set aside by the others; and hence, in regard to all
“of them, what should have been asserted is that—no second *could be*
“perceived; and hence, wherefore should it have been declared that
“no third is perceptible?’

“*Reply*: This objection does not affect the case; because if what
“the *Bhashya* meant to declare were the *non-perception of mutual rejection*,
“in the case of the *Aindrāgna* and other Animals, laid down with
“regard to other Actions,—then such a declaration would be wholly
“groundless (as there is no rejection of the subsequently mentioned ani-
“mals). As a matter of fact, however, it speaks of a mere ‘non-
“perception’; and this is quite applicable to all the three animals,
“as the first, the *Agnēya*, is actually rejected, while as for the
“middle ones (The *Aindrāgna* and the *Aindra Vrishṇi*), there is no
“possibility of the presence of these (and so there would be *non-*
“perception of all the three). And thus too, the *Āgneya* would
“be rejected; and this is what is meant by the declaration—‘*napūrvah*
“*pūrvah parēṇa*, etc.’

“For these reasons, it must be admitted that all the Terminus-
“es are equally related to the enjoined Accessory Details.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (43): *The Terminuses are mere modifications
(of the Jyotishtoma); because, being spoken of in
connection with distinct desirable results, they are
equal to the Nitya.*

The *Ukthya* and the other *Samsthās*, being so many particular
Terminuses, being laid down as leading to distinct desirable results,
stand in need of a substrate with an end; and as such they enter
into the Original *Jyotishtoma*, by modifying its inherent Terminus
of the *Agnishtoma*; and it is for this reason that they are spoken of as
its ‘Modifications.’

Objection: “It is only when the *Ukthya*, etc., have become
“endowed with the character of *Terminuses*, that they stand in need of
“something with an end. As a matter of fact, we find that, they have

“no such character of ‘Terminus,’ before they have been connected with the *Jyotishtoma*; as the word ‘Terminus’ stands in need of a beginning and a middle. Then, if that Connection with the “*Jyotishtoma* be the first to be established, then, in that case, they would, from the very beginning, come to be recognised as being subordinate to the *Sacrifice*; and as such they would have no connection with any result desired by *man*; and as this would constitute an equality with the *Nitya* (‘*sa nityasya samatvāt*’) they would cease to be known as ‘modifications.’ Then again, the Holding, etc. (of the Vessels), being distinctly laid down with reference to a distinct Result, how could we recognise any connection between the Terminuses and a desirable Result?”

I. To this some people make the following reply: Even if there be a connection of the *Holding*, etc., with the Result, the present *Adhikaraṇa* would be quite explicable and reasonable; as the question, in that case, would be as to the Injunction of Details being for the sake of the *Jyotishtoma* or for that of the *Holding*, etc. And as for the word ‘Terminus’ (‘*Samsthā*’), inasmuch as these *Holdings*, etc., are laid down at the end, they have a distinct relationship with an end; and as such, the name ‘*Samsthā*’ (Terminus) can very well apply to them. That is to say, we have the Injunction of these, in the passage ‘One desiring Cattle should hold the *Ukthya*; one who desires power and virility should hymn by means of the *Shodaṣi*, etc.’, etc., wherein we find one action (*Hymning* f.i.) laid down as appearing at the end of the previous Action (*the Holding*); and as such these Actions come to be spoken of as other ‘Terminuses.’

II. Other people offer the following explanation: In the case in question, the *Holding*, etc., are such as are already known to be performable, as subsidiaries to the *End* leading to a distinct desirable result; and hence, the sentence quoted being only meant to be an Injunction of the relationship between the particular means and consequences, the *Holding*, etc., are mentioned, merely by way of reference, just like the actions of ‘*nirvapati*’ and ‘*ālabhati*.’ Because when the Injunctive potency of the Affix (in ‘*grhṇīyāt*’) has been transferred (to the Name), the root is used simply for the sake of that affix (being used); and hence the Result would follow from (and belong to) the Name,—just as in the case of the ‘Desire for sense efficiency.’

Objection: “In the sentence, ‘*ukthyan grhṇīyāt*’ on account of the distinct expression of the co-extensiveness (of the Name ‘*Ukthya*’ with the action of Holding, etc.), the Name would belong to these ‘Holdings, etc., only.’”

Reply : It is not so ; it is the *End* itself, which, through its connection with the *Ukthya Hymn*, is called "*Ukthya*," and this is applied, figuratively, to the *Holding*, which is connected with that *End*. And so long as a word can be taken in its direct sense, we cannot take it in any secondary or figurative sense. And as a matter of fact, we find that the words '*Ukthya*,' etc., are always used as co-extensive with the word '*Yajña*' (Sacrifice),—e.g. (1) '*Ukthyēna yajēta*' '*Ukthyo yajñah*'; (2) '*Shodaṇinā yajate*' '*shodaṇi yajñah*'; and as there is no such sacrifice as the *Shodaṇi*, the use of this name in the last sentence is based upon the fact of its denoting the *End* (or *Terminus*), which is not altogether distinct from the sacrifice itself, and not upon that of its denoting either the *Holding* or the *Hymn*. Then again, the Masculine gender of '*Shodaṇi*' could be explicable, only if it denoted the *Terminus* ('*samāpti*') ; as it is only a word in the Neuter gender that could denote the *Hymn* (Stotra). As for the Masculine gender that we sometimes find used in connection with the *Hymn*,—e.g., '*Ekaviṃśaḥ shodaṇi*'—that should be regarded as a figurative use. Consequently, inasmuch as, in the case in question, we find the word '*shodaṇi*' (in the Masculine gender), in the subsequent portion of the sentence, we conclude that it denotes the *Terminus*. (3) Then again, we have the sentence—'*Atirātreṇa prajākāmam*,'—where the word '*Atirātra*' is found to be distinctly denotative of the *Terminus*. Because there is no other action mentioned in this ; as for the root '*yaji*' (to sacrifice), that too is used only as subservient to the signification of the Causative affix ; and it would involve a deal of trouble to take it as the predominant factor. Consequently the sentence cannot but be taken as pointing out the connection of the particular Result (obtaining of offspring) with that *Terminus which is reached after the night is over*. If the Result were connected with the *Holding* and the *Hymn*, then, inasmuch as they are independent actions in themselves, they would not stand in need of any other action ; and hence they would have to be performed independently by themselves. And in that case we could not find any use for their mention in the particular Context ; nor could we find any explanation for the use of the words '*Ukthya*,' etc. For this reason also it is the *Terminuses* that lead to the particular results.

Question : " How could there be a *Terminus*, before its connection with the Sacrifice ? "

1. In answer to this, some people quote the *Smṛiti text*—' There are seven *Terminuses* of the *Soma*, (1) the *Agnishṭoma*, (2) the *Atyagnishṭoma*, (3) the *Ukthya*, (4) the *Shodaṇi*, (5) the *Atirātra*, (6) the *Vājapeya*,

and (7) the *Āptoryamā*,—which distinctly shows that the word '*Samsthā*' signifies the *Terminus* of all Soma offerings; and as such it excludes all other Sacrifices, save the *Soma sacrifice*, and there too, through Context, it comes to rest in the *Jyotishtoma*.

II. Others, however, offer the following reply: In the course of a certain particular Repetition of the *Jyotishtoma*, we come across another *Terminus*, which, as soon as it appears, comes to be known by the names of '*Ukthya*,' etc., and becomes connected with certain definite results. And through the superior authority of Direct Declaration (which connects the *Terminus* with distinct desirable results), we reject the fact of these being subservient to the Sacrifice, which is indicated by the Context. As for the relationship of the Container and the Contained (subsisting between the *Terminuses* and the *Jyotish-toma* Sacrifice), that is accepted, on account of its being quite compatible with the aforesaid Direct Declaration.

III. With regard to the present question, there is yet another theory; it is as follows: At the very outset, a certain action, spoken of by the words '*Ukthya*,' etc., becomes connected with a certain desirable result (by means of the sentence '*Paçukāma Ukthyam grhṇīyāt*'). And then, on seeking after this particular action, we come to recognise, through another Direct Declaration, a particular *Terminus* of the *Jyotishtoma* as that Action.

IV. Or, the *Ukthya* is a particular Repetition of the *Jyotishtoma* itself; and, through another Declaration, it enters at the close of the *Jyotishtoma*; and as such, comes to be laid down with reference to a particular desirable result; and then it comes to be called '*Samsthā*' ('*Terminus*'), by reason of the fact of the Sacrifice being completed in, or by, that particular Action.

V. Others hold that '*Samsthā*' ('*Terminus*') is the name of that *cessation of action* which follows after the last Repetition of the *Jyotishtoma* Sacrifice; and inasmuch as that *cessation* has not the nature of an action, it could not be the means of bringing about a desired result; and hence the sentence laying down the *Samsthā* must be taken as enjoining the *sacrifice* characterised by the presence of that *cessation*.

VI. There is yet another explanation offered by some; it is this: Inasmuch as there is nothing too much for Direct Declaration, there could be no incongruity in the fact of a negative entity (*the cessation of action*) being laid down as the means of leading to a definite result. In fact, we do often find such declarations as that—'the *not-doing* of the *enjoined*, as well as the *doing* of the *prohibited*,' etc.—which

distinctly speaks of a *negation*, the *not-doing*, as causing *sinfulness*. Or, we can regard the *cessation from action* as involving a *positive mental action*, in the shape of a determination to remain inactive; and thus there can be no such incongruity as urged above.

Then, as to how a definite result follows from an accessory detail, and how the *Nitya* action is modified by the Accessory calculated to bring about a definite result,—we should refer to the '*Indriya kāmādhikaraṇa*' (II—ii—25, etc.) and the '*Godohanādhikaraṇa*' (III—vi—10). This is what is meant by the *Bhūshya*-declaration—'In such cases we find results following from the Accessories.' In fact, the Vedic declaration also that we have is that '*one desiring Cattle* should get hold of the *Ukthya*,' and not '*one who desires the Jyotishtoma*' or '*the holding of the Ukthya*.' And this distinctly shows that the *Ukthya* (as bringing about a definite desirable result) cannot be regarded as subservient to the Sacrifice. Because, if it were subservient to a Sacrifice, then, even without the word '*Kāma*' ('*desiring*'), the *Ukthya* would be recognised as something that should be done, for the simple reason of its helping in the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. If what is meant to be done is the mere *getting hold of the Ukthya*, then it would be implied by the very nature of things that the Inflection is meant for one who desires the *holding of the Ukthya*;—that is to say, for one who would be seeking for the due bringing about of the mere *holding of the Ukthya*. But both these contingencies are avoided by the addition of the word '*kāma*.'

Thus then, being meant to bring about definite desirable results, the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses must be regarded as *modifications* (of the *Jyotishtoma*);—in accordance with the Law relating to the *Milking Vessel* (III—vi—10). And when we come to consider the question as to the process by which they should be performed, we find the process of the *Jyotishtoma* pointed out, by Implication, as that to be adopted in these cases.

Question: "In what way is the process of the *Jyotishtoma* taken up by the Terminuses? (1) If it is by Proximity, then all of them will have to be regarded as equally connected with the enjoined details (and this would not be acceptable for the *Siddhānti*). Nor is mere Proximity enough reason for the Implication (of the presence of the accessories of the original sacrifice at its Modifications); as such Implication will be shown later on to be due to *Similarity*. (2) If it be by reason of their serving the functions of the *Jyotishtoma*,—then, all that we can say is that the causal efficiency of this fact has been already set aside. Nor are the *Dikṣaṇīyā*, etc., details belonging to

“the Terminuses; and hence they could not be transferred from one
 “Terminus to the other serving the functions of the former. Nor do
 “the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses serve the functions of the
 “*Jyotishtoma*; and as such they could not obtain the accessory details
 “of this latter sacrifice. (3) The same reasoning serves to set aside
 “the view that the Process comes in by Implication: that is to say,
 “one who holds that the Details of the *Jyotishtoma* would come in at
 “the Terminuses, by Implication, for him also, there would be no
 “similarity, to serve as the basis of that Implication. Though the
 “*Agnishtoma* has a certain similarity with the other Terminuses, yet
 “there is no sort of similarity of the *Jyotishtoma* to the *Ukthya* and
 “the other Terminuses; and hence the *Jyotishtoma* cannot be regarded
 “as the Original archetype of these Terminuses—(and hence the Pro-
 “cedure of that Sacrifice could not come into these latter, through the
 “Implicatory Injunction that the Modification should be done in the
 “same way as the Original’). It is for these reasons that the Author
 “of the *Bhāshya* has kept silent with the mere declaration that it
 “was due to Proximity. And hence it becomes all the more incumbent
 “upon you to explain the difficulties raised above.”

Answer: That this is a case of Implication we have already shown above. Nor is *Similarity* the only ground for Implication. That is to say, we have already shown, in connection with the sentence ‘*Dadhñendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*,’ (under *Sūtras* II—ii—25 *et. seq.*), that even without *similarity*, we have an Implication (of the accessories of *Homa*), for the simple reason that, without the *Homa* the result spoken of could not come about. All that *Similarity* could do in such cases, is to point to the particular Original Sacrifice (whose Accessories would come into the Modifications in question); and it could not do anything in the shape of bringing in any transcendental aid to bear upon the sacrifices. Hence in the case in question, even without similarity, the *Jyotishtoma* comes to be regarded as the substratum of the Terminuses, on the sole ground of *Proximity*. It is this ‘*Proximity*,’ and not the Proximity of the *Dikshanīyā*, etc., that has been spoken of in the *Bhāshya*. Because when the *Jyotishtoma* has been accepted as the substratum of the Terminuses, it can very well indicate the presence of such of its operations as are due to the *Apūrvas* of the *Dikshanīyā* and the other details; and this establishes the fact of there being an Implication of these.

Question: “How is it that the Procedure in question is taken as
 “belonging to the *Nitya* (*Jyotishtoma*) only, and not as belonging to
 “the *Kāmya* (Terminuses) only, or to both, in common?”

The theory held by the Questioner is that the Procedure belongs to

both in common; the alternative—that it belongs to the *Kāmya* only—has been put forth simply by way of a bold assertion, made on account of the unbearable character of the aforesaid *Siddhānta* theory; the sense of the Question being as follows: “If without any reason, you declare that the Procedure belongs to the *Nitya* only, then, why should you not stick to the more reasonable theory that it belongs to the *Kāmya* only? If you do not accept this latter view, because of its not having any reasons in support of it,—then you should accept the only reasonable view, that the Procedure belongs, in common, to the *Nitya Jyotiṣhtoma* as well as to the *Kāmya Terminuses*. If without any reasons, you should persist in holding that the Procedure belongs to the *Nitya* only, simply because you wish it so,—well, in that case, why should not it be taken as belonging to the *Kāmya* only, because we wish it so? If this latter view be rejected for want of reasons in support of it, then you should accept the strictly reasonable view that it belongs to both.”

The Author of the *Bhāṣhya*,—not brooking this swaggering exaggeration, and thinking that the Arguments, brought forward against the theory of the Procedure belonging to the *Kāmya* only would be of use in the refuting of the last alternative theory, that it belongs to both,—proceeds to refute the former theory, in the sentence—‘*yatra yatra guṇe kāmah, tatra tatra kriyāyām sādhyā-mānāyām nānyathā.*’ The sense of this is that, if the Accessory, could, by itself (independently of all Action), take up the Procedure (made up of the *Dikṣanīyā*, etc.),—then what you say would be possible. But the Accessory could take up the Procedure, only if this latter were connected with the Instruments only, or if the Accessory itself were the qualification of the *Bhāvanā*. As a matter of fact, however, we find, that the Procedure is not connected with the Instruments, as has been shown above: and at the beginning of *Adhyāyas* VII and IX also, it will be declared that—with regard to the *Bhāvanā*, there arises a question as to ‘how it is to be accomplished,’ and not as to ‘how, by means of the Instruments, it is to be accomplished.’ That *Bhāvanā*, in which the Instruments consist of that which is denoted by the Verbal Roots,—in such a *Bhāvanā* alone, do the Instruments, independently of everything else, attain to the subsequent relationship of the Procedure, indicated in accordance with the Law of the ‘*Arunaikahāyani*’ (*Sūtras* III—i—12, etc.). But in the case of that *Bhāvanā* where the Instrument consists of the Accessories,—inasmuch as there could be no Instrumentality without a particular Root-meaning, there is always a need for something definitely expressed by the verbal Root, which would

serve as the object to be accomplished ; because mere *activity in general* could not be brought about by the Accessories. Nor is the Accessory capable of serving as a general Instrument, unless it has served to accomplish a particular action. Consequently, at that particular *Bhāvanā*, wherein the existing Accessory takes up the Procedure, the denotation of the Root is found to take the very first place. And thus, the two—the *Root meaning* and the Instrumental Accessory—come to be regarded as restricting or qualifying one another, just as in the case of the '*Arunakāhāyani*' (*Sutra* III—i—12). If the Root-meaning were not capable of taking up the Procedure, then it might not take it up. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Root-meaning leads to a distinct desirable result, and serves to qualify the *Bhāvanā* which is the way to the taking in of the Procedure ; and as such, it could not but take up the Procedure.

And thus all the following four agencies lead to the taking up of the Procedure by the Root-meaning : (1) without the particular Root-meaning the *Bhāvanā* is not capable of taking up the Procedure ; (2) the Accessory also is not capable of doing so, until it has brought up the Root-meaning ; because there can be no *Bhāvanā* wholly independent of the Root-meaning ; and because it is absolutely impossible for the mere action 'to do' to be performed ; and lastly, because the Accessory itself is not an *action* ; (3) the Procedure also, betaking itself to the Accessory, cannot reach it, after having passed over the Root-meaning ; and as such it falls into this latter ; (4) the Root-meaning also, being, by itself, in need of the Procedure, is quite capable of taking it up, even though it may have been meant for the Accessory ; and as such why should it abandon that Procedure ?

Thus then, in the case in question, the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses that are laid down with reference to distinct desirable results, being recognised as resting in the *Jyotishtoma*,—when they stand in need of a Procedure, they find presented before them, by the Context, such details as the *Dikshanīyā* and the rest ; and inasmuch as these latter have no other way of reaching those, they inevitably enter into the *Jyotishtoma*. Because the *Ukthya*, etc., being of the nature of Terminuses, cannot, independently of the *Jyotishtoma*, take up those details ; nor does the *Jyotishtoma* give them up when they come to enter into it. This is what is meant by the *Bhāshya* declaration—'*nāsau sādhyasyābhavanti sādhanēna sambandhyatē.*' The particular Procedure is enjoined in this way : 'For the sake of such and such results, the means employed should be the *Ukthya*, etc., and that in such and such a way,'—i.e. in such a way as to make it lead to the

fulfilment of those results ; and hence there being a touch of the verb 'to do,' there is a distinct relationship with the *Bhāvanā*. Under the circumstances, there is no such way by which the Procedure could make the *Ukthya*, etc., efficient means of accomplishing the result, independently of the Root-meaning.

Though the word used by the *Bhāṣhya* (page 385, line 7) is *a-sādhya-mānayām kriyāyām*, yet what is meant is ' *ananugrhitāyām* '—' the action not being aided.' Some people explain ' *tēna sādhyamānayām* ' as = ' *Ukthyādīnā sādhyamānayām* ;' but inasmuch as this would involve an abandoning of the previously-mentioned Procedure, the whole would become entirely irrelevant ; and further, the mention of ' *tatra tatra kriyāyām sādhyamānayām* ' would be a useless repetition. Consequently one who requires a Procedure for the Accessory which would serve as the means, must admit that the Accessory belongs to the *Root-meaning*, which is what has to be accomplished.

Having thus laid down the general definition, the Author applies it to the particular case under the consideration :—' *Sādhyaṅca Jyotiṣṭomaḥ* ' (' It is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that has to be accomplished ') ; and hence the Accessories cannot be regarded as belonging to the *Kāmya* (Terminuses) only.

The opponent then puts forward the more Authoritative second alternative—" Why then should not the Accessories be regarded as " belonging to both (the *Nitya Jyotiṣṭoma* and the *Kāmya Terminususes*) ? "

The *Siddhāntavādi* replies—*Because they are laid down as Nitya*. In all cases, a common relationship is possible only when there is some sort of uniformity ; in the case in question however, we find no sort of uniformity in the relationship borne by the *Jotiṣṭoma*, and that borne by the *Terminuses*, to the Accessories in question. Because the Accessories, not being connected with any particular desirable results, are laid down as *Nitya* ;—and that would clearly show that the *Dikṣaṇīyā* and the other accessory details should be performed only when we have the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. And even though the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is present, yet if there be no desire for Cattle or other desirable results, there is no possibility of the *Ukthya* and other *Terminuses*. For certainly, it is not necessary to have one *Terminus* while we are having the other. Nor are these *Terminuses* ever devoid of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* ; as this inheres, in its entirety, in every one of them,—just as the *Class* does in every one of the *Individuals*. Consequently, it must be admitted that the Accessory Details as laid down are related to the permanent *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and not to the fleeting *Terminuses*.

Objection : “ Even though the Terminuses are transient, yet, inasmuch as they would have, inhering in them, the *Nitya* (permanent) element of the *Jyotishtoma*, there would be no incongruity in the Details, which are laid down as *Nitya* (being related to the Terminuses) ; as the Injunction of these as *Nitya* would be duly observed in connection with the inhering element of the *Jyotishtoma*. And while this condition (of relationship with the permanent factor of *Jyotishtoma*) is duly fulfilled, there would be no harm in the Details being, at the same time, related to certain transient factors (the Terminuses) also. Because it is only when that which is laid down as transient is related to the Permanent that, that there is an incongruity, and not in cases like those we are dealing with.”

Reply : It is not so, because this would mean an abandoning of the theory of common relationship (of the Details with the *Nitya* and the *Kāmya*) ; because the *Kāmyas* are not capable of prompting the said Details. In a case where, without belonging to the *Nitya* sacrifice, the Details cannot be laid down as permanent,—when the fact of its belonging to the *Nitya* being ascertained, the requirements of the text are all duly fulfilled,—their relationship with the other (i.e. the *Kāmya*) comes about by itself ; and thus too all of them (*Nitya* and *Kāmya*) cannot be regarded as equally related to the enjoined accessories. Otherwise, the Injunction of the Accessory details would be in some such way as that—‘ These Details should be always done in connection with *Jyotishtoma*, and at times, also when there should be a desire for Cattle, etc.’ ; and this would involve a self-contradiction, with regard to a single Injunction.

Objection : “ We can resolve the Injunction into two parts—“ one inferred from the Context, and the other from Direct Declaration ; “ and of these one would lay down the details as permanent, and “ the other would enjoin them as transient.”

Reply : True, the contradiction might be avoided by the difference in the Injunctions of the Performances ; but there would be a distinct self-contradiction in regard to the *prompted* (details) ; inasmuch as they would be following in the wake of both the permanent and the transitory. Thus then, with a view to keep intact the permanent character of these Details (the *Dikshanīyā* and the rest), we must regard the taking up of the procedure also to be permanent. And thus those Details should be regarded as belonging to the *Jyotishtoma*, as it is with this that they are invariably concomitant.

Objection : “ The Agnishtoma Terminus also is *Kāmya*, and hence “ all the Terminuses must be regarded as transitory (on the ground

“of their being *Kāmya*); and as there is no permanent form of the *Jyotishtoma*, apart from these Terminuses,—when the *Jyotishtoma* would take up the *Nitya* Details, all these would, through that sacrifice, become equally related to all the Terminuses; and thus it cannot be ascertained where (in which Terminus) we should have the *Nitya* performance of the *Jyotishtoma*; and hence we are faced, by the Law of Option, to the conclusion that, the Details in question belong to the transitory (*Kāmya*) performances only.”

In reply to the above it is declared—‘*Sa nityasya samutvāt.*’ That is to say the two Injunctions—that of the Details pertaining to the Sacrifice itself, as well as that of those relating to a desired result—are both equal; and hence looking into these two, we conclude, in accordance with the law ‘*ekasya tūbhayaivē samyogaprthakvam*’ (IV—iii—5), that it is as *Nitya* that the performance ending with the *Agnishtoma* is related to the Desire; while that which lays down the others (*i.e.* the *Ukthya*, etc.) being merely related to the particular Desires, are distinctly transitory (optional); and herein lies the difference between the two Injunctions.

[Sūtra 44: Because of repetition, they would occur in the Original.]

Thus then, though the *Ukthya*, etc., are transient, as regards their performances, yet on account of the *Nitya* character of the *Jyotishtoma*, and of the fact of the *Agnishtoma* Terminus also being *Nitya*, as invariably accompanying the *Jyotishtoma*,—which makes the *Agnishtoma* obtain the subsequent portion of the Details taken up by the *Jyotishtoma*,—the Details in question come to be spoken of as ‘belonging to the *Agnishtoma*.’ Or, as regards the two-fold presence of the Details at the *Ukthya*, etc., that which would pertain to the factor of the *Jyotishtoma* would be enjoined directly, while that which would pertain to the factor of the *Ukthya* and other Terminuses would be got at only by means of the Implicatory Injunctions; and this would constitute the difference (between the case of the *Agnishtoma* Terminus and that of the other Terminuses).

Sūtra (45): [The goats] could be employed together; because of the Direct Declaration to that effect.

[This meets the objection urged in *Text*, Page 1110, Line 20.]

There is nothing too much for a qualified Injunction.

Sūtra (46): Because of the preclusion of previous Indications.

We have the text—‘*yadi Agnishtomah, juhoti; yadi Ukthyah, paridhivanakti, na juhoti*’ (‘If it is the *Agnishtoma*, he offers in *Homa* the Butter-remnant; while if it is, *Ukthya*, he paints the *Paridhi* stick with it, and does not offer it in *Homa*’),—where we find that, among the *Kratu-karaṇas* (the Instruments of Sacrifices), the Injunction of the subsequent is accompanied by a reference to the negation of the previous one (‘*na juhoti*’); and this would be explicable only in accordance with the view that these Terminuses are modifications of the *Jyotishtoma*; because what is done by the text quoted is that it precludes (in the latter Sacrifice) what is found to be applicable to it by Implication (that is to say, the *Homa* has been precluded, ‘*na juhoti*, in regard to the *Ukthya*, chiefly because the *Homa* was liable to being done in accordance with the law that ‘the Modification is to be done like the Original’). If the Terminuses were all equally connected with the enjoined Details, then, inasmuch as the Direct cause (of *Homa*, i.e. the *Agnishtoma*) would be in close proximity to the *Ukthya*, and this proximity of the Cause would necessarily bring in its wake the effect (in the shape of the *Homa* of the Remnant and Butter); and thus at the *Ukthya*, we would have both (the *Homa* as well as the *Painting of the Paridhi*); and in that case, the subsequent Preclusion or Prohibition (‘*na juhoti*’) would be that of the previous distinct Injunction; and that would give rise to a syntactical split (in the sentence ‘*yadi Ukthyah, etc.*,’ which would contain an Injunction of the *Painting of the Paridhi*, as well as the prohibition of the *Homa* which has been enjoined in the previous sentence, and whose connection with the *Ukthya* has been established by the Implicating Injunction). Nor can the sentence in question be regarded as containing a *qualified Injunction*, like the sentence ‘*Agnēyamajam..... Aindrāgna Ukthyā Dvīṭiyah, etc., etc.*,’ as the Injunction and Prohibition are of such contradictory characters (that the one could not be taken along with the other); nor is it possible for the sentence to be taken as a *Paryudāsa* (a mere preclusion of *Homa*).

Then again, all that the *Pūrvapakshi* has said in regard to the *Savānīya* animal can be used with advantage, in favour of the *Siddhānta* view. As it is only when the actions (of *Homa* and *Painting*) are due to the Terminuses, that we can explain, on the ground of the absence of the cause (the particular Terminuses), the mention of negation (‘*na juhoti*’), even if all of them were equally related to the

enjoined Accessories ; and in the case of the *Siddhānta* also, inasmuch as the two actions in question would be such as serve only imperceptible (transcendental) results, there would be a liability of both of them (Homa and Painting) being done ; and in support of this we would have the Indications of the Name ‘ *Kratukaraṇa*,’ which would distinctly point to the *Original Sacrifice*.

Some people argue as follows : “ The *Homa* that is laid down in the text quoted is one that serves as the disposal of the Butter that has been left behind at the *Pracaranī Homā* ; and hence when this Disposal will have been effected by the *Painting of the Paridhi*, there would naturally be a negation of the other *Disposal* (by means of *Homa*),—even if the Terminuses were equally related to the enjoined details (that is to say, the said Preclusion is quite compatible with the *Pūrvapakṣa* also). ”

But when we find the sentence laying down the *Homa* as an independent action, it should be explained how we could regard it as a mere Disposal of the Remnant. Then again, even though the Disposal may be effected by the *Homa*, yet it would be quite possible for us to perform the other action of ‘ *Painting the Paridhi* ’ also, in so far as what is directly denoted by the word ‘ *Paridhyāñjanu* ’ (and hence the performance of one Disposal would not necessarily involve the Non-performance of the other). Consequently, the mention of negation (‘ *na juhoti* ’) must be taken as indicative of what we have shown above.

Sūtra (47) : The specific mention of one is due to the presence of particular Accessories.

It has been agreed that—“ that which is not an original Action (but a mere *modification*), could not be spoken of with the conditional “ if,”—as in the case of the *Drādaçāha*. ” But the case of the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses under consideration is not similar to that of the other modifications. Though in the case of these, on account of the incompatibility of the connection of the *Nitya* and the *Kāmya*, the Context cannot take up the Procedure (of the *Nitya*, with reference to the *Kāmya*), yet inasmuch as that would be in close proximity with it, it becomes necessary to make use of the conditional ‘ if.’ Or, it may be that, it is just possible for the unheard of Accessories to be brought in as if they were heard of, through the introduction of a heard of Action to which those Accessories belong ; and in that case, the mention of the *Agnishtoma* (in ‘ *Yadyagnishtomah*, etc.), whose presence is already indicated by the Context, would be by way of a reference to the *Nitya* action. Or, its mention may be taken as laying

down the fact of the particular action ('Homa') being due to the presence of the particular *Hymn* (of the *Agnishtoma-Sāma*); and there can be no incongruity in such a mention.

Then, there arises the question as to what is the use of all this Discussion (in the present *Adhikarana*).

Some people declare that the use is exactly the same as in the case of the *Phalacamaśa* (*Vide sutras III—v—47 et. seq.*).

But with regard to this view we have got to say something; and it is this. It is quite true that that is the use of the present Discussion; but this would not be applicable to the case of all Accessory Details. For instance, all the details of the '*Sadomāna*' and the like, which are laid down with reference to particular desirable results,—even though there be a likelihood of the presence of the other details, by reason of the Implicatory Injunction, yet inasmuch as the particular Details would be found to have a substrate (the *Jyotishtoma*) which is enjoined by Direct Injunction, these latter could not be totally set aside, as in the case of the other Modifications. Because at these other *modifications*, inasmuch as there is no substrate in the shape of the *Jyotishtoma*, it is readily admissible that the Actions, laid down as bringing certain desirable results through particular Accessories, are found impossible to be performed. In the case of the Terminuses, on the other hand, though the Results, spoken of as following from certain Accessories, are not applied by Implication,—yet, inasmuch as the Man desiring those results would naturally wish to do that action, and hence long after the particular Accessories (laid down as bringing about those results),—there would be a possibility of the presence of the enjoined substrate (in the shape of the *Jyotishtoma*); and as such there would be no improbability of the Actions leading to definite results through certain Accessories.

For these reasons we conclude that the use of the Discussion lies in the following fact: There are certain accessories, not belonging to the original *Jyotishtoma*,—such as, the *holding of the Ukthiyā Vessel*, the particular *Ukthya* Hymns and Praises,—which are due solely to the presence of the particular Terminus (the *Ukthya*); and in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*, it would be possible for us to have in this Terminus, the other details of actions calculated to bring about definite results by means of certain accessories introduced by the Implicatory Injunctions of such details as belong to the other (*Shodāci*) Vessel and Hymn; whereas in accordance with the *Siddhānta*, this would not be possible.

There is yet another use of the Discussion; it is as follows: If all

the Terminuses were equally related to the enjoined Details as (held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*) then, at those Sacrifices which are recognised Modifications of the *Jyotiṣtoma* (in accordance with the law '*Vyaktāsu tu samasya*'), we would have all the Terminuses as optional alternatives; while, in accordance in the *Siddhānta*, it is the *Agnīṣtoma* Terminus alone that could find a place at those Sacrifices; while as for the Details connected with the *Ukthya* and the other Terminuses, they could be possible only in a case where we would have distinct Injunctions of these Terminuses. And herein lies the real use of the present *Adhikaraṇa*.

Thus ends the *Sixth Pāda* of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.—PĀDA VII.

ADHIKARAṆA (I).

[The *Grass*, etc., belong to the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* as well as to their Subsidiaries.]

Sūtra (1): “*Because of the particular Context, that which is not connected (with Direct Declaration) ‘belongs to the Principal Action only.’*”

In continuation of the subject of common or uncommon Injunction, we proceed to consider,—through the question of contradiction and non-contradiction of Syntactical Connection and Context,—the question as to whether the *Altar* spoken of in the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa* Context, and the Details of *Digging*, etc., laid down in connection with that *Altar*, as also the *Grass* and the Details of *Chopping*, etc., laid down in connection with it, belong to the Principal Sacrifices (of the *Darça Pūrṇamasa*) or to the Subsidiary ones.

And on this question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Though the fact of the Details in question belonging to the Principal as well as the Subsidiaries is distinctly shown by such general declarations as—‘*Vēdyām havīmshi*,’ ‘*Varṣiḥi havīmshi*,’ ‘*Varṣhirlunā*,’ ‘*Vedim Khanati*,’—yet if the Details belonged to the *grass*, etc., independently, then they would have to be performed in connection with the ordinary *grass* also, i.e., that which is used for such ordinary purposes as the thatching of houses, etc. : but inasmuch as such performance of the Details would be absolutely useless, the connection of those with the *Grass* should be regarded as due to the fact of the *grass* bringing about a transcendental result (*Apūrva*). And as this fact of its bringing about an *Apūrva* is not indicated by Syntactical Connection, it must be regarded as indicated by Context. And inasmuch as the Context pertains to the Principal Action only, the Details must be regarded as belonging to this latter only. Even though the Context cannot serve the purposes of specification, yet it is only through the particular character of being

“ the Partaker (*grāhaka*) that it serves to prompt the particular factors of actions; and as such becomes the cause of restricting the Declaration to a particular Action,—as we have shown (under *Sūtra* III—iii—11).

“ The word ‘*asamyuktam*’ (‘not-connected’) means that, even though Syntactical connection indicates the connection of the *Havi* and the *Varhi*, yet there is no connection with anything that is contrary to (not in keeping with) the Context. That is to say, in the case in question, the words ‘*Havish*’ and ‘*Varhih*’ are quite capable of being taken in connection with the Context, and are not unconnected with it, like the *Ahina* (and as such they cannot but be taken as connected with the Principal Action, to which alone the Context belongs) ”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (2): *They belong to all; because the character of the Accessory is not based upon the Context.*

It has been already shown that all the Details are equally related to Syntactical Connection.

It has been argued above, that “ the Context would serve the purpose of prompting the particular factors of actions.” It is in reply to this that we have the clause ‘*atatprayuktatvāt*’;—that is to say, the Context does not serve the purposes of the specification.

Question: “ How can you set aside the well-established fact of “ the Context serving the purpose of prompting the factors of actions? “ How, too, can you accept the much faulty explanation of the character of the *Qesha* (Subsidiary) as being in the form of *Help*, and not in “ that of *being for the sake of something else?* ”

Reply: In cases like the present, the Context can serve the purposes of the prompting cause; because it has been shown under *Sūtra* III—iii—11, that it is only that which is *not connected* with the other means of knowledge that is controlled by Context (while in the present case we have the Connection of Syntax).

Then again, it has been argued above that “ there is no contradiction (between Syntactical Connection and the Context).”

But why should there be no contradiction, when we find that, inasmuch as due predominance attaches to the *Havish* and the *Varhi*, if these accessory details were related to everyone of the Actions, they would come to be recognised as belonging to the Subsidiaries also; and this has got to be set aside in view of the Context.

The opponent puts forward the reason by which he took the Context to be non-contradicted (by Syntactical Connection), on account

of the too extensive application of this Syntactical Connection having been precluded : " The Details would come to be performed in connection with the *Varhi*, etc., employed in ordinary actions also ; and at these, they would be absolutely useless."

To this we offer the following reply : The Syntactical Connection, in its natural functioning, can be set aside from that only where it would be actually useless. As a matter of fact, we find that the Details performed in connection with *Varhi* at the Subsidiary Sacrifices are not useless ; and hence the Syntactical Connection would certainly apply to the case of the subsidiaries, and there would be no improper application involved in this.

It is with a view to this that the *Bhāshya* has declared '*Upakāra-lakṣaṇam hi tat*,' which indicates the *subsidiary character* as consisting of *being for the sake of something else (tādarthya)* ; as one thing is taken as being for the sake of another, when, with regard to the latter, the former is found, by reason of according a much needed help, to be of use.

The *Bhāshya* has used the word '*prakaraṇāt*,' with a view to avoiding of the too extensive application of the Syntactical Connection. But this declaration, at the present stage, would bar the way of the objection contained in the next *Sūtra* ; and hence it must be regarded as put forward too soon ; and as such to be disregarded on the present occasion.

Sūtra (3): Objection : " They could be take themselves to remote " actions."

" *Objection :* " If the Details in question were to be precluded from " the grass, etc., employed in the ordinary actions of the world, simply " on account of their being useless in that Connection,—then, there " would be every possibility of these Details being introduced into these " Actions in connection with which they would not be useless,—f.i. the " grass employed at the sacrifices other than those of the *Darṣa Pūrṇa-* " *māsa* (and certainly these sacrifices would be helped by the transcen- " dental results brought about by these Details). If there be some reason " for precluding the Details from such other actions,—then, the same " reason would apply to the case of the Subsidiaries (of the *Darṣa* " *Pūrṇamāsa*) also (and hence the said Details could not be related " to these Subsidiaries).

" As for the *Saurya* and other such Subsidiaries of the *Darṣa* " *Pūrṇamāsa*, even according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the presence in " them of the Details are indicated by Implication ; and hence it is the

“ ‘*Piṇḍapitryajña*’ (of the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*) which, as being entirely devoid of the Details, either by Direct Injunction or by Implication, should be taken as the basis of the present Discussion. That this *Piṇḍapitryajña* is an entirely new sacrifice, and is not a subsidiary will be shown later on (in Adhyāya IX); and hence the acceptance of the *Siddhānta* view (with regard to this *yajña*) would lead to most undesirable consequences.”

Sūtra (4): Reply: Not so; because of the sentence (being Syntactically connected with the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*),—as shown by the fact of its being subservient to it.

What you say would have been quite possible, if the sentence (*‘Vedyām varhiḥ’*) were an independent one. As a matter of fact however, the sentence, that lays down the Grass, the Altar, and their various Details, is syntactically connected with the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*; that is to say, with the sentence laying down the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*. And for this reason the Details laid down in these sentences must be regarded as belonging to those Grass and Altar, etc., which are spoken of in the sentence that is so connected, and with those mentioned in other sentences. As for the *Piṇḍapitryajña*, it is not found to be mentioned in the sentence laying down the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*; and as such it could never be related to these Details.

Objection: “If the sentences be regarded as syntactically connected with the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*,—such connection could not be got at by any other means save the Context; and inasmuch as this Context would pertain to the Principal (*Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*) only, the Subsidiaries could have no connection with the Details in question.”

Reply: That does not affect our position; because the Details of Chopping, Digging, etc., cannot be directly connected either with the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* or their Subsidiaries; they can be present only in those places where we would have the Grass and the Altar; and these latter again are related to the keeping of the offering materials; and lastly, this keeping of the material also must be that which is spoken of in the sentence laying down the performance of the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices, as a whole. And the keeping of the offering materials in connection with the Subsidiaries also would be included in that Sentence, because all the Subsidiaries along the Primary Action go to make up a single performance (and as such the Details would be as much related to the Primary *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* as to their Subsidiaries).

Objection : “ In the case of the *Prayājas* we find that even though “ they are all included in the single Injunction of Performance, “ yet, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—i—22, they are not regarded “ as subsidiary to one another ; and in the same manner the *Grass* “ could not be related to the offering materials of the Subsidiary Sacri- “ fices (inasmuch both would be equally Subsidiaries to the *Darṣa* “ *Pūrṇamāsa*). ”

Reply : It is not so ; because just as the *keeping* of the offering material of the Primary Sacrifice becomes connected with the Details in question, so, in the same manner, that of the material of the Subsidiary Sacrifices also becomes connected with them as the Subsidiaries of the Subsidiaries. If the meaning of the sentence ‘ *Varhishi āsādayati* ’ (‘ keeps upon the grass ’) were assumed to be that ‘ the material is kept upon that grass which has been brought in for the sake of the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*, ’—then alone could the Details be taken as belonging to the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* only. As a matter of fact, such is not the case. As when, in order to avoid the uselessness of the Details, we make it step beyond the mere form of the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice, should we take them as referring to ‘ that grass which is brought in for the sake of the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*, ’ or to ‘ that which helps in the accomplishment of these Sacrifices ? ’ If we accept the former alternative, then the sentence would become too limited in its scope ; while the latter alternative affords it a more extensive scope ; and it is incumbent upon us to accept that theory which should give the greatest scope possible to the sentence in question. The Subsidiaries of Subsidiaries also are regarded as helping in the accomplishment of the Primary Sacrifice, even though they may not be directly for the sake of this latter ; and we have seen that it is the mere fact of *helping*, and not that of its being for its sake, that constitutes the ground of relationship ; as when a detail is contained in that which does not in any way help the Sacrifice, it cannot accord any help to it ; which cannot be said with regard to that which is not contained in that which is not for the sake of that. This we shall explain latter on, under the *Sūtra* IX—ii—44. As a matter of fact, even without being for the sake of the Primary, we find the *Curd* and the *Milk* merely helping in the *Abhyudīśeṣhti* ; and yet they become connected with the Details of the *Pranīta*.

For these reasons we accept, on the ground of Context, the fact of the sentence in question being syntactically connected with that which lays down the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa*,—the construction being explained as follows : ‘ Those, without the performance whereof the

transcendental result of the *Darṣa Pūṇamāsa* is not duly accomplished,—in all these, the Details in question should be performed.' And inasmuch as we find the imperfections in the materials of Subsidiary Sacrifices causing discrepancies in the Result of the Primary Sacrifice, we must admit the connection, with the subsidiaries also, of those Details which are due to the transcendental result of the Primary Sacrifice.

Sūtra (5): Also because of Indications.

It is only when such Details, as those in question, are accepted as belonging to the Primary as well as to the Subsidiary,—that the '*Abhighāraṇa*,' spoken of in the sentence '*Prayājāṣeṣhēṇa havīmshyā-ghārayati*,' could be taken as belonging to both the Primary and the Subsidiary; and then alone could we justify the declaration '*Sa vai dhruvāmēvagrē, etc.*,' wherein we have an *Order* spoken of as a well-established fact, and hence appearing as a '*Hēluvannigada*' (giving reasons for a certain Injunction,—*Vide* I—ii—26 *et. seq.*). Because such a declaration could be possible only when there would be an *Abhighāraṇa* of the material of the *Ājyabhāga* also (which is a Subsidiary Sacrifice). Otherwise, for the *Dhruvā* also, we could have the *Abhighāraṇa* only as connected with the *Upāmçuyāja*; and in that case there could be no further *Abhighāraṇas*; and as such, it would be absolutely useless to put forward the reason—'*Tato hi prathamāvājya-bhāgaṁ, etc.*'

For these reasons it must be admitted that the Details belong to all (the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries).

ADHIKARANA (2).

[The Purifications of the Master of the Sacrifice belong to the Primary Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (6): *That which is related to the Master of the sacrifice belongs to the Primary; because of the mention of Results.*

The Details which are found to belong to the Master of the Sacrifice, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—viii—4,—with regard to these there arises the question, as to whether they belong to the Master, in his character of the *Performer*, and as such pertain to the Primary Sacrifice as well as its Subsidiaries; or they belong to him, only in the character of the *experiencer* of its results, and as such pertain to the Primary Sacrifice only.

And on this question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“According to the foregoing *Adhikarana*, they must be regarded “as pertaining to all (the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries). “Specially as belonging to the Master, who is equally related to “all Sacrifices, they could help in the accomplishment of all these; “and there is no reason for precluding them from the Subsidiaries.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: The very reason that proves the fact of the Purifications belonging to the Master, would also serve to show that they pertain to the Primary Sacrifice only.

That is to say, if the Details in question belonged to the Master in the character of the *Performer*, then they could be taken as pertaining to all the Sacrifices. As a matter of fact, however, we find that they belong to him in the character of the *Experiencer* of the Result of the Sacrifice. Then again, we find that a neglect of the Purificatory Details would interfere with due experiencing of the Result; whereas even without these details, there is no discrepancy in the character of the *Performer*. And (if the Details belonged to the *Performer*), they

would belong to the Priests also, as these also would be the *Performers*, of certain Actions in connection with the Sacrifices. Then again, it is only with reference to a certain desired result, that one wishes to create certain capabilities (or powers); and that too only in a place where these capabilities did not exist before. And as a matter of fact, what is desired is not the Master's Character of the *Performer*; nor was this Character non-existent, in him, prior to the performance of the Purificatory Details. It is only the Actions bringing in certain capabilities that are called '*Samskaras*' (Purifications); and as such they always betake themselves to the factor of the *Experiencer* of the Result.

Then again, when the result of a certain Action is experienced by the Master, the Purifications pertaining to the character of the *Experiencer* help in that Action alone, in none other. And as a matter of fact, it is the result of the Primary Sacrifice, and not that of the Subsidiaries, that is enjoyed (or experienced) by the Master; as the Subsidiaries affect the Sacrifices only (and do not bring about any results for the Person performing them); and hence it must be admitted that the Purifications in question belong to the Primary Sacrifice only.

Objection : " If the Purifications did not fall within the character of the "*Performer*, then they would become Subsidiaries to the Result (and " that would be against the *Sūtra* '*Phaladevatayoṣṭa IX—i—14*'). "

Reply : This does not affect our position; because the help that is accorded to the Primary Sacrifice consists in that the Performer is made capable of experiencing its Results. Consequently, just as there are many other Subsidiaries bringing about imperceptible results which, while creating a capability for experiencing results, do not fall off from their subsidiary character,—so, in the same manner, we would have in the case of the Purificatory Details under consideration.

The use of the present *Adhikarāṇa* is that, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*, there would be,—and according to the *Siddhānta*, there would not be—the *shaving of the head* and such other actions for the Master, at the *Agnish-mīya* and other such like subsidiaries of the *Jyotishṭoma*.

ADHIKARANA (3).

[The *Saumika Vēdi*, etc., belong to the Primary as well as to the Subsidiaries.]

Sūtra (7): “*Because of connection with the ‘desire to do,’ (they should be regarded as belonging to the Primary only).*”

[In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* we find the sentence—*‘Shatṭṛmṣatprakramā prācī, Caturvinṣatiragrēṇa, tṛmṣajjaghanēna iyati cakshyāmahē’*; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the *Altar*, the Details of whose measurements are herein laid down, belongs to the Primary as well as its Subsidiaries, or to the Primary only.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*, the *Saumika Altar* is regarded as belonging to the Primary Sacrifice only; specially as the sentence *‘Iyati cakshyāmahē syāṅkartum’* distinctly shows that it is laid down for that which one ‘desires to do.’ Because what one ‘desires to do’ is the Primary, which leads to a desirable result,—and not the Subsidiaries, which, though not directly ‘desired to be done,’ are yet done as helping the accomplishment of the Primary.”

Before having completed this *Adhikarāṇa*, by putting forward the *Siddhānta*, the Author starts another discussion.

ADHIKARANA (4).

[The *Touching* belongs to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries.]

Sūtra (8): So also (on account of connection) with Name, (the "*Touching*" should be regarded as belonging to the Primary only)."

[In connection with the *Darṣa Pūrṇamāsa* we find the sentence— '*Caturhotrā pūrṇamāsimabhimṛcēt, pañcahotrā Amāvāsyām* ' (' *Caturhotri* ' is that name of the *Mantra* '*Prthivī hota, etc.*, and *Pañcahotri* of '*Agnirhotā, etc., etc.*'). And with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the *Touching* herein laid down belongs to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries, or to the Primary only.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the words '*Pūrṇamāsi*' and '*Amāvāsyā*' apply "to the Primary Sacrifices only, even though they might be applicable "to the Subsidiaries in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—i—18, yet—they "are applied to the offering materials used at the Primary Sacrifices. "Consequently it is the Offering material used at the Primary Sacrifice "only that is to be touched with the *Caturhotri* and the *Pañcahotri* "*Mantras*."

SIDDHĀNTA (of the former *Adhikarāṇa*).

Sūtra (9): The Result is declared as following from the Primary as performed along with the Subsidiaries; and hence the '*desire to do*' would be related to all of them.

In as much as the *Altar* is a particular place, and *place* and *time* are laid down for the Primary together with its Subsidiaries, the *Altar* (the details of whose measurement are laid down in the sentence '*Shatṛmṣatprathama, etc.*') belongs to all the Sacrifices (the Primary as well as the Subsidiary).

As for the mention of the '*desire to do*,' that too must be taken as pertaining to the Primary together with the Subsidiaries, as the

fulfilment of the Result depends upon the due performance (of the Primary together with its Subsidiaries).

Consequently, the *Altar* being regarded as belonging to the Primary as performed along with the Subsidiaries, it might belong to these latter also. And hence the making of the *Altar* would be necessary at the *Nirūdhapaṇu* and other such Sacrifices, which are the Subsidiary Modifications of the *Agnīshomīya*.

SIDDHĀNTA (of the latter *Adhikaraṇa*).

Sūtra (10): *Because the 'Touching' is spoken of as an accessory, it must be regarded as pertaining to all (Sacrifices).*

[There should be a Touching of the Materials of the Subsidiary Sacrifices also, with the *Caturhotri* and the *Pañcahotri Mantras*; because the Accusative ending in '*Paurṇamāsīm*' and '*Amāvāsyām*' indicates that the '*Touching*' is an action done as accessory to the performance of the *Paurṇamāsī* and the *Amāvāsyā* Sacrifices; and as such it should be done at all Sacrifices whereat it would help in these two Sacrifices; and as a matter of fact, all that is connected with these two *Sacrifices* are regarded as *helping* in them; consequently the *Touching* should be done in connection with the offering materials of the Primary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices.]

Against this explanation of the *Bhāṣya* we have the following objections: "The Declaration,—that 'because the Accusative ending indicates the Touching as an accessory action, therefore it must be regarded as belonging to all Sacrifices'—is not quite relevant. "Because the discussion itself was started on the very supposition that the Touching is an accessory; and as a matter of fact also, the "Accusative ending, whose denotation follows that of the basic nouns "*Paurṇamāsī*' and '*Amāvāsyā*' (which denote the two Primary Sacrifices), shows that the *Touching* is of those materials that are used at "the Primary Sacrifices, and as such it could not prove what is desired "by the *Siddhānti*. Then as for the fact of the *Touching* being for the "sake of the *Amāvāsyā* and the *Paurṇamāsī* Sacrifices, brought "forward by the *Bhāṣya*,—that only supports the *Pūrvapakṣa* view."

In view of these objections, we must explain the *Siddhānta* in the following manner: In the sentence—'*Paurṇamāsīmabhimṛcēt*' what the word '*Paurṇamāsī*' directly denotes is either the particular point of *Time*, or the *Sacrifice*, or the *Sacrifice as qualified by the Time*; but as none of these can be '*touched*,' the word must be taken in its secondary signification. And then, though between the denotations of the Affix

and the Basic word, it is the former that is the predominant factor, and as such the basic noun becomes the subordinate factor (the word '*Paurṇamāsī*' being taken as indicating the *Sacrifice qualified by the particular point of Time*),—yet, in as much as the latter also is not recognized as capable of being *touched*, there arises a confused sort of an idea as to the *Touching* applying to all such Sacrificial accessories as the *Sruva*, etc. (which are found to be capable of being *touched*); and hence it becomes necessary to seek, somewhere else, for the means of ascertaining to which particular object the *Touching* applies; and, for the sake of arriving at a definite conclusion, we must take the denotation of the basic noun ('*Paurṇamāsī*') to be the principal factor, as standing need of the other factors, and as being the first to be cognised (and hence incapable of being taken in the secondary sense); and hence it is the subordinate factor of the Accusative ending that has to be taken in the secondary sense of the Locative, the word '*Paurṇamāsīm*' being taken in the sense of '*Paurṇamāsyām*'; as it is the *Locative*, that is wanted by the Principal factor,—the particular *object* to be *touched* being the *Offering Material* as indubitably pointed out by the fact of the sentence occurring in connection with that. Consequently the sentence must be taken as restricting the *Touching* to the particular *time* or *performance* (of the *Paurṇamāsī* Sacrifice as a whole); and consequently there should be a *Touching* of every one of the materials used at that Sacrifice (whether in connection with the Primary or its Subsidiaries).

Even if the word '*Paurṇamāsī*' were to indicate the *offering material*, then too, in as much as it would indicate the help accorded to it (by the *Touching*), this *Touching* could not but be regarded as belonging to all the offering materials.



ADHIKARAṆA (5).

[The *Initiatory Rite* and the *Sacrificial Fee* pertain to the Primary only.]

Sūtra (11): The Initiation and the Fee pertain to the Primary only; because of the Direct Declaration to that effect.

[In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* there are laid down "three Initiations," and also the "Sacrificial fee of a hundred and twelve"; and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee pertain to the Primary together with the Subsidiaries, or to the Primary alone. And on this point we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"In as much the Men (performing the Sacrifices) are equally "related to the Primary and the Subsidiaries, the Initiations and the "Sacrificial Fee also pertain to all of these.]

"There is an initial objection to the form of the *Pūrvapaksha*, on "the ground of the case of the Initiations being subject to the law "enunciated in *Sūtra* III—vii—6. But some people support it in the "following manner; In all such actions, as the *Purchase of Soma*, etc., "we find the Agent laid down as '*dīkṣhita*' ('Initiated'); and it is a "well-known fact that the Initiations serve the purpose of bringing "about this character of the 'Initiated'; and this character is laid "down as an Accessory for every one of the actions; hence the Initia- "tions come to be regarded as pertaining to the Primary as well as the "Subsidiaries.

"As for the Sacrificial Fees, they serve the purpose of obtaining "the good services of the Priests; and this winning of their good will "helps in the performance, by reason of there being a desire, on the "part of the Master, to obtain the aid of such Priests. And hence, in "accordance with the Law of the *Sūtra* III—vii—7, the Fees come to be "related to the Performance of the Primary along with the Subsidiary "Sacrifices; and hence they must be regarded as belonging to all "of these."

“Then again, it is a perceptible fact that the Priests, obtained “by means of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, perform the Subsidiary Sacrifices also; otherwise if the Fee pertained to the Primary only, the Priests, being paid for performing the Primary only, would not have performed the Subsidiaries; while as a matter of fact we find that the Master does not pay them for performing the Primary only (as that would not serve his purpose); hence it must be admitted that the Fee is related to every one of these Actions, which the Priests are made to perform by means of the payment of the Fee. This fact of the *Performer* being common to all the Actions will be fully explained in *Adhyāya XI*. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Sacrificial Fee pertains to all the Sacrifices (Primary as well as Subsidiary).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

The Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee belong to the Primary Sacrifice only, because of such direct declarations as—‘*Dikshāḥ somasya*,’ ‘*Dakṣhīṇāḥ somasya*.’ As for the Infjunction with regard to the ‘Initiated’ in connection with the Subsidiaries, it must be taken as referring to the Person who has been ‘initiated’ at the Primary Sacrifice; as otherwise we would have to have recourse to a most useless Secondary Indication. We shall show later on (in *Adhyāya XII*) that the Fees, while really pertaining to the Primary, help in the Subsidiaries, only incidentally (by ‘*Prasaṅga*’).

Sūtra (12): *Also because of texts showing the absence of these (at the Subsidiaries).*

In connection with the *Nirūḍha paçuyāga* we have the sentence ‘*yat shadho juhōti sā 'sya Dīkshā*,’—which says that the factor of Initiation is supplied by the *Shadhōtrihoma*; and this distinctly shows that there is no real Initiation at this *yāga* (which is a Subsidiary); while if the Initiation were equally related to all—the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries,—then we would have the real Initiation itself applicable to the *Nirūḍhapaçuyāga*; and there would no need of a makeshift as declared in the text quoted.

Objection: “As no Initiation would, according to you, be required (by the *Nirūḍhapaçuyāga*) the laying down of any makeshift, in regard to it, would be absolutely useless,—even if it were not a Subsidiary Sacrifice.”

Reply: This does not affect our position; because, in as much as

at the Original Sacrifice of the *Nirūdhapaçuyāga*, the Initiation, which was due to some other Actions, was found to be of use,—if it were to be wholly absent at the *Nirūdhapaçuyāga*, by reason of this latter not being the means of the appearance of Initiations, there would be suspicions regard the perfect completion of this latter Sacrifice; and hence there would be a distinct use for the declaration of the *makeshift*.

ADHIKARANA (6).

[The Inner Altar is not related to the *Post*.]

Sūtra (13): “The Altar is related to the *Post*.”

In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* we find the sentence—‘*Ardhamantarvēdi minoti, ardham vahirvēdi.*’ And with regard to this there arises the question as to whether it lays down a part of the Inner Altar with reference to the *Post*, or it only indicates that point where the Inner Altar meets the Outer.

Objection: “In as much as the fact of the *Altar* pertaining to all “Sacrifices has been already established (in *Adhi. 3*), it is not right to “introduce the present *Adhikarāṇa* here.”

Reply: The former *Adhikarāṇa* should be taken as preceded by the present one; because when the Altar will have been cognized, through Syntactical Connection, as subservient to the *Post*, wherefore should arise any question as to what the Altar is subservient. Whereas, when the mention of the *Altar* has been shown to be indicative of a particular place (as is done in the present case) then naturally arises the question (considered in *Adhi. 3*) as to what the Altar is Subservient to.

On this former question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Setting aside the indication of the Context, the *Altar* must be “regarded, through Syntactical Connection, as belonging to the *Post*; “otherwise it would be necessary to have recourse to Secondary Indication. And so long as we do not find any incongruity in the word “‘Inner Altar’ being taken in its direct primary signification, we have “no reason to have recourse to Secondary Indication. Consequently, “the general declaration—‘*Jyoti cakshyāmahē, etc.*’ being taken as “pertaining to the particular case of the *Post*, the *Altar* should be “taken as subservient to the *Post*.”

“Or, in accordance with the previous *Adhikarāṇa* (3), the *Altar* “being taken as Subservient to the *Jyotishṭoma* together with all its “Subsidiaries, there would arise the question as to whether, or not it “is subservient to the *Post*. (And on this too, we would have the “same *Pūrvapaksha*).

“*Objection*: ‘The very fact of its being subservient to *all* shows that it is subservient to the *Post* also; and as such there can be no use in any enquiry on this point.’

“*Reply*: The Subservience to the *Post* is not proved by the subservience to the subsidiaries of the *Jyotishtōma*; as the *Post* is subsidiary to the *Paçu-sacrifice* (and not to the *Jyotishtōma*); and what has been proved in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* is that the *Altar* is subservient to the *Jyotishtōma* together with its subsidiaries, and not that it is so to the *Paçu-sacrifice*.

“*Objection*: ‘It may be that the *Altar* is subsidiary to the *Paçu-Sacrifice* itself, which makes it over to the subsidiaries of the *Jyotishtōma*.’

“*Reply*: This would have been possible if the *Altar*, by itself, belonged to the *Paçu-Sacrifice*; as a matter of fact, however, it comes into this latter, through the Primary Sacrifice; and hence it must be taken as resting in the *Paçu-sacrifice* itself (and could not be relegated to the Subsidiaries). And when it is found that an *Altar* is necessary at the *Paçu-sacrifice*, it is the *Altar* of the *Soma-sacrifice* (*Jyotishtōma*) that enters into it, through Implication, after having precluded the entrance of the *Altar* of the *Darça-Pūrṇamāsa*. And this *Altar* of the *Soma-sacrifice* is used only for certain purposes in connection with the Original Primary sacrifice. The *measuring* of the *Post* spoken of in the sentence in question, is not, in any way, connected with the Primary sacrifice; and as such, it could not pertain to the *Post*. Consequently, in as much as there would be no possibility of the entrance of the sacrificial *Altar* (at the *Paçu-Sacrifice*), the *measuring*, spoken of as inner or outer, would apply to the ordinary conception of *place*; and hence the sentence in question must be taken as laying down the Inner *Altar* as the particular place (where the measuring of the *Post* is to be done) [and as such the *Altar* must be regarded as subservient to the *Post*].”

To the above, we make the following reply:—

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (14): (The Sentence must be taken as laying down) *merely a particular point* (of space); *because it is syntactically connected with that which is not meant to be enjoined* (according to you).

The two words ‘*Antarvēdi*’ and ‘*Vahirvēdi*’ indicate the middle point; and the sentence does not lay down any relation of subserviency (between the *Altar* and the *Post*). Because in all cases the

mention of that which has already served its purpose is accepted as being for the sake of the specification of Time and Place; and in the case in question we find that both the *Altar* and the *Post* have already served their purposes elsewhere. If the sentence in question had laid down the relation of Subserviency, then we could take either the *Altar* to be subservient to the *Post*, or *vice versa*. As a matter of fact, however none of these is possible; (1) because each has had its requirements fulfilled; (2) because any such relationship would involve the assumption of an imperceptible result; and (3) lastly, because of its occasioning a syntactical split. That is to say, the *Post* which is used for the *tying* of the animal does not stand in need of the *Altar*; and the *Altar* too, being used as the seat of the Performer and as the place for the keeping of the offering material and its accessories, does not stand in need of the *Post*, which occupies only a thousandth (very small) part of its space. Nor are these two capable of producing any visible effect in each other. Then again, the factor of '*Ardham vahirvēdi*' cannot be meant to be enjoined; as according to you, it is capable of neither Injunction nor a descriptive Reference; while according to you it is necessary to take this also as *Enjoined*; because until we have both ('*Ardhamantarvēdi*' and '*Ardhamvahirvēdi*') distinctly enjoined, we could not get at the specification of the particular point in the *Post* (i.e. the point where the *Inner* meets the *Outer Altar*). Specially as (according to you) the whole of the *Post* being recognised as to be measured either inside or out, the sentence '*Ardhamantarvēdi*' serves to enjoin the measuring of half of it as to be done at the Inner Altar; and then the measuring of the second half being doubtful, the other sentence could not but be taken as serving the same purpose with regard to this other half; and thus there being a multiplicity of objects enjoined, there would be a distinct Syntactical Split; and also there would be the further complication of connecting the verb '*Minoti*' both ways; and lastly, a part will have to be taken as a mere descriptive reference to what already exists.

Objection: "The connection of one half of the *Post* with the "Inner Altar having been enjoined by the former sentence, there "being no Injunction with regard to the other half, it would come "to be dealt with at the Outer Altar."

Reply: This would have been the case if there were a possibility of the *Post* being dealt with either at the Inner Altar, or at the Outer Altar, exclusively. That is to say, if the whole of it were cognised as to be dealt with at the Inner Altar, then the mention of the other half over again would serve to preclude the other half

from the Inner Altar, and connect it with the Outer one; and conversely, if the whole were cognised as to be dealt with at the Outer Altar, the mention over again of the other half would connect this with the Inner Altar, to the preclusion of the Outer one. As a matter of fact, however, we find neither of these to be the case; and hence the sentence ‘*Ardhamantarvēdi*’ must be taken as ‘*Ardhamantarvedyēva*’ (‘half of it is dealt with at the Inner Altar only’), and not as ‘*Ardhamēva antarvedi*’ (‘only half is to be dealt with at the Inner Altar’). And thus nothing definite being known with regard to the other half, this latter could, sometimes, be dealt with at the Inner Altar also; and hence there could be no dealing with the Outer Altar exclusively.

Objection: “In case the whole of the Post be dealt with at ‘the Inner Altar, we could not have the Injunction in the form of ‘*Ardham, etc.*’ (which mentions only ‘one half’).”

Reply: Why could we not have it in this form, when what it lays down is the fact of *one half* of the Post being dealt with *always* at the Inner Altar, while it does not preclude the Outer Altar (with regard to the other half).

For these reasons we conclude that both the sentences together lay down a *particular point of space*, qualified by both (the Inner and the Outer Altar),—i.e. the point where the one meets the other—(as the place where the Post is to be dealt with). And in this manner, there would be no Syntactical Split.

ADHIKARAṆA (7).

[The *Havirdhāna* is not subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēnī*.]

Sūtra (15): *In as much as the Havirdhāna Carts "are mentioned in the sentence—'Sāmidhēnistadanvāhuh,'—they must be regarded as subservient to the Sāmidhēnis."*

In connection with the *Jyotishṭoma* we find the sentence '*Ut yat sunvanti Sāmidhēnistadanvāhuh*' (the meaning of which is that 'out of the two *Havirdhāna* carts that one should be connected with the *Sāmidhēnis* near which the Soma pounding is done'). And with regard to this we have the same Question, the same processes of reasoning and the same conclusion as in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. [That is to say, the question being as to whether the sentence lays down the *Havirdhāna* as subsidiary to the *Sāmidhēnis*, the sense being that 'the *Sāmidhēnī* verses are to be recited as qualified by the *Havirdhāna*,' or the mention of the *Havirdhāna* only marks out the place for the recitation of the *Sāmidhēnis*,—we have the former alternative as the *Pūrvapakṣa*, and the latter as the *Siddhānta*.]

Objection: "Under the circumstances, why should not the present case have been included in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*?"

Reply: Because in the present case the two alternatives are not distinctly mentioned. That is to say, in the present case we do not find that the factor in question is 'enjoinable' for us, and 'not enjoinable' for our opponent.

Question: "In that case, how do you establish your *Siddhānta*?"

Answer: In the following manner:

Sūtra (16): (The sentence must be taken as laying down) *mere place; as the Havirdhāna serves a distinctly visible purpose for the Soma.*

As a matter of fact we find that the *Havirdhāna* has its use justified by its serving the purpose of holding the *Soma*. As for the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, the purpose that they serve is already known to consist of the kindling of the fire at the Original Primary Sacrifice; and hence these too do not stand in need of any relation of sub-

serviency (between the *Havirdhāna* and the *Sāmidhēnis*). Then again, if we were to take the sentence, which lays down a particular relationship of *Havirdhāna*, as indicating its capability of a general relationship,—then, we would have the same Syntactical Split that we found in the *Agnēyyadhikaraṇa* (II--iii—25). If we were to avoid this Syntactical Split by taking the *general* relationship to be implied by the *Particular*,—then we would be faced by the fact of there being no Apparent Inconsistency of the general relationship, which is got at by the method of the *Siddhānta* (and thus in absence of this Apparent Inconsistency nothing could justify the said implication of the general by the Particular). That is to say, any one of the two *Havirdhāna* carts are recognised as making a place in connection with the original Sacrifice, (and in this way the said general relationship is duly established); and hence it becomes a comparatively easy matter for the sentence to lay down merely the specialisation of that relationship. For this reason also, we must take the sentence as indicating the place.

Sūtra (17): *The name also points to the same fact (as before).*

The name '*Havirdhāna*' can apply to that which serves no other purpose than the *holding* (of the *Soma*); and hence the *Havirdhāna* cart comes to be regarded as belonging to the *Soma*; otherwise (if the cart were related to the *Sāmidhēnis*) we would have the name '*Sāmidhēnidhāna*.'

ADHIKARAṆA (8)

[The Subsidiary Sacrifices are to be performed through others.]

Sūtra (18) : “*In as much as the Result laid down pertains to the actual Performer,—as pointed out by the Scripture,—the Result could accrue only when the performance would be done by the Master himself.*”

Henceforward we shall treat of the question of contradiction, or otherwise, of *Name* to the other five (Direct Declaration and the rest),—the main question to be dealt with being, in what way such *names* as ‘*Hotā*,’ ‘*hautram*’ and the like serve the purpose of pointing out the particular *Performers* and *Actions*. But before taking up this question, we first take up an introductory discussion ; because it is only when we have many such *Performers* (at a Sacrifice), as the *Hotṛ* and the like, that we can have any discussion as to how they are to be employed at the Sacrifice. For if all the actions in connection with the Sacrifice were to be done by the Master himself, then there would be no room for other performers ; and hence there could be no occasion for a discussion as to the compatibility or otherwise of the fact of certain *Names* indicating the fact of certain other persons performing certain actions in connection with the Sacrifice.

As the basis of this Discussion, we can take such Sacrifices as the *Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsa* and the like, which lead to distinct results, and at which certain Sacrificial Fees are given. And in regard to these, there arises the question as to—(A) whether all actions are to be done by the Master himself ; (B) or it is the Primary action alone that has to be performed always by himself (while the others might be performed by himself, or by others) ; (C) or, the Primary must necessarily be done by the Master, the rest are to be as necessarily done by others (and never by the Master himself).

On this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA (A).

“All the actions should be done by the *Master* himself ; because the *Atmanēpada* ending (in the word ‘*Yajēta*’) found in the Infunc-

"tion of the Performance of the Sacrifice as a whole, distinctly shows
"that it is the Person desiring the result that is the *Performer* in
"connection with the *Bhāvanā* (of the Sacrifice as a single whole)
"with all its accessories; and hence if he should leave off the perform-
"ance of the slightest action, he would not receive the aid that
"that action would be calculated to impart; and (inasmuch as this
"would create an imperfection in the final Result) it is necessary
"that it should be performed by himself. Then again, of the
"Result that is being brought about (by means of the Sacrifice),
"it is the Master that is spoken of as the 'Producer,' 'Prompter.'
"Then as for the *names* 'Hotṛ' and the like, they belong to the
"Master himself, as performing the several actions in course of the
"Sacrifice,—in accordance with the Law of the *Sūtra* (III—vii—23)."

PŪRVAPAKSHA (B).

Sūtra (19): "It is only the Primary Action that must
"be performed by the Master; while as for the Sub-
"sidiaries of that Primary, they could be per-
"formed either by the Master, or by some other
"person."

"The affix (*Ātmanēpada*), appearing after the *Root* which signifies
"the Primary Sacrifice only, points out that Sacrifice alone as to be
"performed by the person desiring the Result (i.e. the Master); as for
"the other Sacrifices (the Subsidiaries) it indicates the mere accomplish-
"ment, without pointing to the necessity of their being performed
"by any particular person. Consequently these latter might be per-
"formed either by the Master, or by the Priests (there being no res-
"triction as to who should perform them).

"*Objection*: 'Inasmuch as it is necessary for the Subsidiaries
"to be performed by the same Person as the Primary, we must regard
"the Master himself as the performer of these also.'

"*Reply*: Not so; because in regard to the Subsidiaries, the
"Master is spoken of as the 'Performer,' on account of his being the
"Director of their performance. If the (mental) 'giving away' of the
"materials (in connection with the Subsidiaries also) were done by
"somebody else, there would be nothing that would be done by the
"Master; and hence this much is always done by him. And when
"he has done this much, if he gets the other details performed by
"other persons paid for their services, he does not altogether lose the
"character of the 'Performer.'"

“Some people offer the following explanation : ‘The *Ātmanēpada* always denotes the operation of the *Director* (and not that of the *Performer*). That is to say, the *Ātmanēpada* ending, which is laid down as to be used in the case of the result of Actions pertaining to the actual Performer of that Action, has always the sense of the *Causative* (*yajeta-yājayati*),—its denotation consisting in the *paying* for the services that the other person is *directed* to render. Thus it is that, in the case of actions performed by persons directed to do them, we find the *Parasmaīpada*, expression *yajanti yājakāḥ* ; while in the case where what is meant to be expressed is only the operation of the *Director*, we have the *Ātmanēpada* expression *yajātē yajamānāḥ*.’

“This explanation, however, is not admissible ; because if such were the case, then the Primary Sacrifice also would, somehow or other, have to be performed through others ; as the Master would not obtain the Result of that which he would perform himself (as on account of the special explanation of the *Ātmanēpada*, the Results accruing to him would be only those of the Actions of which he would be the *Director*, and not the *Performer*). Then again, if the *Master* should perform the Primary Sacrifice, such performance would be aided and prompted by the operations of the Priests ; and as such the *Parasmaīpada* expressing the operations of the Priests, as prompting the Action of the Master, should have to be taken in the sense of the *Causative*,—and not the *Ātmanēpada* word (expressing the operation of the Master himself). Consequently, it is on the strength of the former explanation, that we conclude that the Actions other than the Primary, could be done either by the Master himself, or by other persons engaged by him.

“But in that case also, it will be necessary to explain, how it is that the *Bhāvanā* being expressed by the (Injunctive) Affix, and recognised, through Proximity, as to be performed by the person desiring the Result (the Nominative, as well as the *Bhāvanā*, is denoted by the affix, and hence the *proximity*),—the Nominative agency (with regard to the accomplishment of this *Bhāvanā*) is restricted to the Instrumental factor (of the *yāga*) only.

“In view of this difficulty, we must explain as follows : The *Ātmanēpada* does not lay down the fact of the Action being performed by the Person desiring the Result ; as the Person, who becomes related to the Result, is one the fact of whose being the Performer is implied by the *Bhāvanā* ; and hence the Result could not betake itself to any person other than the actual Performer ; but at the same

“time, there could be no incongruity in certain actions being done by persons other than the one who desires the Result. And this absence of incongruity shows that with regard to the Subsidiaries there is no restriction as to their being performed either by the Master himself or by other persons engaged by him.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (20): Other persons would perform (the Subsidiaries); because of the declaration of ‘Purchase’ (‘Payment for services to be rendered’),—which could not apply to the Master himself.

We find the Veda laying down the gifts of the ‘*Ānvāhārya*,’ the ‘hundred and twelve,’ etc., etc., as *fees* paid for services rendered in connection with Sacrifices,—as will be fully explained under *Sūtra* ‘*Parikrayārtham vā karmasamyogāt*’ (X—ii—23). The ‘Purchase’ (‘Payment’) is, by its very nature, done with regard to another Person, and not to one’s self; as it is not possible for payment to be made to one’s self. Consequently, if, at sometime, the Master himself should perform the Subsidiaries,—there could be no ‘Payment for services’ in that case, as any such would be an absolute impossibility; and this would be a direct infringement of the Injunction of this ‘Payment’ as a necessary factor in connection with the Subsidiaries. Hence with a view to preserve the universality and necessary character of this Injunction, it is absolutely necessary to get hold of such Performers (for the Subsidiaries) as are capable of being *paid* for the Services they would render. And thus it must be admitted that in certain cases (i.e. those of the Primary Sacrifices) the Master would perform directly by himself, while in others (i.e. those of the Subsidiaries) he would perform, indirectly (having them performed by others), by paying for their services.

As for the *Ātmanēpada*, it should be taken as resting in the *Bhāvanā* connected with the said ‘Payment for services’; and hence there could be no incongruity in the Result of the Actions pertaining to a Performer such as has been just pointed out (as performing some actions directly, and others indirectly through others).

ADHIKARAṆA (9).

[The number of the Priests engaged at Sacrifices is limited.]

Sūtra (21) : *"The number of the performers would be implied by the nature of the Action itself; and hence there can be no specification of the exact number; specially as no special purpose could be served by such specification."*

[On the question of the exact number of Persons to be engaged for the performance of the Subsidiaries, we have the following]—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"As the 'Purchase' could be done by the engagement of one as well as two Priests, hence there can be no restriction as to the number of such Priests.

"Or again, the fact of having the same performer as the enjoyer of the Result being found, through co-extensiveness and the *Ātmunepadu* affix, to be applicable to the performance of the Sacrifice as a whole, —we can set aside only that much of this fact, as would be necessary for the due observance of the Injunction of 'Purchase' And as this Injunction would be duly observed by a single Person performing any one of the Actions (for 'payment'), we cannot set aside any more than that."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (22) : *There should be only as many performers as there are actions with names (indicating special performers); because of the direct declaration of every one of them being different.*

Inasmuch as the Injunction that we have is that of the *Bhāvanā* connected with Actions whose performers are distinctly pointed out by means of different names,—it should also be taken as laying down that there should be an engagement (or appointment) of as many Priests as there are such names. That is to say just as the Name serves the purpose of differentiating Actions,—as shown under *Sūtra* II—ii—22,—so would it also serve to differentiate the Performers; and hence it must be admitted that the number of the Priests to be engaged should be the same as that of the names (of Actions).

Sūtra (23): Objection: “A single person could be taken (as the Performer of all the Actions); as the names indicate a diversity of actions only (and not of the Performers).”

“The names are found to apply to Persons, as employed in certain definite operations, and not by ordinary convention; and hence, like the *Yūpa*, etc., they are always to be taken as characterised by these operations. And hence, the names ‘*Hotṛ*’ and the rest, being similar to the word ‘*pācaka*,’ etc., they could apply to one and the same person, as performing the various Actions (indicated by these Names); and as such there could be no diversity of Performers (on the ground of the diversity of Names).”

Sūtra (24): Reply: Not so; as (the Performers are distinctly mentioned) in the *Originative Injunctions* (of the Actions, prior to the actual appearance of the Actions themselves).

If the Names in question were found, either at the time of the actual engagement in the Action, or after such engagement, then, in that case, they may not serve to differentiate the Performers. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Appointment, being of such persons as are sitting unemployed consists of a request to take up the performance of a certain action; and it is in connection with these Appointments, that we find the *Names* (of Priests) mentioned,—e.g. in the sentences ‘*Brahmāṇam vṛṇīta*,’ ‘*Hotāraṃ vṛṇīta*,’ and so forth. And at this juncture we do not find any other reason (than the diversity of Performers) for the diversity of these names; and then again, the *Appointments* too, laid down in the aforesaid Sentences, are to be taken as distinct and diverse,—according to the *Sūtras* II—ii—2, and II—ii—23. And on account of the diversity of these Appointments, we must admit of a diversity among those that are appointed; and hence the number of the *Priests appointed* should be regarded to be the same as that of the *Appointments*. Then, as for the Names, in as much as they are not found to apply to the Persons, before the Appointments, as they are used as well-established names only after the Appointments have been made, it must be admitted that the *Names* are due to (and based upon) these Appointments only. And it is only natural that a diversity of the Cause (Appointment) should give rise to a diversity in the effects (the *Appointed Priests*).

Then again, inasmuch as the *Appointment* of a Priest serves

only a visible purpose (and does not bring about any transcendental results), several *Appointments* could not be made with regard to one and the same person ; because one who has been once appointed (engaged for service) need not be appointed over again. Then again, in as much as the various persons, laid down in the originative Injunction, as to be *Appointed*, can neither be rejected, nor taken as optional alternatives, nor as all at once conjointly,—one sentence (laying down the appointment of a certain person) could not be connected with the Person appointed in accordance with another Sentence ; and for this reason also, the Appointments must be regarded as distinct and diverse.

Then again, we find all these Appointments laid down simultaneously by the Sentence laying down the performance of the Sacrifice as a whole,—just like the Holdings of the various Vessels dedicated to Indra, Vāyu and the rest. And the mention of these appointments means the mention of all the Priests (appointed). And thus it is established that there should be as many distinct Priests as there are Appointments.

The *Bhāṣya* says—‘*Tasmādēśhām varanē sankīrtanam, na vidhiḥ.*’ But this statement does not seem to be quite proper ; as there could be no restriction (of number) with regard to those Appointments that are not enjoined. Nor could this justify our taking all the Sentences (‘*Brahmāṇam vṛṇīta,*’ ‘*Hotāram vṛṇīta,*’ etc.), as syntactically connected, and leading to a result in the shape of the cognition of the *Number*—which is obtainable by the much easier method of taking the Sentences collectively. Consequently it must be admitted that the Number is laid down, at the very outset, by the Injunction of the Appointments themselves, as following in the wake of these (Appointments) ; and there is no use of differentiating the Number (from the Appointments).

ADHIKARAṆA (10).

[The *Camasādhvaryus* are distinct Priests.]

Sūtra (25): *The Camasādhvaryus are different (from the aforesaid Priests); because of their being named as such.*

[At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we have certain priests called the ‘*Camasādhvaryus*’; and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these are included among the Priests dealt with in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*,—the *Hotr*, etc., or they are distinct from them.]

And on this question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as they are named ‘*Adhvaryus*,’ they must be regarded to be the *Appointed Adhvaryu* priests themselves, as connected with the *Cups (Camasas)*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply :—

(1) Inasmuch as all *Names* are based upon *distinctness*,—(2) as the *Camasādhvaryus* are mentioned as equally distinct from all the other Priests,—(3) as there is a distinct Appointment laid down for these *Camasādhvaryus*—they must be regarded as distinct from those other Priests, as shown on a previous occasion.

Though, in reality, the *Camasādhvaryus* are appointed by the Master himself, yet, they are spoken of as ‘appointed by the Principal Priests,’ because of their being subordinate to these latter.

ADHIKARAṆA (11)

[There should be a plurality of *Camasādhvaryus*.]

Sūtra (26): They must be regarded as many; because of their being spoken of as many, in the Originative Injunction.

[With regard to the *Camasādhvaryus* there arises the question as to whether it is necessary that there should be many of them, or it may be that there may be either one or two, or many of them. And the latter alternative being the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, we have the former as the *Siddhānta*, on the ground of their being spoken of, in the Originative Injunction, as ' *Camasādhvaryavaḥ*,' in the Plural.]

ADHIKARAṆA (12).

[The number of *Camasādhvaryus* must be Ten only.]

Sūtra (27): *Their number should be Ten; because of Indications to that effect.*

On the question of the number of *Camasādhvaryus*, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“There being no restriction as to the exact number of the *many*, “we must accept their number to be *Three* only, in accordance with “the *Sūtra* ‘*Prathamam vā niyamyēta*’ (XI—i—43).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

In connection with the *Daçapēya* Sacrifice, which is a modification of the *Jyotishtoma*, we have a reference to the *Camasādhvaryus* as being ‘*Ten*’ in number; and from this we conclude that at the original Sacrifice (of the *Jyotishtoma*) also *Ten* of them are appointed. And further, the fact of these being *Ten* is always shown by the number of Possessors of the Cups, as well as of the Cups themselves, being *Ten* only.

ADHIKARANA (13).

[The Çamitr priest is not distinct from the Principal Priests.]

Sūtra (28): “*The Çamitr is different from the others, because of a distinct name being applied to him.*”

[With regard to the Çamitr priest, there arises the question as to whether he is included among the Priests enumerated before, or he is distinct from them. And on this question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as he is spoken of by means of a distinct word ‘Çamitā,’ he must be regarded as distinct from the rest. (2) Then again, in as much as the mention of the Çamitr is found to cause an increase in the number of Priests, he must be regarded as a distinct Priest. (3) Lastly, we find the sentence—*Klomāva.....yadya-brāhmaṇaḥ syāt*,—which shows that the fact of the Çamitr Priest being a Brahmana is doubtful; and no such doubt could be possible if he were one of the Principal Priests (as these are all always *Brāhmaṇas*—*Vide Sutra XII—iv—41, et seq.*.”]

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (29): (He is distinct from the rest) *because of the Context; specially as the name does not appear in the Originative Injunction.*

It is only when a Name appears in the originative Injunction that it serves the purposes of differentiation; and as a matter of fact we do not find the name ‘Çamitr’ appearing in any such Injunction; and consequently this name must be regarded as another name for one of the previously enumerated Priests, applied to him on account of his performing some action other than his previous one (as shown in *Sutra III—vii—23*).

Objection: “In the course of action we find that the Çamitr holds the neck of the animal, at the time that all the other Priests are busy performing other appointed duties: and for this reason he must be regarded as distinct from these latter.”

Reply : This does not affect our case ; because the neck of the animal could be held by any one of the Priests that may, at that time, have nothing else to do ; specially as, at that time, we do not find all the Priests to be engaged ; this will be explained in detail under *Sutra*—‘ *Itaramanyastēshām yato viçeshah syāt.*’

Then, as for the indications of the expression ‘ *yadyabrāhmaṇah etc.*,’ that cannot prove what is held by the *Pūrvapaksha*, as there is absolutely no chance of any but *Brāhmaṇas* officiating at Sacrifices ; and hence the expression cannot but be taken as referring to the Master of the Sacrifice (the sense being that ‘ if the Master of the Sacrifice happen to be a *Non-Brāhmaṇa*, etc., etc.’). Specially as on account of the duties of the *Çamitr* being mentioned in the Context of those of the *Master*, they could never be recognised as belonging a *Non-Brāhmaṇa*. It might be argued that—‘ the duties of the *Çamitr* consisting of the killing of the animal, they could not be accepted by the *Brāhmaṇa*.’ But the same might be said with regard to the *Non-Brāhmaṇa* also (who may be as unwilling to do the *Killing*). In fact, the *Non-Brāhmaṇa* has not many remedies available for clearing himself of the sin attaching to him by reason of the killing ; and he would be more liable the Sin (and as such much more unwilling to do the act). For these reasons, we conclude that, just as the *Çūdra* (and other *Non-Brāhmaṇas*) are forced to do such actions, even against their will,—in the same manner, the *Brāhmaṇa*, won over by various gifts, would do them ; and there would be no incongruity in this.

In fact it is for these reasons (of the Priest having to perform questionable actions) that the *Priestly Duties* are spoken of deprecatingly.

ADHIKARAṆA (14).

[The *Upaga* Priest is not distinct from the others.]

Sūtra (30): The Upagas too are not distinct from the rest; because of Indications to that effect.

[We have the sentence—‘*Na adhvaryurupajayēt,*’ which prohibits the Adhvarya officiating as the *Upaga*; and this shows that the duties of the *Upaga* are to be performed by one out of these Principal Priests themselves.]

ADHIKARAṆA (15).

[The *Seller of Soma* is distinct from the Priests.]

Sūtra (31): The Seller is a distinct person ; because the Action (of selling) is not directly enjoined (in the Veda).

[The *Pūrvapaksha* is that the Soma-vendor must be regarded as one of the Principal Priests, as he is spoken of along with them. The *Siddhānta* is that he is a totally different person ; because his action is not enjoined.]

ADHIKARAṆA (16).

[The Name 'Rtvik' does not apply to all the persons engaged at the Sacrifice.]

Sūtra (32): "*Inasmuch as the Action is performed by all, the name 'Rtvik' applies to all equally.*"

[The question being as to whether all the Persons, that are spoken of as engaged in connection with the performance of the *Jyotishtoma*, are 'Rtviks' or only a few among them].—we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The word 'Rtvik,' being laid down as an arbitrary form (in 'Pāṇini's Sūtra III—ii—59), is used in the sense afforded by the Prefixed word, the Root and the Affix, collectively,—i.e. the word is explained as 'Rtauyajanti yē tē Rtvijah' ('those who perform Sacrifices at appointed seasons'). And if the application of the name 'Rtvik' were based solely upon this fact (of performing Sacrifices at a certain time), then it could not but be regarded as applying equally to all the persons engaged in the Sacrifice; and as such all of them would be Rtviks (or Priests). And for this reason the mention of the Number of 'Four,' 'Five,' 'Six,' 'Seventeen,' etc., with regard to these, must be taken as mere *Arthavāda*, meant to show that there are many parts of the Sacrifice (performed by various numbers of Priests)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (33): "*It cannot be so; because of the preclusion (of others besides the Seventeen).*"

The expression 'Parisankhyānāt' in the Sūtra has been explained by the *Bhāṣya* as referring to the fact of the sentence 'Saptadaśa Rtvijah' being a *Preclusive Injunction*. There being a possibility of the *Seventeen* persons, as well as the others, being engaged (as Priests), the repetition of "Seventeen" could not have been made simply for the purpose of laying down that number; in fact it is for the purpose of indicating the absence of others besides the

Seventeen. In all cases, we find that whenever two things are spoken of as bearing some sort of a relationship to each other, the following three factors are therein involved: (1) the mere forms of the things; (2) their mutual connection; and (3) the preclusion of a third thing; and a sentence is always meant to convey the idea of one of these factors (according to the wish of the speaker). And in a case where either the form of the things or their mutual connection is not meant to be expressed, (as in the case in question), we cannot but take the Injunction as serving the purpose of *precluding* the things other than those mentioned. And such cases of Preclusion are entirely free from the aforesaid three Objections (of *Svārthaparitṛyāga*, etc., pointed out as applying to Preclusions); because the direct denotation of the declaration (the mere laying down of 'Seventeen Rtviks') cannot be accepted as the object of Injunction by this sentence; as they have been already enjoined elsewhere; and hence as we did not take it to be an Injunction of what it implies (i.e. the *Preclusion of others besides the Seventeen*), the Injunction itself would become absolutely meaningless.

The Opponent however still accepts the *performance of the Sacrifice* to be the sole condition of the application of the name 'Rtvik'; and hence concludes that whoever may be found to fulfil that condition must be spoken of as 'Rtvik'; it is with a view to all this that we have the passage in the *Bhāṣhya* "*Nanu prati-shidhyānyēshvapi*, etc."

In replying to this, the *Siddhānti* begins with showing that it is the *Action* that is denied. That is to say, in all cases, the form of the Agent being incapable of being denied, it is only his action or functioning that is denied; for instance, the sentence, 'he is not my son' simply means that 'he does not perform the duties of a son.' And in the same manner, in the case in question, the *denial*, that is made with regard to others besides the 'seventeen,' must be taken to be a denial of the fact of these *other persons* functioning (towards the accomplishment of the Sacrifice),—and not that of the mere existence of these other persons.

It might be argued that—"it is the fact of being *appointed* that is the condition or basis of the applicatoin of the name; and as such the citing of the instance of the *functions pertaining to the Rtvik* is wholly irrelevant."

But it is not so; because, in accordance with this theory, the use of the word ('Rtvik') is accomplished, solely through the presence of these functions.

Says the Opponent: "*How could the persons 'performing the sacrifice at particular seasons' be denied to be 'Rtviks'?*" That is to say, "inasmuch as there can be no denial of the mere existence of these persons, the functions too cannot be very easily denied."

With a view to offer the correct reply, the *Siddhānti* begins with the declaration—*In that case the word 'Rtvik' comes to be of two kinds—one based upon the 'performance of Sacrifices at particular seasons,' and another upon Appointment, etc.* The sense of this is that if the application of the word '*Rtvik*' were dependent upon its literal etymological meaning ('one who performs sacrifices at certain seasons,') then, in that case, it could not but apply to all the persons engaged in the sacrifice. As a matter of fact however, its application is found to be conditioned by certain purificatory rites and these 'rites' are none other than the *Appointment* and the *offering of certain gifts*; and hence those persons, who, while performing the functions (of sacrifice at particular seasons), have not had these purificatory rites done to them, cannot be spoken of as '*Rtviks*.' And as a matter of fact we find that the Master of the Sacrifice appoints, and offers the gifts, to only *Seventeen* persons; and consequently, we could explain the repetition of '*Seventeen Rtviks*' as a descriptive reference, only if we accepted the application of the name '*Rtvik*' to be based upon these two facts (of *Appointment* and *Gifts*); otherwise this repetition would come to be a partial descriptive reference to the '*Seventeen Rtviks*,' in a form that would not be quite true. Consequently the word could not have an unduly extensive application (if it were based upon the aforesaid two facts of *Appointment* and *Gift*).

Objection: "In that case, we would have a most undesirable mutual interdependence,—inasmuch as we would have the *Appointment* and the *giving of gifts*, of those that are *Rtviks*; and these would be regarded as '*Rtviks*,' who would receive these *Appointments* and *Gifts*."

Reply: This does not affect our position; because at the very outset, we are at once faced by the declaration—"Those that are *Rtviks* are to be appointed and offered the gifts"; but when it is found that the *Rtviks* are not so well known in ordinary parlance as the Tree, etc., then we come to understand that 'the *Rtviks* are to be created by Appointment' just as in the case of the sentence—"weave a piece of cloth out of this yarn," in as much as it is only by *weaving* that the *Cloth* is made, we have the name '*Cloth*' used in view of something that is yet to come, and yet there is

nothing objectionable in this,—so too we would have in the case in question.

The same reasoning holds respecting sentences—' *Adhvaryum vṛṇāta*, etc.' which lay down the appointment of particular *Rtviks*.

Thus alone could we justify the Accusative ending in connection with the *Rtviks* that are being appointed. As for the Appointment, etc., bringing about the *Rtviks* that would perform the sacrifices, it would be serving a distinctly visible purpose, just like the *Laying of fire* (which serves the purpose of bringing in the Sacrificial Fire). And it is in view of the order of sequence among the Vedic texts bearing on the question, that we come to speak of the *Rtviks* as 'created by Appointment'; and hence this statement cannot be regarded as wholly unknown.

As a matter of fact however, it is not proper to reject the well-recognised fact of the application of the name '*Rtviks*' being based upon the 'performance of Sacrifices at particular seasons,' on the mere ground of the word being laid down (by Pāṇini) as an 'arbitrary form.' Then again, in as much as the 'Appointment' and 'the giving of gifts' are formed, as related to the well-known *Rtviks*, to be directly laid down with reference to those *Rtviks*,—it is not right to subvert the natural order of sequence of the sentences (by taking the '*Rtviks*' as to be 'created by the appointment and the Gift'). As for the argument that, until they are known, the '*Rtviks*' could not undergo any purificatory rites,—the same may be said of the 'Appointment' also; as no person could comprehend an Injunction where he would be told to do something which he does not know. In fact even while the Appointment would be in course of operation, the name '*Rtvik*' could not be recognised as based upon that Appointment. If, however, it be held that the *Rtviks* are known by means of the particular order of sequence among the Vedic texts, then, in that case, the purificatory rites (of Appointment, etc.) could be very easily cognised as pertaining to the *Rtviks* duly known by the said means. One who is making the Appointment has the following idea present in his mind at the time: 'The *Rtviks* are entities that are well known in the Veda; but for me they are created by means of Appointment; as prior to this Appointment, no one has recognised them as '*Rtviks*.' Or, we might go even farther, and declare that for the *Appointer* also, the *Rtviks* have already a prior existence, in the general shape (of the Class '*Rtvik*'). It is the case with every thing that in whatever particular form it may be known, it helps in the operation all the same; specially

as it is not possible for a thing to be known, all at once, in all its forms.

Thus then, we come to the following analysis of the matter under consideration ; (1) 'Those that perform the Sacrifices at particular seasons, and who perform the Duties of the *Ādhvaryava*, etc., are *Rtviks*' ; (2) 'Those that are capable of such performance are such persons, as those devoid of capability are not entitled to the performance of any action ; (3) in as much as this does not give us any definite idea, we come to take them to be 'those that are obtained by means of Appointment' ; (4) then again, 'those to whom the gifts are given. And it is through all these grades that we arrived at the real denotation of the word '*Rtvik*.' Thus we find that though the original denotation of the word consisted of 'one who performs Sacrifices at various seasons,' yet in as much as this is found to be inadmissible, it goes on being specialised, until we come to one that is admissible and compatible with the rest of the Context ; and hence the character of the '*Rtviks*' must be regarded as a duly established entity, even prior to its being created (by the Appointment).

Then again, we should like to know whether the Appointment and the gift create the *Rtviks* themselves, or the character of the '*Rtvik*.' As for the former, they have been already created or produced by their parents, and as such do not require to be produced again. And as for the character of '*Rtvik*,' it consists of a particular capability, which is brought about by study and hearing of the Veda ; and as such this too does not require to be brought about again ; we shall show, under the *Sutra* III—viii—4, that the Master does not create the capabilities of the Priests. Specially as in all cases what is created or produced is what does not exist already ; and with regard to the *Rtviks* all that is non-existent, prior to the Appointment, is their being won over to perform the actions connected with the Sacrifice.

Objection : "The Character of '*Rtvik*' also does not exist with "regard to the particular persons concerned."

Reply : True ; but that character we do not find to be produced, even after the Appointment. If it be urged that whatever is produced by the Appointment is the Character of '*Rtvik*,'—then, that would be nothing else besides their being won over. Nor is the *Rtvik*-character an imperceptible entity ; as that alone can be regarded as imperceptible whose functions are found to be so. The functions of the *Rtvik*, which consist of the accomplishment of the

Action, are quite perceptible; and how could this perceptible effect be brought about by means of an imperceptible agency? Specially as all that is found to bring about the accomplishment of the action is quite perceptible,—in the shape of *Brāhmaṇahood* and the rest. The only imperceptible element that there is (i.e. *Apūrva*), is taken up, through the context, by the sentence laying down the performance of the action as a whole; and as such it is found to help directly in the Action, and not in the bringing about of the character of the *Rtviks* (*Adhvaryu* and the rest). Nor is this imperceptible element (of the *Apūrva*) produced by means of the Appointment or Rewarding of the *Rtviks*; and hence these two (the Appointment and the Gifts) cannot be regarded as the basis (of the signification of the word '*Rtvik*').

As for the *Āhavanīya*, etc., on the other hand, (1) in as much as their production is not spoken of in the (present) Context,—(2) as the help that they accord is always of the imperceptible (or transcendental) character,—(3) and as the purifications laid down for them are all such as pertain to them before they have been brought into existence,—it is only right that they should be spoken of as 'to be produced.' Then again, in the case of these consecrated Fires, the *Homa* and other actions do not stand in need of a substrate to hold the materials that are offered; and hence it must be admitted that the presence of these consecrated Fires brings about a certain transcendental result; and as such a result could not be obtained from the ordinary Fire, we require, for the fulfilment of that result, the imperceptible (transcendental consecrated character of the Fire, *Āhavanīyatva*). For these reasons the case of these Fires cannot be analogous to the case in question.

And further, if the imperceptible *Rtvik*-character were produced by the Appointment and the Gift, then at the *Sattra* also (at which all the persons engaged are *Masters*), it would be necessary to produce that character in the *Masters* also; and in as much as in the sentence, laying down the Initiation of these by one another, the persons referred to (as to be initiated) are the *Masters* themselves, as occupying the positions of the *Adhvaryu* and other Priests,—it would be necessary to have Appointments and Gifts in this case also; which is absurd. Because as for the Appointment, in as much as it is done simply for the purpose of winning the co-operation of the Priests, it could not be done at the *Sattra*, at which every one of the Priests being *Masters*, it is his own business for every one of them; (and as such no winning over is necessary); and any such Appointment

would be directly contradictory to what is said under *Sūtra* (X—ii—35).

For these reasons it must be admitted that it is for the sake of the Action that we have the restrictive rule for the engaging of such persons (as Priests) as have been previously ascertained to have the capability of accomplishing that Action. And as for the word '*Rtvik*,' that too comes to be restricted to such capable persons (as have been obtained by Appointment and Gifts);—as it is only this much that is necessary for the perfection of the Action; and it does not refer to Persons other than those, even though they be endowed with the necessary capability. At the *Saṅgṛaha* however, in as much as it is the Masters themselves that officiate as the various Priests, there is no need of Appointments and Gifts; and hence these are not admitted; and the absence of these does not create any discrepancy in the Sacrifice; and consequently in this case, the character of the several Priests—*Adhvaryu* and the rest—is accomplished, solely through *Capability*. Just as at the *Purnamāsī* Sacrifice, even without the *Ṣākhāparivāsana*, any substance, that is found capable of removing the Fire-embers, comes to be accepted as the '*Upavēsha*,' and the absence of the *Ṣākhāparivāsana* does not create a discrepancy.

Thus then, just as the case of the sentence '*Yūpasya svaram karoti*,' will be explained under *Sūtra* IV—ii—6 (that the word '*karoti*,' means 'creates' or 'produces' obtains or acquires), so would it also be in the case in question, according to the *Bhāṣya* (i.e. the '*Varaṇa*' and '*Bharaṇa*' would be explained as equivalent to 'obtaining').

***Sūtra* (34): Objection: "It might be a partial alternative."**

["The sentence 'Seventeen Priests' may be taken as laying down 'the particular number as an optional alternative.'"]

***Sūtra* (35): Reply: It is not so; because all do not form the subject of treatment.**

It is in connection with the *Vaiṣvānara-Dvādaśakapāla* that we have the declaration of the numbers 'Eight,' etc.; and as these numbers are not found to be of any direct use in the Actions, they can be regarded as referring to the different parts of the number ('Seventeen') of Priests employed; and they serve the purpose of eulogising them. In the case in question however, we do not find mentioned any number beyond 'Seventeen,' of which this number

('Seventeen') could be regarded as a part, whose mention could serve the purposes of eulogisation. Hence it must be admitted that the declaration 'Seventeen Priests' only serves the purpose of recapitulating the number of Priests employed.

ADHIKARAṆA (17)

[It is only the Brahmā, etc., mentioned in the sentences laying down the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fees, that make up the 'Seventeen Priests.']

Sūtra (36) : *(The number of the Priests) is limited by the direct declaration of the sacrificial Fees.*

[With regard to the declaration of 'Seventeen Priests,' there arises the question as to which are these *seventeen*.]

On this question we have the—

PŪRVAPAKSHA

"that, any of the Priests employed at the original Sacrifice may be taken as making up the 'Seventeen.'"

SIDDHĀNTA.

The number of the Priests is limited by the sentence expressing the *Co-ordination* (of certain Priests with certain factors in the Sacrifice) ; and as a matter of fact, we find this *Co-ordination*, expressed in the sentence laying down the order in which the Sacrificial Fees are to be paid, pertaining to the Brahmā and other Principal Priests, and not to be the minor ones, the *Camasādhvaryu*, etc. Though there may be an idea that the well-established character of the *Rtvik*, being referred to, cannot be thus limited in its scope,—yet the specific limitation in the case in question may be accepted as based upon the particular declaration of the number 'Seventeen' ; and as this number is found to be restricted, by the Veda, to the Brahmā, etc., only, we cannot but admit that it is these alone that make up the 'Seventeen Priests.'

Sūtra (37) : *Also because it is the Imitation of these that is laid down, immediately after that of the Master has been enjoined.*

We find the sentence '*ye rtvijastē yajamānāḥ*' showing that the two words '*rtvik*' (Priest) and '*Yajamāna*' ('Master of the Sacrifice')

apply to the same Persons; and then, the rest goes on to speak of the Purificatory Rites of Initiation of the Master as pertaining to the *Brahmā*, etc.,—by way of showing the Order in which these are to receive their Fees; and this distinctly shows that the two words are applicable to the *Seventeen Priests*, *Brahmā* and the rest.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the character of the '*Ṛtvik*' (i.e. the priestly character) belongs only to such persons as are capable of performing the duties of the *Brahmā*, etc., and 'perform the Sacrifices at particular seasons'; and the basis of the denotation of the word '*Ṛtvik*' lies in the 'performance of sacrifices at particular seasons,' as done by these persons. Just as though the word '*Go*' (Cow) literally means 'that which moves' ('*gacchalīti gauḥ*'), yet its denotation is restricted to that moving thing which is characterised by the *Dewlap*, etc. Or again, just as the word '*Dhāyyā*,' laid down by Pāṇini (*Sutra* III—i—129) as an arbitrary form signifying the *Sāmidhēnīs*, is restricted to these only and not to any other verses, even though the etymological meaning of the word ('*Dhāyyā*') may be found applicable to these latter also,—exactly in the same manner, in the case in question, it must be admitted that the word '*Ṛtvik*' is applicable to the *Brahmā*, etc., alone as performing Sacrifices at particular seasons, and not to all that might perform such Sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (18).

[It is the Master that makes the Seventeenth of the Priests.]

Sūtra (38): *The seventeenth of the Priests is the Master ; because of the similarity of their functions.*

Sixteen of the Priests are found to be mentioned in the sentences laying down the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fees ; and it remains to be learnt who is the *Seventeenth*. The persons engaged at the Sacrifice, apart from the aforesaid sixteen, are the *Sadasya* (the Assembled guests), the *Yajamāna* (the Master of the Sacrifice), and the *Camasādhvaryus*. As for the *Camasādhvaryus* however, as there are many of them of equal status, we find no grounds for fixing upon any one of those as the required *Seventeenth*. Hence there remains the question as to whether the *Sadasya* or the *Master* makes the *Seventeenth*.

On this question, the PŪRVAPAKSHA—being that, “ inasmuch as it is the *Sadasya* that renders services similar to those rendered by the other sixteen Priests, in connection with the Sacrifice, it is he that must be regarded as the *Seventeenth*,”—we have the following :—

SIDDHĀNTA.

The Master would be the Seventeenth of the Priests.

Objection : “ In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it has been denied that the application of the name ‘ *Ṛtvik* ’ is based upon the ‘ performance of sacrifices at particular seasons ’ ; and then, how is it that on the present occasion, you declare the Master to have the functions of the *Ṛtvik*, on the ground of his performing, like the other Priests, the *Sacrifices at particular Seasons* ? Then again, inasmuch as we have a distinct originaive Injunction of the *Sadasya*, in the sentence ‘ *Sadasyān vṛṇīta*, ’ we must regard the *Sadasya* as a distinct Priest, like the *Adhvaryu* and the rest (and as such it would be more reasonable to take the *Sadasya* as the *Seventeenth* Priest). Nor could the name ‘ *Sadasya* ’ be taken as applying, etymologically, to the *Brahmā* Priest ; because such etymological application is precluded by the well-known denotation of the word. Nor could the sentence ‘ *Sadasyam Vṛṇīta* ’ be taken as an Injunction, or

"Reference, of a second Appointment for the *Brahmā*; as in that case we could have second Appointments of the *Adhvaryu* and other Priests also. Then again, in all the Recitations, we find that the *Mantras*, laid down as to be recited by the *Sadasya*, are distinct from those that are laid down for the *Brahmā*; and hence if the *Sadasya* were the same as the *Brahmā*, we would have to accept the objectionable fact of the two sets of *Mantras* being optional alternatives. Nor could the mention of the *Brahmā* as the '*Sadasya*' be of any use, in the matter of his connection with the *Soma-Cup* (consequently the *Sadasya* cannot be the same as *Brahmā*. And lastly, the *Sadasya* must be one who is found to be capable of *Keeping an eye on the performance*; and, through this action of *Keeping an eye on it*, he can be spoken of as 'performing the Sacrifice at particular seasons.' And further we find that all Sacrifices appoint the *Sadasya* separately. For all these reasons it is not right to exclude the *Sadasya* from the 'Seventeen Priests.'"

Reply: We do not exclude the *Sadasya* from all connection with the Sacrifice: all that we mean is that, like the *Camasādhvaryu*, he cannot be called a '*Rtvik*'. The *Sadasya* is certainly to be appointed separately. Nor is the *Brahmā* spoken of as '*Sadasya*.' But, the *Sadasya* is not spoken of as a '*Rtvik*';—because though the name applies to one who has been appointed and who performs the Sacrifices at particular seasons, yet he is not mentioned among the Recipients of the Sacrificial Fee, nor in the sentence laying down the *Dwādaçāha* Initiation (for Priests). Just as even though the *Camasādhvaryus* fulfil the two conditions of *being appointed*, and *performing the Sacrifice*, etc., inasmuch as they do not fulfil the other two conditions, they are not spoken of as '*Rtviks*.'

As for the *Master*, on the other hand, though he is not *appointed*, yet, inasmuch as he fulfils all the other conditions, it is only right that he should be spoken of as a '*Rtvik*.'

It has been urged above, that—"the *Sadasya* may be spoken of as 'performing the Sacrifice,' on the ground of his *witnessing* it." But, though it is true that he is formally *appointed*, yet this is done simply in obedience to a direct Injunction to that effect; and as a matter of fact, we find that there is no special function attached to him in connection with the Sacrifice, whereby he could be spoken of as 'performing the Sacrifice.' The mere *witnessing* is no action connected with the actual *performance of the Sacrifice*; and as such that could not be any ground for his being taken as a particular 'Performer' (of the Sacrifice). Hence it must be admitted that, even

though we have the *Sadasya*, it is only right that the *Master* should be spoken of as the *Seventeenth* 'Rtvik.'

The *Bhāshya* said something to the effect that there is no *Sadasya*; but this must be regarded as a much too sweeping declaration made with a view to deny, most emphatically, the fact of the *Sadasya* being a 'Rtvik'; and much significance cannot be attached to such a sweeping declaration.

ADHIKARĀṆA (19).

[(a) The *Ādhvaryava* and other Actions must be performed by the *Adhvaryu* etc. respectively. (b) The Fire belongs to the Original Primary Sacrifice, as well as to the Modifications.]

Sutra (39): “*The Priests would perform all Actions, as they are appointed for that purpose.*” *As for the Fire, that also belongs to all Sacrifices as they are laid down independently by themselves.*

Having dealt with the diversity of Performers, the *Bhāṣya* next proceeds to deal with the matter of the employment of things being governed by Name. [And on this point it raises the question as to whether all Actions, in connection with the Sacrifice, that can be done by men, are to be done by all the Priests, or there is any restriction as to certain Actions being always performed by certain definite Priests, --and also the question as to whether all the functions of Fire are to be performed by all the three Sacrificial Fires, or there is a certain restriction as to the functioning of these also.]

On this question, the *Bhāṣya* puts forward the *Pūrvapakṣa*, that—“*They would perform all the Actions, because etc. etc.* [That “is to say, when the Priests are appointed, they must be appointed “for doing all that can be done by man; and similarly when the “Fires are prepared, they must be prepared for performing all the functions of the Fire.”]

But we do not quite understand whether the question refers to the doubt as to the Priests performing only the actions pertaining to the Sacrifice or those pertaining to the Sacrificer also, or it refers to that as to their performing all actions pertaining to the Sacrifice or all the actions (those pertaining to the Sacrifice as well as those pertaining to the Sacrificer). Then again, we do not understand whether ‘all actions’ spoken of are those only that are mentioned in connected sentences or those that are not so expressly mentioned.

If the meaning be that the ‘Actions pertaining to the Sacrificer’ also (are to be performed by the Priests),—that would be wholly inadmissible; inasmuch as the fact of the *Appointment* and the *gift* of the Priests being laid down in the context of the Sacrifice, distinctly

shows that the Priests are appointed only for the sake of those actions that pertain to the Sacrifice only ; as has been explained in the *Sūtra* III—iv—15, and also under the *Sūtra* 'nirdēṣādāvā etc.' (XII—ii—3). For these reasons the expression 'sarvārthāḥ' cannot be taken as referring to the actions pertaining to the Sacrificer. Nor could any actions, that are not mentioned in the sentences 'Tānpurāḥ Adhvaryurvibhajati' etc., be included among those that are mentioned in these sentences. And as for those actions that are not expressly mentioned in such sentences, these, being found to be laid down at random anywhere in the Veda, could be performed by any persons capable of such performance, without restriction ; and as such with reference to these alone the Priests may be spoken of as 'sarvārthāḥ.'

The phrase 'prayuktatvāt' means—"because all the actions are capable of prompting the appointment of the Priest ; and also because all the Priests are capable of performing all the actions".

Says the *Bhāṣhya*—'sarvam puruṣakāryam' ; and this refers to those actions which the man is capable of performing, and which he would perform, if certain direct declarations had not pointed out only some of them as to be performed by him ; and it cannot be taken as referring to the Actions pertaining to the man (i.e., those calculated to bring about certain results desired by him).

As for the sacrificial fires, *Āhavanīya*, etc., any mention of their being 'sarvārtha' is wholly irrelevant. Nor could it be taken as declared by the way, because the reason that is given—'svakālatvāt' is not applicable to it. Nor do we find any mention, later on, of the reply, or the arguments in favour of the reply, to the *Pūrvāpakṣa* put forward by the *Bhāṣhya* in this connection (of the Fires).

Then again, if the Fires be held to be spoken of as 'sarvārtha' with reference to the ordinary actions of the world, then, inasmuch as this would be fully dealt with under the *Sūtras* 'vihāro laukikānāmartham sādhayēt prabhutvāt,' (XII—ii—1), and 'nirdēṣādāvā vaidikānām syāt' (XII—ii—3),—there would be no need of dealing with the question in the present connection. Even as regards the mention of 'sarvārtha' being with reference to the fact of the original primary and as well as the subsidiary modifications being for the sake of all those functions of the Fire that are laid down in the Veda—that too, having been fully dealt with, in connection with the sentence 'agnimupasamādhāyā stuvatē,' under the *Sūtras* 'Viçayē laukikan syāt, etc.' (VII—iii—30), 'na vaidikam, etc.' (VIII—iii—31), and 'Tatthotpattirēlāṣhām, etc.' (VII—iii—32), where 'ēlāṣhām' = 'of the Dhaishnya Fires,'—should not have been discussed on the present occasion.

For these reasons, we must take the latter assertion in the *Sūtra* ('*Agnayaṣṣa svakālatvāt*') as a declaration of the *Siddhānta*; as we do not find, in the *Sūtra*, any assertion negating the one herein made. And with a view to this, we explain it in the following manner:

The fact of the Fires being '*sarvārtha*' has been put forward, not as a *Pūrvāpaksha*, but as a *Siddhānta* in reply to a *Pūrvāpaksha* inferred from what has been laid down in a *Sūtra* of another *Adhikaraṇa*, the present *Sūtra* thus containing two distinct utterances (one from the *Pūrvāpaksha* and another from the *Siddhānta* standpoint. Nor does '*sarvārtha*' refer to the functions of the Fire; but it refers to the Primary Original and the subsidiary modifications.

And it is in accordance with the laws of the *Anārabhyavādas* (Vide III—vi—1 *et seq.*) as pertaining to the *Laying of Fire*, that we should put forward the *Pūrvāpaksha* and the *Siddhānta* in connection with the question under consideration;—this question being as to whether the Sacrificial Fires belong to the Primary Original Sacrifice only, or to all sacrifices.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVĀPAKSHA (A).

"The Fires must be regarded as belonging to the Primary Original, 'just like all details not laid down in any particular context;—in accordance with the *Sūtra* '*Prakṛtan vā dviruktatvāt*' (III—vi—2)."

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA (A).

The Fires would belong to all the sacrifices, the Primary Original, as well as the subsidiary modifications; because they are laid down independently, by themselves.

Objection: "But this has been already established under the *Sūtra*: '*sarvārtham vā ādhanasya svakālatvāt*' (III—vi—15) [and as such it "should not be discussed over again, on the present occasion]."

Reply: The '*sarvārtha*' mentioned in the present *Sūtra* cannot be the same as that spoken of in connection with the *Ādhāna*. Because if we rested on the former *Adhikaraṇa* only, such things as the Fire in question would appear in accordance with the appearance of those things the means whereof is dependent upon something else, and not when they would be independent (as in the case in question); and hence the Sacrificial Fires would belong only to those *Darvi-Homas* that are laid down in their form by the scriptures,—and not to the

Sacrifices ; as they would not be enjoined with regard to these. That is to say, the Vedic declaration that we have is in the form—‘ *yajjuhōti tadāhavanīyē*,’ and not ‘ *yadyajēran tadāhavanīyē* ’ ; and this injunction of the *Āhavanīya* (Sacrificial) Fire must stand in need of some such means (for its appearance) as are enjoined, directly or indirectly, in such sentences as—‘ *yāvaccaturavattanjuhōti*,’ ‘ *Yad grahān juhōti*,’ ‘ *yaccamasān juhōti*,’ and so forth. And hence in this case, the *Laying* would, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—vi—2, come to be recognised as appearing, through Implicatory Injunction, along with the Fire itself. And it is with a view to this that in *Sūtra* III—vi—16, it has been asserted as a well-established fact that the Fire belongs to the *Ishtis*. So also, with regard to the *Caru* and *Purodācas* used at the Modificatory Sacrifices, there being no Direct Injunction of the *Preparation* of the offering material, there would be no direct means available for the appearance of the *Gārhapatya* Fire ; and hence it becomes necessary to seek for the *Preparation* together with the *Gārhapatya* Fire, to appear from out of the Primary Original Sacrifice.

Thus we have dealt with that portion of the *Sūtra* which refers to the Fires ; and as for the other (former) portion, embodying the *Pūrvāpaksha* (B), in regard to the Priests performing all the Actions, the reply to it is given in the following *Sūtra*, which embodies—

SIDDHĀNTA (B)

[which is put forward in the *Bhāṣhya* as *Adhikaraṇa* (20)].

***Sūtra* (40) : There would be restriction of actions (to be performed by each Priest) ; because of the mention of names ;—these being mentioned for that purpose.**

Because of the presence of *Names* (of the Priests and the Actions performed by them), there must be a restriction. That is to say the name ‘ *Hotṛ* ’ would be wholly useless, if the Priest bearing that name did not perform the actions that are named ‘ *Hautra* ’ ; and conversely unless the actions were performed by the Priest called ‘ *Hotṛ* ’ it could not be named ‘ *Hautra*.’ Consequently, on the ground of this Apparent Inconsistency of the Names, we must regard them as serving the purpose of pointing out certain actions as to be performed by certain persons.

In this connection some people declare as follows : “ The two “ names (‘ *Hotṛ* ’ and ‘ *Hautra* ’) are applied independently of each “ other, to the Performer and the Action respectively, by mere conven-

tion (and not through the etymological signification of the words) : and it is by reason of the mere similarity of sounds that the word ‘*Hotṛ*’ comes to point to the fact of the priest bearing that name being the performer of actions bearing the name of ‘*Hautra*’ (and not because of the word ‘*Hautra*’ signifying ‘that which is performed by the *Hotṛ* Priest’). Because it is only when the relationship (between a certain word and a particular thing) has been previously established, that it serves as the ground of that word being taken as the name of that thing ; in the case in question, however, we find that before the recognition of the names, there is no relationship (between the words ‘*Hotṛ*’ and ‘*Hautra*’ on the one hand, and ‘the Performer and the Action on the other).

That is to say, the word ‘*Hotṛ*’ is not based upon the performance of the *Hautra* action ; because, as in the case of the word ‘*Rājā*’ (not being based upon the ‘performance of the *Rājyas*, kingly duties’), so in the present case also, we have no declaration (of Pāṇini) authorising the elimination of the affix (‘*aṇ*’) and the reduplication of the basic noun (both of which contingencies would be involved in the word ‘*Hotṛ*’ being taken as equivalent to ‘*Hautrasya kartā*’, the Performer of the *Hautra* actions). And though in the case of the words ‘*Rājā*’ and ‘*Rājya*’, the converse holds good,—i.e. ‘*Rājya*’ is ‘*Rajñah Karma*, the Duties of the King’—yet that could not be the case with the words ‘*Hotṛ*’ and ‘*Hautra*’ ; that is to say, the word ‘*Hautra*’ cannot be taken as ‘*Hotṛ Karma*, the Duties of the *Hotṛ*’ ; because in the case of the word ‘*Rājya*’, we find that there are certain definite actions, such as the protecting of the people and the like, laid down, by Manu and the other law-givers, as the ‘Duties of the King,’ and these being known as such, can be taken as constituting the denotation of the affix in the word ‘*Rājya*’ ; while in the case of the word ‘*Hautra*,’ we find that there is no other means (save that afforded by this name itself) by which we could recognise the actions, of the Recitation of the *Sāmidhēni* verses and the like, as to be done by the *Hotṛ*,—on a recognition whereof we could base the name ‘*Hautra*.’ And from all this we conclude that the names cannot serve the purpose of pointing out which actions are to be performed by which Priests.

Question : ‘The words not being taken in their etymological sense, what would be there to point out the fact of certain Actions being done by particular Priests ?’

Answer : We have already explained above that this is done by the similarity of the words (i.e. the *Hautra* actions are recognised as

“to be performed by the *Hotṛ*, simply because there is a similarity “between the words ‘*Hotṛ*’, and ‘*Hautra*’.”

Reply: All this is not quite admissible; because if the word ‘*Hautra*’ be not taken as signifying ‘the Duties of the *Hotṛ*’, then, inasmuch as, even without the signification of any such relationship as that of the *Performer* and the *Action* (between the *Hotṛ* and the *Hautra*), the *Names* would be capable of pointing out the *performance*, by means of the conventional meanings of the words, based upon the similarity of sounds between them; and as such, there would be no Apparent Inconsistency that could lead to the assumption of a Direct Declaration to the effect. Then again, the mere similarity of sounds between two words does not always point to any relationship (between their denotations); e.g. in the case of the words ‘*Qālā*’ (house) and ‘*Mālā*’ (garland); as we shall show, later on, that there is no relationship between the *Rathantara* and the *Kaṇṇvarathantara* (though the two words resemble each other.)

It has been argued above that—“the word ‘*Rājya*’ is used only when the *King* (‘*Rājā*’) has become connected with certain definite duties.” But this is not so; as in that case, the relationship (of the word ‘*Rājya*’ with its denotation) would come to have a beginning (and this would be contradictory to what has been said, in the *Tarkapāda*, in regard to the eternality of this relationship). Consequently, it must be admitted that, what happens in the case of the word ‘*Rājya*’ is that its relationship with its denotation is eternal, and this eternal relationship is recognised from the scriptures, and when we come to comprehend the correctness of the form of the word, we explain the word ‘*Rājya*’ after the word ‘*Rājā*’ has been explained (the former being explained as ‘*Rājñāḥ karma*’); and as such it comes to be taken in its etymological sense; and hence even though the signification of the word ‘*Rājya*,’ is thus spoken of as based upon that of ‘*Rājā*,’ yet inasmuch as this basis too is eternal, the said relationship does not lose its eternal character;—exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as in the word ‘*Hautra*,’ we find the vowel-sound of the first letter broadened (from ‘*ō*’ into ‘*au*’), we come to explain it as formed from the word ‘*hotṛ*’ with the affix ‘*aṇ*,’ in accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*tasycadam karma*’ [and this does not affect the eternality of the word and its denotation].

Question: “But by what means is it known that that particular Action constitutes the Duty of that Person?”

Answer: From the presence of the names (‘*Hotṛ*’ and ‘*Hautra*’)

we shall infer the existence of a Text to the effect (that the Actions called ‘*Hautra*’ constitute the Duty of the Priest called ‘*Hotṛ*’).

Objection : “ Under the circumstances, there would be a mutual interdependence ; the Text being assumed from the Names, and the application of the Names being based upon the Text declaring the fact of the actions as to be performed by a particular Priest.

Reply : That does not affect our case ; because the Names are distinctly perceived to be applicable (to the Actions and the Performer) ; and when we come to look into the basis of their application, we find that they could not stand in need of a basis for their application, simply because of their having been previously applied (to the Action and the Performer) ; and as we do not find any other basis for this, we conclude that there must be a Text to the effect that ‘ the action called *Hautra* is to be done by the *Hotṛ* ’ ; we have explained above that the assumption of such Texts is made in this manner, even in the case of Indicative Force and the rest ; and thus there is no mutual interdependence in the case in question.

Objection : “ In that case, the present case will have been dealt with under the *Sūtra* ‘ *Ākhyā caivāntadarthatvāt* ’ (III—iii—13) (and “ as such it should not have been discussed over again, on the present occasion). ”

Reply : True, it has been dealt with on the former occasion ; but on that occasion we did not discuss the question of the contradiction or non-contradiction of *Name* with *Direct Declaration*, etc. In the present *Adhikaraṇa*, however, we find that *Capability* and *Context* indicate the fact of all the Actions being performed by all the Priests promiscuously,—while the *Names* show that certain actions are to be performed by particular Priests only,—so that there is a seeming contradiction between these two (*Context* and *Name*) ; and this contradiction is explained away in the manner shown above. Or, it may be that the present Discussion has been introduced on the present occasion, simply by way of an introduction to the following *Adhikaraṇa* ; and hence it cannot be regarded as a mere useless repetition.

ADHIKARAṆA (21).

[In certain cases we have to reject the indication of *Names*, as to the particular Priest performing a certain action.]

Sūtra (41) : The Action is spoken of as to be performed in accordance with the Direct Injunction and the Specific Name.

[The question being as to whether the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, is to be accepted as universal—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that it is so ; and on this we have the following *Siddhānta*.]

A specific Name, like a specific Direct Injunction, is much quicker in its operation than a common Name ; and as such sets aside the indications of this latter.

Sūtra (42) : Such too are the Indications.

The sentence that the *Bhāṣya* quotes as affording the Indications spoken of, is—‘*Yatra hotuḥ prātarānuvākamanubruvata etc.*’; but this indicates the performance of actions by certain Priests as pointed out by a *Common Name* ; and hence we should look out for another sentence that could afford the Indications as to the performance being pointed out by *Specific Names*.

ADHIKARĀṆA (22).

[The *Anuvacana* (Recitation) and the *Praisha* (Direction) are to be done conjointly, by the *Maitrāvaruṇa Priest*]

Sūtra (43): “ *All Reciting and all Directing is to be done by the Maitrāvaruṇa, because of the Direct Injunction to that effect.* ”

It having been established that the indications of Name are set aside by Direct Injunction, we now proceed to consider the question, as to whether they are set aside *wholly*, or only *partially*.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣhṭoma*, we find the sentence—‘*Tasmān Māitrāvaruṇaḥ preshyati cānuṣaḥ ca*’; and with a view to show the exact place where the sentence occurs, the *Bhāṣhya* mentions the ‘*Agnīshomīya*.’ The two actions spoken of in this sentence (i.e. *Reciting* and *Directing*) are found to be named ‘*Ādhvaryava*’ and ‘*Hautra*’ respectively; and these names distinctly indicate the fact of *all Reciting* being done by the *Ādhvaryu*, and *all Directing* being done by the *Hotṛ*; whereas we find the sentence quoted directly laying down that these two actions are to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa Priest*. And hence there arises the question as to whether this Direct Injunction rejects the Indications of the two *Names*, with regard to *all Recitings* and *Directings*, or only with regard to only a few of these.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as we find the sentence distinctly laying down the *Maitrāvaruṇa* with reference to the *Reciting* and the *Directing*, no significance can be attached to the words expressing the fact of the two actions appearing conjointly; as all that the word ‘*ca*’ expresses is that the two actions might be dealt with conjointly, or separately (one following in the wake of another), and not that they qualify, or are dependent upon, each other,—these two facts being always expressed by means of compounds; nor do we find any grounds for taking one of them as following in the wake of another; as both are found to be equally important; and hence it must be admitted that both should be done. And as this would be possible,

“even in the case of all the *Recitings* and *Directings* being done separately, we conclude that, inasmuch as the sentence makes the declaration in a general form, it must be taken as pertaining to all *Recitings* and *Directings*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (44): *The Direct Infjunction would apply to the case of the (Reciting of the) Puroṇuvākya only; because of this latter being accompanied by the Directive words.*

The sentence in question could not apply to all *Recitings* and *Directings*; it must be taken as applying to the *Reciting* of the *Puroṇuvākya* verses only; as it is only these verses that end with certain *Directive words*; and it is in connection with these verses that we find the *Direct Infjunction* under consideration.—‘*Tasmān maitravarunaḥ* etc.’ And the *Puroṇuvākya* verses ending in *Directive words* are found in the section of ‘*Hautra*’ Actions; and hence, on account of this name ‘*Hautra*,’ they would be recognised as to be recited by the *Hotr* only (and hence it is with regard to these verses alone that the sentence in question sets aside the indications of the Name).

At the end of the *Puroṇuvākya* verses, we find the word ‘*yaja*’ (‘*Sacrifice*,’ in the Imperative),—and this *sacrificing* is found to belong, by Implication, to the *Adhvaryu*, in connection with subsidiary modifications of the *Ishli*—sacrifices. And as regards the *Soma*-sacrifices, the word ‘*yaja*’ is precluded (from the *Adhvaryu*), as shown under *Sūtra* III—viii—22, and relegated to the *Maitravaruna*, as shown under *Sūtra* ‘*Teshām yato viçe-shah syāt*’ (III—viii—21). Or, inasmuch as the *Directing* person would do both (the *Reciting* and the *Directing*), we could take the *Maitravaruna* to be the person *directed*, in accordance with the law to be explained later on (*vide Sūtras* III—viii—22 *et. seq.*); and in that case the *Directing* would be done by the *Hotr* himself. Similarly, inasmuch as with regard to the *Adhvaryu* we find a distinct *Directive word* laid down in the sentence—‘*Adhvaryoḥ praishyah* etc.’,—we must preclude the word ‘*yāja*’ from all connection with him; and hence in this case, it would come to belong to the *Pratiprasthātr* Priest. As for the other *Recitings* and *Directings* (than those dealt with above), inasmuch as the particular persons who are to perform them are already known, they do not stand in need of any *Infjunctions* with regard to their performers; and as such the *Infjunction* with regard to the *Maitravaruna* Priest cannot apply to them.

As for the *Puronuvākya*s however, they are to partake of the nature of both (Recitation and Direction), on account of their ending with Directive words; but even then, their recitation constituting a single action, they could not be performed by more than one person; consequently they become precluded from all connection with the *Hotṛ* as well as the *Ādhvaryu* (with whom they are connected by the names 'Ādhvaryuva' and 'Hautra,' the former belonging to the portion made up of the Directive words, and the latter to the *Mantra*-portion); and as such they stand in need of an Injunction as to the Priest who should do their recitation; and then, on account of the close proximity (of the mention of these) to the Injunction of *Maitrāvaruṇa* (in the sentence in question),—it is only right that we should accept the *Maitrāvaruṇa* as the person who should recite the *Puronuvākya* verses (and also address the Directive words accompanying them).

And in this manner, the word 'ca' also (in the sentence) comes to be taken in its direct sense of the concomitance (or accruing together) of the two actions of *Reciting* and *Directing*,—which is possible in the case of the *Puronuvākya* verses only; as it is only these that are found to end in Directive words also. But it does not follow from this that the Directive words '*Praishyu*' and the rest also belong to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* himself.

Sūtra (45): *Also because we find the Hotṛ mentioned in connection with the Prataranuvāka (the Morning Recitation).*

[As a matter of fact, we find a distinct Injunction laying down the fact of the *Morning Recitation* being done by the *Hotṛ* Priest; and this would be contradictory to the sentence *Tasmāl*, etc., if this latter were taken as laying down *all Recitations* as to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest. This contradiction is avoided by taking this latter sentence as laying down the Recitation of the *Puronuvākya* verses only as to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (23).

[The *Camasu-Homa* should be done by the *Adhvaryu*.]

Sūtra (46): “*The Camasa-Homa should be done by the
‘ Camasādhvāryus,—because of their Name.’*”

[With regard to the *Camasādhvāryu* Priests, there arises the question as to whether the offering of the Cups in *Homa* is to be done by these or by the *Adhvaryu*.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢHA.

“ All that is done by means of the Cups, are the actions of—(1) *Unnayana* (Fetching of the *Soma*), (2) *Āsādāna* (keeping of the *Soma*), (3) *Homa*, and so forth and though there is a likelihood of every one of these actions being relegated to the *Adhvaryu*,—yet on account of the specific name (that is given to the *Camasādhvāryu* Priests, we cannot but conclude that all these actions are to be done by these latter.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (47): *The Adhvaryu should do them; because of the Law relating to the Adhvaryu.*

The indications of the generic Name are set aside by those of the specific one, only when the latter operates independently of the former. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the name ‘*Camasādhvāryu*’ only denotes the fact of the persons thus named acting like the *Adhvaryu* (with regard to the Cups), (and so this name is not independent of the ‘*Adhvaryu*.’) And under the circumstances, if the *Adhvaryu* were not to perform the *Homa*, the other Priests performing it would not be ‘acting’ like the *Adhvaryu*; in fact it would be only by not performing the *Homa* that they would be acting like him. While if the *Adhvaryu* perform the *Homa*, then it might happen that on certain occasions, the *Adhvaryu* being otherwise engaged, the *Homa* might be done by others, who would thus come to be acting like the *Adhvaryu*. Hence it must be admitted that the *Homa* is performed by the *Adhvaryu*.

Sūtra (48): *Also because of other Priests being spoken of in connection with the Cups.*

[We have the sentence—' *camasāñcamasādhvaryavē prayacchati. tāt sa vashatkartrē harati,*' which shows that it is some other Priest, who, having performed the *Homa* out of the Cups, hands over these Cups to the *Camasādhvaryu*]. Because the sentence distinctly speaks of the *Camasādhvaryu* as the person carrying the Cups to the *Vashatkartrī Priest*; and as a matter of fact, the Cups could be carried to this latter for no other purpose than that of eating the Remnants contained in the Cups; thus then, inasmuch as there could be no *eating* of that out of which no *Homa* had been offered, it is clear that the person handing over the Cups in the first instance for *eating*, must be the same that performed the *Homa*; and as the *Camasādhvaryus* would be engaged in the mere *holding* of the Cups handed over to them (by the person who has offered the *Homa*),—the sentence must be taken as showing that the *Homa* is offered by some one other than the *Camasādhvaryu*; and this can be no other than the *Adhvaryu Priest*.

Sūtra (49): *It is only in cases where the Adhvaryu would be unable to perform the Homa, that the Camasadhvaryus could be recognised as his substitutes.*

[It is the fact of their *acting in place of the Adhvaryu*, upon which the name '*Camasādhvaryu*' is based.]

ADHIKARAṆA (24).

[The *Çyēna* and the *Vājapēya* are performed by many Priests.]

Sūtra (50): “ On account of the Vedic Injunction (Name),
“ —even in cases where the actions happen to be
“ mentioned in different Sections of the Vedas,—they
“ should be done in accordance with the Injunctions,
“ as in the previous case.”

[We have the *Çyēna* sacrifice laid down in the section on ‘ *Audgātra*,’ and the *Vājapēya* in the section on ‘ *Ādhvaryava* ;’ and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether all actions in connection with the *Çyēna* are to be done only by the *Udgātṛ* Priest, and those in connection with the *Vājapēya* by the *Ādhvaryu* only, or, in both cases, they should be done by the several Priests.]

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKṢHA.

“ It has already been explained, under *Sūtra* III—iii—9, that the
“ subsidiaries are always named after that section of the Veda in which
“ their Primary Original is found to be laid down. Consequently, all
“ actions laid down as to be performed in connection with the *Çyēna*
“ have to be done by the *Udgātṛ* Priest only (as they would be named
“ ‘ *Audgātra*’ on account of their Primary, the *Çyēna* being laid down
“ in the *Audgātrā* section of the Veda).

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (51): *Because of its taking in the details of the Primary Original, the Action, along with its Subsidiaries, should be done, as connected with its own accessory details, as laid down by the (Implicatory) Injunctions; specially as (the particular performer is) not distinctly indicated (by the Name), its indication can be accepted only in cases (where there are no Injunctions to the contrary).*

It has been shown, before, and will also be shown later on, that the sentence, assumed as injunctive of the performance of the Sacrifice

as one complete whole, is always weaker, in its authority, than the Implicatory Injunction ('*Prakṛtiṇa Vikṛiti*'); because the former appears long after this latter. Then, as a matter of fact, we find that the Name ('*Audgātra*') of the Primary would apply to the Subsidiaries only through the said assumed sentence; and even though this is directly perceptible, yet it is weaker than the (inferred) Implicatory Injunction. Because until the Subsidiaries are laid down by this latter Injunction, whose performer would the said assumed sentence point out? (Hence being preceded by the Implicatory Injunction, the assumed sentence becomes very much weaker in authority). Then again, as soon as the subsidiaries are laid down, they are always recognised as having a particular Performer, and as such they do not stand in need of any mention of their Performer; and hence there is nothing that the name ('*Audgātra*') could do for them. Nor is it possible, in the present case, to take the name as setting aside what has been previously pointed out; because inasmuch as it is necessary for the Name to assume a corroborative Direct Declaration, it is very much farther removed from its objective than the Implicatory Injunction; specially as we have already explained above that only those means of knowledge that have their basis duly ascertained, can set aside what has been laid down before and not those whose basis has still got to be ascertained.

For these reasons we conclude that, on account of its taking up the accessories of the Primary, by the fact of the Injunction, the Action (*Çyēna*) should, like the *Jyotishtoma*, be performed by many Priests. Though at the Primary Original also, multiplicity of Performers is due to the Names ('*Hotr*' and the rest), yet, inasmuch as in this case, the relationship of these Performers with the performance is duly ascertained, the Indication of Name is accepted to be as authoritative as Direct Declaration itself.

As for those details mentioned in connection with the *Çyēna* which do not belong to the Primary Original, the performer of these would be pointed out by the Name of the Primary Sacrifice. It is with a view to this that the *Sūtra* adds—'*Avyaktāh Çeṣṣe*.' That is to say, in the case of such Details, inasmuch as the relationship to any particular Performer has yet got to be assumed, it is 'not clear'; and as such this could apply to actions other than those with regard to which this relationship has already been ascertained.

But we do not find any case that would be quite amenable to this law. As for the case of the '*Kantakaviloḥana*' etc., cited in the *Bhāshya*, it would be natural to ask whether they are mentioned in the

section of the Veda named after the Primary Sacrifice, or in a wholly different section. If the former, then, in that case, their Performer would be pointed out by the Name, and not through the Primary Sacrifice. If the latter, then, even though this would be directly applicable, yet it would be set aside by the former more authoritative specific Name. If the aid of the *Law of the Primary and Secondary* (Sūtra III—iii—9) be called in, then the *Stotra-Castra* or the *Jyotishtoma*, being subject to the name 'Ādhvaryava' would come to be done by the *Adhvaryu* (which would not be desirable). Nor have we, in this connection, at our disposal the explanation that was given in regard to the sentence 'Mandram prātahsavanē, etc.' (Vide, III—ii—26).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Names of the subsidiaries are not set aside by the Primary. Because the Name of the subsidiary is due to its uniform relationship to the Performer,—and as such, is not caught hold of by the Primary. Nor is it possible for the subsidiaries to bear, through the Primary, the names of 'Ādhvaryava,' etc. Nor again is it possible for the Primaries to be related to such names as 'Ādhvaryava' and the like; because the operation of such names rests in the accessory detail of the Performer. And that Name which is not operative in connection with the Primaries—how could that Name apply to the subsidiaries *through those Primaries*? As for such names as 'R̥gveda' and the like, these are compatible, with regard to the Primaries as well as to the Subsidiaries; because these names are based upon the fact of those Actions being 'done by means of these (R̥gveda), etc.' and this fact being capable of being enjoined by the assumed sentence laying down the performance of the Action as a whole, it is quite possible for these Names to apply to the Subsidiaries also (as these are also included in that sentence). As for the names 'Ādhvaryava' and the like, however, these are based upon the fact of the sentences mentioning these Actions being found in those sections of the Veda; and as such they would apply precisely in accordance with the actual mention of the Actions (and as such they could not apply to the Primaries and the Subsidiaries alike). Nor is there any thing objectionable in the acceptance of the Law of the (Primary and the Secondary) (Sūtra III—iii—9) in the present connection.

Then as for the *Kantakavitodana*, etc., they should be taken as having their originative Injunctions in the same Veda (as the Primaries); and hence with regard to these, the declaration, 'Avyaktah Ṣṣṣhē,' becomes quite justifiable.

Nor is it absolutely necessary that it is only that Name which comes through the Primary, that can be accepted (in connection with

the Subsidiaries); because as these names would have their requirements fulfilled all the same, there would be nothing incompatible in their being accepted, or not accepted, directly, with regard to the subsidiaries themselves (without the intervening agency of the Primary). Consequently, it must be admitted that the Name is operative towards the pointing out of such accessories only as are distinct from those belonging to the Primary (the subsidiaries having their needs supplied either directly, by themselves, or indirectly, through the Primary)

Thus ends the *Seventh Pāda* of Adhyāya III.

ADHYAYA III.

PĀDA VIII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1).

[The *Purchase* is to be done by the Master.]

Sūtra (1): *The Purchase (of the Priest's Services) as to be done by the Master; as the sacrifice is performed for his sake.*

By way of an exception to the Indications of Name, we proceed to take up the following question: 'Is the *Purchase* to be done by the *Adhvaryu* and the other Priests, on account of its being mentioned in the *Adhvaryava* and other sections of the Veda,—or is it to be done by the Master of the Sacrifice?' And the *Siddhānta* represented in the *Sūtra*: '*Anyo vā syāt parikrayāmnānāt*' (III—vii—20) could be possible only after the *Siddhānta* of the present *Adhikaraṇa* has been fully established.

On the above question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"What should be done by the Master is that he should have recourse to some such ordinary method (as imploration etc.) as would induce the *Adhvaryu* to effect the *purchase* of the services of the other Priests, with the property of the Master; and in this way alone could we justify the name of '*Ādhvaryava*' (of the section in which the *Purchase* is laid down)."

In reply to this, we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

An ordinary wordly method can have had recourse to, only in a case where no other Vedic method is available; in the case in question, inasmuch as we have the distinct Vedic method of giving the Sacrificial Fee, why should recourse be had to the worldly methods of (winning the co-operation of the *Adhvaryu*)?

That is to say, it is only through his having *purchased* the services of all the other Priests, that the Master has been shown to be the actual 'Performer' of the sacrifice, and if he were not to do even the *Purchase* of the others' services, then (all other actions being performed by the Priests), he would not be the 'Performer' of any action. It might be argued that he would acquire that character by having recourse to certain ordinary worldly methods. But that could not be. Because in the absence of a Direct Declaration to the contrary, we cannot set aside the fact of the Master himself being the 'Performer.' And hence it must be admitted that the Purchase is to be done by the Master himself.

Sūtra (2): *It could be done by others, only in cases where we would have a direct declaration to that effect.*

In the sentence 'etām ishtakām upadadhyāt satṛuvarandadyāt, the *Parasmaipada* ending in 'Upadadhyāt' distinctly shows that the action referred to in this is not to be done by the Master (the enjoyer of its Result); and hence from this it follows that the 'giving of gifts' here-in laid down is to be done by the Priest. But if the Priest does this work, on account of his services having been purchased by the Master, by a method laid down in the scriptures, then in this case also, we have the Master himself as the 'performer' (indirect) of the action (of the giving of gifts); if however the Priest refuses to do it, for the payment he has received for doing the other actions, then it becomes necessary for the Master to have recourse to the ordinary worldly methods (for securing his necessary co-operation).

ADHIKARĀṆA (2).

[The Purificatory Rites of *Shaving*, etc., pertain to the Master.]

Sūtra (3) : “ *All purificatory rites resting upon the capability of Man (to undergo them), they should be done just like the Sacrifice, in accordance with the name of the particular section of the Veda in which they are laid down.* ”

[In this connection we find laid down the *Shaving of the Head* and the *Beard*, the *Cleaning of the Teeth*, and the *Bathing*. And with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these are to be done by the *Adhvaryu*, or by the Master. And on this question we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“ Inasmuch as without these purificatory rites, the Priest would not be a perfect Performer,—it must be admitted that they should be done by the *Adhvaryu*, in accordance with the Name, ‘ *Ādhvaryava*,’ of that section of the Veda, in which we find the Injunctions of the Rites in question.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (4) : *They belong to the Master ; as their principal effect consists of the enabling of the Master (to experience the Result) ; just as the Principal Action (of giving away belongs to the Master.*

Inasmuch as these Rites tend principally to the bringing about of a capability in the Man, they must be regarded as belonging to the Master. It is only when the Performer is looked for as a secondary factor that the Name is accepted as indicating which action should be done by which Person. As for the Master however, we find that he has been indubitably recognised as the Principal Performer (of the Sacrifice). Nor are the Rites in question meant to create in him the character of the *Performer* ; this character is found to be possible even without these. Then what is not duly accomplished, without the due performance of these Rites, is the Final Result of the Sacrifice. Then again,

as for the result accruing to the Priests, which consists of the obtaining of the Sacrificial Fee,—we find that this is duly accomplished, even without a performance of the Rites in question. But as for the Result accruing to the Master, we find that this is not duly accomplished, unless the Rites are duly performed. For this reason it must be admitted that these should be performed by the Master; just as the Principal Actions, being calculated to lead to certain results desired by Man, are performed by the *Master* (and not by the Priests who perform only those Actions that are calculated to help in the performance of the Sacrifice).

Then, inasmuch as these Rites belong to the Master, exactly in the same form in which they are done in ordinary life,—it cannot be held that the *Adhvaryu* is to get hold of the tooth-brush, and clean the teeth of the Master. And as for the *shaving of the Head and Beard*, these are always done by the Barber; and the Master is spoken of as its ‘Performer’ simply because it is he who directs the Barber to do it; and hence in this case also, there is no chance of the Razor being held by the *Adhvaryu*.

Sūtra (5): *Also because of the mention (being in that form).*

Inasmuch as in the case of the Action being one that is done by the *Adhvaryu*, we have the Injunction in the *Parasmaipada* form—e.g. ‘*tamabhyanakti*,’—whenever we find one in the *Ātmanêpada* we cannot but conclude that the action is meant to be performed by the Master himself.

Sūtra (6): *Because the action is spoken of as subservient to the Person (it cannot be regarded as having its performer pointed out by the Name, assigned in Sūtra 3).*

It has been argued above that—“like other actions, these Rites would have their *Performer* marked out by the *Name* of the Vedic section in which they are found to be mentioned.” But such a name can serve the purpose of pointing out the Performer, where the Injunction stands in need of the mention of one; and the need is found to be present only in the case of those Actions, for the performance whereof the services of the Priests are engaged; as this *engaging (Purchase)* of *services* is done with a view to making the Performer subservient (to the Main Action), and not with a view to a purification of him. With a view to this, it is said—‘*In the case of the actions of shaving,*’ etc.,

that is to say, in the case of these actions, we find that the action is mentioned as subservient to the Person, and as such their Performer, being already marked out, if we were to assume their relationship with other Persons, this would have to be assumed without the Actions standing in need of any such relationship; while in the case of the actions that are spoken of as the principal factor, such relationship is already established by the fact of the Inflection standing in need of the mention of the Performer.

Sūtra (7): *Also because of the Rites being laid down with reference to the resultant Apūrva.*

Inasmuch as the Purificatory Rites are laid down with reference to the resultant *Apūrva* of the Principal Action, they must belong to the Master; as it is only when belonging to the Master that they could be taken up by the *Apūrva*; because this latter is most intimately related to the Master. Or, for the sake of the accomplishment of the *Apūrva*, the Rites must belong to the Master.

Sūtra (8): *They could not be regarded as belonging equally to both (the Master and the Priests); because of dissimilarity.*

Objection: “By the above reasonings the Rites are found to belong to the Master; while by *Name*, they are shown to belong to the Priests; and hence we could take them as belonging to both; as there would be no incongruity in this. Specially as the Rites being purely *purificatory*, and as such of a secondary character, there would be no incongruity in their being repeated (performed over and over again), with reference to each principal factor (of the Persons, the Master and the Priests).”

The *Reply* to this is as follows: This cannot be; because of all actions in connection with the Sacrifice, there are some that have to be performed by the Master himself, while the rest are to be got done by him, through the Priests engaged for the purpose. Even if the Purificatory Rites were performed by the *Adhvaryu*, etc., inasmuch as they would in that case be incapable of being done by *Purchase* (of services), they would neither be done by the Master himself, nor got done, by him, through the hired services of others; and as such they would cease to be auxiliaries to the Sacrifice. Consequently they cannot be regarded as belonging equally to the Priests and the Master.

ADHIKARAṆA (3).

[The Penances are to be done by the Master.]

Sūtra (9): *The Penance also (belongs to the Master); because it is done for the sake of a particular result; just as in ordinary life.*

[In connection with Sacrifices, we find certain *penances* laid down.—e.g. ‘should not eat for two days’ ‘for three days,’ and so forth; and with regard to these there arises the question, as to whether these are to be done by the Priests, or by the Master. And on this question we have the following—].

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“As the doing of Penances is always painful (and is not desirable for its own sake), the person doing it must be regarded as the subservient factor; and as such it must be accepted as pointed out by the Name (of the Vedic section in which they are found to be mentioned).”

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

Inasmuch as, like the Purificatory Rites, the Penances also serve the purpose of creating a capability of experiencing the Results of Actions,—and as the unobstructed capability that has to be created is that of the *Master*, and not that of the Priests,—they must be regarded as to be done by the Master.

Capability, in all cases, is of two kinds: one that removes undesirable qualities, and another that brings about fresh desirable ones. As a matter of fact we find that *Purificatory Rites* belong to the latter category, while *Penances* belong to the former: Whoever sets about performing the *Jyotishtoma* and other sacrifices is bound to have, in himself, certain undesirable qualities, due to his having, either in the present or in past lives, done something sinful, in the shape of the neglect of his necessary duties, and the performance of prohibited actions. And if these are not removed they would surely bring about results contrary to the accomplishment of the Final Result of the Sacrifice; and hence they would obstruct the fulfilment of this Result, even

though the sacrifice may be performed perfectly, without any discrepancies. And consequently, the Sacrifice stands in need of some agency for the removal of these obstacles. And then, inasmuch as we find the Penances laid down in the same Context, we must regard these as according some aid to the Sacrifice. And the aid accorded by them is taken, on the grounds of *Mutual need, Proximity and Capability*, to be in the form of the removal of the aforesaid undesirable qualities.

Specially as the Penances bring some pain to the Performer, it can, by that Pain, set aside the aforesaid sins that tend to obstruct the accomplishment of the *Apūrvā*. Just as the slight pain, caused by the performance of the Expiatory Rite, is accepted, on the ground of Direct Declarations to that effect, to set aside the *Adharma* (sin) tending towards the bringing of much greater pain;— so in the same manner, we could also have in the case in question (the Pain caused by the Penances setting aside the sins tending to obstruct the realisation of the sacrificial *Apūrvā*).

As for those Penances that are laid down distinctly as accessories to sacrifices, or as leading to desirable results,—inasmuch as it is not necessary for them to accomplish any other results,—and as there is no need of the removal of any obstacles,—they must be regarded as leading to such desirable results as Heaven and the like. But those that are laid down by way of Expiatory Rites, can lead to no other result, save the removal of the obstructing Sin. And so all the Penances cannot be regarded of one and the same form and character.

Sūtra (10): *The subsequent declaration also is to the same effect.*

In continuation of the Injunction of the Penances, we have the declaration '*atha medhyatamah*' ('he becomes capable of performing excellent sacrifices'); and this mention of the 'capability of performing sacrifices' must be regarded as pointing to the fact of the Penances being performed by the Master (who is the actual Performer of Sacrifices).

Sūtra (11): *They could be done by others, when there would be a direct declaration to that effect.*

As in the case of the 'giving of gifts,' in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, so in the present case also we have the distinct declaration of 'the Priests fasting'; and in view of this Direct Declaration, this particular Penance of *Fasting* cannot but be regarded as to be done by the Priests.

ADHIKARAṆA (4).

[The 'Red Turban' etc., belong to all the Priests.]

Sūtra (12): *Inasmuch as they are Accessory Details, (secondary factors) their performance could not be regulated by the Name of the Vedic section in which they happen to be mentioned.*

[Some people explain this Sūtra, as shown in the *Bhāshya*, as embodying a reply to the assertion that the Penances should be done by persons indicated by the names of the Vedic sections in which they happen to be mentioned.]

But as this reply has already been given in Sūtra (6), the *Bhāshya* proceeds to give another explanation. There are certain details which, though having the character of Purificatory Rites, are distinctly laid down as pertaining to the Priests,—e.g., the '*Red Turban for the Priests*' (at the *Cyēna*) the '*golden necklaces for the Priests*' (at the *Vajapēya*); and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these belong to the particular Priest indicated by the *Names* of the Vedic sections in which they happen to be mentioned or to all of them.

And on this question, we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"The '*Red Turban*' etc., are found mentioned in particular sections of the Veda, named the '*Audgātṛa*' etc.; and as such, even though they are Purificatory in their nature, yet, inasmuch as they are done to the Priests, in accordance with the Direct Declaration ('*Lohitoshṇīṣhā Rtvijah*'), they cannot but be regarded as having their performers marked out by the *Name* (of the Vedic section in which they are laid down)."

SIDDHĀNTA.

The amenability of such accessories as those in question being set aside by the fact of their being distinctly purificatory in their nature, the Declaration, by which they would be transferred (from the Master) to the Priests, would also connect them with all of them. That is to

say all that the sentence ‘*Lohitoshnīshā Rtvijah*’ does is to lay down the ‘Red Turban’ with reference to the Priests; and as such there would be no incongruity in these being repeated with each of the Priests, in accordance with the Law of the Repetition of the Secondary with each Primary; and hence the presence of the ‘Red Turban’ with *all* the Priest could not be set aside by the Indication of the *Name* (of the Vedic section in which the sentence occurs). And hence there could be no restriction as to the Details in question belonging to any particular Priest only.

ADHIKARAṆA (5).

[The Desire for Rain belongs to the Master.]

Sūtra (13): *The Desire also (belongs to the Master); as it is he who is related to the purpose served by the Sacrifice.*

[In connection with the *Jyotishtoma* we find the sentence—‘*Yadi kāmāyēt varshēt parjanyaḥ nīcaissado minuyāt*’; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether ‘Desire for Rain’ pertains to the Master or to the Priest.]

As the desire for the Principal Result is definitely ascertained,—(1) on account of the *Ātmanēpada* ending in ‘*Yajēta*, (2) on account of co-extensiveness, and (3) because of the *Ātmanēpada* affix in *Ādadhita*,’—as belonging to the same Person who performs the Principal Action, hence what remains *doubtful* is only the particular person to whom the *Desire for the Minor Result* belongs; and on this question we have the following—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The *Desire for Minor Results*, such as those mentioned in connection with the *Sadomāna*, are pointed out—by the *Parasmaipada* “‘affix in ‘*minuyāt*’—as belonging to the same person who does the *Sadomāna*; and hence there can be no doubt as to that *person* being “pointed out by the *name* (‘*Ādhvaryava*’ of the Vedic section in “which the sentence occurs), as the *Ādhvaryu*.”

And in reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

The *Ātmanēpada* ending in the word ‘*Yajēta*,’ which occurs in connection with the Principal Action (to which the *Sadomāna* is subsidiary), distinctly shows that all the desires connected with the whole Performance belong to the Master only. That is to say, from the Context it is clear that ‘*yadi kāmāyēt*’ is always to be taken as ‘*yadi kāmāyēt yajamānah*’; and hence the Result cannot but be regarded as belonging to the Master.

In fact the *Parasmaipada* ending in ‘*minuyāt*’ also, which denotes

an action of the *Ādhvaryu*, is quite explicable in accordance with the *Siddhānta* view ; as otherwise, if the Result, following from the action expressed by the root ‘ *Dumīṇ* ’ (to throw) (in ‘ *minuyāt* ’), were meant to belong to the same Person that would do the *Māna* (i.e., who would be the nominative of ‘ *minuyāt*,’ the *Ādhvaryu* Priest),—then, inasmuch as the Root is a ‘ *ṇīṭ* ’ one, we should have had the *Ātmanēpada* ending (in accordance with Pāṇini’s *Sūtra* : ‘ *svarita ṇīṭaḥ karṭṛigāmini kriyaphalē*.’ And as this Direct Declaration (in the shape of the *Parasmaipada* ‘ *minuyāt* ’) would set aside the co-extensiveness (i.e. the fact of the *Desire* and the *Sudomāna* pertaining to the same Nominative) indicated by *Syntactical Connection*, there would be nothing incongruous in this. Or. we might retain the said co-extensiveness indicated by *Syntactical Connection*, as quite compatible with the *Siddhānta*, by taking it as based upon the *Adhvaryu*’s *Desire* being in the form—‘ may the Master obtain the Rain *that he desires*.’

The word ‘ *tathā* ’ (‘ also ’) in the *Sūtra* is meant to show that the conclusion—‘ *samākhyavā na nyamyatē* ’ (‘ the Name does not restrict the performance as being done by a certain Person ’)—arrived at in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, applies to the present case also.

Sūtra (14) : The Desire would belong to others, when it would be spoken of as such.

In the other *Adhikaraṇas* the *Sūtra* has had ‘ in cases where we have a direct declaration to that effect ’; but inasmuch as there is no such Direct Declaration in connection with the subject of the present *Adhikaraṇa*, we have the *Sūtra* simply saying ‘ in a case where it is spoken of as such.’

The sentence—‘ *Udgātā ātmanē vā yajamānāya vā yam kāmam kāmayetē tamāgāyati* ’—clearly indicates the fact of the Desired Result belonging to both (the *Udgātṛ* as well as the *Master*) ; (1) because of the mention of the word ‘ *vā* ’ (‘ or ’), and (2) because of the Dative (in ‘ *ātmanē* ’ and ‘ *yajamānāya* ’) distinctly pointing to the fact of the Action being for the sake of both.

ADHIKARAṆA (6).

[The *Mantras* beginning with 'Āyurdā' belong to the Master.]

Sūtra (15): *The Mantras also, that are not instrumental in the performance of any actions, are like the Desire.*

[In regard to such *Mantras* as—'Āyurdā āgnē āyur mē dēhi, 'varcodā agnē asi varco mē dēhi' etc., etc.,—there arises the question as to whether these have to be recited by the Priests, or by the Master. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"These Benedictory *Mantras*, not being connected with any action, must be regarded as to be recited by the Person indicated by the *Name* (of the Vedic section in which they occur). Because there are no results to follow from them; because the *Mantras* are not injunctive, and there can be no reason for the assumption of results following from what is not enjoined. As for the *Hope* expressed in the *Mantras*, that could serve the purpose of encouraging the *Adhvaryu*, as much as the Master."

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

They must be regarded as to be recited by the Master. Because, having no distinct results of their own, they could not but be expressing the *Hope* for the Results to follow from the Principal Sacrifice. And there can be no doubt that this latter Result is to be hoped for by the Master, and not by the Priest; as the Result accruing to the latter,—viz., the obtaining of the Sacrificial Fee,—would be accomplished even without the due fulfilment of the Principal Result; and because this Result (the Fee) being obtainable from the Master, could not be asked for from Agni.

If the Priest should ask for these Results, from Agni, *for the sake of the Master*, that would not be compatible with the expression 'mē dēhi,' which distinctly shows that the Result is asked for by the speaker for himself.

Hence it must be admitted that it is the Master himself who is to recite this *Mantra* for the purpose of encouraging himself, by the delineation of the desirable Results to be obtained from the Principal Sacrifice.

Sūtra (16) : Specially as we find the Mantras recited during his absence (from the place of Sacrifice).

We find that these mantras appear along with certain other *Mantras*,—such as '*Iha ēva san tatra santam, etc.*'—which are to be recited by the Master, by way of a worshipful address to Agni; and the words of the latter *Mantra* distinctly show that it is to be recited by one who is absent from the place where the *Agnihotra* is actually performed. And this shows that the Recitation belongs to the Master, and not to the Priest; because a Priest that would be absent from the place of Sacrifice, would no longer be a Priest; as he would not be connected with the Sacrifice. As for the Master, even during his absence, the materials offered in Sacrifice must be those that belonged to him and which he had set aside (mentally *given away*) for the Sacrifice; and as such he would continue to be related to the Sacrifice, as its Master (even during his absence).

And inasmuch as the other Benedictory *Mantras*—'*Āyurdā, etc.*'—are similar in character to the *Mantra* '*Iha ēva san etc.*', just treated of, they too must be regarded as to be recited by the Master, and not by the Priests.

ADHIKARAṆA (7).

[*Mantras* mentioned in two sections of the Veda are to be recited by both the Priests indicated by the names of those sections.]

Sūtra (17) : *Mantras mentioned twice are to be recited by both: as thus alone could the repetition be justified.*

In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find certain *Mantras* mentioned in two parts of the Veda—e.g. that with which the Butter is taken up, ‘*Pancānāntvāṭānam*, etc.’ is found mentioned in a general way in the *Ādhvaryava* section, and again more specifically in the *Yājāmāna* section. And with regard to this there arises the question as to whether this *Mantra* is to be recited (1) by both conjointly, (2) or by one or the other, optionally, (3) or by the *Adhvaryu* alone, or (4) by the Master alone. And on this question—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—“It should be recited either by the *Ādhvaryu* only, or by the one or “the other, optionally.”

In reply to this we have the *Siddhānta*, that both (the *Adhvaryu* as well as the Master) should recite it.

Objection : “Inasmuch as the *Mantra* is more specifically mentioned in the section named ‘*Yājāmāna*,’ it should be recited by the “Master only.”

Reply : A specific Name is accepted to be more authoritative, only when the *Mantra* is mentioned but once. When however it is mentioned separately, in the generic and as well as the specific section,—if we were to accept the indications of the *Specific Name*, then the mention of the *Mantra* in the other section would be absolutely purposeless. Further, when the *specific* and the *generic* pertain to the same object, the former sets aside the latter. And in the case in question though both treat of the same *Mantra*, yet as its mention is distinct in the two cases, the two must be regarded as pertaining to diverse objects. Then again, we must find some use for the two distinct mentions of the *Mantra*; and there can be no other use save that it should be recited by both persons. Consequently it must be admitted that both (the Master and the *Adhvaryu*) should recite the *Mantra*.

Objection : “Of the two mentions, one may be taken as serving the

“ purpose of showing the form of the *Mantra*, and the other that of
 “ pointing out the use to which it should be put. And then, inas-
 “ much as *Mantras* are meant to serve the purpose of indicating the
 “ actions to be performed,—and as the primary action and its subsi-
 “ diaries have all one and the same performer,—the *Mantra* should be
 “ recited by that Priest who gives his name to the Vedic Section in
 “ which the *action of holding the butter* (which is indicated by the
 “ *Mantra*) may be found to be laid down. Because it is only in such
 “ cases that the *Mantra*, being cognised as to be used, comes to stand
 “ in need of a Person who should use it. And as for the mere pointing
 “ out of the form of the *Mantra*, that could be done, even without its
 “ being used at the time of the performances of an Action, by a mere
 “ reading of the Vedic text. As a matter of fact, we find that the
 “ *Holding of the Butter* is distinctly found to be laid down in the
 “ *Ādhvaryava* section ; and as such the *Mantra* should be recited by the
 “ *Ādhvaryu* only, and not by the Master.”

Reply : The mention of the *Mantra* in the *Yājñamāna* section also,
 —even though it be meant merely as showing the form of the *Mantra*,
 and not as connected with any action,—leads us to believe that it is
 to be used ; and as such even in this case, it stands in need of a person
 who could use it ; and the fact of its being mentioned in the *Yājñamāna*
 section shows that it is to be used by the *Yājñamāna* (Master).

Question : “ What special purpose would be served by such use of
 “ the *Mantras* ? ”

Answer : It is necessary for the *Master* to examine (keep an eye
 on) the actions, just in the same manner as it is necessary for the
Ādhvaryu to perform them. And in cases where no *Mantras* are laid
 down for the *Master*, the examining would be done in other ways ; in
 the case in question however, we find the *Mantras* distinctly laid down
 for the Sacrifice ; and hence the examining would be done by means of
 these *Mantras*. And the use of the *Mantras* would lie in their serving
 as the means of examining the *Ādhvaryu's* doings.

ADHIKARĀṆA. (8).

[It is only the *Learned* that is to be made to repeat *Mantras*.]

Sūtra (18): *It is only the learned that is to be made to repeat (Mantras); as an ignorant person is not spoken of (in connection with Sacrifice).*

We have certain sentences laying down the fact of the Master being made to repeat certain *Mantras*; [and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether the learned and the ignorant master alike are to be made to repeat them, or the learned only. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The Ignorant too can be made to repeat the *Mantra*, in parts; and as such it is both the Learned and the Ignorant that are to be made to repeat the *Mantras*; or, inasmuch as the Learned would himself know the *Mantra*, there would be no need, in his case, of another person prompting him in the repeating of the *Mantra*,—it is the Ignorant only who is to be made to repeat.”

In reply to this, we have the following--

SIDDHĀNTA.

The Ignorant person is not spoken of (in connection with sacrifices).

That is to say, if the study of the Veda had been laid down along with the declarations of certain actions as to be performed with a view to certain desirable results,—then, it would be possible for the Ignorant Master to be taught the Vedic texts, even at the time of the performance. As a matter of fact, however, the study of the Veda is laid down, without reference to any particular action, in the sentence ‘*tasmāt svādhyayo dhyātavyah.*’ And as, in accordance with this, there would be many persons, knowing the Veda, available for sacrifices, there would be no Apparent Inconsistency (to justify an Ignorant Master repeating the mantras); and consequently all sacrifices would pre-suppose a knowledge of the Veda as a well-established fact, just like the *Laying of Fire*; and they could not point to the fact of the

Veda being taught at the time of the performance. Nor would the texts, taught at the spur of the moment, be called 'Veda' (as the proper study of the Veda has to be made under certain very rigid conditions). Consequently, only those *Mantras* that have been got up before the performance of the Action commenced, could be accepted as accessories to that Action; and hence no Ignorant person can be entitled to the repetition of *Mantras* at sacrifices.

Even in the case of the Master knowing the *Mantras*, we could have a person urging him to repeat the *Mantras*; just as we have the Priests addressing the several Directions to one another (though every one of them knows quite well what is required to be done); because even though the Master might be quite capable of reciting the *Mantra*, yet he cannot do it until urged to it (by the *Adhvaryu*). And as for this *urging* or *prompting*, this can be done in two ways: (1) the prompter could go on repeating the *Mantra* part by part (and the Master would be repeating it after him), or (2) he would simply ask him to recite (and the Master, knowing full well which *Mantra* was meant to be recited, would go on with the recitation).

The *Bhāshya* puts forward the question: "Knowledge of how much of the Veda is necessary for a person being entitled to the repetition of the *Mantras*?" This question is calculated to clear the question raised by the upholders of the *Vaġieshika* and other systems of philosophy as to a knowledge of their own philosophical systems being necessary for a person before he is entitled to the performance of sacrifices.

The reply to this question, given in the *Bhāshya* is—'Knowledge of that much of the Veda is necessary, as would render him capable of performing the duties devolving upon him,'—this reply being based upon the fact of the knowledge affording a perceptible help to the Sacrifice through creating (in the Performer) a certain capability (tending to the proper accomplishment of the Sacrifice). That is to say, though the whole of the Veda is included in the '*svādhyāya*' ('Vedic study' laid down by the Injunction '*svādhyāyo*' *dhyetavyah*), yet inasmuch as the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* portions dealing with the *Jyotish-toma* could be of no use to one performing the *Darṇa-Pūrṇamāsa*, the absence of a knowledge of those portions could not incapacitate the person from performing these latter Sacrifices. Similarly inasmuch as a knowledge of the *Ishti* portion of the Veda would make a man capable of performing the *Ishtis*, only that portion of the Veda would constitute the '*svādhyāya*' for one who would be performing them. But the whole of the Veda is studied, because it is not known which action and at what time, one might be called upon to perform,—as all

actions, the *nitya*, the *naimittika* and the *kāmya*, are performed as occasion presents itself (there being no fixed time for these). Consequently, if he read only certain portions of the Veda, there might be occasions when he would be called upon to perform Sacrifices with a view to certain results,—the Vedic portions relating to which he may not have read; and not knowing these he would be incapable of performing these Sacrifices; and as such, would be excluded from its performance. Then again, the reading up of these portions at the time of the performance would not be counted as ‘*Vedic study*’; as this has a fixed time for it, like all observances; nor would such a *reading* be accepted at Sacrifices, which have all their requirements fulfilled by the Veda studied in the right style (as done during a period of *Brahmacarya*, etc., etc.); and hence the employment of such a person would create a discrepancy in the performance. Then again, inasmuch as ‘*Vedic study*’ is not included in the texts laying down the performance of actions with a view to certain desirable results, all sacrifices stand in need of the Veda as studied in accordance with the generic Injunction of Vedic study, not laid down with reference to any particular Action; and as such it is necessary for the *whole Veda* to be studied during the period of *Brahmacarya*. If through some inherent incapacity, one could not read up the whole at that time,—and he manages to get up the portions relating to the *Agnihotra* and the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, then this much of knowledge would not fail to entitle him to the performance of these Actions.

Such being the case, the knowing of the branches of knowledge other than the Veda (i.e. the various systems of Philosophy etc) would be very far from being necessary (for the performance of Sacrifices). As for the knowledge of Self, however, inasmuch as without such knowledge one could not take up the Sacrifices (which are always done with a view to certain transcendental results accruing after death),—it must be regarded as necessary for the performance of all Sacrifices (*Vide Ātmanvārtika*—section on ‘*Ātmanvāda*’).

ADHIVKARANA (9).

[The Twelve *Dvandvas* are to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*.]

Sūtra (19): “ *Being mentioned in the Yājñamāna section of the Veda, the Actions should be done by the Master.*”

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, are laid down the twelve actions—‘*Vatsamupavasṛjati*’ and the like; and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these Actions are to be done by the *Ādhvaryu* or by the *Master*. And on this question, we have the following].—

PURVAPAKSIA.

“The twelve *Dvandva*-Actions in question are found mentioned “in the *Yājñamāna* as well as the *Ādhvarya* section of the Veda: and “as such, being like *Mantras* mentioned in the two sections (dealt with “under *Sūtra* 17), they could not be performed by both (the Master “and the *Adhvaryu*); and hence, through the name ‘*Yājñamāna*’, the “Actions in question should be regarded as to be performed by the “*Master*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (20): *The Adhvaryu should perform them; as it is for the sake of these (that he is appointed); the Indications of the Name (‘Yājñamāna’) too would justify that procedure.*

Until the Actions have actually made their appearance, they do not acquire the character of ‘*Dvandva*’; and as there are no words in-junctive of them (in the *Yājñamāna* section), they cannot be regarded as having their original appearance in that section; as a matter of fact, they have their appearance in the *Ādhvarya* section. And with regard to the actions thus originatively mentioned in this section, there arises a desire to know who their *Performer* is; and the fact of the services of the *Adhvaryu* having been engaged for the performance of these Actions marks out the *Adhvaryu* as the required Performer of these Actions; and hence there would be no further desire to find out

their Performer, at the time that the same Actions are spoken of as ‘*Dvandvas*’ (in the *Yājñamāna* section); and as such they could not be regarded as to be performed by the *Master* (on the strength of the name of this latter section).

Thus then we find that the simple performance of the Actions not being connected with the Master, it is only the *Dvandvatā* (Coupling) of these that could be done by him. (But this too is not possible); as the *Coupling* too could not possibly be done by a person other than the actual performer of the Actions; because the *Coupling* is to be done immediately after the Actions have been performed; and when all Actions are performed by one Person, their *Coupling* could not be done immediately after their performance, if it were done by another Person. Nor would it do to make the Actions also performed by the Master, for the sake of the immediate *Coupling*. Hence, in accordance with the Law relating to *Contradiction of the Accessories of Subsidiaries* (*Sūtra*, XII—ii,—25), the *Coupling* too must be regarded as to be done by the *Adhvaryu* (and not by the Master).

Then, as for the name ‘*Yājñamāna*’ (of the section in which the *Couplings* are laid down), its indications would be duly observed, by the fact of the *Master* calling the attention of the *Adhvaryu* to the *Couplings* of the Actions performed by the latter.

ADHIKARĀṆA (10).

[The *Ādhvaryava-Karāṇa* should be performed by the *Hotri*.]

Sūtra (21): *When there is mutual incompatibility, the Karāṇa Mantra should be recited (by the Hotri); because of the inherent relationship (between the two). The other Mantra should be recited by another Priest, who may have special reasons for doing it.*

In connection with the Sacrificial Post at the *Jyotishtoma*, we have two *Mantras*—one to be recited by the *Adhvaryu*, '*Parivīraṣi etc.*' which is descriptive of the Instrumentality of the tying of the Rope, and another to be recited by the *Hotri* '*Yuvā suvāsāh etc.*', which is descriptive of the actual *Tying*,—both of which are recited simultaneously, by the two Priests, at the Primary Sacrifice (*Jyotishtoma*); and these same *Mantras* come to be used at its Modification—the *Kuṇḍapāyiniṇāmayaṇa* (in accordance with the Law that the Modification is to be done in the same way as the Original); and inasmuch as at this particular Sacrifice (of the *Kuṇḍapāyiniṇāmayaṇa*), the duties of the *Hotri* and the *Adhvaryu* are performed by the same person (in accordance with the Injunction '*Yo hotā so 'adhvaryuh*'); and as such the recitation of both *Mantras* being impracticable, it becomes necessary to recite only one of them, and reject the other. And there arises the question, which one of the two *Mantras* should be admitted and which rejected.

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

"In the first place there can be no hard and fast rule as to "which one of the two should be recited. Or, it may be that in- "asmuch as the *Hotri* has a well-established character, the Injun- "tion '*Yo hotā so 'adhvaryuh*' must be taken as laying down "the duties of the *Adhvaryu* as to be one by the *Hotri*; and as "such at the Sacrifice in question, the *Hotri* cannot give up any of the "accessories belonging specifically to him; and as such it his *Mantra* "('*Yuvā suvāsā, etc.*') that should be rejected (and not that which "belongs to the *Adhvaryu*, *Parivīraṣi etc.*').

SIDDHĀNTA.

When both cannot be used, and one has to be rejected, it is the *Karaṇa-Mantra* ('*Parivṛasi* etc.') that should be admitted, *because of the particular inherent relationship.*

In connection with this some people offer the following explanation: "The 'inherent relationship' spoken of could be nothing else but the *close proximity* to the Principal. And hence, inasmuch as that which is descriptive of the *Tying* would be an extraneous factor in the *Tying* it would be a remoter auxiliary than the other which is descriptive of the *Instrumentality*; as this latter forms an integral part of the *Tying*, and as such is more nearly related to it (and it is for this reason that the former *Mantra* '*Parivṛasi* etc.' should be rejected)."

But this explanation is not tenable; as the said 'proximity' could not serve as the ground for the admission of one of the *Mantras*. Because if the Performer would come to the Action, (the *Reciting*) through the Principal Action (the *Tying*), then in that case, a proximity or non-proximity to this latter could serve as a determining factor. But as a matter of fact we find that the said Performer is got at, both as regards the Primary and the Subsidiaries, by means of the *Name* and the Implicating Injunction. Nor is the present case subject to the Law of the Contradiction of the Accessories and Subsidiaries (*Sūtra* XII—ii—25); as both the *Mantras* are equally *Accessories*. Nor does the mere remoteness of the aid imparted make the accessory imparting such aid the less authoritative, when this accessory appears in another action; as this also falls in with the action. In fact, the *Mantra* sought to be rejected is not a remote Auxiliary either; as it serves the purpose of bringing about a visible purificatory effect, by the contrivance of the remembrance of the *Tying being performed*. Hence we conclude that the 'inherent relationship,' of the *Mantra* belonging to the *Adhvaryu*, spoken of in the *Sūtra*, is that consisting in the fact of the connection of this *Mantra* (with the *Tying*) being distinctly perceptible; while that of the *Mantra*—that belonging to the *Hotri*—can at best, be only *inferred*. That is to say, in the Implicatory Injunction laying down the '*Hotri*' and other priests, these words being used in their direct original signification—with reference to the Actions that are spoken of in connection with the word '*Adhvaryu*' and the like,—we cannot but conclude that the relationship of the *Hotri* with these Actions is only one to be inferred, while that of the *Adhvaryu* is distinctly perceptible.

It has been argued above that, "the *Hotri*, without renouncing his characteristic details, becomes connected with the *Mantra* belonging to the *Adhvaryu*."

But he could have been thus connected, only—(1) if the *Hotri-character* depended wholly upon the recitation of that *Mantra*, or (2) if the *Adhvaryu* had been laid down with reference to the *Mantra* related to the *Hotri*, or (3) if the duties of the *Adhvaryu* had been laid down with reference to the *Hotri*. As a matter of fact however none of these contingencies is possible. (1) Because, the character of the *Hotri* is ascertainable from the presence of a certain capability, and even if that character were determined by any action, there would be thousands of such actions (done by him) that would serve to mark out the *Hotri priest*. (2) Nor is the *Adhvaryu* laid down with reference to the actions belonging to the *Hotri*; because the two words *Hotri* and ' *Adhvaryu* ' denote two wholly distinct persons; and as such (in the sentence ' *yo hotā so' dhvaryuh* ') there could be no co-extensiveness between the words (in their direct significations); and as such it becomes necessary to take one of them in their indirect secondary signification; and then it is a well-known fact that all such secondary significations are assumed on the ground of certain incongruities or inconsistencies (of the Direct signification); and as a matter of fact, we do not find any grounds for assuming such an indirect signification for the word ' *Hotri* ,' as this is the first to appear in the sentence (and the inconsistency appears only after the sentence has been concluded with the word ' *Adhvaryuh* '); and hence, according to the *Sūtra* XII—ii—23, we must take the word ' *Hotri* ' in its direct signification; and as a necessary outcome of this, the word ' *Adhvaryuh* ' should be taken as indicating the ' *duties of the Adhvaryu* ' ; and with reference to these the *Hotri* would be laid down; and these would serve certain useful purposes in connection with the Sacrifice, which cannot be said of the Performer (*Hotri*); and as in all such cases it is the principal factor with reference to which something is laid down, the *Hotri*, if enjoined, would be the subordinate factor; and as such he would have to be connected with only such of his own accessories as would be compatible with the Principal factor (' *duties of the Adhvaryu* ,' with reference to which he has been enjoined). (3) And if the sentence be taken as laying down the ' *duties of the Adhvaryu* ' with reference to the *Hotri* (and not the *Hotri* for these *duties*), then, inasmuch as only those of these duties would come in to be performed by the *Hotri* as are compatible with his own *duties*, there would be no abandoning by the *Hotri* of any of his own specific duties. And under the circumstances, the ' *duties of the*

Adhvaryu’ would come to be merely purificatory of one not related to the Original Sacrifice; and as this would be far from desirable, it is the contrary view (that the *Hotṛi* is laid down as reciting the *Adhvaryu*’s *Mantra*) that has been accepted. And hence it must be admitted that it is the relationship (to the *Hotṛi*) of the ‘*Mantra belonging to the Adhvaryu*’ that is directly perceptible; and hence being the principal factor, this would be the *Mantra* recited (by the *Hotṛi* who is not to recite his own *Mantra*).

Against this, some people bring forward the following objections :—
 “ In the case in question neither of the two *Mantras* should be dissociated from the *Hotṛi*. Because, there could be an incompatibility in the two *Mantras* (being recited by the same person) only if they were meant to be recited at one and the same time; in the case in question, however, we find that the *Karaṇa-Mantra* is to be recited before the action, while the other is recited after the Action has been performed. That is to say, in accordance with the Law ‘*Mantrāntena Karmādisannipātaḥ*’, the *Karaṇa-Mantra* is always recited before the *Tying*, while the other *Mantra* (descriptive of the *Kriyamāṇa* action) is recited after the *Tying* has been done. And as such there would be no incongruity in the *Hotṛi* reciting both these *Mantras*.”

Reply: It is not so; because the *Kriyamāṇa-character* (i.e. the character of being performed) persists from the *Sankalpa*, a mental operation of the Agent, to the end of the Action; and hence if the action of *Tying* were called up by the completion of the Action immediately preceding it,—then all the said time (from the *Sankalpa* to the end of the Action of *Tying*) would be the time for the reciting of the *Mantra* descriptive of the *Kriyamāṇa* (and as such the recitation of the *Karaṇa-Mantra* at this time would be wholly incongruous, there being every likelihood of the time of the one overlapping that of the other).

Objection: “ But even then inasmuch as the *Karaṇa Mantra* would be recited before the aforesaid operation of the *Tying* (beginning from the *Sankalpa*), there could be no incongruity (no chance of the said overlapping).”

Reply: Not so; because the *Karaṇa-Mantra*, ‘*Parivāraṣi* etc. can not indicate all the following: the *Sankalpa*, the getting hold of the Rope, the Sacrificial Post which has not yet been brought in, and the *Tying* which is but partially coming to appear; and as such this *Mantra* could not but be recited by the Priest standing near the Post, when the Principal Action has been begun (and not before that).

Objection: “ But even then, inasmuch as the Action (of *Tying*)

“ would continue for a certain length of time, the two *Mantras* could “ be recited at different periods of it, and thus too there would be no “ incongruity in the reciting of both.”

Reply: Why should there be no incongruity, when both the *Mantras* actually come to be recited at one and the same time, the time for the *Karaṇa-Mantra* being indicated by the *Order of Sequence* mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇa*—passage—‘*yūpāya parinīyamānāyānu-brāhi*,’ while the same time is also indicated for the other *Mantra* also, by the force of the same *Direction* (‘*yūpaya* etc.’) ? Nor is there any authority for regarding the *Mantra* descriptive of the *Kṛyamāṇa* as to be recited at any one period of time during the performance of the Action. Because we find that the Recitation of that *Mantra* is called-up by the *Direction* addressed (to the *Hotri*) immediately after the Holding of the Rope; and being a long *Mantra* it takes up all the time from then till the end of the Action (of *Tying*); and if the *Ādhvaryu*’s *Mantra*—i.e. the *Karaṇa-Mantra*—were to come in during this time, it could not be admitted without interfering with the recitation of the former *Mantra*.

Objection: “ Under the circumstances, it being found necessary to “ reject either the simultaneity of the two *Mantras*, or the fact of their “ being recited by the same person,—it would be more reasonable to “ reject the time (i.e. the simultaneity), as its cognition appears long “ after that of the subject under consideration; and there would be “ no ground for rejecting their intimate relationship to the same “ person (Reciter).”

Reply: Such could have been the case if, in stepping over the time of the Original, the *Mantras* did not fall off from their purpose. As a matter of fact however, if any of the two *Mantras* were to be recited at a time other than the Original, it would certainly fall off from the purpose pointed out by its own Indicative force; and thus in this case we would have a contradiction of *Linga* (Indicative Force).

Objection: “ This Indicative Force would be set aside by the “ superior authority of the Direct Declaration—‘*Yō hotā so’ adhva-ryuh*.’ ”

Reply: It would have been set aside if this sentence had involved a *Direct Declaration* (of one and the same Person reciting both the *Mantras*); as a matter of fact, however, the sentence indicates this fact only by means of *Syntactical Connection*; and this too has been found to be based upon Indirect *Secondary Signification*. Because we do not find any word of the sentence directly expressing that ‘the *Mantras* belonging to the *Hotri* and the *Ādhvaryu* are to

be recited by one and the same Person'; in fact this is indicated by the fact of the two words '*Hotā*' and '*Adhvaryuh*' appearing in the sentence as Co-extensive; and we have already shown above that such an indication is always due to Syntactical Connection; and this too has been found to be possible only by taking the word '*Adhvaryuh*' as indirectly indicating the *action* (*Mantra*) related to the *Adhvaryu*. (And certainly such an Indication based upon a far-fetched Syntactical Connection could not set aside that based upon the aforesaid Indicative Force.)

Objection: "The Indicative Force also, depending upon the "Implicatory Injunction, would be very much removed from its objective. The Syntactical Connection would be set aside by the Indicative Force, only on account of the former being removed from its objective; and in the case in question, the case would be quite the reverse (inasmuch as the Indicative Force would be further removed from its objective than the Syntactical Connection would be from its own). Because as a matter of fact, until the presence of the *Mantras* has been pointed out by the Implicatory Injunction, they are not recognised as to be recited at the same time. Consequently it must be admitted that the fact of the *Mantras* being recited by the same person is more authoritative than that of their being recited at the same time."

Reply: It is true that we have to accept the Implicatory Injunction; but that is for the sake of the *form of the Mantra*, and not for that of the Indicative Power. And as for the admission of the Injunction for the sake of the form of the *Mantra*, that is common to both, Indicative Power as well as Syntactical Connection. And when the two *Mantras* have been duly laid down as to be recited, their Indicative Force becomes equal to any Direct Injunction.

Objection: "This could have been the case, if the Implicatory Injunction laid down the *Mantras* as to be recited. As a matter of fact, however, this Injunction cannot lay down the two *Mantras*, in contradiction of the unity of the Reciter as laid down by the Direct Injunction ('*yo hotā so' dhvanyuh*). Though Syntactical Connection could not lord it over Indicative Power,—yet if the form of the *Mantra* were laid down by the Implicatory Injunction, even the subsequent recognition of incompatibility would enable us to reject the said Injunction; and thus the very basis of the Indicative Force having been cut off, the Indicative Force itself becomes very much weakened."

Reply: It is only when two means of knowledge contradict each

other that one is set aside by the other ; nor can an unrecognised contradiction be the cause of such rejection. And in the case in question, at the time that the Implicatory Inflection is laying down the *Mantras*, no such contradiction (or incompatibility) is recognised. And as for the incompatibility perceptible after the *Mantras* have been laid down, we have already shown that in all such cases of subsequent recognition of incompatibility the Indicative Force is endowed with the superior authority.

If, in the case in question the fact of both the *Mantras* being recited by the same person were indicated by Syntactical Connection itself, then, there might have been some ground for accepting this Connection as possessed of superior authority. As a matter of fact, however, what is laid down is the connection with the *Hotri*, of the *Mantra* belonging to the *Ādhvaryu*, and not that of the *Mantra* belonging to the *Hotri* himself ; as the reciting of this latter is indicated by the Implicatory Inflection (i.e. this *Mantra* is recited by the *Hotri* at the modification simply because of its being so recited at the Original Sacrifice ; while as for the other *Mantra* being recited by the *Hotri*, that is aspecial provision meant for the Modification only, laid down by the sentence ' *Yo hotā etc.* '). Consequently if the sentence ' *yo hotā etc.* ' were to reject the other, on the ground of its indications being directly perceptible, then, the Name itself would come to set aside the Connection, with the *Hotri*, of the *Mantra* descriptive of the *Kriyamāṇa* (i.e. the *Mantra* ' *yuvā suvāśāh etc.* '). And in that case, there being no incompatibility between the indications of Indicative Force and Syntactical Connection, there is nothing that could be set aside ; and we would obtain the recitation of the *Mantra* belonging to the *Ādhvaryu*. While if we were to accept the fact of Indicative Force being possessed of superior authority, in the manner shown above, then, we would fall upon something most undesirable (i.e. we would have the recitation of the *Mantra* belonging to the *Hotri* only, the other being wholly rejected) ; and that would lead to the very object of the sentence ' *Yo hotā etc.* ' being wholly set aside (by the said Indicative Power) ; as the object of this sentence is the connecting of the *Hotri* with the *Mantra* belonging to the *Ādhvaryu*, and not that of the *Hotri* with the *Mantra* belonging to himself. And hence in that case we would have the recitations at the Modification (the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*) exactly in the same way as we have at the Original Primary Sacrifice (of the *Jyotishtoma*).

For these reasons it must be admitted that, on account of the peculiar inherent relationship (expressed by the sentence ' *yo hotā*

so' *dhvaryuh*' the *Karṇa-Mantra* (belonging to the *Adhvaryu*) should be recited by the *Hotṛi*,—thereby setting aside the indications of the name '*Ādhvaryava*', as to the *Mantra* bearing this name being recited by the *Adhvaryu*, which could be possible (at the *Modification*) only through the Implicatory Inflection (that 'the Modification is to be done in the same way as the Original Primary').

ADHIKARAṆA (11).

[The *Directing*, and the *Action* commissioned are to be done by different persons.]

Sūtra (22): *In the case of Directions also, (the Action commissioned should be done by a person other than the Director); because Directions always refer to another person.*

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pūrṇamāsa*, we find certain *Directions* laid down—such as ‘*prokṣhaṇīrāsūdaya*’ etc. etc ; and with regard to these there arises the question whether the Person addressing the Direction is the same that is carrying out the Direction, or they are different. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as both the Direction and the Action commissioned ‘thereby are equally subject to the Name ‘*Ādhvaryava*,’ both should ‘be regarded as to be done by one and the same person— viz.: the ‘*Ādhvaryu*.”

“*Objection*: ‘How could there be a *Direction* of one’s own self?’

“*Reply*: The words under consideration are no *Imperative Directions*; the Imperative ending is only meant to indicate that the ‘time for the particular action has arrived.

“The upholder of the ‘*Direction-theory*’ retorts: ‘If the Imperative in the sense referred to by you were addressed to one’s own self, then, certainly, we should have the affixes of the First Person. The Second Person, in the sense of *you*, could not be possible unless it were meant for another person. If however the word be taken as *Directions* (to somebody else) it is only right that there should ‘be the endings of the Second Person.’

“*Reply*: The fact of the words being imperative directions is set aside by the very fact of the utterance of these words, and the performance of the action commissioned by those words, being done ‘by one and the same person,—as is distinctly indicated by the name ‘*Ādhvaryava*’; and then, in that case, the words could not but be ‘taken as laying down the advent of a particular time: and then there

“arises the question whether this *time* is that of the *Actions* or of the *Performers*; and it is at once concluded that it is that of the *actions*; because it is these that, being enjoined, have been previously recognised as having an origination; and hence the recalling of the *time* for their performance is found to serve a perceptibly useful purpose. If the *time* were taken as pertaining to the *Performers*, then the case would be wholly the reverse of it (the purpose served being, at best, only an imperceptible one). Then as for the *Second Person* endings, it has been used simply because the affix of some particular Person was necessary in a Verb; and there is no special significance attaching to the affixes of the particular Person used. In fact it is the *action* itself which is addressed thus, ‘your *time* has arrived.’ If the word were taken as signifying the advent of the time of the *Performer*, then, he would stand in need of being told that for the doing of which the time had arrived. And if he were meant to be told that ‘his time for the doing of the *Āsādana* of the *Prokshanī* etc. had arrived,’—then, the Direction being a qualified one, there would be a syntactical split. And for this reason we must take the word as pointing out the advent of the time of the Action to be performed.

“If, however, the sentence be taken as real *Directions*, then, too, they could not but be taken as addressed to one’s self, the speaker himself being taken as the *director* and the *directed*, in view either of the difference between the Body and the Bodied soul, or of the different conditions of his own life.

“And thus there can be no doubt as to the addressing of the *Directions* and the performance of the *Actions* commissioned therein, being performed by one and the same person.”

In reply to the above, we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

The *Directions* are to be addressed by another person; because by their very nature, they refer to another person; just like *Purchase*.

It has been argued above that the sentence in question is not a real *Direction*; but that is not admissible; as the form of the *Mantra* itself clearly shows that the words involve a real imperative *Direction*. If we were to set aside this by the indication of the name ‘*Ādhvaryava*,’ as to the two being done by one and the same person.—then that would mean the setting aside of Indicative Power by the Name, which is an absurdity. Nor could this contradiction of Indicative Power be explained away by taking the words as signifying the *advent of time*;

because in that case, the presence of the affix of the Second Person could not be explained. Specially as unless the *action* were spoken of by means of another word, the word in question could not be taken as addressed to the Action, in the sense of—'your time has arrived.' Even if this were possible, it could not serve any perceptible purpose, because as a rule such words are addressed to living persons only. The admission of the difference in the various states of one's own self too could not serve any perceptibly useful purpose : and apart from this, such interpretations would involve the necessity of having recourse to secondary significations, while it has been already shown that *Mantras* are to be used in connection with actions signified by them directly. Hence, even though the Imperative were taken as signifying the *advent of time*, yet even then it could be addressed to some one else; and as such the fact of its being done by another person remains untouched.

Nor would this involve a syntactical split ; as the Direction would be with regard to a *qualified* object. In any case it would be necessary to admit this object being a *qualified* one ; because of the words 'Prokshaṇi' etc. Nor does the signification of many things by a single word constitute a syntactical split, as we can never avoid the fact of all Verbs signifying at one and the same time, such distinct objects as—the Action, the Performer, its number, the Transitive or Intransitive character of the Verb, the particular Person, and the *Bhāvanā* ; and hence we cannot but admit of such a qualified Inflection as we have in the sentence in question. In fact, if we were to take the words as signifying the *Advent of time*, inasmuch as the *Second Person* and the *Action* would be wholly distinct, we would have to assume two distinct expressive potencies in the word (and so it would be in your case that there would be a syntactical split). In the case of the words being taken as Directions, inasmuch as these are always addressed to Second Persons, the use of the Second Person affix might be taken as used by way of mere descriptive reference ; in fact it is only thus that we could justify the name of '*Madhyama* (Second)—Purusha (Person).'

Thus then, the Indicative force of the words setting aside the Indications of the Name '*Ādhvaryuḥ*,' the Directions should be addressed by one person, and the action commissioned therein should be performed by another.

ADHIKARAṆA (12).

[The *Direction* and the *Action* are to be done by the *Adhvaryu* and the *Agnīh* respectively.]

Sūtra (23): “*The Adhvaryu (should perform what is commissioned); as is distinctly shown (by the Veda).*”

[Now then, there arises the question as to whether the *Direction* is to be addressed by the *Adhvaryu* to the *Agnīh*, or vice versa. And on this we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“We have the declaration—‘*Yadānvācan dhārayēt vajrēṇādh-varyum kshinṛīta*’—or as otherwise read, ‘*Vajrodhvaryum kshin-ṛīta*.’ It is a well-known fact that the *Sphya* is held by the *Agnīh*; and hence the declaration ‘*Adhvaryum kshinṛīta*’ distinctly shows that it is the *Agnīh* wielding the *Sphya* who is to address the *Direction*.

“*Question*: ‘Wherefrom do you get the injunction of this *Agnīh* as the *Director*?’

“*Answer*: In accordance with the *Sūtra* XII—ii—25, inasmuch as the *Direction* is a subsidiary action, it is only right that there should be an elimination of the *Nominative* of this subsidiary, and not of the *Principal Action*. Then again, there are many actions commissioned, while the actual *Direction* is one only; and for this reason also, in accordance with the *Sūtra*—‘*Bhūyasām syāt sadharmatvāt*,’—[the *Performer* as indicated by the name ‘*Ādhvaryava*’ should be taken as pertaining intact to the action commissioned by the *Directions*,—of which actions there are many, and as such as it is only right that that whereof the number is large should be given the preference in the matter of relationship with the *Performer* indicated by the name]; and hence the *Adhvaryu* being regarded as the *Performer* of the actions, we cannot but take the other, the *Agnīh*, to be the person who addresses the *Directions*.”

SIDDHĀNTA

Sūtra (24): *The word ‘Adhvaryu’ would indirectly apply to the Agnīt; because of the similarity of the duties (of the two Priests).*

In accordance with the *Sutrā* XII—ii—23, it is only proper that, through priority, it is the *Direction* that should have for its Performer the person indicated by the *name*; nor, at that time, is there any incongruity perceptible in the acceptance of this person as the addressor of the *Direction*; in fact it is after the *Direction* has been addressed by that person (the *Adhvaryu*), that the performance, by the same person, of the Actions commissioned therein being found to be incongruous, the performance of these is relegated to another person. And as the *Director* has got some sort of a nominative agency towards the actions performed under his *Directions*, the said adjustment of the functions of the two Priests would be quite in keeping with the name ‘*Ādhvaryava*’ (as the directing *Adhvaryu* would have an agency with regard to the actions performed by the *Agnīt* under his directions). Otherwise (if the *Agnīt* were to do the *Directing*) in regard to the *Direction*, there would be total rejection of the indications of the *Name*; as it would be neither *done* nor *got done*, by the *Adhvaryu*. Hence it must be admitted that the *Agnīt* performs the actions, when directed by the *Adhvaryu*.

Then as for the declaration ‘*Vajrēṇādhvaryum etc.*’ we can take the word ‘*Adhvaryu*’ as referring to the *Agnīt*, as performing the duties of the *Adhvaryu*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13).

[In the *Karaṇa-Mantras* what is asked for is the Result accruing to the Master.]

Sūtra (25): “It is the Result accruing to the Priests that is asked for in the *Karaṇa-Mantras*; as the declaration directly points to that.”

[In connection with the *Daśa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the declaration—‘*Mamāgrē varco viharēśhwastū ili pūrvamagnim grhṇāti.*’ And with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the ‘Glory’ (*Varcus*) asked for in the *Mantra* is for the Priest, or for the Master. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Just as in the case of the results spoken of in *Mantras* other than the *Karaṇa-Mantras*, the Result is taken to be one that is mentioned in the Context, and we do not assume any other,—so, in the same manner, in the *Mantra* in question, the result spoken of must be regarded as the same that is mentioned in the Context. And as the *Mantras* other than the *Karaṇa-Mantras* are recited by the Master, it is only proper that the Results therein asked for should refer to the Master. The *Karaṇa-Mantras* however are always recited by the Priests, as it is necessary that their recitation should be done by the same Person that does the Action. If the *Mantras* recited by the *Adhvaryu* Priest would speak of Results pertaining to the Master, then the mention of ‘*Mama*’ (Mine) would be wholly incongruous.

“As for the question as to what sort of ‘Glory’ could accrue to the Priest (when the final result of the Action accrues to the Master),—we reply that a proper fulfilment of the Sacrifice would show that Sacrifices at which a particular priest officiates is sure to terminate successfully; and this *fame* would greatly encourage the Priest. This is what is meant by the *Bhāshya* declaration—‘*ēva-mutsāhi bhavishyati*’).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (26): *It would be the Result accruing to the Master; as the whole thing is done for his sake.*

The *Mantra* in question cannot be taken merely as serving the purposes of *encouragement* as is done by the *Mantras* other than the *Karana-Mantras*. What the *Mantra* does is to mention a result that always follows from the subsidiary action (done with the *Mantra*). Because the *Mantra* has been laid down as serving a wholly distinct purpose (that of pointing to the Deity); and as such it is only when it indicates either the action, or something else connected with it, that it comes to be regarded as an accessory of the Principal Action.

Thus then, in the case in question, if the *Mantra* only spoke of the glory attaching to the *Adhvaryu* Priest, - then, in that case, the whole of this *Mantra* could not be used in accomplishment of the *Anvādhāna* of Fire (in connection with which it is laid down); because an indication of the *Adhvaryu's* glory is not required by this *Anvādhāna*. In fact, even if it indicated the Result of the Principal Action, then too, it could not have any connection with the *Anvādhāna*; and this connection becomes all the more impossible, when it indicates merely the *Adhvaryu's* glory, which is something wholly extraneous to the sacrifice, and serves no useful purpose in connection with the sacrificial operations. Hence in accordance with the Law of the *Sūktavāka* (III—ii—15 et seq.), the Result spoken of must be taken as that which follows from the action of *Anvādhānā*, as otherwise we could not justify the injunction of the *Mantra* as instrumental in that Action (and it has been proved already that the Result of actions belongs to the Master, and not to the Priests).

As for the *Benedictions*, they are directly subsidiary to the Principal Action; and hence they could become subsidiaries, by the indication of the Results of that Action; and hence if they were to bring about distinct results of their own, then, being 'connected' (with the distinct result), they could not be taken up by the Context as subsidiaries of the sacrifice (*Vide, Sūtra* III—iii—11). And hence the case of the *Mantra* in question cannot be regarded as similar to these *Benedictions*.

Objection: "Even if the *Mantra* were to lead to a distinct result, " inasmuch as the word '*Mama*' refers to the *Adhvaryu* (who recites " the *Mantra*), the Result should be regarded, in accordance with the " Law of *Tadvyapadēṣa*, as pertaining to the *Adhvaryu*."

Reply: It is *Indicative Power* that indicates the fact of the Result

pertaining to the *Adhvaryu*; while the *Ātmanēpada* affix (in 'ādadhīta') involves the *Direct Declaration* of its pertaining to the *Master* (and there can be no doubt that this latter is more authoritative than the former).

Objection: "Well, in that case, in order to be in keeping with both " (Direct Declaration and Indicative Power), why should not this " action also be taken as to be performed by the *Master* himself; as in " that case we would have no incongruity in the use of the word " 'Mama,' and the said *Ātmanēpada* ending."

Reply: It is not so; because if the Action (of *Anvādhāna*) were preceded by a recitation of the *Mantra*, then we could have such a restriction as you speak of. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Action appearing before (the *Mantra*) comes to be recognised as wholly subservient to the Sacrifice only; and as such it becomes quite compatibly connected with the *Adhvaryu*, in accordance with the indications of the Name '*Ādhvaryava*' (of the Section in which the Action happens to be mentioned).

Nor could it be urged that—"in that case, the mere recitation of the *Mantra* would be done by the "Master." Because that which is taken up by the Action itself has necessarily the same *Performer* as that Action.'

Objection: "In that case, inasmuch as the Result in question " would also be taken up by the Action (it could not but pertain to " the Master)."

Reply: The Result could be taken up, if such taking up were not obstructed by the said *Ātmanēpada* ending. But inasmuch as there is no possibility of the indication of the *Ātmanēpada* being set aside,—and as there is no possibility of its being taken in an indirect secondary signification,—it is far more reasonable to take the word '*Mama*' in the *Mantra* either as explained by means of certain words supplied from without, or as being used in an indirect secondary signification,—the sentence in question being taken as '*May my Master obtain glory*,' or '*May the Master similar to me obtain glory*.'

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Result spoken of pertains to the *Master*.

Those theorists who hold the *Anvādhāna* of *Fire* as to be done by the *Master* himself fall into this mistake, simply by reason of this word '*Mama*' occurring in the *Mantra*. If they could bring forward any text in support of their contention, then too, then it would be necessary to consider the question as to whether the Result should

be taken as pertaining to the *Adhvaryu* and the *Master*, as optional alternatives,—as in the case of options with regard to Actions,—or as pertaining always to the *Master* only.

Sūtra (27) : Also because of Indications to that effect.

The Benedictions that are pronounced by the Priests are distinctly declared,—in the sentence ‘*Yām vai kāncanaṣṭurija aṣṭhamāṣṭasāṭi Yajamānasyaiva sā*,’—as pertaining to the *Master*; and this declaration would be compatible with the *Siddhānta*, and not with the *Pūrva-paksha* view.

ADHIKARAṆA (14).

[In the *Karaṇa Mantras*, those Results that affect the Action belong to the Priests.]

Sūtra (23): *The Results affecting the Action belong to the Priests; as the Master also would want such results to accrue to the Priests only.*

This is an exception to the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. In a case where the *Karaṇa Mantra* speaks of a result that affects the Action,—e.g. the *Mantra*, ‘*Agnāvishṇū māvukramisham vijihāhām mā mā santāptam*’ (‘May Agni and Vishnu . . . not make me very hot’); and in this case, inasmuch as the Result—absence of much heat—would be of use in the Action (as the Priests when not overheated would be in a position to perform their duties better),—and as such the Master too would require such a result to accrue to the Priests (as thus would his Sacrifice be performed in a suitable manner),—this conclusion would not be incompatible with the *Ātmanēpada* ending.

Sūtra (29): *Because of the distinct mention (of the Priest as connected with the Result).*

Under the *Sūtra* III—viii—14, we have cited an instance of the mention in *Brāhmaṇas*: while what we cite, in course of the present discussion, is an instance of the mention in *Mantras*. As this mention in the *Mantra* would be hard to be got at, there might be a doubt as to the Results in question not pertaining to both (the *Adhvaryu* and the *Master*). But as a matter of fact the ground for the assumption of the Result being mentioned in the *Mantra*, operating simultaneously, is found to be applicable to both, and as such there would be no necessity of having recourse to a complicated method of interpretation.

Objection: “Well, in that case, why should not both recite the ‘*Mantra* in question?’”

Reply: When being recited by one only, the *Mantra* can indicate the Result accruing to both,—and all that is desired having been accomplished by that single recitation,—there could be no use for its

being recited over again by the other. And as it is the *Adhvaryu* alone who recites the *Mantra* (the Result herein spoken of is one that belongs to the *Adhvaryu*).

ADHIKARAṆA (15).

[The Purification of Materials pertains to the Primary as well as to the
Subsidiary Sacrifices.]

***Sūtra (30) : The Purification of Materials pertains to
all Actions; as all equally belong to the same Con-
text.***

We have done with the question of the contradiction and non-contradiction of *Name* (by Direct Declaration, etc.). And all these discussions relating to the contradiction or non-contradiction of Direct Declaration, etc., apply equally to the Original Primary Sacrifice as well as its modifications.

It has been shown that the Accessory Details belong to the Primary as well as its subsidiaries (*Sūtra* III—vii—1 et seq.) ; and then there arising the question as to how it would be with the Modifications, the present *Sūtra* has been introduced simply by way of showing that the same conclusion holds regarding these also.

ADHIKARAṆA (16).

[The Accessory Details peculiar to the Original Primary do not belong to the Modifications.]

The last *Sūtra* (30) can be taken as embodying the *Pūrvapaksha* of the *Siddhānta* put forward in the following *Sūtra*; and thus for the present *Adhikaraṇa*, we have the following :—

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the accessory details, in the shape of the Grass, etc., have been shown to belong to *all Actions*, we must regard them as “belonging to the Modifications also.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (31): Inasmuch as they are mentioned in connection with the Primary Original, the Peculiar Accessory Detail could not belong to the Modification.

If the Accessory Detail in question had been mentioned as common to all actions by way of *Anuṣaṅga* like the Injunction with regard to the Subsidiaries, —and if these were scriptural texts pointing to its presence at the Modifications, —then, in those cases, inasmuch as there would be no grounds for restricting the Injunction of that Accessory to the Primary Sacrifice only, we could not but regard it as belonging to *all Actions*. As a matter of fact however, all attribution of Accessory Details is preceded by an Injunction of the Actions themselves. And when an Accessory has been taken up by a Sacrificial operation, it does not take upon itself, for its own accomplishment, the purposes, perceptible and imperceptible, emanating from restrictions. And these purposes again enter into the (Primary) Sacrifice, only as having their extent fully recognised. And these, for the sake of their own fulfilment, betaking themselves to several Actions, come into these as wholly restricted within themselves. •

Nor have we found, at the Primary Sacrifice, the *Yūpāvastaraṇa*

being done by the *Grass*; and hence the Modifications could not take in either the *Grass* or its accessories. Those actions,—e.g. the *Vedistarana* and the like—that do take in those accessories of the *Grass*, are not found to be wanting in any essential factor, without the *Yūpāvatastarana*; and as such the said Details could not enter into the Modification for the sake of those—i.e. the *Vedistarana*, etc. Hence it must be concluded that the Accessory that is peculiar to the Primary does not find place in the Modification.

The *Bhāṣya* says—‘*Pradhānam hi codako’pekshatē*’; and the sense of this is that the Accessory cannot be regarded as enjoined in common for the Primary and the Modification; nor does any scriptural text imply the presence of that Accessory at the Modification. Because if the Modification could call up all the texts bearing upon its Primary Original, then everything in connection with it would have to be done afresh, just as in the Original sacrifice; and that would involve the necessity of connecting factors very remote from one another.

Then again, as a matter of fact, we have found that the mere Implication of scriptural texts and the fact of the Accessory being enjoined equally for both (the Primary and the Modification), do not connect, with other duties, the *Paçupurodāça*, which, among the purificatory rites relating to the Sacrificial animals, has been found to pertain to the *Animal* dedicated to the Deity *Agni-Soma*. And this fact, as well as the presence of *Uhas* (at the Modification), would not be compatible with the theory that the Accessory in question belongs to the Primary Original, as well as to its Modification. Hence it must be admitted that it is only the beneficial effect of the rite performed in connection with the Original Primary that is transferred to the Modification (and not so the actual performance of the Rite).

ADHIKARAṆA (17).

[The *Vidhṛti* and the *Pavitra* should be made of the *Paribhojanīya* Grass.]

Sūtra (32): *There being an incompatibility, the others could have no distinct connection (with the Accessory Detail in question); specially because of a particular Declaration.*

We proceed to show that the *Grass* laid down for the Primary does not subserve all purposes.

[In connection with sacrifices we have the making of the *Pavitra* and the *Vidhṛti*, out of the *Kuça Grass*, laid down. And with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these are to be made out of the *Grass* brought in for the purpose of being spread over the Altar, or out of other Grasses. And the *Pūrvapakṣa* taking up the former alternative, we have the following—]

SIDDHĀNTA.

The *Grass* that has been chopped in a particular way being laid down as to be used for spreading over the Altar,—in the sentence ‘*Tṛdhānupancadhā*, etc.’,—it could not be used for the making of the *Pavitra*, etc. Consequently we must seek for another sentence laying down the *Grass* in general, for the purpose of making the *Pavitra* and the *Vidhṛti*. And we find that the sentence ‘*Dhātuh*, etc.’ serves to lay down collectively a number of spreadings (and among these we find the mention of the *Paribhojanīya* Grass; and the *Pavitra* and the *Vidhṛtis* should be made out of this Grass).

ADHIKARĀṆA (18).

[It is the *Cake*, etc. of the Original Sacrifice that should be kept in.]

Sūtra (33): *It is a portion (of the former) that should be set aside; because of the connection (with the Injunction) of what already exists.*

[In connection with the *Jyotishtoma*, we find the declaration—‘*Purodāçaçakalam aindravāyasya grahē nidadhāti*, etc., etc.’; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the *Cake-piece* that is kept in these vessels is taken out of the *Cake* used at the Original Primary Sacrifice, or it is obtained from elsewhere. And on this question we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the *Cake*, the *Dhānā*, etc., are meant for the ‘*Savaniya*’ Sacrifice, we must, in accordance with the previous ‘*Adhikarāṇa*’, take the *Cake-pieces*, required for *Grahana*, *Çrapana*, “etc., as to be obtained from elsewhere.”

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

In accordance with *Sūtra* IV—i—28, the *Pūrvapaksha* view would necessitate a recourse to Secondary signification, without much use, and we must regard the *Cake-pieces* as to be obtained from the *Cake* that has been used at the Original Sacrifice; specially (1) because we do not find any other piece of *Cake* in existence; (2) because at the Original Sacrifice only two *Slices* having been offered, the Disposal of the remainder by the *Keeping* under question would serve a distinctly useful purpose; (3) and because this procedure would be in keeping with the Accusative ending (in ‘*Purodāçaçakalam*’). Consequently it must be admitted that the *Cake-pieces* kept in the *Aindravāyava* and other vessels, should be those obtained from the *Cake* that has been used at the Original Primary Sacrifice.

ADHIKARĀṆA (13)

[At the Kāmya Ishṭis, the specification of *Upāmṇu* pertains to the Principal Action.]

Sūtra (34): “*The Accessory laid down in connection with the Modification relates to all Actions,—just like the Original Primary.*”

[We have the declaration—‘*Yajñātharvaṇa vasi kāmṇā ishṭayah, iā upāmṇu kartavyāḥ*’; with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the specification of *Upāmṇu* (Quietness) pertains to the Primary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices, or to the Primary only. And on this question we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“The *Upāmṇu* should be observed in all those cases, where existing, it could afford some aid to the *Kāmya Ishṭis*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (35): “*It must be regarded as meant for the Principal Action only; as it has not been enjoined for the Subsidiary.*”

Some people explain the expression ‘*acoditavāt*’ as follows: “Inasmuch as the character of the *Upāmṇu* has already been found to be distinctly perceptible, the Subsidiaries that are amenable to the Implicatory Injunction do not get at it.”

But this explanation is not admissible; because in all cases the operation of the Implicatory Injunction is the very first to come in. Hence the expression should be explained in the following manner: In the case of the *Original Sacrifice*, the Context having shown that the characteristic in question pertains to the Principal Action only,—it is the more authoritative Syntactical Connection that connects it with all the Actions; in the case of the *Modification*, on the other hand, it is Syntactical Connection itself that specifies the Characteristic as belonging to the Principal Action only; because the sentence

distinctly mentions the word ' *Kāmyāḥ* ' ; and certainly the Subsidiaries are never related to any *desires* ; and hence the characteristic in question cannot be regarded as enjoined for these Subsidiaries. .



ADHIKARANA (20).

[At the Subsidiaries of the *Çyēna* simple *Butter* should be used in place of *Clarified Butter*.]

Sūtra (36): *Because of the impossibility of its being used at the Primary Sacrifice, it must be used at the Subsidiaries; specially on account of the peculiar proximity.*

[In connection with the *Çyēna*, we find the declaration *Dr̥ṭi-navanūtamājyam'*: and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the *Butter* is to be used at the Principal Sacrifice of the *Çyēna*, or at its Subsidiaries. And on this question, we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to be a qualified ‘Injunction in the Context of the Principal Action, the *Butter* must be taken as replacing the *Soma* at the Principal Sacrifice.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Inasmuch as it is not possible to have Injunctions of many substances, the sentence must be taken as laying down a particular substance with reference to the *Clarified Butter* (*Ājya*). And as a matter of fact we find that there is no *Clarified Butter* used at the Principal Sacrifice; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* III—i—18, the material laid down in the sentence in question must be regarded as pertaining to the Subsidiary Sacrifices.

Sātra (37): Objection: “*The same would be the case with the Laying of Fire also.*”

“The ‘*Clarified Butter*’ spoken of in the sentence must be taken as *that which imparts some aid to the Çyēna sacrifice*, and in that case inasmuch as the *Clarified Butter* used at the *Pavamāna Ishṭis* of the *Laying of Fire* would also be imparting some aid to the *Çyēna*,

“ we would have the *Simple Butter* at these *Ishtis* also in place of the “Clarified Butter.”

Sūtra (38): Reply: *It cannot be so; because these (Ishtis) do not appear in the Context (of the Āyēna); specially as (the mere fact of the Ishtis imparting an aid to the Āyēna) cannot be a ground for regarding them as Subsidiaries to it.*

That is to say, an Action becomes subsidiary to a Sacrifice, not by merely imparting an aid to this latter, but by imparting such aid while being laid down in its Context. And as a matter of fact, the Clarified Butter that is found in the Context of the *Āyēna* is that which is mentioned in its Injunction, and not that used at the *Pavamāna Ishtis*; and as such we have the restriction that it is only at the actual Subsidiaries of the *Āyēna* (and not at these *Ishtis*) that the Clarified Butter is to be replaced by simple Butter.

ADHIKARAṆA (21).

[At all the Subsidiaries of the *Çyēna* we have Simple Butter in the place of Clarified Butter.]

Sūtra (39): “*The Replacing would be at the particular Subsidiaries (performed at the time of the Sutyā); because of Indications to that effect.*”

Now there arises the question as to whether the Clarified Butter is to be replaced by *Simple* Butter, only at those Subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the *Sutyā*, or at *all* the Subsidiaries of the *Çyēna*. And on this, we have the following—

PŪRVA PAKSHA.

“The Replacing is to be only at the Subsidiaries performed at the time of the *Sutyā*: (1) because of the proximity (of Context); (2) also because of Inference from Analogy, based upon Indications, the argument being this:—The *presence of the Animal* as an accessory of the *Çyēna* has been found to appear at those Subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the *Sutyā*; as the Subsidiaries connected with the *Agnistomīya* and the *Anubandhyā* (animals of the *Çyēna*) are spoken of as aided by other Accessories (and not by the Clarified Butter). Consequently, the simple Butter also must be regarded as an accessory of those Subsidiaries only that are performed at the time of the *Sutyā*.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

Sūtra (40): *It must be at all the Subsidiaries; because of its being related equally to all;—*

as has been fully established under the *Sūtra* III—vi—2.

Sūtra (41): *As for the Indications (spoken of), they could be regarded as authoritative only when referring to something based upon Reason.*

That is to say, it is a well-known fact that such Indications can be regarded as authoritative only with regard to such subjects as are

amenable to *Reason* only. The case in question however is found to be amenable to *Verbal Authority* only. Because the '*Sahālamḥa*' (*Killing together* of the Animals) is to be done at the time of the *Sutyā*, not because it is an accessory laid down with special reference to this time, but because of a *reasoning*,—which however does not apply to the case in question, of the *Butter*.

This 'reasoning' we proceed to show as follows: There is a certain *order of sequence* pointed out in certain sentences, whose authority in the shape of Direct Declaration is to be inferred from *proximity*; and the connecting of the other Details with the time of the *Sutyā* would be in keeping with this *order of sequence*. Specially as in connection with the time of the *Savanīya*, we do not find any section dealing with the Animals; and as such we could not but pass over the time of this *Savanīya*. Nor could there be two ways of taking the things; as in that case we would have both (which would not be desirable). Thus then, the Indications in question are quite compatible with the *Siddhānta* view.

ADHIKARANA (22)

[The *Savanīya* Offerings only consist of Flesh.

Sūtra (42) : The Flesh belongs to the *Savanīya* Offerings : because of the particular Injunction.

[In connection with the 'Çāpyānāmāyana extending over thirty-six years', we find the declaration—'Samsthilē samsthilē' haviṁ mṛga-patirmṛgayām yāti, sa tatra yān mṛgān hanti teshāmantarasāh purōdācāh savanīyā bhavanti'; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the Flesh of the animals killed in the hunting is to form the Cakes at the *Savanīya* as well as the other offerings, or at the *Savanīya* only. And on this question we have the following—]

PŪRVAPAKSHA.

"Inasmuch as the word '*Purodāca*' (in the sentence in question) could not be taken as referring to the *Dhānū* and the other offerings of the *Savanīya*, we must regard all the *Cakes* as to be made of the Flesh in question. And even though the sentence speaks of the '*Savanīya* Offerings,' yet this could not be taken as specifying the Cake (as this specification would involve a syntactical split)."

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHĀNTA.

The mention of the word '*Savanīya*' cannot be regarded as mistaken reading; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* I—iv.—28, we must take the word '*Purodācāh*' in its secondary signification, and as such, including the *Dhānū* and the other *Savanīya* Offerings.

Sūtra (43) : Objection : "In the absence of Proximity, the recourse to Secondary signification cannot be admissible."

"Inasmuch as the *Dhānū*, etc. are wholly different from the *Purodāca*, we cannot rightly take the word '*Purodāca*' as indirectly indicating those other substances. For, even if this were possible, it could be so only by the word '*Purodācāh*' being partly taken, by way of a reference to the word '*Savanīyā*' (and this too would not be admissible)."

Sūtra (44): Reply: The word could be (taken as indirectly indicating the Savanīya offerings); because of its being found to be so indicative, in connection with the Original Primary Sacrifice; just as in the case of the Vairāja.

In connection with the Primary Sacrifice, we find the declaration—‘*Purodācānalankuru*,’—where the word ‘*Purodācān*’ indicates the *Dhānā* and the other offerings; as for the word ‘*Savanīya*’ however, we do not find it ever applying to any other offerings save the *Savanīya*. Then again, the word ‘*Purodācāh*’ could very well indicate the *Dhānā*, etc., on account of the proximity of these; while the word ‘*Savanīyāh*’ cannot indicate anything else. And then, inasmuch as that *Purodācā* which does not constitute a *Savanīya Offering* can have no connection with the *Dhānā*, etc.,—it must be admitted that the Flesh in question is to be employed at the *Dhānā* and other offerings in connection with the *Savanīya*.

Thus have we explained the relation of subserviency among Actions,—as based upon the (six) *Means of Knowledge*,—whose certitude is based finally upon Direct Vedic Declaration, and with regard to which the question of their comparative authoritativeness has been fully dealt with, as leading to definite conclusions in cases of conflict among the various Means of Knowledge.

Thus ends the *Eighth Pāda* of *Adhyāya* III.

Thus ends the *Third Adhyāya*.

Here ends the *Tantravārtika* of *Bhatta Kumārila*.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

Abhikramaṇa, 1031, 1032.
 Abhikrāman juhōti, 1031, 1195.
 Abhiṣava, 1475, 1477, 1562.
 Abhiṣecaniyā, 1210, 1211, 1515
 Abhyuditeṣṭi, 802.
 Abhyañjana, 1381.
 Abhyādāna, 82.
 Abhyādāna mantra, 82.
 Abstract, 979, 1332, 1333, 1334.
 Absurdity, 914.
 Accessories, 65, 94, 170, 398, 400, 430,
 441, 660, 705, 736, 774, 816, 840, 843,
 845, 847, 848, 858, 860, 866, 875, 937,
 994, 1046, 1018, 1073, 1141, 1142,
 1143, 1144, 1146, 1148, 1150, 1152,
 1156, 1157, 1164, 1165, 1182, 1190,
 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1227, 1266,
 1508, 1511, 1518, 1520, 1522, 1531,
 1540, 1549, 1565, 1567, 1568, 1571,
 1572, 1579, 1583, 1587, 1588, 1589,
 1595, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1600, 1605
 Āchārya, 242.
 Accusative ending 671, 1021.
 Acquisition, 883.
 Adābhya, 863, 864, 1559.
 Ādhāna, 832, 835, 857, 1141, 1232, 1526.
 Adharina, 2.
 Adhaatāt samidhan dhārayan anudra-
 vet upari hi dovebhyo dhārayati,
 1283.
 Adhvarakalpa, 1516.
 Adhvaryu, 153, 1162, 1389, 1479, 1623,
 1628, 1651, 1653, 1692.
 Adhvaryava, 1162, 1271, 1384, 1389,
 1651.
 Aditi, 98.
 Ādityasthālī, 1113.
 Affix, 475, 478.
 Affix verbal, 1290, 1301, 1302, 1303,
 1304, 1475, 1481.
 Affix Feminine, 1327.
 Affix Conjugational, 478, 1313, 1315,
 1317, 1322, 1329, 1330.
 Affix abstract, 979, 1333, 1334.
 Āgama, 280.
 Agastya, 101.
 Āghāra, 398, 402, 633, 635, 679, 680,
 681, 692.
 Āghāranāghārayati, 679, 682, 689.
 Agna āyāhi, 1090, 1091.
 Agnī patnīvān sajurdevana tvastrā
 somena piba, 1116.
 Agnayā, 1058.
 'Agnāviṣṇū etc.', 1698.

Agnōstrnani, 1023.
 Agnayāḥ svakālatvat, 1645.
 Agnayō juṣṭam nirvapami, 1179.
 Agneyamajamagnistoma ābhiheta ān-
 dragnamukthyā divītyam, 1572.
 Agneyyanumantraṇa, 1157.
 Āgnēyī, 102, 1090, 1093, 1094, 1096,
 1101.
 Āgnēya, 411, 633, 636, 647, 658, 880,
 881, 887, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1057,
 1195, 1419, 1424, 1425, 1428, 1431,
 1432.
 Agneyan caturdhā karoti, 1049, 1194.
 Agneyamastākapaḥ nirvapet rukā-
 mah, 881.
 Agnēyostākapaḥ, 662, 1427, 1432,
 1434.
 Agnōstākapaḥ bhavati, 1125, 1426.
 Agnōstākapaḥ bhavati etayā annad-
 yakūnam yajayet, 883.
 Agnōstākapaḥ hiranyam dakṣiṇā,
 816, 1887.
 Agnōstākapaḥ māvāsyāyām bhavati,
 Agnōstākapaḥ māvāsyāyām paurṇa-
 māsyānēcūto bhavati, 887, 1419.
 Agneyā, 102, 1091, 1093
 Agneyā agnīdhramupatīṣṭhātē, 1690,
 1543.
 Agni, 102, 547, 694, 695, 863, 867, 868,
 869, 870, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1056, 1078,
 1080, 1091, 1095, 1121, 1123, 1127,
 1137, 1419, 1424, 1426, 1427, 1428,
 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1435, 1552,
 1553.
 Agnicayana, 866.
 Agnīdagnīnvihara, 1068.
 Agnid Agnid, 85, 97.
 Agnīdhra, 1097, 1191.
 Agnīdhropasthāna 1090.
 Agnihotra, 398, 680, 681, 692, 694, 695,
 698, 752, 771, 852, 871, 872, 873, 875,
 876, 877, 890, 891, 892, 896, 901, 1280.
 Agnihotram juhōti, 679, 682, 689, 695.
 Agnihotrin, 270.
 Agniin, 868.
 Agnīcinutē. āhāt 'gnimagnis tōmēnā-
 nujanāti, 866.
 Agnīrmānavakah, 1055, 1057.
 Agnīrūrdhā re. 83.
 Agni-soma, 1452, 1553.
 Agniśomīya, 547, 1049, 1234, 1535, 1537
 1551, 1553, 1557.
 Agniśoma, 1239, 1240, 1250, 1254, 1535,
 1560. •

Agniṣṭomē, 1250, 1254, 1589.
 Agniṣṭut, 783.
 Agnitrāhimaṇaḥ, 444.
 Agnirāruni, 1088.
 Agniviḥaraṇa, 1068.
 Agravanti Prāgagrāṇi udgagrāṇi, 1282.
 Āgrayaṇasthāli, 1114.
 Āhvanīya, 1531, 1532, 1635.
 Ahichatṛa, 194.
 Ahina, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1239, 1376.
 Āhitāgnirva eṣa yo'agnihotram juhōti,
 900.
 Āhvayati, 1067.
 Aibhiraṇē . . patnivatastṛiṃṇatas-triṃ-
 ṇa . . mādāyeva, 1118.
 Aindra, 1195.
 Aindrāgna, 1049, 1086, 1192, 1193.
 Aindravāyava, 1457, 1458, 1459.
 Aindravāyam grhṇāti, 701, 709.
 Aindri, 1061, 1169, 1172, 1175.
 Aindrya, 1172.
 Aindryā gārahapatyamuptiṣṭhātē, 1167,
 1169, 1170, 1173, 1176, 1190, 1201.
 Aitiṣāyana, 1129.
 Ajā, 1327.
 Ājya, 397, 416.
 Pancadaśajyāni, 396.
 Ājyabhāga, 646, 1043, 1044, 1144, 1145.
 Ākāṅkṣā, 1208.
 Ākṛti, 331.
 Ālabhēt, 702, 853, 854.
 Ālambhana, 845, 848, 850, 851.
 Allegorical-interpretation, 44.
 Alphabet, 296.
 Altar, 1595, 1610, 1611, 1613, 1628.
 Amāvāsyā, 650, 664, 1044.
 Amṇu, 864, 1559.
 Amṇu grhṇāti, 863.
 Amyakṣatā, 100.
 Anabhihite, 1338, 1357, 1360, 1361.
 Analogy, 4, 107, 310, 498, 802, 951.
 Anavānam yajati, 1487.
 Āndra, 820.
 Anṅa, 930.
 Animal, 388, 854, 970, 988, 991, 1234,
 1237, 1238, 1257, 1259, 1335, 1539,
 1551, 1553, 1557, 1558.
 Aukṣā, 737.
 Anna, 1381.
 Anointment, 822.
 Anṛtam, 1385.
 Antarvedi, 1611.
 Anu, 867.
 Anubandhya, 1144, 1145, 1535, 1639.
 Anujānāti, 867.
 Anusāṅga, 599, 605, 606, 609.
 Anuvācāna, 1651.
 Anuvāda, 1017.
 Anuvāsatkāra, 1122.

Anvāhāryapacana, 1273, 1365.
 Apaṇabda, 270.
 Apaṇavo vā anye, 446.
 Appointment, 1488, 1489, 1622, 1632,
 1634, 1635, 1636, 1641.
 Apūrva, 265, 336, 471, 472, 473, 474,
 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503,
 504, 506, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515,
 523, 532, 610, 613, 621, 623, 625, 724,
 793, 861, 937, 948, 949, 950, 953, 954,
 957, 958, 1027, 1097, 1208, 1266, 1267,
 1311, 1374, 1514, 1562, 1564.
 Ārambhāṇiya, 1533.
 Architecture, 121.
 Ardhamantarvedīminotī, 1610.
 Arjuna, 193.
 Āra, 228.
 Arihāvāda, 1, 3, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25,
 26-32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 53, 65,
 66, 68, 81, 93, 119, 122, 375, 429, 430,
 439, 565, 672, 854, 925, 1135, 1137,
 1218, 1242, 1269, 1273, 1276, 1280,
 1286, 1288, 1309, 1399, 1403, 1405,
 1406, 1407, 1445, 1451, 1497, 1501,
 1553.
 Ārtreṇa, 1403.
 Ārtvijye, 1410.
 Aruṇā, 980.
 Aruṇayā, 959, 970, 974, 975, 980, 981,
 984, 985, 987.
 Aruṇayā pingūkrayā ekahāyanyā somam
 krīṇāti, 959, 1186.
 Ārya, 208, 209, 219.
 Āryāvarta, 217, 828.
 Ācūbbhīdhānī, 91.
 Ācvin, 1546, 1549.
 Ācvinā, 1453.
 Āṣṭakā, 112.
 Āṣṭākāpāla, 1409.
 Āsamyuktam, 1157, 1158.
 Āsandeḥa, 283.
 Āsa, 1008.
 Āṣṭi, 483.
 Āsura, 287.
 Āsyāḥ, 965.
 Āṣṭakā, 923.
 Āṣṭi, 923, 926.
 Āṣṭiśa Jyotiḥ, āṣṭiśa vicvajyotiḥ, 731.
 Āṣṭiśa, 156, 157.
 Āṣṭiśa vā, 772.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1250, 1569.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1144, 1145.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1617, 1618, 1619.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1535.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1465.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1144, 1145.
 Āṣṭiśa vā . . . svīṣṭakṛtī vadyati
 pratyabhīhārayati, 1446.
 Āṣṭiśa, 701, 702.
 Āṣṭiśa, 1026.

Āvedana, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048.

(Addressing.)

Aveṣṭi, 810, 816, 817, 820, 821, 828, 829, 830, 831, 883.

Avivakṣā, 996, 997, 999.

Āyurvai ghṛtam, 460.

Bābara pravāhaṇi, 14.

Bādari, 939, 941.

Bahirvedi, 1611.

Bahu, 1332, 1335.

Bahuṣu, 1332.

Bahutva, 1332, 1335.

Bahuvrīhi, 808, 959, 961, 966, 967, 970.

Bathing, 1370.

Baudha 166, 167, 226, 232, 233, 234.

Bārhaspatya, 816.

Beaconing, 485.

Bedding, 441.

Being, 333.

Bhāga, 1262, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1419.

Bhakṣa, 1102.

Bhakṣānuvāka, 1103, 1107, 1108, 1128, 1189.

Bhakṣe hi ma viçā..bhakṣayāmi, 1162.

*Bhakṣitāpyāyitaṅcamasān.....dakṣi-
nasyānasovalambē sādāyanti*, 1460.

Bharaṇa, 1636.

Bhāryam, 1384.

Bhāṣya, 5, 6, 15, 26, 32, 39, 66, 69, 70.

71, 78, 116, 118, 147, 169, 178, 204,

207, 239, 249, 250, 253, 256, 340, 341,

345, 355, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362, 365,

373, 383, 419, 426, 465, 469, 492, 494,

515, 517, 531, 547, 554, 555, 565, 566,

569, 587, 603, 610, 611, 612, 614, 689,

690, 708, 709, 723, 751, 752, 758, 797,

798, 834, 835, 852, 853, 870, 873, 878,

913, 924, 926, 928, 936, 937, 940, 941,

942, 971, 972, 1010, 1050, 1051, 1074,

1079, 1082, 1083, 1085, 1171, 1203,

1216, 1217, 1224, 1228, 1269, 1275,

1351, 1407, 1443, 1457, 1462, 1500,

1503, 1520, 1540, 1543, 1548, 1550,

1597, 1622, 1642, 1643, 1646, 1650.

Bhāvanā, 20, 21, 23, 250, 473, 474, 475,

478, 480, 481, 482, 483, 485, 486, 488,

489, 491, 492, 494, 610, 611, 612, 613,

616, 659, 689, 732, 787, 877, 878, 908,

997, 1000, 1001, 1003, 1004, 1012, 1208,

1289, 1291, 1301, 1303, 1313, 1314,

1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1336, 1340,

1343, 1347, 1348, 1353, 1360, 1361,

1619.

Bhāvārtha, 474, 493.

Bhāvarthaṣbada, 492.

Bhāvaṣbada, 473.

Bhavatī, 477.

Bhāvayati, 478.

Bhāvayēt--batham, 492.

Bhāvayēt--kim, 488.

.. *kena*, 489.

Bhīma, 190.

Bhūtāmṣa, 100.

Bhū 477, 478

Bhūyastva, 1154.

Bilva 1578.

Body, 517, 519, 521, 901, 998, 1257, 1259, 1370.

Boy, 1056.

Brahmā, 1623, 1638.

Brahmacharya, 162, 163.

Brāhmaṇa, 7, 10, 103, 193, 194, 195,

196, 198, 227, 241, 444, 568, 570, 816,

821, 828, 890, 908, 1051, 1131, 1219,

1222, 1247, 1377, 1379, 1462, 1497,

1499, 1502, 1503.

Brāhmaṇēna na mlecchhitavyam, 2

Branch, 1554.

Brhat, 919.

Bricks, 1561.

Brightness 1383.

Buddha, 165, 179.

Bull, 291.

Butter, 916, 1415, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1511, 1707.

Cake, 94, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1257, 1259, 1421, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1454, 1455, 1456.

Calf, 852, 853.

Calling, 1065, 1066.

Camasa, 1470, 1623, 1625.

Camasādhvaryu, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1640.

Cart, 1454, 1615.

Cart wheel-shaped, 1454.

Caru, 1259, 1269, 1262, 1265, 1266,

1411, 1419, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1426,

1427, 1428, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434,

1435, 1444.

Caste, 10, 11, 816, 818, 819, 821, 823.

Cattle, 1518, 1525.

Caturhotrā pūrṇamāsi, 1604.

Cāturmāsya, 902.

Cayana, 866, 868, 869.

Challenge, 876.

Chanda, 129.

Chandoga, 1466.

Chanting, 184.

Child, 9, 10, 49.

Cinutā, 868.

Chopping, 1053, 1595.

Citpatistvā etc., 605.

Citrā, 368, 388, 390.

Citrinī, 1561.

Cleaning, 1556.

Cloth, 145, 146, 153.

Clothes, 1382, 1383, 1386.

Coalition, 1165, 1166.

Commence, 187.

Competition, 1524.
 Compilation, 165, 167, 168.
 Completion, 899, 906, 917.
 Composite, 648, 650, 665.
 Compound, 545, 547, 548, 550, 556, 807,
 808, 959, 960, 961, 965, 966, 967, 968,
 970, 1471.
 Compound — Bahuvrīhi, 808, 959, 961,
 966, 967, 970.
 Concord, 106.
 Conflict, 1164, 1165, 1172, 1174, 1178,
 1182, 1183, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189,
 1196, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195,
 1200, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1210,
 1212, 1214, 1224, 1227, 1239, 1256,
 1269, 1291, 1370.
 Conversation, 1380, 1381.
 Conversing, 1380, 1381.
 Cooking, 1238, 1352.
 Cora, 521, 951, 954.
 Completa, 1087.
 Courses, 1380, 1381.
 Covering, 1234, 1550, 1553.
 Covering, protective, 1234.
 Cows, 817, 854.
 Cubit, 1028, 1029.
 Cups, 815, 863, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111,
 1112, 1124, 1125, 1449, 1461, 1463,
 1468, 1469, 1470, 1474, 1477, 1479,
 1494, 1496, 1497, 1499, 1503, 1523,
 1524, 1525, 1546, 1549, 1623, 1625.
 Cupholder, 1468.
 Ābhidabrahma, 998, 999.
 Ābhidatva, 293.
 Ākṣhā, 903, 904, 908, 910, 913, 914.
 Ākṣa, 1215.
 Ālā, 1648.
 Āmitr, 1626.
 Āmyu, 1377, 1379.
 Āntimayah Srucāh, 538.
 Āstrā, 542, 563.
 Āstrā, 316.
 Ātām brahmaṇāḥ somaḥ bhakṣayanti,
 1497, 1499, 1501, 1502.
 Ātapatha, 1051, 1052.
 Āṣa, 921, 922, 923, 930, 1420, 1425.
 Āśalākṣaṇa, 921, 922, 923.
 Ākṣā, 119.
 Āṇa, 1322, 1324, 1328.
 Āṇo dhāvati, 1328.
 Ārī, 1327.
 Ārotriya, 1255.
 Ārta, 153.
 Āruti, 124, 936, 1164, 1167, 1168, 1169,
 1170, 1172, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1177,
 1178, 1179, 1183, 1184, 1186, 1187,
 1190, 1191, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197,
 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1212,
 1215, 1216, 1218, 1220, 1221, 1223,
 1224, 1227, 1230, 1233, 1366.

Ānashshapa, 1210.
 Āndhadhvam, 1212.
 Āveta, 885.
 Āyāna, 403, 1707.
 Dabdhiramāsīt, 1169.
 Dadhi, 691, 752, 771, 946, 1400.
 Dadhā Juhoti, 679, 691.
 Dadhāndriyakāmasya Juhuyāt, 752.
 Dākṣyaṇa, 840, 841, 842, 843.
 Dākṣiṇāḥ somasya, 1608.
 Dākṣyaṇayajneṇa yajēta, 840.
 Darṣa, 152, 1078, 1080, 1084, 1085.
 Darṣapūrnāmāṇa, 633, 666, 840, 841,
 842, 845, 847, 851, 873, 946, 948, 950,
 1031, 1034, 1039, 1078, 1144, 1156,
 1212, 1235, 1238, 1276, 1277, 1280,
 1289, 1310, 1364, 1365, 1374, 1380,
 1389, 1515, 1532, 1595, 1597, 1598,
 1600, 1604, 1616.
 Darvi-homa, 1148.
 Daṣaḍaikaṁcamasānupasanpāyuh,
 1497, 1501.
 Daṣāpavitreṇa, 1016.
 Daṣāpavitreṇa graham sammārati, 994.
 Daṣāpāya, 1497, 1625.
 Dāṣātya, 1093.
 Dative, ending, 671.
 Day, 46, 1223, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1230,
 1242, 1535, 1540.
 Death, 896.
 Deity, 414, 424, 427, 542, 543, 547, 549,
 552, 553, 554, 556, 561, 562, 646, 669,
 671, 672, 698, 705, 717, 719, 736, 856,
 857, 864, 908, 1059, 1070, 1072, 1074,
 1076, 1078, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085,
 1086, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112,
 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118,
 1119, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126,
 1153, 1169, 1219, 1260, 1262, 1263,
 1264, 1266, 1267, 1424, 1432, 1443,
 1454, 1552.
 Delinquencies, 1366.
 Delivrance, 119.
 Denominations, 960.
 „ verbal, 960.
 „ nominal, 960.
 Denotability, 1339.
 Deprecation, 24, 26, 42.
 Desire, 810, 881, 1296, 1300.
 Devadatta, 1327, 1351.
 Devasya tvā, ...nirvapāmi, 1181.
 Devāvai Āmyum...abruvan...yo brah-
 maṇāyāvagurēt, 1377.
 Dharma, 2, 5, 1, 104, 115, 119, 128,
 133, 166, 180, 181, 184, 187, 188, 203,
 263, 267, 269, 282, 320, 924.
 Dhāyyā, 1088.
 Dhṛtarāstra, 191.
 Dhṛtyai, 1242, 1245.

- Dhruvā, 1445, 1447, 1448.
 Digesting, 1102.
 Digestion, 1412.
 Digging, 1595.
 Dikṣāṇi somasya, 1608.
 Dikṣaṇīyā, 1144, 1145, 1569, 1583.
 Directing, 1651, 1652, 1639.
 Direction, 121, 488, 593, 1066, 1193, 1203, 1286, 1380, 1653.
 Direction, 1617, 1618, 1689.
 Dīrgha, 1239, 1241, 1242.
 Dīrghasoma, 1239, 1240, 1241.
 Dīrghasomā santrdyād, dhṛtyai, 1239.
 Disfigurement, 1386.
 Disposal, 1412, 1439, 1450, 1458, 1571.
 Disposal-offering, 1076, 1453, 1456, 1458.
 Disruption, 1142.
 Draupadī, 192.
 Drāvida, 219.
 Drinker, 1117.
 Drinking, 1116, 1411.
 'Dṛtinavanītam' 1705.
 Dropsy, 1393, 1398.
 Duality, 1229, 1230, 1232.
 Duplication, 905, 915.
 Durability, 1242, 1243.
 Dvādaśāha, 1223.
 Dvaipāyana, 190.
 Dviraindravāyavyasya bhakṣayati 1457, 1458.
 Dvirātra, 1229.
 Dvirhviśvadyati, 1421, 14 3.
 Dvyavadāna, 1419.
 Dvyavadānam juhōti, 1425, 1427, 1434.
 Eastern, 255.
 Eating, 1102, 1103, 11 5, 1108, 1109, 1113, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1122, 1124, 11 1126, 1129, 1130, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1457, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1466, 1468, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1473, 1474, 1475, 1476, 1479, 1480, 1482, 1483, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1489, 1490, 1493, 1494, 1497, 1499, 1502, 1603.
 Effort, 1107.
 Ehi, 1105.
 Ekahāyanī, 961, 967, 968, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 991.
 Ekahāyanīyā, 959, 985, 988.
 Ekam hāyanam asyāh, 967.
 Ekasya hāyanasya īyam, 967. [269.
 Ekaha Cabdah... Kūmadhug bhavati.
 Ekākam, 1501.
 Ekūrihavarīvūt vācah, 1166.
 Ekayā etc, 101.
 Eka tvā, 1187.
 Elements, 518, 810.
 Employment, 1643. [1618.
 Endings, 537, 1349, 1350, 1352, 1617
 Endings, Case 537, 1350, 1352.
 Endings, Conjugational, 1349, 1350.
 Enemy, 1386.
 Entirely, 1154.
 Eṣū vai darsapūrṇamāsayaḍakṣiṇā, 1443, 1444.
 Eṣa vai haviṣā...yo'dābhyam grīhītvā, 863.
 Etasya, 784.
 Etasyaiva veratiṣu vāravantiyam, 774.
 ! Etayā anuvāhya Kāmam, 829, 829.
 Ete vadanti hotvūt pūrvā havirōdyam ācāts, 1479.
 Etymology, 217, 418, 552, 821, 1163, 1632.
 Eulogistic character, 41.
 Eulogisation, 1074.
 Eulogy, 562, 892, 1444.
 Evening, 1554, 1556.
 Expiation, 897, 906, 917.
 Face, 11, 49.
 — brightening of, 11.
 False, 1365.
 Falsity, 1367.
 Farming 187.
 Fasts, 184.
 Fat, 42, 1550.
 Father, 9, 184.
 Fee, 1442, 1443, 1607, 1632, 1634, 1635, 1636, 1638, 1640.
 Femininity, 1327.
 Festivals, 184.
 Fetching, 1554.
 Fire, 13, 46, 52, 421, 832, 833, 868, 869, 870, 992, 1056, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1365, 1433, 1434, 1527, 1530, 1531, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1531, 1613, 1645.
 Fire-kindling, 1040, 1041, 1614.
 Fire-laying, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1148, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1531, 1534.
 Fist, 1550.
 Fist closing, 1045, 1046, 1048.
 Fondling, 554.
 Force, 505, 509, 709.
 Footing, 1521, 1562.
 Fruit, 8070.
 Fuel, 1284, 1354.
 Fuel stick, 1284.
 Gārhapatya, 1061, 1063, 1169, 1172, 1173, 1176.
 Gārhapatyan, 1062, 1063.
 Gārhapatyē, 1062, 1063.
 Gautama, 244, 245.
 Gāyatrācchandasaḥ, 1128.
 Gāyatri, 1128.
 Gender, 979, 1002, 1327, 1328, 1350.
 Generation, 10.
 Genitive ending, 980, 988.

- Ghṛitam, 460, 461.
 Ghṛitam devāṇām mastu pitṛiṇām, 1286.
 Gifts, 1224, 1390, 1393 to 1401.
 Girā, 1193.
 Glorification, 4, 122, 887, 888, 1288
 Gloss, 852.
 Gō, 346, 963, 964.
 Gotva, 346.
 God, 45, 1120, 1274, 1379.
 Godāna, 925.
 Gold, 1382, 1386.
 Golden, 1196.
 Gomān, 960, 963, 964, 965.
 Goyajñā, 925.
 Graha, 1026, 1027.
 Grahāgratā, 805.
 Graham, 994, 1003, 1004, 1013, 1016, 1017.
 Gaham Saminārsti, 997, 999, 1010
 Grahāṇa, 710, 716, 719.
 Grāhayēt, 1406, 1408.
 Grain, 521, 1196, 1257, 1258, 1259.
 Grammarians, 969, 979, 1315, 1316, 1329, 1330, 1337, 1343, 1344, 1347, 1348, 1351, 1352, 1363.
 Grass, 1281, 1550, 1557, 1595, 1598.
 Grass bundle, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1079, 1082, 1084.
 Grass spreading, 1045, 1046.
 Grāvastut, 1468.
 Greatness, 556.
 Greed, 156, 165, 174, 182, 184, 187.
 Gr̥hṇāti, 702.
 Gr̥hṇīyāt, 810, 1408.
 Grhya, 271.
 Grhyasūtra, 244, 252.
 Grinding, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1260, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1268.
 Guests, 1288, 1640.
 Guṇa, 930, 1054.
 Hautra, 1616, 1646, 1647, 1649, 1650, 1651.
 Hāriyोजना, 1468, 1469.
 Hastam avanēnakti, ulaparājinstṛṇāti, 1045.
 Hasti, 1327.
 Havirdhāna, 1614, 1615.
 Havirdhanē Grāvabhautya, āhavanīyē hutvā..Sādasi bhakṣān bhakṣayanti, 1475.
 Haviṣkṛt, 1066, 1067.
 Haviṣkṛt ehi triravaghnān āhvayati, 1065.
 Head 1602.
 Heart, 677, 1257.
 Heaven, 86, 98, 1399.
 Hell, 1312.
 Herbs, 86.
 Hūm avāmō, 1102.
 Holding, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1107, 1284, 1285, 1320, 1546, 1549, 1580.
 Hole, 1553.
 Holākā, 248.
 Homa, 153, 184, 680, 681, 695, 752, 771, 925, 1031, 1032, 1073, 1388, 1419, 1432, 1435, 1438, 1437, 1459, 1475, 1477.
 Honey, 12.
 Horns, 86, 98.
 Horse, 91, 1008, 1324, 1390, 1391, 1393, 1396, 1397, 1400, 1401, 1403, 1404, 1406, 1407, 1409, 1410.
 Hotr, 1203, 1479, 1480, 1486, 1616, 1623, 1646, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653.
 Hotṛcarnasaḥ, 1459, 1461.
 Hṛdayasyāgre'vadyati, 709.
 Hunger, 1107.
 Hymns, 542, 556, 557, 561, 562, 800, 1090, 1102, 1107, 1128, 1153, 1193, 1464, 1545.
 Hymn-singer, 1464, 1467.
 Hymning, 564, 778, 1463.
 Idā, 1454.
 Idāmapahvayati, 1445.
 Idambrahmaṇaḥ, 1442.
 Idam dyāvapṛthivī agnīridam, 1083.
 Idamdyāvapṛthivī soma idam, 1083.
 Imāmagrbhnan, 82, 91.
 Imāmagrbhnam rāshanāmṛtasyētya-
 vābhidhānimadattē, 1007.
 Implements, 956, 958, 973, 1957.
 Implication, 726, 1571, 1584, 1597.
 Import, 1295.
 Impurity, 157, 159, 1485, 1503.
 Incapability, 905, 915.
 Indication, 974, 977, 981, 1001, 1067, 1074, 1086, 1104, 1105, 1116, 1155, 1156, 1173, 1201, 1202, 1206, 1209, 1213, 1214, 1241, 1273, 1372, 1404, 1517, 1526, 1650, 1652.
 Indra, 189, 543, 544, 549, 553, 554, 556, 705, 1050, 1061, 1062, 1086, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1113, 1114, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1129, 1169, 1173, 1176, 1267.
 Indrapita, 1127, 1129, 1130.
 Indrapitasya, 1108, 1123, 1125, 1129.
 Indravāyū, 1457.
 Indravāyupātnivātpitasya, 1113.
 Indrāya rathantarāya...indrāya cakva-
 rāya, 1454.
 Inference, 121, 131, 308, 498, 1200, 1218, 1351.
 Infringement, 1311, 1365, 1449.
 Initiation, 1607, 1638, 1640.
 Instrument, 378, 1354.
 Instrumental Ending, 981, 984, 985, 1172.
 Intelligence, 26, 998.

- Intercourse, 1381.
 Interdependence, 149, 186, 928, 1274.
 Invitation, 1432, 1483, 1484, 1485.
 Irā, 1193.
 Iṣṭi, 654, 880, 1040, 1144, 1145, 1390, 1391, 1393, 1394, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1403, 1404, 1496, 1410, 1526, 1527, 1531, 1533, 1534.
 Itihāsa, 25, 272. [793.
 Iṣṭi vṛṣṭikāmasya nidhanam kuryāt
 Jāghani, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238.
 Jāghanyā patniḥ samyājayanti, 1234.
 Jaimimi, 138.
 Jaina, 234.
 Jāmi, 669, 674.
 Jāmi, flaw of, 674.
 Jañjabhyamāna, 1374.
 Japa, 184.
 Jarāmāyānā vā ētat satraim, 900.
 Jayā, 1387, 1388, 1389.
 Jayatē, 485.
 Joining together, 1239, 1240, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1256.
 Juhoti, 1032.
 Juhū, 1448, 1449, 1505.
 Juhuyāt, 771.
 Jyotiṣā, 120.
 Jyotiṣoma, 731, 733, 805, 806, 807, 811, 812, 813, 815, 868, 1097, 1100, 1123, 1144, 1145, 1147, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1192, 1193, 1203, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1233, 1239, 1241, 1243, 1244, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1490, 1491, 1535, 1556, 1559, 1562, 1563, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1580, 1582, 1583, 1584, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1602, 1603, 1607, 1611, 1623, 1625.
 Kadā ca nastarīrasi, 1061, 1109, 1173.
 Kalabha, 1325.
 Kalpa, 224, 227, 229, 240, 241, 242, 271.
 Kalpasūtra, 120, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 238, 239, 242, 243.
 Kāmya, 1037, 1086, 1087, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1522, 1524, 1525, 1584, 1587.
 Kāmyam yājyākāṇḍam, 1087.
 Kāraka, 997, 1297, 1314, 1317, 1319, 1320, 1322, 1336, 1341, 1342, 1352, 1359, 1360.
 Karabha, 1325.
 Kāraṇamantra, 1694.
 Karma, 493.
 Karmaṇābda, 487, 492.
 Kāmyā Itayah, 1705.
 Kartavya, 1208.
 Karoti, 477, 478.
 Karturēkatvō, 1336.
 Kārya, 610.
 Kāstham pacanti, 1354.
 Kāthaka, 910, 911.
 Kātyāyana, 267, 272, 273, 282.
 Kauṇḍinya, 1222.
 Kauṣṭhikā, 1247.
 Khadira, 1505.
 Kikata, 87.
 Killing, 854, 1546.
 King, 817, 818, 819, 822.
 Kingly functions, 818, 819, 820, 821, 823, 825, 827.
 Kṛpti, 597.
 Kṛ (to do), 477.
 Kriyā, 487.
 Kriyābda, 487.
 Kṛṣṇa, 192, 194.
 Kṛṣṇala, 1196.
 Kṛt, 481, 1350, 1358.
 Kṛtya, 486.
 Kṣanikavāda, 123.
 Kṣatriya, 167, 193, 816, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 825, 828, 831, 1490, 1497, 1499, 1503, 1563.
 Kṣaunḍi vāsānam, 1232.
 Kṣaya, 1562.
 Kuṣa, 1222.
 Kuṇḍapāyīnāmāyana, 1549.
 Kulāya, 1229.
 Kumāra, 1325.
 Ladle, 1026, 1027.
 Laghu (simplification), 1283.
 Lah, 1361, 1362.
 Lah karmani ca, 1332, 1361.
 Lakṣaṇa, 921.
 Language, 219, 298.
 Lāta, 1381.
 Law, 82, 167, 172, 684, 958, 1007, 1047, 1061, 1256, 1452.
 Leaves, 1505.
 Level platform, 654.
 Liar, 5.
 Libation, 1365.
 Lie, 270, 1291, 1297, 1304, 1312.
 Lying, 1289, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1364, 1368.
 Life, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 896, 897, 899, 900, 901, 1390, 1391, 1394, 1397, 1399, 1411, 1416.
 Limb, 677, 1257.
 Limits, 1173, 1238.
 Linga, 143, 936, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1172, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1195, 1196, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1218, 1220, 1269, 1551.

Locative, 1606.
 Logicians, 969.
 Loss, 1418.
 Loudness, 1131, 1132, 1137, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1143, 1148.
 Mahābhāṣya, 274, 276, 1334, 1338.
 Mahendra, 543, 544, 545, 547, 549, 550, 552, 553, 554, 556.
 Māhendra, 1545.
 Maitrāvartuṇa, 1203, 1560, 1651, 1652, 1653.
 Maitrāyaṇī, 1409.
 Mālā, 1648.
 Malavadvāsas, 1380.
 Malavadvāsasā na samvadēt nāsyā annamadyūt, 1380.
 Mamāgrē varco, 1694.
 Māna, 1562.
 Mandrabhibhūtiḥ... bhakṣayāmi, 1107.
 Manotā, 1188.
 Mantra. 15, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 122, 144, 229, 287, 375, 454, 457, 556, 557, 558, 561, 562, 565, 566, 567, 568, 570, 573, 574, 593, 594, 597, 600, 698, 925, 1008, 1043, 1044, 1053, 1058, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1078, 1079, 1083, 1086, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1097, 1100, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1113, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1120, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1138, 1139, 1155, 1157, 1160, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1169, 1173, 1176, 1180, 1187, 1188, 1194, 1195, 1202, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1212, 1219, 1370, 1374, 1479, 1483, 1486, 1565, 1568.
 Manu, 180, 183, 214, 825, 1088.
 Māsamagnitatram juhōti, 871.
 Masculinity, 1328.
 Master, 1616, 1619, 1640, 1641, 1697.
 Māthara Brāhmaṇa, 1222.
 Mathurā, 194, 256.
 Matup, 977, 979.
 Mayi dakṣakratū, 1370.
 Meaning, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1061, 1063, 1067.
 Meaning—Primary, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1061, 1063.
 Meaning—Secondary, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1057, 1058, 1059.
 Measure, 1028, 1030, 1412.
 Measurements, 1603.
 Medicine, 1411.
 Metaphor, 98.
 Method, 685, 770, 1079.
 Method of direct Injunction, 885.

Metre, 1128.
 Metrical feet, 576.
 Milk, 854, 1453.
 Milking, 1518, 1523, 1524, 1554.
 Middy, 1556.
 Mīmāṃsā, 121, 482.
 Mīmāṃsaka, 129, 997, 998.
 Mind, 5, 49, 138, 296.
 Mitrabinda, 1516.
 Mleccha, 208, 209, 218, 219, 220.
 Modification, 573, 657, 841, 1129, 1219, 1255, 1256, 1452, 1490, 1513, 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518, 1520, 1521, 1568, 1580, 1591, 1625, 1643, 1701.
 Mokṣaṇī, 418.
 Mouth, 871, 872, 875, 876, 877.
 Morning, 1545, 1554, 1556.
 Mother, 102, 203.
 Motion, 516, 518, 522.
 Motive, 15, 128, 129, 152, 165, 168, 182, 184, 187.
 Mrakṣaṇa, 1381.
 Mṛtāgnihotra, 1276, 1280, 1281, 1283.
 Mukhya, 1225.
 Mustikarāpa, 1045.
 Muṣṭim karoti vācam yacchati, 1045.
 Na, 1365.
 Nā, 1327.
 Nādhvaryurupajapāt, 1628.
 Nahuṣa, 189.
 Nairmīttika, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521.
 Naivāra caru, 855.
 Naivāraçarurubhavati... yadēnañcaru-mupadadhāti, 855.
 Nāṅtam vadēt, 1289, 1304, 1365.
 Na prathamē yajñe pravṛjyāt, 1247.
 Narasimha, 1437.
 Na somam, 1494, 1495.
 Navanīta, 1705, 1707.
 Negation, 107, 509.
 Neha bhujyatē, 1360.
 Nidhana, 793, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 803.
 Nigada, 579, 580, 1073.
 Nipāta, 273, 323.
 Nirmanthya, 421.
 Nirukta, 120, 222, 271.
 Nirvāpa, 1192.
 Nirvapana, 946.
 Nivids, 1037.
 Nispadyatē, 485.
 Nitya, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1523, 1524, 1525, 1584.
 Nivāra, 1565, 1566.
 Nivēçanaḥ... itī gārhapatyamapatis-thatē, 1061.
 Nivāta, 1260, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274.
 Nivitam manuṣyāṇām, 1269.
 Niyama, 91.

- Nominative, 1290, 1296, 1301, 1313, 1314, 1318, 1320, 1322, 1329, 1335, 1336, 1340, 1343, 1352, 1353, 1360, 1364, 1384.
 Nominative agent, 1290, 1313, 1315.
 Non-employment, 1523.
 North, 1281.
 Northwardliness, 1281, 1282.
 Names, 323, 347, 472, 473, 481, 494, 495, 1352.
 Nṛcaśan, 1102.
 Number, 978, 994, 999, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1021, 1023, 1313, 1315, 1317, 1319, 1322, 1326, 1332, 1334, 1336, 1343, 1345, 1352, 1358.
 Number—singular, 994, 999, 1003, 1016.
 Number—plural, 994, 1022.
 Objective, 1322, 1329, 1336, 1340, 1341, 1343, 1346, 1347, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1394.
 Oblations, 184.
 Observances, 1310.
 Omnipresent, 519, 521, 522.
 Option, 133, 134, 137, 138, 142, 149, 151.
 Origin, 122, 167, 1149.
 Origin of the word, 122.
 Original, 1452.
 Origination, 1150.
 Ownership, 1432.
 Pācakah, 1351, 1352.
 Pacati, 1335, 1345, 1350, 1351.
 Pacati devadattaḥ, 1345, 1353.
 Pain, 26, 321.
 Pairs, 1178.
 Paktā, 1345, 1350.
 Paktā devadattaḥ, 1345.
 Palmistry, 121.
 Paurodācika, 1212, 1214.
 Pans, 1410.
 Pāncadaśasāmidhenīranubrūyāt, 1195.
 Pāṇḍava, 191.
 Pānini, 266, 272, 273, 274, 282, 1329, 1330, 1335, 1360, 1361.
 Parents, 10.
 Paribhojaniya, 1703.
 Paridhi, 539.
 Parisaṅkhyā, 91, 92.
 Parivirasī, 1188.
 Parlance, 60, 61, 323, 600, 1138, 1213, 1483.
 Participle, 1032.
 Parties, 1501, 1571.
 Paruṣī-dita, 1286.
 Paryagnikarāṇa, 858, 860.
 Paryagnikṛtam, 859, 861.
 Paryudāsa, 1251, 1254.
 Paṇu 701, 703, 709, 1030, 1235, 1236, 1516, 1611.
 Paṇubandha, 1144, 1145.
 Paṇukāma, 1191.
 Paṇumālabbeta 701.
 Patāñjali, 267, 272, 273, 278, 280, 282, 283, 287, 294, 1320, 1331, 1337, 1338.
 Patni eṣa tē lokah, 1380.
 Patnīsamyañja, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1238.
 Pātrivata, 859, 860, 861, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1118, 1120, 1121.
 Patnivatamāgrayanāt grhṇāti, 1113.
 Pataḥ gukḥaḥ, 1333.
 Patasya gukḥaḥ, 1333.
 Patasya gukḥatvam, 1333.
 Paurṇamāsa, 650, 652, 1078, 1080, 1084, 1085.
 Paurṇamās, 650, 652, 1044, 1605, 1606.
 Paurṇamāsin, 1606.
 Paurṇamāsyām, 1606.
 Paurṇamāsyām paurṇamāsyām yajeta, 895.
 Pavamāna, 1040, 1041, 1526, 1527, 1532, 1533, 1534.
 Pavitra, 1703.
 Payasā juhōti, 679.
 Payment, 1619.
 Penalties, 1378.
 Perception, 9, 121, 131, 141, 142, 252, 1218.
 Permissibility, 1254, 1255.
 Phalacamasā, 1462, 1490, 1491, 1492, 1494, 1495, 1496, 1503, 1562, 1563.
 Phonetics, 225.
 Pilupāka, 975.
 Pīṇapitryajña, 1598.
 Pingakṣī, 961, 969, 968.
 Pingakṣyā, 959.
 Pītharapaka, 975.
 Plants, 86.
 Pleasure, 26, 119, 187, 521.
 Plurality, 1229, 1230, 1624.
 Poetry, 278.
 Possessor, 1296.
 Post, 63, 141, 145, 1028, 1030, 1187, 1518, 1557, 1610, 1611.
 Pot, 1452.
 Potency, 509, 511, 565, 566, 568, 884, 997, 999, 1168, 1315, 1316, 1347.
 Pounding, 1239, 1495.
 Pouring, 946, 1111, 1365.
 Pracīṇdevā abhajaṇta dakṣiṇām pitarāḥ, 1286.
 Praharati, 1070.
 Praiṣa, 486, 1051.
 Praise, 24, 26, 32, 40, 42, 49, 60, 61, 63, 72, 73, 94, 98, 441, 444, 445, 446, 1227.
 Praitu hatuṣcamasah pra brahmanah prodgāt-nām 1477.
 Prajapati, 42, 44, 189.

Prājāpatya, 925.
 Prakaraṇa, 143, 938, 1173, 1175, 1182,
 1183, 1189, 1188, 1190, 1191, 1192,
 1193, 1195, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210,
 1212, 1213, 1231, 1269, 1551.
 Prakṛti, 1231.
 Pramāṇa, 1185.
 Prāṇabhṛta, 457.
 Prācitra, 1051.
 Prastara, 1070.
 Prastotr, 1464.
 Prāṭhasavanēe, 1129, 1130, 1550.
 Prātaranuvaka, 1653.
 Prathamabhakṣaḥ, 1471.
 Prathana, 95, 951.
 Prathayati, 95.
 Pratibhartr, 1464.
 Pratigrhñyāt, 1406.
 Pratigrhyatō, 1409.
 Pratipat, 1229, 1230, 1233.
 Pratipat kalpa, 1192.
 Prāṭhikākyas 282.
 Pratisthākāmasya ekavimṣatīranubrū-
 yāt, 1186, 1191.
 Praudhi-vāda, 855.
 Pravara, 45.
 Pravagya, 1247, 1250, 1254, 1255.
 Prāya, 677.
 Prayadarṣana, 1134.
 Prāyē, 1135.
 Prayāṣas, 289, 635, 657, 658, 1031, 1047,
 1146, 1190, 1199, 1222, 1533.
 Prayājñāna havimsyāghārayati, 1000.
 Prāyanīya, 1144, 1145.
 Procincts, 861.
 Preclusion, 1006, 1007, 1008.
 Predicate, 1003, 1006.
 Prefixes, 323.
 Premises, 115.
 Preparatory, 710, 712, 717, 865, 866,
 1035.
 Price, 959, 985.
 Priest, 85, 153, 156, 289, 1058, 1072,
 1203, 1365, 1368, 1403, 1410, 1411,
 1414, 1415, 1416, 1442, 1444, 1461,
 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, 1468, 1474,
 1477, 1479, 1480, 1482, 1483, 1494,
 1602, 1607, 1620, 1623, 1626, 1628,
 1629, 1635, 1636, 1638, 1639, 1640,
 1643, 1646, 1649, 1651, 1652.
 Priesthood, 1641.
 Primary (sacrifice), 1513, 1517, 1532,
 1552, 1603, 1604, 1607, 1608, 1616,
 1617.
 Prokṣaṇīrāsādaya, 1689.
 Prompter, 1403, 1404.
 Prompting, 1391, 1397, 1414, 1596.
 Pronouns, 1415.
 Property, 897, 901, 939, 946, 959, 975,
 979, 1054, 1131, 1137, 1139, 1140,

1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1149, 1150,
 1219, 1271, 1272, 1279, 1286, 1322,
 1324, 1328, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1387,
 1418, 1503, 1568.
 Prose, 1073, 1132, 1138.
 Protection, 818, 1379.
 Prstakota, 570.
 Pṛthupājavatī, 1088.
 Punarabhyunnīta, 1110.
 Punita, 605.
 Purākṛta, 25.
 Purāṇa, 25, 26, 129, 272.
 Purchase, 970, 971, 981, 982, 984, 985,
 987, 988, 993, 1619.
 Purification, 97, 293, 294, 295, 296, 1019,
 1367, 1374.
 Purity, 10.
 Purity original, 10.
 Pūrṇāhuti, 50.
 Purodāca, 1212, 1552, 1553.
 'Purodācaçakalani, 1704.
 Purodāca vessel, 1212.
 Purodācañcaturdhā karoti, 1194.
 Puroṇuvākya, 557, 1652, 1653.
 Puraṣa, 1297.
 Purvakalpa, 25.
 Pūṣan, 1059, 1256, 1257, 1260, 1262,
 1263, 1264, 1266, 1267.
 Pūṣānumantraṇa, 1188.
 Pūrvōdyuramāvāsyāyām vōdim karoti
 1192.
 Putikā, 1495, 1567, 1568.
 Qualification, 1294, 1297, 1346, 1359,
 1363, 1547, 1557, 1558.
 Quarters, 45.
 Quartering, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1442, 1456.
 Rāja, 1465.
 Rājanya, 823, 824.
 Rājā, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822,
 823, 824, 827, 828, 1297, 1648.
 Rājānamabhiñcēt, 822.
 Rājā rājasūyena yajēta, 816.
 Rājapurusa, 1297.
 Rājasūya, 816, 817, 821, 828, 830,
 1210, 1497.
 Rājya, 818, 819, 824, 827, 1648.
 Raksā, 276.
 Rāma, 190.
 Rathantara, 805, 807, 812, 813, 814,
 919.
 Rathantara-sāma, 807, 808.
 Rātrīsatra, 52.
 Rcyadyūdhama sāma, 1139.
 Reading, 40, 147, 517, 772, 1784, 1506,
 1507.
 Recensions, 127, 803, 1409.
 Receptacle, 1114.
 Redness, 959, 970, 979, 981, 987, 989.
 Regress, 1533.

- teins, 1008.
 tujection, 1151, 1164, 1172, 1174, 1218,
 1219, 1220, 1221, 1372, 1444, 1523.
 telationship. 9. 23, 41, 91, 413, 472,
 779, 782, 785, 810, 950, 953, 960, 961,
 962, 963, 965, 966, 980, 981, 982, 983,
 984, 988, 991, 1162, 1173, 1184, 1213,
 1424, 1611.
 temembrance, 39, 105, 108, 237.
 temnants, 1108, 1110, 1111, 1113, 1114,
 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1123, 1124,
 1125, 1126, 1127, 1130, 1419, 1420,
 1421, 1422, 1425, 1427, 1438, 1439,
 1441, 1445, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1450,
 1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457,
 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1463, 1470,
 1486.
 temoteness, 1178, 1182, 1213.
 resigning, 1432.
 retirement, 1224.
 evati, 785, 787.
 ice, 855, 856, 857, 1257, 1461.
 insing, 178.
 insing of the month, 178.
 ising, 1068, 1069.
 tu, 863, 865, 866, 906, 917, 1021,
 1034, 1040, 1365, 1366, 1493, 1534.
 gveda, 890, 1131, 1148.
 ik, 576, 787, 1131, 1132, 1137, 1138,
 1139, 1148.
 oot, 477, 481, 482, 485, 496, 610, 611,
 612, 616, 621, 689, 770, 877, 878, 908,
 1102, 1290, 1292, 1294, 1361, 1302,
 1313, 1320, 1343, 1344, 1586, 1587.
 ope, 1187, 1546, 1857, 1858.
 sis, 99, 100, 127.
 tugrahesti, 1486.
 tvik, 1410, 1630, 1631, 1632, 1634,
 1636, 1637, 1639.
 tvīktva 1634.
 ūdhi, 962.
 ukmin, 194.
 urifice, 63, 80, 85, 89, 90, 93, 98, 99,
 144, 156, 157, 179, 321, 373, 376, 381,
 386, 392, 397, 398, 490, 403, 404, 406,
 411, 423, 499, 501, 503, 505, 506, 543,
 621, 631, 633, 636, 647, 650, 652, 654,
 658, 659, 664, 665, 666, 668, 670, 672,
 674, 675, 701, 702, 704, 705, 709, 717,
 736, 737, 738, 782, 783, 805, 807, 811,
 813, 815, 816, 817, 832, 833, 840, 841,
 845, 850, 852, 853, 855, 856, 857, 858,
 860, 861, 863, 864, 866, 867, 868, 869,
 870, 871, 872, 881, 883, 941, 942, 943,
 983, 1028, 1030, 1034, 1040, 1043,
 1044, 1050, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1078,
 1079, 1080, 1081, 1083, 1085, 1086,
 1087, 1088, 1094, 1097, 1122, 1123,
 1141, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1191, 1219,
 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1229,
 1232, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239,
 1241, 1242, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249,
 1252, 1253, 1255, 1256, 1266, 1267,
 1276, 1277, 1279, 1289, 1291, 1304,
 1307, 1311, 1312, 1364, 1365, 1366,
 1368, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1374, 1377,
 1378, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383,
 1384, 1385, 1390, 1391, 1399, 1400,
 1403, 1404, 1407, 1409, 1410, 1411,
 1412, 1414, 1418, 1434, 1435, 1437,
 1438, 1442, 1453, 1455, 1458, 1461,
 1468, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1490, 1491,
 1493, 1494, 1503, 1505, 1506, 1514,
 1515, 1516, 1518, 1520, 1521, 1522,
 1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1528, 1529,
 1530, 1531, 1533, 1561, 1563, 1564,
 1568, 1582, 1595, 1596, 1598, 1600,
 1601, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1605, 1106,
 1607, 1611, 1616, 1620, 1625, 1630,
 1631, 1634, 1636, 1638, 1639, 1640,
 1641, 1643, 1645.
 Sacrificer, 160, 441, 1065, 1232, 1380,
 1432, 1443, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1490,
 1494.
 Sacrificial, 49, 94, 119, 177, 224, 229,
 274, 295, 388, 390, 398, 400, 441, 677,
 904, 998, 1028, 1029, 1187, 1218, 1304,
 1412, 1490, 1491, 1495, 1496, 1514,
 1533, 1557, 1561, 1565, 1607, 1632,
 1634, 1638, 1640, 1643, 1645.
 Sacrificing, 778, 853, 854.
 Sādāna, 1856, 1859.
 Sadasya, 1640, 1641, 1642.
 Saśo'cvaḥ pratigṛhyatē, 1409.
 Saghyāsana, 1102.
 Sāhna, 1223.
 Sākamprasthāyā, 1452.
 'Samsthāḥ samsthāḥ etc., 1709.
 Samākhyā, 1173, 1175, 1183, 1184, 1187,
 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194,
 1195, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215.
 Sāma, 577, 780, 787, 803, 804, 805, 807,
 812, 1090, 1132, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141,
 1142, 1148.
 Samastīyajñah, 1448.
 Samavāya, 1165.
 Sāmaveda, 276, 803, 1141, 1148, 1152,
 1153, 1463, 1465.
 Sāmavedic, 1465.
 Sāmavedins, 1465, 1466, 1467.
 Samavatta, 1446, 1451.
 Saubhara, 793, 796, 798, 801, 803, 804.
 Sāmidhēnā, 1034, 1036, 1037, 1088, 1513,
 1515, 1516, 1518, 1614, 1615.
 Samidho yajati, 1290.
 Samit, 621, 631.
 Sammārjana, 994.
 Sammārsti, 1003, 1004, 1011.
 Sānnāyā, 1212, 1452.

Sampradānatva, 671.
 Samsthās, 1239, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1580, 1582.
 Sanctifications, 939, 946, 1202, 1235, 1491, 1527, 1551, 1601, 1602, 1632.
 Sandamṣa, 1047.
 Saṃskṛta, 260.
 Sautrāmaṇi, 1453.
 Sapdaṣa prajāpatyaṇ paṇḍalabhota, 723.
 Saptadaṣaratni, 958.
 Saptasāratnirvāṇapāyasya yūpaḥ, 778, 1028.
 Saptadaṣa rtvijah, 1630.
 Saptadaṣa Sāmidhēnanubṛūyat, 1513.
 Sārāsvata, 919.
 Sarit, 1327.
 Sarvapṛsthesti, 1454, 1458.
 Sarvam puruṣakāryam, 1644.
 Sarvārtha, 1644.
 Sarvataḥparihāram ācvinam bhakṣa-yati, 1459, 1460.
 Satisfaction, 1107.
 Sattra, 808, 892, 1239, 1635.
 Sattṛmṣatprakramā prāchi, 1603.
 Saṃmika Vadi, 1603.
 Saurya, 1597.
 Savana, 1129, 1130, 1146.
 Savaniya, 1146, 1188, 1535, 1537, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1545, 1549, 1559, 1553, 1557, 1709.
 Sa yadi rājanyam vā vaiṣṇyam vā yājayēt nyagrodhastibhiḥ, 1491, 1562.
 Science, 119, 121, 123, 173, 179, 185, 225, 237, 240, 241.
 Science of reasoning, 121.
 Science, scriptural, 1112, 1566.
 Scriptures, 110, 111, 128, 179, 181, 201, 204, 206, 226, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 242, 259, 263, 264, 280, 282, 294, 303, 308, 309, 316, 502.
 Seeing, 1102.
 Self, 321.
 Series of Ideas, 519.
 Services 1442, 1607, 1619.
 Share, 1256, 1257, 1260, 1442, 1443.
 Sickness, 1393.
 Signification, 6, 88, 94, 97, 279, 441, 443, 552, 807, 816, 821, 1078, 1102, 1163, 1266, 1365, 1573.
 Silence, 1045, 1046, 1048.
 Silver, 41.
 Sin, 1309, 1312.
 Singularity, 1319.
 Size, 521, 1028.
 Sky, 13, 84, 295.
 Slabs, 1239.
 Slices, 1419, 1421, 1422, 1424, 1425, 1427, 1428, 1431, 1433, 1434, 1435.
 Slicing, 1423.

Slowness, 1141.

Smṛta, 155.

Smṛtis, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 173, 175, 179, 209, 210, 224, 225, 229, 237, 244, 245, 247, 266, 271, 317, 533, 825, 925, 1196, 1218, 1221, 1278, 1279, 1282, 1301, 1306, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1329, 1330, 1365, 1381, 1411, 1412, 1414, 1418, 1440, 1457, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1483, 1468, 1470, 1471, 1475, 1477, 1479, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1490, 1491, 1494, 1495, 1496, 1593, 1562, 1563, 1564, 1567, 1568, 1582, 1583, 1614, 1615, 1629.

Soma, 156, 160, 547, 701, 702, 705, 709, 717, 872, 902, 959, 970, 971, 983, 985, 1050, 1051, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1116, 1117, 1124, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1239, 1241, 1246, 1249.

Soma juice, 1110.

Somēna yajña, 701, 705.

Soma-vendor, 1629.

Somāindra, 1411, 1414.

Somāindram carunnirvapēt yaḥ somam vamat, 1411.

Somāpāṇam carunnirvapēt nēmapīṣṭam, 1264, 1268.

Somārudri, 1188.

Somārudriya, 1192.

Somasyūguā vihitānuvaṣat karoti, 1122.

Soul, 500, 503, 507, 511, 516, 518, 519, 521, 522, 999.

Space, 1911, 1613.

Speech, 5, 292, 1068, 1069.

Sphota, 296.

Sphya, 953.

Sphyṣṣa kapālāni ca, 956.

Spring, 832.

Sruva, 531.

Sṛsti, 454.

Sruk, 1070, 1284.

Sruva, 1505, 1508, 1510, 1511.

Sihāna, 1173, 1175, 1183, 1184, 1186, 1188, 1189, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1207, 1210, 1212, 1213, 1551.

Stone, 1239.

Story, 26, 100, 119.

Stotrā, 1146.

Striking, 1377.

Students, 915, 1310.

Stuti, 542, 563.

Subrahmanya, 1463.

Subserviency, 1611, 1615.

Subsidiary-action, 525, 528, 531, 567.

- 644, 854, 1152, 1387, 1595, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1599, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1611, 1616, 1617, 1619, 1620.
- Substances, 939, 946, 962, 963, 966, 968, 969, 970, 972, 974, 975, 976, 978, 979, 980, 985, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 993, 1006, 1012, 1014, 1023, 1028, 1219, 1257, 1333, 1334, 1349, 1352, 1438, 1439, 1447, 1453, 1467, 1505, 1537.
- Substantive, 974.
- Substitute, 1491, 1503, 1562, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1568.
- Substitution, 1562, 1563.
- Substratum, 502, 511, 970, 1568.
- Sūka vāka*, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1209, 1210.
- Sūktavāka eva yājyā*, 1073.
- Suktavākēna prastaram praharati, 1070.
- Sun, 894.
- Supplementary, 726.
- Supplementary Sentence, 726.
- Susiro vā ētarhi paṇḍ...chidrapidhā-nārthopi, 1563.
- Butyā, 1146, 1148, 1145, 1549, 1707.
- Suvāsasā bhavitavyam, 1382.
- Śvalakṣaṇa, 342.
- Śvārājya, 1058.
- Śvayamudaya yajati, 1457.
- Śviṣṭakṛt, 1078, 1420, 1438, 1439, 1441, 1445, 1446, 1451, 1452, 1454, 1456.
- Synonym, 1209, 1330, 1351, 1432.
- Syntactical connection, 16, 920, 946, 972, 985, 1000, 1046, 1048, 1093, 1105, 1131, 1139, 1155, 1157, 1167, 1239, 1248, 1249, 1258, 1267, 1273, 1370, 1372, 1404, 1516, 1526, 1610.
- Syntactical split, 67, 784, 797, 839, 848, 859, 873, 930, 1027, 1099, 1273, 1425.
- Syntactical unity, 583.
- Syonantē sadanam kṛnōmi—sīda, 1179, 1180, 1195, 1204, 1205.
- Advīdhaḥ karmabhedah, 469.
- Udaḥin, 919, 1569.
- Uail, 1234.
- Uattiriya, 1250.
- Uamasmai bhakṣam prayacchōt, 1492, 1493.
- Uām oaturbhirādattē, 90, 91.
- Uanūnapāt, 631, 1290.
- Uāp, 1327.
- Uasānmaitrāvaruṇah preṣyati cānuca-ha ca, 1193, 1203, 1651.
- Uasāt pūṣā prapīṣṭabhāgaḥ adatko hi gaḥ, 1256.
- Uasāt somo nānupahūtēna pāyah, 1482.
- Uasāt suvarṇam hiraṇyam, bhāryam, 1382.
- Teachers, 946, 1255.
- Technicality, 1339.
- Teeth, 1264, 1268.
- Temporal, 1412.
- Temporal actions, 1387.
- Tense, 1278, 1279.
- Tense—Present, 1278, 1279.
- Terminus, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1580, 1582, 1584, 1587, 1589, 1590, 1591.
- Theories, 122, 123, 223, 390, 513, 515, 709, 810, 914, 915, 930, 931, 932, 933, 941, 963, 968, 975, 1069, 1329, 1372.
- Thief, 546.
- Thread, 178.
- Thread-Wearing of the sacred, 178.
- Threatening, 1377.
- Threefoldness, 1557.
- Threshing, 946, 951, 952, 954, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1196.
- Throwing, 1432.
- Time, 859, 878, 880, 891, 893, 894, 897, 901, 1044, 1065, 1066, 1068, 1070, 1075, 1311, 1313, 1314, 1370, 1479, 1496, 1523, 1549, 1550, 1554, 1604, 1630, 1632, 1634, 1639.
- Tirthasnāna, 1370.
- Tisra āhutiṛjuhōti, 722.
- Touching 845, 850, 852, 854, 1604, 1605, 1606.
- Toya, 1327.
- Traidhātaviyā dikṣaṇiyā, 881.
- Trayī, 1138.
- Trayividyā, 1138.
- Tree, 1554.
- Trio, 654.
- Trṇāni, 1023.
- Trvṛt, 214.
- Trpyatu, 1107.
- Truth, 1309, 1310.
- Tvam hi agnē, 103.
- Tvaṣṭra, 861.
- Tvaṣṭr, 1116, 1117.
- Tvaṣṭrampātnīvatam, 858.
- Twice-born, 816, 817.
- Tying, 1546, 1557.
- Uccairpṛā kriyate...yadi rṣkta ulvaṇam kurutē, 1131.
- Ucchiṣṭa, 1485.
- Udayāṃga, 1144, 1145.
- Udbhid, 373, 374, 376, 383.
- Uddeṣya, 881, 884, 1002, 1017.
- Udgātr, 1463, 1465, 1467.
- Udgātrṇām camasaḥ, 1463, 1465.
- Udumbara, 63.
- Udyat Sunvanti Sāmidhōnistanvabhīh, 1614.
- Uha, 102, 276, 278, 279, 280, 1564, 1568.
- Uktha, 1239.
- Ukthya, 1244, 1569, 1570, 1580, 1583.

Ukthyam grhṇiyāt, 1580.
 Unit, 1141.
 Upadadhāti, 855, 856.
 Upādeya, 875, 1017.
 Upaga, 1628.
 Upahūta upahvayaśva, 1453, 1484.
 Upakaraṇa, 1535.
 Upanayana, 1304, 1307.
 Upaniṣadio, 521.
 Upāṃṇu, 662, 666, 677, 1705.
 Upāṃṇu Paurṇamāsyām, 677.
 Upāṃṇu Yāga, 666, 674, 677.
 Upāṃṇu Yaśtavayah, 666.
 Upāṃṇu Yāgamantarā yajati, 672, 677.
 Upāṃṇu Yāga, 1159, 1445, 1447, 1448.
 Upari hi dēvēbhyo dhārayati, 1283.
 Upāsada, 872, 1144, 1145, 1186, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1253.
 Upasarjana, 1298.
 Upasthāna, 1090, 1091, 1099, 1100, 1101.
 Upatiṣṭhati, 1063.
 Upāvaharaṇa, 1562.
 Upavamṇa, 852.
 Upavita, 1034, 1036, 1039, 1274, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280.
 Upavyayatē, 1273, 1278.
 Upavyayatē dēvalakṣmameva tat kurutē, 1278.
 Urdhvamāghārayati, 679.
 Uruprathā, 81, 93.
 Uśrāṇām, 103.
 Utsrjati, 859.
 Uttarārdhāt svīṣṭakṛte'vadyati, 1445
 Utterance, 1084.
 Uttering of speech, 1068, 1069.
 Uttiṣṭhan, 1068.
 Uttiṣṭhan anvāha āgnidagnīn vihāra, 1068.
 Vadāt, 1304, 1319, 1365.
 Vaisarjana, 153.
 Vaikāṇkata, 1040.
 Vaiṣvadeva, 423.
 Vaiṣvadevi āmikṣā, 736, 740.
 Vaiṣvānara, 668.
 Vaiṣya, 1490, 1518, 1563.
 Vaiyākaraṇas, (see 'Grammarians').
 Vājapeya, 406, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1191.
 Vājāpeyasya, 1030.
 Vājibhyo vājinam, 736, 742.
 Vājina, 737.
 Vajrīnī, 1561.
 Vākya, 1168, 1172, 1173, 1175, 1179, 1182, 1186, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1195, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1210, 1212.
 Vākyapadiya, 333.
 Vākyatva, 1134.
 Vākya-bheda, 972, 1548.
 Vākyam bhidyeta, 1550.

Vākya-ṣeṣa, 458, 925.
 Vapāpracāra, 1549.
 Vapayā prāṭahsavane pracaranti, 1543.
 Vapayā. pracaranti purodāṣena mādhyandinī savanē, 1552.
 Varana, 1636.
 Vārāṇa, 1040.
 Vāravantiya, 774, 782, 785, 787, 1141.
 Vāravantiyamagnīstomasāṇa kīryam, 774.
 Varhīh, 416.
 Vari, 1327.
 Varkara, 1325.
 Vārtika, 154, 178, 208, 209, 239, 244, 254, 319, 339, 340, 341, 366, 374, 465, 547, 552, 554, 566, 567, 569, 604, 611, 613, 709, 750, 874, 1076, 1083, 1138, 1227, 1275, 1458, 1478, 1500, 1502, 1529, 1605, 1650.
 Vārtagrāhī, 1043.
 Varuṇa, 292. [1526.
 Vārūṇa, 1390, 1393, 1397, 1400, 1401, 1410.
 Varuṇo grhṇāti, 1398.
 Varuṇo va etam pratigṛhṇāti yo' evam pratigṛhṇāti, 1390.
 Vasanto brāhmaṇo'gninādadhīta, 832.
 Vasanto vasantē jyotiṣā, 902.
 Vaśatkāra, 1470, 1471, 1473, 1474, 1477, 1480, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1489.
 Vaśatkartr, 1471, 1472, 1474, 1477, 1480.
 Vaśatkartuh prathamō bhakṣaḥ, 1470, 1472, 1480.
 Vaśatkartuh camasaḥ, 1470.
 Vashīṣṭha, 190.
 Vaso, 1102.
 Vasumat, 1107.
 Vata berries, 1490.
 Vatsa, 1325.
 Vatsamālabbhēta, 852.
 Vāyu, 705, 1113, 1114.
 Vāyavyam cvetāmalabbhēta bhutikā-maḥ, 845.
 Veda, 5, 16, 17, 20, 26, 38, 39, 52, 61, 89, 91, 101, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 147, 150, 156, 157, 167, 171, 172, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 188, 209, 213, 217, 320, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 266, 269, 272, 278, 279, 280, 281, 284, 294, 306, 307, 316, 323, 325, 350, 352, 374, 501, 506, 552, 564, 595, 600, 601, 819, 908, 909, 914, 924, 994, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1143, 1144, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1152, 1154, 1177, 1197, 1211, 1218, 1255, 1365, 1366, 1379, 1387, 1445, 1446, 1483, 1484.

Vedāṅgas, 110, 281.

Veda-prāya, 1135.

Vedi, 918.

Vedic, 13, 17, 25, 88, 99, 106, 107, 110,
111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 124, 126,
127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137,
138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 153,
154, 169, 170, 171, 173, 179, 181, 185,
187, 212, 213, 214, 221, 224, 227, 228,
229, 244, 245, 247, 262, 262, 263, 269,
274, 275, 277, 285, 287, 506, 515, 562,
563, 601, 780, 903, 919, 952, 998,
1024, 1085, 1177, 1196, 1387, 1388,
1389, 1390, 1391, 1394, 1396, 1411,
1412, 1484, 1571, 1608, 1630, 1634.

Vegetables, 946.

Verbs, 323, 347, 472, 473, 474, 481,
482, 483, 485, 494, 495, 565, 566,
567, 568, 610, 611, 912, 613, 618,
621, 623, 624, 628, 635, 636, 722,
863, 877, 1032, 1291, 1292, 1294,
1295, 1297, 1300, 1301, 1313, 1314,
1317, 1319, 1329, 1341, 1342, 1344,
1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1360, 1384,
1586, 1587, 1617, 1648.

Verb—Impersonal, 1360.

Verb—Intransitive, 491, 1341.

Verb—Transitive, 491.

Vernaocular, 260, 307, 308.

Verses, 1087, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1095,
1096, 1101, 1131, 1132, 1138, 1139,
1614, 1652.

Vessels, 808, 994, 995, 999, 1003, 1004,
1005, 1011, 1013, 1016, 1017, 1021,
1026, 1027, 1029, 1040, 1041, 1212,
1445, 1451, 1453, 1457, 1458, 1459,
1479, 1485, 1518, 1523, 1524, 1556,
1559.

Videvana, 1537.

Vidheya, 881.

Vidhi, 91, 486, 565, 1017.

Vidhrti, 1703.

Vidhyādi, 1209.

Vijñānavada, 123.

Vikṛti, 1256.

Violation, 1213.

Viçvāmitra, 190.

Viṣṇu, 675.

Viṣṇurūpamṇu yastavyah, 672.

Vitiation, 1312.

Vivakṣā, 996, 997, 998, 999.

Vomitter, 1415, 1416.

Vomitting, 1411, 1412, 1414, 1415, 1416,
1418.

Vratam kṛṇta iti vācam visṛjati, 1068.

Vṛdhanvati, 1043.

Vṛhi, 1562, 1565, 1566.

Vṛti, 794.

Vṛtikāmasya, 797, 799.

Vṛtti, 243, 752, 852, 943.

Vyākarnaa, 120, 250, 260, 262, 263, 266,
267, 268, 669, 276, 277, 278, 280, 283,
287, 291, 292, 293, 304, 298, 304, 305,
306, 307, 316, 319, 322, 1330, 1339.

Vyākaranatva, 268.

Vyakti, 332.

Vyavadhāranakalpaṇa, 1435.

Washing—946, 994, 999, 1004, 1005,
1012, 1019, 1020, 1026, 1027.

Washing—hand 1045, 1046.

Water, 418, 1518, 1523.

Weakness, 1178, 1207.

Wearing, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386.

Western, 255.

Wife, 1065, 1232, 1380.

Windows, 49.

Wine, 193, 1453.

Wish, 998.

Woman, 1389, 1381.

Wood, 1505, 1518.

Worship, 1063, 1173.

Wounding, 1377.

Yādānyāṇcan masājuhvatī, 1495.

Yadi, 810.

Yadi brāhmaṇo Yajeta—Yadi rajanyaḥ
etc. 816.

Yadi brhatsāmā cūkrāgrāh, 805.

Yadi rathartarasūna, 805.

Yadi Somam na vindeta putikām, 1587.

Yadyagnīstome juhoti, 1571.

Ya evam 647, 659, 665.

Yāga 925, 1432, 1435, 1436, 1437.

Yāgena bhāvayāt, 479.

Yaja, 1652.

Yajati, 621, 623, 628, 635, 636, 868.

Yajeta, 479, 787.

Yaji, 670.

Yajñapatimavati, 94.

‘Yajñātharvāna, etc.’ 1705.

Yajñayajñīya pragātha, 1190.

Yajñopavīti hi devebhyo dohayati,
1280.

Yajamāna, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1367,
1368, 1403, 1404, 1410, 1411, 1414,
1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1601, 1602,
1135, 1640.

Yajamāno Yūpah, 445.

Yajurveda, 890, 1139, 1141, 1142, 1144,
1148, 1153, 1271, 1409.

Yajus, 578, 579, 1132, 1138, 1139, 1152.

Yajyā, 587, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1087,
1088, 1486, 1487, 1488.

Yājyānuvākya, 1086.

Yājyāpuronuvākya, 1088.

Yasyāgnē vadyati, 701.

Yā tē agnē rajāshayā, 602.

Yathācamasamanyān, 1465.

Yat paṇuṣi ditam, 1286.

Yat pravargyam 1247, 1253.
 Yat purāntanmanuṣyānām, 1256.
 Yat catam Somam, 1502.
 Yat Sado juhvī, 1608.
 Yaugika, 962, 963, 966.
 Yava, 1562.
 Yavajjivam, 893, 896, 901, 902.
 Yavat, 893, 896.
 Yāvajjivamagnihotram, 890.
 Yavāning, 1370, 1374.
 Year, 970.

Yena karmaṇa itṣyēt, 1387.
 Yō purodācāḥ 1281.
 Yo evam pratigrhṇāti, 1401.
 Yo'sya vrātye hani, 1380.
 Young-ones, 854.
 Yo vidagdhaḥ sa naigṛtaḥ, 1288.
 Yo vṛstikāmo, 793.
 Yudhiṣṭhira, 192.
 Yūpaḥ, 1029, 1030.
 Yūvam hi sthaḥ, 1229.

